Showing posts with label Central Banks and Bubbles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Central Banks and Bubbles. Show all posts

Saturday, May 30, 2009

freed up a lot of capital for productive investment--capital that instead went into the purchase of houses at ever higher prices

From The Atlantic Business Section:

May 26 2009, 8:52PM

Response to Comments--May 16 to May 26

There were a number of interesting comments; rather than try to respond to them individually, I will group them into themes and respond to each theme.

One theme is that, contrary to my argument, the unhappy situation of the economy today should not be viewed as a "failure of capitalism" but as a failure of government. In fact both characterizations are correct, because capitalism and government cannot be separated. You cannot (here I part company with "anarcho-capitalists," such as David Friedman) have capitalism without a government, specifically a central bank with discretionary authority over the money supply and a regulatory regime for financial intermediation (banking in a broad sense). The money supply has to be geared to the amount of output--otherwise you have inflation if the ratio of money to output rises sharply or deflation if it falls sharply, and both are destructive; and because output varies unpredictably, a constant growth rate in the money supply will not avoid inflation or deflation.

And you have to have regulation of banking because banking is inherently risky (it involves lending borrowed capital, and the only way to create a spread between the cost of borrowing and the return from lending is to lend at a greater risk than that borne by the suppliers of capital to you, as by borrowing short and lending long), because the risks are not independent (that is, they are not idiosyncratic risks of particular banks), and because a failure of the banking industry freezes economic activity (which depends on credit), precipitating a severe recession or depression. So if one wants to have monetary stability and a safe banking system, one needs a central bank and a bank regulatory regime: one needs, in short, governmental controls over the economy. They are intrinsic to functioning capitalism.

What is not intrinsic to capitalism is subsidizing home ownership, whether through the mortgage-interest deduction from the income tax or the subsidization of risky mortgages by government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). I don't defend our housing policies--on the contrary. But neither do I think they are major causes of our current economic distress.

I do worry about the "moral hazard" problem--that is, the tendency of insurance to encourage risky behavior. If banks expect to be bailed out by government if they get into trouble, they will take greater risks than otherwise and get into more trouble. But we must be precise about the problem. Bailouts generally are quite painful for shareholders and management, as the financial institutions that have received government loans during the present crisis have learned to their sorrow. The principal beneficiaries of the bailouts are unsecured bondholders of the bailed-out firms, who would take a bath if the firms they lent to went bankrupt. If they think the government will bail out those firms, the firms will be able to borrow at lower cost than their competitors, and the lenders will be less vigilant in policing the borrowers' conduct.

The answer to this moral hazard problem is regulation. Any insurer has a right to take measures to reduce moral hazard, and an interest in doing so. Bank deposits are federally insured, which protects banks against runs and reduces the incentive of depositors to monitor the banks' behavior, so federal regulators, in their capacity as insurers concerned with moral hazard resulting from the insurance, try to prevent banks from taking excessive risks. If "too big to fail" operates to insure other lenders to banks, namely bondholders, then we have a further moral hazard problem to which regulation must attend.

One comment attributes our economic situation to the high oil prices last summer, and another to China's export-first economic policies, which resulted in a flood of cheap imports to the United States and a huge Chinese dollar surplus invested in the United States, which tended to keep interest rates down. I am more sympathetic to the first suggestion than to the second. I think the high oil prices, besides reducing Americans' wealth and thus making them more vulnerable to an economic downturn, fooled the Federal Reserve into keeping interest rates higher than necessary to prevent the recession that turned into a depression, because it worried that oil prices were creating a danger of inflation. The Federal Reserve raised interest rates too late to prevent the housing bubble, and then lowered them too late to prevent the bursting of the housing bubble from bringing down the banking industry.

A number of countries, not just China, which have weak domestic demand, promote exports, acquire large dollar balances, and invest them in the United States. The Federal Reserve could have offset the effect of foreign capital on interest rates by reducing the money supply by raising interest rates, as eventually it did--too late.

Another theme in the comments is the allocation of blame for the economic meltdown to the bankers. As one comment puts it, to excuse the bankers on the basis of lax regulation is equivalent to saying that because government issues gun permits, it's responsible for murder. That's fair if you think the bankers committed fraud or theft, but not if, as the comment goes on to state, they exhibited "exorbitant leverage, poor long-term risk management, and a capricious disregard for the well-being society as a whole." For that just amounts to saying that they took a lot of risk in an effort to maximize their profits, and we want businessmen to maximize their profits because, as long as business operates within the law, the general tendency of profit maximization is to minimize cost and maximize consumer welfare. If the legal framework is defective, it should be changed; competition will not permit businessmen to subordinate profit maximization to concern for the welfare of society as a whole. Ethics can't take the place of regulation. That may be a dyspeptic or cynical outlook on human character, but it is realistic.

A third theme is skepticism about my discussions of preventives and remedies for our economic situation. One comment makes the interesting suggestion that raising interest rates in an effort to burst the bubble before it became so large that its collapse did grave harm to the economy would have been a blunt instrument, since higher interest rates reduce productive activity as well as pricking asset-price bubbles, by restricting credit. But higher interest rates, by bursting the bubble early, would have freed up a lot of capital for productive investment--capital that instead went into the purchase of houses at ever higher prices.

Other comments contest my argument that regulatory reform should be postponed until after the economic downturn ends. They make the related points that the current angers and anxieties make it a politically propitious time for getting serious reform measures through Congress and that with the passage of time the banks will reacaquire and reassert their considerable political clout--political clout that in the past has defeated efforts at effective regulation. In short, in the view of these commenters, there's no time like the present for reform.

These are good points, for which I don't have a compelling answer. My concerns are with the complexity of sensible reform of banking, the limited staff resources of government to devise effective regulations while trying to execute emergenvcy measures for speeding recovery from the depression, and the negative impact on recovery of further unsettling the legal and political environment in which the banking industry is operating. But I don't how to weigh these concerns against the concerns expressed in the comments."

Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat

"But higher interest rates, by bursting the bubble early, would have freed up a lot of capital for productive investment--capital that instead went into the purchase of houses at ever higher prices."

If this was me, you misread my point. My argument was that there were other, more concentrated, means of bursting the housing bubble without having to use the Fed. While you were freeing capital from housing,that might well have been better spent, you could well have been destroying other businesses with higher interest rates. If you see that it's a housing bubble, then you should be able to deal with it as a problem of the housing sector. I'm not even sure why you believe that the Fed has the sagacity to notice the bubble, but can't bring the problem to the attention of regulators and lawmakers, and suggest that they deal with it as a problem with the housing sector.

Quite frankly, since the Fed has to use a blunt instrument, I would imagine that it would be a laggard in dealing with the problem, waiting until everybody else has attempted to deal with it, before they apply the breaks to those not involved in the bubble area as well. This reliance on the Fed seems ill-founded.

Don the libertarian Democrat

Let me give you a particular proposal: As housing prices go up relative to other goods, and, hence, become More Expensive, you raise the down-payment requirement. Would that have had any effect? You are indeed reigning in a part of the economy, but it's a particular part of the economy, as opposed to the whole economy.

Thursday, December 11, 2008

“Asset prices are a symptom. The underlying problem is excess credit growth.”

Can Central Banks stop bubbles? On Bloomberg, here's Caroline Baum:

"Dec. 11 (Bloomberg) -- Central banks care about financial stability.

Asset bubbles can be financially destabilizing.

Therefore, central banks care about asset bubbles.

If only policy makers found this syllogism persuasive.

Until now, central bankers pretty much cared about asset bubbles only to the extent that asset prices affected their ability to deliver price stability and, in the case of the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate, maximum employment. Otherwise, the operative doctrine was laissez-faire-’til-after-they-burst.

That’s about to change, said William White, who recently retired from the Bank for International Settlements, where he was economic adviser and head of the Monetary and Economic Department from 1995 to June 2008.

“The most calamitous downturns were not preceded by any degree of inflation,” White said in a telephone interview yesterday. “There was no inflation in 1873-74, in the 1920s, in the 1980s in Japan and in the 1990s in Southeast Asia.”

All these extended credit cycles ended badly. The U.S. economy contracted for 65 months, a record, from 1873 to 1879.

The bursting of the housing bubble and the deepening financial and economic crisis should be sobering to those who resist the idea that asset bubbles, when they burst, can be as destabilizing as inflation, which is the reason central bankers adopted inflation targets."

This is a pretty straightforward plan. Since Bubbles need easy credit or low interest rates for an extended period of time, don't let that happen. Central Banks can stop this by raising interest rates preventively.

"Central banks are still holding the line, at least publicly, on the inappropriateness of “targeting” asset prices, which misrepresents the issue. (More on that later.) Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Don Kohn said in a speech last month that he had reexamined the evidence and had came to the conclusion that he agrees with Alan Greenspan, his former boss and long-time advocate of bubble mop-up.

Bank of England policy makers are equally dug in, with Andrew Sentance, Charlie Bean and Sir John Gieve all arguing in recent speeches that using monetary policy, or interest rates, to “lean against the wind” is inadequate or inappropriate.

All these arguments miss the point. No one is suggesting central bankers target asset prices (Dow 13,000?). Nor is the issue bubble detection or identification, which implies policy makers know the appropriate level for asset prices and inspires visions of Sherlock Holmes-like characters looking under rocks in the hopes of making a discovery.

Economics is a social science. Econometric models spit out results that lack the accuracy of chemistry experiments and the precision of mathematical equations."

I was going to argue that this plan was a Mechanistic Plan, when she surprised me by agreeing with me about such models.

"Central bankers are forced to deal in the realm of the touchy-feely all the time. If their work could be reduced to an equation, we wouldn’t a) need them or b) find ourselves in the mess we’re in now. So why is it so hard for policy makers to grasp what White and his BIS colleagues have been saying for a decade?

“Targeting asset prices is not at all what we’ve been suggesting,” White said. “Asset prices are a symptom. The underlying problem is excess credit growth.”

Too much effort goes into differentiating this asset bubble from the rest: what White calls “the school of what’s different: the CDOs, CDO-squareds, the SIVs, the rating agencies.”

It makes more sense to focus on “the school of what’s the same, and that’s the credit cycle. There’s always something new, but there’s always something the same: leverage, speculation, declining credit standards,” he said."

He says that the problems are:

1) Leverage ( True )

2) Speculation ( True, but less important than 1 and 3 )

3) Declining Credit Standards ( True )

I would add:

4) Fraud, etc.

5) Government Incompetence

I also agree that it's not the new products, but disagree strongly about the Credit Ratings Agencies.

"Cracks are starting to appear in the asset-bubble-resistance facade. Questioned about a change in approach at an Oct. 15 speech, Fed chief Ben Bernanke said policy makers would have “to look very hard at that issue and what can be done about it.” He said it was unclear whether monetary policy or regulation and supervision was the proper tool.

Until now, there has been a persuasive argument for a hands- off approach to asset bubbles.

“Is it possible to lean against the upturn, or is it preferable to wait and clean up afterwards?” White said. “The models say you can wait. And it always worked. That’s a pretty powerful argument.”

The counter argument is that models aren’t always reliable. What worked in the past may not work now.

If the recession proves to be longer, deeper and more intractable than recent slumps, central bankers may come to appreciate the merits of leaning versus cleaning. Leaning may entail both “macroprudential instruments,” such as raising reserve requirements, capital requirements and loan-to-value ratios, and a “monetary instrument,” White said."

So, he suggests:

1) Raising Reserve Requirements ( Fine )

2) Raising Capital Requirements ( Fine )

3) Raising Loan-to-Value Requirements ( Fine )

4 ) A Monetary Instrument ( Not Sure )

"Cleaning appeared to have worked in the past, following the 1987 stock market crash, the early 1990s recovery from the savings and loan crisis in the U.S., and the late 1990s Asian financial crisis and near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management. But “it works at the expense of making it worse next time around,” White said.

Cleansing, not cleaning, is what’s really needed. Without it, central banks have to “use a monetary instrument that is ever more aggressive” and will eventually cease to work, he said.

The best medicine, as with most things, may be an ounce of prevention.

“When you see a combination of rapid credit growth, a rapid rise in asset prices across a broad spectrum and changes in spending behavior, it should be a wake-up call that says: We have a problem,” White said.

Central bankers should realize that a lack of action during the credit upswing may impose greater costs to society.

“The facts are so obvious,” White said. “You don’t need to be a rocket scientist. Even an economist, when he sees something happen, will admit it is possible.”

If we see:

1) Rapid Credit Growth

2) Rapid Growth In Asset Prices

3) Changes In Spending Behavior

We should be worried.

I agree, but still find that using interest rates might be very harmful to businesses not participating in this rise, and a very blunt instrument. However, as a marginal tool, I wouldn't have a problem with it. But he conveniently left out the details of what he's calling for. I'm assuming that the blunt instrument argument is blunted by the bubble problem being a general problem, and so not limited to certain sectors, and pointing out that the bursting of the bubble has consequences for the entire economy.

It still seems to me that we need a better handle on how this mechanism actually influences people's behavior before we really commit to it.

Saturday, November 1, 2008

"This led me to correctly predict that as the housing bust picked up steam in the U.S., the trade deficit would peak as a percent of GDP."

From Calculated Risk, an interesting chart:

"Perhaps we have seen a Virtuous Cycle as depicted in the following diagram:
Virtuous Cycle Click on graph for larger image in new window.Starting from the top ... lower interest rates have led to an increase in housing prices. And those higher housing prices have led to an ever increasing equity withdrawal by homeowners. ... it is reasonable to assume that a large percentage of this equity withdrawal has flowed to consumption, increasing both GDP and imports over the last few years. ... it appears mortgage equity withdrawal has been a meaningful contributor to the ever widening trade and current account deficits.

To finance the current account deficit, foreign Central Banks (CBs) have been investing heavily in dollar denominated securities. Some analysts have suggested that these investments have lowered interest rates by between 40 bps and 200 bps (Roubini and Setser: "Will the Bretton Woods 2 Regime Unravel Soon? The Risk of a Hard Landing in 2005-2006")

If these analysts are correct, and foreign CB intervention is lowering treasury yields, then this has also lowered mortgage interest rates ... and the cycle repeats. The result: a Virtuous Cycle with higher housing prices, more consumption and lower interest rates.

As a result of the rapidly increasing housing prices, we are now seeing significant speculation, excessive leverage and poor credit quality of new homebuyers; all the signs of an overheated market. ... What happens if the housing market cools down? "

It's very informative, and there's a counterclockwise one as well called the Vicious cycle.

It's truly informative as to the what and why, but not the who. Here's my comment:

Don the libertarian Democrat
writes:

Are there any human agents in these cycles, or is this like a mechanism? At what point do individual human decisions pass over from possible to inevitable in this schema, or do humans even matter? Or only the movement of money and other financial products?