reflects an a priori commitment to laissez-faire

TO BE NOTED: From John Quiggan:

"Austrian Business Cycle Theory

By jquiggin | May 3, 2009

I’ve long promised a post on Austrian Business Cycle Theory, and here it is. For those who would rather get straight to the conclusion, it’s one I share in broad terms with most of the mainstream economists who’ve looked at the theory, from Tyler Cowen, Bryan Caplan and Gordon Tullock at the libertarian/Chicago end of the spectrum to Keynesians like Paul Krugman and Brad DeLong.

To sum up, although the Austrian School was at the forefront of business cycle theory in the 1920s, it hasn’t developed in any positive way since then. The central idea of the credit cycle is an important one, particularly as it applies to the business cycle in the presence of a largely unregulated financial system. But the Austrians balked at the interventionist implications of their own position, and failed to engage seriously with Keynesian ideas.

The result (like orthodox Marxism) is a research program that was active and progressive a century or so ago but has now become an ossified dogma. Like all such dogmatic orthodoxies, it provides believers with the illusion of a complete explanation but cease to respond in a progressive way to empirical violations of its predictions or to theoretical objections. To the extent that anything positive remains, it is likely to be developed by non-Austrians such as the post-Keynesian followers of Hyman Minsky.

First, some history and data. Austrian Business Cycle Theory was developed in the first quarter of the 20th century, mostly by Mises and Hayek, with some later contributions by Schumpeter. The data Mises and Hayek had to work on was that of that of the business cycle that emerged with industrial capitalism at the beginning of the 19th century and continued with varying amplitude throughout that century. In particular, it’s important to note that the business cycle they tried to explain predated both central banking in the modern sense of the term and the 20th century growth of the state. The case of the US is of particular interest since the business cycle coincided with a wide range of monetary and banking systems: from national bank to free banking, and including a gold standard, bimetallism and non-convertible paper money.

This NBER data goes back to 1857, but there was nothing new about the business cycle then (Marx, for example, had been writing about it for a decade or more). The US experienced serious “panics”, as they were then called in 1796-97, 1819 and 1837 [1] as well as milder fluctuations associated with the British crises of the 1820s and 1840s.

The typical crisis of the 19th century, like the current crisis, began with bank failures caused by the sudden burst of a speculative boom and then spread to the real economy, with the contraction phase typically lasting from one to five years. By contrast, recessions since 1945 have generally lasted less than a year, and have mostly been produced by real shocks or by contractionary monetary and fiscal policy.

According to the theory, the business cycle unfolds in the following way. The money supply expands either because of an inflow of gold, printing of fiat money or financial innovations that increase the ratio of the effective money supply to the monetary base. The result is lower interest rates. Low interest rates tend to stimulate borrowing from the banking system. This in turn leads to an unsustainable boom during which the artificially stimulated borrowing seeks out diminishing investment opportunities. This boom results in widespread malinvestments, causing capital resources to be misallocated into areas that would not attract investment if price signals were not distorted. A correction or credit crunch occurs when credit creation cannot be sustained. Markets finally clear, causing resources to be reallocated back towards more efficient uses.

At the time it was put forward, the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory was actually a pretty big theoretical advance. The main competitors were the orthodox defenders of Says Law, who denied that a business cycle was possible (unemployment being attributed to unions or government-imposed minumum wages), and the Marxists who offered a model of catastrophic crisis driven by the declining rate of profit.

Both Marxism and classical economics were characterized by the assumption that money is neutral, a ‘veil’ over real transactions. On the classical theory, if the quantity of money suddenly doubled, with no change in the real productive capacity of the economy, prices and wages would rise rapidly. Once the price level had doubled the previous equilibrium would be restored. Says Law (every offer to supply a good service implies a demand to buy some other good or service) which is obviously true in a barter economy, was assumed to hold also for a money economy, and therefore to ensure that equilibrium involved full employment

The Austrians were the first to offer a good reason for the non-neutrality of money. Expansion of the money supply will lower (short-term) interest rates and therefore make investments more attractive.

There’s an obvious implication about the (sub)optimality of market outcomes here, though more obvious to a generation of economists for whom arguments about rational expectations are second nature than it was 100 years ago. If investors correctly anticipate that a decline in interest rates will be temporary, they won’t evaluate long-term investments on the basis of current rates. So, the Austrian story requires either a failure of rational expectations, or a capital market failure that means that individuals rationally choose to make ‘bad’ investments on the assumption that someone else will bear the cost. And if either of these conditions apply, there’s no reason to think that market outcomes will be optimal in general.

A closely related point is that, unless Say’s Law is violated, the Austrian model implies that consumption should be negatively correlated with investment over the business cycle, whereas in fact the opposite is true. To the extent that booms are driven by mistaken beliefs that investments have become more profitable, they are typically characterized by high, not low, consumption.

Finally, the Austrian theory didn’t say much about labour markets, but for most people, unemployment is what makes the business cycle such a problem. It was left to Keynes to produce a theory of how the non-neutrality of money could produce sustained unemployment.

The credit cycle idea can easily be combined with a Keynesian account of under-employment equilibrium, and even more easily with the Keynesian idea of ‘animal spirits’. This was done most prominently by Minsky, and the animsal spirits idea has recently revived by Akerlof and Shiller. I suspect that the macroeconomic model that emerges from the current crisis will have a recognisably Austrian flavour..

Unfortunately, having put taken the first steps in the direction of a serious theory of the business cycle, Hayek and Mises spent the rest of their lives running hard in the opposite direction. As Laidler observes, they took a nihilistic ‘liquidationist’ view in the Great Depression, a position that is not entailed by the theory, but reflects an a priori commitment to laissez-faire. The result was that Hayek lost support even from initial sympathisers like Dennis Robertson. And this mistake has hardened into dogma in the hands of their successors.

The modern Austrian school has tried to argue that the business cycle they describe is caused in some way by government policy, though the choice of policy varies from Austrian to Austrian - some blame paper money and want a gold standard, others blame central banks, some want a strict prohibition on fractional reserve banking while others favour a laissez-faire policy of free banking, where anyone who wants can print money and others still (Hayek for example) a system of competing currencies.

Rothbard (who seems to be the most popular exponent these days) blames central banking for the existence of the business cycle, which is somewhat problematic, since the business cycle predates central banking. In fact, central banking in its modern form was introduced in an attempt to stabilise the business cycle. The US Federal Reserve was only established in 1913, after Mises had published his analysis.

Rothbard gets around this by defining central banking to cover almost any kind of bank that has some sort of government endorsement, such as the (private) Bank of England in the 19th century, and arguing for a system of free banking that would avoid, he asserts, these problems. But, on any plausible definition of the term, the US had free banking from the Jackson Administration to the Civil War and that didn’t stop the business cycle (Rothbard offers some historical revisionism to argue that the Panic of 1837 didn’t really happen, but that wasn’t what US voters thought when they threw the Jacksonians out in 1840). And free banking in late 19th century Australia (our first quasi-central bank was the Commonwealth Bank established in 1915) didn’t prevent a huge boom and subsequent long depression around 1890. Overall, the US was much closer to free banking throughout the 19th century than in the period from 1945 until the development of the largely unregulated ’shadow banking’ system in the 1990s, but the business cycle was worse then (how much worse is a matter of some controversy, but no serious economist claims it was better).

To sum up, the version of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory originally developed by Hayek and Mises gives strong reasons to think that an unregulated financial system will be prone to booms and busts and that this will be true for a wide range of monetary systems, particularly including gold standard systems. But that is only part of what is needed for a complete account of the business cycle, and the theory can only be made coherent with a broadly Keynesian model of equilibrium unemployment. Trying to tie Austrian Business Cycle Theory to Austrian prejudices against government intervention has been a recipe for intellectual and policy disaster and theoretical stagnation."

"Friedrich Hayek is going to be out; Friedrich Engels in. Larry Kudlow out; Larry Mishel in."

John Judis sees a resurgence of Marx:

"The Crisis Of '08 Reading List

The best books to help you make sense of Marx, Keynes, the Great Depression, and how we got where we are now.

John B. Judis, The New Republic Published: Wednesday, December 24, 2008

Every few years, someone urges me to do a Christmas book list, and while protesting my ignorance and incompetence, I gladly comply. This year's subject is the current global recession, which threatens to become a global depression. This is a layman's list, because I am strictly a layman on the subject of economics. You don't have to know anything about string theory to read any of the books I recommend.

I learned most (or what little I know) of economics from reading on my own or from study groups we used to hold in the fading days of the new left. I read all three volumes of Capital in a study group organized by the late Harry Chang, a Korean immigrant to the Bay Area who was a computer programmer by day (in the keypunch era) and a Marxist scholar by night. I read Keynes under sporadic supervision of economist Jim O'Connor, the author of The Fiscal Crisis of the State( A GOOD BOOK ), and a fellow member of the collective that published Socialist Revolution (which in 1978 became Socialist Review). And I got my introduction to economic history from historian Marty Sklar, who was also a member of that collective.

A decade ago, I might have been embarrassed to admit that I was raised on Marx and Marxism, but I am convinced that the left is coming back( NONSENSE ). Friedrich Hayek is going to be out( SILLY ); Friedrich Engels in( NO WAY ). Larry Kudlow out( THANK GOD ); Larry Mishel in( I DON'T KNOW HIM ). And why is that? Because a severe global recession like this puts in relief the transient, fragile, and corruptible nature of capitalism( SILLY ), and the looming contradiction between what Marx called the forces and relations of production evidenced in unemployed engineers and boarded up factories and growing poverty amidst a potential for abundance. As capitalism itself--or at the least the vaunted miracle of the free market--becomes problematic, the left is poised for an intellectual comeback( GOOD LUCK ). So here are four topics and some books to read about them, plus a few articles, from someone who learned economics by reading and rereading Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy's Monopoly Capital( INTERESTING BOOK ).

1. The current crisis. I was warning my colleagues of an encroaching disaster a year ago, because I was reading the columns and articles of Paul Krugman, Nouriel Roubini, Larry Summers, and Dean Baker. They were on top of this when Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke were still telling everyone not to worry. Of the current books I've read (and I haven't read many), I'm very high on Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf's Fixing Global Finance, George Cooper's The Origin of Financial Crises, Jamie Galbraith's The Predator State, and Dean Baker's Plunder and Blunder. Wolf is terrific on the international currency mess--and the Financial Times is the paper to read--Cooper is first-rate on the irrationality of money and finance, Galbraith has a good explanation of how we got to where we are, and how to get out of it, and Baker is the expert on the housing bubble. I also liked Krugman's The Return of Depression Economics when it appeared almost ten years ago (Short take: If it could happen to Japan, it could happen to us). There is a new edition that incorporates some material about 2008, but I haven't read it. ( THESE SOUND GOOD )

2. John Maynard Keynes. Keynes is back in vogue, and rightly so( I AGREE ). One economist--I can't remember who it was--recently warned against reading The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money( I AGREE ) because it was written strictly for economists. I don't agree at all. It's a very hard book, especially some of the middle sections, but worth reading and rereading. If you don't have energy for the whole thing, read the first three chapters, some of the middle chapters (7, 10, 16, and 18 are my suggestions) and the last three. I suggest, however, a guide. The best I've found is Dudley Dillard's The Economics of John Maynard Keynes, which, to my amazement, is still in print after sixty years. I also like Hyman Minsky and Paul Davidson's guidebooks to Keynes. But you've got to read Robert Skidelsky's three-volume biography of Keynes, Hopes Betrayed, The Economist as Savior, and Fighting for Freedom (also now available in an abridged one-volume edition). Believe me, this is one of the great biographies( I READ VOLUME ONE. IT IS GOOD ). The way he brings together Keynes, the gay aesthete of Bloomsbury, and Keynes, the economist and man of worldly affairs, is something to behold. Skidelsky's second volume is also the best introduction to Keynes's economics, because you learn that exactly those ideas you found mystifying or most difficult in Keynes were hotly debated between him and his colleagues.

3. The Great Depression. There have been a lot of books on this subject, but most of what I read I read decades ago, so I'm sure I'm going to overlook worthy choices. Still, there are two older books that continue to stand up. George Soule was an editor of The New Republic during the 1930s. He was also an economist and in 1947 published a study of the American economy from 1917 to 1929 entitled Prosperity Decade. Soule shows that well before 1929, there were rumblings of trouble in the American economy--not only in the stock market bubble, but in overcapacity in key industries like auto, and in the rise of technological unemployment( SOUNDS INTERESTING ). You'll see the surprising resemblance to our own decade, including an anticipatory recession in 1926 like the one in 2001. On the international crisis of the 1930s, I like Charles P. Kindleberger's The World in Depression( GOOD BOOK ), which I reread two months ago when I was writing about the current international imbroglio. I want also to mention an essay by Sklar in The United States as a Developing Country. In chapter five, "Some Political and Cultural Consequences of the Disaccumulation of Capital," Sklar puts forward the idea that during the 1920s, capitalism shifted from the accumulation to disaccumulation of capital. That's Marxist jargon, but what it means is that goods production began to expand as a function of the reduction rather than increase in labor-time and in the labor force( I DON'T FOLLOW HERE. COULD BE WORTH LOOKING INTO ). That created an enormous opportunity, but also a potential crisis. The depression of the 1930s, Sklar argues, was the first "disaccumulationist" depression. One of his former students, historian Jim Livingston from Rutgers, has put forward a similar analysis of the current recession.

4. Marx and Marxism. Marx, like Keynes, is best read in his own words. There are a lot of brilliant shorter works, but I'd put the first volume( VOL. 2 IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ) of Capital up there with The Origin of Species, The Interpretation of Dreams, and The Philosophical Investigations on my list( IT'S AN EXCELLENT LIST ) of great books of the last two hundred years. It's not a guide to starting your own business and really doesn't have a theory of crises. Some of that is in the other unfinished volumes. What volume one does is establish capitalism as a phase, and perhaps a passing phase, in world history whose very nature has consisted in disguising that fact from worker and capitalist alike. You read Capital to understand the historical underpinnings, not the mechanics of capitalism. Marx's theory of history has obvious deficiencies( IT'S FALSE I'M AFRAID )--he didn't foresee, certainly, the rise of corporate capitalism and of corporate liberalism. His trademark theory of the falling rate of profit, which you can find in volume three, is also unpersuasive( IT'S FALSE). But these failings pale beside his portrayal of capitalism as mode of production based upon labor power as a commodity and on the accumulation of capital( IF YOU UNDERSTAND VOL. 2, YOU CAN UNDERSTAND HOW JEVONS REFUTES IT ). I wish I could recommend guides to Marx's thought( I.BERLIN ). The economic guides often err by trying to justify his works as modern economics. G. A. Cohen's book, Karl Marx's Theory of History, is a little academic, but of all the books I've read in the last twenty or thirty years, it's the best( IT'S A VERY GOOD BOOK. ).

Have a good, if grim, read of these books--if you have some better ideas, include them in the comments below--and let's hope that the next year brings some better economic news than this one.

John B. Judis is a senior editor at The New Republic."

What we have in the US is our version of the Welfare State. It is a government/private sector hybrid. That is not going to change, nor has it been discredited. In fact, these bailouts are a confirmation that the system is alive and well and functioning according to plan. What was not anticipated is the virulence of the crisis or the impotence of government actions to effectively quell this crisis swiftly. The people who populate the investor class are firm believers in this system. The idea that they are free market fanatics is silly. They simply use the rhetoric when it suits them. Otherwise, they say that the government needs to help them because they are essential to the health of the economy and country, and lobby for government favors and protections.

The Obama Administration is firmly rooted in this system. However, one can hardly imagine anything worse than the recent cronyism driven and interest driven administration that we've just experienced. It simply had an especially obnoxious and incompetent version of our hybrid, which allowed massive fraud, massive government guarantees implicitly guaranteeing the massive fraud, and allowed massive incompetence and graft in the name of party and interest groups associated with it. It has less destroyed the system than robbed it.

Once rid of this pestilence, we will slowly meander back through a thicket of problems to a different point of equilibrium in the balance of the hybrid. However, unless we allow social problems to insert themselves into these largely economic problems, we will retain this hybrid system indefinitely. It is a peculiarly resilient cultural artifact, created by a whole host of political compromises that are not easily disentangled without ruinous consequences.

All of the authors Judis cites might have some use for us, and we should certainly read them and learn from them. But most of the people he cites, certainly Marx and Engels, are defined by their Mechanistic Explanations, as opposed to Human Agency Explanations, and, as such, are likely to do more harm than good. To not understand the importance of panic and fear in this crisis, as opposed to "forces" of production, say, is to miss the whole tragedy that got us into this mess, and will only delay our leaving it behind.

It's too bad humans aren't mechanical for some theories, but they aren't.

"As was the case in the 1930s, we also have a choice"

Martin Wolf on Keynes on the FT:

"We are all Keynesians now. When Barack Obama takes office he will propose a gigantic fiscal stimulus package. Such packages are being offered by many other governments. Even Germany is being dragged, kicking and screaming, into this race.

The ghost of John Maynard Keynes, the father of macroeconomics, has returned to haunt us. With it has come that of his most interesting disciple, Hyman Minsky. We all now know of the “Minsky moment” – the point at which a financial mania turns into panic.

Like all prophets, Keynes offered ambiguous lessons to his followers. Few still believe in the fiscal fine-tuning that his disciples propounded in the decades after the second world war ( TRUE ). But nobody believes in the monetary targeting proposed by his celebrated intellectual adversary, Milton Friedman, either( TRUE ). Now, 62 years after Keynes’ death, in another era of financial crisis and threatened economic slump, it is easier for us to understand what remains relevant( I SAY USEFUL ) in his teaching.

I see three broad lessons.

The first, which was taken forward by Minsky, is that we should not take the pretensions of financiers seriously. “A sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional way along with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him.” Not for him, then, was the notion of “efficient markets”( I AGREE ).

The second lesson is that the economy cannot be analysed in the same way as an individual business. For an individual company, it makes sense to cut costs. If the world tries to do so, it will merely shrink demand( AS A WHOLE, I CAN UNDERSTAND THIS ). An individual may not spend all his income. But the world must do so( TRY TO ).

The third and most important lesson is that one should not treat the economy( ECONOMICS IS FINE HERE ) as a morality tale( HERE I DISAGREE COMPLETELY. MORALITY IS PART OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ). In the 1930s, two opposing ideological visions( THERE WERE OTHERS, THANKFULLY DEFEATED ) were on offer: the Austrian; and the socialist. The Austrians – Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek – argued that a purging of the excesses of the 1920s was required. Socialists argued that socialism needed to replace failed capitalism, outright. These views were grounded in alternative secular religions: the former in the view that individual self-seeking behaviour guaranteed a stable economic order(I DON'T AGREE WITH HIM HERE. VON MISES CRITIQUE OF SOCIALISM WAS MORE THAN A MORALITY TALE, AND SO WERE HAYEK'S VIEWS ABOUT THE MARKET AND THE DANGERS OF TOO MUCH STATE CONTROL); the latter in the idea that the identical motivation could lead only( IT WAS THIS MECHANISTIC APPROACH TO POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY THAT MADE MARXISM, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT SUITABLE FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION ) to exploitation, instability and crisis.

Keynes’s genius – a very English one – was to insist we should approach an economic system not as a morality play but as a technical challenge( WRONG ). He wished to preserve as much liberty as possible( I AGREE. AS DO I. ), while recognising that the minimum state( HERE I DISAGREE ) was unacceptable to a democratic society with an urbanised economy( I CAN FORESEE A TIME OF LESS GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT, BUT THIS IS CURRENTLY TRUE ). He wished to preserve a market economy, without believing that laisser faire makes everything for the best in the best of all possible worlds( I WOULD SEEM TO AGREE WITH HIM ).

This same moralistic debate is with us, once again. Contemporary “liquidationists” insist that a collapse would lead to rebirth of a purified economy( COMPLETELY UNBURKEAN ). Their leftwing opponents argue that the era of markets is over. And even I wish to see the punishment of financial alchemists who claimed that ever more debt turns economic lead into gold( I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINALS ).

Yet Keynes would have insisted that such approaches are foolish. Markets are neither infallible nor dispensable( TRUE. THEY ARE USEFUL. ). They are indeed the underpinnings of a productive economy and individual freedom( TRUE ). But they can also go seriously awry and so must be managed with care( TRUE ). The election of Mr Obama surely reflects a desire for just such pragmatism( TRUE ). Neither Ron Paul, the libertarian, nor Ralph Nader, on the left, got anywhere( TRUE ). So the task for this new administration is to lead the US and the world towards a pragmatic resolution of the global economic crisis we all now confront.( I AGREE )

The urgent task is to return the world economy to health.

The shorter-term challenge is to sustain aggregate demand( YES ), as Keynes would have recommended. Also important will be direct central-bank finance of borrowers( YES ). It is evident that much of the load will fall on the US, largely because the Europeans, Japanese and even the Chinese are too inert, too complacent, or too weak( TOO MUCH BEGGARING ON THEIR PART ALREADY ). Given the correction of household spending under way in the deficit countries( SPENDER COUNTRIES ), this period of high government spending is, alas, likely to last for years( BTREATHE DEEPLY MATE ). At the same time, a big effort must be made to purge the balance sheets of households and the financial system. A debt-for-equity swap is surely going to be necessary( IT WON'T NEARLY BE AS LARGE AS HE THINKS. TOO MANY PEOPLE WANT THE OLD SYSYEM BACK. IT SUITS US. ).

The longer-term challenge is to force a rebalancing of global demand. Deficit( SPENDER ) countries cannot be expected to spend their way into bankruptcy( TRUE ), while surplus ( SAVER )countries condemn as profligacy the spending from which their exporters benefit so much( THAT'S WHY THEY'RE STRUGGLING TO KEEP THIS SYSTEM ). In the necessary attempt to reconstruct the global economic order, on which the new administration must focus, this will be a central issue. It is one Keynes himself had in mind when he put forward his ideas for the postwar monetary system at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.

No less pragmatic must be the attempt to construct a new system of global financial regulation and an approach to monetary policy that curbs credit booms and asset bubbles( WE'LL TRY ). As Minsky made clear, no permanent answer exists( TRUE ). But recognition of the systemic frailty of a complex financial system would be a good start( OK ).

As was the case in the 1930s, we also have a choice: it is to deal with these challenges co-operatively and pragmatically or let ideological blinkers and selfishness obstruct us ( I AGREE ). The objective is also clear: to preserve an open and at least reasonably stable world economy that offers opportunity to as much of humanity as possible( I AGREE ). We have done a disturbingly poor job of this in recent years. We must do better. We can do so, provided we approach the task in a spirit of humility and pragmatism, shorn of ideological blinker. ( WE GET THE POINT )

As Oscar Wilde might have said, in economics, the truth is rarely pure and never simple. That is, for me, the biggest lesson of this crisis. It is also the one Keynes himself still teaches( I AGREE )."

He gets a bit simplistic, but I generally agree with what he's saying, except for the fact that, long term, I believe that less government with a growing and balanced economy is possible. Keynes view is still too rooted in the 30s to be of major use to us undigested, and is much too pessimistic and mechanistic, as that era tended to be. Again, Political Economy and Politics are underpinned by the context and presuppositions of the time.

What Keynes offers us is a little useful wisdom and a narrative of perceived success at helping the world out of a crisis, which goes a long in times like these.

"the main propositions about economics that so-called Austrians believe."

Via Positive Liberty, I came upon this credo of Austrian Economics put up by Peter Boettke :

"Proposition 1: Only individuals choose.

Man, with his purposes and plans, is the beginning of all economic analysis. Only individuals make choices; collective entities do not choose. The primary task of economic analysis is to make economic phenomena intelligible by basing it on individual purposes and plans; the secondary task of economic analysis is to trace out the unintended consequences of individual choices."

I'm not sure that I understand this. Can't a Union, say, the UAW, choose to ratify a contract? Also, I don't understand what it means to say "make economic phenomena intelligible", if all there is to describe are individual actions. In order to describe a person's choice, say, why he chose an apple instead of a pear, you simply ask him. His intentions make his decision intelligible. All economic choices are is really a subset of human choices and actions that have to do with things like buying and selling. In the same way, one can only have an unintended consequence of an action where one has an intention to be fulfilled by the action that goes sideways, or that one didn't foresee. However, an unintended consequence can't simply mean anything that flows from a particular action, otherwise it encompasses consequences that can't be humanly predicted, and, therefore, can't even be intended.

When you limit or delimit a range of human action as economic, you are already abstracting out a quality that rises over and above individual actions. It's the difference between the members of the set, and the set. To the extent that you attempt to standardize, regularize, or categorize, particular human actions, you are describing something over and above the individual, unless saying that individuals make choices and collective entities do not, simply means that collective entities are not physical. Yet, even that seems false, since a club can be a group of particular individuals. This seems a lot like Russell trying to define numbers with sets, and getting into a bit of jam by doing so, as I remember.

A point about methodology. It's no good telling me that something I can say meaningfully doesn't really mean anything. If I say, "The Chess Club is meeting on Tuesday", you can't reply that I really mean to say that " The members of the Chess Club are going to meet on Tuesday". Suppose I say, "The Chess Club is 100 years old". Do I mean to say that the members of the club are all 100 years old?

"Proposition 2: The study of the market order is fundamentally about exchange behavior and the institutions within which exchanges take place.

The price system and the market economy are best understood as a “catallaxy,” and thus the science that studies the market order falls under the domain of “catallactics.” These terms derive from the original Greek meanings of the word “katallaxy”—exchange and bringing a stranger into friendship through exchange. Catallactics focuses analytical attention on the exchange relationships that emerge in the market, the bargaining that characterizes the exchange process, and the institutions within which exchange takes place."

This sounds like barter. Here's Liddell:

katallagê ¹

I.exchange, esp. of money: the profits of the money-changer, Dem.

II.a change from enmity to friendship, reconciliation, Aesch., etc.

2.reconciliation of sinners with God, NTest.

I like number three. None of them fit. Anyway, from Wikipedia, this is funny:

"According to Mises (Human Action, page 3) it was Richard Whately who coined the term "catallactics". In effect, in Whately's book Introductory Lectures on Political Economy, published in 1831, it can be read:

"It is with a view to put you on your guard against prejudices thus created, (and you will meet probably with many instances of persons influenced by them,) that I have stated my objections to the name of Political-Economy. It is now, I conceive, too late to think of changing it. A. Smith, indeed, has designated his work a treatise on the "Wealth of Nations;" but this supplies a name only for the subject-matter, not for the science itself. The name I should have preferred as the most descriptive, and on the whole least objectionable, is that of CATALLACTICS, or the "Science of Exchanges.""

Also, in a footnote to these sentences, he continues:

"It is perhaps hardly necessary to observe, that I do not pretend to have classical authority for this use of the word Catallactics; nor do I deem it necessary to make any apology for using it without such authority. It would be thought, I conceive, an absurd pedantry to find fault with such words as "thermometer," "telescope," "pneumatics," "hydraulics," "geology," &c. on the ground that classical Greek writers have not employed them, or have taken them in a different sense. In the present instance, however, I am not sure that, if Aristotle had had occasion to express my meaning, he would not have used the very same word. In fact I may say he has used another part of the same verb in the sense of "exchanging;" (for the Verbals in are, to all practical purposes, to be regarded as parts of the verbs they are formed from) in the third book of the Nicom. Ethics he speaks of men who hold their lives so cheap, that they risked them in exchange for the most trifling gain []. The employment of this and kindred words in the sense of "reconcilement," is evidently secondary, reconciliation being commonly effected by a compensation; something accepted as an equivalent for loss or injury."

It has also been cited that Whately first coined the term in commentary during his Oxford lectures. ^[3]

I love when he says," nor do I deem it necessary to make any apology for using it without such authority". No. But you need to spend a paragraph justifying it.

I think I said buying and selling earlier, without have to search through Liddell. What about the institutions? Fine. But this kind of defining the limits of a subject is messy.

"Proposition 3: The “facts” of the social sciences are what people believe and think.

Unlike the physical sciences, the human sciences begin with the purposes and plans of individuals. Where the purging of purposes and plans in the physical sciences led to advances by overcoming the problem of anthropomorphism, in the human sciences, the elimination of purposes and plans results in purging the science of human action of its subject matter. In the human sciences, the “facts” of the world are what the actors think and believe.

I would say that Human Agency has Intentionality.

"The meaning that individuals place on things, practices, places, and people determines how they will orient themselves in making decisions. The goal of the sciences of human action is intelligibility, not prediction. The human sciences can achieve this goal because we are what we study, or because we possess knowledge from within, whereas the natural sciences cannot pursue a goal of intelligibility because they rely on knowledge from without. We can understand purposes and plans of other human actors because we ourselves are human actors."

I agree.

"But unless the Martian comes to understand the purposes and plans (the commuting to and from work), his “scientific” understanding of the data from Grand Central Station would be limited. The sciences of human action are different from the natural sciences, and we impoverish the human sciences when we try to force them into the philosophical/scientific mold of the natural sciences."

The Martian would use the Martian version of the Principle of Charity. Read Quine.

"Proposition 4: Utility and costs are subjective.

All economic phenomena are filtered through the human mind. Since the 1870s, economists have agreed that value is subjective, but, following alfred marshall, many argued that the cost side of the equation is determined by objective conditions. Marshall insisted that just as both blades of a scissors cut a piece of paper, so subjective value and objective costs determine price (see microeconomics). But Marshall failed to appreciate that costs are also subjective because they are themselves determined by the value of alternative uses of scarce resources. Both blades of the scissors do indeed cut the paper, but the blade of supply is determined by individuals’ subjective valuations."

Marshall is philosophically correct. Cost is not Subjective. Cost can be no more subjective than the meaning of a word. We can't have a Private Language, and we can't have a Private Cost.

As Wittgenstein says:

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

Institutions and the meanings of words and the cost of a pear are objective, not subjective. What is subjective is my decision to buy the pear or not.

"In deciding courses of action, one must choose; that is, one must pursue one path and not others. The focus on alternatives in choices leads to one of the defining concepts of the economic way of thinking: opportunity costs. The cost of any action is the value of the highest-valued alternative forgone in taking that action. Since the forgone action is, by definition, never taken, when one decides, one weighs the expected benefits of an activity against the expected benefits of alternative activities."

This is not how human beings act. This picture is an abstraction, an attempt to organize disparate intentions and actions. Nothing more. It might be useful, but it is not true.

As Yeats says:

"Man can embody truth but he cannot know it. W.B. Yeats"

"Proposition 5: The price system economizes on the information that people need to process in making their decisions.

Prices summarize the terms of exchange on the market. The price system signals to market participants the relevant information, helping them realize mutual gains from exchange. In Hayek’s famous example, when people notice that the price of tin has risen, they do not need to know whether the cause was an increase in demand for tin or a decrease in supply. Either way, the increase in the price of tin leads them to economize on its use. Market prices change quickly when underlying conditions change, which leads people to adjust quickly."

The price system is useful to us. Nothing more. If something was or becomes more useful, we will use that. It has no special magic.

"Proposition 6: Private property in the means of production is a necessary condition for rational economic calculation.

Economists and social thinkers had long recognized that private ownership provides powerful incentives for the efficient allocation of scarce resources. But those sympathetic to socialism believed that socialism could transcend these incentive problems by changing human nature. Ludwig von Mises demonstrated that even if the assumed change in human nature took place, socialism would fail because of economic planners’ inability to rationally calculate the alternative use of resources. Without private ownership in the means of production, Mises reasoned, there would be no market for the means of production, and therefore no money prices for the means of production. And without money prices reflecting the relative scarcities of the means of production, economic planners would be unable to rationally calculate the alternative use of the means of production."

The only book by Von Mises that I really liked was "Socialism". It is the best book on the subject. I haven't read it for many years, but as I remember it, Von Mises said that if Socialism could do what is says it can, we would all be socialists. However, it cannot. That's my opinion, but my opinion is provisional. I don't like the human nature argument at all. It could be that the reason private property works has nothing to do with what we tell ourselves. What has come about has done so because it works, not because it was preordained. We merely perceive what works as preordained.

"Proposition 7: The competitive market is a process of entrepreneurial discovery.

Many economists see competition as a state of affairs. But the term “competition” invokes an activity. If competition were a state of affairs, the entrepreneur would have no role. But because competition is an activity, the entrepreneur has a huge role as the agent of change who prods and pulls markets in new directions.

The entrepreneur is alert to unrecognized opportunities for mutual gain. By recognizing opportunities, the entrepreneur earns a profit. The mutual learning from the discovery of gains from exchange moves the market system to a more efficient allocation of resources. Entrepreneurial discovery ensures that a free market moves toward the most efficient use of resources. In addition, the lure of profit continually prods entrepreneurs to seek innovations that increase productive capacity. For the entrepreneur who recognizes the opportunity, today’s imperfections represent tomorrow’s profit.1 The price system and the market economy are learning devices that guide individuals to discover mutual gains and use scarce resources efficiently."

The most efficient uses of resources for what? I actually helped start a business. It was formed really out of dissatisfaction by the two other people who started the business with me with the business we were working at. I simply went along for the ride. People starts businesses for many different reasons. They do it. That's what we need to know. Some incentives might work once, and not work later. That's life.

"Proposition 8: Money is nonneutral.

Money is defined as the commonly accepted medium of exchange. If government policy distorts the monetary unit, exchange is distorted as well. The goal of monetary policy should be to minimize these distortions. Any increase in the money supply not offset by an increase in money demand will lead to an increase in prices. But prices do not adjust instantaneously throughout the economy. Some price adjustments occur faster than others, which means that relative prices change. Each of these changes exerts its influence on the pattern of exchange and production. Money, by its nature, thus cannot be neutral...

But inflation is socially destructive on several levels. First, even anticipated inflation breaches a basic trust between the government and its citizens because government is using inflation to confiscate people’s wealth. Second, unanticipated inflation is redistributive as debtors gain at the expense of creditors. Third, because people cannot perfectly anticipate inflation and because the money is added somewhere in the system—say, through government purchase of bonds—some prices (the price of bonds, for example) adjust before other prices, which means that inflation distorts the pattern of exchange and production."

I generally agree with this, but it strikes me as exaggerated. A little inflation might well work for reasons that are hard to define. Major discontinuities are generally destructive.

"Since money is the link for almost all transactions in a modern economy, monetary distortions affect those transactions. The goal of monetary policy, therefore, should be to minimize these monetary distortions, precisely because money is nonneutral.2"

I don't know what's being distorted. It's like saying that if a planet does something different than expected, and varies from our models, it's a distortion. Rather, it's simply that our models are of limited use.

"Proposition 9: The capital structure consists of heterogeneous goods that have multispecific uses that must be aligned.

Right now, people in Detroit, Stuttgart, and Tokyo City are designing cars that will not be purchased for a decade. How do they know how to allocate resources to meet that goal? Production is always for an uncertain future demand, and the production process requires different stages of investment ranging from the most remote (mining iron ore) to the most immediate (the car dealership). The values of all producer goods at every stage of production derive from the value consumers place on the product being produced. The production plan aligns various goods into a capital structure that produces the final goods in, ideally, the most efficient manner. If capital goods were homogeneous, they could be used in producing all the final products consumers desired. If mistakes were made, the resources would be reallocated quickly, and with minimal cost, toward producing the more desired final product. But capital goods are heterogeneous and multispecific; an auto plant can make cars, but not computer chips. The intricate alignment of capital to produce various consumer goods is governed by price signals and the careful economic calculations of investors. If the price system is distorted, investors will make mistakes in aligning their capital goods. Once the error is revealed, economic actors will reshuffle their investments, but in the meantime resources will be lost"

I don't understand the use of "distorted". People use the information available as best they can. If they make too many cars, why is that a "distortion"? If I throw a pitch and it's called a ball, is that a distortion?

"Proposition 10: Social institutions often are the result of human action, but not of human design.

Many of the most important institutions and practices are not the result of direct design but are the by-product of actions taken to achieve other goals. A student in the Midwest in January trying to get to class quickly while avoiding the cold may cut across the quad rather than walk the long way around. Cutting across the quad in the snow leaves footprints; as other students follow these, they make the path bigger. Although their goal is merely to get to class quickly and avoid the cold weather, in the process they create a path in the snow that actually helps students who come later to achieve this goal more easily. The “path in the snow” story is a simple example of a “product of human action, but not of human design” (Hayek 1948, p. 7).

The market economy and its price system are examples of a similar process. People do not intend to create the complex array of exchanges and price signals that constitute a market economy. Their intention is simply to improve their own lot in life, but their behavior results in the market system. Money, law, language, science, and so on are all social phenomena that can trace their origins not to human design, but rather to people striving to achieve their own betterment, and in the process producing an outcome that benefits the public.4

This seems true. As Austin says:

"...our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetime of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonable practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our armchair of an afternoon – the most favorite alternative method"

"The implications of these ten propositions are rather radical. If they hold true, economic theory would be grounded in verbal logic and empirical work focused on historical narratives. With regard to public policy, severe doubt would be raised about the ability of government officials to intervene optimally within the economic system, let alone to rationally manage the economy.

Perhaps economists should adopt the doctors’ creed: “First do no harm.” The market economy develops out of people’s natural inclination to better their situation and, in so doing, to discover the mutually beneficial exchanges that will accomplish that goal. Adam Smith first systematized this message in The Wealth of Nations. In the twentieth century, economists of the Austrian school of economics were the most uncompromising proponents of this message, not because of a prior ideological commitment, but because of the logic of their arguments."

I don't see these propositions as that radical, and they seem true, by and large, as does this final statement. I also don't like the phrase "logic of their arguments". All this says is that the proposition follow from each other, not that they are true. Logic needs premises.

Am I an adherent of Austrian Economics? No. It seems to be a misnomer, for one thing. But do the economists mentioned in this group have a lot of important things to tell us? Yes.

"then I’m a libertarian in the sense of the term dominant in contemporary public discourse"

God bless Will Wilkinson for wading into the " Who's A Libertarian?" nonsense. At least he's readable. Nevertheless, and maybe it's age, he spends a hellish amount of time on this issue, as well as on the meaning of the word "coerce". I was thinking of doing an Austinian analysis of "coerce", but didn't last more than five minutes. It's more interesting than who's a libertarian, which is uninteresting to the point of being a soporific. Some people seem to think it's like a brand, say "Coca-Cola" or "Tide", and you can be sued for copyright or trademark infringement, or whatever the hell it is.

Anyway, I think that I agree with Wilkinson, but we have very different ways of expressing our views. I use negative and positive liberty, and, if it interests you, go read Berlin's "Two Concepts Of Liberty", from where I derive these concepts. If not, fine.

"Why don’t I get 100% on economic issues? Because, like noted socialists Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek, I support a redistributive safety net.

One might be a WSPQ-libertarian for many, many different reasons. I happen to think principled constraints on government power are extremely important for the very same reasons I think rooting out sexism and racism are important: because people need to be free."

I agree here.

Anyway, here's Austin:

"there is no simple and handy appendage of a word called "the meaning of the word (x)"

Definitions of words are messy affairs, and, if you are going to examine them, it's best to come prepared with a decent armory of conceptual and analytical weapons.

"I just took the “World’s Smallest Political Quiz.” It says I am a… libertarian!"

To hell with the quiz. Do you think I'm Raymond Smullyan or Martin Gardner for God's sake?