Showing posts with label Regulations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Regulations. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

"Matt Apuzzo's excellent article on how the goverment failed to reign back subprime mortgage lenders paints a picture of deregulation run amok"

Felix Salmon considers the story about the Bush Administration's objections to regulation, which I considered interesting, but not of particularly cogent value:

"This is worth underlining. Even if the OCC, the FDIC, the Fed, and the OTS had miraculously managed to come to unanimous agreement on curtailing subprime lending, it still wouldn't have helped much -- because between them, they only had regulatory control over banks. Any subprime lenders which didn't take deposits -- and there were hundreds of them cropping up all over the country, originating loans and selling them on to investment banks to be packaged into bonds -- would have remained outside the regulatory reach.

In other words, without major regulatory consolidation, nothing effective was going to happen in any event. There's a general consensus in Washington now that we need a super-regulator with teeth, and the US might be able to learn from the UK's lessons in setting up the FSA. Once we have that, doing things like clamping down on subprime lending might become a great deal easier."

This is extremely important. Regulations need to be simple and easily enforced. This tangled web of regulations and regulators is, among other things, a breeding ground of lobbying and regulator shopping, as well as of confusion and legal complexity. We need to rationalize many of these agencies, and, just as I wrote that , I became very weary. What's the point?

Here's my comment, for what it's worth:

Posted: Dec 02 2008 5:07pm ET
"These mortgages have been considered more safe and sound for portfolio lenders than many fixed-rate mortgages," "David Schneider, home loan president of Washington Mutual, told federal regulators in early 2006. Two years later, WaMu became the largest bank failure in U.S. history."

The shocking thing in that story was the ignorance and negligence of the industry representatives quoted, who assured everyone that everything was coming up roses. Too bad that they didn't warn us that they meant a thicket of thorns were included.

Monday, December 1, 2008

"It ignored remarkably prescient warnings that foretold the financial meltdown, according to an Associated Press review of regulatory documents."

This ones making the rounds, but it's worth preserving. From CNN Money:

"WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Bush administration backed off proposed crackdowns on no-money-down, interest-only mortgages years before the economy collapsed, buckling to pressure from some of the same banks that have now failed. It ignored remarkably prescient warnings that foretold the financial meltdown, according to an Associated Press review of regulatory documents.

"Expect fallout, expect foreclosures, expect horror stories," California mortgage lender Paris Welch wrote to U.S. regulators in January 2006, about one year before the housing implosion cost her a job."

Pray you expect them in 2009.

"Bowing to aggressive lobbying -- along with assurances from banks that the troubled mortgages were OK -- regulators delayed action for nearly one year. By the time new rules were released late in 2006, the toughest of the proposed provisions were gone and the meltdown was under way."

They were OK. They were guaranteed by the government, they assumed, if everything went sideways.

"These mortgages have been considered more safe and sound for portfolio lenders than many fixed-rate mortgages," David Schneider, home loan president of Washington Mutual, told federal regulators in early 2006. Two years later, WaMu became the largest bank failure in U.S. history."

On the other hand, they've been considered time bombs waiting to go off when interest rates go up.

"The administration's blind eye to the impending crisis is emblematic of its governing philosophy, which trusted market forces and discounted the value of government intervention in the economy. Its belief ironically has ushered in the most massive government intervention since the 1930s."

That was the deal. Less regulations, with the understanding that the government would intervene in a financial crisis.

"Many of the banks that fought to undermine the proposals by some regulators are now either out of business or accepting billions in federal aid to recover from a mortgage crisis they insisted would never come. Many executives remain in high-paying jobs, even after their assurances were proved false."

Let me repeat that this was the understanding.

"In 2005, faced with ominous signs the housing market was in jeopardy, bank regulators proposed new guidelines for banks writing risky loans. Today, in the midst of the worst housing recession in a generation, the proposal reads like a list of what-ifs:"

This isn't that useful, but...

--Regulators told bankers exotic mortgages were often inappropriate for buyers with bad credit. (Obvious )

--Banks would have been required to increase efforts to verify that buyers actually had jobs and could afford houses. ( Obvious )

--Regulators proposed a cap on risky mortgages so a string of defaults wouldn't be crippling. ( Obvious )

--Banks that bundled and sold mortgages were told to be sure investors knew exactly what they were buying. ( Obvious )

--Regulators urged banks to help buyers make responsible decisions and clearly advise them that interest rates might skyrocket and huge payments might be due sooner than expected. ( Obvious )

By "Obvious", I mean these are all already part of the code of fair business practices, and deviations from these points are either fraud, negligence, or fiduciary mismanagement.

"Those proposals all were stripped from the final rules. None required congressional approval or the president's signature."

Were they stripped from decency and common sense.

"In hindsight, it was spot on," said Jeffrey Brown, a former top official at the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, one of the first agencies to raise concerns about risky lending.'

Hindsight usually is.

"Federal regulators were especially concerned about mortgages known as "option ARMs," which allow borrowers to make payments so low that mortgage debt actually increases every month. But banking executives accused the government of overreacting."

Accused? Is overreacting a crime?

"Bankers said such loans might be risky when approved with no money down or without ensuring buyers have jobs but such risk could be managed without government intervention."

Actually, they could have, given honest bankers.

"An open market will mean that different institutions will develop different methodologies for achieving this goal," Joseph Polizzotto, counsel to now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers, told U.S. regulators in a March 2006."

What goal? Bankruptcy?

"Countrywide Financial Corp., at the time the nation's largest mortgage lender, agreed. The proposal "appears excessive and will inhibit future innovation in the marketplace," said Mary Jane Seebach, managing director of public affairs."

"Inhibit" doesn't mean "preclude".

"One of the most contested rules said that before banks purchase mortgages from brokers, they should verify the process to ensure buyers could afford their homes. Some bankers now blame much of the housing crisis on brokers who wrote fraudulent, predatory loans. But in 2006, banks said they shouldn't have to double-check the brokers."

Fraud. Yes. So why don't we pursue it?

"It is not our role to be the regulator for the third-party lenders," wrote Ruthann Melbourne, chief risk officer of IndyMac Bank."

Just give us the money, and we'll look the other way?

"California-based IndyMac also criticized regulators for not recognizing the track record of interest-only loans and option ARMs, which accounted for 70% of IndyMac's 2005 mortgage portfolio. This summer, the government seized IndyMac and will pay an estimated $9 billion to ensure customers don't lose their deposits."

Last week, Downey Savings joined the growing list of failed banks. The problem: About 52% of its mortgage portfolio was tied up in risky option ARMs, which in 2006 Downey insisted were safe -- maybe even safer than traditional 30-year mortgages.

"To conclude that 'nontraditional' equates to higher risk does not appropriately balance risk and compensating factors of these products," said Lillian Gavin, the bank's chief credit officer."

The were meant to be higher risk. Period.

"At least some regulators didn't buy it. The comptroller of the currency, John C. Dugan, was among the first to sound the alarm in mid-2005. Speaking to a consumer advocacy group, Dugan painted a troublesome picture of option-ARM lending. Many buyers, particularly those with bad credit, would soon be unable to afford their payments, he said. And if housing prices declined, homeowners wouldn't even be able to sell their way out of the mess.

It sounded simple, but "people kind of looked at us regulators as old-fashioned," said Brown, the agency's former deputy comptroller."

Why worry? We're too far down this road.

"Diane Casey-Landry, of the American Bankers Association, said the industry feared a two-tiered system in which banks had to follow rules that mortgage brokers did not. She said opposition was based on the banks' best information.

"You're looking at a decline in real estate values that was never contemplated," she said."

That's preposterous. I saw it coming.

"Some saw problems coming. Community groups and even some in the mortgage business, like Welch, warned regulators not to ease their rules.

"We expect to see a huge increase in defaults, delinquencies and foreclosures as a result of the over selling of these products," Kevin Stein, associate director of the California Reinvestment Coalition, wrote to regulators in 2006. The group advocates on housing and banking issues for low-income and minority residents.

The government's banking agencies spent nearly a year debating the rules, which required unanimous agreement among the OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision -- agencies that sometimes don't agree.

The Fed, for instance, was reluctant under Alan Greenspan to heavily regulate lending. Similarly, the Office of Thrift Supervision, an arm of the Treasury Department that regulated many in the subprime mortgage market, worried that restricting certain mortgages would hurt banks and consumers.

Grovetta Gardineer, OTS managing director for corporate and international activities, said the 2005 proposal "attempted to send an alarm bell that these products are bad." After hearing from banks, she said, regulators were persuaded that the loans themselves were not problematic as long as banks managed the risk. She disputes the notion that the rules were weakened.

In the past year, with Congress scrambling to stanch the bleeding in the financial industry, regulators have tightened rules on risky mortgages.

Congress is considering further tightening, including some of the same proposals abandoned years ago".

Good work. In a way, this is pointless. However, it's part of the record.

Saturday, October 25, 2008

"We just need better regulation."

Kevin Sullivan and Neil Irwin in the Washington Post with a good post on hedge funds:

"Regulators at the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission and beyond have increasingly concluded that they need more power to gather information about what kinds of risks hedge funds are taking and what risks they pose to the financial system as a whole.

Using its existing legal authority, the SEC attempted to require hedge funds to register as investment advisers, but a court ruled against that decision in 2006. In congressional testimony Thursday, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said the agency wants lawmakers to grant it that authority explicitly. He also said he would favor folding the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, an independent agency that regulates futures markets, into the SEC to better coordinate regulation."

Here's my comment:

"Leaders of the Federal Reserve, meanwhile, are broadly re-examining their views on financial regulation in light of the crisis. Among their concerns is that light regulation could be worse than none at all, as it could give hedge funds the implicit protection of government oversight even if officials lack the tools to actually guard against risks to the system."

This is a real problem, which is why regulation to aimed at basic concepts like transparency and collateralization, things that the industry itself recognizes.

"Those gathered in London had mixed views on greater regulation. Roman, the executive at GLG Partners, said greater regulation of hedge funds was "long overdue." He said "someone can graduate from college on a Friday and start a hedge fund on Monday."

But Borges said the current political clamor for more regulation could backfire and hurt the economy. "We are not saying that we need zero regulation," he said. "We just need better regulation."

Again, the regulations should simply focus on making the trade clear and solvent.

Let's be honest: We also need better investors.
10/25/2008 11:14:54 AM


Monday, October 6, 2008

Two, Maybe Even Three, Senses Of Regulation

Sebastian Mallaby says the following:

"The financial turmoil has pushed the Obama campaign into the lead, and this is mostly justified. Barack Obama is more thoughtful on the economy than his opponent, and his bench of advisers is superior. But there's a troubling side to the Democratic advance. The claim that the financial crisis reflects Bush-McCain deregulation is not only nonsense. It is the sort of nonsense that could matter. "

You should read the rest of the column to understand why he says that.

I want to make a point about regulation. On the one hand, regulation can be seen as inhibiting the free market, keeping businesses from doing things that would enhance the economy. On the other, regulation can be seen as forcing more conservative business practices on the free market, in order to enhance the economy.

I see regulation through the eyes of taxpayers who are the ultimate guarantors of our financial system in a crisis. If the taxpayers are going to have to foot the bill in the end when crises like this one occur, then I think that it is entirely appropriate that taxpayers put constraints on businesses and business practices in order to guarantee that business in this country in some areas is conducted in a more conservative manner.

So, if you don't want the government to be the ultimate guarantor, then I can see arguing against regulation, since the losses will be borne by businesses. But if not, then government can put in place constraints on what is really their investment.

I agree with Mallaby that it is a real concern that the reaction to this crisis, as in all crises, will be over-regulation. I do not agree that the reaction should be no regulation, but rather minimal and effective regulation to obviate the occurrence of crises.

There is also a lot of talk about socialism, etc., but that is a lot of nonsense. We will continue to have a free market and pursue free trade, however imperfectly. In the real world that is all that we can expect.

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

Can We Really Avoid Some Regulations?

Nick Gillespie has a good post on Reason called "McCain On AIG". Here he quotes Tyler Cowen:

"There are two ways to view this history. First, with the benefit of hindsight, one could argue that we needed only a stronger political will to regulate every corner of finance and avert a crisis.

Under the second view, which I prefer, regulators will never be in a position to accurately evaluate or second-guess many of the most important market transactions. In finance, trillions of dollars change hands, market players are very sophisticated, and much of the activity takes place outside the United States—or easily could."

It's a good point, but here's my response:

"Don the libertarian Democrat | September 17, 2008, 2:34pm | #We'd better come up with a way to avoid these kinds of crises, otherwise there will more bailouts and more regulations. That's the real world. I say that we should try and develop some decent and minimal regulations. But,hey,if the world changes, that's fine with me."

Two points:

1) I agree that we can't regulate every corner of finance, but would like to try and set up some minimal, but suitable, rules to avert future crises like the current one.

2) I'm not sure that we can't have regulators focus on a few well thought out regulations or aspects of the most important market transactions.

Still, I take the point. I just don't see any other real option than some regulations.