Showing posts with label AM Rosenfeld. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AM Rosenfeld. Show all posts

Monday, April 6, 2009

The government should seize it, as it is already authorized — indeed, compelled — to do

TO BE NOTED: From the NY Times:

"
How to Clean a Dirty Bank

Chicago

COMMERCIAL banks in the United States are not subject to the bankruptcy statute — when they become insolvent they are simply acquired by the government. This is what banks sign on for in return for a charter, deposit insurance and direct access to the Federal Reserve lending window, which generally allow banks to prosper as long as they control risk.

Now Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner wants to apply this same swift acquisition process to large insolvent “shadow banks” that risk doing damage to the financial system — big hedge funds, investment banks, insurance holding companies and the like — because bankruptcy proceedings move too slowly to allow these institutions to be quickly refinanced or restructured.

Secretary Geithner says the lack of a good mechanism to restructure Lehman Brothers contributed to that firm’s failure last fall. And it is why the Bush administration’s ill-designed overnight infusion of capital into American International Group turned out to be such a mess. The company avoided bankruptcy, but could not be properly restructured.

Mr. Geithner is right to want a rapid seizure system for shadow banks. What’s odd is that at the same time that he is proposing one, the government is failing to use powers it already has to restructure insolvent commercial banks. Instead, Mr. Geithner continues to suggest a variety of other actions that seem unlikely to solve the banks’ central problem — a lack of equity capital. Perhaps he fears what would happen if large bank holding companies were to default on their bonds, which are held by insurance companies and other institutional investors. But that is a problem that needs to be tackled head-on, not by propping up failing banks.

Consider what happens when the government acquires an insolvent bank. The shareholders and the debt holders of the bank’s holding company may be essentially wiped out — even as the bank itself is merged into another institution. That is what happened, for example, when JPMorgan Chase “acquired” Washington Mutual bank; its holding company promptly went bankrupt. This approach allows the market to properly discipline banks. The fear of loss gives investors the critical incentive to deny capital to those that take excessive risks. Also, when the price of a bank holding company’s stock and debt plummets, it is an early warning of trouble.

Treasury’s new plan, the Public-Private Investment Program, reduces that incentive by preserving shareholder and debt holder ownership of insolvent banks. It also injects capital into those banks in a roundabout, unproductive way. Under the program, the government will help private investors buy at auction the banks’ toxic assets (what Treasury now calls “legacy assets”). Private firms will use government funds, along with some money of their own, to buy the assets at prices above current market value.

The government will bear almost all the exposure to losses from these transactions, but earn only a small fraction of any profits. Another problem is that if the buyers of these assets harvest significant gains, they will have to worry that Congress might seek to recapture the money in the future, as it has threatened to in the recent bonus turmoil at A.I.G. This fear will lower the bids and therefore the amount paid for the toxic assets.

Even if it is successful, the program will add very little new capital to the banks — roughly only the amount paid for toxic assets that is over and above their current value.

There is a simpler, sounder and fairer way to recapitalize an insolvent bank. The government should seize it, as it is already authorized — indeed, compelled — to do. Then it could inject cash (in the form of Treasury notes) as equity in the bank and, at the same time, remove the toxic assets the bank holds. Bank regulators might perhaps swap Treasury securities for toxic assets “at par” — that is, in an amount equal to the original purchase price of the assets removed. This would be a fair transaction, and it would cost nothing, because the government would own both the bank and the bonds. The toxic assets could then be placed in the basement of the Treasury building while we wait to see what they turn out to be worth.

The government could then quickly — say within a month — auction off the bank. Speed would be critical: If Treasury were to hold a large bank for a long time, it would be difficult to retain the most talented employees, and it is the people, along with a clean balance sheet, that make a bank valuable.

If markets work at all (and if they don’t, Treasury’s new plan is doomed to fail), such an auction would produce a new privately owned “clean” bank, with ample capital to lend. It would also generate proceeds from the sale that would be at least as great as the value of the securities injected into the bank as equity — and likely greater.

If the recapitalized bank could not be sold at a price that amounts to (at least) the new cash injected, then the bank would be worthless, but not because of the toxic asset problem. It would be because the bank has been mismanaged or has other bad loans unrelated to the mortgage crisis, and such a bank should be allowed to fail.

If the sale succeeds, however, the government would have created a fully financed private bank at essentially no incremental cost to taxpayers, and Treasury would still hold the toxic assets on its books — to be sold whenever it becomes economical to do so.

This is a simple and fair plan. And unlike the Public-Private Investment Program, it would not reward bank investors for their folly or inject too little capital when more is needed.

Andrew M. Rosenfield is a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School and the chief executive of an investment advisory firm.

Monday, February 2, 2009

lacks any comparative advantage in managing vast and complex financial institutions

From Portfolio:
"
5 Steps to Fix the Banks
Guest Commentary: Pulling banks out of their apparent death spiral won't be easy. But these simple principles should frame the debate.
rebuilding banks
As the liquidity crisis continues, the problem is clear—it's the solution that remains opaque.

The problem with the U.S. banking system is simple: It's largely insolvent. Banks have far too little capital to supply the credit needed to finance recovery let alone growth.

The insolvency problem is centered around so-called "toxic" or troubled assets that banks hold in great amount and which are today worth far less than cost—generally securitized residential home loans.

But the problem of insolvency is centered around toxic assets only in the sense that the problem of a burning house is "centered" around the place the fire started.

As Congressman Henry Steagall said the last time we faced a severe depression, once a fire is raging, the most important issue is how to put it out—not to locate the point of origin.

The United States must provide "rescue capital" to its banks and needs to do so now because private capital markets cannot. However, rescue capital should be provided only on terms that maximize the prospect of recovering it along with a full and fair return. Governmental capital must not be provided to subsidize current investors in these institutions or to relieve the institutions themselves from past errors.

How then can we swiftly recapitalize the banking system? Here are five simple principles that should guide the effort:

  1. If a bank is nearing insolvency (or is already insolvent) and seeks rescue capital from the government, that capital should be provided only on terms at least as favorable to taxpayers as those that a stable and thriving private capital market would demand. In other words, we should insist on terms at least as favorable as those that private investors typically demand to refinance an imperiled business trying to avoid liquidation in normal economic circumstances.

    If new capital is not available to banks from private sources, including importantly rights offerings addressed to their incumbent shareholders, then the rescue capital provided by government must obtain at least the rights and preferences that fresh capital routinely receives in workouts.


  2. These structural terms are well understood and certainly include:

    • Full and preferential recovery of all new capital along with a risk-adjusted rate of return before anything is paid to incumbent or "dead" capital

    • Governance controls and rights giving the new capital a super-majority of seats on the board of directors that shifts to the providers of the new money the right to control the hiring, firing and compensation of executives and, in particular, the CEO and senior leadership team and

    • The right of the board to sell or merge the business with a "times-money" liquidation preference in favor of new capital.

    There is no basis for providing fresh capital to imperiled banks without these traditional and routine terms.


  3. The government should not acquire toxic or troubled assets at above-market prices. Doing so is perverse. Such a policy provides new risk capital in direct proportion to the recipient's past foolish investment decisions.

    Buying mortgage-backed securities at a premium to market, for example, is payment for error—the banks with the largest holdings of the worst assets and their incumbent investors get a larger subsidy than do those that resisted such assets. That makes no sense and not only creates moral hazard—it celebrates it.


  4. Rescue finance under these standard terms is far superior to formal nationalization or receivership when that means assuming total direct operating control of institutions as complex as, say, Citibank or Bank of America—especially if the goal is to immediately empower those institutions to lend again.

    The government has its hands full and, in any event, lacks any comparative advantage in managing vast and complex financial institutions. The board of each bank rescued should hire, motivate and compensate independent senior executives, not government employees, to run the bank.


  5. There must be a clear and immutable deadline for banks to seek governmental rescue finance. The rescue program must force the banks immediately to come to terms with their financial condition and end the appearance of solvency which leads to dangerous "last period" problems and, in any event, doesn't provide needed liquidity.

    If an imperiled bank cannot obtain the capital it needs from the private market it must seek rescue capital from the government right now—say in the 60 to 90 days following the launch of a rescue finance program. After that, insolvency means seizure and liquidation or forced merger, all without prospect of any financial recovery for incumbent investors.

    This mandatory pressure is designed to avoid banks trying to hang on in the hope things will somehow work out for their investors. We need well-capitalized banks to create liquidity and we need them now.

If the government follows these simple principles we may be able to create a solvent banking system swiftly enough to prevent a long depression. If we succeed, the U.S. and its citizens get repaid fully for the risk taken before incumbent investors recover anything.

These are the standard terms, and we have no time to waste.