Showing posts with label Y.SmithNakedCap. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Y.SmithNakedCap. Show all posts

Sunday, May 17, 2009

as the ability to raise cash has fallen, actual cash holdings must rise

From Naked Capitalism:

"Guest Post: Chasing The Shadow Of Money

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Submitted by Tyler Durden of Zero Hedge

For readers who have the time and interest to follow up on the topic Zero Hedge commenced yesterday discussing money liquidity and the shadow banking system, the best place to start is with Friedrich Hayek's seminal Prices and Production, published in the depression days of 1935. Curiously Hayek discerned the critical role of the shadow banking system long before the advent of securitization, derivatives and other products that today have caused the monetary supply problem to reach a screaming crescendo. A very salient sample is presented below:
"There can be no doubt that besides the regular types of the circulating medium, such as coin, notes and bank deposits, which are generally recognised to be money or currency, and the quantity of which is regulated by some central authority or can at least be imagined to be so regulated, there exist still other forms of media of exchange which occasionally or permanently do the service of money. Now while for certain practical purposes we are accustomed to distinguish these forms of media of exchange from money proper as being mere substitutes for money, it is clear that, other things equal, any increase or decrease of these money substitutes will have exactly the same effects as an increase or decrease of the quantity of money proper, and should therefore, for the purposes of theoretical analysis, be counted as money.

In particular, it is necessary to take account of certain forms of credit not connected with banks which help, as is commonly said, to economize money, or to do the work for which, if they did not exist, money in the narrower sense of the word would be required. The criterion by which we may distinguish these circulating credits from other forms of credit which do not act as substitutes for money is that they give to somebody the means of purchasing goods without at the same time diminishing the money-spending power of somebody else. This is most obviously the case when the creditor receives a bill of exchange which he may pass on in payment for other goods. It applies also to a number of other forms of commercial credit, as, for example, when book credit is simultaneously introduced in a number of successive stages of production in the place of cash payments, and so on. The characteristic peculiarity of these forms of credit is that they spring up without being subject to any central control, but once they have come into existence their convertibility into other forms of money must be possible if a collapse of credit is to be avoided."

Great 500+ page read for a Sunday afternoon. As for some more generic, brief (and modern) thoughts, I provide a few personal observations.

First, a run through the orthodox framework.

A basic account of money supply starts with the monetary aggregates that matter most for CPI inflation: in the case of the US this includes cash balances in aggregates such as the M2 (total deposits) or MZM (zero maturity money/cash plus bank claims and money market funds). The traditional recent definition of "available stock" of money consists of the cash notional of money printed by the central bank (outside money) and how much the banking system has created by making loans (inside money). Of course, due to the deposit multiplier effect, the inside money is much bigger than outside money. For the purposes of this narrative, the impact of securitization and derivatives (tier 3 and 4) will not be discussed currently as the complexity involved would take a big turn for the uglier. It will, however, be a topic pursued in the future.

The chart below shows the relative composition of inside money (mostly deposits) was almost ten times the outside money (monetary base) prior to the recent crisis.



Furthermore, as the historical chart demonstrates below, while rare, it has occurred, most notably during the Great Depression, that the broader money stock and monetary base moved in opposite directions.



A looking at the other side of the equation: demand, is the desired cash balances held by the public. Money demand rises via transactions demand with a growing economy, and falls when interest rates rise as zero-yielding cash becomes less attractive. Some math: money demand is the inverse of the velocity of money. If MV=PY (where M is money stock, V is velocity and PY is nominal GDP), then (1/V) = (M/PY), which is the level of money stock relative to nominal GDP. For households, 1/V can be represented as the desired money holdings as a share of nominal income. If a household decided to increase their money holding to 9 months of income from 6 months (a process occuring pervasively in the current environmen tof job and otherwise insecurity and lack of trust), V would fall to 1.33 from 2x.

This is, in simple terms, the standard approach. As the bolded section of Hayek's quote demonstrates, however, it does not go far enough. What he is trying to convey, is that the economy, like any other constantly shifting "ecosystem" can create its own media of exchange in order to "economize" on the use of inside and outside money for use in the purchasing of assets. Once assets themselves can serve as collateral, allowing for leverage purchases, they also take on money-like properties. And, herein lies the rub, when financial assets serve as collateral for borrowing to purchase yet more assets (margin purchasing), this kind of shadow money becomes especially potent in driving asset price overshoots and bubbles. The chart below demonstrates the various parts of the credit cycle from the perspective of shadow money.



A good form summary of a credit bubble is presented below, compliments of Credit Suisse:

It starts with some genuine investment opportunity almost always related to a real improvement in technology or fundamentals. As strong price performance turns into a boom, optimistic investors desire to buy more on margin. They leverage up, usually using the buoyant asset itself as collateral. Lenders are all too willing to benefit by funding these purchases – after all, in the worst case, they will be holding valuable collateral. Borrowing terms such as haircuts, loan-to-value ratios, or margin requirements get easier. New money flows in, and associated financial assets begin to take on money-like attributes.

As buying on leverage accelerates, prices and credit conditions blow past what is warranted by fundamentals. There is a monetary expansion in the broad sense of shadow money, but when the bust comes this is quickly reversed. Lending conditions tighten, collateral prices plummet, and highly leveraged optimists are wiped out. Now cash is king; investors do not want houses, stocks, tulips or asset-backed commercial paper. To accommodate this demand for cash the government/central bank must quickly and forcefully expand the monetary base or else the increase in money demand can lead to a painful general deflation.

Meanwhile, the sudden disappearance of good collateral in the financial system has created a dangerous de-leveraging that could feed on itself. The government may respond by increasing its own debt, since public collateral in the forms of treasury bills and such do still have funding liquidity, and by flooding the market with government paper the leverage collapse can be better managed. In this example effective money (meaning shadow money plus the conventional money stock) falls sharply, but it would have fallen much more without aggressive policy actions.

As shadow money is a pro-cyclical, boom-time phenomenon, serving as a medium of exchange to finance a bubble, it affects asset prices directly, but only indirectly affects goods and services prices. An approach to estimate shadow money is calculating the immediate cash embodied in various debt securities: this can be done using asset haircuts in repo markets as well as current market values at FMVs in four points in time: early '07, 2008 Pre Lehman, 2008 Post Lehman, and currently.

If the market had outstanding securities worth $100 billion and repo haircuts of 5%, then effective money would be $95 billion. If prices fell 50% and repo haircuts rose to 20%, effective money would be ($100* 0.5)*(1-20%) = $40 billion. Some asset haircuts are presented below in the attempt to determine effective money.



The exhibit below estimates the size of effective US money stock as a sum of inside and outside money as well as shadow money, broken by private and public.



A simplified breakdown of public and private effective money stock is presented on the next chart.



Lastly, in order to demonstrate the dramatic outflow in private shadow money in the immediately pre/post Lehman economy, and just how effectively subdued the public shadow money response has been in dealing with the pull back of the private sector. Credit Suisse estimates that since 2007 the shadow money in private debt securities (IG, HY bonds, non-agency RMBS, CMBS and ABS) has fallen by 38% or $3.6 trillion to $5.9 trillion, mostly due to a drop in market values, a scarcity of new issuance and, most importantly, a huge increase in repo haircuts. To compensate for this, public shadow money represented by treasuries, agency bonds and agency RMBS, has risen by $2.8 trillion, driven by an unprecedented ramp up in treasury and MBS issuance, and an increase in relevant asset prices.



It is immediately obvious that the expansion of public shadow money is no match for the massive contraction seen in the private side. In this light, the question of the efficacy of the QE rollout and other public shadow money expansion has a tinge of futility to it, and not just in terms of money supply inflection points. The continued risk aversion by banks means inside money contraction, and not outside money expansion, is the threat. Not just the wilful allowance of rising inflation by policy makers, but, much more relevantly, a recovery in loan creation is needed. As Keynes noted, in assessing money demand, in addition to interest rates and growth, the subject of "liquidity preference" is critical - the desire by the public to hold (often abnormally large) cash balances as buffers in times when bad economic outcomes are feared, such as currently. As liquidity preference is a mass psychology phenomenon, it is impossible to quantify and predict. A huge increase in cash demand at a time of weak growth is a rare, dangerous and deflationary occurrence, and tends to occur exactly at financial crises such as this one. The administration's, and the media's, massaging of mass psychology through the constant and repeated message that all is well, in order to rekindle the liquidity preference by the general public, makes all the sense in the world, as absent its intangible "benefit" the road to recovery is doomed from the onset.

But is even this propaganda machine doomed, in a more subversive way? As households whose HELOCs have been cut or whose home equity has diminished, firms whose commercial property has collapsed in value, and banks whole ability to borrow in collateral markets to raise cash has fallen, all face the same problem: as the ability to raise cash has fallen, actual cash holdings must rise. And, unfortunately for the Obama administration, this is not a temporary hoarding, this is a permanent rebalancing in the trillions of dollars order of magnitude. As money demands skyrockets, the velocity of money plummets.

In the pro-cyclical boom of 2002-2007 many components of everyday lives became a derivative of the shadow money system: repo lending became critical to credit creation; home equity extraction became a key means to smooth consumer spending during period of low or no income; off-balance sheet funding of various assets became a major earnings generator for commercial banks. Yet the process appears not to have affected money demand and supply: regular bank loan growth was limited, keeping money stock from soaring, and money demand was held back by beliefs in easy availability of borrowing against collateral. Most dangerously, economic policy, first through Greenspan then Bernanke, was complicit in allowing the boom by emphasizing price level inflation and not effective money. With regular M2 and MZM money supply and demand effected only indirectly by the credit boom and a massive output gap following the 2001 recession, it was never an issue that inflation would soar. A similar credit boom occurred with no inflation in the 1920s also, another period where a major collateralized credit pyramid was built virtually on top of a reasonably stable money stock. The reason, then, as now, key decision-makers did not notice a massive credit pyramid was being built, is because traditional money indicators, which this post argues are essentially useless in the context of today's much more sophisticated from a money and liquidity perspective economy, were fairly stable. If there is one "crime" for which the most two recent chairmen of the Fed should be held in ridicule in hsitory books, it is precisely this. And yet while Greenspan may be somewhat forgiven due to his less academic nature, Bernanke, who was a depression "specialist", should have seen our current predicament coming from miles. That he failed to do so is why future historians and market pundits will not spare him the criticism of being among the primary culprits for the current, multi-generational crisis. In the meantime, the propaganda issuing from every media source is to be expected (and in some ways welcomed) - it merely demonstrates that the administration finally grasps the severity of the problem, and the need for confidence to rematerialize, even if it is through the current meme of Green Shoots (whose very existence is flawed flawed upon more than a cursory examination, whether it is due to seasonal factors, subsequent economic data adjustments, or outright misrepresentations).

Yet now that any hope of a preventative approach has failed and we are stuck with the consequnces, what happens? In order for there to even be hope of recovery, money stock has to rebound. Not only Bernanke, or Geithner, but Obama himself has now demontrated that he is on the same page with regard to explanding the shadow money stock (while presumably providing better oversight and supervision).

For now, the immediate focus should be on whether confidence can return: in collateral, in lending, in risk taking, in entrepreneurship. In the meantime, any talk of inflation is premature. The deflationary shock has to wear off first, and in many asset classes it has not even accelerated yet.

It is ironic that shadow money and credit are not just the dynamo that drives the free market, but also its Achilles heel. While most of the time they serve a useful purpose, currently their purpose is a destructive one as long as they continue to trendline away from recent asymptotes. If history is any indication, the overshoot to the downside will likely be just as severe as the upside overshoot was protracted. In that case, nothing the Fed does can accelerate inflation. Also, while possible that Bernanke has something up his sleeve, it is improbable.

Thus while the market continues trading on a sepculative basis and conjecture rooted in the casino psychology that has gripped equity markets (and recently credit markets as well), the long term picture is much less sanguine as the excesses of the credit cycle from the past 60 years wear off and not only asset prices but also repo haircuts find a new equilibrium.

What is certain is that the near-term economy will be driven in spurts and starts as mass psychology shifts from one extreme to another. The next catalyst in my view will be the interplay of the impact of stimulus spending coupled with the failure of the green shoots materializing into anything worthwhile. And while this will make the life of daytraders interesting, the traditional buy and hold approach to asset accumulation must be delayed indefinitely, until the critical equilibrium discussed above is achieved. Until that happens, anyone who claims the economy is headed in the right direction (either much higher or much lower), is merely spreading their own agenda or has an opinion that is fundamentally not rooted in actual facts.

Thanks to Credit Suisse for primary observations and ideas and hat tip to Gunther."

Me:

Don said...

"as the ability to raise cash has fallen, actual cash holdings must rise. And, unfortunately for the Obama administration, this is not a temporary hoarding, this is a permanent rebalancing in the trillions of dollars order of magnitude. As money demands skyrockets, the velocity of money plummets."

This sounds to me like your saying that a Flight to Safety does just that. Money ends up in safe investments. However, this is real money. So some people have money.

"For now, the immediate focus should be on whether confidence can return: in collateral, in lending, in risk taking, in entrepreneurship. In the meantime, any talk of inflation is premature. The deflationary shock has to wear off first, and in many asset classes it has not even accelerated yet."

Shouldn't we attempt to attack the Fear and Aversion to Risk and the Flight to Safety with disincentives to save and incentives to invest? I'm not sure how we would know that they work until we try them.

As for QE, if short term interests rates are low, and longer term rates begin to go up, then you have a disincentive to save and a longer term signal of confidence. That seems good to me. It won't work on its own, but with rising stocks, a short term sales tax decrease, tax incentives for investment, and some govt spending, you can at least have a plan to attack the problem. It doesn't strike me as a priori false or doomed to fail.

As for the casino, I never get that analogy, since there's a winner: namely, the casino. The money doesn't disappear.

Don the libertarian Democrat

fraud in the financial crisis has been virtually ignored when he contends it was a major factor, and is also overlooked in the regulation of financial

From Naked Capitalism:

"William Black Uses the "F" Word A Lot

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William Black, in a lecture in Iceland, discusses how the role of fraud in the financial crisis has been virtually ignored when he contends it was a major factor, and is also overlooked in the regulation of financial institutions. He also argues that standard econometric models produces the worst possible when a financial bubble is growing.



The lecture comes in two videos, Part 1 and Part 2. Enjoy!


Me:

Don said...

Financial Crises go through different stages, like grief. Right now, we're still at the Stupidity, Complexity, Elmer Fudd, Ostrich, Devil Made Me Do It, Inanimate Causes, Defenses level or stage. The first stage. The actors were idiots and are happy now to say so, having earned millions as experts.

The Fraud, Negligence, Fiduciary Mismanagement, and Collusion, Stage, which I consider as a group the second leading cause of our crisis, takes time, and, more importantly, litigation to develop and uncover. Hang in there. We'll get to it.

Don the libertarian Democrat

the too big to fail situation.

From Naked Capitalism:

"
Sunday, May 17, 2009

Links 5/17/09

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Can You Die From Lack of Sleep? Slate

James Lull, Ponzi Scammer, Drives Truck Off Cliff The Day Of His Sentencing Huffington Post

Debunking The Notion Of Too Big To Fail Barry Ritholtz

Japanese Housewives Back in the Game? Japan Economy Watch

Europe in deepest recession since War as Germany suffers Telegraph (hat tip reader Dwight)

Faith-Based Economics John Mauldin

Proving Me Wrong Michael Panzner

The Exuberance Glut Or The Dollar-Euro Short Squeeze Race Tyler Durden

Antidote du jour:



"Debunking The Notion Of Too Big To Fail
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By Barry Ritholtz - May 16th, 2009, 3:30PM

Interview and analysis with Mariner Kemper of UMB Financial regarding about the testifying of Sheila Bair before the congress on the too big to fail situation.

4:16

Bloomberg"

Me:

Don said...

In general, I agree with Kemper, but I don't agree that size doesn't matter, only complexity. It is only the size, number, not complexity, of the holding companies, that makes them TBTF, and the amount of money that depends upon them. If the HCs were smaller, then bankruptcy could be allowed to work itself out, no matter how tediously complex. After all, the FDIC is currently seizing smaller banks, and other financial concerns are going bankrupt.

My answer is narrow/limited banking, precisely because I don't want the bedrock of our financial system resting on regulators perceptions to any great degree. You can rely on that if you have a solid base to fall back upon.

The small banks have a good gripe because, strictly speaking, they're on the hook for the FDIC. They'll be taking a big hit before the taxpayers do as regards the FDIC at least.

You cannot get away from the concept of "Too big to fail", if that means that the government would sit idly by during debt-deflation. I cannot imagine that in any real world scenario. In that sense, I think we're fooling ourselves about fixing the system to avoid that.

Don the libertarian Democrat

Saturday, May 16, 2009

how to regulate capital adequacy and "too big to fail" and only one (Robert Hunter) made a serious, if sketchy, effort to answer the question

From Naked Capitalism:

"Insurance Experts Tongue-Tied on Ideas for Capital Adequacy, Too Big to Fail Rules

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The Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises subcommittee of the House Financial Services committee held hearings on how the Federal government should oversee insurance, a timely question since we've discovered the Federal government is backstopping a state regulated activity.

What is noteworthy about this session is that five experts were asked to opine on how to regulate capital adequacy and "too big to fail" and only one (Robert Hunter) made a serious, if sketchy, effort to answer the question. I can understand not having a simple answer to a complicated question (there are a lot of different products in insurance) but the flat-footedness is not encouraging.

The experts were:

Mr. Baird Webel, Specialist in Financial Economics, Congressional Research Service;
Ms. Patricia Guinn, Managing Director, Global Risk and Financial Services Business, Towers Perrin;
Mr. J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of America;
Mr. Martin F. Grace, James S. Kemper Professor, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, Georgia State University; and
Mr. Scott Harrington, Alan B. Miller Professor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania."

Me:

Don said...

It might help to know exactly what people mean by Systemic Risk. I see the current problem as Debt-Deflation. Consequently, I can propose various solutions to try and keep that from occurring again. For example, I like Narrow/Limited Banking. I can also see that as long as we have a Lender Of Last Resort, we cannot rule out Moral Hazard. No real government would tell people "Good luck" facing Debt-Deflation, especially if you have a LOLR. That's basically what it means to have a LOLR.

I guess I'm arguing that a Systemic Risk Regulator will be mainly window dressing, although it probably would do some good, assuming that people don't rely on its blessing as the word of God. Good luck.

Don the libertarian Democrat



Thursday, May 14, 2009

malfeasance and silliness, the triggering events for today's crisis, were much greater and more widespread

TO BE NOTED: From Naked Capitalism:

"Munger on Phony Accounting, Cultural Decay, and Derivatives

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Stanford Law Review has a great interview with Warren Buffett's longstanding partner, Charlie Munger. Munger offers much less corn pone and more direct opinion than Buffett does.

The entire piece is very much worth reading, but I wanted to hone in on some key topics. One is the neglect of the role of what amounts to accounting fraud in this mess. Much of this is technically not fraud under the current regime but would be if the standards of 20 years ago were still in place. We now live in a world where everyone knows that the authorities simply will not take down any of the Big Four. Four is now deemed to be the minimum number of big accounting firms permissible. So we de facto have accounting firms "too big to fail", which means "too big to be asked to eat much liability, not matter how indefensible their conduct." So if they do something bad, they might have to fire a few partners and pay a moderate fine.

So effectively, we live in a world that echoes the Nixon Presidency. If the Big Four does it, it must be legal.

From the Stanford Law Review (hat tip reader Hubert):
As we look at the current situation, how much of the responsibility would you lay at the feet of the accounting profession?

I would argue that a majority of the horrors we face would not have happened if the accounting profession developed and enforced better accounting. They are way too liberal in providing the kind of accounting the financial promoters want. They've sold out, and they do not even realize that they've sold out.

Would you give an example of a particular accounting practice you find problematic?

Take derivative trading with mark-to-market accounting, which degenerates into mark-to-model. Two firms make a big derivative trade and the accountants on both sides show a large profit from the same trade.

And they can't both be right. But both of them are following the rules.

Yes, and nobody is even bothered by the folly. It violates the most elemental principles of common sense. And the reasons they do it are: (1) there's a demand for it from the financial promoters, (2) fixing the system is hard work, and (3) they are afraid that a sensible fix might create new responsibilities that cause new litigation risks for accountants....

Very few people realize how much we've screwed up. Even in leading law schools and business schools very few people realize that the mess at Enron never could have happened if accounting customs hadn't been changed. What we have now is a bigger, more widespread Enron.

Munger also has some interesting observations about the decay in values:
Worse than the Great Depression?

The economy hasn't contracted as much as during the Great Depression, but the malfeasance and silliness, the triggering events for today's crisis, were much greater and more widespread. In the '20s, a tiny class of people were financial promoters and a tiny class of people were buying securities. Today, it's deep in the whole culture, and it is way more extreme. If sin and folly get punished appropriately, we're in for a bad time....

The investment banks of yore, chastened by the '30s, were private partnerships, or near equivalents. The partners were dependent for their retirement on the prosperity of the firms they left behind and the customs and culture they left behind, and the places were much more responsible and honorable. That ethos, by the time the year 2006 came along, had pretty well disappeared. Our regulators allowed the proprietary trading departments at investment banks to become hedge funds in disguise, using the "repo" system—one of the most extreme credit-granting systems ever devised. The amount of leverage was utterly awesome. The investment banks, to protect themselves, controlled, to some extent, the use of credit by customers that were hedge funds. But the internal hedge funds, owned by the investment banks, were subject to no effective credit control at all.....

How and why do you think economists have gotten this so wrong?

I would argue that the economists have not been all that good at working concepts of good and evil into their profession. Nor do they understand, at all well, the economic consequences of bad accounting.

In fact, they've made a profession of driving value judgments out of the subject.

Yes. They say it's not economics if you think about the consequences of good and evil, and good and bad business accounting. I think what we're learning is that when you don't understand these consequences, you don't have an adequately skilled profession. You have big gaps in what you need. You have a profession that's like the man that Nietzsche ridiculed because he had a lame leg and was very proud of it. The economics profession has been proud of its lame leg.

There is also a good bit on why he and Warren have been so successful:
You've often said that one of the keys to your success has simply been to avoid making the garden-variety mistakes that you see other people make.

Warren and I have skills that could easily be taught to other people. One skill is knowing the edge of your own competency. It's not a competency if you don't know the edge of it. And Warren and I are better at tuning out the standard stupidities. We've left a lot of more talented and diligent people in the dust, just by working hard at eliminating standard error.

If you had to characterize a few mistakes that you see executives making, which ones jump out at you?

An extreme optimism based on an inflated self-appraisal is one. I think that many CEOs get carried away into folly. They haven't studied the past models of disaster enough and they're not risk-averse enough. One of the very interesting things about Berkshire Hathaway is how chicken it is, how cautious, how low is its leverage.

I can't speak for Berkshire overall, but that is certainly true of their reinsurance business. Ajit Jain is willing to sit around and do no business, even if he has to wait a couple of years, until, say, two hurricanes hit in 72 hours and the industry is desperate for reinsurance capacity and willing to pay big premiums. They are very disciplined and play only in "hard markets". "

Me:

Don said...

"They are very disciplined and play only in "hard markets"

Value investing is very hard, and the reason it is makes me doubt the efficacy of so-called "counter-cyclical" policies.

"the malfeasance and silliness, the triggering events for today's crisis, were much greater and more widespread"

I agree with this, but also believe that it goes against arguments such as Winkler's view that:

"Asset managers are more or less forced to seek higher interest rates through riskier investments."

No one is forced into malfeasance and silliness. They are embraced by human beings for their own reasons and desires.

Don the libertarian Democrat

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

unduly fond of very large banks when the superiority of that model is in question

From Naked Capitalism:

"Richardson and Roubini Call for Bank Resolution, Diss Stress Tests

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History repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. But when it's your farce, sometimes it's hard to appreciate the humor.

We've railed about the stress tests since they were announced, but the chicanery, starting with the March 10 Citi and Bank of America pronouncements that they had had a decent couple of months, have lead to a big rally in bank shares. Of course, before we get too excited, it's important to remember that Citi is still trading at a bit over $3 and Bank of America at just over $10.

Nevertheless, the insistence of the cheerleading is looking strained, particularly when pretty much every professional investor we know is skeptical of the rally, even those who had the foresight to buy into it early. And even an equity broker (generally of the bullish persuasion) commented on earnings season: "One third had earnings that beat expectations, one third were short, and one third were delusional."

I've also noticed more than a few headlines, particularly on Bloomberg, that take any snippet of the positive and play it up. For instance, one a few days ago called a morning when stocks opened down and then moved into weakly positive territory as 'stocks gain" which was technically accurate, but when the averages again fell into losses, it was "stocks fluctuate." Please. Similarly, tonight Bloomberg tells us, "Chrysler Bankruptcy May Not Dent Economy as Cutbacks Were Set". The point of the story is that (assuming the bankruptcy goes according to plan, an open question) the plant cutbacks and furloughs had already been planned as part of the restructuring. But that means that much damage was inevitable, regardless. Saying "Bankruptcy May Not Dent" is not the same as "Bankruptcy May Do No Incremental Damage," which is what the story really says. I plan to keep closer tabs on this and readers are encouraged to e-mail sightings of misleading headlines.

Back to the matter at hand. Matthew Richardson and Nouriel Roubini, in "We Can't Subsidize the Banks Forever," provides a welcome bit of reality to the unwarranted optimism about banks. Having companies look viable as the result of massive, and seeming open ended subsidies does not say much about how they'd be faring ex life support. And even worse are the distortions. We've seen that large scale banking with score based credit paradigms has fared badly. Yet these companies are being subsidized to the detriment of smaller regional and local players who are closer to their communities and can incorporate local knowledge into their credit decisions. But no, just as old style computer jockeys had trouble accepting that big iron might be inferior to PC and distributed processing, so to the powers that be seem unduly fond of very large banks when the superiority of that model is in question.

From the Wall Street Journal:
The results of the government's stress tests on banks, to be released in a few days, will not mark the beginning of the end of the financial crisis.....the overall message is that the sector is in pretty good shape.

This would be good news if it were credible. But the International Monetary Fund has just released a study of estimated losses on U.S. loans and securities. It was very bleak -- $2.7 trillion, double the estimated losses of six months ago. Our estimates at RGE Monitor are even higher, at $3.6 trillion, implying that the financial system is currently near insolvency in the aggregate. With the U.S. banks and broker-dealers accounting for more than half these losses there is a huge disconnect between these estimated losses and the regulators' conclusions.

The hope was that the stress tests would be the start of a process that would lead to a cleansing of the financial system. But using a market-based scenario in the stress tests would have given worse results than the adverse scenario chosen by the regulators. For example, the first quarter's unemployment rate of 8.1% is higher than the regulators' "worst case" scenario of 7.9% for this same period. At the rate of job losses in the U.S. today, we will surpass a 10.3% unemployment rate this year -- the stress test's worst possible scenario for 2010.

The stress tests' conclusions are too optimistic about the banks' absolute health, although their relative assessment is more precise, because consistent valuation methods were used....We fear that we are back to bailout purgatory, for lack of a better term. Here are some suggestions for how to extricate ourselves.

First, while Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's public-private investment program (PPIP) to purchase financial firms' assets is not particularly popular, we hope the government doesn't give up on it. True, the program offers cheap financing and free leverage to institutional investors, which will lead to the investors overpaying for the assets. But it does promote price discovery and remove the assets from the bank's balance sheets -- necessary conditions to move forward.

And to minimize the cost to taxpayers, banks must not be allowed to cherry-pick which legacy assets to sell. All the risky loans and securities banks were never meant to hold should be on the block. With enough investors participating in the PPIP program, the prices of the assets should be competitive, and there should be no issue of fairness raised by the banks.

Yves here. With all due respect, the program is voluntary, and the whole point is NOT price discovery but to permit banks to unload crap assets at at least the inflated carrying price on their books. It does NOT serve the intended goal, a hidden subsidy, otherwise. The banks don't need more liquidity, they need to fill the hole that would otherwise be caused if these assets were valued fairly. These assets trades actively. The issue is not price discovery, but that the banks don't like the prices on offer. Back to the piece:
Second, the government should stop providing capital, loan guarantees and financing with no strings attached. Banks should understand this. When providing loans to troubled companies, they place numerous restrictions, called covenants, on what these firms can do. These covenants generally restrict the use of assets, risk-taking behavior, and future indebtedness. It would be much better if the government focused on this rather than on its headline obsession with bonuses.

For example, consider the fact that the government, while providing aid to banks, did not restrict their dividend payments. A recent academic study by Viral Acharya, Irvind Gujral and Hyun Song Shin (www.voxeu.org) notes that banks only marginally reduced dividends in the first 15 months of the crisis, paying out a staggering $400 billion in 2007 and 2008. While many banks have been reducing their dividends more recently, bank bailout money had been literally going in one door and out the other.

Consider also recent bank risk-taking. The media has recently reported that Citigroup and Bank of America were buying up some of the AAA-tranches of nonprime mortgage-backed securities. Didn't the government provide insurance on portfolios of $300 billion and $118 billion on the very same stuff for Citi and BofA this past year? These securities are at the heart of the financial crisis and the core of the PPIP. If true, this is egregious behavior -- and it's incredible that there are no restrictions against it.

Third, stress tests aside, it is highly likely that some of these large banks will be insolvent, given the various estimates of aggregate losses. The government has got to come up with a plan to deal with these institutions that does not involve a bottomless pit of taxpayer money. This means it will have the unenviable tasks of managing the systemic risk resulting from the failure of these institutions and then managing it in receivership. But it will also mean transferring risk from taxpayers to creditors. This is fair: Metaphorically speaking, these are the guys who served alcohol to the banks just before they took off down the highway.

And we shouldn't hear one more time from a government official, "if only we had the authority to act . . ."

We were sympathetic to this argument on March 16, 2008 when Bear Stearns ran aground; much less sympathetic on Sept. 15 and 16, 2008 when Lehman and A.I.G. collapsed; and now downright irritated seven months later. Is there anything more important in solving the financial crisis than creating a law (an "insolvency regime law") that empowers the government to handle complex financial institutions in receivership? Congress should pass such legislation -- as requested by the administration -- on a fast-track basis.

Yves here. We have been saying that pretty much since the Bear collapse. We also called then, for the power that be to go into the firms that were most at risk (and throw in a few better ones so as not to create stigma) and go over their books with a fine toothed comb. The stress tests come nearly a year late, and are no where granular enough. Back to the article:
The mere threat of this law could be a powerful catalyst in aligning incentives. As the potential costs of receivership are quite high, it would obviously be optimal if the bank's liabilities could be restructured outside of bankruptcy. Until recently, this would have been considered near impossible. However, in 2008 there was a surge in distressed exchanges of debt for equity or preferred equity.

Still, the recent negotiations with Chrysler's creditors suggest large obstacles. The size and complexity of large banks' capital structures make debt-for-equity exchanges an even taller task, particularly because creditors will want to hold out for a full bailout along the lines they have been receiving.

The government should be able to dangle an insolvency law as an incentive to cooperate. This will result in a $1 trillion game of chicken. But given the size of the stakes, and the alternative of the taxpayers continuing to foot the bill, it's the best way forward.

Me:

Don said...

The following are the context of this crisis:

1)Since we saved AIG, everybody, I mean everybody, has been hanging tough for govt money.
2)Since we let Lehman fail, everybody has been unsure of our commitment to guarantees. With China, it actually started earlier.

The stress test didn't work because:
1) It's being invested on as part of the investment strategy of how much govt intervention there will be.
2) The stress test was supposed to actually be a govt guarantee to make these banks solvent come what might. Unfortunately, the credibility of the US govt is not sound.

For me, we should not have let Lehman fail, but have guaranteed everything. Once we let Lehman fail, we should have guaranteed everything. Subtlety will not work well in alleviating Debt-Deflation. You can either clearly get out, or get in full force. Since only government guarantees stop Debt-Deflation, all eyes have been turned on the level of govt guarantees since Lehman. The implicit strategy has worked, but not well. No one knows if implicit means explicit or not.

We have a bill to deal with seizing large financial concerns:

"March 25, 2009
tg-70

Treasury Proposes Legislation for Resolution Authority

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Monday called for new legislation granting additional tools to address systemically significant financial institutions that fall outside of the existing resolution regime under the FDIC. A draft bill will be sent to Congress this week and several key features are highlighted below.

The legislative proposal would fill a significant void in the current financial services regulatory structure and is one piece of a comprehensive regulatory reform strategy that will mitigate systemic risk, enhance consumer and investor protection, while eliminating gaps in the regulatory structure. "

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg70.htm

I'm assuming that they're talking about this.

"Yves here. We have been saying that pretty much since the Bear collapse."

Nothing against you, but I'm wondering what people are actually calling for now, and why Bear was seen as a turning point. If it was Debt-Deflation, what would you have done? Without backing assets, showing that the problem was imminent was a terrible risk. That's what I heard Dizard saying. The governments would need to pretty much bankroll the unwinding.

If you can't convince people of that now, how would you have convinced them of that then?

Don the libertarian Democrat

May 5, 2009 11:21 AM

Don said...

Let me please add this:

To the extent that Bear worked, it was because it showed that the govt would back the unwinding, if it came to that. At whatever point either:

1) The unwinding began to get out of control.
2) The govt's commitment to backstopping the unwinding was not total.

You were going to begin the crisis. To risk 1, by making clear the depth of the problem, without doing 2, would have put us right where we are now or worse, no matter when it began.

Don the libertarian Democrat

May 5, 2009 11:35 AM

The US can disregard its creditors’ concerns for the time being without worrying about a dollar collapse

From Naked Capitalism:

"Andy Xie: "If China loses faith the dollar will collapse"

Listen to this article. Powered by Odiogo.com
It's easy for Americans to pooh-pooh bearish talk about the dollar. Yet the sterling was once the reserve currency, and has fallen, what, by 80% since it lost its standing.

With increasingly dubious accounting and lax enforcement, the US capital markets no longer stand out by virtue of being better regulated. Yes, they still may be deeper and more liquid. But overseas buyers have to look hard at foreign exchange risk. The direction for the dollar in the long term is certain to be down. Overextended debtors trash their currencies (see the Great Depression, the Nordic and Swedish banking crises, and the Asian crisis for a few of many examples).

What is interesting about the Xie piece is that even the stalwart Chinese retail investor has become leery of the dollar. Despite th logic of "oh if you sell, you only hurt yourself", the flip side is if you become certain you are indeed holding a depreciating asset, it makes sense to exit. You want to be early, not late, out.

And that logic, if it starts to take hold, in classic run on the bank fashion, could lead to a disorderly fall in the dollar. It isn't clear what the trigger might be, but Bob Shiller contends that sudden flights from markets don't necessarily require an event to kick them off. And given that Willem Buiter, who though fond of colorful writing, is hardly an extremist, foresees a collapse in dollar assets if the US fails to contain its fiscal deficit, talk of a dollar plunge isn't a a radical view.

From the Financial Times:
Emerging economies such as China and Russia are calling for alternatives to the dollar...Because the magnitude of the bad assets within the banking system and the excess leverage of its households are potentially huge, the Fed may be forced into printing dollars massively, which would eventually trigger high inflation or even hyper-inflation and cause great damage to countries that hold dollar assets...

....emerging economies...have amassed nearly $10,000bn (€7,552bn, £6,721bn) in foreign exchange reserves, mostly in dollar assets. Any other country with America’s problems would need the Paris Club of creditor nations to negotiate with its lenders on its monetary and fiscal policies to protect their interests. But the US situation is unique: it borrows in its own currency, and the dollar is the world’s dominant reserve currency. The US can disregard its creditors’ concerns for the time being without worrying about a dollar collapse.

The faith of the Chinese in America’s power and responsibility, and the petrodollar holdings of the gulf countries that depend on US military protection, are the twin props for the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese, including those in the mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas, may account for half of the foreign holdings of dollar assets....

The Chinese love affair with the dollar began in the 1940s when it held its value while the Chinese currency depreciated massively. Memory is long when it comes to currency credibility. The Chinese renminbi remains a closed currency and is not yet a credible vehicle for wealth storage. Also, wealthy ethnic Chinese tend to send their children to the US for education. They treat the dollar as their primary currency.

The US could repair its balance sheet through asset sales and fiscal transfers instead of just printing money. The $2,000bn fiscal deficit, for example, could have gone to over-indebted households for paying down debts rather than on dubious spending to prop up the economy. When property and stock prices decline sufficiently, foreign demand, especially from ethnic Chinese, will come in volume. The country’s vast and unexplored natural resource holdings could be auctioned off. Americans may view these ideas as unthinkable. It is hard to imagine that a superpower needs to sell the family silver to stay solvent. Hence, printing money seems a less painful way out.

The global environment is extremely negative for savers. The prices of property and shares, though having declined substantially, are not good value yet and may decline further. Interest rates are near zero. The Fed is printing money, which will eventually inflate away the value of dollar holdings. Other currencies are not safe havens either. As the Fed expands the money supply, it puts pressure on other currencies to appreciate. This will force other central banks to expand their own money supplies to depress their currencies. Hence, major currencies may take turns devaluing. The end result is inflation and negative real interest rates everywhere. Central banks are punishing savers to redeem the sins of debtors and speculators. Unfortunately, ethnic Chinese are the biggest savers.

Diluting Chinese savings to bail out America’s failing banks and bankrupt households, though highly beneficial to the US national interest in the short term, will destroy the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese demand for the dollar has been waning already. China’s bulging foreign exchange reserves reflect the lack of private demand for dollars...

America’s policy is pushing China towards developing an alternative financial system. For the past two decades China’s entry into the global economy rested on making cheap labour available to multi-nationals and pegging the renminbi to the dollar. The dollar peg allowed China to leverage the US financial system for its international needs, while domestic finance remained state-controlled to redistribute prosperity from the coast to interior provinces. This dual approach has worked remarkably well. China could have its cake and eat it too. Of course, the global credit bubble was what allowed China’s dual approach to be effective; its inefficiency was masked by bubble-generated global demand.

China is aware that it must become independent from the dollar at some point. Its recent decision to turn Shanghai into a financial centre by 2020 reflects China’s anxiety over relying on the dollar system. The year 2020 seems remote, and the US will not pay attention to something so distant. However, if global stagflation takes hold, as I expect it to, it will force China to accelerate its reforms to float its currency and create a single, independent and market-based financial system. When that happens, the dollar will collapse."
Me:

Don said...

"America’s policy is pushing China towards developing an alternative financial system."

China has two main complaints against the US:
1) We're using our currency to help us get out of this crisis
2) We don't guarantee assets, such as bonds
They have already taken numerous steps:
1) Swap lines in their own currency
2) A regional bailout fund
3) Telling everyone that we're unreliable, and it's working

Although we are still a flight to safety port, the flight from agencies to treasuries, from implicit to explicit guarantees, was not a good deal for us. It was a deflationary move of some magnitude, and showed the beginnings of lack of trust in us.
Oddly, Geithner's mocked total guarantee is exactly what the Chinese wanted and expected. China believes that being the economic powerhouse brings with it certain responsibilities. In the Asian Crisis, for example, China believes that it never used its currency for its benefit, or reneged on deals. The Chinese claim that this is acting responsibly, while we, in this crisis, are not.
The threat of defaulting on bonds, loans, especially if we are de facto running or backing these companies, is very irresponsible from the Chinese perspective.
Truly, the Chinese are making headway in this crisis worldwide in portraying us as irresponsible, and not worthy of having the position in the world financial system that we do. It will matter going forward because of foreign investment, and the desire for US goods.
But hey, let's keep telling ourselves that we have the upper hand, right up until the point that we don't. If people don't believe that much of the world blames us for this crisis, they're going to be in for a rude awakening. Solving our crisis at the expense of foreign countries and investors seems a really poor move.

Don the libertarian Democrat

May 5, 2009 10:33 AM

From the FT:

"
If China loses faith the dollar will collapse

By Andy Xie

Published: May 4 2009 19:28 | Last updated: May 4 2009 19:28

Emerging economies such as China and Russia are calling for alternatives to the dollar as a reserve currency. The trigger is the Federal Reserve’s liberal policy of expanding the money supply to prop up America’s banking system and its over-indebted households. Because the magnitude of the bad assets within the banking system and the excess leverage of its households are potentially huge, the Fed may be forced into printing dollars massively, which would eventually trigger high inflation or even hyper-inflation and cause great damage to countries that hold dollar assets in their foreign exchange reserves.

The chatter over alternatives to the dollar mainly reflects the unhappiness with US monetary policy among the emerging economies that have amassed nearly $10,000bn (€7,552bn, £6,721bn) in foreign exchange reserves, mostly in dollar assets. Any other country with America’s problems would need the Paris Club of creditor nations to negotiate with its lenders on its monetary and fiscal policies to protect their interests. But the US situation is unique: it borrows in its own currency, and the dollar is the world’s dominant reserve currency. The US can disregard its creditors’ concerns for the time being without worrying about a dollar collapse.

The faith of the Chinese in America’s power and responsibility, and the petrodollar holdings of the gulf countries that depend on US military protection, are the twin props for the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese, including those in the mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas, may account for half of the foreign holdings of dollar assets. You have to check the asset allocations of wealthy ethnic Chinese to understand the dollar’s unique status.

The Chinese love affair with the dollar began in the 1940s when it held its value while the Chinese currency depreciated massively. Memory is long when it comes to currency credibility. The Chinese renminbi remains a closed currency and is not yet a credible vehicle for wealth storage. Also, wealthy ethnic Chinese tend to send their children to the US for education. They treat the dollar as their primary currency.

The US could repair its balance sheet through asset sales and fiscal transfers instead of just printing money. The $2,000bn fiscal deficit, for example, could have gone to over-indebted households for paying down debts rather than on dubious spending to prop up the economy. When property and stock prices decline sufficiently, foreign demand, especially from ethnic Chinese, will come in volume. The country’s vast and unexplored natural resource holdings could be auctioned off. Americans may view these ideas as unthinkable. It is hard to imagine that a superpower needs to sell the family silver to stay solvent. Hence, printing money seems a less painful way out.

The global environment is extremely negative for savers. The prices of property and shares, though having declined substantially, are not good value yet and may decline further. Interest rates are near zero. The Fed is printing money, which will eventually inflate away the value of dollar holdings. Other currencies are not safe havens either. As the Fed expands the money supply, it puts pressure on other currencies to appreciate. This will force other central banks to expand their own money supplies to depress their currencies. Hence, major currencies may take turns devaluing. The end result is inflation and negative real interest rates everywhere. Central banks are punishing savers to redeem the sins of debtors and speculators. Unfortunately, ethnic Chinese are the biggest savers.

Diluting Chinese savings to bail out America’s failing banks and bankrupt households, though highly beneficial to the US national interest in the short term, will destroy the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese demand for the dollar has been waning already. China’s bulging foreign exchange reserves reflect the lack of private demand for dollars, which was driven by the renminbi’s appreciation. Though this was speculative in nature, it shows the renminbi’s rising credibility and its potential to replace the dollar as the main vehicle of wealth storage for ethnic Chinese.

America’s policy is pushing China towards developing an alternative financial system. For the past two decades China’s entry into the global economy rested on making cheap labour available to multi-nationals and pegging the renminbi to the dollar. The dollar peg allowed China to leverage the US financial system for its international needs, while domestic finance remained state-controlled to redistribute prosperity from the coast to interior provinces. This dual approach has worked remarkably well. China could have its cake and eat it too. Of course, the global credit bubble was what allowed China’s dual approach to be effective; its inefficiency was masked by bubble-generated global demand.

China is aware that it must become independent from the dollar at some point. Its recent decision to turn Shanghai into a financial centre by 2020 reflects China’s anxiety over relying on the dollar system. The year 2020 seems remote, and the US will not pay attention to something so distant. However, if global stagflation takes hold, as I expect it to, it will force China to accelerate its reforms to float its currency and create a single, independent and market-based financial system. When that happens, the dollar will collapse.

The writer is an independent economist based in Shanghai and former chief economist for Asia Pacific at Morgan Stanley"

And:

Don said...

Walter,

Yes. That's why I said 'believe'. Let me get you the best place that they've argued this:

http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=138

"2. The role and contribution of China, as a responsible big country, in Asian financial crisis

In order to mitigate the impact of Asian financial crisis and help crisis-stricken Asian countries walk out of the plight, then China's Premier Zhu Rongji promised, on behalf of the Chinese government, to the world that the RMB would not depreciate, followed by a series of active measures and policies.



(1) China made vigorous efforts to participate in the IMF's rescue operations to help related Asian countries. After the outbreak of financial crisis, under the arrangement framework of the IMF, the Chinese government provided a total of over US$4 billion assistance to Thailand, as well as export credit and emergency free medicine assistance to Indonesia and other East Asian countries, although China had inadequate foreign exchange reserves at that time.



(2) China actively cooperated with relevant parties to participate in and advance regional cooperation. At the sixth ASEAN informal leaders' meeting, then China's President Jiang Zhemin unveiled three proposals of strengthening regional cooperation to refrain the crisis from spreading, reform and improve international financial system, and respect self-selected measures of relevant countries and areas to overcome financial crisis. At the second informal ASEAN+China, Japan and Korea leaders' meeting and the informal ASEAN+China leaders' meeting, then Vice President Hu Jintao emphasized that East Asian countries should vigorously engage in reform and adjustment of financial system, with the most pressing need to intensify the management and supervision over short-term capital flow. He called on the East Asian countries to strengthen exchange on macroeconomic issues such as financial reform, have dialogue between deputy finance ministers and deputy governors of central bank, and form expert team at appropriate time to launch in-depth research on specific measures on managing short term capital flow. The above measures adopted by the Chinese government received positive response and support from most crisis-stricken countries.



(3) China promised that the RMB would not depreciate. Being a highly responsible country, the Chinese government made the decision of no depreciation of the RMB with an aim of safeguarding regional stability and promoting development, which played a pivotal role in maintaining economic and financial stability of the Asian countries and the world at large, as well as Asian countries' economic recovery and regaining of rapid growth in later years.



(4) China implemented policies to boost domestic demand and stimulate economic growth. While sticking to no depreciation of the RMB, the Chinese government took a wide range of measures to boost domestic demand and stimulate economic growth, which safeguarded health and stability of domestic economic growth, mitigated difficult situation in the Asian economies, and fueled recovery of Asian economy.



The adoption of these measures by the Chinese government embodied that as a part of Asia, China had a full awareness of collective interests and responsibility and has made its due contribution to the rapid recovery and regaining of growth momentum of the Asian economy."

Now, of course, there's something amusing about China saying that it doesn't use currency considerations in its planning. However, they're making a more salient point, which is that they did not use their currency for their own advantage during a crisis.

Bottom line, whether true or not, China is getting very good at playing the capitalist game very fast. They have problems, but, even so, they do make some at least plausible sounding criticisms against the US in this crisis.

Take care,

Don the libertarian Democrat

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

So let me be clear: for sixteen months now I have been a Swedish-model advocate who wants to guarantee bank bondholders

TO BE NOTED: Grasping Reality with Both Hands:

"
Tim Geithner and the Swedish Model

James Surowiecki:

The Sweden Example: The Balance Sheet: Ryan Avent beats me to the punch by pointing out the most important part of today’s Times’ story on Tim Geithner, namely that in the summer of 2008, after the collapse of Bear Stearns but before the meltdown of Lehman Brothers, Geithner proposed having the government guarantee the debts of all U.S. banks. The plan was shot down as politically untenable, but, as Ryan points out, had it been put into effect, we would most likely not have seen Lehman go under or had to deal with the incredibly negative consequences of that failure. More important, perhaps, by reducing the threat of panicked runs on bank debt (since those debts would have been guaranteed), such a guarantee would also have made it easier for regulators and banks to deal in a transparent fashion with the toxic-asset problem. That’s why the very first step in Sweden’s much-admired solution to its banking crisis in the early nineteen-nineties, was, yes, a guarantee of all bank debt. As one of the regulators involved in that effort put it, the guarantee “was provided in order to restore confidence and to ease the immediate pressure on banks,” by ensuring “the stability of the payment system and to safeguard the supply of credit.”

Given all this, Ryan is perplexed that Yves Smith... dismisses Geithner’s proposal... her conviction that any plan to deal with the banking system has to require bank bondholders to take a major hit. In other words, for Smith, the Swedish solution is not the right one. Nationalizing the banks, and wiping out the shareholders, isn’t enough: you have to impose significant pain on the banks’ debtholders, too. Lots of nationalization advocates believe that a debt guarantee is a bad idea. But one of the things that’s made the debate over nationalization confusing is that many of these same people, while arguing that bank debtholders should take a hit, also say that what the U.S. should do is emulate Sweden.... [T]his doesn’t make any sense. At the heart of the Swedish solution was the guarantee of all bank debt, ensuring that bondholders would not take a hit. And the Swedes, at least, thought that guarantee was essential to making their plan work.... [N]ationalization supporters should be clear: if they want to cram down the debtholders, then they don’t want the U.S. to follow the Swedish model. You cannot “Go Swedish” and “wipe out bond holders” at the same time.

There are nationalization advocates who really do want the U.S. to emulate Sweden, including most notably Paul Krugman, who’s said, “Sweden guaranteed all [bank liabilities]. If forced to say, I would go the Swedish route; but of course we can’t do that unless we’re prepared to put all troubled banks in receivership.” But many supporters of nationalization are just invoking Sweden in order to prove that there’s a historical precedent for successful nationalization, while at the same time arguing that the U.S. should reject a crucial part...

So let me be clear: for sixteen months now I have been a Swedish-model advocate who wants to guarantee bank bondholders. I thought and think it is the best practical road out of this mess."

Saturday, April 25, 2009

And as this blog has stressed, there does not seem to be a Plan B

From Naked Capitalism:

"
Saturday, April 25, 2009

Markets Cheer Stress Test Double Speak

Listen to this article. Powered by Odiogo.com
Forgive me for sounding even crankier than usual, but the reason deception sells is that so many people line up for it.

The release claiming to describe how the stress tests were conducted in fact provided no new information. Some analysts were more than a tad dismissive:
The central bank released a so-called white paper today describing methods used by examiners from the Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to calculate the capital buffer the banks will require through 2011 under two economic scenarios.

“The anticipation over the white paper appears to be much ado about nothing,” said Josh Rosner, an analyst at independent research firm Graham Fisher & Co. in New York. “The most significant numbers provided by the Fed in the paper appear to be the page numbers.”

Financial stocks did well on the belief that most of the big banks would get clean bills of health. But that was the plan from the outset, to validate that the system was more or less OK so that if the poor chump taxpayer had to stump up more money, it could be positioned as due to completely unforeseen events (thanks to having put on very big blinkers) yet still a good risk.

The cheer seems a naive view. Citi is far from out of the woods, with a half trillion of foreign deposits, plus roughly $1 trillion in off balance sheet exposures (remember those SIVs, the watchword of late 2007?). Dislocation there would have far bigger ramifications.

The Financial Times, looking at more or less the same fact set, comes to less upbeat conclusions. Is this the result of being further from the spinmeisters?

From the Financial Times:
Some of the country’s biggest banks will be asked to raise more capital by US authorities following the completion of bank stress tests, senior Federal Reserve officials said on Friday.

A second, larger, group of leading banks will be asked to improve the quality of their capital by increasing their amount of common equity, the officials indicated.

Yves here. A surprisingly large number of market participants are of the view that the current rally is at least in part the result of market manipulation. I can't recall ever seeing so much commentary to that effect. It amounts to an open secret. Even during the commodities run-up of last year, if you dared suggest there was a speculative component, you were treated as a conspiracy theorist. Now a fair number of commentators are making more aggressive claims, and they don't seem terribly far out.

The latest sign of something out of whack is via Jesse, who tells us that insider sales are at high levels. When did that last happen? October 2007. Admittedly, not long ago, but nevertheless not a sign of confidence.

Now back to the FT. The officialdom has wanted banks to raise more equity since the Bear collapse. They fantasized that the banks would be able to get enough done in that recovery to stave off disaster. But as John Dizard pointed out at the time, the needs were so massive that (and he was serious) that central bankers would need to help conduct road shows.

That didn't happen, needless to say. A year later, same problem, bank stocks much cheaper even post rally, so any equity raise more dilutive. And the powers that be have to hope all these banks that need more capital (admittedly reduced considerably thanks to the kindness of taxpayers) raise funds in this window.

The best of breed (for now) Goldman offering was a bit sloppy. Think all these banks, particularly with the stigma of a stress test forced raise, will get their deals done? The vast majority will be back at the government feed bucket, yet Mr. Market is acting as if everything is all for the best in this best of all possible worlds. Back to the FT:
Meanwhile, people familiar with the situation said regulators indicated that Citigroup might need more capital beyond a planned conversion of preferred shares into common stock that will give the government a 36 per cent shareholding.

If Citi has to raise more funds from the government, the authorities might force out Vikram Pandit, its chief executive. However, they added that no decision had been made and each bank had a week to discuss the results of the tests with regulators. Citi declined to comment.

While banks will be encouraged to raise the equity needed from the market, those unable to do so may have to ask the government to convert the preferred shares it holds in them into common equity. This could result in the US government ending up owning – at least temporarily – stakes in a number of the top US financial institutions.

Recall that banks (Citi et al.) that can't raise the needed capital in six months then have to take more TARP funding. And recall further that the "stress" scenario is increasing looking like the mainstream forecast.

The Wall Street Journal has a similar report, with the addition than three of the 19 are to bolster their equity levels:
The identities of the banks, among the 19 institutions that were subjected to federal "stress tests," couldn't be learned. Analysts believe they likely include regional banks with large exposures to commercial real estate in the Midwest and Southeast. Three people familiar with the matter said at least three banks are in this position.

As we said, if the stress test fingers Fifth Third (clean reporting, well managed God-awful geographic footprint) and not Citi, you know the the priority is finding examples to validate its seriousness, and not really discovering real risks.

The problem with the tests is that the focus on the loan books (as reported by the AP) is missing the fact that loans decay more gracefully than bad structured debt or derivatives exposure. Outlier events will hit the big capital markets players far worse than traditional banks. But those scenarios have been deliberately omitted.

And per Bill Black, the emphasis on loans is a charade without inspection of the underlying loan files. And the number of inspectors was clearly insufficient for that to have happened.

The strategy is TinkerBell: if enough people applaud, belief alone will restore goners. That may work in theater, but I'm loath to rely on mere faith in matters of consequence. And as this blog has stressed, there does not seem to be a Plan B (the ideas of Paul Volcker and others not in the Summers/Geithner camp have been relegated to a policy gulag).


Me:

Don said...

Yves. Thanks for bringing up the Dizard. It allows me to comment on Bears and its importance for this crisis. I could just write it up, but I'm a commenter, and by nature passive. I'm passive with women as well. In fact, passivity is the theme of my second novel.

So, let's look at Dizard:

"The Fed itself would have to be a co-sponsor in some form."

"For all the chicanery of speculators and hedgers on the exchanges, there have been no fears of contagion, of one participant's failure leading to others, of the sort that led to the Bear Stearns bail-out/ takeover/near collapse."

So, I made the following assumptions from Bear:
1) The govt fears Debt-Deflation
2) The govt fears we're in a bubble
3) There's no Plan B
4) There's no free market plan
5) The govt will have to guarantee everything
I couldn't explain the bailout without these assumptions.

Now, I could be wrong, but I thought that I read at the time that Bernanke was a follower of Fisher and that explained his view on Bear. Of course, since then, there are a number of commenters who say that Bernanke doesn't understand Fisher. In any case, I have to admit being fooled, and assuming that we could handle this crisis well.

Here's Paulson in March 2008:

"We are working to get through the current period of market turmoil while minimizing its impact on our economy. And, as we do so, risk is being re-priced and markets are de-leveraging. This is creating liquidity challenges and, as a result, credit markets are not functioning as normal. We are encouraging financial institutions to continue to strengthen balance sheets by raising capital and revisiting dividend policies; we need these institutions to continue to lend and facilitate economic growth."

I take the risk of the de-leveraging to be Debt-Deflation. So, again, I thought that everybody understood where we were. Consequently, I'm having a hard time understanding the govt's responses since Bear.

Okay. Let's go to Fannie/Freddie:

"Assumed guarantees

There is a wide belief that FNMA securities are backed by some sort of implied federal guarantee, and a majority of investors believe that the government would prevent a disastrous default. Vernon L. Smith, 2002 Nobel Laureate in economics, has called FHLMC and FNMA "implicitly taxpayer-backed agencies".[27] The Economist has referred to "[t]he implicit government guarantee"[28] of FHLMC and FNMA. In testimony before the House and Senate Banking Committee in 2004, Alan Greenspan expressed the belief that Fannie Mae's (weak) financial position was the result of markets believing that the U.S. Government would never allow Fannie Mae (or Freddie Mac) to fail.[29]"

My assumption:
1) The govt will bailout Fannie/Freddie, with 5 above still in place.
And it did, but it did so in a way that led investors to believe that the govt was not going to guarantee everything. If you look at when China started selling Agencies, you'll see that it's August 2008.

And then Lehman. The real question is why did this happen? Did the govt think it would be a disaster? From Swagel:

"Free Markets Day
The way Congressman Barney Frank put it at a hearing at which I testified on
Wednesday, September 17 was that we should celebrate, Monday, September 15, as
“Free Market Day”— Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail and the free market to work
on that day. Now, the next day, Chairman Frank continued, AIG had been bailed out so
“the national commitment to the free market lasted one day,”3 (as quoted by WSJ.com),
but we should celebrate that day.
The decision not to save Lehman Brothers is no doubt the most hotly debated decision of
during the crisis. Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke have made the point that
with the firm evidently insolvent, they did not have the authority save it—the Treasury
outright had no authority, while the Fed could provide liquidity, not capital. The Fed can
lend, however, against collateral to its satisfaction, so in principle the Fed could have lent
against unencumbered Lehman’s assets—essentially what it did with AIG. This would
not have saved the Lehman—indeed, it would have concentrated losses on the rest of the
firm—but it is possible such lending could have provided time for a more orderly
dissolution of the firm (indeed, there are estimates that the disorder bankruptcy reduced
the recovery value of the firm by billions of dollars). The feeling at Treasury, however,
was that Lehman’s management had been given abundant warning that no federal
assistance was in the offing, and market participants were aware of this and had time to
prepare. It was almost as if Lehman management was in a game of chicken and
determined not to swerve."

China's actions in August should have signaled trouble. I think that he understands this. As to being prepared, this is the main problem I have with his essay. Things had gotten worse, not better. Nor was this a short term problem.

Here again:

"A number of lessons of that weekend have received extensive discussion in the financial
press and in the academic literature, including the role of liquidity (as discussed by Allen
and Carletti (2008)), fragilities arising from counterparty risks embedded in the tri-party
repo system and the over the counter derivative markets, and the need for a resolution
mechanism for non-bank financial institutions. At Treasury, two additional lessons were
learned: (1) we had better get to work on plans in case things got worse, and (2) many
people (at least in Washington, DC) did not understand the implications of non-recourse
lending from the Fed. This latter lesson was somewhat fortuitous, in that it took some
time before the political class realized that the Fed had not just lent JP Morgan money to
26
buy Bear Stearns, but in effect now owned the downside of a portfolio of $29 billion of
dodgy assets. This discovery of the lack of transparency of non-recourse lending by the
Fed was to figure prominently in the financial rescue plans adopted in the first part of
2009.
The Fed’s announcement of the primary dealer credit facility (PDCF) immediately after
the collapse of Bear Stearns seemed to us and many Wall Street economists to remove
the tail risk of another large financial institution suffering a sudden and catastrophic
collapse. This was a time to plan for further events.
Part of the planning was for the long-term, on which Treasury on March 31, 2008
released a Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure with a vision for a
long-term reshaping of financial sector regulation. This had long been in the works—
indeed, Treasury had requested public comments on the topic in October 2007—but the
timing of the report led to press reports that this was Treasury’s “response” to the crisis.
More near term in vision was work being done on so-called “break the glass” options—
the reference being to what to do in case of an emergency. This work evolved from a
recurring theme of the input we received from market participants over the prior year,
which was that the solution to the financial crisis was for Treasury to simply buy up and
hold the “toxic” assets on bank balance sheets. Indeed, this suggestion found its way into
some versions of the Frank-Dodd bill. Eventually a memo was written that listed options
to deal with a financial sector crisis arising from an undercapitalized system—indeed, the
memo went through more than a dozen iterations in discussions around Treasury and
with other agencies between March and April. The options ended up being to buy the
toxic assets, turn the Treasury into a monoline and insure the assets, directly buy stakes in
banks to inject capital, or use a massive scheme to refinance risky mortgages into
government-guaranteed loans and thus improve asset performance and firms’ capital
positions from the bottom up. With estimates in mind that U.S. financial institutions
would suffer $250 billion of losses from mortgage securities, we envisioned a
government fund of $500 billion. A mix of asset purchases, capital injections, and
additional private capital raising by banks would allow this amount to roughly offset the
forthcoming losses.
All of these options, however, would require Congressional action—this would move the
focus of financial markets policy back from the Fed to the Treasury, which would be
appropriate in what was a problem reflecting inadequate capital rather than insufficient
liquidity. But there was no prospect of getting approval for any of this. With growth
positive and the stimulus rebates only just beginning to go out in late-April, it was just
unimaginable then that Congress would give the Treasury Secretary such a fund. And it
was doubly unimaginable that the fund could be enacted without being used. Such a
massive intervention in financial markets could only be propose if Secretary Paulson and
Chairman Bernanke went up to Congress and told them that the financial system and
economy were on the verge of collapse. And we understood that by then it could well be
too late."

I don't know if this is true, but, if it is, congress would bear some heavy responsibility for this crisis. In my opinion, from Lehman, we've been in a slow-motion Debt-Deflation. The govt's actions have done a lot, but we could have done a lot better. For one thing, we could have recognized that the govt has to guarantee everything in order to stop Debt-Deflation. Does that mean we want to spend a lot of money? Quite the contrary, it means that we expect the guarantee to stop the panic, the downward spiral, and allow:

"This would
not have saved the Lehman—indeed, it would have concentrated losses on the rest of the
firm—but it is possible such lending could have provided time for a more orderly
dissolution of the firm (indeed, there are estimates that the disorder bankruptcy reduced
the recovery value of the firm by billions of dollars)."

This could have saved an unknown amount of dollars and jobs. Now, I understand that many, if not most, people don't agree with me, and that's fine. But if you do, do you really believe that the blanket guarantees could have passed the congress or gotten our citizens behind it? From my point of view, we have a crony welfare state which caused and continues to hinder our solving the crisis, but we also have a system in which hard choices and tough news is constantly deferred and put off by everyone. We have the ghastly hybrid precisely because we disagree and have different solutions. Given that, it's amazing that we seem to be lurching towards some decent solutions. One minority view, and tentative supporter of Geithner.

Don the libertarian Democrat

PS Contra Dizard, the Pharisees and Money Changers were not evil people. The Pharisees allowed the average Jew to act like a priest in everyday life, honoring the average person. The money changer allowed average worshipers, who's offerings might be damaged in transport, to sell the offering locally, get cash for it at the Temple ( there were lots of currencies ) and buy an acceptable offering at the Temple. Again, a plan designed to help the average Jew.

April 25, 2009 4:52 PM