Showing posts with label SIFMA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SIFMA. Show all posts

Monday, June 8, 2009

asset managers are starting to take on the establishment

TO BE NOTED: From the FT:

"
On the march

By Gillian Tett and Aline van Duyn

Published: June 8 2009 20:30 | Last updated: June 8 2009 20:30

Wall Street
A new day dawns on Wall Street: in the boom years, asset managers allowed big investment banks to make the running in over-the-counter trading. Now, they say this ‘sell side’ has had things its own way for too long

Samuel Cole was fed up. Some of the world’s largest investment banks were, in the view of the chief operating officer at BlueMountain Capital, playing foul in the credit derivatives market in which his New York hedge fund sought to make its money.

Far from being chastened by their near-death experience in the financial crisis, he seethed, Wall Street’s finest were displaying a stubborn unwillingness to reform trading practices.

So Mr Cole fired off an e-mail last week to more than 100 bankers, investors and regulators, in which he argued that many of the banks that sold those sorts of securities were “not seriously engaged in working with the buy side” – the asset managers who invested in them. Banks needed to co-operate in reforming trading practices to create a more balanced and transparent market.

“The dealer community may be filibustering to protect its oligopoly,” he wrote – echoing the sentiments of many hedge fund managers, who worry that harsh regulatory intervention could kill off the sector.

The banks deny being recalcitrant. But as regulators step up their efforts to reform banking, the angry e-mail is just one sign of a new set of strains building in the financial system between those who sell financial products and the asset managers who buy them – mostly on behalf of clients. The fight, which extends well beyond trading in credit derivatives, could potentially affect far more than just financiers. If the structure of capital markets changes, it could reduce the fees that the financial industry takes from customers that include many of the world’s biggest companies.

The hedge fund’s criticism adds to pressure from regulators and politicians for a better way to run the so-called over-the-counter markets, where deals take place away from any recognised exchange.

During the credit boom, it was clear who had the upper hand. In the City of London and on Wall Street it had long been taken for granted that the world’s largest investment banks dominated the financial markets. These “sell side” institutions had vast resources and tended to structure activity in ways that were most profitable for them, at the expense of investors buying the products. Asset managers – pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds and the like – often appeared to have little incentive or ability to challenge this status quo.

Now, however, that power balance between buy and sell sides is starting to shift. Wracked by losses incurred in the crisis, and under attack from their own investors for tolerating the dominance of banks, asset managers are starting to take on the establishment.

“The wealth destruction that has occurred has been enormous, although it will probably only become [fully] visible in the next few years, when people go to get their pension and discover it is much less than they thought,” says Hans-Jörg Rudloff, the chairman of Barclays Capital who also heads the International Capital Markets Association (Icma), a financial industry lobbying group. “The end result of that wealth destruction is that investors are looking more closely at what is being bought, how markets are working – they are questioning many things.”

DISTRESSED DEBT

‘Organise to assert your rights or face an adverse outcome’

The sudden involvement of the US government in numerous distressed sectors – from the car industry to the mortgage market – has prompted investors to find a voice in Washington to ensure their interests are protected, writes Aline van Duyn.

When debts exceed the amount of money available to repay them, there is an inevitable scramble among the people owed money as they vie for as much as possible of a shrinking pie. These efforts are usually guided by the contracts that underpin the loans or other debts. In the US, the process of restructuring a company’s debts is well-established through law and bankruptcy judges weigh in whenever it is not clear who stands to benefit.

In the recent fight over the future of Chrysler and General Motors, bondholders and some lenders said the government pushed through terms that favoured workers and overturned relationships established by contract law. Tactics to capture the attention of politicians have included rallies by private investors who owned GM bonds.

Similar arguments are taking place in the US mortgage market, which has long been financed by investors such as pension funds and insurance companies buying bonds backed by home loans.

Seeking to tackle a house price collapse and stem the rise in foreclosures, the government has introduced a series of measures that allow people to renegotiate mortgage payments to make them more affordable.

That hurts asset managers holding mortgage bonds that are backed by so-called “first lien” mortgage loans. These are supposed to incur losses only when riskier, “second lien” mortgages have been written off.

However, hedge funds, pension funds and others have struggled to make their case. That is partly because they are not a homogenous group and because, according to some, they have had few direct connections with senators, having left much of the mortgage industry lobbying in the past to banks.

“It seems very clear in the months ahead that first lien investors must get better at organising to assert their rights, or they will face an extremely adverse outcome,” says Laurie Goodman, analyst at Amherst Securities.

Although there are plenty of hedge funds involved in the mortgage securities battle, it was the mutual funds or pension funds that represent ordinary people who were put forward and who wrote to or met senators.

Another factor behind the power shift is liquidity, or the ease with which investors can trade assets. That is seldom a problem with shares in big companies that change hands in large numbers daily on a public stock exchange – where buyers and sellers have equal clout. But when securities are only thinly traded on an exchange (as is the case with some smaller companies), investment banks can wield more power, since they use their own money to make markets in such stocks. And when assets are traded via private deals in the so-called over-the-counter sector, the banks that act as brokers in the transaction have enormous power at their disposal, since they not only organise trades but also have exclusive access to information about the prices and volumes that are being achieved.

That over-the-counter set-up prevailed in particular for many derivatives and the more complex credit products that were the hot products of the boom years. Opacity enabled the broker banks to charge high fees and organise trades to suit them. Asset managers tacitly accepted this, since brokers made markets and thus enabled others to trade.

Moreover, in the days of the credit boom, banks were willing to provide hedge funds with the loans they needed to make ever bigger bets in search of the best rewards. “There was a lot of competition among the dealers, which resulted in tight bid/offer spreads and good liquidity,” says Rohan Douglas of Quantifi, a provider of credit market analysis.

Now, however, many banks are so short of capital that they are no longer willing to make loans to investors, or even to act as marketmakers. “Instead of being liquidity providers, the dealers have become liquidity users,” says the chairman of one large investment bank. That has made it even more expensive for asset managers to trade – and some parts of the market have frozen up. The climate has changed “and, now, what’s good for banks – as they are constrained in the amount of capital available for trading – is not necessarily good for investors,” says Mr Douglas.

Hence the tensions between the buy and sell sides – which are prompting some investors to seek ways to cut out the middleman. “These days we are seeing lots of corporate [bond] issuers coming to us directly when they want to raise money, not using a broker,” says an executive at a Middle Eastern sovereign wealth fund.

The collapse of liquidity is also prompting a wider rethink of the market structure. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are backing a drive to make over-the-counter trading more transparent and egalitarian or move many of those dealings on to an exchange. They are being egged on by securities exchanges, which scent an opportunity.

The future structure of the $27,000bn (£16,900bn, €19,500bn) credit derivatives market – the subject of the angry e-mail from the Park Avenue-based BlueMountain – is one case in point. Until now, it has been dominated by a small coterie of banks. But Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, is demanding that activity should move to a central clearing platform, to reduce “counterparty risk” – the danger that a trade will collapse if one party defaults. Some politicians and regulators want to go further and place all activity on an exchange.

Other battlefronts are opening up. The European Commission is pushing for more price transparency in privately traded company bonds. Investors in structured credit – the packages of debt sliced and diced by investment bankers – are demanding the same. America’s mortgage bond market is immersed in a separate collection of fights, because efforts to restructure delinquent home loans are pitching the interests of investors against those of the banks.

“There is a natural tension between all stakeholders – dealers, investors and, uniquely today, governments – that has been aggravated recently due to the extreme economic and market pressures on all participants,” says Tim Ryan, head of Sifma, an industry grouping that tries to represent both banks and investors. “We see the tension up close as we strive for consensus among our members,” he adds, noting that this jostling “has been most pronounced in mortgage modifications, industrial restructurings, equity shorting and derivative markets.”

Or as Armins Rusis of Markit, a data provider, notes: “Some markets will continue to be as they are now, typically with a few big marketmaking dealers trading with many smaller dealers and investors. But some may shift completely.”

How many of these battles will be won by investors remains unclear. Brokers and large banks have in the past been adept at fighting off challenges. “The buy side is very fractured – there are big differences between all the different types of institutions, between those serving retail clients and others,” says Robert Parker of Credit Suisse Asset Management and head of an investor lobbying group within Mr Rudloff’s Icma.

Yet Mr Parker’s creation of the investor group last year is itself evidence of a mobilisation by buy-side interests. Moreover, politicians and regulators appear to be supporting their cause.

In the US, William Dudley, president of the New York Federal Reserve, is trying to give investors a louder voice. The Fed used to garner almost all of its market feedback from the sell side – groups such as JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs or Merrill Lynch. But in recent months the New York Fed has started including asset managers in advisory committees and created an informal advisory group of hedge fund, private equity and asset managers. “Our aim in this is not to disenfranchise the dealers but to enfranchise the buy side. We want the whole market to be part of the decision-making process,” says Mr Dudley.

Whether the “whole market” can be corralled into making collective decisions remains unclear: though groups such as Sifma and the Fed itself stress that it is in everyone’s interest to co-operate, the turf wars are likely to grow more rather than less intense. “All over the place, there are fights going on about who will control the system. It’s ugly,” observes one Wall Street financier.

Yet some see all this as healthy in the long run. “This crisis has been terrible, but it has been good in a way because it is making us rethink things about how the market is run,” says Sandrine Guerin, deputy chief executive of Credit Foncier, the French financial group. “It could make a better system in the future – or so I hope,” she adds. It is an aspiration that millions of savers will share, after two years of brutal losses.


Additional reporting by Hal Weitzman and Michael Mackenzie

TRADING PLACES: CONDITIONS AND TERMS

Global banks market

Only a fraction of buying and selling in financial markets occurs in institutions such as the New York and London stock exchanges. Newer activities, such as the trading of derivatives, are transacted privately in over-the-counter markets. These are split between buy-side institutions, such as pension funds and hedge funds, that have money to invest, and the sell side : banks and brokerages that make investment recommendations and allow investors to buy and sell assets. Much of the sell-side activity is marketmaking, in which banks and brokers commit always to offer a price for an asset. Prime brokerage, where banks lend to hedge funds and other clients so they can invest, is also lucrative.

The industry accepts its share of responsibility for its role in the economic crisis and its duty to be part of the recovery

TO BE NOTED: From the FT:

"
Wall Street is a willing partner in financial reform

By Tim Ryan

Published: June 8 2009 20:41 | Last updated: June 8 2009 20:41

Many Americans are angry and have lost basic trust in the financial services industry. The industry accepts its share of responsibility for its role in the economic crisis and its duty to be part of the recovery. We intend to partner with governments to overhaul the regulatory system to help prevent such a crisis again.

President Barack Obama will soon unveil a comprehensive regulatory reform plan. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Sifma) recognises the urgent need for such a plan and is strongly in support of reform. Financial market participants know the time for change and reform in financial services has come.

Financial products and services are interwoven into the daily fabric of economic life. While not every financial firm or employee contributed to the crisis, it is clear that too many acted improperly and some products were pushed to a level of unsustainable complexity. Given this reality, Sifma has already unveiled its support for a number of major policy reforms as we build a new foundation for our economy.

First, we have endorsed the creation of a single financial markets stability supervisor, a central authority with oversight in all markets and of all systemically important market participants – regardless of charter, function or unregulated status. This stability supervisor must be given sufficient resources to collect data across markets and the ability to use it to take swift corrective action to prevent systemic instability. Never again should the failure of one or a handful of firms be allowed to threaten the viability of our economic system.

Second, the industry strongly supports the administration’s proposal for a public-private partnership to absorb troubled assets. While both the economy and financial firms have retreated from the brink, it remains crucial that the government build the infrastructure for these programmes. We do not know what the future holds, but with a few stable weeks behind us, we cannot assume that the worst has passed. These necessary programmes should serve as a temporary safety net, until our economic future stands on more certain ground.

Third, it is clear the complexity of some financial instruments went too far, while some supervisory policies did not go far enough, making the crisis worse. Securitisation market participants seek a return to the basics and are making smart reforms to industry practices such as tightening underwriting practices and increasing transparency to protect investors. Markets themselves have also imposed some much-needed discipline, declaring the end of complex and confusing products such as collateralised debt obligations squared.

Fourth, we support many of the new policies to bring transparency to the derivatives market, while ensuring that derivatives continue to be widely available to serve their critical role of increasing credit availability to borrowers. When lenders can purchase protection against the credit risk of making a loan, they are more willing to provide and expand credit for businesses, enabling those businesses to grow and hire.

Sifma has supported the need for regulatory reform of derivatives, noting that our current system had as many gaps as safeguards. Some firms exploited these gaps for regulatory arbitrage. Tim Geithner, the Treasury secretary, has announced moves in the right direction: asking for fundamental measures to ensure the significant market participants are properly overseen, and suggesting how to deliver the transparency needed for proper oversight.

Finally, we firmly believe that there have been excesses on the compensation front, and the industry is working to ensure that compensation is tied to long-term, not short-term, performance. In our view, compensation should not encourage excessive risk-taking, but should promote business sustainability and be aligned with the best interests of shareholders, the financial system and the economy.

When it is relevant to the reforms, it is crucial we collaborate with the proper international regulatory authorities. In the coming weeks, Sifma will engage in more substantive discussions on these issues and the others that will emerge, because the industry is committed to being part of the solution. With industry and government working together, we can restore confidence and sustainable growth.

The writer is chief executive of Sifma

Friday, April 3, 2009

For occasional investors, Travis Larson recommends investinginbonds.com.

TO BE NOTED: From Shopyield:

Retail transparency

Online help for novice bond investors

A Financial Q&A with Steve Dinnen.

from the April 2, 2009 edition, Christian Science Monitor

Q : I have had trouble finding a user-friendly bond site. I seem to keep getting sites where there are runs of transactions bought and sold in the past 12 hours. But I can’t find a site where I could peruse bonds, check out maturities, yield, etc. I would really appreciate it if you can direct a novice user

M.C., Center Sandwich, N.H.

A: The bond market, vastly larger than the stock market, can indeed be a daunting place in which to navigate. There are several for-pay sites, which can be quite expensive and are aimed mainly at professional traders. Your brokerage house also should have web-based information on bonds that’s available to clients.

For occasional investors, Travis Larson recommends investinginbonds.com. This is an educational web site designed by the industry and sponsored by the organization for which he is a spokesman, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (formed after a merger that included the Bond Market Association).

Mr. Larson says the site is appropriate for individuals with all levels of financial education, from beginners to experienced investors. It offers bond price information and includes a wide variety of market data, news, commentary, and education about bonds.

You can dive fairly deep into information on corporate, municipal, and government bonds.
This has been ranked as a top investor site for bonds by a number of media outlets, and he says it’s “continually enhanced and updated with new data, information, and features.”

Bonds are a fast-moving target. Here’s an area where it pays to check with your financial adviser, who typically will have access to proprietary research and trading programs.

Submit your question to Steve Dinnen.

Sunday, November 9, 2008

"“I am a big believer in government establishing the market clearing price for these assets because nobody else is doing it.”

Here's an argument for buying toxic assets with TARP in the FT:

"Plans for the US government to buy troubled assets as part of its $700bn financial sector rescue should not be abandoned or delayed in the transition to the Obama presidency, a top securities industry official has warned.

In an interview with the Financial Times, Tim Ryan, president of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, said: “I do not think we can put this on hold for two months. We would not put foreign policy on hold for months during the transition.”

The plan to buy so-called toxic assets from banks was the original centrepiece of the $700bn financial sector rescue approved by Congress, but was overshadowed when the first $250bn was diverted to buy stakes in banks.

There are still few details as to which securities the government will buy, and how, and many question whether the Obama administration will implement the asset purchase scheme at all.

Traders say uncertainty over the fate of the purchase plan is compounding all the many existing difficulties restarting trading in these troubled assets."

Mr Ryan, a former head of the Resolution Trust Corporation which cleaned up the mess after the Savings and Loan crisis, added: “I am a big believer in government establishing the market clearing price for these assets because nobody else is doing it.”

He said as long as banks remained unsure about what their assets were worth, capital injections would have only limited impact on their willingness to extend credit."

Here's my question:

In order for the government to buy these toxic assets they have to be priced. How are they going to be priced since they can't be priced now? Why does the government have to do that by buying them? In other words, how can you buy something that isn't priced?

One thing is clear. TARP, contra Anna Schwartz, can both recapitalize banks and buy toxic assets. They aren't necessarily mutually exclusive.


Thursday, October 30, 2008

Securitization Reconsidered

Okay. Big news. Derivative Dribble explains securitization. Let's go back to the Bloomberg article:

"The bundling of consumer loans and home mortgages into packages of securities -- a process known as securitization -- was the biggest U.S. export business of the 21st century. More than $27 trillion of these securities have been sold since 2001, according to the Securities Industry Financial Markets Association, an industry trade group. That's almost twice last year's U.S. gross domestic product of $13.8 trillion. "

Okay. Claims about securitization:
1) bundles loans and mortgages into securities
2) more than $27 trillion of these securities have been sold since 2001
3) that makes these securities the largest U.S. export since 2000

So what? That hardly seems a bother other than the figure being quite large, but, then, good for the U.S.

So now banks outside the U.S. start doing this:
Result: $667 billion in losses: $260 billion or so outside of U.S.: about $400 billion in the U.S.

Okay. These securities lost this money? How?

"Securitization is a shadow banking system that funds most of the world's credit cards, car purchases, leveraged buyouts and, for a while, subprime mortgages. The system, which pools loans and slices up the risk of default, made borrowing cheaper for everyone, creating a debt culture that put credit cards in wallets from Seoul to Sao Paolo and enabled people to buy luxury cars and homes. It also pumped out record profits for banks, accounting for as much as one-fifth of their revenue over the last decade."

Okay, here, I'm lost.

These securities fund:
A. Credit cards
B.Car purchases
C. Leveraged buyouts
D. Subprime mortgages

The "system"
A. Pools loans
B. Spreads risk
C. Makes borrowing cheaper

Voila: A Debt Culture
Does all lowering of interest rates lead to a Debt Culture?

There's $4.2 trillion in money market funds ( deposits paying interest )
Banks made money with the mm funds by funding subprime mortgages and cutting costs
The cutting costs sounds like a good thing, the subprime loans don't

"Before the invention of securitization, banks loaned money, received payments and profited from the difference between what the borrower paid and the bank's funding cost."

The banks took in deposits, paid interest on the deposits to the depositors, and loaned the money out to borrowers at a higher rate of interest than they were paying depositors or charged fees. This example doesn't make that clear.

Now, after securitization:

"During the mid-1980s, mortgage-bond traders at Salomon Brothers devised a method of lending without using capital, a technique at the heart of securitization. It works by taking anything that has regular payments -- mortgages, car loans, aircraft leases, music royalties -- and channeling the money to a trust that pays bondholders principal and interest."

How do the banks make money in this? If it's lending, do they get interest, fees, what?

"Securitization's biggest innovation was off-balance-sheet accounting. If a bank couldn't sell a bond or didn't want to, the asset could be sold to a trust within a so-called special- purpose entity, incorporated in a place such as the Cayman Islands or Dublin, and shifted off the books. Lending expanded, and banks still booked profits.

With this new technology, a bank could originate $100 million in loans, sell off some to investors, transfer the rest to a special-purpose entity and not have to hold any capital. The profit could be as much as 1.25 percentage points of the amount loaned, or $1.25 million for every $100 million issued.

``The banks could turn a low return-on-equity business into one that doesn't use any equity, which was the motivation for this,'' said Brad Hintz, a Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. analyst and former chief financial officer at Lehman. ``It becomes almost like a fee business because it requires no capital.''

It is a fee business if there's no capital. That's why I asked how the banks make money on these securities. How does the bank originate a loan without capital?

"As securitization caught on, borrowing increased. U.S. consumer debt tripled in the two decades after 1988 to $2.6 trillion, according to the Federal Reserve. Foreign banks used the new technology to expand lending, seeking borrowers on their home turf. ``One of the things the United States exported overseas was a debt culture,'' Haley said."

So, because of these securities, consumer debt tripled in the U.S., and, since we seem to be rich, other nations did the same thing.

I've already gotten a headache, and we're just coming to CDO's.

"Starting around 2005, securitization began to rely more on short-term money-market funds for financing. This was especially true for securities made by pooling other bonds, known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. Investors were loath to buy long-term debt of issuers that didn't have a track record, so new issuers sold asset-backed commercial paper that matured in less than a year. While money markets are the cheapest way to finance, they can also be the most dangerous for borrowers because they can mature as soon as the next day."

Okay. CDO's use short term debt which is cheap but comes due fast.

"SIVs, banks and CDOs sold trillions of dollars of asset- backed commercial paper between 2005 and 2007 in maturities ranging from nine months to overnight. In the U.S., the amount outstanding marched higher almost every week beginning in April 2005, peaking at $1.2 trillion for the week ending Aug. 8, 2007"."

And:

"Once money-market funds began to be tapped for financing, Ocampo said, ``it created a huge appetite for high-yield assets, far more than could be originated on a sound basis.''

To accommodate the demand, banks funded more subprime mortgages, with an average life of seven years, replacing car loans with an average life of three years and credit-card bonds paid off within 18 months."

And:

``Most of the terrible things happening now are because of the presence of money-market assets, taking what used to be long-term funding and making it short-term,'' Bruce Bent, 71, who started the first money-market fund in 1970, said in an interview in July"

Okay. Short term lending is the problem.

"Yet asset-backed securities weren't Bent's undoing. His fund also owned $785 million in Lehman debt, bought before the firm filed for bankruptcy Sept. 15. In the two days following the bankruptcy, Reserve clients asked to pull about $40 billion from the $62.5 billion fund, and its net asset value fell to 97 cents. It was the first time that a money fund ``broke the buck,'' or fell below $1, in 14 years. The fund is now being liquidated, and Bent hasn't given an interview since."

Only it's not. It looks here like lack of collateral.

We've come a long way. Derivative Dribble asked if I was fair to securitization in the first post I did? No, I wasn't. It looks like the culprits are:

A: Lack of capital
B. Poor loans

A poor loan is a poor loan.

Here's Derivative Dribble:

"So What Does That Accomplish?

B wanted to enter the local mortgage market but was struggling to do so because it couldn’t lend at the same rates as national banks. This was due to B’s inferior credit standing relative to large national banks. But the securitization process above allows B to isolate the credit quality of the mortgages it issues from its own credit quality as an institution. Thus, the rate paid on the notes issued by the SPV will be determined by examining the credit quality of the mortgages themselves, with no reference to B. Since the rate on the notes is determined only by the quality of the mortgages, the rate on any individual mortgage will be determined by the quality of that mortgage. As such, B will be able to issue mortgages to its local community at the market rate and profit from this by servicing the mortgages for a fee."

So remember where I said the banks are making money through fees? Banks are making money on these securities, mortgages through fees.

Of course, whether there is enough capital in a bank, or whether a loan or mortgage is sound, are completely separate questions. So until I hear otherwise from Derivative Dribble, it seems to me that, just like CDS's, the problems are lack of collateral and unwise loans, not the investments themselves.

Can people have been deluded?

See my post about coming up about PRDC's in Japan.