Showing posts with label Akerloff. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Akerloff. Show all posts

Friday, April 3, 2009

our best guide to recovery from our present distress, not least because of its common-sense psychology

TO BE NOTED: From The New Republic:

"Shorting Reason

Richard A. Posner, The New Republic Published: Wednesday, April 15, 2009


Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism

By George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller

(Princeton University Press, 264 pp., $24.95)

The economics profession has been greatly embarrassed by the economic crisis. The crisis began last September, with the crash of the banking industry (broadly defined, as it should be in this deregulatory era, to include investment banks and other financial intermediaries besides commercial banks), and of the stock market and other financial markets. It has since grown into the first depression since the 1930s, if one may judge from its global sweep, the pervasive anxiety that it has engendered among government officials as well as the business community and the public at large, and the trillions of dollars that nations have desperately committed to fighting it. The economists had assured us that there would never be another depression in the United States, because economics had discovered how to prevent depressions: if economic activity dropped, the Federal Reserve had only to push down interest rates, for this would induce banks to lend and consumers and businessmen to borrow, and the borrowed money would be used to finance consumption and production, restoring output to its level before the crash. Academic and government economists specializing in the business cycle were as surprised by the September collapse and the ensuing downward spiral of the economy as anyone, and were unprepared with plans for arresting it. Six months later they cannot agree on what should be done to recover from it. Not knowing what will work, the government is trying everything.

The idea that monetary policy--raising interest rates (and therefore reducing the amount of money in circulation, because interest is the price of putting money into circulation rather than hoarding it) to check inflation, and lowering interest rates to check economic downturns--holds the key to moderating the business cycle, and therefore to preventing depressions as well as inflations, has been falsified. The Federal Reserve has pushed interest rates way down, but the amount of lending has been tepid and economic activity has continued to fall--hence the bailouts of banks and other financial institutions and the $787 billion stimulus package recently enacted by Congress. The stimulus, a program of deficit spending, seeks to replace the loss of private demand, and the resulting decline in economic activity, brought about by the economic crisis. It seeks to do this by public works, such as the construction and repair of highways and other transportation infrastructure, designed to increase employment, and by tax cuts and welfare payments, which are intended to increase incomes directly and by doing so to stimulate spending.

In 1936, John Maynard Keynes argued in his great book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money that government could use deficit spending to replace private demand with public demand, and by doing so put a nation's unemployed to work. Over time, this position has encountered increasing opposition. Many influential economists came to oppose deficit spending on public projects, which injects the government deep into the economy and creates a risk of inflation and high taxes in the future. Increasingly economists favored the monetarist approach, championed most famously by Milton Friedman, which teaches that the proper management of the money supply is all that is needed to avert depressions, and that it can do so painlessly.

But now that monetarism has received a sharp blow to its solar plexus, much of the economics profession has thrown its support to the idea of a fiscal stimulus (while rightly critical of many of the details of the stimulus package enacted by Congress). Which is to say, it has thrown its support to Keynesianism. In Animal Spirits, two distinguished liberal economists, reflecting on the current depression, marry Keynes to "behavioral economics" and offer the resulting union as a replacement for conventional monetarist economics, and for rational-choice theory more broadly.

George A. Akerlof's and Robert Shiller's book is short, and aimed at the general reader (though the end notes and bibliography are strictly for economists), but it is intended to be taken seriously as a work of economic theory. Akerlof is an expert on frictions in consumer and employment markets. Shiller is an expert on speculative excesses, and he was one of the few economists to warn about the danger of the housing bubble that brought the economy low.

Their thesis is that the key to understanding depressions, and the ups and downs of the economy more generally, is psychology, which they call "animal spirits." They relate this emphasis on psychology to the new field of economics called "behavioral economics," which rejects the "rational man" model of conventional economic theory in favor of what its proponents consider a more realistic picture of human motivations and capacities. Akerlof and Shiller believe that if people were rational, there would be no depressions; but there are depressions, and so the rational model must be inadequate.

They want a pedigree, or a sacred text, to lend authority to their thesis, and they want to champion the liberal Keynes over the conservative Friedman. Hence their appropriation of the term "animal spirits" from a famous passage in The General Theory: "Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits--of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.... Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism fades, enterprise will fade and die.... It is our innate urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance."

Akerlof and Shiller think that by "animal spirits" Keynes meant "noneconomic motives and irrational behaviors," and they imply that he wanted government to "countervail the excesses that occur because of our animal spirits." This is a misreading. The passage in The General Theory is not about excesses, and it does not argue that "animal spirits" should be damped down. It is about the danger of paralysis in the face of uncertainty ("if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism fades, enterprise will fade and die"). As Keynes's biographer Robert Skidelsky explains, The General Theory argues that "actual output is normally below 'potential' output; in depressions disastrously so. It is only in moments of 'excitement' that the economic machine works at full blast. This helps explain why economic progress has been so slow and fitful."

Keynes picked up from the American economist Frank Knight the distinction between calculable risk, the sort of thing on which insurance premiums are based, and uncertainty in the sense of a risk that cannot be quantified. (Keynes had published a treatise on probability theory in 1921.) The fact that businessmen would venture to invest at all in the face of uncertainty was a puzzle, and the explanation, Keynes argued, lay in emotion. You would have to be high-spirited--say, like Columbus--to embark on a costly, uncertain venture. In other words: nothing ventured, nothing gained.

What happens in a depression, and makes it a psychological event as well as an economic and political one, is that the economic environment becomes so uncertain that people freeze. Not only are businessmen afraid to invest, but consumers are afraid to spend; instead they hoard cash. Right now our banks, dubiously solvent and harassed by an angry Congress, are hoarding. Consumers are hoarding, too; the savings rate has shot up, and the increased savings are taking safe and rather inert forms--CDs, money market accounts, government securities, even currency and gold--that do not stimulate investment. Until animal spirits revive, the economy will not recover.

Keynes thought that if government put the unemployed to work, their animal spirits would rise, along with those of the contractors who hired the unemployed to perform the government's contracts. Even more important, people who were still employed but afraid they would soon be unemployed would regain confidence if unemployment fell and the threat to their own jobs thus receded. Feeling more confident about their future, they would begin to spend, and business would begin to invest. The vicious cycle of falling consumption, production, and employment would turn into a virtuous cycle of rising consumption, production, and employment. Keynes worried about stock market speculation, because he thought that speculators based their decisions on guesses about the psychology of other investors rather than on which companies had the best prospects and therefore should attract new investment. But he did not relate speculation to an excess of animal spirits.

Akerlof and Shiller believe that the key to understanding depressions lies in motives or behaviors that they regard as non-rational or irrational. They list "confidence," "fairness," "money illusion," the temptation to "corruption, " and susceptibility to "stories" and treat all of these as manifestations of "animal spirits." Only "confidence" comes within shouting distance of Keynes's understanding of animal spirits. But Akerlof and Shiller give it a negative charge that is alien to Keynes.

People buy common stock when stock prices are rising. They (notoriously) bought houses during the early 2000s when house prices were rising. Since almost no one can predict the ups and downs of the stock market or the housing market, these purchases must have been motivated, Akerlof and Shiller argue, by something other than a rational investment strategy. But this is not at all obvious, or implied by Keynes's usage. Stocks have generally been a good investment, at least when held for a considerable period. And since no one is able to time market turns, no one knows when the market is overpriced and therefore when one should sell rather than buy. Indeed, the idea of selling at the "top" of the market is incoherent, because if it were known that stock prices had peaked, no one would buy. Buying stock, or buying a house, is at any time a guess about the future, a venture into the unknown. Yet that does not imply irrationality.

In the early 2000s, interest rates were very low because of a mistaken decision by Alan Greenspan (but who knew?); and since a house is a product purchased with debt (a mortgage), houses became a more than usually attractive investment. The housing stock expands only slowly because it is so durable, so the increase in demand for houses outran the increase in supply (new housing starts), causing prices to rise. Since very few economists and no government officials warned of a bubble, it was not irrational for people to think that houses were a good investment, even though house prices had risen steeply since the 1990s.

They were wrong. But mistakes and ignorance are not symptoms of irrationality. They usually are the result of limited information. Ben Bernanke, in October 2005, just before the housing bubble began to leak air, denied that the rise in housing prices was a bubble. Was he irrational? That the errors of experts can lead to disaster is hardly a novelty, but it does not follow that only an irrational person would heed the advice of experts.

Akerlof and Shiller rightly associate booms with "new era" thinking, but wrongly deem such thinking irrational. Stocks soared in the late 1920s because it was a period of rapid economic growth based on rapidly rising labor productivity and new products such as the massproduced automobile, new methods of retailing such as the chain store, and new methods of finance such as installment buying and the purchase of common stock on margin. There was no reason to think that existing stock prices reflected an exaggerated expectation of increased wealth in so dynamic an era. The late 1990s were likewise heralded as a new era, this time on the basis of expectations that the computer would transform the economy. The early 2000s seemed to most people still another new era, this one based on the seemingly magical conjunction of low interest rates with low inflation, rising asset values, and new financial instruments that were believed to enable greater lending and borrowing with less risk. In all three cases the new era turned out, at least in the short run, to be a false dawn, and an asset-price crash ensued. Given the uncertainty of the economic environment, stressed by Keynes, such disappointments are not surprising, and they do not show that investors are irrational.

Nor are booms the result, as Akerlof and Shiller curiously argue, of "corruption scandals." They think that economic downturns are preceded by increases in corruption, and they give examples. The oddest is the widespread violation of the prohibition laws in the 1920s, but they also note the financial scandals exposed by investigations of Wall Street that Congress conducted in the ensuing depression. They think that mortgage fraud was a major cause of the present crisis. How all this relates to animal spirits is unclear, but in any event they are wrong about the causality. Warren Buffett had it right: until the tide goes out, you cannot know who is swimming naked. A crash exposes frauds; it is rarely caused by them. Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme fell apart when, as a consequence of the stock market crash last fall, his investors--their wealth diminished and their animal spirits crushed--tried to withdraw money from his phony hedge fund. The scheme itself was not a cause of the crash.

There was more than the usual amount of mortgage fraud during the housing bubble, but it was not the cause of many millions of people overpaying for houses, as we know with the benefit of hindsight that they did. Cheap credit and soaring house values were the immediate causes of the bubble and of all that followed when it burst. The underlying causes were the deregulation of financial services; lax enforcement of the remaining regulations; unsound decisions on interest rates by the Federal Reserve; huge budget deficits; the globalization of the finance industry; the financial rewards of risky lending, and competitive pressures to engage in it, in the absence of effective regulation; the overconfidence of economists inside and outside government; and the government's erratic, confidence-destroying improvisational responses to the banking collapse.

Some of these mistakes of commission and omission had emotional components. The overconfidence of economists might even be thought a manifestation of animal spirits. But the career and reward structures, and the ideological preconceptions, of macroeconomists are likelier explanations than emotion for the economics profession's failure to foresee or respond effectively to the crisis.

That animal spirits droop in a bust is no more anomalous than that they soar in a boom. To freeze and to hoard is a perfectly sensible reaction to an increase in economic uncertainty, whether one is a businessman or a consumer. It is individually rational behavior, though bad for the economy. Rich women think they are helping the economy by cutting down on luxury purchases; they are merely increasing unemployment in retailing.

While for Keynes "confidence" (or "animal spirits") was the key to getting out of a depression, for Akerlof and Shiller it is something to be chilled down in order to prevent booms that might turn into busts. This inversion of Keynes may explain the strangest statement in the book: that "both presidents are heroes of ours," the two presidents being Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt. Both are "heroes" because both ran budget deficits and created new agencies to regulate the economy.

But there is a significant historical difference that Akerlof and Shiller overlook. In the three years of depression during which Hoover was president, confidence drained out of the economy. The depression touched bottom at the end of his term, and turned around within days of Roosevelt's inauguration. As Gauti Eggerstsson recently explained in the American Economic Review, Hoover's adherence to the gold standard, and his determination to keep government small (so no Keynesian stimulus) and raise taxes to try to balance the budget, created a rational expectation of continued economic contraction, dampening the economy's animal spirits. Roosevelt's decision, made promptly upon his taking office, to go off the gold standard (in effect), push up prices (in order to end deflation), and engage in massive (for the time) deficit spending, created an expectation of economic recovery. This expectation had positive effects on the economy even before the new policies could take effect. Roosevelt restored confidence, which Hoover had killed, and renewed confidence restarted the economic engine.

A weakness of Akerlof's and Shiller's book is a failure to define their target: the rational model of human behavior. If rationality means omniscience, then it is indeed an unsound premise for economic reasoning. If it means reasoning unaffected by emotion, then it misunderstands emotion. The word "emotional" has overtones of irrationality, but actually emotion is at once a form of telescoped thinking (it is not irrational to step around an open manhole "instinctively" without first analyzing the costs and benefits of falling into it) and a prompt to action that often, as in the case of investment under uncertainty, cannot be based on complete or even good information and is therefore unavoidably a shot in the dark. We could not survive if we were afraid to act in the face of uncertainty.

Irrationality is not the courage to act. Irrationality is to be found in the cognitive quirks that we owe to the human brain having evolved in a very different environment from our present one. We are poor at evaluating low-probability events because in the ancestral environment (as evolutionary biologists call it) there was little that could be done about such events. The sense of the irrational that merchants exploit--that a price of $5.99 is meaningfully less than $6.00--is a trace of the limited value in that environment of being able to evaluate fine differences. These quirks do not explain depressions.

As one reads this book, one has the sense that deep down Akerlof and Shiller believe that being rational is the same as being right. That is a mistake. It prevents them from entertaining the possibility that what has now plunged the world into depression is a cascade of mistakes by rational businessmen, government officials, academic economists, consumers, and homebuyers, operating in an unexpectedly fragile economic environment, and that what is retarding recovery is not the "unreasoning fear" of which Franklin Roosevelt famously spoke but the rational fears--the reasoning fear, to use Roosevelt's idiom--of businesspeople, consumers, and officials who confront economic uncertainties for which no one had prepared them.

Akerlof and Shiller invoke "fairness" and "money illusion" to explain the puzzling behavior of employment and wages in a depression. It may seem obvious that employment would fall in a depression. But it is not. If demand for a firm's products falls, the firm will have less revenue, and therefore it will have to cut its costs, including its labor costs, to survive. So why not just cut its workers' wages and explain to them why? If they stalk off in anger, the employer should have no difficulty in hiring replacements at the lower wage, for in the unsettled conditions of a depression it will be attractive to other workers. Or suppose, as often happens in a depression (and may still happen in our current one), the general price level falls. In a deflation, the same amount of money buys more, because prices are lower. So one might expect an employer to say to his employees, "Since the purchasing power of the dollar has risen, I am going to cut your wage, as otherwise, by receiving the same amount of money when its purchasing power has increased, you would be receiving a wage increase, which makes no sense in a depression." (Among the paradoxes of depression is that we want wages to fall, so that producers will have lower costs and will therefore produce more and so hire more workers. This is not understood by the politicians who are pushing for legal changes that will encourage unionization. They should wait until we are out of the woods.)

Wages do fall in a deflation, but not as far as prices; and employers do generally prefer to economize on labor costs by laying off workers rather than by reducing their wages. The resistance of workers to having their wages cut in a deflation, a resistance that in the Great Depression of the 1930s produced a sharp rise in real incomes for many workers while others were on breadlines, is ascribed by Akerlof and Shiller to workers' sense of "fairness"--of their sense of entitlement to their existing wage--and to "money illusion," by which they mean the failure to distinguish between the amount of money one receives as a wage (the nominal wage) and the purchasing power of the wage (the real wage). They also argue that employers deliberately "overpay" their workers in order to boost morale and loyalty. But this does not explain why nominal wages are not cut during a depression in order to maintain (not cut) real wages.

There is a simpler explanation for unemployment in depressions, one that dispenses with irrationality. A worker who, rather than being paid a flat wage, is paid a percentage of his firm's income would be unlikely to complain when his wage dropped in a depression; he would know that his wage was variable, and he would plan his life accordingly. But if paid a fixed wage, he is likely to count on it as a steady source of income. Since depressions are rare and have unpredictable consequences, he will not have been able to protect himself from the consequences of a depression-induced cut in his wage. He is going to be upset to find that he is working as hard or harder but being paid less, and he will not be reassured by being given a lecture on deflation and purchasing power, because he will not understand or believe it. And whereas wage cuts make the entire work force unhappy, layoffs make just the laid-off workers unhappy, and since they are no longer on the premises they do not demoralize the remaining work force by their unhappy presence. The employer, for this and other reasons--such as wanting to economize on benefits and overhead and induce the remaining workers to work harder lest they be laid off too--is likely to prefer laying off workers to cutting wages. (Unemployment insurance is a factor as well.)

This explanation for unemployment in depressions is consistent with Akerlof and Shiller in giving weight to cognitive and emotional factors (workers do not understand deflation, unhappy workers can demoralize the workplace), but it avoids jargon and condescension and the fascination with irrationality. Yet it may be too simple to please an academic economist. One reason why Keynes fell into disfavor among academic economists, and why Akerlof and Shiller want to dress him in the garb of a behavioral economist, is that although he was a brilliant economist and remains a hero of liberal economists, he was not a formal or systematic thinker. He belonged to the era before economists insisted on mathematizing the discipline. The General Theory is beautifully written--and full of loose ends and puzzling omissions. Keynes was a self-taught economist and a part-time academic. He had a rich and varied non-academic life as a government official and adviser, journalist, speculator, academic administrator, and member of the Cambridge Apostles and the Bloomsbury group. Having observed how people, including himself, behaved in the real world, he was unself-conscious about incorporating into economic theory such unsystematized and untheorized concepts as "animal spirits" (and its opposite, "liquidity preference"--the desire to hoard cash rather than spend or invest it).

The complexity of a modern economy has defeated efforts to create mathematical models that would enable depressions to be predicted and would provide guidance on how to prevent them or, failing that, to recover from them. The insights of behavioral economics have not done the trick, either. Shiller is to be commended for spotting bubbles, but few if any other behavioral economists noticed them; and he and Akerlof offer no concrete proposals for how we might recover from the current depression and prevent a future one. They want credit loosened, but so does everyone else--so did Keynes, who criticized our government for tightening credit in the early stages of the Great Depression.

We will discover soon enough whether the measures taken by the Obama administration are reviving the animal spirits of producers and consumers. The intentions are good. But the lack of focus, the partisan squabbling, the dizzying policy oscillations, the delays in execution, and the harassment of bankers are bad. By increasing the uncertainty of the business environment, these things are dampening the animal spirits--the courage to reason and act in the face of an uncertain future. Seventy-three years after the publication of The General Theory, it may still be our best guide to recovery from our present distress, not least because of its common-sense psychology.

Richard A. Posner "

Wednesday, March 11, 2009

The paper’s message is that the promise of government bailouts isn’t merely one aspect of the problem. It is the core problem.

From the WSJ:

"
Secondary Sources: Greenspan’s Defense, Depression, Looting

A roundup of economic news from around the Web.

  • Greenspan Defense: On the Journal’s opinion pages, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan says the central bank wasn’t responsible for the housing bubble. “There are at least two broad and competing explanations of the origins of this crisis. The first is that the “easy money” policies of the Federal Reserve produced the U.S. housing bubble that is at the core of today’s financial mess. The second, and far more credible, explanation agrees that it was indeed lower interest rates that spawned the speculative euphoria. However, the interest rate that mattered was not the federal-funds rate, but the rate on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. Between 2002 and 2005, home mortgage rates led U.S. home price change by 11 months. This correlation between home prices and mortgage rates was highly significant, and a far better indicator of rising home prices than the fed-funds rate.”
  • What Is Depression?: Calculated Risk looks at what would need to happen for this recession to become a depression. “Some people argue the duration of the economic slump defines a depression - and the current recession is already 15 months old. That is longer than the recessions of ‘90/’91 and ‘01. The ‘73-’75 recession lasted 16 months peak to trough, and the early ’80s recession (a double dip) was classified as a 6 month recession followed by a 16 month recession (22 months total). Those earlier periods weren’t “depressions”, so if duration is the key measure, the current recession still has a ways to go… Even though the current recession is already one of the worst since 1947, it is only about 1/3 of the way to a depression (assuming a terrible Q1). To reach a depression, the economy would have to decline at about a 6.6% annual rate each quarter for the next year… I still think a depression is very unlikely. More likely the economy will bottom later this year or at least the rate of economic decline will slow sharply. I also still believe that the eventual recovery will be very sluggish, and it will take some time to return to normal growth.”
  • Looting: David Leonhardt of the New York Times looks at a 1993 paper titled “Looting” by George Akerlof and Paul Romer, and he sees parallels to the current crisis. ““Looting” provides a really useful framework. The paper’s message is that the promise of government bailouts isn’t merely one aspect of the problem. It is the core problem. Promised bailouts mean that anyone lending money to Wall Street — ranging from small-time savers like you and me to the Chinese government — doesn’t have to worry about losing that money. The United States Treasury (which, in the end, is also you and me) will cover the losses. In fact, it has to cover the losses, to prevent a cascade of worldwide losses and panic that would make today’s crisis look tame. But the knowledge among lenders that their money will ultimately be returned, no matter what, clearly brings a terrible downside. It keeps the lenders from asking tough questions about how their money is being used. Looters — savings and loans and Texas developers in the 1980s; the American International Group, Citigroup, Fannie Mae and the rest in this decade — can then act as if their future losses are indeed somebody else’s problem. Do you remember the mea culpa that Alan Greenspan, Mr. Bernanke’s predecessor, delivered on Capitol Hill last fall? He said that he was “in a state of shocked disbelief” that “the self-interest” of Wall Street bankers hadn’t prevented this mess. He shouldn’t have been. The looting theory explains why his laissez-faire theory didn’t hold up. The bankers were acting in their self-interest, after all.”

Compiled by Phil Izzo"

Me:
11:26 am March 11, 2009
    • “The paper’s message is that the promise of government bailouts isn’t merely one aspect of the problem. It is the core problem.”

      You’ve got it. This is the main cause of the crisis, even though it’s practically impossible to get people to see this. Maybe this post will help.

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

In layman’s terms, he was asking for a clearer legal path to nationalization.

From the NY Times:

"
Banks Counted on Looting America’s Coffers

Sixteen years ago, two economists published a research paper with a delightfully simple title: “Looting.”

The economists were George Akerlof, who would later win a Nobel Prize, and Paul Romer, the renowned expert on economic growth. In the paper, they argued that several financial crises in the 1980s, like the Texas real estate bust, had been the result of private investors taking advantage of the government. The investors had borrowed huge amounts of money, made big profits when times were good and then left the government holding the bag for their eventual (and predictable) losses.

In a word, the investors looted. Someone trying to make an honest profit, Professors Akerlof and Romer said, would have operated in a completely different manner. The investors displayed a “total disregard for even the most basic principles of lending,” failing to verify standard information about their borrowers or, in some cases, even to ask for that information.

The investors “acted as if future losses were somebody else’s problem,” the economists wrote. “They were right.”

On Tuesday morning in Washington, Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, gave a speech that read like a sad coda to the “Looting” paper. Because the government is unwilling to let big, interconnected financial firms fail — and because people at those firms knew it — they engaged in what Mr. Bernanke called “excessive risk-taking.” To prevent such problems in the future, he called for tougher regulation.

Now, it would have been nice if the Fed had shown some of this regulatory zeal before the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. But that day has passed. So people are rightly starting to think about building a new, less vulnerable financial system.

And “Looting” provides a really useful framework. The paper’s message is that the promise of government bailouts isn’t merely one aspect of the problem. It is the core problem.

Promised bailouts mean that anyone lending money to Wall Street — ranging from small-time savers like you and me to the Chinese government — doesn’t have to worry about losing that money. The United States Treasury (which, in the end, is also you and me) will cover the losses. In fact, it has to cover the losses, to prevent a cascade of worldwide losses and panic that would make today’s crisis look tame.

But the knowledge among lenders that their money will ultimately be returned, no matter what, clearly brings a terrible downside. It keeps the lenders from asking tough questions about how their money is being used. Looters — savings and loans and Texas developers in the 1980s; the American International Group, Citigroup, Fannie Mae and the rest in this decade — can then act as if their future losses are indeed somebody else’s problem.

Do you remember the mea culpa that Alan Greenspan, Mr. Bernanke’s predecessor, delivered on Capitol Hill last fall? He said that he was “in a state of shocked disbelief” that “the self-interest” of Wall Street bankers hadn’t prevented this mess.

He shouldn’t have been. The looting theory explains why his laissez-faire theory didn’t hold up. The bankers were acting in their self-interest, after all.

The term that’s used to describe this general problem, of course, is moral hazard. When people are protected from the consequences of risky behavior, they behave in a pretty risky fashion. Bankers can make long-shot investments, knowing that they will keep the profits if they succeed, while the taxpayers will cover the losses.

This form of moral hazard — when profits are privatized and losses are socialized — certainly played a role in creating the current mess. But when I spoke with Mr. Romer on Tuesday, he was careful to make a distinction between classic moral hazard and looting. It’s an important distinction.

With moral hazard, bankers are making real wagers. If those wagers pay off, the government has no role in the transaction. With looting, the government’s involvement is crucial to the whole enterprise.

Think about the so-called liars’ loans from recent years: like those Texas real estate loans from the 1980s, they never had a chance of paying off. Sure, they would deliver big profits for a while, so long as the bubble kept inflating. But when they inevitably imploded, the losses would overwhelm the gains. As Gretchen Morgenson has reported, Merrill Lynch’s losses from the last two years wiped out its profits from the previous decade.

What happened? Banks borrowed money from lenders around the world. The bankers then kept a big chunk of that money for themselves, calling it “management fees” or “performance bonuses.” Once the investments were exposed as hopeless, the lenders — ordinary savers, foreign countries, other banks, you name it — were repaid with government bailouts.

In effect, the bankers had siphoned off this bailout money in advance, years before the government had spent it.

I understand this chain of events sounds a bit like a conspiracy. And in some cases, it surely was. Some A.I.G. employees, to take one example, had to have understood what their credit derivative division in London was doing. But more innocent optimism probably played a role, too. The human mind has a tremendous ability to rationalize, and the possibility of making millions of dollars invites some hard-core rationalization.

Either way, the bottom line is the same: given an incentive to loot, Wall Street did so. “If you think of the financial system as a whole,” Mr. Romer said, “it actually has an incentive to trigger the rare occasions in which tens or hundreds of billions of dollars come flowing out of the Treasury.”

Unfortunately, we can’t very well stop the flow of that money now. The bankers have already walked away with their profits (though many more of them deserve a subpoena to a Congressional hearing room). Allowing A.I.G. to collapse, out of spite, could cause a financial shock bigger than the one that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Modern economies can’t function without credit, which means the financial system needs to be bailed out.

But the future also requires the kind of overhaul that Mr. Bernanke has begun to sketch out. Firms will have to be monitored much more seriously than they were during the Greenspan era. They can’t be allowed to shop around for the regulatory agency that least understands what they’re doing. The biggest Wall Street paydays should be held in escrow until it’s clear they weren’t based on fictional profits.

Above all, as Mr. Romer says, the federal government needs the power and the will to take over a firm as soon as its potential losses exceed its assets. Anything short of that is an invitation to loot.

Mr. Bernanke actually took a step in this direction on Tuesday. He said the government “needs improved tools to allow the orderly resolution of a systemically important nonbank financial firm.” In layman’s terms, he was asking for a clearer legal path to nationalization.

At a time like this, when trust in financial markets is so scant, it may be hard to imagine that looting will ever be a problem again. But it will be. If we don’t get rid of the incentive to loot, the only question is what form the next round of looting will take.

Mr. Akerlof and Mr. Romer finished writing their paper in the early 1990s, when the economy was still suffering a hangover from the excesses of the 1980s. But Mr. Akerlof told Mr. Romer — a skeptical Mr. Romer, as he acknowledged with a laugh on Tuesday — that the next candidate for looting already seemed to be taking shape.

It was an obscure little market called credit derivatives."

Me:

"With moral hazard, bankers are making real wagers. If those wagers pay off, the government has no role in the transaction. With looting, the government’s involvement is crucial to the whole enterprise."

"Either way, the bottom line is the same: given an incentive to loot, Wall Street did so. “If you think of the financial system as a whole,” Mr. Romer said, “it actually has an incentive to trigger the rare occasions in which tens or hundreds of billions of dollars come flowing out of the Treasury.”

Thank you for this post. I believe that looting was the main cause of this crisis. At least now, some people will finally see its importance.

I'd like to add this quote:

WHY BANKS FAILED THE STRESS TEST
Andrew G Haldane*
Executive Director for Financial Stability
Bank of England
13 February 2009

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk...

"No. There was a much simpler explanation according to one of those present. There was absolutely no incentive for individuals or teams to run severe stress tests and
show these to management. First, because if there were such a severe shock, they would very likely lose their bonus and possibly their jobs. Second, because in that
event the authorities would have to step-in anyway to save a bank and others suffering a similar plight.
All of the other assembled bankers began subjecting their shoes to intense scrutiny. The unspoken words had been spoken. The officials in the room were aghast. Did
banks not understand that the official sector would not underwrite banks mismanaging their risks? Yet history now tells us that the unnamed banker was spot-on. His was a brilliant articulation of the internal and external incentive problem within banks. When the big
one came, his bonus went and the government duly rode to the rescue. The timeconsistency problem, and its associated negative consequences for risk management, was real ahead of crisis. Events since will have done nothing to lessen this problem, as successively larger waves of institutions have been supported by the authorities"

Don the libertarian Democrat

— Don, Tacoma, WA

Thursday, February 19, 2009

The American stimulus package was constrained by politics, not economics.

From Free Exchange:

"Link exchange
Posted by:
Economist.com | WASHINGTON
Categories:
The econoblogosphere

TODAY’s recommended economics writing:

Conor Clarke interviews George Akerlof, co-author with Robert Shiller of a new book entitled Animal Spirits. It's interesting stuff:

If we go back to the great depression, I think the problem was that people didn't have a proper theory of how the economy works. And so Hoover and Roosevelt at different times -- they vacillated on what they thought -- but at different times they had the right view as to what should be done. You know, new programs and some government spending and so forth. But the trouble was they didn't have a proper model of how the economy works. And because they didn't have the proper model of how the economy works, they were too unambitious about what they did. What both of them needed was the confidence that what they were doing -- at least at one time or another -- was a move the right direction.

So that's one of the aims of this book. To give that theory of how the economy works, so that people who pursue the policies know that they actually need to do something quite big at the moment.

I wonder about this point, however. The American stimulus package was constrained by politics, not economics. It would obviously be valuable to have a better model of how fiscal policy works in deep recessions, but until political debates more closely resemble the economic debates, it's not clear that policy will change. Barack Obama may well have believed that a much larger stimulus was appropriate, as people like Paul Krugman have argued. Given the balance of power in the Senate, it wouldn't have much mattered.

Ed Glaeser says that while the Obama administration's housing plan was advertised as addressing a broad array of housing market failures, it actually only focuses on two—the financial wherewithal of Fannie and Freddie, and the need to facilitate mortgage negotiations. He also says that's for the best.

Matthew Yglesias writes that what the global economy needs is a coordinated global response to the economic crisis, to boost aggregate demand while also addressing global imbalances.

And Peter Orszag, former head of the Congressional Budget Office, and current head of the Office of Management and Budget, is a man who gets things done. These things include stimulus compromises. They also include setting his office on fire his first week on the job."

Me:

"The American stimulus package was constrained by politics, not economics."

I think that the size of the stimulus was constrained by our burden of debt. I agree with Shiller that a large stimulus would work, although I would probably disagree with him on how to spend/borrow it. The problem is that Buiter has a valid point, which is that the amount of debt which triggers serious problems could be lower than we'd like to believe.

http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/02/fiscal-expansions-in-submerging-markets-the-case-of-the-usa-and-the-uk/

"The only element of a classical emerging market crisis that is missing from the US and UK experiences since August 2007 is the ’sudden stop’ - the cessation of capital inflows to both the private and public sectors. There has been a partial sudden stop of financial flows, both domestic and external, to the banking sector and the rest of the private sector, but the external capital accounts are still functioning for the sovereigns and for the remaining creditworthy borrowers. But that should not be taken for granted, even for the US with its extra protection layer from the status of the US dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency. A large fiscal stimulus from a government without fiscal credibility could be the trigger for a ’sudden stop’."

Hence, for better or worse, we have to hedge our bets. After all, my worry, and maybe Buiter's as well, is that there's a point at which investors in the US will essentially panic. What could be more relevant to behavioral economics than that worry?
2/20/2009 1:41 AM GST

In fact, I'm basically on board with nearly any idea that's based on taking away the punch bowl in boom times and spiking it in bad times.

From Kevin Drum:

"
Animal Spirits

Conor Clarke has an interview today with George Akerlof, co-author (with Robert Shiller) of Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, and one of the things Akerlof says is this:

What are the implications of your theory for the sort of fiscal policy we should be pursuing?

Well, one of the things is that one of the roles of the government is to offset the animal spirits. So that when animal spirits are high — and people are too trusting and they engage in investment projects that they shouldn't engage in — one of the roles of the government is to offset them. More should have been done to curb the over-exuberance and excesses in the housing market. That's one.

Felix Salmon comments:

This is much bigger than the idea that it's the job of central bankers to identify bubbles and gently deflate them before they get too big. For one thing, it draws no clear distinction between fiscal policy and monetary policy; instead, it looks at the animal spirits of the country as a whole, and tries to keep them on a relatively even keel.

....On an individual level, it's really important to examine one's own biases as pitilessly as possible; on a national level, I see the job of entities such as Paul Volcker's Economic Recovery Advisory Board to be one of gauging the level of animal spirits across the country — something that all central bankers do by nature, which is one reason that Volcker is a good choice to head it.

I am totally on board with this. In fact, I'm basically on board with nearly any idea that's based on taking away the punch bowl in boom times and spiking it in bad times.

Still, this is not as easy as it sounds, is it? We would need some kind of Animal Spirits Index to make it work. And as far as I know, even in retrospect, we don't have one. Economic expansions always end eventually, but nobody has ever been able to consistently predict ahead of time when things have started to get out of hand. So while I love the concept, it needs some serious meat on its bones before it can become an actual policy instrument. Unfortunately, I'm not optimistic that anyone can do that."

Me:
Taking away the punch bowl

It's difficult, but not much different than value investing, which some people have done quite successfully. I advocate reading Benjamin Graham, and applying his principles of investing to supervision of the economy. Personally, I like the idea of Narrow/Limited Banks on the one hand, and a vibrant non-guaranteed investment area on the other, with careful supervision of new products, in order to ascertain their goal, e.g., to lower capital requirements.

I say this as an adherent of behavioral economics, as I, poorly or eccentrically, interpret it.

Saturday, December 27, 2008

"In fact, they are in the nature of swindles. "

Skidelsky on the New Straits Times:

"ECONOMICS, it seems, has very little to tell us about the current economic crisis( TRUE ). Indeed, no less a figure than former United States Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan recently confessed that his entire "intellectual edifice" had been "demolished" by recent events. Scratch around the rubble, however, and one can come up with useful fragments. One of them is called "asymmetric information".

This means that some people know more about some things than other people. Not a very startling insight, perhaps. But apply it to buyers and sellers. Suppose the seller of a product knows more about its quality than the buyer does, or vice-versa. Interesting things happen -- so interesting that the inventors of this idea received Nobel Prizes in economics.

In 1970, George Akerlof published a famous paper called The Market for Lemons. His main example was a used-car market. The buyer doesn't know whether what is being offered is a good car or a "lemon". His best guess is that it is a car of average quality, for which he will pay only the average price.

Because the owner won't be able to get a good price for a good car, he won't place good cars on the market. So the average quality of used cars offered for sale will go down. The lemons squeeze out the oranges.

Another well-known example concerns insurance. This time it is the buyer who knows more than the seller, since the buyer knows his risk behaviour, physical health and so on.

The insurer faces "adverse selection", because he cannot distinguish between good and bad risks. He, therefore, sets an average premium too high for healthy contributors and too low for unhealthy ones. This will drive out the healthy contributors, saddling the insurer with a portfolio of bad risks -- the quick road to bankruptcy.

There are various ways to equalise the information available -- for example, warranties for used cars and medical certificates for insurance. But, since these devices cost money, asymmetric information always leads to worse results than would otherwise occur.

All of this is relevant to financial markets because the "efficient market hypothesis" -- the dominant paradigm in finance -- assumes that everyone has perfect information and, therefore, that all prices express the real value of goods for sale( IT'S A MODEL ).

But any finance professional will tell you that some know more than others, and they earn more, too. Information is king. But just as in used-car and insurance markets, asymmetric information in finance leads to trouble.

A typical "adverse selection" problem arises when banks can't tell the difference between a good and bad investment -- a situation analogous to the insurance market.

The borrower knows the risk is high, but tells the lender it is low( THIS IS FRAUD ). The lender who can't judge the risk goes for investments that promise higher yields. This particular model predicts that banks will over-invest in high-risk, high-yield projects, i.e. asymmetric information lets toxic loans onto the credit market.

Other models use principal/agent behaviour to explain "momentum" (herd behaviour) in financial markets.

Although designed before the current crisis, these models seem to fit current observations rather well: banks lending to entrepreneurs who could never repay, and asset prices changing even if there were no changes in conditions.

But a moment's thought will show why these models cannot explain today's general crisis. They rely on someone getting the better of someone else: the better informed gain, at least in the short-term, at the expense of the worse informed. In fact, they are in the nature of swindles( THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT THEY ARE ). So these models cannot explain a situation in which everyone, or almost everyone, is losing -- or, for that matter, winning -- at the same time.

The theorists of asymmetric information occupy a deviant branch of mainstream economics. They agree with the mainstream that there is perfect information available somewhere out there, including perfect knowledge about how the different parts of the economy fit together.

They differ only in believing that not everyone possesses it. In Akerlof's example, the problem with selling a used car at an efficient price is not that no one knows how likely it is to break down, but rather that the seller knows well how likely it is to break down, and the buyer does not( FRAUD ).

And yet the true problem is that, in the real world, no one is perfectly informed. Those who have better information try to deceive those who have worse( FRAUD ); but they are deceiving themselves that they know more than they do.

If only one person were perfectly informed, there could never be a crisis -- someone would always make the right calls at the right time.

But only God is perfectly informed, and He does not play the stock market.

"The outstanding fact," John Maynard Keynes wrote in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, "is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made." ( TRUE )

There is no perfect knowledge "out there" about the correct value of assets, because there is no way we can tell what the future will be like( TRUE )

Rather than dealing with asymmetric information, we are dealing with different degrees of no information. Herd behaviour arises, Keynes thought, not from attempts to deceive, but from the fact that, in the face of the unknown, we seek safety( THAT'S THE MAIN POINT. SAFETY ) in numbers. Economics, in other words, must start from the premise of imperfect rather than perfect knowledge. It may then get nearer to explaining why we are where we are today. "


I'm wondering why he assumes that there are no laws concerning business transactions?

Friday, December 26, 2008

"This leads me to wonder how we should view the Bush Administration's stewardship of the economy."

Menzie Chinn on econbrowser scores the Bush Economic Disaster. As you know, I believe that the causes of this crisis are:
1) Effects on Investors of the Implicit and Explicit Government Guarantees to intervene in a financial crisis. This allowed much of the excessive risk. I also include here the lack of clarity as to what the government will or won't do.
2) Fraud, Negligence, Fiduciary Mismanagement, and Collusion. I include here lack of enforcement by the government.
3) The perceived incompetence of the Bush Administration. In my view, when this crisis hit, expectations were that the Bush Administration would make things far worse.
Now, let me add:
4) The budget deficit and debt run up in the last eight years. Truly speaking, this should be 3, but, in this crisis, I think that 4 added with other Bush disasters to push the total Bush Disaster Effect higher.

Here's the post:

"Stuff Happens": the Bush Administration's Economic Stewardship

As we near the end of the year, and the end of eight years of Bush economic policy, I think it's useful( BUT NOT PLEASANT ) to look back. The White House has recently tangled with the NYT regarding what got us into the current economic crisis [0] (see also [1]). This comes on the heels of the Paulson argument that he would not have done anything different( SO ASININE ), had he known the full extent of the looming crisis. This leads me to wonder( I DON'T ) how we should view the Bush Administration's stewardship of the economy.


writedown1.png
Figure 1: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (Oct. 2008), Box 1.3.

Candidate Explanations

In particular, when one examines the mixture of policies and events that have led us to the brink of possibly the deepest and most persistent downturn since the Great Depression, one can see several suspects listed.

  • Fannie and Freddie( A BIT )
  • Community Reinvestment Act( A BIT )
  • CDO's and CDS's( NO. THE MISUSE OF THESE WAS FRAUD, ETC. )
  • Global saving glut( NO )
  • Monetary policy( A BIT )
  • Deregulation( A BIT )
  • Criminal activity and regulatory disarmament( 2nd MAJOR CAUSE )
  • Tax cuts and fiscal profligacy( 4 MAJOR CAUSE )
  • Tax policy( A BIT )

Red Herrings

I've already dealt with the first two "betes noire" -- favorite villains in the fevered commentary of certain noneconomists -- in this post, so we can dispense with these as key drivers (Jim attributes some blame, here, although I don't think he attributes central blame here either). I don't think CDO's and CDS's in and of themselves caused the crisis( I AGREE ), although they certainly obscured the primary problem of overleveraging (CDO's) and lack of transparency (CDS's). And the saving glut -- well, the saving glut was a worldwide phenomenon, but I think it safe to say the countries that did and didn't borrow from the Chinese have suffered in the current crisis( I AGREE ) (here is my critique from 2005; CFR report [pdf]).

Synergy

So what I want to think about is the toxic mixture of the last five items, which interacted in a synergistic manner to place us in the situation we are now in.

First, monetary policy. While there seems to be a widespread consensus that it was too lax in 2002-04, this is a viewpoint made with the benefit of hindsight. As Orphanides and Wieland (2007) [pdf] have pointed out, according to the Greenbook forecasts, monetary policy was not -- according to a Taylor rule framework -- overly lax.( I AGREE )

Second, deregulation. On this front, I think it's important to not indict all deregulation (eliminating the Glass-Steagall barriers makes sense to me, while the Phil Gramm-sponsored Commodity Futures Modernization Act exemption of regulation of CDS's does not( A FAIR POINT). I outline some empirical research on what factors were important in this crisis in this post.

Third, regulatory disarmament/nonenforcement and "criminal activity". I would have discounted this item in the absence of clear evidence, but now that we know about how the OTS "helped out" IndyMac [2] [3], I think we can be reasonably confident that we'll hear a lot more about how deregulatory zeal [4] [5] metastatized over into criminal activities on the part of regulators and the regulated.( 2nd MAJOR CAUSE )

Fourth, fiscal profligacy via tax cuts. I think it's important to focus on profligacy (because it pushed the economy more into a boom exactly at a time when not needed) and on tax cuts (because it made people feel like they had more discretionary income than reasonable), thereby pushing the asset boom. ( 4th MAJOR CAUSE )

Fifth, tax policy. In particular, I have been thinking about the tax deductibility on second homes, a provision dating back to 1997 [6] [7] [8]. (I've been thinking about this in part because mortgage deductibility on a second home never made sense to me, let alone on a first home). Capital Games and Gains has pointed out this provision, citing a NYT article. But even this last article doesn't locate primary blame here; rather it's cited as a contributing factor. I suspect that on its own, this provision wouldn't had a big impact, but in combination, it might have. My caveat here is that I haven't found much empirical work backing a big role for this factor.( MINOR )

Typically, in my academic work, I would think of these factors adding up in a linear fashion, so that each of the impulses would sum to the total effect. But (departing from a model, and with no econometric work to back up the hypothesis interactive effects), I think it's worthwhile to think about lax monetary policy, deregulatory zeal and criminal activity/regulatory disarmament, and tax cuts and tax policy changes, all combining to lead to the "bubble" (in a nontechnical sense) we've witnessed, the deflation of which has been associated with the ongoing financial crisis.

Consider one example of a pernicious synergy: the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were aimed at higher income households, while the second home mortgage deductibility benefited mostly higher income households [7]; with regulatory oversight absent, and low interest rates, well the stage was set.

Prescient, or Not

I won't claim to have foreseen the full enormity of the crisis we're now undergoing. As I indicated when I posted my first blogpost some three years ago, I thought the sheer irresponsibility of the fiscal policy being pursued( TRUE ), against a backdrop of overconfidence in largely nontraded derivatives, would lead to grief in the form of a "sudden stop" of net capital flows to the US. In this respect, I was wrong -- what we've achieved instead is a sort of "global sudden stop" where the process of deleveraging proceeded in a discrete (and "disorderly") fashion( TRUE. DUE TO THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK AND THE ACCOMPANYING FLIGHT TO SAFETY ). So, unlike some, I was only partially -- not completely -- blindsided. (And, I'm sure Akerlof and Romer were completely aware of what was coming...)

I believe history will look critically on the Bush Administration's economic stewardship, in particular how the policies propelled an unsustainable bubble, and tied our hands in the use of fiscal policy tools. In sum, I think Kevin (Dow 36,000) Hassett's view "Bush's Legacy May End Up Better Than You Think" will not prove true."

You are thinking very clearly. I believe that her Synergy is equivalent to my Bush Disaster Effect. Only she fails to see how the Wars, Katrina, etc., can effect economic behavior. For me, Economics only exists in the context and presuppositions of its time.

Monday, December 22, 2008

"that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks, at a penalty rate, and against collateral deemed to be good under normal times."

Xavier Freixas and Bruno M. Parigi consider the concept of the Lender Of Last Resort on Vox:

"
This column argues that the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 redefines the functions of the lender of last resort, placing it at the intersection of monetary policy, supervision and regulation of the banking industry, and the organisation of the interbank market.

Since the creation of the first central banks in the 19th century, the existence of a lender of last resort (LOLR) has been a key issue for the structure of the banking industry. Banks finance opaque assets with a long maturity with short-lived liabilities – a combination that is vulnerable to sudden loss of confidence ( A BANK RUN ). To avoid avoidable disasters when confidence evaporates, the classical view (Thornton 1802 and Bagehot 1873) is that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks, at a penalty rate( ONEROUS ), and against collateral deemed to be good under normal times( YES ).

With the development of well-functioning financial markets, this view has been considered obsolete( IT IS ? ). Goodfriend and King (1988) in particular argue that the central bank should just provide liquidity to the market and leave to banks the task of allocating credit and monitoring debtors. This view, however, assumes that interbank markets work perfectly and in particular are not plagued by asymmetric information – but that is one of the main reasons why banks exist. The problem with asymmetric information is that liquidity shocks affecting banks might be undistinguishable from solvency shocks, thus making it impossible to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent banks( TRUE ) (Goodhart 1987 and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 2004).

LOLR and bank closure policy

LOLR is thus connected with the efficient bank closure policy and, more generally, with the costs of bank failures and of the safety net. In cases of illiquidity, the LOLR is channelling liquidity and improving the efficiency of the monetary policy framework( TRUE ). In insolvency cases, the LOLR acts as part of a safety net and thus is directly related to the overall regulatory framework( TRUE ).

Clearly, the design of an optimal LOLR mechanism has to take into account both the banking regulation context and the monetary framework that is intended to cope not only with inflation but also with the management of aggregate liquidity ( YES ).

These issues are compounded by the fact that financially fragile intermediaries are exposed to the threat of systemic risk. Systemic risk may arise from the existence of a network of financial contracts from several types of operations: the payment system, the interbank market, and the market for derivatives. The tremendous growth of these operations recent decades has increased the interconnections among financial intermediaries and among countries. This has greatly augmented the potential for contagion( TRUE ) (Allen and Gale 2000 and Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 2000).

The panic of 2008 and subprime crisis of 2007

The panic of 2008, originating with the subprime crisis of 2007, offers key insights into systemic risk and illustrates vividly the new role of a lender of last resort.

Years of accommodating monetary policy( LOW INTEREST RATES ), regulatory arbitrage to save capital( SEEKING INVESTMENT WITH LOWER CAPITAL STANDARDS ), and waves of financial innovations( CDSs, CDOs, etc. ) – which by definition tend to escape traditional prudential regulation( TRUE ) – have created the conditions( I'LL ACCEPT CONDITIONS, BUT NO MORE ) for slack credit standards and rating agencies that fail to call for adequate risk premia( BUT THEY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE CONDITIONS FREELY ).

The opacity of the assets of the banks and of the financial vehicles they created to hold mortgages resulted in a dramatic and sudden reappraisal of risk premia( FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK, AND THE ACCOMPANYING FLIGHT TO SAFETY ). As with a thin market typical of the Akerlof lemons problem (Freixas and Jorge 2007), financial intermediaries have become reluctant to lend to each other if not for very short maturities. The fear that the interbank market might not work well and might fail to recycle the emergency liquidity provided by the central banks around the world in various and coordinated ways has induced banks to choose the rational equilibrium strategy of hoarding some of the extra liquidity instead of recycling it to the banks in deficit.

The resulting equilibrium closely resembles the gridlock described by Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), where the fear that a debtor bank will not honour its obligations induces the depositors of the creditor bank to withdraw deposits, thus triggering the liquidation of assets in a chain reaction. This is the modern form of a “bank run” – financial intermediaries refuse to renew credit lines to other intermediaries, thus threatening the very survival of the system( TRUE. IT IS LIKE A BANK RUN. THAT'S ESSENTIALLY WHAT THE FLIGHT TO SAFETY IS ).

Liquidity in a non-functioning interbank market

Clearly channelling emergency liquidity assistance through the interbank market will not work if the interbank market is not functioning properly. Thus, to limit the systemic feedbacks of the sudden deleveraging of financial institutions, the Fed has taken the unprecedented steps of both increasing the list of collateral eligible for central bank lending and extending emergency liquidity assistance to investment banks, government sponsored entities, money market mutual funds, and a large insurance company (AIG). Preventing a complete meltdown of the financial system has required the central bank to guarantee (and accept potential losses) that most if not all claims on financial institutions will be fulfilled( THAT'S IT. GUARANTEE ).
The panic of 2008 has showed that it would be erroneous to adopt a narrow definition of the LOLR, stating that its role should be limited to the funding of illiquid but solvent depository institutions, while capital injections should be the Treasury’s responsibility( TRUE ). This would lead to a very simplistic analysis of the LOLR’s functions, as the complex decisions would be either ignored or handed over to the Treasury. Such a narrow view of the lender of last resort would create an artificial separation between lending by the lender of last resort at no risk and the closure or bail-out decision by the Treasury. In fact, the recent crisis has proved that the lender of last resort cannot deny support to a systemic, too-big-to-fail financial institution in need( BINGO! AND THE MARKET AND INVESTORS BELIEVED THAT AND HAVE BEEN ACTING UNDER THAT PRESUMPTION ).
To understand the interventions of the lender of last resort in the current crisis, the view of its role has to be a broad one encompassing the closure or bail-out decision defining the lender of last resort as an agency that has the faculty to extend credit to a financial institution unable to secure funds through the regular circuit.

LOLR policy as part of the banking safety net

Once we establish that the lender of last resort policy has to be part of the overall banking safety net, the interdependence of the different components of this safety net becomes clear.

  • First, the existence of a deposit insurance( FDIC ) system limits the social cost of a bank’s bankruptcy, and therefore, reduces the instances where a LOLR intervention will be required. ( TRUE )
  • Second, capital regulation( REQUIRING HIGHER CAPITAL ) reduces the probability of a bank in default being effectively insolvent, and so has a similar role in limiting the costly intervention of the LOLR.( TRUE)
  • Third, the procedures to bail-out or liquidate a bank, determined by the legal and enforcement framework will determine the cost-benefit analysis of a LOLR intervention( WE WISH ).

Adopting a perspective of an all-embracing safety net does not mean that the safety net has to be the responsibility of a unique agent. Often several regulatory agencies interact, because different functions related to the well functioning of the safety net are allocated to different agents( OK ).

It is quite reasonable to separate monetary policy from banking regulation, and the separation of the deposit insurance company from the central bank makes the cost of deposit insurance more transparent. Also, the national jurisdiction of regulation makes cross-border banking a joint responsibility for the home and host regulatory agencies, an issue of particular concern for the banking regulatory authorities in the EU.

Lessons for the LOLR’s role

  • First, we have witnessed how an additional aggregate liquidity injection is not a sufficiently powerful instrument to solve the crisis. ( TRUE )

The illiquidity of financial institutions around the world is, in fact, directly linked not only to their solvency but also to asset prices.

  • Second, central banks around the world have been much more flexible in providing support to the banking industry than initially expected( I DON'T AGREE ).

In other words, that central bank cannot credibly commit to a bail-out policy( YES IT CAN ). Indeed, the arguments regarding the bail-out of banks only if their closure could have a systemic impact (too-big-to-fail), that were intended for an individual bank facing financial distress were soon discarded in favour of a more realistic approach.

The case of Northern Rock, certainly not a systemic bank, illustrates this point. Its liquidation in such a fragile banking environment would have triggered a domino effect with contagion from one institution to another. From that perspective the lesson is that when facing a systemic crisis, the LOLR has to take into account also the “too-many-to-fail” issue, and consider how it will treat all banks that are in a similar position( TRUE ).

  • A third point is that, in a systemic crisis, the safety net is extended to non-bank institutions. ( TRUE )

This may be the result of financial innovation. Yet, because AIG had been issuing credit default swaps, its bankruptcy would have affected the fragility of the banking industry by leading to losses and a lower capital.

  • Fourth, regulators around the world have a mandate to protect the interests of their national investors. ( COME ON )

The international coordination of regulators, and in particular, the European coordination has been helpless when faced with the real cost of the Icelandic crisis. So, the theoretical models of non-cooperative behaviour( YEP ) are the ones to cope ex-ante with the burden-sharing issue."

Truthfully speaking, countries have been pursuing a beggar thy neighbor policy right from the start. A good article, but of limited scope.

Editor’s note: This article draws in part on the work Freixas and Parigi (2008).

References

Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2000). Financial Contagion, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1-33
Bagehot, W. (1873). Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. London: H.S. King
Freixas, X. and Jorge, J. (2007). The role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A model with rationing, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming.
Freixas, X. and Parigi, B.M. (2008) “Lender of last resort and bank closure policy” CESifo working paper 2286, April 2008
Freixas, X., Parigi, B.M. and Rochet, J-C. (2000). Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking August, 32, Part 2, 611-638
Freixas, X., Parigi, B.M. and Rochet, J-C. (2004). The Lender of Last Resort: A 21st Century Approach, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 1085-1115
Goodfriend, M. and King, R. (1988). Financial Deregulation Monetary Policy and Central Banking, in W. Haraf and Kushmeider, R. M. (eds.) Restructuring Banking and Financial Services in America, AEI Studies, 481, Lanham, Md.: UPA
Goodhart, C. A. E. (1987). Why do Banks need a Central Bank?, Oxford Economic Papers, 39, 75-89
Thornton, H. (1802). An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain, London: Hatchard