Showing posts with label LOLR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LOLR. Show all posts

Friday, May 29, 2009

I think it is probably a little bit of both, discounting the supply of new debt, but I detect...there is a pick up in confidence about the future

TO BE NOTED: From Reuters:

"
Fed's Fisher says recovery will be very slow
Thu May 28, 2009 7:56pm EDT

By Alister Bull

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. recession is fading but the economy will not recover in a "meaningful" way before the end of this year and deflation remains a risk in this climate, a top Federal Reserve official said on Thursday.

Dallas Federal Reserve Bank President Richard Fisher also said that official foreign holdings of U.S. government bonds had grown and appetite to hold the country's assets remained intact, despite expected record U.S. government deficits.

"There continues to be strong demand for longer duration Treasuries," Fisher told the Washington Association of Money Managers in a speech. A steep sell-off in the U.S. government bond market on Wednesday was blamed in some quarters by a decline in foreign demand for U.S. assets.

Fisher also said he had not detected any evidence that the Chinese wanted to significantly alter their U.S. Treasury holdings during a recent trip he had made to Beijing.

"They have no desire to inflict harm on the financial markets of the United States because they would inflict harm on themselves," he said.

The Fed has promised to buy $300 billion of longer-dated U.S. Treasuries and $1.45 trillion of agency mortgage debt and discussed increasing this program at its last policy meeting on April 28-29.

Fisher declined to say if he favored ramping up the purchases. The gap between 2- and 10-year government bond yields widened to a record 2.75 percent on Wednesday and some economists said this yield curve steepening might dampen the economic recovery and trigger more Fed asset buying.

But Fisher said it was not clear if the curve steepened on worries over upcoming Treasury supply to finance record U.S. fiscal deficits, or because of a brighter economic outlook.

"I think it is probably a little bit of both, discounting the supply of new debt, but I detect...there is a pick up in confidence about the future," Fisher told reporters after the speech. The distinction matters.

Economists say the Fed is much more likely to ramp up the asset purchasing program if it thought the yield curve had steepened due to an increase in the risk premium being charged by investors to buy U.S. assets, because this would make credit more expensive for businesses and households.

But if the yield curve steepened because investors thought the economic recovery was on track, and the Fed would at some point begin to raise its benchmark overnight funds rate from current levels of almost zero, this would be a healthy development that would not warrant more Fed asset buying.

Fisher, who is not a voting member of the Fed's policy-setting committee this year, said that inflation would stay "meek" amid a tepid economic recovery.

However, he also emphasized that the Fed was well aware its aggressive expansion of the central bank's balance sheet through the purchase of assets like Treasuries and mortgage backed securities had long-term inflation implications, and it was focused on getting its exit strategy right.

"Nobody I know on the (Fed's policy) committee wants to maintain our current posture for any longer and to any greater degree than is minimally necessary to restore the efficacy of the credit markets and buttress economic recovery without inflationary consequences," he said in the speech.

"Indeed, as I speak, we are studying ways to unwind our balance sheet in a timely way," Fisher added.

This did not sound like an immediate concern for Fisher, who said he expected the economy to find its footing, but thought it would not post a vigorous rebound, or even a more modest 'U' shaped recovery.

"I would be delighted, but surprised, if meaningful sustained growth gets under way before the end of the year," Fisher said.

Fisher also acknowledged criticism that some of the Fed's robust actions to shelter the U.S. economy had veered onto turf that could be called fiscal policy. This has raised questions of Fed independence, as well as whether U.S. lawmakers might want more say in the running of the central bank.

"There have been suggestions that Congress should be involved in the selection of Federal Reserve Bank presidents," Fisher said, referring to himself and the 11 other heads of the dozen regional Federal Reserve banks.

The U.S. president appoints the seven members of the Fed's Board of Governors in Washington, subject to the approval of the Senate, but the 12 regional Fed chiefs are selected by their local business communities, and approved by the Board.

"I trust that Congress will resist this initiative and not upset the careful federation that has for so long balanced the interests of Main Street with those of Washington, just as we at the Federal Reserve must resist the urgings of some to accommodate the short-term financing needs of the Treasury," he said.

(Reporting by Alister Bull; Editing by Diane Craft)"

"From the Dallas Fed:

Richard W. Fisher

Remarks before the Washington Association of Money Managers
Washington, D.C.
May 28, 2009

I want to thank the Washington Association of Money Managers for having me here this evening and Fred Boos for that kind introduction. Thank you also for allowing two of my best friends, Evan Thomas and the Reverend Derrick Harkins, to join me tonight.

Neither Evan nor Derrick is a money manager. Evan is editor-at-large of Newsweek and is one of the great American nonfiction writers. He wrote The Wise Men and one of the great biographies of Bobby Kennedy. Yet, as an Annapolis man, I love him best for his work on John Paul Jones—the father of the American Navy. But that is not why he is here tonight. We are "cousins" through marriage: Both he and my wife, Nancy, descend from the family tree of Norman Thomas, a Presbyterian minister who ran for the presidency six times as a socialist and pacifist. Evan is here because in a most nonpacifist manner, he plans to dispatch with me on the golf course this weekend and wants to make amends ex ante.

I shall appeal to Reverend Harkins for some ex ante divine intervention in Saturday's match! Derrick leads the Nineteenth Street Baptist Church and has been my pastor for many years, going back to when he led the New Hope Baptist Church in Dallas. He is one of our country's most eloquent preachers, and I am honored that he is here.

With such a distinguished man of the cloth present among this group of people dedicated to the pursuit of mammon, I thought I would give a little sermonette this evening.

Here are four quotes from financial scripture:

The first is from Charles Mackay's Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions, written in 1841:

"Every age has its peculiar folly—some scheme, project or phantasy [sic] into which it plunges, spurred on either by the love of gain, the necessity of excitement, or the mere force of imitation."

"Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds...."

The second is taken from the father of central banking—Walter Bagehot—from his essay "Edward Gibbon," in the 1856 edition of National Review:

"[A]t particular times … people have a great deal of … money…. At intervals … the money of these people … is particularly large and craving: it seeks for some one to devour it, and there is [a] 'plethora'; it finds some one, and there is 'speculation'; it is devoured, and there is 'panic.'"

From Liaquat Ahamed, who has written a superbly entertaining book, published earlier this year, titled Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World:

"I maintain that the Great Depression was not some act of God or the result of some deep-rooted contradictions of capitalism but the direct result of a series of misjudgments by economic policymakers.…"

Finally, Paul Volcker as quoted in Bill Neikirk's Volcker: Portrait of the Money Man in 1987:

"The Federal Reserve has no way of offsetting the financial market pressure associated with excessive deficits.… Pushing more money into the system to finance the Treasury would only serve to heighten fears about inflation and the future course of interest rates."

Tonight, I will reference each of those passages as we explore where we have been, where we are today and the fiscal predicament that awaits us further down the road. But first, some context.

Reverend Harkins will no doubt have heard the story of the humble Presbyterian pastor who visited a shelter where he found a man who looked particularly downtrodden. This generous pastor took pity upon the man. He took him to a barber for a shave and a haircut and to a store for a pair of shoes, a shirt, a tie and a new suit. The pastor then dropped the man back at the shelter, handed him $20 and told him, "Son, you have been saved. My church is just one block away from here. I want you to come to my church on Sunday and praise the Lord."

Sunday came but the man did not. So immediately after the service, the pastor went to the shelter. There was the man, sitting in a rocking chair, all dressed up and beautifully groomed, reading a newspaper. "Son, I had asked you to come to my church this morning to give testimony to having been saved. Where were you?" asked the pastor.

"Pastor," the man replied, "I surely did go to church. I woke up this morning, shaved my whiskers, combed my hair, put on this beautiful shirt and tie you bought me and dressed in this new suit. I put on these fancy new shoes. When I looked in the mirror, I felt like a millionaire. So I used the $20 to take a cab to the Episcopal church."

I certainly don't need to tell a room full of Washington money managers what got the nation into its current economic situation. A sudden new set of circumstances, easy money seemingly heaven-sent and the short-sighted suspension of time-tested, prudent financial practice led us on the road, not to salvation, but to economic perdition.

The new set of circumstances included the economic and financial windfalls that came from at least two major structural changes. The first was the end of the Cold War and the commercial reorientation of China, Vietnam, India and Eastern Europe, which unleashed enormous new capacity for the increased production of goods and services, held down costs and restructured the global economic map. The second was the explosion of computational power and communication ease that came from technological advancement and the Internet, facilitating globalization and leapfrogging frontiers that formerly separated the economic landscape. The world was our oyster. It simultaneously gave us new consumers and suppliers. It provided new sources of funds as well as new places to invest.

Easy money may well have been encouraged by central banks that held interest rates too low for too long. But it was exacerbated by lenders, investors and consumers who—keen on enhancing returns that seemed pedestrian with a flat yield curve anchored by low, risk-free rates—"craved" and "devoured" new risk instruments, to paraphrase Bagehot. As a result, they came up with new "schemes" and "projects" and "phantasies" made more enticing by expanded markets and financial innovation.

Short-sightedness was manifest in the abandonment of prudential practices. For the banker and lender, the time-tested principle of "know your customer" took a back seat to the mad rush to package and sell exposure to others. For the consumer, "living within your means" became a less compelling discipline in a world where a house was not just a home but a means to financial gain. For the investor, prudence took on another dimension with the presumed ability to mathematize judgment and hedge away the risk of default.

And yet, while the world had indeed changed, the behavioral pathology documented by Mackay and Bagehot in the 19th century—a pathology based on their studies of countless debacles through history—prevailed. A "plethora" of commercial and financial opportunity begat "speculative" excess that inevitably begat a "panic." The thundering "herd," spurred on by "the love of gain, the necessity of excitement or mere force of imitation" and "mad" with irrational exuberance for the upside, suddenly realized in 2008 it had "devoured" more risk than it could stomach and panicked. The financial system seized up and the economy descended into recession.

Who is to blame? Well, if you had been listening to the radio on Feb. 26, 1933, you would know the answer. You would have heard a crazed Father Charles Coughlin, pastor of the Shrine of the Little Flower in Royal Oak, Mich., rail against "the Morgans, the Kuhn-Loebs, the Rothschilds, the Dillon-Reads, the Federal Reserve banksters, the Mitchells[1] and the rest of the undeserving group, who without … the blood of patriotism … flowing in their veins have shackled the lives of men and of nations with the ponderous links of their golden chain."

Advance the tape 76 years. If you substitute Goldman Sachs for the Rothschilds, Lehman Brothers for Kuhn-Loeb, AIG for Dillon Read, Ken Lewis or John Thain for "Sunshine Charlie" Mitchell and keep the text about Federal Reserve "banksters," you will have captured the liturgy of invective heard from Father Coughlin's contemporary secular cousins. Nothing is new under the sun; old prejudices and conspiracy theories never die.[2] On airwaves and in the blogosphere, on editorial pages and even in the halls of Congress and foreign parliaments, critics are casting about for whom to blame for "shackl(ing) the lives of men" and women from Bethesda to Beijing with the "ponderous links" that took us to the very edge of the abyss of global economic collapse.

I will let you draw your own conclusions about who is to blame. In my time at the Federal Reserve, starting in 2005 and working predominantly under the chairmanship of Ben Bernanke, my colleagues and I have been focused primarily on finding a way to undo past errors and mend the system.

I believe that the initiatives taken by the Federal Reserve prevented us from falling into the chasm of an economic depression. Beginning in August of 2007, we confronted a total breakdown of the financial system. Having announced our extension of term lending to banks in December, in rapid order, we then set in motion a series of steps to provide liquidity, strengthen the security of certain banks, become the equivalent of market maker for key financial instruments such as commercial paper and certain asset-backed securities and, in ways appropriate to the times, deliver on our mandate as lender of last resort.

You are all familiar with the efforts taken by the Federal Reserve to these ends. I won't review them program by program this evening. I think it fair to say that with these actions the Federal Reserve has done everything in its power to avoid making the modern equivalent of the "misjudgments" that Liaquat Ahamed argues were made by our predecessors in the 1930s (and, I should add parenthetically, that everyone and their brother feel Japan made in the 1990s).

There is evidence that our actions have succeeded in pulling the financial markets and the economy from the edge of the abyss. There are, as many have noted, some "green shoots" beginning to sprout that will help end the contraction in output and set the stage for a recovery. This is not to be Pollyannaish or imply that these sprouts are spreading like kudzu. But the knock-on effect of the Fed's direct efforts does seem to have reignited animal spirits in markets that had been frozen. The commercial paper market has been revived. Mortgage rates have declined significantly. Issuance of corporate bonds has become robust. The premium over Treasuries that investment-grade corporations pay to borrow in the open market has fallen by more than 35 percent since peaking last December. The same can be said of higher risk bonds as well as jumbo mortgages—all markets considered to be at the far end of the risk spectrum. This round-trip back from last fall's unprecedented flight to quality is also reflected in the stock market, as equity markets have coursed upward and volatility has diminished.

While it takes some time for these improved financial conditions to start helping the broad economy, I am pleased to see a reaction on Main Street: The most recent reports indicate that purchasing managers see an abatement in the pace of decline in new orders; manufacturers surveyed by the Kansas City, Philadelphia, Richmond and Dallas Feds, to varying degrees, report a moderation in their previous rates of decline in activity;[3] retail sales are no longer plunging; and, as all of you heard from the Conference Board on Tuesday, consumers' assessment of the economy over the next six months—driven primarily by slowing job losses—appears to be less pessimistic.

These are encouraging signs. But, to be sure, we are not out of the woods. We have miles to go before we sleep.

Compared with the fourth quarter of last year, first quarter results for the nation's largest banks are encouraging, yet obvious challenges remain. Confidence among business women and men—the creators of lasting, productive jobs and prosperity—has shown signs of revival but remains elusive. Consumers at home remain cautious, for fear of losing their homes or their jobs. The markets we sell into abroad—Mexico and Europe, for example—remain strikingly weak, while others such as China are perhaps more robust but are insufficiently sized to fill the hole left by consumers at home and in our larger export markets.[4]

Under these conditions, I have been forecasting a slow recovery. Not a V-shaped snapback—nor even a U-shaped one—but a very slow slog as we find a more sensible and sustainable mix between consumption, savings and investment. It is worth recalling that employment did not reach its nadir until 21 months after the end of the 2001 recession, though headwinds then were not nearly as severe as those we face today.

You know the numbers that have been reported for the nation for the first quarter: Even after upcoming revisions, I venture we will find we contracted at somewhere between an annualized 5 and 6 percent. The pace of decline will moderate in the current quarter, and then we are likely to bounce along the bottom for a while. I would be delighted, but surprised, if meaningful sustained growth gets under way before the end of the year. Regardless, increases in unemployment, while mitigated by the expansion of government (particularly the need for census takers), will likely take us to a 10 percent jobless rate before we reverse course. And global excess capacity is likely to remain excessive for some time to come.

As to price stability—the touchstone of central banking—given the vast amount of slack worldwide, the near-term outlook for inflation is meek. Indeed, the recent pressures have been to the deflationary side. As evidenced in the Dallas Fed's most recent manufacturing survey, firms receiving lower prices for their goods outnumbered those receiving higher prices 11-to-1, although firms do expect deflationary pressures to begin subsiding.[5]

Neither deflation nor inflation engenders confidence. Both distort the decisionmaking of households as well as businesses. Both inhibit sustainable employment growth. If you want to know the outlook for inflation over the next quarter or next year, look at current domestic and global slack: It is doubtful that inflation will raise its ugly head until employment and capacity utilization tighten. Looking further out, however, Milton Friedman—who, in keeping with the theme of this evening, I suppose I could safely refer to as the Moses of monetary policy—reminds us that inflation, defined as "a steady and sustained rise in prices," is "always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon."[6] Bearing this in mind, we must be careful with the deployment of our monetary initiatives.

As the nation's central bank, the Fed performs two major roles, in addition to its regulatory duties. One is the standard conduct of monetary policy—a blunt instrument of adjusting interest rates and the money supply to achieve our long-term objectives of price stability and sustainable employment.

The Fed's other role is, as mentioned, to act as a lender of last resort( NB DON )—to stabilize financial markets when confidence breaks down and markets become unduly segmented and dysfunctional. This entails targeted injections of liquidity to keep markets functioning under dire circumstances. Reflecting the larger role of securities markets in funding loans, the Federal Reserve has extended its lender of last resort role beyond banks. Since the fall of 2007, the Federal Reserve has been aggressive in putting programs in place to revive the functioning of key credit markets and pull the economy away from the brink. I point to the term auction (TAF) and commercial paper (CPFF) facilities as examples of initiatives that have worked as planned by the FOMC and are now shrinking in size. These actions are not permanent injections of money that may later fuel inflation, but rather are temporary injections of liquidity to stabilize malfunctioning markets. As such, they are intended to promote financial stability, sustainable growth and price stability.

Congress, spurred on by the new president, has been aggressive with fiscal policy. The good news is that if fiscal policy has been properly designed—and time will tell if it has been—it should propel the economy farther away from the edge and put it on its way to a new cycle of economic growth, somewhat tentatively at first but hopefully gathering momentum as time passes.

Unfortunately, that momentum faces a real, long-term threat: storm clouds on the horizon in the form of daunting fiscal imbalances.

That deficits will be high over the next few years seems clear, with a $1.8 trillion deficit expected this year and $3.8 trillion in new debt issuance now forecast over the next five years. Perhaps more important, annual deficits exceeding half a trillion dollars are projected for at least 10 years into the future, emphasizing that we as a nation will continue to spend considerably more than we take in long after the current economic crisis.

The country's major newspapers recently reported with great urgency the administration's finding that Social Security would begin spending more than it takes in by 2016—seven short years from now. Left unreported was the fact that the discounted present value of entitlement debt, over the infinite horizon, reached $104 trillion.[7] This is almost eight times the annual gross domestic product of the United States—and almost 20 times the size of the debt our government is expected to accumulate between 2009 and 2014.

Most of this entitlement shortfall comes from Medicare rather than Social Security. As you may know, Medicare has three main components: Part A for hospital stays, Part B for doctor visits and Part D for prescription drugs. The fiscal shortfall for Part A alone is $36.4 trillion—about one third of all entitlement debt. Part B's shortfall is just a tad larger, clocking in at $37 trillion. Part D—the latest addition to the Medicare program—registers a shortfall of $15.5 trillion. And Social Security, the program about which various reforms have been so frequently mooted in recent years, registers a deficit of $15.1 trillion—only one seventh of the total unfunded liability from entitlement programs.

This is the fiscal predicament to which I alluded earlier—a looming budgetary threat to our long-term economic prosperity. And while the announcement that the Social Security trust fund will begin its decline one year earlier is an important fiscal event, the swelling of overall entitlement debt to more than one hundred trillion dollars has far more serious implications for economic growth—implications we are poorly positioned to address given the budget deficits we face today.

Our successor generations are coming to grips with this daunting reality. Faced with the prospect of a government that they believe may be unable to deliver on its promise of long-term fiscal balance—particularly with regard to entitlement programs—these individuals might logically begin to alter their consumption patterns, spending less today to save more for tomorrow. There is nothing wrong with increasing savings. But, in an economy driven by consumption, this intertemporal hedging may dampen the pace of future economic growth.

Of course, any student of history knows that throughout time, governments unwilling to face the music and fund their liabilities have turned to monetary authorities to print their way out of their predicament. We all know by heart the pathologies that afflicted Weimar Germany, Argentina and other countries. And we have daily reminders from bond vigilantes like Bill Gross about the prospect of losing our AAA rating. This cannot be allowed to happen in America. Which is why I am pleased to see that the new administration has embraced what was hitherto perceived as the third rail of American politics and brought the issue of unfunded entitlement liabilities to the fore. For the sake of our grandchildren, I hope that the administration and the Congress will take this vexing beast of a problem by the horns and tame it.

Against that background, it is important that monetary policymakers be especially sensitive to concerns voiced about the dramatic expansion of the Fed's balance sheet in an era of high deficits. I return to the Book of Ahamed and the Book of Volcker. Ahamed speaks of the miscalculations of policymakers. Volcker warns that the Fed cannot monetize deficits without heightening fears of inflation and negatively impacting the future course of interest rates.

Those of us responsible for developing monetary policy must constantly bear both observations in mind. We have been very careful to calibrate our actions so as to accommodate the needs of credit markets and the economy—not political imperatives. We are well aware that some of our balance sheet additions, designed to pull markets and the economy from the edge, have raised a few eyebrows (like the $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities we have pledged to purchase if necessary—although it has unquestionably driven mortgage rates to historic lows). And while it is not unusual for the System Open Market Account to buy Treasuries along the yield curve, the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) decision to purchase $300 billion in U.S. Treasuries—a decision made to improve the tone in private credit markets—has been viewed by some as skating a little too close to the edge of political accommodation.

I can tell you that the FOMC is well aware of the doubts being voiced about its intentions. I can also tell you that nobody I know on the committee wants to maintain our current posture for any longer and to any greater degree than is minimally necessary to restore the efficacy of the credit markets and buttress economic recovery without inflationary consequences. Indeed, as I speak, we are studying ways to unwind our balance sheet in a timely way.

In the meantime, looming before us is the prospect of a heavy calendar of debt issuance by the Treasury. Between now and the end of the current fiscal year in October, the Treasury will issue just over $1 trillion in net new debt, with at least that much to follow in fiscal 2010. As the Book of Volcker warns, the Federal Open Market Committee can ill afford to be perceived as monetizing debt, lest we come to be viewed as an agent of, rather than an independent guardian against, future inflation and drive real interest rates higher.

You may wish to note that, press and analysts' reports to the contrary, a keen student of the H.4.1 and the Foreign and International Monetary Authority (FIMA) custody holdings reports of the Fed will detect that foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries and agencies have been growing at a robust pace, not shrinking. And from what I can detect from the activity of so-called indirect bidders in Treasury auctions—indirect bidders submit competitive bids through others rather than directly; central banks are among those who commonly bid indirectly—there continues to be strong demand for longer duration Treasuries—again, contrary to rumors and press reports. Thus, to date, our actions have not given rise to concern that we will violate Paul's Dictum.

This is important, for there are concerns in some quarters that the Federal Reserve will be politicized. For example, there have been suggestions that Congress should be involved in the selection of Federal Reserve Bank presidents, who, unlike the seven members of the Board of Governors, are not appointed by the president nor confirmed by the Senate. I trust that Congress will resist this initiative and not upset the careful federation that has for so long balanced the interests of Main Street with those of Washington, just as we at the Federal Reserve must resist the urgings of some to accommodate the short-term financing needs of the Treasury.

Your central bank has worked hard to pull the economy back from the abyss. To be sure, the FOMC has taken risks to do so. We have no doubt erred on occasion, but for the most part, I think we have gotten it right—primarily because each of us has an abiding faith in the time-tested virtues of conducting responsible monetary policy. We will work hard to remain virtuous, always bearing in mind that our job is to conduct monetary policy with the simple, yet profound, mission of underpinning sustainable economic growth without sacrificing price stability.

So much for the Gospel according to the Dallas Fed! Thank you for letting me speak to you tonight. I will now do my utmost to avoid answering any questions you have.

About the Author

Richard W. Fisher is president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Notes

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System.
  1. "Sunshine Charlie" Mitchell was the head of National City Bank, the forerunner to Citigroup.
  2. For instance, in a current best-selling book in China, Currency Wars, it is asserted that the major central banks—including the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England—are controlled by a small group of private bankers. These bankers make their profits through the control of the nation's money supply.
  3. Texas produces more than 8 percent of the total manufactured goods in the United States, ranking second behind California in factory production.
  4. Through April, China's overall imports from the rest of the world dropped 23 percent from last year's level to $78.8 billion. The U.S. is presently exporting $5.6 billion a month in goods to China.
  5. "Texas Manufacturing Remains Weak But Outlook Continues to Improve," Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, press release, May 26, 2009.
  6. The quotes are taken from Milton Friedman's "Inflation: Causes and Consequences" in his book Dollars and Deficits, published by Friedman in 1968. Friedman clearly recognized that any of a wide variety of shocks can give rise to short-term changes in the price level. Too often, those who quote his inflation dictum fail to distinguish between temporary and sustained price movements.
  7. Estimates for Social Security are compiled from the official 2009 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds. The $15.1 trillion figure presented here is the amount by which promised benefits exceed expected revenues, primarily from payroll taxes, over the infinite horizon using a long-run discount rate of 2.9 percent.

    Estimates for Medicare are compiled from the official 2009 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds. The $88.9 trillion cumulative figure presented here is the amount by which promised benefits for Medicare Parts A, B and D exceed expected revenues over the infinite horizon using a long-run discount rate of 2.9 percent.

    Neither estimate incorporates the value of program trust funds, currently estimated at $2.4 trillion for Social Security and $0.3 trillion for Medicare. Because spending down these trust funds will require the use of general revenue, some budget analysts include them when calculating unfunded liabilities. If this is done, then the total figure would rise from $104 trillion to $106.7 trillion.

    These figures also do not include current or projected future nonentitlement debt, including the $10.7 trillion national debt as of the end of 2008, the $1.8 trillion deficit for this year, the $3.8 trillion in projected debt between 2010 and 2014, and any future debt that might be compiled after 2014. If projected debt between now and 2014 were added, and no further nonentitlement debt were accumulated in the future, then the total figure would rise from $106.7 trillion to $123.0 trillion."

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

fix a system that broke when our animal spirits got out of bounds.

TO BE NOTED: From Bloomberg:

"Depression Lurks Unless There’s More Stimulus: Robert Shiller

Commentary by Robert Shiller

April 15 (Bloomberg) -- In the Great Depression of the 1930s the U.S. government had a great deal of trouble maintaining its commitment to economic stimulus. “Pump- priming” was talked about and tried, but not consistently. The Depression could have been mostly prevented, but wasn’t. Ultimately, the reason for this policy failure was inadequate understanding of the relevant economic theory.

In the face of a similar Depression-era psychology today, we are in need of massive pump-priming again. We appear to be in a much better situation due to the stronger efforts to date. Still, there is a danger that, because of a combination of faulty economic theory and inadequate appreciation of human psychology, as well as deep public anger, we will not continue with such stimulus on a high enough level.

We desperately need to be persistent, keeping our government response adequate for the problem at hand on a sufficient scale and for sufficient time.

George Akerlof and I lay out how economic theory needs to be changed in “Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism” (2009). It shows that the most basic questions can only be answered if we take into account how psychology affects fundamentals such as our sense of fairness or corruption in our economic transactions, which helps determine how trusting or wary we are at any given time.

Following John Maynard Keynes, we call such motivations animal spirits.

Confidence is Key

Our theory of animal spirits is centered on confidence, and the vicious downward cycle of loss of confidence leading to decline in economic activity and then to more loss of confidence. This cycle is fed by the proliferation of stories of failure that spread like a virus by word of mouth over months and years. Moreover, our theory emphasizes that the sense that our society is basically fair can become wounded, and if that happens will not heal for many years.

In our analysis of the current economic crisis, we conclude that the government should have two targets. One would be a joint fiscal-monetary policy target. The same kind of expansionary policies embodied in the government expenditure stimulus and tax cuts that are already being tried have to be done on a big enough scale and for a long enough time in the future.

Gauging Success

Following this target, aggregate demand should be sufficiently high that firms producing good products at a price the public would want to pay will be able to sell them. And if this target is met, skilled labor willing to work at a wage that makes it profitable to sell such products will be able to get a job.

The government should also have a credit target. Once again, we are calling for more of the same kinds of existing policies, but there should be an explicit measure of their success, and until that is reached, the scale and time frame of such policies need to be extended.

The Federal Reserve has to be the lender of last resort and to provide credit in circumstances like we have today. Businesses and consumers, who in normal times would be good credit risks with legitimate needs, should find credit available at reasonable terms. Achieving this requires new approaches, like those announced by the Bernanke Fed and the Obama administration, but on a continuing and even larger scale.

Outrage Creates Dangers

But we have lived for years in a system that tolerated the high-flying inequalities of the current financial system to play itself out, without protest. Where was the outcry then? Why should it not be much more generally targeted? We had two large tax cuts at the federal level that gave highly disproportionate tax advantages to those at the very top. It even gave special provision for extremely low tax rates, much lower than you or I pay on our regular wage income, to managers of hedge funds.

In this crisis, acceptance of these measures is being replaced with outrage. It is increasing the blood pressure of the public, and that can’t continue without damage to our system. Compensation practices in the U.S. need to be made fairer. Vast earnings shouldn’t go virtually untaxed, while the middle class is paying a sizable fraction of each extra dollar in taxes. Only then will the government have the mandate to restore our banking and securities institutions to their proper strong role in our economy.

Shutting Hoovervilles

It is now time to stimulate demand. It is also time to repair the credit system. Those are the two targets that must be hit to get us out of the current economic slump, and to restore confidence. It will be costly to meet both of these targets, and it will require new legislation to give enhanced regulatory powers to deal with a greatly changed financial system, now in a systemic slump.

It is time to face up to what needs to be done. The sticker shock involved will be large, but the costs in terms of lost output of not meeting either the credit target or the aggregate demand target will be yet larger.

It would be a shame if we are so overwhelmed by anger at the unfairness of it all that we do not take the positive measures needed to restore us to full employment. That would not just be unfair to the U.S. taxpayer. That would be unfair to those who are living in Hoovervilles in Sacramento and Fresno, California, and elsewhere; it would be unfair to those who are being evicted from their homes, and can’t find new ones because they can’t find jobs. That would be unfair to those who have to drop out of school because they, or their parents, can’t find jobs.

It is now time to keep our eye on the ball and set clear targets to fix a system that broke when our animal spirits got out of bounds.

(Robert Shiller is the Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics and Professor of Finance at Yale University, and Chief Economist at MacroMarkets LLC. The opinions expressed are his own.)

To contact the writer of this column: Robert.shiller@yale.edu"

Thursday, March 19, 2009

by failing to intervene forcefully in a way that quells the existential terror currently afflicting the markets

TO BE NOTED: From Vox:

"
Punter of last resort

Debate: Financial rescue and regulation, a Global Crisis Debate

Posted by: Christopher D. Carroll (Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University), 18 March 2009

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The financial meltdown that shifted into high gear last September has flushed into public view many surprising facts. One of the strangest is the existence, in the economics profession, of a bizarre religious cult. This cult adheres to the dogma that the “price of risk” is the Holy of Holies that can properly be set only by the immaculate invisible hand of the financial marketplace; and cult members seem to believe, to paraphrase President Lincoln from a rather different context, that “If the Market wills that the economic crisis continue until every dollar of economic activity created by the taking of risk shall be repaid by another dollar destroyed by a newfound fear of risk, so it still must be said that the judgments of the Market are true and righteous altogether.”

The deep origins of the cult, as always, are obscure; presumably they lie properly in the field of psychoanalysis. But to the extent that overt origins can be traced, the wellspring is the literature that attempts to explain the Mehra and Prescott (1985) ‘equity premium puzzle.’ The ‘puzzle,’ in a nutshell, is that asset prices have not, historically, exhibited a relationship between risk and return that is easy to reconcile with the rational behavior of a representative agent facing perfect markets. Many of the responses to this challenge start with the assumption that asset prices must be always and everywhere rational, and then proceed to work out the kind of preferences or environment that can rationalize observed prices. This game brings to mind Joan Robinson’s comment that “utility maximization is a metaphysical concept of impregnable circularity,” and Larry Summers’s remark (quoted by Robert Waldmann) that the day when economists first started to think that asset prices should be explained by the characteristics of a representative agent’s utility function was not a particularly good day for economic science. Oddly, even the failure of this literature to produce a widely agreed solution to the ‘puzzle’ does not seem to have weakened participants’ belief in the soundness of the intellectual framework within which asset prices are a puzzle.

Nor does the assumption that asset prices are always and everywhere perfect reflect the actual past practice of economic policymaking during crises. As DeLong (2008) has recently reminded those of us who are susceptible to the lessons of history (see also Kindleberger (2005)), the “lender of last resort” role of the central bank has always been, during a panic, to short-circuit the catastrophic economic effects of a collapse of financial confidence (in today’s terminology, ‘an increase in the price of risk’).1

Some economists, of course, view narrative history in the deLong and Kindleberger mode as irrelevant to the practice of their science; they prefer hard numbers to mere narrative. For the numerically inclined, however, Figures 1a and 1b should be persuasive; they show that controlling a market price of risk is something the Federal Reserve has done since it first opened up shop. The top figure depicts a measure of what we are now pleased to call the ‘risk-free’ rate of interest in the United States – essentially, the shortest-term interbank lending rate for which data are available (on a consistent basis) from before and after the founding of the Fed.2 Figure 1b shows the month-to-month changes in this interest rate. The only reason this rate is now viewed as ‘risk-free’ is that the Fed takes away the risk.3

Figure 1a

Figure 1b

Do the advocates of the risk-is-holy view really believe that we were better off in a real free-market era when interbank rates could move from 4 percent to 60 percent from one month to the next (as happened in 1873)? And how long do they think such a system would last? It was, after all, the intolerable stresses caused by financial panics that ultimately led to the founding of the Federal Reserve, in the face of adamant opposition from people holding financial-markets-are-perfect, believe-me-not-your-lying-eyes views that are eerily similar to dogmas that continue to be propounded today. The panic of 1907, in which J.P. Morgan effectively stepped in as a private lender of last resort, constituted the last straw for the unregulated financial system that preceded the managing of risky rates that we have had since the creation of the Fed.

A less extreme version of essentially the same dogma states that while it is acceptable for the central bank to suppress the aggregate risk that would otherwise roil short-term interest rates, the Fed should ignore all other manifestations of financial risk. It is, if anything, harder to construct a coherent economic justification of this point of view than of the strict destructionist view that says the Fed should not exist at all. But there is, at least, a perception that this way of operating is hallowed by time and practice: Since the Fed, the story goes, has spent most of its history ignoring risk, it shouldn’t change that now.

But even this milder dogma does not match the facts. Recent work by Robert Barbera, Charles Weise, and David Krisch,4 shows that over the “Taylor Rule” era of systematic monetary policy (roughly since 1984), the Federal Reserve’s choice of the short run interest rate has been powerfully correlated to market-based measures of risk such as the difference between the interest rates on corporate bonds and corresponding maturity Treasuries. When risk has been high, the Fed has felt the need to stimulate the economy by cutting short-term rates, and vice-versa.

Given the Fed’s pattern of past responses to risk and economic conditions (as embodied in risk-augmented Taylor rules), the implied value of the short term interest rate right now should be somewhere below negative 3.3 percent (actually even lower, since these projections do not reflect the dire recent news). Since interest rates cannot go below zero, the Fed must do something else to boost the economy. The obvious answer is to do everything possible to rekindle the appetite for risk – even if that means taking some of that risk onto the Fed’s balance sheet. This could be accomplished under some interpretations of the still-evolving Term Asset Lending Facility and has already happened in the case of some other, bolder, Fed actions that have been properly viewed as necessary to prevent financial collapse (Bear Stearns; the takeover of the commercial paper market). How much to buy, and which assets to buy, and how to minimize the political risks, are all difficult questions. But the danger of doing too little is far greater, at present, than the danger of doing too much.

The voices that say the Fed should do nothing at all, or nothing beyond perhaps some purchases of longer-dated Treasury securities, are not the voices of reason; they represent a howling dogma that was discredited in 1844 (when the Bank of England received its first implicit authority to intervene during panics; see DeLong (2008)), was discredited again in the panic of 1907, and again during the Great Depression (by being adopted in an extreme form), and is in the process of being discredited yet again today. (In fairness, during ordinary times it is probably wise for the authorities to avoid attempting systematic manipulation of the price of risk, for all the reasons Kindleberger (2005) and Robert Peel (1844) articulated. But this is no ordinary time).

Let’s put it this way: Simple calculations show that the current price of risk as measured by corporate bond spreads amounts to a forecast that about 40 percent of corporate America will be in bond default in the near future.5 The only circumstance under which this is remotely plausible is if government officials turn these dire forecasts into a self-fulfilling prophecy by failing to intervene forcefully in a way that quells the existential terror currently afflicting the markets. While I realize that some economists (and some politicians) might be willing even to undergo another Great Depression as the steep price of clinging to their faith, those of us who do not share that faith should not have to suffer such appalling consequences. ( NB DON )

As the Economist magazine might put it, the problem is that the ‘punters’ (investors) who normally populate the financial marketplace and risk their fortunes for the prospect of return, have fled from the field in terror. Back when the financial system was almost entirely based on banks, the solution to such a problem was that the Federal Reserve would act as the ‘lender of last resort’ to quell the panic. In the new financial system where banks are a much smaller share of the financial marketplace than they once were, the Fed’s appropriate new role seems clear: It needs to intervene more broadly than before, in public markets (as has already been done for the commercial paper market) as well as for banks; it needs, in other words, to step up to the plate and become the punter of last resort.

Christopher D. Carroll

Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University

References

Barbera, Robert J., and Charles L. Weise (2008): “Minsky Meets Wicksell: Using the Wicksellian Model to Understand the 21st Century Business Cycle,” Manuscript, Gettysburg College, Available at http://www.gettysburg.edu/dotAsset/2104335.pdf.

DeLong, J. Bradford (2008): “Republic of the Central Banker,” The American Prospect, Available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=republic_of_the_central_banker.

Holland, A. Steven, and Mark Toma (1991): “The Role of the Federal Reserve as “Lender of Last Resort” and the Seasonal Fluctuation of Interest Rates,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 23(4), 659–676, Stable: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1992702.

Kindleberger, Charles P. (2005): Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. Wiley, 5th Edition.

Macaulay, Frederick R. (1938): The Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States Since 1856. National Bureau of Economic Research, New York.

Mehra, Rajnish, and Edward C. Prescott (1985): “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 15, 145–61, Available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v15y1985i2p145-161.html.

Weise, Charles L., and David Krisch (2009): “The Monetary Response to Changes in Credit Spreads,” Paper Presented at the Eastern Economic Meetings, March 1 2009, Corresponding Author: Charles Weise, weise@gettysburg.edu."

Sunday, March 15, 2009

world is likely to become a more complicated place without a single hegemonic and dominant public financial institution

From Free Exchange:

"Rodrik roundtable: A global lender of last resort
Posted by:
Economist.com | WASHINGTON
Categories:
Rodrik roundtable

Brad DeLong is a professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley. His popular blog on economics can be found here

This discussion can be followed in its entirety here.

Dani Rodrik writes:

[T]he most fundamental objection to global regulation...[is that f]inancial regulation entails trade-offs along many dimensions. The more you value financial stability, the more you have to sacrifice financial innovation...Different nations will want to sit on different points along their “efficient frontiers”. There is nothing wrong with France, say, wanting to purchase more financial stability...Nor with Brazil giving its state-owned development bank special regulatory treatment, if the country wishes, so that it can fill in for missing long-term credit markets. In short, global financial regulation is neither feasible, nor prudent, nor desirable. What finance needs instead are some sensible traffic rules that will allow nations (and in some cases regions) to implement their own regulations while preventing adverse spillovers...

Similarly, a new financial order can be constructed on the back of a minimal set of international guidelines. The new arrangements would certainly involve an improved IMF with better representation and increased resources. It might also require an international financial charter with limited aims, focused on financial transparency, consultation among national regulators, and limits on jurisdictions (such as offshore centres) that export financial instability. But the responsibility for regulating leverage, setting capital standards, and supervising financial markets would rest squarely at the national level...

This seems to me to be dangerously wrongheaded. Let me try to explain why.

Go back to 1825, when the Bank of England first explicitly takes on its monetary policy mission in an attempt to stem the systemic impact of the banking crisis of 1825. Before 1825 or so a sudden shock that makes investors seek to hold portfolios of shorter duration and less risk does not have a great impact on values; the economy responds by unloading the trade goods from the ships about to sale for Hudson’s Bay or Batavia or Madras and selling them on the domestic market instead, and the fall in demand for long-duration and risky assets is met by deleveraging the real economy without much impact on values. But by 1825 the capital stock of the economy now has large components that cannot be deleveraged—plantations, canals, factories, and soon railroads. So a crisis shock to the demand for duration and risk now has a big depressing effect on asset prices—and that in its turn has a feedback effect further decreasing demand for duration and risk. And so it is in and after 1825 that we see the origin of central banking—the judgment by First Lord of the Treasury Lord Liverpool that the prices of risky and long-duration assets are too important to be left to the free play of market forces, that it is important for the government to support them, at least in crisis, to prevent mass unemployment by making sure that the firms that should be expanding and hiring workers can get finance to do so on terms that make it profitable for them to expand.

From this perspective monetary policy is and always has been about supporting asset prices at a level that allows firms that ought to be expanding to obtain finance and expand profitably. And ever since 1825 the central bank has done this by, whenever it needs to, taking long-duration and risky assets into its own portfolio—and thus off of the stock that must be held by the private sector whose risk tolerance has collapsed. Given that there are going to be sudden shocks to risk and duration tolerance on the part of global investors, we need a global institution to provide support for asset prices in an emergency—a global lender of last resort.

That lender of last resort needs two things if it is to function. First, it needs to be able to "print money"—to have its own liabilities be and be perceived to be the safest assets in the world so that when it borrows it calms markets by giving them more of the high-quality short-duration low-risk paper for which they suddenly have such a great craving. Second, it needs to know what it is buying—to have sufficient regulatory oversight and control over global finance to be able to limit the growth of potentially toxic assets beforehand and then to understand what prices it should offer when it does decide that it is time to support the market.

As my old teacher Charlie Kindleberger taught me (or, rather, taught Barry Eichengreen, who in turn taught me), when the global financial system has had a hegemonic lender-of-last-resort with the power and the will to exercise this function, things have gone relatively well. And when the possible candidates for the role have lacked either the power or the will, things have gone relatively badly.

Back in the 1997-1998 crisis the American Federal Reserve and Treasury acting alongside the IMF had the power and the will. Right now the American Federal Reserve and the Treasury in cooperation with the IMF and the ECB have the power (but they may not have the will). In the future the world is likely to become a more complicated place without a single hegemonic and dominant public financial institution. To my mind, this creates grave dangers for the next quarter century. But Dani does not see them."

Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat wrote:
March 15, 2009 19:44

"That lender of last resort needs two things if it is to function. First, it needs to be able to "print money"—to have its own liabilities be and be perceived to be the safest assets in the world so that when it borrows it calms markets by giving them more of the high-quality short-duration low-risk paper for which they suddenly have such a great craving. Second, it needs to know what it is buying—to have sufficient regulatory oversight and control over global finance to be able to limit the growth of potentially toxic assets beforehand and then to understand what prices it should offer when it does decide that it is time to support the market."

What about 3?: The LOLR cannot be in such deep and serious debt that its borrowing leads eventually to such a deep hole that no one believes that it can get out of it without defaulting or not paying completely some of its debts.

"when the global financial system has had a hegemonic lender-of-last-resort with the power and the will to exercise this function, things have gone relatively well"

Could this please be spelled out? I'm trying to figure out is this has something to do with Gramsci.

Friday, January 9, 2009

"On the contrary, among the biggest supporters of both have been the world’s investors, at least insofar as their collective judgment "

Another good James Surowiecki post:

"
Libertarians Against the Market

Tyler Cowen, in his ongoing effort to ensure that the government spends as little as possible in its attempt to stimulate the economy, cites approvingly a post by Arnold Kling arguing against a big fiscal-stimulus package, because the risks vastly outweigh the potential rewards (actually, Kling doesn’t really think there are any potential rewards from a stimulus plan). Kling enumerates those “risks” in a list. This is not a very useful list, because it contains absolutely no evidence for any of his assertions—he simply assumes the existence of his risks to be a fact—and no assertion about how likely any of these “risks” are, which makes it a little hard to do a cost-benefit analysis. Kling says that “on close examination,” the case for stimulus is weak, but, in this post, at least, he offers no such “close examination,” merely a laundry list of familiar (and unproven) criticisms of government spending.

The most curious thing about Kling’s post, though, is the way he closes—namely by complaining that even though he and his side “have logic on their side,” they will be “mocked and vilified in the media” for their opposition to a big stimulus package, and that that package will be pushed through as a result of “elite groupthink”—the same groupthink, in fact, that pushed through the Paulson rescue plan. The implicit assertion here is that the support for a stimulus package, as for the rescue plan, is driven by this élite group of interventionist economists and politicians, who are overriding what would otehrwise be commonsense economic policy.

What’s odd about this is that the support for the stimulus package, as well as support for the Paulson plan, hasn’t just come from liberal economists or Democratic politicians. On the contrary, among the biggest supporters of both have been the world’s investors( TRUE ), at least insofar as their collective judgment is reflected in market prices. As I showed yesterday, investors overwhelmingly supported the Paulson plan: it was only when it was killed, that stock prices really started their downward spiral( I AGREE ). And it was only after Obama unveiled his economic team and made clear how big his stimulus plans were that the market began its sharp recovery( I AGREE ) (the S. & P. 500 is now up twenty-five per cent since Nov. 20th). And as The Economists mystery blogger noted yesterday, anyone’s who’s paying attention to the stock market knows what would happen if Obama announced today that he was abandoning his plans for a major stimulus package:

Markets would plummet, with significant knock-on effects, based on the actual news that government spending would not nearly close the American output gap, but also given the signal that America was no longer committed to serious stimulus.( TRUE )

The point is that it isn’t just some group of pointy-headed Keynesians saying that a big stimulus package will be good for the economy: the collective wisdom of the market is saying the same thing( TRUE ). And it seems peculiar for a supposed believer in the efficiency and intelligence of markets—which, as a libertarian economist, I assume Kling is—to simply disregard what the market is saying in this case. In effect, libertarian economists are saying that they have a better sense of what’s good for the economy than the aggregated wisdom of investors does. And that makes them sound peculiarly like the Platonic economic planners that they typically decry( TRUE ).

There is no doubt that our Investor Class wants a government bailout large enough to stop both the Calling Run and the Proactivity Run. TARP and other various government actions have tried to stop the first, while the stimulus is an attempt to stop the second. Only explicit government guarantees and actions are believed to be sufficient enough to stop these runs. Leaving the two Runs to run their course could lead to extreme losses of wealth and jobs, large enough to effect social stability. This outcome must be avoided at all costs.

The Investor Class had no Plan B. They believed, quite correctly, that the government would have to intervene in a financial crisis. Investing has been done for at least the last twenty years with this understanding, as well as the understanding that government has an important role in funding and helping the Investor Class. They do not believe in limited or no government, and would have no idea to do business in such an environment. As Wittgenstein said, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him". I say, "If the free market showed up, the Investor Class would not know how to do business in it". They are the ones with the money, not theoreticians.

In the future, we will need a LOLR and SOLR to undergird our financial system. The explicit conditions of these guarantees will be meant to prevent Calling and Proactivity Runs. This can work. In other words, the intent is to keep the government from having to actually spend money, by allowing time for financial knots to unwind at minimal cost and disruption. Only the government can do this. In order to keep moral hazard from being a consequence, a strict application of Bagehot's Laws and a strict regime of supervision, not regulation, which focuses on aims and methods, as opposed to relying on particular laws, can keep moral hazard from becoming a problem. For one thing, by the end of the process, the Investor Class members which need a bailout will essentially be bust. It will not be a pleasant experience for them, as opposed to TARP.

The current political culture is a result of compromises over time. It cannot be easily changed, and should not be quickly changed. But, over, time, the system can be made fairer and freer for most people. Starting out with the changes listed above would be an excellent down payment.

Wednesday, December 31, 2008

"it is safe to lend to them at low rates … no matter how leveraged they are or how many risky bets they are making"

From Brad Setser:

"By bsetser

Tyler Cowen argues that the “Committee to Save the World” made a mistake in 1998 by, well, saving the financial world. They thus missed an opportunity to teach the banks a lesson in sound risk-management.

He specifically argues that the Fed (actually the New York Fed) shouldn’t have called the big banks together to recapitalize LTCM. The recapitalization didn’t require any Treasury funds or draw on the Fed as a lender of last resort, so calling it a bailout obscured the meaning of the term bailout – the fed catalyzed a private bailout of LTCM but it didn’t do a true government bailout. You might even say that the Fed catalyzed a bail-in of LTCM’s creditors. But by acting, Cowen argues that the Fed set a precedent that creditors of big financial institutions don’t take losses, and thus encouraged bad bets.( I AGREE WITH COWEN THAT IT SET A PRECEDENT, IN THAT THIS IS IN FACT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION. WHO KNOWS WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN WILLING TO DO? HOWEVER, IT'S CLEAR THAT THEY WOULDN'T COUNTENANCE A CALLING RUN. I DON'T AGREE THAT THE NY FED SHOULDN'T HAVE INTERVENED.)

I am not totally sure. The big banks called to the New York Fed were the creditors of LTCM and they were in some sense “bailed-in.” To avoid taking losses on the credit that they had extended to LTCM, they had to pony up and recapitalize LTCM.*( WERE ANY GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES OR INDUCEMENTS USED? )

It just so happened that the market recovered and it was possible for LTCM to exit many of its positions without taking large losses, or in some cases any losses. The banks that took control of LTCM when LTCM was on the ropes were able to unwind LTCM’s portfolio in a way that didn’t result in additional losses. But the result Cowen desired — large losses for the banks and broker-dealers who provided credit to LTCM – was quite possible if LTCM’s assets weren’t sufficient to cover all its liabilities. No creditor of LTCM was able to get rid of its exposure as a result of the Fed’s actions.

Lehman’s creditors didn’t get a chance to do a similar deal. There were too many of them — and there was too little time. I suspect, though, that Lehman’s creditors and counter-parties would be far better off if they had all agreed to pony up say 10% of the money they had lent to Lehman and in the process had provided Lehman with enough equity to allow it to be unwound in a more orderly way( I AGREE ).** They still would have taken losses, but those losses might well have been smaller – even counting the new money they put in – than the losses that Lehman’s creditors will incur as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy filing( I TEND TO AGREE ).

Moreover, it seems a bit strange to look at LTCM in isolation( WE SHOULDN'T ).

LTCM, remember, came just after Russia defaulted.

And Russia was at the time considered the quintessential moral hazard play.

A host of financial institutions thought it was too nuclear to fail, and thus concluded that that they could safely pocket the high coupon on Russia’s GKOs (short-term Ruble denominated Russian securities) …

Bad bet. Then Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin concluded that it wasn’t possible to save Russia without effectively turning Russian credit into US credit. He wasn’t willing to do that. He wasn’t willing to support the disbursement of the second tranche of Russia’s IMF program after Russian burned through the first tranche really quickly.

Not providing Russia more money then was a risky call. Kind of like letting Lehman fail. Russia, remember, had nukes. Lots of them. The national security types weren’t thrilled by the prospect of a bankrupt nuclear power.

Russia’s creditors (including Lehman) took large losses at the time( A CALLING RUN WAS AVERTED. ). That presumably should have taught them a lesson or two about managing risk – it was more or less what I suspect Dr. Cowen would have prescribed.

It also implies that LTCM wasn’t the Lehman of 1998.

It was more like one of the institutions that was found to be swimming naked after Lehman defaulted.

LTCM was bailed out by its creditors (you might even say its creditors were bailed in … ). Today, the big financial institutions are truly getting bailed out. Most would be bust if not for Treasury capital injections and Fed liquidity support( TRUE ).

Nor was LTCM the only big borrower that got a bit of help after Russia didn’t get bailed out.

Brazil, like Russia, had a lot of short-term debt that had to be rolled over. Now it so happens that most of Brazil’s domestic debt was owed to domestic banks not foreign investors – and that really helped. The analogy isn’t perfect. Brazil also had a pegged exchange rate. It, like Russia, had pegged to the dollar at too high a rate to be sustained after Asia’s crisis cut into global demand for commodities and reduced private capital flows.

Brazil not surprising came under a lot of pressure. But it also got a decent sum of money from the IMF. That loan supplemented Brazil’s reserves and allowed for a more orderly exit from its fixed exchange rate than otherwise would have been the case. They delay made possible by the IMF (and the government’s heavy intervention) in the foreign exchange market allowed a lot of Brazilian firms to hedge their dollar exposure, so they didn’t go bust when the real eventually was devalued. And Brazil didn’t default. Not in 98. Not in 99. And not in 2002, when it also had to draw on the IMF after Argentina’s default.

Ending moral hazard consequently would have implied letting Brazil go – not just letting LTCM go. The odds are that a Brazilian default soon after Russia’s default would have brought done a major financial institution or two, and brought about a major systemic crisis.( NOT GOOD )

I am personally though glad that this wasn’t what happened. Brazil actually was suffering from a liquidity crisis as much as a solvency crisis. Or rather the IMF provided it with a cushion that allowed it to make the fiscal adjustment needed to assure its long-term solvency — and that was something it was willing to do. That kept its liquidity crisis from morphing into a solvency crisis. The line between the two often isn’t as clean in practice as in theory (apologies for all the detail; I wrote an equation-free book on this with Dr. Doom before he was Dr. Doom).

I doubt Brazil would be better off today if it had defaulted in 98 or early 99. Defaulting on domestic government debt does bad things to the long-term health of any country’s domestic banking system. It creates a really bad hangover – and leaves a country permanently more vulnerable to a run( I AGREE ).

Nor am I convinced that Dr. Cowen’s solution – standing aside as LTCM failed – would have ended moral hazard.( NOT BY ITSELF )

LTCM after all was an unregulated hedge fund. It wasn’t a regulated bank. Or a big – and sorta-regulated- broker-dealer. If LTCM had failed, I suspect that policy makers would have stepped in to prevent any major regulated financial institutions from failing as a result of its exposure to LTCM, or its own LTCM-style bets. Rather than ending the expectation that big banks and big broker-dealers were too big-to-fail, the failure of LTCM might have reinforced that sense( I AGREE ).

The real moral hazard in the financial system – in my view – comes not from expectations that if a firm like Goldman (or Lehman) makes a bad bet on a country like Russia (or a bad bet on US commercial real estate) the government will come in and protect the firm from losses on those investments. Rather it comes from the expectation on the part of those lending to places like Lehman and Goldman that these institutions are too important to fail, and thus it is safe to lend to them at low rates … no matter how leveraged they are or how many risky bets they are making.( THAT'S IT EXACTLY )

If that is right, ending moral hazard in 1998 would have required allowing an institution like Lehman to fail in a way that imposed large losses on Lehman’s creditors. Not just allowing LTCM to fail in a way that imposed large losses on firms like Lehman. ( IN A WAY THAT SHOWED THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER INTERVENE )

And, well, right now a lot of people seem to think allowing an institution like Lehman to go bankrupt in 2008 was a mistake.( IT WAS )

To me the real failure during the last crisis was the failure of regulators to clamp down more seriously on leveraged institutions once the markets calmed.( IF THIS MEANS BAGEHOT'S PRINCIPLES, I AGREE. IF IT JUST MEANS TINKERING WITH THE REGULATIONS, THEN I DON'T AGREE. )

Losses in Russia – and a close call with LTCM did lead to a bit more prudence for a while. Regulators did start to pay more attention to the financial firms that were providing a lot of credit to big hedge funds. But that started to seem a bit superfluous in a context where (for a period) the banks actually were lending less to hedge funds, in part because the big hedge funds were shrinking. Not just LTCM. Tiger too … even Soros.

Most macro funds got burnt on the yen carry trade in 98.

And when the party got going again this decade — and hedge funds and private equity firms and the broker-dealers and the banks (through off balance sheet vehicles) all started to gear up — there was a team at the Treasury that wasn’t at all interested in regulating the financial sector. And the Fed – Greenspan especially – was never very keen on tight regulation.

Given all the scale of this year’s crisis, I certainly cannot rule out the possibility that Dr. Cowen is right and we would all be better off now if we had had a deeper crisis in 1998. A crisis that scarred the banks as deeply as it scarred most emerging markets might have produced a world where the banks wanted to increase their capital as badly as most emerging markets wanted to increase their reserves.( MAYBE )

But I doubt that that outcome would have been possible without standing by and watching a lot more institutions than just LTCM fail( I AGREE. IT COULD HAVE LED TO A RUN ). One big borrower — Russia — did fail rather spectacularly in 1998. Its failure created large losses for a lot of banks (far more than most were expecting, as some banks’ risk models at the time didn’t allow for a default on ruble denominated debt … ). The yen carry trade also unwound in ways that led to big losses at a lot of hedge funds. And that wasn’t enough.

My bottom line: getting rid of all moral hazard – and forcing creditors to evaluate the real risk of lending to a large, highly leveraged financial institution rather than bet that some large institutions were too big and too complex to fail – would have required a lot more that letting the market sort out LTCM with a gentle nudge from the Fed. It would have required allowing the set of institutions that were lending to LTCM to have failed …( AND EVEN THEN... )

And I suspect it would ultimately have meant allowing solvent but illiquid institutions (and countries) to fail. That is a bit further than I would be willing to go( I AGREE ).

*Bear Stearns excepted. Bear didn’t participate in the equity injection.
** Lending here should be read as shorthand for all credit exposure, even if it isn’t structured as a loan. And no doubt one complication of a plan based on “recapitalization from Lehman’s creditors” was that a lot of Lehman’s creditors had lent on a secured basis, and thus had little direct exposure to Lehman (though lots of exposure to a firesale of Lehman’s assets in the secondary market).
Relitigating 1998 …"

I agree with Setser, but I also agree that LTCM did add to the belief about implicit and explicit government guarantees. Whatever happened in Russia or Brazil or Mexico, our government was not going to let a Calling Run occur here. They were probably wise with LTCM.

I've concluded that we need a LOLR or final guarantor in order to prevent a Calling Run. Like the FDIC, its terms should be clear from the outset. The hope would be that it would allow the time for deals to unwind without inducing a panic. Implementation of Bagehot's Principles would help solve this problem, and possibly even rid us of it.

The Place Of Government Guarantees In Avoiding Bank And Calling Runs

I want to briefly talk about the causes of this crisis before the silly explanations like lack of regulations and complex investments win day, as they surely will, guaranteeing that this system will go on and even implode again in the near future, although hopefully not to the this extent.

I want to ask a simple question: Does FDIC Insurance on individual accounts help prevent bank runs? Bank Runs being a result of depositors running to the bank to get their money out before the resources of the bank run dry, leaving a number of depositors to lose their money. If you think that FDIC Insurance is stupid, illegal, unconstitutional, a gift to moral hazard, doesn't help stop bank runs, and should be gotten rid of, then my points going forward won't matter to you. I do, however, address this position at the end of the post.

Now, our current crisis is a Calling Run. As the credit rating of a business goes down, investors or creditors that can demand money from the business do so, forcing the business to sell assets or borrow to fund these calls, which leads to a further deterioration of the finances of the business and a further downgrade, which leads to more calls... Now, if better regulations and higher capital standards are all that is needed to stop runs, why do we need FDIC Insurance? Surely higher capital standards and better regulation should suffice to stop a Bank Run. You see my point.

In the current crisis, the flight to Treasuries was in lieu of an explicit government guarantee concerning their assets. Investors fled into explicitly guaranteed, and hence liquid investments, since they can be priced, and even fled from implicitly guaranteed investments. In other words, investors fled to an equivalent of the FDIC. Simply put, you need government guarantees about losses to stop a run. Regulations and Capital Standards won't suffice. Well, they could, but they would be incredibly onerous and high, making them impractical, so, in effect, you need government guarantees to stop runs.

In the current crisis, it has all been about the extent and particulars of government guarantees. Certainly the gyrations of government actions have led to problems, but only in the sense of not making the extent of the guarantees explicit and particular. Anyone who believes that we could stop this crisis without government guarantees, like US Treasuries, is wrong.

From my analysis, it's clear that regulations and capital standards are not sufficient to stop a run. They might have effected this crisis in some manner, but explaining the crisis by seeing what has just occurred and writing laws that might have prevented it is of very little use, and has no real explanatory power. It's a help going forward, but, taken too particularly, it will result in a set of rules and laws that very smart people will manage to elude.

What to do then going forward?
1) Put in some sort of FDIC Insurance for these investments
2) Accept that runs might occur, and do your best to preclude them and be prepared for them
On 2, I say," good luck". Wishful Thinking at its worst. This is what will happen naturally.
On 1, what can we do? I suggest Bagehot's Principles. We need a LOLR I'm sorry to say in the modern world. All that we can do is make the guarantees explicit and adhere to firm standards going forward. But there is no practical solution without LOLR guarantees. They should be robust enough to preclude Calling Runs. One solution would allow some minimal use of FVA as opposed to MTM in supervised cases, with a government guarantee.

For libertarians, I'm sorry. This is the best that we can do for you. However, by averting Runs, we can avoid the kind's of crises that usher in enormous government intrusion. That should prove sufficient to the practically minded.

Finally, to the FDIC abstainers, a Burkean response. We don't have the FDIC for James Grant. We need it for:
1) Our actual Investor Class, which feeds on government guarantees and intervention.
2) Much more importantly, and let me put this in terms that the Investor Class can understand, in order to stave off social rebellion. A system that leads to mass unemployment, low wages, a very wealthy upper class, is not stable. Telling average workers to accept the pain of recessions and depressions is going to eventually lead to trouble. They don't have to. In other words, some people believe that we live in a world where such events as rebellions cannot occur. Of course, some people live in a world where depressions cannot occur. As a good Burkean, I know that isn't our world, and the bonds of civil society must allow compromise in order to stave off societal dislocations.

Monday, December 29, 2008

"It was a largely unregulated system. And it was largely offshore, at least legally. "

Brad Setser:

"The collapse of financial globalization …

The last six months — if not the last year — logged what felt like a decade’s worth of financial news. So perhaps it isn’t surprising that swings that normally would attract an enormous amount of attention have gone almost unnoticed. Like the near-total collapse of private capital flows.

Both private capital inflows to the US and private capital outflows from the US have fallen sharply. They have gone from a peak of around 15% of US GDP to around zero in a remarkably short period of time …( FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK )

The fall in private flows over the last four quarters has been much sharper than the fall in the US current account deficit. The current account deficit continues to hover around $700 billion (5% of US GDP). Financial globalization — the growth in private cross-border flows, and associated rise in private inflows and private outflows — doesn’t seem to have been as central to the ability of the United States to sustain large current account deficits as some thought back in 2004 and 2005.( INTERESTING )

The preceding graph is based on the BEA’s balance of payments data, scaled to US GDP (the quarterly data was transformed into an annual series by calculating a rolling 4q sum and the sign on private outflows was reversed). I did adjust the latest BEA data in one way. From q2 2007 on I subtracted “private” purchases of Treasuries from the “private’ total. The last survey of foreign portfolio holdings — which revised the data from mid-2006 to mid-2007 — basically re-attributed all private purchases of Treasuries from private investors in the UK to the world’s central banks. My adjustment thus anticipates the revisions that are likely to follow from the next survey.*

But even if “private” Treasury purchases since mid-2007 are counted there still would have been a stunning fall in private capital flows. Direct investment flows have continued. Other financial flows though have largely gone in reverse, with investors selling what they previously bought.( FLIGHT TO SAFETY ) In the third quarter foreign investors sold about $90b of US securities (excluding Treasuries) and Americans sold about $85 billion of foreign securities. And the reversal in bank flows on both sides (as past loans have been called) has been absolutely brutal. ( FROM THE CALLING RUN? )

This sharp fall has bearing on the bigger debate over the role global capital, global savings and foreign central banks played in helping to to create the conditions that allowed US households to sustain a large deficit for so long — and whether American and other policy makers should have paid more attention to the risks that came with the surge in foreign demand for US financial assets earlier this decade.

Back in 2004 and 2005 — when it was beginning to be apparent that the growth in central bank reserves had led to unprecedented demand for US assets from reserve managers — many argued that central banks weren’t as important to the financing of the US deficit as it seemed. While net central banks demand seemed large in relation to net private demand for US assets, central banks only accounted for a small share of gross inflows — and in some sense total foreign purchases of US assets matter more than anything else. Ergo, central bank demand wasn’t central to the ability to the United States’ ability to sustain large current deficits, whether from large fiscal deficits (03-04) or a rise in household borrowing (05-06).

Fair enough. But even then it seemed like the increase in private inflows was tied to an increase in private outflows, so there was a reason why the growth in private flows wasn’t generating much net financing. Note how closely gross inflows and gross outflows move together in the graph — setting aside the inflows attracted by high US interest rates in the 1980s and the period in the late 1990s when foreign investors really were clamoring to buy US equities. Most of the rise in total flows reflected a rise short-term flows and short-term cross-border bank flows often seem to offset each other. Or to put it a bit differently, the US deficit has not been financed by short-term borrowing from the world’s private banks. ( OK )

Think of the process this way. Suppose a US bank lends a billion dollars to a bank in London that lends that money to a hedge fund domiciled the Caribbean that buys a billion dollars of US securities. That chain results in an outflow and inflow, but the outflow just financed the inflow — it doesn’t help to finance the current account deficit. By contrast, China’s purchases of Treasuries and Agencies reflect in large part China’s current account surplus — not Chinese banks borrowing from US banks. They certainly help to finance the US current account deficit.

I think we now more or less know that the strong increase in gross capital inflows and outflows after 2004 (gross inflows and outflows basically doubled from late 2004 to mid 2007) was tied to the expansion of the shadow banking system.( OK )

It was a largely unregulated system. And it was largely offshore, at least legally( THIS IS WHAT I SAY WOULD HAVE HAPPENED WITH MORE US REGULATION ). SIVs and the like were set up in London. They borrowed short-term from US banks and money market funds to buyer longer-term assets, generating a lot of cross border flows but little net financing. European banks that had a large dollar book seem to have been doing much the same thing.** The growth of the shadow banking system consequently resulted in a big increase in gross private capital outflows and gross private capital inflows.

Those private flows have now disappeared, or even reversed. They actually started to disappear back in August 2007. That didn’t keep the US from continuing to run a large (5% of GDP) current account deficit. The fall in private flows has been far sharper than the fall in the current account deficit.

Why didn’t the total collapse in private flows lead financing for the US current account deficit to dry up? That, after all, is what happened in places like Iceland — and Ukraine.

My explanation is pretty straightforward.

Central banks were the main source of financing for the US deficit all along.*** Setting Japan aside, the big current account surplus countries were all building up their official reserves and sovereign funds — and they were the key vector providing financing to the deficit countries.

And when (net) private demand for US assets fell, official flows picked up. As I noted earlier, private purchases of Treasuries after June 2007 are almost certainly really official flows. If those purchases are added to recorded official flows,**** total official flows over the last four quarters of data (q4 07 to q2 08) now almost match the current account deficit.

That is true even though I have calculated net official flows — and in the third quarter of 2008 for the first time in a long time the US central bank was a net lender to the world. Yep. The Fed provided $226 billion of credit through various swap lines in q3, and foreign central banks only bought $118 billion of US assets. This shows up cleanly if official inflows are plotted against official outflows (the graph is done on a rolling four quarter basis).

Central banks lent the proceeds of their swap lines with the Fed to private banks abroad, and private banks in turn repaid their maturing dollar debts — so the swap lines financed the unwinding of existing US loans to the rest of the world. Call it facilitating the unwinding of some of the legacy of the excesses of the past few year. Or call it a new wave of financial globalization, one led by the central banks …

At this point, I don’t really think that there can be much doubt that the enormous increase in central bank reserves over the last five years was central to the process that allowed the US to run large current account deficits during a period when private demand — that is private inflows net of private outflows — for US financial assets wasn’t there. At least not on the scale needed to finance the United States big deficits.

In my judgment, the US housing bubble — and the associated rise in private consumption as households borrowed against the rising value of their home — wouldn’t have been able to grow for as long as it did without this inflow from the rest of the world. But that is a story for a different post.( I NEED TO SEE THAT )

*Watch what happens when the data from the June 2008 survey is released. I would expect a large upward revision in official inflows from q3 07 to q2 08. The BEA data currently indicate $478 billion in official purchases over these four quarters and another $256 billion of private purchases of Treasuries.
** We know this in large part because of how much they have borrowed (indirectly, through their “home” central bank) from the Fed after financing from the interbank market and US money market funds dried up after Lehman’s collapse.
*** In theory, central banks could have bought a lot of euros and private European investors could have bought a lot of US assets, allowing the US to run a large deficit financed by European private investors even in the absence of a European current account surplus. This perhaps happened to an extent — but it seems to have been less important than central bank purchases of dollar assets.
**** This still likely under counts total official flows. Before they stopped buying Agencies this fall, central banks (especially China’s central bank) also bought Agency bonds from private intermediaries, so the survey tended to revise private Agency purchases down and official purchases up. And even the revised data doesn’t seem to pick up a large fraction of Gulf purchases — whether purchases of “risk” assets by sovereign funds or “safe” assets by SAMA (the Saudi Monetary Agency) and Gulf central banks."

I would expect the Central Banks of Saver Countries to be the buyers of our Treasuries and Agencies, and Japan to do so in order to keep exports high. This fits in with two of my predictions:

1) It is the Saver Countries ( China, Germany, Japan ) that want to really keep this current arrangement going.

2) Investors would simply have done more offshore investing had the US had tougher regulations.

I would add that two main problems:

1) The Flight To Safety ( Into Treasuries )

2) The Calling Run ( The need to raise capital )

Are bound up with this system. How? Very simple. As I've said before, foreign investors were also counting on strong and decisive government intervention in a financial crisis. They were directly tied into the same ideas and presuppositions as US investors. Our leaders didn't perceive that we were the LOLR for the whole world, and the Implicit And Explicit Guarantees extended to the whole world, by these Central Banks buying our debt.