Showing posts with label Credit Suisse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Credit Suisse. Show all posts

Friday, June 5, 2009

All of a sudden it seems to be a sellers’ market for financial assets.

From Alphaville:

"
BGI sale to Blackrock nears, $12bn price tag mooted (updated)

All of a sudden it seems to be a sellers’ market for financial assets.

Usually knowledgeable sources indicated on Friday that Barclays is now very close to completing the sale of its entire asset management arm, Barclays Global Investors, to American rival Blackrock. A statement was being prepared for release in New York after the market close, although sources warned that a formal announcement could be delayed by last minute haggling over price.

A price tag of $11-13bn has been mooted — substantially in excess of market expectations.

Barclays was first approached about selling the whole of BGI back in February. The bank subsequently decided to shore up its balance sheet by selling just iShares, its market-leading exchange trade fund business, to CVC Capital Partners. But the $4.4bn terms included a “go shop” provision (which ends on June 18) - and this left the door open to fresh approaches for the whole of BGI.

Blackrock’s interest in BGI was eventually confirmed towards the end of May.

Of the $11-13bn proceeds, some $175m will go to CVC in the form of a break-fee, but attaining such a full valuation for a business with assets under management of around $1,600bn is bound to impress - even if it was supposed to be the jewel in the Barclays crown.

The move will clear away any nagging doubts over Barclays decision to avoid seeking bailout funds from the UK government.

Oh, and Bob Diamond gets another fantastic payday.

As for Blackrock, which has been advised by Credit Suisse and Citigroup, the only question now is how it will fund the deal.

UPDATE 19.00: Still not clear whether this deal will be finalised on Friday. But one tidbit to add is that Barclays could well retain a stake in the newly merged Blackrock/BGI. So there is the potential here for Barclays Capital to get a new big customer (it doesn’t trade with BGI at present), while also sharing in the upside. If there is any, of course.

Neil Hume and Paul Murphy



Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat Jun 6 04:53
"All of a sudden it seems to be a sellers’ market for financial assets."

I believe that this is also influencing the behavior of asset owners towards the proposed Legacy Loan Program.

Saturday, May 23, 2009

dozens of lawsuits from angry investors alleging that his companies used deceptive and misleading trade practices in representing the demand for and v

TO BE NOTED: From the NY Times:

Gary Bogdon for The New York Times

At Tesoro, a Ginn development, there is a $48 million clubhouse, along with 750 empty lots.



"
It’s Tee Time. Where Is Everybody?

Montverde, Fla.

OFF the turnpike here in central Florida, hidden behind stucco walls, sits a sprawling Tuscan-style clubhouse on a hill overlooking a string of lakes, a golf course and green fields.

This 1,900-acre property, called Bella Collina, was designed to hold 800 homes. Today, only 48 houses dot the landscape, and just three are occupied. The clubhouse, though open, is eerily quiet, and a promised swimming pool and equestrian center have yet to be built.

Bella Collina, the brainchild of Robert Edward Ginn III, looks like a ghost town. So does Tesoro, another resort opened by Mr. Ginn near Port St. Lucie, where just 150 houses sit on 900 lots. And the Conservatory in Palm Coast, also from Mr. Ginn, is even more barren: 335 out of 340 lots are empty.

As the real estate boom expanded in recent years, developers and home buyers believed that residential golf resorts were a sure-fire bet. Many buyers looked to buy properties that they could flip for a quick profit. Others were lured by stunning views, club services and security. While there is no reliable data on the growth in residential golf resorts, analysts say the market is well past its peak — particularly in the Sun Belt — and there is now an overabundance of developments.

“The aggressive building of new resort courses continued from the mid-1990s into the 2000s, contributing to an increasing glut of inventory that finally found no market,” said Joe Beditz, chief executive of the National Golf Foundation, a trade group that tracks data on the golf industry.

Mr. Ginn, 60, was able to cash in on the boom despite a spotty record that included some well-publicized failures on Hilton Head Island, S.C., in the 1980s. But when the real estate market began to tank in 2007, his empire came undone. “As property values plummeted, many investors had property worth less than their loans, and they were unprepared to pay their club and association fees,” says Toby Tobin, a Florida real estate agent.

Other golf resorts are also struggling. WCI Communities, which built resorts in Florida, Virginia and the Northeast, filed for bankruptcy in August. So did the Yellowstone Club in Big Sky, Mont., and three other resorts that, like some of Mr. Ginn’s, had loans arranged by Credit Suisse. Even the venerable Greenbrier Resort in West Virginia has sought bankruptcy protection.

For Mr. Ginn, a man who could sell 400 lots in a single day during the height of the real estate boom, it has been a huge comedown. While other developers may have built more golf resorts, few did so as grandly or as extravagantly. The tab for the 116,000- square-foot clubhouse at Tesoro reached $48 million.

“Most developers used consultants,” recalled Dean Adler, co-founder of Lubert-Adler Partners, a private equity firm in Philadelphia that invested in Mr. Ginn’s projects. “Bobby had a feel. He could be handed a topography map at a site and sketch out the entire resort.”

An amiable Southerner with a casual personal style, Mr. Ginn was a virtuoso at selling investors his vision of the luxe lifestyle.

“Bobby is very smooth and very likable,” said Hilton Wiener, a lawyer who bought an investment property at Tesoro. “He is a down-home guy who is not a pushy kind of salesperson.”

But when a new resort was in the works, Mr. Ginn knew how to generate a buying frenzy by holding lavish parties where potential buyers greatly outnumbered available lots, say agents and investors who attended the events.

“You would come to one of Ginn’s sales weekends and you would be drinking and thinking, ‘I hope I get chosen as one of the select few who gets to buy a lot,’ ” Mr. Wiener recalled. “The setting is very lush: hand-rolled cigars, fancy parties, vans with the Ginn name plastered on them.”

The high times ended when the market turned two years ago. Sales stalled, and Mr. Ginn had trouble paying off loans. Two of his properties, Tesoro and Quail West in Naples, Fla., filed for bankruptcy in December 2008 and were later sold for a fraction of what he had put into them. He sold Laurelmor, a resort in North Carolina, to another developer for $32 million. Mr. Ginn’s network of companies still owns the facilities at Bella Collina and the Conservatory.

Not all of Mr. Ginn’s 13 golf resorts are in such dire straits. But even at some of the most successful, like Reunion near Orlando, the Ginn Companies is considering programs to attract more buyers by offering fractional ownership at lower prices.

Mr. Ginn says his remaining properties will eventually pay off. “My belief is that when the depression ends, there will be a pent-up demand for happiness,” he said in an interview at his offices at the Hammock Beach Resort near Daytona Beach. “Sometime between 2035 or 2040, Florida will double in size.”

In the meantime, he faces dozens of lawsuits from angry investors alleging that his companies used deceptive and misleading trade practices in representing the demand for and value of his properties. “We will vigorously defend against these false allegations,” Mr. Ginn said.

BOBBY GINN grew up in Hampton, S.C., where his father was a small homebuilder. “I dropped out of school when I was 19 to go into the business because I always had a passion for building,” he said.

When Mr. Ginn was in his 30s, he worked with the Butcher brothers, Jake and C. H. Jr., Tennessee bankers who went to prison for bank fraud. In 1986, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation sued Mr. Ginn, contending that he had participated in a scheme with the brothers to defraud banks under the pretense of developing a property in that state. Mr. Ginn said he settled with the F.D.I.C. in the early 1990s and paid $500,000, without admitting wrongdoing. An F.D.I.C spokesman said the agency did not have documents from that period detailed enough to confirm Mr. Ginn’s account.

In 1985, he bought several resort and residential developments on Hilton Head Island, including such landmarks as the golf course where the Heritage Classic was played. “I liked the resort business more than building condos and shopping centers,” Mr. Ginn said. “Selling fun is more enjoyable.”

But his Hilton Head project did not prove to be a good investment. Some critics argue that he took on too much debt. As his cash-flow problems grew, a local radio station carried bulletins announcing when Ginn employees could safely cash paychecks and bumper stickers began appearing that said: “Honk if Bobby Owes You.”

Mr. Ginn sold his Hilton Head assets in 1986 to pay off debts, and declared personal bankruptcy two years later.

He resuscitated his career by working for Rochester Community Savings Bank in New York as a consultant on its investment in Wild Dunes, a North Carolina resort.

He got a big break in 1997, when Lubert-Adler started investing in his projects. Over the next decade, the firm, whose investors include the endowments for Harvard and Princeton, pumped about $800 million into his properties. Their partnership was structured such that the private equity firm put up all the money and took 80 percent of the profits.

The timing of the relationship couldn’t have been better. “Their business really took off after Sept. 11, when people turned from financial investments to hard assets,” said Robert Gidel, a former president of the Ginn Companies.

Mr. Ginn’s development style was unusual: he didn’t build clubhouses or other services until a large number of lots were sold. “Typically, developers start with a hotel or amenities because skeptical buyers want to see things,” Mr. Gidel said. “But here the market was so strong, and people wanted to believe.”

Dan Gerner, who owned a home in Quail West, one of the few developed properties that Mr. Ginn bought, said Mr. Ginn’s lavish spending ornamented his operation with all the trappings of success. At Quail West, Mr. Gerner said, Mr. Ginn “spent $12 million remodeling the clubhouse, and when the members didn’t like it, he spent $4 million more changing it.”

Many buyers bought several properties and hoped to flip them for a profit.

Even Mr. Adler, the Lubert-Adler chief, was personally involved in at least one deal at Tesoro. According to property records, he bought a parcel in 2004 and quickly sold it for a $205,000 profit.

A partnership formed by Mr. Adler and Mr. Ginn, A & G, also bought and sold five properties at Bella Collina for a $2.5 million profit over a period of weeks.

Those transactions raised possible conflict-of-interest questions, experts in private equity say, because the partnership bought property in developments that were also assets held by private equity funds that Mr. Adler was helping to oversee. Steven N. Kaplan, a professor of finance at the University of Chicago, said that transactions such as this can be problematic because investors in a fund are deprived of profits that potentially accrue to insiders who buy assets for themselves.

Mr. Adler says that although he bought the single property at Tesoro in his own name, he had actually “made a loan to two individuals to purchase that property.” He said that they — not he — kept the profits from the transaction and that they repaid him with interest.

As for the five properties purchased by A & G, Mr. Adler said the situation was “rectified.”

“I transferred my investment back to Mr. Ginn and never participated or received a penny of profit,” he said. Mr. Ginn confirmed Mr. Adler’s account.

The A & G deals are cited in a class-action suit filed last week in federal district court in Florida, alleging a scheme to sell properties based on fraudulent appraisals. Although Mr. Adler and Mr. Ginn are cited in the case, their firms, and not they as individuals, are named as defendants. Mr. Adler said he was no longer a partner in A & G when the transactions took place and denied any wrongdoing. Mr. Ginn said he had not seen the suit but also denied allegations of wrongdoing.

In 2006, Mr. Ginn’s partnership with Lubert-Adler borrowed $675 million from Credit Suisse, out of which it took a distribution of $332 million. (Mr. Adler said that his firm put back roughly that amount after sales slowed.) The partnership used the balance of the Credit Suisse loan to finance four resorts.

But the next year, the real estate market began to enter a free fall, and by 2008 the partnership couldn’t make payments on the Credit Suisse loan. Tesoro and Quail West filed for bankruptcy, and Laurelmor was sold. “There were no buyers and no market,” Mr. Tobin said.

Mr. Ginn says he now faces about 30 lawsuits.

According to one filed in a Florida circuit court, buyers were required to turn over their power of attorney to Richard T. Davis, a partner in a law firm that represented several Ginn companies, in order to buy land in Tesoro. The suit alleges that Mr. Davis signed documents that never provided detailed disclosures about costs, as the government requires. Since Mr. Davis was the companies’ closing agent, the suit contends, he knew that the disclosures were incomplete.

“I assure you that we tried to disclose everything that was out there,” Mr. Ginn said. Mr. Davis’s lawyer said the allegations were without merit.

The Florida suit also alleges that Mr. Ginn worked to artificially inflate the prices of parcels in his development. In one case, according to the lawsuit, a buyer bought two properties for a total of $1.007 million, and Mr. Ginn’s title company recorded the respective sale prices as $1.007 million and $1. The company then used the larger price as a “comparable” figure in an appraisal for Roy Bridges, a British financial adviser who bought a property for $1.195 million, according to appraisal records. Mr. Bridges’s property is now in foreclosure.

Mr. Ginn contends that “the county recorded it incorrectly.”

According to a transcript of a video obtained by a law firm representing property owners in the suit, a Ginn salesman told a group of potential buyers at Bella Collina that “Lot 5 sold for $2.1 million this morning.” But property records showed that the parcel sold for just $416,900, according to the lawsuit.

Mr. Ginn said he was “shocked because the salesman deviated from company practices.”

MR. GINN’S partnership with Lubert-Adler still has three properties left to develop and owns some land at existing resorts. “At this point, we have invested more than we have distributed back to investors,” Mr. Adler said. “We got hit by the economic tsunami, and we did not anticipate how tough it would be.”

Mr. Ginn says he is “ready to sell properties in trophy locations” when the market turns around.

“If you can’t sell,” he said, “you die.”

Monday, May 11, 2009

claiming that the banks had conspired with Apollo and interfered with Huntsman’s previous merger pact with Basell

TO BE NOTED: From the NY Times:

"Huntsman Wins Right to Sue Banks Over Failed Deal

The chemical maker Huntsman said on Monday that a Texas court cleared the way for it to proceed with a multibillion-dollar lawsuit against Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank stemming from its failed takeover by Apollo Management’s Hexion Specialty Chemicals unit.

The company said Judge Fred Edwards of the Ninth District Court of Montgomery County, Tex., ruled in its favor on six motions brought by the banks.

Huntsman agreed to end its $6.5 billion agreement to be acquired by Hexion in December after months of litigation. Apollo and its affiliates paid $1 billion to settle the suit.

But the company has proceeded with its lawsuit against Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank, the banks that had agreed to finance the Hexion deal, claiming that the banks had conspired with Apollo and interfered with Huntsman’s previous merger pact with Basell.

Huntsman said it would go to trial on June 8, claiming that the banks committed common law fraud in connection with its original agreement to merge with Basell, tortious interference with its merger agreement with Hexion, negligent misrepresentation and civil conspiracy.

Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank could not immediately be reached for comment."

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

"We are not taking the post down, but this disclaimer stands: viewer beware."

A controversial but revealing post on Alphaville:

"
Bank picture du jour( DOESN'T KEDROSKY HAVE THIS PATENTED? )

A caveat - We have received a slew of complaints in the comments and more than one email about this picture. One reader notes, for instance, that the graphic “just happens to make JPM look like the best bank by far. Represented correctly by area, things are not quite so clear cut between JPM and santander/HSBC.”

Points well taken. We are not taking the post down, but this disclaimer stands: viewer beware.Hat Tip JP Morgan (Click to enlarge).

Banks: Market Cap

Tuesday, December 16, 2008

"All were looking for gains this year, and their targets at the start of the year are far above where the S&P 500 is currently trading."

This isn't fair, really, but if you're going to pretend that you can predict the future better than anyone else, it shouldn't be unexpected. I guess when you're wrong, as I told John Gapper, it's better to be gloriously wrong. From Bespoke:

"Bloomberg
recently surveyed market strategists for their 2009 S&P 500 price targets, and collectively, they're looking for a gain of 21.8% from the index's current price level. As shown below, UBS is the most bullish of the group with a year-end 2009 price target of 1,300 (a 47.2% gain). UBS was the most bullish last year as well with a 2008 price target of 1,700. Goldman and Strategas are the second most bullish this year with price targets of 1,100. Credit Suisse has a target of 1,050 (for mid-year '09), Citi and HSBC are at 1,000, and Merrill Lynch is at 975. Merrill is the least bullish strategist of those surveyed, but they're still looking for a gain of 10.4% from current levels.

For those looking for direction from these strategists, their 2008 projections should be noted. All were looking for gains this year, and their targets at the start of the year are far above where the S&P 500 is currently trading.

09pricetargets

Interested in more in-depth market analysis from Bespoke? Subscribe to Bespoke Premium and start receiving our closely followed reports today.

Sunday, December 14, 2008

"I think there are at least three arguments for the canary theory and against the domino theory."

Here's a post on The Baseline Scenario about Subprime Lending and its role in the crisis by James Kwak:

"Asking whether subprime lending caused the crisis raises all the questions about agency and causality that I’ve raised before. On the agency question, insofar as there was a problem in the subprime lending sector - and few would deny that there was - does the fault lie with borrowers who took on loans they had no chance of repaying, perhaps sometimes without understanding the terms; with the mortgage lenders who lent them the money without doing any due diligence to determine if they could pay them back; with the investment bankers who told the mortgage lenders what kinds of loans they needed to package into securities; with the bond rating agencies who blessed those securities while taking fees from the investment banks; with the investors who bought those securities without analyzing the risk involved; or with the regulators who sat on their hands through the entire process? Note in passing that it may have been perfectly rational, as well as legal, for an investor to by an MBS even knowing that the loans backing it were going to default, but making a bet that he could resell the MBS before the price fell, under the “greater fool” theory of investing. (It may have been rational for an investment bank to do the same, but not necessarily legal, given the disclosure requirements relating to securities. Goldman Sachs is being sued over precisely this question.) Readers of this blog know that my opinion is that, although there is blame to be shared along the chain, the greatest fault lies with the regulators, for a few reasons. First, although the desire to make money may cause problems, it can be no more be said to be a cause of anything than gravity can be said to be the cause of a landslide; second, bubbles are inevitable, at least in an unregulated market; and third, there is a difference in kind between the mistake made by an investor, who is foolish and loses some money, and the mistake made by a regulator (or a legislator who votes to reduce funding for regulators), whose job is to serve the public interest."

I don't agree with this.
1) The desire to make money is always there, but there isn't always Fraud, Negligence, Fiduciary Mismanagement, and Collusion. That is an essential element of this crisis.
2) Bubbles are not inevitable.
3) The markets were not unregulated. Indeed, one also has to remember that there are professional codes that might have also been violated here as well as criminal ones.
4) There's plenty of research that Regulators act as Private Actors do. ( I'm thinking of James Buchanan )

I believe that the Banks and other Financial concerns in general are the most responsible, including the Credit Rating Agencies and Mortgage Brokers, for example.

"But that was all the preamble, because today I want to talk about the question of causality.

I think it’s generally accepted that the crisis we know today first appeared in the subprime lending market, where an increase in delinquency rates triggered a fall in asset values. Those problems were clearly visible early in 2007 (it’s impossible to say exactly when they were first visible, because some people had been warning of the problem for years, to little effect), and over the next year the main entertainment in the financial sector was watching banks and hedge funds suddenly realize they had large subprime exposures and either take writedowns or fold. But I think there are three ways to understand the relationship of subprime and the current crisis:

  1. Subprime was the first place where various structural problems appeared, but those problems existed elsewhere, where they only appeared later. If the subprime lending boom had never happened, we would still be roughly where we are today. Call this the “canary in the coal mine” theory.
  2. Subprime was the first place where various structural problems appeared, and the subprime crisis generated additional pressure that exposed those problems in other areas. For example, subprime concerns caused a pullback in lending, which caused a leveling off in home prices, which caused a reduction in housing construction, which slowed economic growth, etc. Call this the “domino” theory.
  3. Subprime was a necessary cause of the crisis. Without subprime, the levels of housing prices, indebtedness, and risk in the system would have been sustainable indefinitely. Call this the “prime mover” theory.

Only under the prime mover theory can subprime truly be said to have caused the crisis. Under the domino theory it played the role of a precipitating but unnecessary cause. Under the canary theory it is just a leading indicator.

In my opinion, subprime was probably the canary, and possibly the first domino. There are various arguments against the prime mover theory:

  • The U.S. subprime sector is simply not big enough. Although the numbers have been shifting in the last couple of years, roughly 80% of outstanding residential mortgages in the U.S. are prime; the other 20% is split between subprime and Alt-A. About 50 million homeowners have a mortgage, of which about 7 million have subprime mortgages. The idea that an increase in the delinquency percentage among 7 million U.S. homeowners (total mortgage value about $1-2 trillion, so losses on foreclosure - assuming a 100% foreclosure rate - about $0.5-1 trillion) could have by itself caused the largest economic downturn in the world since the 1930s is hard to credit.
  • In absolute terms, losses in the subprime sector will be dwarfed by losses in the prime sector. Credit Suisse is now forecasting 8.1 million foreclosures by 2012, over 5 million of those outside of subprime. Current-month foreclosures among prime mortgages have already caught up to and passed (see chart on p. 4) foreclosures among subprime mortgages.
  • The U.S. and global economies bumped along passably for over a year from the beginning of the subprime crisis. The U.S. recession did begin in December 2007 (Econbrowser for a good post on recession dating), but most of the numbers don’t start falling off cliffs until the second half of 2008. By the time Lehman went bankrupt in September, it’s probably true that all of the bad news about subprime was already priced into the various markets. What’s happened since then is new bad news about every other market.

Deciding between the canary and domino theories is tougher. The canary theory is that there were lots of boulders perched precariously on a cliff and subprime was just the first one to fall. The domino theory is that the subprime boulder knocked into a lot of much bigger boulders and knocked them off, but something else could have knocked them off just as easily. The domino theory could go something like this: Subprime caused writedowns and instability in the financial sector and nervousness in the housing market; nervousness in the housing market caused housing prices to start to fall, making it harder to refinance and increasing delinquencies on all kinds of mortgages; expanding writedowns caused a liquidity run on banks such as Bear Stearns and eventually Lehman; falling house prices and the consequent wealth effect reduced U.S. personal consumption, slowing economic growth; reduced consumption had the usual multiplier effect, reducing incomes and creating a recessionary cycle; the the recession hurt the value of every other type of debt (commercial mortgages, credit cards, etc.), triggering a full-scale banking crisis; and the fear created by the banking crisis led to the sharp downturn in credit and in consumption that put us where we are today.

I think there are at least three arguments for the canary theory and against the domino theory.

First, there is the issue of timing. The subprime crisis took an awfully long time to blossom into a full-fledged global recession and, as I said above, by the time the latter occurred the full scale of the subprime problem was more or less known to everyone. On that principle, the other boulders withstood the bump they got from the subprime boulder.

Second, once we had a housing bubble, it was inevitable that it was going to pop one way or another. So one question to ask is whether subprime lending was the reason for the housing bubble. Even at the peak of housing prices in 2006, subprime loans only made up about 20% of total mortgage origination volume. (Everyone cites Inside Mortgage Finance, but you have to pay for their data; here’s an NPR primer on subprime with a chart.) Could that 20% have have been solely responsible for the bubble? I suppose it’s possible, depending on the shape of the supply curve, but count me as skeptical.

Third, there is another good explanation for what pushed all those boulders down. James Hamilton thinks that the economy was structurally fragile, and the shock that knocked the boulders down was the oil price spike.

My view is that we were teetering on the edge of a cliff last summer, and the oil price shock may have been just enough to tip us over the edge. As we did so, the financial disaster that had always been a potential became a reality.

The trouble is, now that the economy is in free fall, it’s going to take more than $2 gasoline to pull us back up.

Ultimately, I think this question (canary or domino) is not definitively answerable, like many historical counterfactual questions, but I’m on the side of the canary.

One final note: Blaming subprime can have a disturbing overtone of blaming poor people for reaching beyond their means. First of all, it’s not true that subprime has more than a vague correlation with income. In the words of the late Tanta:

The capacity C of traditional underwriting was, of course, always relative to the proposed transaction. A lower-income person buying a lower-priced property was, you see, not a case of subprime lending; assuming a reasonable credit history, it was a prime loan. People with quite good incomes and stellar credit histories who tried to buy way too much house got turned down by the prime lenders.

More often, however, people in gentle society realize it’s not proper to blame poor people, so they take aim instead at the Community Reinvestment Act and liberal politicians generally for attempting to extend homeownership to people who couldn’t afford it. This line of attack was most recently exhibited on the New York Times op-ed page. I will leave the rebuttals to the experts:

I suppose I also accept the Canary Theory, in that there were other investments that could have triggered this crisis. The lowering of capital requirements infected a number of investments. The complexity of the investments also contributed as well. In general, there was a mountain of Wishful Thinking that infected a whole range of investments.

Thursday, December 4, 2008

“Ultimately this ends with inflation being significantly higher than the market is anticipating right now. "

Here's a Bloomberg post that addresses a few of my concerns:

"By Thomas R. Keene and Cordell Eddings

Dec. 3 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. actions meant to thaw credit markets will lead to inflation, making Treasury Inflation Protected Securities attractive, said Ira Jersey, an interest- rate strategist at Credit Suisse Group AG.

“The Federal Reserve is increasing its balance sheet and now printing money, and that’s all quantitative easing is, printing money,” Jersey said in an interview with Bloomberg Radio in New York. “Ultimately this ends with inflation being significantly higher than the market is anticipating right now. Things like TIPS in 10 or 20 years are a better value.”

This is what I believe should happen, and will happen.

The Fed will:

1) Print Money

2) Inflation Will Result

"Jersey also said there is value in the corporate market, where BBB-rated industrial debt is priced at default rates higher than those seen during the Depression.

“The question is do you think things are going to be worse than the Great Depression?” said Jersey. “We don’t think so.”

I've also already argued this same point.