I think I mostly just dig the ironies in the title, “Social Collapse Best Practices", but Dmitry Orlov's take on U.S. declinism is much-loved among the apocalypse set. Here he is recently in San Francisco:
"There is an area that I think is, I don't know, shameful is the word," Paul Volcker said this morning at a Joint Economic Committee hearing. "The Secretary of the Treasury is sitting there without a deputy, without any undersecretaries, without any, as far as I know, assistant secretaries responsible in substantive areas at a time of very severe crisis. He shouldn't be sitting there alone."Felix Salmon agrees (the same Salmon who called the lack of detail in Geithner's banking rescue "inexplicable" a couple weeks ago). Salmon considers this a huge blunder by the Obama administration, as well as an indication that the Obama administration is being managed inefficiently.
"My mother spoke: "Oh, but then Mamma will be having trouble with her breathing again."
The doctor reassured her: "Oh, no! The effect of the oxygen will last a good while yet. We can begin again presently."
It seemed to me that he would not have said this of a dying woman, that if this good effect was going to last it meant that it was still possible to do something to keep her alive. The hiss of the oxygen ceased for a few moments. But the happy plaint of her breathing still poured forth, light, troubled, unfinished, ceaselessly recommencing. Now and then it seemed that all was over; her breath stopped, whether owing to one of those transpositions to another octave that occur in the respiration of a sleeper, or else from a natural intermittence, an effect of anaesthesia, the progress of asphyxia, some failure of the heart. The doctor stooped to feel my grandmother’s pulse, but already, as if a tributary had come to irrigate the dried-up river-bed, a new chant had taken up the interrupted phrase, which resumed in another key with the same inexhaustible momentum. Who knows whether, without my grandmother’s even being conscious of them, countless happy and tender memories compressed by suffering were not escaping from her now, like those lighter gases which had long been compress in the cylinders? It was as though everything that she had to tell us was pouring out, that it was us that she was addressing with this prolixity, this eagerness, this effusion. At the foot of the bed, convulsed by every gasp of this agony, not weeping but at moments drenched with tears, my mother stood with the unheeding desolation of a tree lashed by the rain and shaken by the wind. I was made to dry my eyes before I went up to kiss my grandmother."
The SEC has amended its complaint against R. Allen Stanford, Laura Pendergast-Holt and James Davies.
Here’s a summary of the allegations, emphasis FT Alphaville’s:
1. For at least a decade, R. Allen Stanford and James M. Davis, through companies they control, including Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (”SIB”) and its affiliated Houston-based investment advisers, Stanford Group Company (”SGC”) and Stanford Capital Management (”SCM”), executed a massive Ponzi scheme. In carrying out the scheme, Stanford and Davis misappropriated billions of dollars of investor funds and falsified SIB’s financial statements in an effort to conceal their fraudulent conduct.
2. Laura Pendergest-Holt, the chief investment officer of Stanford Financial Group (”SFG”) and a member of SIB’s investment committee, facilitated the fraudulent scheme by misrepresenting to investors that she managed SIB’s multi-billion investment portfolio of assets and employed a sizeable team of analysts to monitor the portfolio.
3. By year-end 2008, SIB had sold approximately $8 billion of self-styled “certificates of deposits” (the “CD”) by touting: (i) the bank’s safety and security; (ii) consistent, double-digit returns on the bank’s investment portfolio; and (iii) high return rates on the CD that greatly exceeded those offered by commercial banks in the United States.
4. Contrary to SIB’s public statements, Stanford and Davis, by February 2009, had misappropriated at least $1.6 billion of investor money through bogus personal loans to Stanford and “invested” an undetermined amount of investor funds in speculative, unprofitable private businesses controlled by Stanford.
5. In an effort to conceal their fraudulent conduct and maintain the flow of investor money into SIB’s coffers, Stanford and Davis fabricated the performance of the bank’s investment portfolio. Each month, Stanford and Davis decided on a pre-determined return on investment for SIB’s portfolio. Using this pre-determined number, SIB’s internal accountants reverse-engineered the bank’s financial statements to report investment income that the bank did not actually earn. SIB’s financial statements, which were approved and signed by Stanford and Davis, bore no relationship to the actual performance of the bank’s investment portfolio.
6. In addition to sales of the CD, SGC and SCM advisers, since 2004, have sold more than $1 billion of a proprietary mutual fund wrap program, called Stanford Allocation Strategy (”SAS”), using materially false and misleading historical performance data. The false data enabled SGC/SCM to grow the SAS program from less than $10 million in 2004 to over $1.2 billion in 2009 and generate fees for SGC/SCM (and ultimately Stanford) in excess of $25 million. The fraudulent SAS performance results were also used to recruit registered financial advisers with significant books of business, who were then heavily incentivized to re-allocate their clients’ assets to SIB’s CD program.
7. By engaging in the conduct described in this Complaint, Defendants directly or indirectly, singly or in concert, have engaged, and unless enjoined and restrained, will again engage in transactions acts, practices, and courses of business that constitute violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (”Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)], and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (”Exchange Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)], and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5] or, in the alternative, have aided and abetted such violations. In addition, through their conduct described herein, Stanford, SGC, and SCM have violated Section 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (”Adviser’s Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1) and 80b-6(2)] and Davis and Pendergest-Holt have aided and abetted such violations. Finally, through their actions, SIB and SGC have violated Section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (”Investment Company Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d)].
(HT the ever-vigilant Joanna Chung)
| 1.50 | Change | % Change |
|---|---|---|
| -0.96 | -39.02% |
Nouriel Roubini points out the truth in Vikram Pandit's strange statement yesterday about how the latest bailout should put nationalization concerns to rest. Yes, the concerns have been put to rest, Nouriel says, because Citi has already been nationalized. The only question remaining is whether we go all the way.
Nouriel says we should, because the current partial nationalization is actually the worst situation of all. And because we're just delaying the inevitable.
Aaron Task, TechTicker: Friday's announcement the government will convert up to $25 billion of its Citigroup preferred stock into common equity represents Uncle Sam's third direct attempt to rescue the floundering bank.
The conversion would give the government up to 36% control of Citigroup stock and leave existing common shareholders with as little as 26% of the company's common stock. That explains why the stock tumbled 39% to $1.50 Friday despite CEO Vikram Pandit's strange declaration: "In many ways for those people who have a concern about nationalization, this announcement should put those concerns to rest."
Pandit's claim is "like saying you're half-pregnant," says Nouriel Roubini and economics professor at NYU's Stern School and chairman of RGE Monitor.
"The government has already taken over the financial system," Roubini says, noting U.S. policymakers have committed $9 trillion to rescue the financial system and already spent $2 trillion. "So let's stop the delusion about 'no nationalization.'"
Roubini, who has publicly advocated for temporary nationalization of insolvent banks, says fully nationalizing Citigroup and/or Bank of America would have a minimal effect on the Dow, which is a price-weighted average. More importantly, he believes full nationalizations (vs. the current partial, piecemeal effort) would be better for the market and the economy because it's the first step in the process of cleaning up "bad" banks so they can later be sold back to private investors, i.e. "re-privatized", as was the case last year with IndyMac.
Tune in Monday as we'll have more from Roubini on:
What are those? Here you go:
VIEWS on the nature of the problem in America's banking system continue to roll in. Justin Fox quotes an analysis of the situation by Richard Katz, who suggests that the Japan parallel is overblown:
It took the Bank of Japan nearly nine years to bring the overnight interest rate from its 1991 peak of eight percent down to zero. The U.S. Federal Reserve did that within 16 months of declaring a financial emergency, which it did in August 2007. It has also applied all sorts of unconventional measures to keep credit from drying up.
It took Tokyo eight years to use public money to recapitalize the banks; Washington began to do so in less than a year. Worse yet, Tokyo used government money to help the banks keep lending to insolvent borrowers; U.S. banks have been rapidly writing off their bad debt. Although Tokyo did eventually apply many fiscal stimulus measures, it did so too late and too erratically to have a sufficient impact. The U.S. government, by contrast, has already applied fiscal stimulus, and the Obama administration is proposing a multiyear program totaling as much as five to six percent of U.S. GDP.
On the other hand, when Japan finally did pull out of its slump, recovery was entirely export driven. It seems extremely unlikely that America will be able to duplicate that feat, particularly since other major exporters, like Germany, China, and Japan, will be trying to do the same thing at the same time.
Also very much worth reading is Matthew Richardson's detailed explication of the advantages and disadvantages of nationalisation. There are distinct advantages to such an approach. It's the surest way to clean up a bank's balance sheet, and it addresses moral hazard issues. But there are serious risks:
Of course, the tricky part of nationalisation is the handling of the bad assets. The bad assets would be broken into two types – those that need to be managed, such as defaulted loans in which the bank would own the underlying asset, and those that could be held, such as the AAA- and subordinated tranches of asset-backed securities. With respect to the former, the government could hire outside distressed investors or create partnerships with outside investors as was done with the Resolution Trust Corporation in the 1980s savings and loan crisis.
Along with the equity of the good bank, these assets would be owned by the existing creditors. The proceeds over time would accrue to the various creditors according to the priority of the claims. Most likely, the existing equity and preferred shares would be wiped out, and the debt would effectively have been swapped into equity in the new structure. Under this scenario, it is quite possible, even likely, that taxpayers would end up paying nothing. This is because, for the large complex financial institutions, these creditors cover well over half the liabilities.
Emphasis mine. This is the rub. Squeezing these creditors could potentially lead to a Lehman-like systemic threat. That's something the government would obviously wish to avoid."
Me:Willie Sutton is supposed to have explained that he robbed banks because that was where the money was.
So it is with white collar crime. If you look where the bubble is, there too will be the crooks.
In the late 1990s, a company could be rewarded with a soaring stock price, and a valuation far beyond anything the company had actually accomplished — if it could show rapid growth. And stock options let executives monetize that gain almost immediately.
On the other hand, if your company was not hot, its share price could languish.
The result was a great temptation to fudge the numbers. At the extreme, we got Enron and WorldCom.
More recently, as soaring asset prices were pumped up by easy credit, it was money managers who could make zillions. Run a $500 million hedge fund and you get $10 million a year, plus 20 percent of the profits. Run a really big one that does very well, and you can take in a billion dollars.
And how do you attract enough money to manage? You show that you can produce outstanding investment results.
It turns out that the easiest way to do that was to lie about the results, and we are now seeing a succession of Ponzi schemes unveiled. The case involving Bernie Madoff may have been the largest, but others are multiplying.
It is no coincidence that we learn about the scandals after the bubbles burst. Enron had used its own high stock price to produce phony profits. When the stock price started to fall, it sparked a crisis and the facts eventually came out. So long as everyone believed assets were going up, money managers could siphon off new cash to pay those few investors who wanted to cash out. But when losses in other investments caused investors to flee, the game was up.
My suspicion is that there are more such schemes to be revealed."
Apparently, they cannot be distinguished from a very good investment for years and years. This means, for anyone looking for a way to live like a king for many years, a Ponzi Scheme just might be the ticket. It’s really a matter of anticipating and avoiding arrest when you’re finally discovered. That seems to be the only flaw.
Not only do I suspect many more to be revealed, I suspect that they will be a growing concern going forward. Fraud was a huge part of this crisis, but it will never be investigated or prosecuted as it should be. That will be the lesson that many remember.
— Don the libertarian DemocratI know that this is silly in a serious time, but I keep hearing Don Ho singing that title.
— Don the libertarian DemocratI realize that there is a lot of competition for the title of “Rottenest Financial Institution,” but if you ask me, the American International Group should be right at the top of the list. Given that the company is about to report a $60 billion loss — and the government is going to have to devise yet another plan to keep it from defaulting — I took the opportunity this week to take a deeper look into the practices that led to its troubles.
To put it bluntly, they were shocking. But they are also extremely complicated and difficult to understand, much less explain. Suffice it to say here that A.I.G.’s credit default swaps — insuring toxic assets that soon went sour — were a form of Wall Street gamesmanship, built on bad assumptions and fueled by short-term greed. When I asked one former A.I.G. executive, Robert J. Arvinitis, what the larger economic purpose of A.I.G.’s credit default swaps were, he laughed. “The purpose was to keep the sausage factory going for the investment banks.”
My column this week is an attempt to unravel, and explain, some of A.I.G.’s seamier practices. It may be easier to get outraged at Merrill’s bonuses, or Lehman’s bankruptcy, or Bank or America’s idiotic deal-making. But you ought to put aside at least a little anger for A.I.G. No company has cost you, the taxpayer, more money. And no company deserves it less."
Next week, perhaps as early as Monday, the American International Group is going to report the largest quarterly loss in history. Rumors suggest it will be around $60 billion, which will affirm, yet again, A.I.G.’s sorry status as the most crippled of all the nation’s wounded financial institutions. The recent quarterly losses suffered by Merrill Lynch and Citigroup — “only” $15.4 billion and $8.3 billion, respectively — pale by comparison.
At the same time A.I.G. reveals its loss, the federal government is also likely to announce — yet again! — a new plan to save A.I.G., the third since September. So far the government has thrown $150 billion at the company, in loans, investments and equity injections, to keep it afloat. It has softened the terms it set for the original $85 billion loan it made back in September. To ease the pressure even more, the Federal Reserve actually runs a facility that buys toxic assets that A.I.G. had insured. A.I.G. effectively has been nationalized, with the government owning a hair under 80 percent of the stock. Not that it’s worth very much; A.I.G. shares closed Friday at 42 cents.
Donn Vickrey, who runs the independent research firm Gradient Analytics, predicts that A.I.G. is going to cost taxpayers at least $100 billion more before it finally stabilizes, by which time the company will almost surely have been broken into pieces, with the government owning large chunks of it. A quarter of a trillion dollars, if it comes to that, is an astounding amount of money to hand over to one company to prevent it from going bust. Yet the government feels it has no choice: because of A.I.G.’s dubious business practices during the housing bubble it pretty much has the world’s financial system by the throat.
If we let A.I.G. fail, said Seamus P. McMahon, a banking expert at Booz & Company, other institutions, including pension funds and American and European banks “will face their own capital and liquidity crisis, and we could have a domino effect.” A bailout of A.I.G. is really a bailout of its trading partners — which essentially constitutes the entire Western banking system.
I don’t doubt this bit of conventional wisdom; after the calamity that followed the fall of Lehman Brothers, which was far less enmeshed in the global financial system than A.I.G., who would dare allow the world’s biggest insurer to fail? Who would want to take that risk? But that doesn’t mean we should feel resigned about what is happening at A.I.G. In fact, we should be furious. More than even Citi or Merrill, A.I.G. is ground zero for the practices that led the financial system to ruin.
“They were the worst of them all,” said Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego and a derivatives expert. Mr. Vickrey of Gradient Analytics said, “It was extreme hubris, fueled by greed.” Other firms used many of the same shady techniques as A.I.G., but none did them on such a broad scale and with such utter recklessness. And yet — and this is the part that should make your blood boil — the company is being kept alive precisely because it behaved so badly.
•
When you start asking around about how A.I.G. made money during the housing bubble, you hear the same two phrases again and again: “regulatory arbitrage” and “ratings arbitrage.” The word “arbitrage” usually means taking advantage of a price differential between two securities — a bond and stock of the same company, for instance — that are related in some way. When the word is used to describe A.I.G.’s actions, however, it means something entirely different. It means taking advantage of a loophole in the rules. A less polite but perhaps more accurate term would be “scam.”
As a huge multinational insurance company, with a storied history and a reputation for being extremely well run, A.I.G. had one of the most precious prizes in all of business: an AAA rating, held by no more than a dozen or so companies in the United States. That meant ratings agencies believed its chance of defaulting was just about zero. It also meant it could borrow more cheaply than other companies with lower ratings.
To be sure, most of A.I.G. operated the way it always had, like a normal, regulated insurance company. (Its insurance divisions remain profitable today.) But one division, its “financial practices” unit in London, was filled with go-go financial wizards who devised new and clever ways of taking advantage of Wall Street’s insatiable appetite for mortgage-backed securities. Unlike many of the Wall Street investment banks, A.I.G. didn’t specialize in pooling subprime mortgages into securities. Instead, it sold credit-default swaps.
These exotic instruments acted as a form of insurance for the securities. In effect, A.I.G. was saying if, by some remote chance (ha!) those mortgage-backed securities suffered losses, the company would be on the hook for the losses. And because A.I.G. had that AAA rating, when it sprinkled its holy water over those mortgage-backed securities, suddenly they had AAA ratings too. That was the ratings arbitrage. “It was a way to exploit the triple A rating,” said Robert J. Arvanitis, a former A.I.G. executive who has since become a leading A.I.G. critic.
Why would Wall Street and the banks go for this? Because it shifted the risk of default from themselves to A.I.G., and the AAA rating made the securities much easier to market. What was in it for A.I.G.? Lucrative fees, naturally. But it also saw the fees as risk-free money; surely it would never have to actually pay up. Like everyone else on Wall Street, A.I.G. operated on the belief that the underlying assets — housing — could only go up in price.
That foolhardy belief, in turn, led A.I.G. to commit several other stupid mistakes. When a company insures against, say, floods or earthquakes, it has to put money in reserve in case a flood happens. That’s why, as a rule, insurance companies are usually overcapitalized, with low debt ratios. But because credit-default swaps were not regulated, and were not even categorized as a traditional insurance product, A.I.G. didn’t have to put anything aside for losses. And it didn’t. Its leverage was more akin to an investment bank than an insurance company. So when housing prices started falling, and losses started piling up, it had no way to pay them off. Not understanding the real risk, the company grievously mispriced it.
Second, in many of its derivative contracts, A.I.G. included a provision that has since come back to haunt it. It agreed to something called “collateral triggers,” meaning that if certain events took place, like a ratings downgrade for either A.I.G. or the securities it was insuring, it would have to put up collateral against those securities. Again, the reasons it agreed to the collateral triggers was pure greed: it could get higher fees by including them. And again, it assumed that the triggers would never actually kick in and the provisions were therefore meaningless. Those collateral triggers have since cost A.I.G. many, many billions of dollars. Or, rather, they’ve cost American taxpayers billions.
The regulatory arbitrage was even seamier. A huge part of the company’s credit-default swap business was devised, quite simply, to allow banks to make their balance sheets look safer than they really were. Under a misguided set of international rules that took hold toward the end of the 1990s, banks were allowed to use their own internal risk measurements to set their capital requirements. The less risky the assets, obviously, the lower the regulatory capital requirement.
How did banks get their risk measures low? It certainly wasn’t by owning less risky assets. Instead, they simply bought A.I.G.’s credit-default swaps. The swaps meant that the risk of loss was transferred to A.I.G., and the collateral triggers made the bank portfolios look absolutely risk-free. Which meant minimal capital requirements, which the banks all wanted so they could increase their leverage and buy yet more “risk-free” assets. This practice became especially rampant in Europe. That lack of capital is one of the reasons the European banks have been in such trouble since the crisis began.
•
At its peak, the A.I.G. credit-default business had a “notional value” of $450 billion, and as recently as September, it was still over $300 billion. (Notional value is the amount A.I.G. would owe if every one of its bets went to zero.) And unlike most Wall Street firms, it didn’t hedge its credit-default swaps; it bore the risk, which is what insurance companies do.
It’s not as if this was some Enron-esque secret, either. Everybody knew the capital requirements were being gamed, including the regulators. Indeed, A.I.G. openly labeled that part of the business as “regulatory capital.” That is how they, and their customers, thought of it.
There’s more, believe it or not. A.I.G. sold something called 2a-7 puts, which allowed money market funds to invest in risky bonds even though they are supposed to be holding only the safest commercial paper. How could they do this? A.I.G. agreed to buy back the bonds if they went bad. (Incredibly, the Securities and Exchange Commission went along with this.) A.I.G. had a securities lending program, in which it would lend securities to investors, like short-sellers, in return for cash collateral. What did it do with the money it received? Incredibly, it bought mortgage-backed securities. When the firms wanted their collateral back, it had sunk in value, thanks to A.I.G.’s foolish investment strategy. The practice has cost A.I.G. — oops, I mean American taxpayers — billions.
Here’s what is most infuriating: Here we are now, fully aware of how these scams worked. Yet for all practical purposes, the government has to keep them going. Indeed, that may be the single most important reason it can’t let A.I.G. fail. If the company defaulted, hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of credit-default swaps would “blow up,” and all those European banks whose toxic assets are supposedly insured by A.I.G. would suddenly be sitting on immense losses. Their already shaky capital structures would be destroyed. A.I.G. helped create the illusion of regulatory capital with its swaps, and now the government has to actually back up those contracts with taxpayer money to keep the banks from collapsing. It would be funny if it weren’t so awful.
I asked Mr. Arvanitis, the former A.I.G. executive, if the company viewed what it had done during the bubble as a form of gaming the system. “Oh no,” he said, “they never thought of it as abuse. They thought of themselves as satisfying their customers.”
That’s either a remarkable example of the power of rationalization, or they were lying to themselves, figuring that when the house of cards finally fell, somebody else would have to clean up the mess.
That would be us, the taxpayers."
“or they were lying to themselves, figuring that when the house of cards finally fell, somebody else would have to clean it up.
That would be us, the taxpayers.”
This gets my vote. Of course, we keep doing it, so why shouldn’t they?
— Don the libertarian DemocratA roundup of economic news from around the Web.
Compiled by Phil Izzo"
The FT post was right. Investors have been buying the TAs. The people that own them don’t like the price that they would receive for them. There’s a huge gap between bid and ask, subsidized by the belief that the government will intervene enough to allow these assets to appreciate. If they do not or would take years and years to do so, we have been wasting an enormous amount of time and money delaying the liquidation of these losses at fire sale prices. Unfortunately, this also holds true for the housing market. At best, we can help create a more orderly and efficient process of people eating these losses. As far as I’m concerned, these delays are not helping.
The late Rudi Dornbsuch of MIT had a way of cutting to the chase, preferably in public and with a minister of finance present. He knew a huge amount about financial crisis, and could distill a lifetime of study and involvement in collapses succinctly: “it always takes longer than you think; but when it happens, it always happens faster than you can imagine.”
The latest credit default swap data for European banks bring Rudi’s perspective to mind - for the United States. We’ve debated this week what to do about U.S. banks, arguing about which unappealing options are less bad. In my view, the choice is not “nationalize vs. don’t nationalize,” but rather “keep our current partial nationalization/bottomless pit subsidy systemvs. start down the road to reprivatization.”
But, honestly, this entire debate may be overtaken by events.
Economic developments in East-Central Europe are very bad. Almost everyone will get IMF loans but, be that as it may, there is a big contraction underway. Nonperforming loans will increase for the West European banks lending to East-Central Europe or lending to firms that are (or were) exporting. Prominent European governments will struggle to afford the implied bailouts - remember, back in October these governments made it quite clear they are on the hook if their banks come under pressure. At the same time, of course, we have a nose dive in property in Ireland, Spain, and the UK.
My point is not that Europe is in big trouble, with no plausible regional rescue mechanisms in place. This is completely obvious - the debate among prominent Europeans is now whether or not to send distressed eurozone members to the IMF, and on what basis.
Focus on this instead: the European banking and fiscal fiasco is a dagger pointed at the heart of major US banks, which have a great deal of exposure - one way or another - to much of Europe. Ask any U.S.-based ”global bank”.
Treasury is constructing an elaborate transfer mechanism through which big banks can be kept in business, thanks to the public purse, without the taxpayer acquiring a majority of the common stock. The contortions required are striking. But this entire approach is predicated on a rosy stress scenario, which assumes the global economy cannot get much worse, at least in the short run.
It may soon be time to wake up.
Written by Simon Johnson
February 27, 2009 at 7:18 am"
By Bob Willis and Sho Chandra
Feb. 26 (Bloomberg) -- Companies are slashing jobs and orders at a faster pace in the U.S., reports today showed, signaling the economy will contract more sharply this quarter than analysts anticipated.
Orders for durable goods fell 5.2 percent in January, more than twice as much as forecast, Commerce Department figures showed in Washington. The Labor Department said 667,000 Americans filed initial applications for jobless benefits last week. Sales of new homes reached a record low in January.
“What we’re looking at in this recession overall might be the biggest slowdown in economic growth in the postwar era,” said Tim Quinlan, an economist at Wachovia Corp. in Charlotte, North Carolina.
The economy’s deterioration reflects a tightening credit crunch that the Obama administration aims to counter with as much as $750 billion in new aid to the financial industry. The U.S. is caught in a “vicious cycle” where economic and financial weaknesses are feeding on each other, White House National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers said today.
“Our economic problems” will “not be solved in a week or month or a year,” Summers said at a conference in Arlington, Virginia. The White House today unveiled a budget outline that includes a $1.75 trillion deficit for the current financial year as officials implement the fiscal stimulus and financial-bailout programs.
Treasury Yields
Treasuries fell as investors anticipated greater issuance of government debt. Yields on benchmark 10-year notes rose to 2.99 percent at 4:08 p.m. in New York, from 2.93 percent late yesterday. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index reversed early gains to close at 752.83, down 1.6 percent.
Morgan Stanley analysts today cut their estimate for gross domestic product in the first quarter to a 6 percent decline from 5 percent previously. Deutsche Bank Securities economist Joseph LaVorgna said the slide in January to March may be closer to 10 percent, the worst since 1958.
The Commerce Department may tomorrow revise its estimate of fourth-quarter GDP to a 5.4 percent drop at an annual pace, from the 3.8 percent decline previously reported, according to the median forecast in a Bloomberg News survey.
Economists projected a 2.5 percent drop in goods orders, according to the median of 71 estimates in a Bloomberg News survey. The fall extended the string of decreases to six months, the longest stretch since records began in 1992.
Growth Impact
Demand for non-defense capital goods excluding aircraft, a proxy for future business investment, plunged 5.4 percent after falling 5.8 percent the prior month. Shipments of those items, used in calculating GDP, dropped 6.6 percent.
The auto industry has led the recession in manufacturing. General Motors Corp., which is seeking $16.6 billion in new federal loans, today reported a $30.9 billion annual loss, the second-biggest in its 100-year history. The automaker this month said it is cutting another 47,000 jobs globally this year, closing an additional five U.S. plants by 2012 and selling or shuttering its Saab, Hummer and Saturn brands as part of a restructuring campaign.
“We expect these challenging conditions will continue through 2009,” GM Chief Executive Officer Rick Wagoner said in a statement today. GM has already received $13.4 billion in federal loans since December to stay in business.
The Labor Department’s claims report showed the number of people staying on benefit rolls rose by 114,000 to a record 5.112 million in the week ended Feb. 14.
No Bottom
“The labor market weakness has not found a bottom,” said Rudy Narvas, a senior economist at 4Cast Inc. in New York. “The payrolls report for February could be really bad.”
Those figures, due from Labor next week, may show job cuts exceeded half a million for a fourth consecutive month, according to a Bloomberg survey. The unemployment rate probably climbed to 7.9 percent, the highest level since 1984.
Already, the 3.6 million jobs lost since the U.S. recession began in December 2007 mark the biggest employment slump of any economic contraction in the postwar period.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. said today it will eliminate 2,800 jobs at Washington Mutual through attrition, bringing to 12,000 the total number of positions lost since the bank purchased the failed thrift in September.
Soaring unemployment and mounting foreclosures are driving away prospective home buyers. Sales of new houses dropped 10 percent in January to an annual pace of 309,000, the lowest level since data began in 1963, Commerce also reported today. The median price decreased 13.5 percent, the most in almost four decades.
Housing Slump
Sales are falling even faster than builders can trim inventory. The number of new homes for sale at the end of the month fell 3.1 percent to 342,000. Still, at the current sales pace, it would take a record 13.3 months to eliminate supply.
“The market is still very much out of equilibrium and in fact things are getting worse,” Michelle Meyer, an economist at Barclays Capital Inc. in New York, said in an interview with Bloomberg Television. “We’re going to see further construction cuts and further declines in home prices. We haven’t seen the peak in foreclosures, which means that prices have further to fall.”
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan said today 6 million families in the U.S. may face foreclosure if policy makers don’t act faster to stem the housing decline."
2) The rules for LOLR( from here on down this includes any government guarantee ) intervention should be clear, public, and followed, otherwise Moral Hazard is ineffective. All guarantees must be explicit.
3) The terms must be onerous.
"Who can forget the end of "Planet of the Apes" when Charlton Heston, kneeling before the half-buried remains of the Statue of Liberty, slams his fists into the sand and cries, "You maniacs! You blew it up! Ah, damn you ... damn you all to hell!"
Now imagine the same scene, but with a half-buried Morgan Stanley building standing in for Miss Liberty and a time-traveling Walter Bagehot playing the lead and you've got the perfect Hollywood dramatization of the real-life tragedy that, with luck, is having its denouement on Wall Street.
Bagehot? The great Victorian man of letters, best remembered today as the second and most celebrated editor of the British magazine The Economist, wasn't exactly a hunk. But he certainly could have delivered those futile last lines with real conviction, for he was among the first to recognize the vast destructive potential of that newfangled weapon of Victorian finance: the modern central bank.
Bagehot first alerted readers to this potential and offered his suggestions for containing it in an article that appeared in The Economist after the great panic and credit crisis of 1866. That panic witnessed the spectacular collapse of Overend, Gurney & Co., which had long been Great Britain's premier investment house.
Bagehot understood that, during such panics, the Bank of England alone commanded the confidence needed to serve other financial firms as a "lender of last resort." But as Bagehot put it later in his book "Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market" (1873), the bank's "faltering way" -- its arbitrary and inconsistent use of its unique lending powers -- tended only to make things worse.
"The public," Bagehot wrote, "is never sure what policy will be adopted at the most important moment: it is not sure what amount of advance will be made. ... And until we have on this point a clear understanding with the Bank of England, both our ability to avoid crises and our terror at crises will always be greater than they would otherwise be."
The ultimate source of trouble, Bagehot believed, was the very existence of the Bank of England and the special privileges it enjoyed. But because nothing save a revolution seemed likely to do away with the "Old Lady of Threadneedle Street," as it was called, Bagehot's preferred, practical solution was for the bank expressly to commit itself to lending freely during crises, though on good collateral only, and at "penalty" rates.
The restrictive provisions were supposed to limit aid to otherwise solvent firms panic had rendered illiquid.
Bagehot's recommendation has since become a sort of master precept of central banking -- albeit one that's mainly honored in the breach by central bankers.
To be fair to today's central bankers, there's never been much agreement on how to apply Bagehot's rule in practice. Just what do "good collateral" and "penalty rates" mean in times like these?
While no one might precisely be able to define good collateral -- and one can debate whether the rate at which banks offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks, known as the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR rate, plus 8 percent constitutes a "penalty" rate -- who even pretends that recent central bank lending has been based on good collateral?
But rescuing insolvent firms is the least of it. The real damage comes from the Treasury's utter lack of any consistent last-resort lending rule. The recently enacted financial institutions bailout bill does little to clarify this.
That's just the sort of thing that troubled Bagehot almost a century and a half ago, when central banks were still in their swaddling clothes. Yet central bankers and governments still don't get it, despite the lip service they pay to this great thinker from our past."
Neither Barack Obama nor John McCain had much of value to say about the financial crisis as it raged through the headlines this fall. Rather than shred their campaign strategies, they played it safe, as most politicians would have. But in the name of justice we ought to recall that there was one candidate who did foresee our predicament with considerable accuracy when it still lay far in the future. Ron Paul, in almost every speech he made during the Republican primaries, spoke of bubbles, reckless credit growth, and the "unsustainability" of present policy. So why isn't there more demand for the common-sense solutions he put forward? Because common sense is not much use in a financial panic. This was the great discovery of Walter Bagehot, the prolific 19th-century essayist and journalist, who was editor of the Economist from 1860 to 1877. (His name rhymes with gadget.) Ninety-nine percent of the time, common sense is a synonym for practicality. But in a serious banking crisis, doing the commonsensical thing--hunkering down and counting your pennies--has proved to be not practical at all. Bagehot's Lombard Street is an insider's look at the Bank of England, and at the principles on which political and financial leaders act when advanced economies come under pressure. Those principles are depressing in the extreme for anyone with an uncomplicated idea of how a democracy works. But they are effective. That is why, in the so-called Anglo-Saxon world, Bagehot's book still provides the bedrock of policy thinking during financial emergencies, including our present one. Lombard Street was published in 1873, seven years after the sudden collapse of Overend, Gurney & Co., a bank that lost £11 million, spread panic among investors, sparked a run, and became "the model instance of all evil in business." The crisis made such a deep impression on British finance and government that the country did not have another bank run for 141 years--not until Northern Rock collapsed in the summer of 2007. (English investors must have longer memories than American ones. Most of our own noxious subprime mortgages were contracted, and the securities built on them concocted, after Enron became our own model instance of evil in 2001.) It was the Bank of England that took charge of averting panic, during the Overend, Gurney crisis and thereafter. It did so by injecting credit into the economy, by bailing people out. Bagehot approved of this. Many ordinary retailers could not pay their suppliers until they got the money for the things they sold. Without credit, they would be ruined, and the ruin would spread to those to whom they owed money. This was not a question of moral failing, it was just the way a modern economy worked. But the modern economic system interacts with the modern political system--democracy--in a rather uncomfortable way. Indeed, at more than one juncture in Lombard Street, Bagehot framed the problem of booms and busts as part of the "increasingly democratic structure of English commerce." People in a democracy are most comfortable when their institutions do the same things that they would do as individuals. In a crisis, banks--like everyone else--reflexively hoard their money. But a central bank must do the opposite. It must lend freely. This was the most basic affront to common sense that the Bank of England presented, but it was not the worst. The worst was that the bank could carry out its necessary duties as a lender of last resort only by breaking the law. The basis of the bank's operating procedure--and of its soundness--was the Bank Act of 1844. We would call it a regime of sound money. It included stringent caps on the ratio of notes issued to reserves held. These caps were hewed to when the economy was running smoothly. Yet at the time Bagehot was writing, a quarter century later, the law had already been suspended three times. Not just that. "No similar occasion has ever yet occurred," Bagehot wrote, "in which it has not been suspended." So the law on which the solvency of the British nation rested was ironclad, except when someone felt a need to break it. Stranger still, never did the Bank of England acknowledge its duty as the lender of last resort. Some of its governors even denied that any such duty existed. Bagehot thought the bank should come clean about what it really was:
But there was a reason for the central bankers' dissembling. If the bank ever acknowledged a duty to rescue banks by generous extensions of credit, it would create a form of moral hazard. Thomson Hankey, a Bank of England director whom Bagehot much admired (and to whom the financial writer James Grant devotes an admiring essay in his new book Mr. Market Miscalculates), called Bagehot's lender-of-last-resort views "the most mischievous doctrine ever broached in the monetary or banking world in this country." In practice, Bagehot was right and Hankey was wrong. The bank was beyond question the lender of last resort. In principle, Hankey was right and Bagehot was wrong. Unless there was a real, credible threat that a bank would be allowed to fail, the guarantee of rescue would simply get priced into any financial bubble that developed, making things worse when the bubble popped. The situation required what we would now call "strategic ambiguity"--both Hankey's doctrine and Bagehot's practice, which contradicts it. The situation today requires the same mix. Central banking is thus often a high-stakes game of chicken. And sometimes, when banks enter the game insufficiently scared, it will be played out to the end. It certainly was in September when the U.S. Treasury terrified the financial world by not coming to the rescue of Lehman Brothers. This was a catastrophe in terms of Bagehot's practice, but it will produce benefits in terms of Hankey's principle. It will discourage people from paying more than is reasonable for assets on the belief that they come equipped with an insurance policy (the promise of a central bank rescue) that has been underwritten by taxpayers. The Republicans who nearly derailed the Treasury's Troubled Assets Relief Program in September played a similar role. A final problem is that there are limits to how accountable a central bank can be. Everyone is always hollering for clear rules and transparency. But a dirty secret of regulation is that it frequently influences conduct most effectively when it is capricious and opaque. Any regulatory system will reveal its vulnerabilities over long use. If it addresses economic problems in a predictable way, savvy investors will find a way to "game" that predictability. You can draw an analogy with antidepressant drugs. There is no permanent right match of medication for a depressive. Antidepressants work only until the mind (or is it the brain?) finds a way around them, at which point a new, unfamiliar drug must be substituted. In the same way, no matter how good the content of a regulatory regime, it must change periodically if big market players are to be kept from profiting off it. As Bagehot outlined his system, he was conscious that the practical realities of banking required him to heap paradox upon paradox. There is a hint of both Andrew Jackson and Thomas Aquinas in the way he referred to central banking as an "unnatural" thing in its very conception. "The business of banking ought to be simple," he wrote. "If it is hard it is wrong." If it is hard, the banker is either delegating poorly or has entangled his institution in complex transactions where it has no business. According to Bagehot, "Adventure is the life of commerce, but caution, I had almost said timidity, is the life of banking." Centralizing a society's cash reserves is complicated, reckless, and artificial:
In his ideas of company size, Bagehot harkened back to the 18th century rather than ahead to our own. To modern eyes, Bagehot is, as a factual matter, simply wrong. The natural tendency under free-market conditions is towards consolidation, and even monopoly. If you want small firms, you must protect them through government--whether this means Teddy Roosevelt-ian trust-busting, French-style subsidies to tobacconists, the EU's hounding of Microsoft, or the NIMBY anti-Wal-Mart campaigns aimed at preserving Mom-and-Pop stores. Bagehot sometimes contradicted himself on this point, noting also that "a large bank always tends to become larger, and a small one tends to become smaller," but his application of the word unnatural to a large central bank was frequent and must be taken as his settled view. It is curious that Bagehot, a contemporary of Marx, came to the opposite (and false) conclusion about how firms evolve. Where Bagehot would agree with Marx is in his belief that there is something predictably destabilizing about modern economies. You don't need banks to have a precarious economy, or one liable to speculation--Bagehot noted that there were no banks, as we would understand them, in 1720, at the time of the South Sea Bubble and the Mississippi Scheme. But modern banking is precarious by design. "In exact proportion to the power of this system is its delicacy," he wrote. "I should hardly say too much if I said its danger." The power, delicacy, and danger all have the same source. In fact they are just different names for the same thing: leverage. At the very opening of the book, Bagehot illustrates with exquisite simplicity how, at least in a boom economy, traders on margin can "harass and press upon, if they do not eradicate, the old capitalist." The old capitalist in question is the poor sap who believes all this stuff about neither-a-borrower-nor-a-lender-be and is foolish enough to be using his own cash:
Later, Bagehot showed that this need for leverage is no different for those selling money than it is for those selling dry goods. The banker can no more choose not to lend than the merchant can choose not to borrow:
In finance, once you can have leverage, you must have leverage. Once you have some leverage, getting more of it than your competitors is a matter of survival. And when governments and central banks debate whether to loosen or tighten up money, they face a constant clamor from the financial world to permit more leverage still. That is why, even in democracies, the instruments of monetary policy tend to be kept far from the influence of voters, and even hidden from view. Otherwise, credit tends to spiral. Bubbles result. Nothing could be more foolish than to assume that this process of spiraling speculation is unleashed by "greed," unless by greed you mean human nature. Credit spirals are a darker aspect of the world Adam Smith described in The Wealth of Nations and Bernard de Mandeville did in the Fable of the Bees. Just as society can be improved by the uncoordinated action of the selfishly motivated, an economy can collapse for reasons having nothing to do with anybody's cupidity. We should be moral in the way we think about money, but a credit system tends to make a mess of moral accounting. Bagehot described London's financial district as "a sort of standing broker between quiet saving districts of the country and the active employing districts." Decent, puritanical Suffolk farmers want to put their money in a safe place; Lancashire entrepreneurs want money to put to work. Thanks to London bankers, both can follow their wishes and make a profit in the process. We have an idea that the Suffolk dairyman is the "moral" party here (he's saving) and the Lancashire speculator the "immoral" one (he's gambling). But, once a banking system intervenes, they are both gambling and they are both saving. In good times you are welcome to mouth the folkloric cliché that holds farmers to be better people than financiers. When depression looms, you had better realize that the rain falls on the just and the unjust. Many Americans who have wound up underwater on their houses and maxed out on their credit cards are greedy, climbing, brand-intoxicated, materialistic shopaholics who thought the world owed them a living. But just as many of them are not. They are trapped, as surely as financial institutions are, in a system based on wild borrowing. Participation in this system is not exactly required, but it is not exactly optional, either. One's quality of life is determined not just by one's purchasing power but also by one's relative economic standing. Chagrin at seeing one's neighbors get richer faster may be a sign of bad character, but do not for a minute assume there is nothing to feel chagrin about! When it comes to the very goods people deem most essential--the proper mate; the schooling of one's children; the size, location, elegance, and comfort of one's house--relative standing is more important than absolute wealth. Those who kept their money in savings banks in the 1990s lost out to those who did things we are supposed to disapprove of, like "spending money they didn't have," borrowing profligately to invest in stocks and even bonds, which appreciated at an average of 15 percent a year over the decade. Among rich people, how one entered the present decade had more to do with how one had done in the stock market than with how one had done in the labor market. Is that just? Of course it's not! It's easy to see now. But while the boom was going on there was all sorts of rationalizing about why it was okay that the social hierarchy should be reordered through stock and housing speculation. One line of argument was that people who did not have a ton of money in stocks, as well as those who rented rather than bought the houses they lived in, were foolish. This line of argument peaked at the turn of the decade, when Americans elected a president who had argued that the public was foolish for not launching its retirement savings onto the open seas of the stock market. Bagehot saw that a speculative mania eventually sweeps up everyone in its path. "Every great crisis reveals the excessive speculations of many houses which no one before suspected," he wrote, "and which commonly indeed had not begun or had not carried very far those speculations, till they were tempted by the daily rise of price and the surrounding fever." Avaricious people get hurt, but it is in the nature of crashes that they are not the ones who get hurt most. A tragic figure present in almost every historic account of speculation and collapse in history is the person who believed, year after year, that the boom was an illusion, and held himself aloof until, at the very last minute, whether out of self-doubt or deference to the opinions of his fellow man, he entered the fray and was (having bought at the top, rather than the bottom, of the market) wiped out. What a wicked irony! His punishment is as much for his long and wise forbearance as for his momentary weakness. So the "cultural contradictions of capitalism" run deeper than we thought. The classic idea, as laid out in their different ways by the economist Joseph Schumpeter and the sociologist Daniel Bell, is that capitalism rewards diligence; diligence produces wealth; wealth begets idleness; and idleness undermines capitalism. But when, as now, push comes to shove, we can ask whether there is really anything particularly capitalist about the virtues of diligence and self-restraint. The real capitalist virtues appear to be optimism and luck. From a central-banking perspective, the cultural contradictions are not results of capitalism but elements of it. The problem with central banking is that it reacts to a system that has been mismanaged by rewarding the managers. That is why objections to central banking, although they can come from the right (Ron Paul, Jim Bunning) or the left (Barney Frank, William Greider), tend to be populist. Bagehot was no populist. He was comfortable with the idea that what some people think should be more important than what other people think:
Although he would surely fault Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson for many things, the criticism most often heard at present--that Paulson is too close to former colleagues on Wall Street, where he worked for years as CEO of Goldman Sachs--would strike Bagehot as misplaced. Because it is on Wall Street, alas, that "the state of credit" is to be determined:
To be blunt, credit is successfully reestablished when financial elites say, "When." Credit is close to a synonym for the mood of the ruling class. To say an economy is based on credit is to say it is based on animal mysteries. Glamour, prestige, élan, sprezzatura, cutting a figure . . . that is what the economy is made of. It is a rather terrifying thought. Viewed as Bagehot viewed it, from the perspective of a central bank in a crisis, an advanced economy looks an awful lot like a primitive economy." |
"Loyal readers, please take a moment to check out Gretchen Morgenson’s column this week. She’s taken a close look at the buyout of Bear Stearns organized by the Federal Reserve, and she has come to an intriguing conclusion: that the Fed not only wanted to prevent financial havoc - it also wanted to deter speculators who were betting on big banks to fail.
Adherents of the Walter Bagehot school of central banking - and I have been among them at times - have cried foul at the sight of big bailouts and the granting of emergency credit at low interest rates. The Bagehot argument is that emergencies that arise from the risks that banks have chosen to take should not be treated with overwhelming sympathy. Emergency credit should be offered, yes, but at rates that will make banks think twice about using the safety net again. That’s not the case this time around (neither in the United States nor in Britain, and probably not in Europe either by the time the folks in Brussels are finished), so the central banks may be telling financial institutions that they can take silly risks without fear of disaster.
But if Morgenson is right, there is a long-term purpose here, too: to reduce the winnings of those who bet on failure, and thus to reduce the incentives to bring that failure to pass. And let’s face it, the speculators aren’t operating in a vacuum; their bets can start to snowball with market sentiment, as they did against Lehman Brothers last week. Still, the Bagehot argument (often called moral hazard) is also a powerful one - which one do you agree with?"
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, who has read his Bagehot and kept a copy in his Princeton office when he was a professor, responded to recent developments first by pumping money into the markets through the New York Fed’s open-market operations and then last week by easing the terms on loans to banks from the Fed’s discount window.
Bagehot (pictured at right) still makes for good reading at times like this.
“What is wanted and what is necessary to stop a panic is to diffuse the impression, that though money may be dear, still money is to be had. If people could be really convinced that they could have money if they wait a day or two, and that utter ruin is not coming, most likely they would cease to run in such a mad way for money. Either shut the Bank at once, and say it will not lend more than it commonly lends, or lend freely, boldly, and so that the public may feel you mean to go on lending. To lend a great deal, and yet not give the public confidence that you will lend sufficiently and effectually, is the worst of all policies; but it is the policy now pursued.”
Robert Feldman, Morgan Stanley’s chief economist for Japan, writes in a note today that it’s key to distinguish between internal discredit — private domestic lenders retreating — and external discredit, which Bagehot defined as a foreign drain on a bank’s money. (Bagehot’s solution to the problem of external discredit is to still lend freely but “at very high rates.”) That doesn’t apply in today’s floating rate system, Feldman says, and exchange rates don’t provide a good substitute, with the dollar’s drop against the yen suggesting we have external discredit while the strengthening against the euro saying we don’t.
Feldman writes: “My view is that the modern counterpart of ‘external discredit’ is moral hazard. The credit of the U.S. IS a problem, since no one knows how big the subprime and related housing market problems really are. Given how poorly banks know their clients, the ‘high rates’ part should come into play. There is no way to re-establish confidence unless those who have made loans to questionable borrowers pay a price for rash lending. Only then will markets regain confidence that risk is under control.
“The next stage of the credit problem — and whether it affects the real economy seriously — depend on eliminating the moral hazard,” Feldman says. “The faster the moral hazard in eliminated, the less impact on the real economy.”
Fed officials are acutely aware of the moral hazard, having resisted action for weeks to not be seen as bailing out risky investments. But they also don’t want a crisis to feed on itself. The Fed stressed its statement, in lowering the discount rate for banks, that it would accept “a broad range of collateral…including home mortgages and related assets.” The central bank sought to reassure a market that had been roiled by risky investments in subprime mortgages.
That’s how the Bank of England halted a panic in 1825, as Bagehot recounts: “A panic, in a word, is a species of neuralgia, and according to the rules of science you must not starve it. The holders of the cash reserve must be ready not only to keep it for their own liabilities, but to advance it most freely for the liabilities of others. They must lend to merchants, to minor bankers, to ‘this man and that man,’ whenever the security is good. In wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes them. The way in which the panic of 1825 was stopped by advancing money has been described in so broad and graphic a way that the passage has become classical. ‘We lent it,’ said Mr. Harman, on behalf of the Bank of England, ‘by every possible means and in modes we had never adopted before; we took in stock on security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we made advances on Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on the deposit of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short, by every possible means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not on some occasions over-nice. Seeing the dreadful state in which the public were, we rendered every assistance in our power.’ After a day or two of this treatment, the entire panic subsided, and the ‘City’ was quite calm.”
"Bagehot advocated in 1873 that a Lender of Last Resort in a crisis should lend at a penalty rate to solvent but illiquid banks that have adequate collateral. The doctrine has been criticised as having no place in our modern interbank market, but this is wrong. Bagehot’s prescription aims to eliminate the coordination problem of investors at the base of the crisis. It is still a useful guide for action when the interbank market stalls.1 It makes clear that discount-window lending to entities in need may be necessary in a crisis.
Bagehot's doctrine, however, is easy to state and hard to apply. It requires the central bank to distinguish between institutions that are insolvent and those that are merely illiquid. It also requires them to assess the collateral offered. Central banks, because of information limitations, are bound to make mistakes, losing face and money in the process. This doesn’t mean they should not try.
Poor collateral versus massive liquidity
The collateral should be valued under “normal circumstances”, that is, in a situation where the coordination failure of investors does not occur. This involves a judgment call in which the central bank values the illiquid assets. A central bank that only takes high quality collateral will be safe, but will have to inject much more liquidity and/or set lower interest rates to stabilise the market. This may fuel future speculative behavior. Some of this may have happened in the Greenspan era, in the aftermath of the crisis in Russia and LTCM, and after the crash of the technological bubble. The ECB and the Federal Reserve have accepted now partially illiquid collateral that the market would not. This seems appropriate and releases pressure to lower interest rates to solve the problem, something that should be done only if there are signs of deterioration in the real economy. The problem is that central banks are extending the lender of last resort facility outside the realm of traditional banks to entities, like Bear Stearns, that they do not supervise and, therefore, over which they do not have first hand information. How does the Fed know whether Bear Stearns or other similar institutions are solvent? It seems that the Fed is not following Bagehot’s doctrine here.
Finally, if banks and investors are bailed out now, why should they be careful next time? This is the moral hazard problem: help to the market that is optimal once the crisis starts has perverse effects in the incentives of market players at the investment stage. The issue is that only when the moral hazard problem is moderate does it pay to eliminate completely the coordination failure of investors with central bank help. When the moral hazard problem is severe, a certain degree of coordination failure of investors - that is, allowing some crises - is optimal to maintain discipline when investing and, amending Bagehot, some barely solvent institutions should not be helped."
To repeat Bagehot's Rule: "very large (domestic) loans at very high rates are the best remedy for the worst malady of the money market when a foreign drain is added to a domestic drain." The Fed, and the U.S. government more generally, have so far got it only half right."
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_56/ai_55015114/pg_6"In a number of recent blog contributions, we have sketched the role of a modern central bank as ‘market maker of last resort’ (MMLR). This MMLR is the analogue, in a world where intermediation is increasingly through financial markets, to Bagehot’s lender of last resort (LOLR) in a world where most intermediation took place through banks (see e.g. Willem H. Buiter and Anne C. Sibert “The Central Bank as the Market Maker of last Resort: From lender of last resort to market maker of last resort"; Willem H. Buiter “Central banks as market makers of last resort, again”; Willem H. Buiter and Anne C. Sibert “A missed opportunity for the Fed”).
The market maker of last resort function can be fulfilled in two ways. First, the central bank can make outright purchases and sales of a wider range of securities than they currently do. Second, central banks can accept a wider range of securities as collateral in repos, and in collateralised loans and advances at the discount window than they currently do. Following Bagehot’s rule, the MMLR should buy these securities outright or accept them as collateral only on terms that would imply a stiff financial penalty to the owner. The central bank of course already applies a liquidity ‘haircut’ even to liquid instruments offered as collateral in repos or at the discount window. Because the MMLR would have to establish a buying price ‘in the dark’, that is, unaided by recent relevant market prices, and would inevitably take on much more credit risk than central banks have become accustomed to, the ‘haircuts’ should be severe – a financial version of ‘short back and sides’.I doubt a week has gone by since last summer during which I haven't seen some pundit or other trot out Walter Bagehot's dictum that in the event of a credit crunch, the central bank should lend freely at a penalty rate. More often than not, this is contrasted with the actions of the Federal Reserve, which seems to be lending freely at very low interest rates.
Ben Bernanke, in a speech today, addressed this criticism directly:
What are the terms at which the central bank should lend freely? Bagehot argues that "these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest". Some modern commentators have rationalized Bagehot's dictum to lend at a high or "penalty" rate as a way to mitigate moral hazard--that is, to help maintain incentives for private-sector banks to provide for adequate liquidity in advance of any crisis. I will return to the issue of moral hazard later. But it is worth pointing out briefly that, in fact, the risk of moral hazard did not appear to be Bagehot's principal motivation for recommending a high rate; rather, he saw it as a tool to dissuade unnecessary borrowing and thus to help protect the Bank of England's own finite store of liquid assets. Today, potential limitations on the central bank's lending capacity are not nearly so pressing an issue as in Bagehot's time, when the central bank's ability to provide liquidity was far more tenuous.
I'm no expert on Walter Bagehot, and in fact I admit I've never read Lombard Street. But I'll trust in Bernanke as an economic historian on this one, unless and until someone else makes a persuasive case that Bagehot's penalty rate really was designed to punish the feckless rather than just to preserve the Bank of England's limited liquidity."
"So, we have, what I will call "Grant's Graham For Investing":
1) Decent Size
2) Current Assets Exceed Liabilities By Two Times
3) 10 Continuous Years Of Profit
4) 20 Continuous Years Of Dividends
5) 10 Years Of Earnings Growth Exceeding 33%
6) Price To Earnings Ratio Less Than 15
7 ) Price To Book Ratio Less Than 1.5"The Government will succumb and will lend taxpayers' money to non-financial companies.
In a way, there's no choice, because we'll be hobbled for years as an economy if our few remaining manufacturers and exporters are wiped out."
"Trader's Narrative's Due Diligence":
"The process of investigation undertaken by an party to gather material information on actual or potential risks involved in a financial transaction or relationship."
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Can't people be hired to do work before they are confirmed? Departments often go out and hire independent contractors. Or is that they can't leave their current positions until they are confirmed? It does seem possible for Geithner to have been able to hire help, although he would not have a full staff.
Don the libertarian Democrat
February 28, 2009 4:58 PM