Showing posts with label Economist's View. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economist's View. Show all posts

Thursday, April 30, 2009

The conclusion that I draw from this is that we should try a combination of all checklist measures

From the Economist's View:

"No Time to Dither"

Brad DeLong:

There is no time to dither in a meltdown, by J. Bradford DeLong, Project Syndicate: Are the world's governments capable of keeping the world economy out of a deep and long depression? Three months ago, I would have said yes, without question. Now, I am not so certain.

The problem is not that governments are unsure about what to do. The standard checklist of what to do in a financial crisis ... has been gradually worked out over two centuries...

The problem comes when expansionary monetary policy ... and central-bank guarantees of orderly markets prove insufficient. Economists disagree about when ... governments should move beyond these first two items on the checklist.

Should governments try to increase monetary velocity by selling bonds, thereby boosting short-term interest rates? Should they employ unemployed workers directly, or indirectly, by bringing forward expenditures or expanding the scale of government programs? Should they explicitly guarantee large financial institutions' liabilities and/or classes of assets?

Should they buy up assets at what they believe is a discount from their long-run values, or buy up assets that private investors are unwilling to trade, even at a premium above their likely long-run values? Should governments recapitalize or nationalize banks? Should they keep printing money even after exhausting their ability to inject extra liquidity into the economy via conventional open-market operations, which is now the case in the United States and elsewhere?

Three months ago, I said that ... trying a combination of these items - even a confused and haphazard combination - was better than doing nothing. All five of the world's major economies implemented their own confused and haphazard combinations of monetary, fiscal, and banking stimulus policies during the Great Depression, and the sooner they did - the sooner each began its own New Deal - the better. ...

The conclusion that I draw from this is that we should try a combination of all checklist measures - quantitative monetary easing; bank guarantees, purchases, recapitalizations, and nationalizations; direct fiscal spending and debt issues - while ensuring that we can do so fast enough and on a large enough scale to do the job.

Yet I am told that the chances of getting more money in the US for an extra round of fiscal stimulus this year is zero, as is the chance of getting more money this year to intervene in the banking system on an even larger scale than America's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).

There is an 80 percent chance that waiting until 2010 and seeing what policies look appropriate then would not be disastrous. But that means that there is a 20 percent chance that it would be.

Posted by Mark Thoma"

Me:

"by the Victorian-era editor of The Economist, Walter Bagehot; and by the economists Irving Fisher, John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman, among many others.

The key problem in times like these is that investor demand for safe, secure, and liquid assets - and thus their value - is too high, while demand for assets that underpin and finance the economy's productive capital is too low. The obvious solution is for governments to create more cash to satisfy the demand for safe, secure, liquid assets."

"The conclusion that I draw from this is that we should try a combination of all checklist measures - quantitative monetary easing; bank guarantees, purchases, recapitalizations, and nationalizations; direct fiscal spending and debt issues - while ensuring that we can do so fast enough and on a large enough scale to do the job."

This is probably the best post about who to study and what to do that I've read since this crisis began. To the extent that we've actually been following this checklist in a series of lurches, we've managed to stay out of a Debt-Deflationary Spiral. However, we're not out of the woods yet.

Posted by: Don the libertarian Democrat

Saturday, April 18, 2009

This exercise was supposed to build confidence in the system

From the Economist's View:

"Bank Regulators Clash Over Endgame"

The bank stress tests are nearly complete, and there's apparently a debate over what to do with the stress test information on individual banks. Shouldn't Geithner have known what they were going to do with the stress test information before announcing the program in February? Or maybe figured out what those plans were over the last two months as they've been conducting the tests? Did they have plans and then realize they hadn't fully thought them through? Didn't we learn the dangers of going to battle without thinking carefully about the endgame and planning accordingly?

This exercise was supposed to build confidence in the system, but that doesn't happen when you put a policy in place before thinking it through thoroughly. Instead of testing banks, it's ending up as a test of Geithner's credibility as a policymaker, and instead of building confidence, it threatens to undermine it:

Bank Regulators Clash Over Endgame of U.S. Bank Stress Tests, by Robert Schmidt, Bloomberg: The U.S. Treasury and financial regulators are clashing with each other over how to disclose results from the stress tests of 19 U.S. banks, with some officials concerned at potential damage to weaker institutions.

With a May 4 deadline approaching, there is no set plan for how much information to release, how to categorize the results or who should make the announcements... While the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and other regulators want few details about the assessments to be publicized, the Treasury is pushing for broader disclosure.

The disarray highlights what threatens to be a lose-lose situation for Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner: If all the banks pass, the tests’ credibility will be questioned, and if some banks get failing grades and are forced to accept more government capital and oversight, they may be punished by investors and customers. ...

Fed officials have pushed for the release of a white paper laying out the methodology of the assessments in an effort to bolster their credibility. ... A statement on the methods is scheduled for release April 24. ... The 19 companies may get preliminary results as soon as April 24, a person briefed on the matter said.

Regulators, all of which regularly administer exams to the lenders they oversee, have privately expressed concern about the tests and whether they will be effective, the two people said.

While weaker banks deemed to need additional capital will be given six months to raise it, financial markets may have little more than six minutes of patience before punishing them if the information is publicly released, one official said.

Geithner has said he crafted the stress test program in an effort to provide more transparency about the health of banks’ balance sheets. ... How the market handles the results is a chief worry of banks and regulators... Banking lawyers and industry officials said that the Treasury needs to be very clear with the public about the reviews, which by their design test events that may not happen. ...

Posted by Mark Thoma"

Me:

“Will applications filed by QFIs or the names of applying QFIs be released publicly?

No. Treasury will not release the names of QFIs who apply for the CAP or those which
are not approved. Treasury will publish electronic reports detailing any completed
transactions, including the name of the QFI and the amount of the investment, as required
by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, within 48 hours of the
investment.”

And:

“What if a QFI needs capital in excess of the investment limit referred to above?
An institution that needs capital in excess of the investment limit referred to above is
deemed as needing “exceptional assistance.” In consultation with the appropriate Federal
banking agency, Treasury will determine whether an institution qualifies for “exceptional
assistance” on a case-by-case basis.
What will be the terms of transactions involving QFIs in need of exceptional
assistance?
QFIs falling under the “exceptional assistance” standard may have bank-specific
negotiated agreements with the Treasury Department.”

That's from CAP. In other words, the whole point was to assure that these banks would be carefully examined for problems, and then made whole or solvent. What we were supposed to hear in public was the amount of assistance, which could vary with the size and particular needs of each bank. The program was meant to instill confidence by assuring the necessary backing for solvency.

Now, just looking at the program as presented, it's asinine to announce who's in what shape. That would negate the point of issuing the blanket guarantee of solvency.

What's happened is that popular perception has latched onto the idea of "stress tests" being a test for who gets seized or something like that. But, think about it: Even if the govt was going to do that, they wouldn't tell us beforehand.

The program was meant to erase a stigma, not produce one. For one thing, we own a lot of Citi, which is trying to sell its assets. It will hardly make selling those assets easier if we announce exactly what they're getting and why.

Now, if you don't want the govt to help these banks, I can understand pissing on this arrangement. But if you do, why would you want to make the banks less able to do business than more?

Finally, unless we seize the banks in an FDIC sort of way, we are going to be left with a hybrid. In other words, if we simply own stock and have someone manage the bank for us until we sell it, that will still be a hybrid plan because the bank will be a private company with certain fiduciary responsibilities to all its shareholders. It's probably a better idea than CAP, but it has lots of risks, such as:
1) It's one thing for a private company to default, another for a govt to default. If we own it, foreign investors and countries expect us to guarantee it. That's why it could lose us a lot of money. We could just screw them, but that will have negative consequences.
2) We will involve ourselves in foreign politics. For example, we needed a retroactive govt law from Mexico to be able to take more than a 10% stake in Citi. That was popular with some people, while not for others. As well, selling Banamex could have currency issues. All of Citi's foreign holdings will involve a similar problem.
3) All other hybrid problems, like conflict of interest, will remain. After all, Geithner is not even from Wall Street, and he's being accused of collusion.

It is true that we can announce every detail of these tests, and that might be what happens. But it could well end up costing us a lot more money if the market and potential investors or buyers hold out for more money. I thought that we were trying to save money.

I'm no fan of this plan, but I'm also not a fan of us shooting ourselves in the foot over and over again. We're in a damnable mess, and there's no clean or easy way out. We've lots of bad choices to choose from. That's it.

I posted this on Yves Smith. The plan was not to show that some banks were in bad shape. That was the opposite of the plan. It's simply that public opinion is not with them on this plan, and is demanding some kind of accounting, as are some investors. However, again, the whole point of CAP was to make the banks solvent. Period.

Posted by: Don the libertarian Democrat

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

governments should undertake additional measures to boost financial asset prices

From the Economist's View:

"DeLong: Kick-Starting Employment

Brad DeLong:

Kick-Starting Employment, by J. Bradford DeLong, Commentary, Project Syndicate: Unemployment is currently rising like a rocket... In response, central banks should purchase government bonds for cash in as large a quantity as needed to push their prices up as high as possible. Expensive government bonds will shift demand to mortgage or corporate bonds, pushing up their prices.

Even after central banks have pushed government bond prices as high as they can go, they should keep buying government bonds for cash, in the hope that people whose pockets are full of cash will spend more of it...

In addition, governments need to run extra-large deficits. Spending ... boosts employment and reduces unemployment. And government spending is as good as anybody else's.

Finally, governments should undertake additional measures to boost financial asset prices, and so make it easier for those firms that ought to be expanding and hiring to obtain finance on terms that allow them to expand and hire.

It is this point that brings us to US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's plan to take about $465 billion of government money, combine it with $35 billion of private-sector money, and use it to buy up risky financial assets. The US Treasury is asking the private sector to put $35 billion into this $500 billion fund so that the fund managers all have some "skin in the game," and thus do not take excessive risks with the taxpayers' money.

Private-sector investors ought to be more than willing to kick in that $35 billion, for they stand to make a fortune when financial asset prices close some of the gap between their current and normal values. ... Time alone will tell whether the financiers who invest in and run this program make a fortune. But if they do, they will make the US government an even bigger fortune. ...

The fact that the Geithner Plan is likely to be profitable for the US government is, however, a sideshow. The aim is to reduce unemployment. The appearance of an extra $500 billion in demand for risky assets will reduce the quantity of risky assets that other private investors will have to hold. ... When assets are seen as less risky, their prices rise. And when there are fewer assets to be held, their prices rise, too. With higher financial asset prices, those firms that ought to be expanding and hiring will be able to get money on more attractive terms.

The problem is that the Geithner Plan appears to me to be too small - between one-eight and one-half of what it needs to be. Even though the US government is doing other things as well -fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing, and other uses of bailout funds - it is not doing everything it should.

My guess is that the reason that the US government is not doing all it should can be stated in three words: Senator George Voinovich, who is the 60th vote in the Senate - the vote needed to close off debate and enact a bill. To do anything that requires legislative action, the Obama administration needs Voinovich and the 59 other senators who are more inclined to support it. The administration's tacticians appear to think that they are not on board - especially after the recent AIG bonus scandal - whereas the Geithner Plan relies on authority that the administration already has. Doing more would require a legislative coalition that is not there yet.

We're losing, roughly, 600,000 jobs per month, which is about 20,000 per day. There are many costs associated with job loss, but I wonder how many foreclosures per day are generated from the loss of 20,000 jobs? And that's in addition to the foreclosures we'd have anyway.

The administration has an obligation to protect people from cyclical fluctuations in the economy, to help them avoid losing their jobs, their houses, and other sources of security. For example, if bank nationalization is the safer path to pursue ex-ante to stabilize the banking system, then that means convincing the 60th vote in the Senate, one way or the other, to support the action. If more fiscal stimulus, or a larger version of the Geithner plan is needed, then there should be no rest until the votes are there. If the "tacticians appear to think that they are not on board," or someone takes the time - as I hope they did - to ask them and finds out that, in fact, they aren't aboard, then do whatever it takes to change that.

Maybe the effort was there prior to the Geithner plan, and maybe the effort is there now to try to enhance the Geithner plan through legislative authority, to set the stage for a second stimulus in case it's needed, and to change the public perception of what has been done to date. Perhaps a lot of it is behind the scenes, and all that can be done, is being done. Maybe the administration is saving political capital for other things. But prior to the announcement of the Geithner plan, I had the impression that many of the minds within the administration that counted the most were already made up, or if not fully made up that they had a preference for clever market-based solutions (that the public had no hope of understanding, which makes obtaining the public's support much more difficult), and that stood in the way of a true full court press toward nationalization. As for now, I also wonder if concerns within the administration about the deficit are causing hesitation to pursue more aggressive policies. So I'm not so sure that Voinovich was and is (or will be) the only thing standing in the way.

Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, March 31, 2009 at 02:07 AM"

Me:

"Even though the US government is doing other things as well -fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing, and other uses of bailout funds - it is not doing everything it should."

I'll give credit to De Long for seeing that PPIP has an effect on QE, and is one of its benefits.

"Unemployment is currently rising like a rocket"

This is the real problem. If you follow a version of Fisher's Debt-Deflation model, we are currently in it. The unemployment figures are the result of a Proactivity Run, in which employers lay workers off in anticipation of worse times to come. In other words, they are laid off even faster than demand drops. In order to get out of this trap, we need to induce inflation. Inflation will end the Debt-Deflation and ease the laying off of workers. Models describing some natural level of downward spiral are fine, but are inconsistent with a Debt-Deflationary Spiral, precisely because no one knows or can predict its stopping point. This is not simply a lack of knowledge, but part of the inherent nature of Debt-Deflation.

Posted by: Don the libertarian Democrat

Sunday, March 29, 2009

the value of an economic theory should be judged according to its contribution to economic policy

TO BE NOTED: From the Economist's View:

"What Use is Economic Theory?"

Given the discussion below, it seems like a good time to rerun this, a post that was suggested in a comment from Hal Varian:

I've weighed in on this debate in this essay. My thesis is that economics should not be compared to physics but to engineering. Or, alternatively, not to biology but to medicine. That is, economics is inherently a "policy science" where the value of an economic theory should be judged according to its contribution to economic policy.

There are many who disagree with this view, but hey, let a thousand flowers bloom.

Here it is:

What Use is Economic Theory?, by Hal R. Varian, August, 1989: Why is economic theory a worthwhile thing to do? There can be many answers to this question. One obvious answer is that it is a challenging intellectual enterprise and interesting on its own merits. A well-constructed economic model has an aesthetic appeal well-captured by the following lines from Wordsworth:

Mighty is the charm
Of these abstractions to a mind beset
With images, and haunted by herself
And specially delightful unto me
Was that clear synthesis built up aloft
So gracefully.

No one complains about poetry, music, number theory, or astronomy as being ‘‘useless,’’ but one often hears complaints about economic theory as being overly esoteric. I think that one could argue a reasonable case for economic theory on purely aesthetic grounds. Indeed, when pressed, most economic theorists admit that they do economics because it is fun.

But I think purely aesthetic considerations would not provide a complete account of economic theory. For theory has a role in economics. It is not just an intellectual pursuit for its own sake, but it plays an essential part in economic research. The essential theme of this essay that economics is a policy science and, as such, the contribution of economic theory to economics should be measured on how well economic theory contributes to the understanding and conduct of economic policy.

1. Economics as a policy science

Part of the attraction and the promise of economics is that it claims to describe policies that will improve peoples’ lives. This is unlike most other physical and social sciences. Sociology and political science have a policy component, but for the most part they are concerned with understanding the functioning of their respective subject matters.

Physical science, of course, has the potential to improve peoples’ standards of living, but this is really a by-product of science as an intellectual activity.

In my view, many methodologists have missed this essential feature of economic science. It is a mistake to compare economics to physics; a better comparison would be to engineering. Similarly, it is a mistake to compare economics to biology; a better comparison is to medicine. I think that Keynes was only half joking when he said that economists should be more like dentists. Dentists claims that they can make make peoples’ lives better; so do economists. The methodological premise of dentistry and economics is similar: we value what is useful. None of the ‘‘policy subjects’’--- engineering, medicine, or dentistry---is much concerned about methodology, and economists, by and large, aren’t either.

When you think about it, it is quite surprising that there isn’t more work on the methodology of engineering or medicine. These subjects have exerted an enormous influence on twentieth century life, yet are almost totally ignored by philosophers of science. This neglect should be contrasted with with other social sciences where much time and energy is spent on methodological debate. Philosophy of science, as practiced in philosophy departments, seems to be basically concerned with physics, with a smattering of philosophers concerned with psychology, biology, and a few social sciences.

I think that many economists and philosopher who have written on economic methodology have not given sufficient emphasis to the policy orientation of most economic research. One reason for this is the lack of an adequate model to follow. There is no philosophy of engineering, philosophy of medicine or philosophy of dentistry---there is no model of methodology for a policy science on which we can build an analysis. The task of constructing such a theory falls to economists. This is, in my view, one of the most interesting problems for those concerned with methodological issues and the philosophy of the social sciences.

2. Role of theory in a policy science

Given my view that economics is a policy science, if I want to defend a practice in economics, then I must defend it from a policy perspective. So I need to argue about how economic theory is useful in policy. The remainder of the paper will consists of list of several such ways. The list is no doubt incomplete, and I would welcome additions. But perhaps it can help focus some discussion on why economists do what the do, and how theory helps them do it.

Theory as a substitute for data

In many cases we are forced to use theory because the data that we need are not available. Suppose, for example, we want to determine how a market price will respond to a tax. We could estimate this effect by running a regression of market price against tax rates, controlling for as many other variables as possible. This would give us an equation that we could use to predict how prices respond to changes in taxes.

We rarely have data like this; taxes just don’t change enough. But if people only care about the total price of a good, inclusive of tax---a theory---then we can use estimated price elasticities to forecast the response of price to the imposition of a tax.

This uses a theory about behavior---people will respond to the imposition of a tax in the same way that they respond to a price increase---in order to allow data on price responses to be useful. We can use the theory to forecast the outcome of an experiment that has never been done.

Here is another, slightly more esoteric example. Consider the assumption of transitivity of preferences mentioned briefly above. This theory asserts that if A chosen when {A,B} is available and B is chosen when {B,C} is available, then we can predict A will be chosen when {A,C} is available. This is certainly a theory about behavior; it may or may not be true.

If we had data on choices between all pairs of A, B, and C, then the theory wouldn’t be necessary. When we want to predict the choice out of the set {A,C} we would simply look at how the person chose previously---that is, we would just use brute induction. And we know why induction works---it has always worked in the past!

But we rarely observe all possible choices; typically we observe only a few of the possible choices. Theory allows us to interpolate from what we observe to what we don’t observe. In the case of the {A,B,C} example brute induction requires observing all choices the consumer could make from the various proper subsets available, which requires 3 choice experiments. But if the assumption of transitivity holds, then 2 choice experiments are all we need. The theory of consumer choice allows us to economize on the data.

Naive empiricism can only predict what has happened in the past. It is the theory---the underlying model---that allows us to extrapolate.

Theory tells what parameters are important and how we might measure them.

The Laffer curve depicts the relationship between tax rates and tax revenue. At some tax rates tax revenue decreases when the tax rate increases. It has been said that the popularity of the Laffer curve is due to the fact that you can explain it to a Congressman in six minutes and he can talk about it for six months.

The Laffer analysis demonstrates both good and bad economic theory. The bad theory is that inference that because the Laffer effect can occur it does occur. The good theory is that we can use simple supply and demand analysis to determine what magnitudes the elasticity parameters have to be for the Laffer effect to occur. We can then compare the magnitudes of estimated elasticities to estimated labor supply elasticities. In the simplest model a marginal tax rate of 50% requires a labor supply elasticity of 1 to get the Laffer effect. The theory tells us what the relevant parameters are; without the theory, one would have no idea of the relevant parameters are. Indeed, if one examines the rather sordid history of the use of the Laffer curve in public policy debates in the U.S. this becomes painfully clear.

For another example, consider the theory of investment in risky assets. I take it as given that risk is a ‘‘bad.’’ Therefore when wealth goes up, people may want to purchase less of it. On other hand, you can afford to bear more risk when you have more wealth. So an argument based on intuition alone shows that investment in a risky asset can go up or down when wealth increases. A systematic theoretical analysis shows what the comparative statics sign depends on: how risk aversion changes with wealth. So the risk aversion parameter is the one you want to estimate in order to predict how investment in risky assets changes with wealth. Conversely how investment changes with wealth tells you something about how risk aversion changes with wealth.

Theory helps keep track of benefits and costs

I indicated above that the sorts of optimizing models used by economists serve the purpose of providing guidance for policy choices. Indeed one of the important roles of economic theory is to keep track of benefits and costs. The idea of opportunity cost is a fundamental one in economics, and would be very difficult to use without a theoretical model of economic linkages.

This brings up the important point that the correct way to measure an economic benefit or cost can only be determined in light of a theoretical model of choice: a specification of what objectives and the constraints facing an economic agent.

Consider for example, the practice of computing present value or risk adjusted rates of return. These computations are only meaningful in light of a model of choice behavior. If the model of behavior does not apply, the policy prescription cannot apply either.

Benefit-cost analysis is only one small field of economics. But the idea behind benefit-cost analysis permeates all of economics. If economic agents are making choices to maximize something, then we can get an idea of what is being optimized by looking at agents’ choices. This objective function can then be used as an input to making policy decisions. In some cases, one may need a quantitative estimate of the objective function. In other cases, one may want to show that one kind of market structure, or tax structure, may do a better job of satisfying consumers’ objectives than another. But the basic framework of moving from individual objectives, to individual choice, to social objectives and social choice is common to many, many economic studies.

Theory helps relate seemingly disparate problems

If one describes a model in a purely mathematical way, it often happens that the underlying equations will describe a rich set of economic phenomena. The classic example of this phenomenon is the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. The concept of ‘‘good’’ can be interpreted as a physical commodity available at different times, locations, or states of nature. One theoretical model can thereby provide a model of intertemporal trade, location, and uncertainty.

Another example from general equilibrium theory is the First Welfare Theorem. This result shows the intimate relationship between the apparently distinct problems of equilibrium and efficiency.

A third example is that a formal analysis of the problem of second-degree price discrimination shows that it is equivalent to the design of an auction or the determination of optimal provision of qualities. Quality discrimination, auction design, and nonlinear price discrimination are essentially the same sort of problem.

Each of these insights came from examining an abstract theory. Once the the ‘‘irrelevant’’ details are stripped away, its becomes apparent that the same essential choice problem is involved.

Theory can generate useful insights

Let me illustrate this role of economic theory with an example. In the U.S. most interest receipts are taxable income, but many kinds of interest payments are tax deductible. This policy has been criticized as ‘‘subsidizing borrowing.’’ Does it?

The answer depends on the tax brackets of the marginal borrowers and lenders. If the tax brackets are the same, for example, the policy has no effect at all on the equilibrium after-tax interest rate. The supply curve tilts up due to the tax on interest income, but the demand curve tilts up by the same amount due to the subsidy on interest payments. This is a simple insight, but it would be very difficult to understand without a model of the functioning of the market for loans.

A theory that is wrong can still yield insight

Pure competition is certainly a ‘‘wrong’’ theory many markets; pure monopoly is a wrong theory for other markets. But each of these theories can be very useful for yielding significant insights for how a particular market functions. No theory in economics is ever exactly true. The important question is not whether or not a theory is true but whether it offers a useful insight in explaining an economic phenomenon.

In my undergraduate textbook I examine a very simple model of conversion of apartments to condominiums. One result of the model is that converting an apartment to a condominium has no effect on the price of the remaining apartments---since demand and supply each contract by one apartment.

This result can hardly be thought of as literally ‘‘true.’’ There are a host of reasons why converting an apartment to a condominium might influence the rent of remaining apartments. Nevertheless, it focuses our attention on a crucial feature of such conversions: they affect both the supply and the demand for apartments. The simple supply-demand framework shows us how to start thinking about the impact of condominium conversion on apartment prices.

Theory provides a method for solving problems

I take the method of neoclassical microeconomics to be 1) examine an individual’s optimization problem; 2) look at the optimal equilibrium configuration of individual choices; 3) see how the equilibrium changes as policy variables change.

This methods doesn’t always work---the models of behavior or equilibrium may be wrong. Or it may be that the specific phenomenon under examination is not fruitfully viewed as an outcome of optimizing, and/or equilibrium behavior. But any method is better than none. In the words of Roger Bacon: ‘‘More truth arises through error than confusion.’’

Methodological individualism is a limited way of looking at the world, no question about it. It probably doesn’t do very well in describing phenomenon such as riots or class loyalty. Certainly this sort of individualistic methodology works better for describing some sorts of behavior than others. But it is likely to add insight to all problems.

Theory is an antidote to introspection

Most people get their economic beliefs from introspection and their personal experience- --the same place that they get their beliefs about most things. Economic theory---and indeed science in general, can serve as an antidote to this kind of introspection.

Consider, for example, the widely held belief that all demand curves are perfectly inelastic. If the price of gasoline increases by 25%, a layman will argue that no one will change their demand for gasoline. He bases this argument on the fact that he would not change his demand for gasoline.

Indeed, it is perfectly possible that most people wouldn’t change their demand for gasoline...but some would. There are always some people at the margin; these people would change their demand. At any one time, most people are infra-marginal in most of their economic decisions. The marginal decisions are the ones that you agonize over. If the price were a little higher or a little lower, the results of your agonizing might be different, and this is what causes the aggregate demand curve to slope downward.

Another nice example of this phenomenon is free trade. It’s hard to convince a layman of the advantages of free trade since it is easy to see where the dollars go, but difficult to see where they come from. People have personal experience with imports of foreign goods of foreign goods; but they rarely encounter their own country’s exports unless they travel abroad extensively. Only by abstracting from introspection can we see the total picture.

A third example is the bias in perceptions of inflation: price moves are perceived to be exogenous from the viewpoint of the individual, but wage movements are personalized. Even if prices and wages move up by the same amount, people may feel worse off since they think that they would have gotten the wage increases anyway.

Verifying that something is obvious may show that it isn’t

One of the criticisms that economists have to deal with is that they spend a lot of time belaboring the obvious. Isn’t it obvious that demand curves slope down and supply curves slope up? But many theories that seem to be obvious turn out not to be. It may be obvious that demand curves slope down---but as the theoretical analysis shows, it is possible to have demand curves that don’t.

Economic theory shows that a profit-maximizing firm will decrease its supply when the output price decreases. But farmers often claim that removing milk price supports will increase the supply of milk since farmers will have to increase output to maintain the same income. The second effect sounds like it might be possible---after all, farmers wouldn’t advance the claim unless it had some plausibility. However, theory shows us that this particular claim cannot be true if the farmers attempt to maximize profits.

Strategic interactions are a good source of counterintuitive results. A simple analysis of a two-person zero-sum game shows that improving your backhand in tennis may lead to your using it less often.

It would seem that a public offer to match any competitor’s price is a sign of a highly competitive market. But when you think about the problem facing a cartel it is not so obvious. The prime problem facing a cartel is how to detect cheating on the agreed-upon prices and quotas. Offering to match a competitor’s price is a cheap way to gain information about what your competitors are doing. What appears to be a highly competitive tactic can easily be viewed as a device to support collusion.

Theory allows for quantification and calculation

According to Lord Kelvin, ‘‘When you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.’'[1]

Theoretical economics gives us a framework to calculate and quantify economic relations. Consider the Laffer curve mentioned above. Laffer gave the existence proof, but it took some theoretical calculations to see what magnitudes were important.

In fact, one of the major differences between economics and the other social sciences is that in economics you can compute. There is very little computation in sociology, political science, history or anthropology. But economics is filled with computation.

Economic theory is useful since you can use it to compute answers to problems. They aren’t always the right answers---that depends on whether the model you have is right. (Or, at least, whether it is good enough for the purposes at hand.) But a desideratum of a good model is that you can compute with it: the model can be solved to determine some variables as a function of other variables.

In my view, it is impossible to learn economic theory without solving lots of problems. Richard Hamming, a highly prolific electrical engineer, once gave me some excellent advice about how to write a textbook. He told me to assemble the exams and problem sets that you want the students to be able to solve by the time they had finished the course, and then write the book that would show them how to solve them. In general, I have tried to follow this advice, with, I think, some success.

Economics is amenable to experimental verification

Because neoclassical economic models enables one to compute answers to problems, it is possible to compare the answers you get with the outcomes of controlled experiments. In my view, experimental economics has been one of the great success stories of the last 20 years. We now have rigorous ways to test models of human behavior in the laboratory. Some standard models, such as supply and demand, have turned out to be much more robust than we would have thought 20 years ago. Other models, such as expected utility, have turned out to be less robust.

But this is to be expected---if there were no surprises from experiments, they wouldn’t be worth doing. The growth of experimental economics has led many theorists to construct theories that simple, concrete and testable, rather than theories that are complex, abstract, and general. And experience in observing human subjects in the laboratory has no doubt contributed to the current emphasis on investigating models of learning. Laboratory observations have also been instrumental in alerting us to theoretical dead ends, such as some of the more convoluted refinements of game-theoretic equilibrium concepts.

I expect that the interaction between theory and experimentation will continue to grow in the future. As economists become more comfortable with experimentation in the laboratory, they will also become better at identifying ‘‘natural experiments’’ in real-world data. Such developments can only lead to better models of economic behavior.

3. Summary

I have argued that in order to understand why economic theorists behave in the way they do one has to understand the role of economic theory’s contribution to policy analysis. The fact that economics is fundamentally a policy science allows one to explain many aspects of economic theory that are quite mysterious otherwise.
___________________
1 However, the same poet whose praise for abstraction and synthesis I quoted in the introduction also once said: ‘‘...High Heaven rejects the lore of nicely calculated less or more.’’

Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, March 29, 2009"

Monday, March 23, 2009

But it would have involved a massive transfer to the banks without giving taxpayers any share of the upside

From the Economist's View:

"Which Bailout Plan is Best?

Which plan is best, the original Paulson plan where the government buys bad paper directly, the Geithner plan where the government gives investors loans and absorbs some of the downside risk in order to induce private sector participation, or straight up nationalization?

Last March, before Paulson had announced his plan, I said that I thought it was time for the government to begin aggressively purchasing toxic assets to solve this problem once and for all:

I’m starting to think that the Fed should drop the term part of the TSLF and instead trade permanently for risky assets (with the haircut sufficient to provide some compensation for the risk), bonds for MBS, money for MBS, or whatever, and don’t limit trades to banks.

The Fed would act as “risk absorber of last resort.” Why should it do this? There has been an unexpected earthquake of risk, a financial disaster on the scale of a natural disaster like Katrina, and the government can step in and sop some of it up by trading non-risky assets (money, bonds, etc.) for risky assets at an attractive risk-adjusted price. ...

I still think that this would have worked then, I called the government a "risk absorber of last resort," and the prices of the assets at that time were high enough to keep banks solvent. But it would have involved a massive transfer to the banks without giving taxpayers any share of the upside. In addition, as time has passed and prices have fallen, solvency issues have come to the forefront - the balance sheet problems are no longer hidden by overpriced assets - and the solvency problems must be addressed directly. That means that if there is no separate program to provide an infusion of capital, simply removing the toxic assets from the balance sheets through government purchases at current prices - prices so low that the banks are insolvent - won't be resolve the problem.

So if it was to work, the Paulson plan had to be amended, it needed to both get assets off the banks' books somehow, and it also needed to provide recapitalization in a way that is politically acceptable (which means no giveaways - the asset purchase plan I proposed above would have been a giveaway without some sort of redistributive mechanism attached to the plan).

So which plan is best? Any plan that does these two things, removes toxic assets from balance sheets and recapitalizes banks in a politically acceptable manner has a chance of working. The Paulson plan does this if the government overpays for the assets, but the politics of that are horrible (as they should be). The Geithner plan also has these two features, though it has a "lead the (private sector) horse to water and hope it will drink" element to it that infuses uncertainty into the plan. The plan for nationalization most certainly has these features, but it has political problems as well.

So I do not take a binary (or, I suppose, trinary), either/or approach to the proposals where I think one plan will work and the others will fail miserably. All three plans have their pluses and minuses. The politics of the Paulson plan make it a non-starter, I have no quarrel with the view that it constitutes a giveaway that is not justified, so the only way the Paulson plan will work is if we can convince people that equity stakes or some other mechanism makes the plan sufficiently equitable. I prefer nationalization because it provides a certainty in terms of what will happen that the other plans do not provide, the Geithner plan in particular, but it also appears to suffer from the political handicap of appearing (to some) to be "socialist," and there are arguments that the Geithner plan provides better economic incentives than nationalization (though not everyone agrees with this assertion). The Geithner plan also has its political problems, problems that will get much worse if the loans that are part of the proposal turn out to be bad as some, but not all, fear. So all three plans do the requisite things - get assets off the books and provide recapitalization - and each comes with its own set of political worries.

So I am not wedded to a particular plan, I think they all have good and bad points, and that (with the proper tweaks) each could work. Sure, some seem better than others, but none - to me - is so off the mark that I am filled with despair because we are following a particular course of action.

The post quoted above was from over a year ago, and we had been aware of growing problems in the financial sector for some time before that. There were programs in place, but nothing of sufficient scale to get the bad paper off the books, so we've been at this for a long time without any big, decisive, effective policy action. What's important to me is that we do something, that we adopt a reasonable plan that has a decent shot at working and that satisfies the political test it must pass (though the administration could certainly do more to sell the plan to the public and help with this part, so passing the test is partly a reflection of the effort that is put into selling it). We've been spinning our wheels for too long, and it's time to get this done. We can't wait any longer.

So I am willing to get behind this plan and to try to make it work. It wasn't my first choice, I still think nationalization is better overall, but I am not one who believes the Geithner plan cannot possibly work. Trying to change it now would delay the plan for too long and more delay is absolutely the wrong step to take. There's still time for minor changes to improve the program as we go along, and it will be important to implement mid course corrections, but like it or not this is the plan we are going with and the important thing now is to do the best that we can to try and make it work.

Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, March 23, 2009 at 11:52 AM "

Me:
You make fair points, and, at least since last September and versions of this idea became possible, you recognize what I thought then, and still do, is the main problem with buying TAs, and that is the huge political downside if this plan blows up into a huge loss.

In September, I was worried that William Gross,for example, who's a damned smart guy, would cause conflict of interest problems big time working for us, if Pimco made money in some way and we lost a ton of cash. Now, I'm worried about the same thing. We'll lose a bunch of money, but Pimco et al will do well.

I understand that, theoretically, this can work. But I still believe that there's a huge potential political and social downside.

One final point: As far as I'm concerned, the mechanics of the plan today, including TALF, are all versions of William Gross's plan put forward in the Sept. 27th version of the WaPo. I'm not joking in feeling that the comments today about this version of that plan seem like reinventing the wheel for the tenth time since that column. There's something about reading blogs and the press daily that has made this crisis seem like a Twilight Zone episode. If I hear that CDOs and CDSs can't be priced one more time, my head is going to explode.

Saturday, March 7, 2009

The reality is that our current problems are more the result of Wall Street’s stupidity and recklessness than its corruption

From the Economist's View:

"links for 2009-03-07
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, March 7, 2009 at 12:06 AM "

Me:

"The reality is that our current problems are more the result of Wall Street’s stupidity and recklessness than its corruption (though there was plenty of that). And dealing with that problem is quite a bit more challenging."

I don't buy that, but , even if I did, I'd be more worried about Fraud, etc., because that's a crime and needs to be investigated and prosecuted or it will continue. But let's get to the real point.

No one is saying that Wall Steet types expected Debt-Deflation or even to lose money. Just like Madoff, they probably thought that things would work out, or that it was worth the risk. Saying that they were hopeful that whatever they were doing would work isn't very profound. Of course they did.

The question is what allowed them to take such enormous risks. Surowiecki doesn't believe in moral hazard at all. The fact that the government had been intervening in financial crises since the S & L Crisis doesn't seem relevant to him. To me, that defies belief, especially when you see how the investor class reacted to Lehman. They were betting on the government intervening. In fact, they were demanding it. The major banks believed that their lobbying had bought them an insurance policy for government aid if there was a crisis. They believed that, as in the recent past, the intervention could be costly but would be contained if the government intervened. They did not have to foresee this specific crisis to have been acting on implicit government guarantees. That's silly. They simply expected government aid if they got in trouble. Since we now know that the FDIC had no plans in place in seize a large bank, and we don't let banks go bust in this country, what does Surowiecki think that the plan was if a major bank became insolvent? It was obviously to merge the insolvent large bank with another large bank, at whatever cost to the taxpayer that was needed.

Also, no one is saying that this is all fraud or criminal behavior, many of the problems seem like negligence or fiduciary misconduct. They are civil problems.

As for the risk wasn't known, that's just silly. They were looking for investment vehicles that allowed lower capital requirements. That makes them inherently riskier than other investments. Robert Rubin has a quote saying that he knew exactly that. They knew that these were risky investments.

CDSs and CDOs are not hard to understand as to RISK. It is difficult to do the math that creates tranches and statistical data for prediction, but the risk is easy to explain. They are an attempt to use high leverage, and that's not hard to explain. Just as in the subprime loan business, wall street types misled investors as to the risk.

Here's a paper from 2005 that I found on the web long ago from 2005:

http://www.msfinance.ch/pdfs/AnnelisLuescher.pdf

You're telling me that highly educated millionaires couldn't find sources like these on the web or find someone to give them another side to these investments? I don't believe that. Would that have meant that they wouldn't have tried these investments? No. They would have. But they would not have invested the amounts that they have. That's the point. They were consciously overlooking and underplaying risk because the rewards were so great. The Kool Aid, as Surowiecki calls it, was, at the very least, a reckless investment strategy that's now being fobbed off as stupidity, just as in the S & L Crisis. Fortunately, although not at the time, we now have a lot of resources that have shown us that much of the so-called stupidity was actual fraud.

Finally, I sold my house early last year because there was a housing bubble. If I could see that, then I have to believe that some of these Wall Street types could as well but ignored it.

A couple more points about Surowiecki. Note this quote:

http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/liquidity_credit_crunch.pdf

"To see this, consider a bank that hypothetically holds two perfectly negatively correlated BBB-rated
assets. If it were to hold the assets directly on its books, it would face a high capital charge. On the other
hand, if it were to bundle both assets in a structured investment vehicle, the structured investment
vehicle could issue essentially risk-free AAA-rated assets that the bank can hold on its books at near zero
capital charge."

I could be reading this wrong, but this helps understand why banks held onto some of these tranches.

Finally, could anything be more helpful to selling risky crap than having someone say that it's AAA and they're investing their own money. One could imagine Mr.Surowiecki helping to sell Madoff or Stanford by saying, "Look! Look! They're investing their own money! How could it be a Ponzi Scheme?"

Perhaps that was part of the pitch.

Friday, March 6, 2009

The well of money may be running dry, and so, too, may be America's legendary optimism and hope.

From the Economist's View:

"Stiglitz: How to Fail to Recover

Yet another voice saying the stimulus package was too small, and that the bank bailout plan is inadequate:

How to Fail to Recover, by Joseph E. Stiglitz, Project Syndicate: Some people thought that Barack Obama's election would turn everything around... Because it has not, even after the passage of a huge stimulus bill,... a new program to deal with the underlying housing problem, and several plans to stabilize the financial system, some are even beginning to blame Obama and his team.

Obama, however, inherited an economy in freefall, and could not possibly have turned things around in the short time since his inauguration. President Bush seemed like a deer caught in the headlights - paralyzed, unable to do almost anything - for months before he left office. It is a relief that the US finally has a president who can act, and what he has been doing will make a big difference.

Unfortunately, what he is doing is not enough. The stimulus package appears big ... but one-third of it goes to tax cuts. And ... Americans ... are likely to save much of the tax cut. Almost half of the stimulus simply offsets the contractionary effect of cutbacks at the state level. ...

In short, the stimulus will strengthen America's economy, but it is probably not enough to restore robust growth. ...

The real failings in the Obama recovery program, however, lie not in the stimulus package but in its efforts to revive financial markets. America's failures provide important lessons...:

- Delaying bank restructuring is costly...

- Governments do not like to admit the full costs of the problem, so they give the banking system just enough to survive, but not enough to return it to health.

- Confidence is important, but it must rest on sound fundamentals. Policies must not be based on the fiction that good loans were made, and that the business acumen of financial-market leaders and regulators will be validated once confidence is restored.

- Bankers can be expected to act in their self-interest... Perverse incentives fueled excessive risk-taking, and banks that are near collapse but are too big to fail will engage in even more of it. Knowing that the government will pick up the pieces if necessary, they will postpone resolving mortgages and pay out billions in bonuses and dividends.

- Socializing losses while privatizing gains is more worrisome than the consequences of nationalizing banks. ...

- Don't confuse saving bankers and shareholders with saving banks. ...

- Trickle-down economics almost never works. Throwing money at banks hasn't helped homeowners: foreclosures continue to increase. ...

- ...The Obama administration is promising to pick up losses to persuade ... private investors to buy out banks' bad assets. But this will not establish "market prices," as the administration claims. With the government bearing losses, these are distorted prices. Bank losses have already occurred, and their gains must now come at taxpayers' expense. ...

- Better to be forward looking than backward looking, focusing on reducing the risk of new loans and ensuring that funds create new lending capacity. Bygone are bygones. ...

The era of believing that something can be created out of nothing should be over. Short-sighted responses by politicians - who hope to get by with a deal that is small enough to please taxpayers and large enough to please the banks - will only prolong the problem. An impasse is looming. More money will be needed, but Americans are in no mood to provide it - certainly not on the terms that have been seen so far. The well of money may be running dry, and so, too, may be America's legendary optimism and hope.

Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, March 6, 2009 at 05:40 PM"

Me:

I agree with the entire post. I simply believe that a sales tax cut which would be for a limited time could help encourage consumption. I also favor a QE plan that does not include borrowing. Infrastructure can be increased as we go along, but it should be carefully spent. Add more social safety net spending if you want more spending other than infrastructure.

What is also needed is a clearheaded perception of how different institutions actually work

From the Economist's View:

"Capitalism Beyond the Crisis"

This is from a longer essay by Amartya Sen in the New York Review of Books:

Capitalism Beyond the Crisis, by Amartya Sen, NYRB: ...While Adam Smith has recently been much quoted, even if not much read, there has been a huge revival, even more recently, of John Maynard Keynes. Certainly, the cumulative downturn that we are observing right now, which is edging us closer to a depression, has clear Keynesian features...

However, Keynes can be our savior only to a very partial extent, and there is a need to look beyond him in understanding the present crisis. One economist whose current relevance has been far less recognized is Keynes's rival Arthur Cecil Pigou... Pigou was much more concerned than Keynes with economic psychology and the ways it could influence business cycles and sharpen and harden an economic recession that could take us toward a depression (as indeed we are seeing now). Pigou attributed economic fluctuations partly to "psychological causes"...

It is hard to ignore the fact that today, in addition to the Keynesian effects of mutually reinforced decline, we are strongly in the presence of "errors of...undue pessimism." Pigou focused particularly on the need to unfreeze the credit market when the economy is in the grip of excessive pessimism... One of the problems that the Obama administration has to deal with is that the real crisis ... has become many times magnified by a psychological collapse. ...

The contrast between Pigou and Keynes is relevant for another reason as well. While Keynes was very involved with the question of how to increase aggregate income, he was relatively less engaged in analyzing problems of unequal distribution of wealth and of social welfare. In contrast, Pigou not only wrote the classic study of welfare economics, but he also pioneered the measurement of economic inequality as a major indicator for economic assessment and policy.[7] ...

A third way in which Keynes needs to be supplemented concerns his relative neglect of social services—indeed even Otto von Bismarck had more to say on this subject than Keynes. That the market economy can be particularly bad in delivering public goods (such as education and health care) has been discussed by some of the leading economists of our time... This is, of course, a long-term issue, but it is worth noting in addition that the bite of a downturn can be much fiercer when health care in particular is not guaranteed for all.

For example, in the absence of a national health service, every lost job can produce a larger exclusion from essential health care... The failure of the market mechanism to provide health care for all has been flagrant, most noticeably in the United States, but also in the sharp halt in the progress of health and longevity in China following its abolition of universal health coverage in 1979. ...

The revival of Keynes has much to contribute both to economic analysis and to policy, but the net has to be cast much wider. ... A crisis not only presents an immediate challenge that has to be faced. It also provides an opportunity to address long-term problems ... like conservation of the environment and national health care, as well as the need for public transport, which has been very badly neglected ... even in the initial policies announced by the Obama administration

The present economic crises do not, I would argue, call for a "new capitalism," but they do demand a new understanding of older ideas, such as those of Smith and, nearer our time, of Pigou, many of which have been sadly neglected. What is also needed is a clearheaded perception of how different institutions actually work, and of how a variety of organizations—from the market to the institutions of the state—can go beyond short-term solutions and contribute to producing a more decent economic world. ...

Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, March 6, 2009 at 12:15 AM"

Me:

I'm not sure what he's talking about. We have a welfare state. It favors certain interests over others, and that might be good to change, but does anyone really believe that we're going to have something besides a welfare state going forward? I worry about things like nationalism, and who's running the show, but the structure seems very entrenched.

I should add that I sort of agree with it, but that its lack of specificity makes it sound much more portentous than it actually reads. Pigou and Smith come up all the time on blogs.

Monday, December 15, 2008

"The risk that this is not the relevant analogy for the US, and that policymakers are not prepared to accept such a possibility."

After saying that mining the Great Depression for clues on how to get us out of this current problem is of minimal use, I find this post by Tim Duy on the Economist's View interesting:

"But to be a real Dollar rout, we would expect to see Treasuries come under severe pressure, which has not exactly been a recent trend. So perhaps there really is nothing to fear. Indeed, I have argued that that if the stimulus is too excessive, that excess should reveal itself in the Treasury market, and policymakers can simply back off. No problem – ease away. Build those bridges.

This assumes that policymakers back off. What if rising Treasury rates encourage the Fed to double down, expanding quantitative easing to hold rates low and stimulative. What if years of research on the Great Depression have left even the best and the brightest with tunnel vision such that they could not accept that they were wrong?

Bottom Line: The Fed is headed to the zero mark, with another 50bp almost certain this week. It is widely expected that they will give some guidance as to their next steps, pointing us in the direction of an explicit policy of quantitative easing. Fed policy, as well as fiscal policy, assumes that the Great Depression is the most accurate analogy. This assumption ignores the external position of the US, which stubbornly refuses to adjust. If that failure to adjust is relevant, then recent Dollar stability was simply a head-fake. We should see pressure on the Dollar and, ultimately, Treasuries. Policymakers could adjust, but would they? With pursuit of the Great Depression case as the baseline scenario, it seems prudent to keep in mind the risk that this is not the relevant analogy for the US, and that policymakers are not prepared to accept such a possibility."

I think that Printing Money is simply the clearest option that we have. It has little to do with the Great Depression. The problems this could lead to are serious, and we'll be in for a rough ride. But the fact that the policy of Printing Money is Assessable makes it a good choice. I doubt that anyone in this mess is going to hold to a failing policy for too long. Rather, I would fear that we do not give these policies a chance to be assessed.

As to the point about the usefulness of the Analogy with the Great Depression, I agree.