Showing posts with label TALF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TALF. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

the COP should be slapping Bernanke, Dudley and Geithner on the back

TO BE NOTED: From HousingWire:

"Viewpoint: The COP Ralfs on TALF

Posted By LINDA LOWELL
June 2, 2009 8:22 am

Elizabeth Warren, chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), appears to have a vendetta against the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset Backed Loan Facility (TALF).

To my knowledge, she first mounted this hobby horse back in March based on a deeply misleading report appearing recently in the Wall Street Journal (“[1] TALF Is Reworked After Investors Balk,” March 14, 2009). The article asserted that several Wall Street dealers were creating CDO-like vehicles harking back to the financial engineering that helped crash the credit markets. The vehicles were designed to “allow investors in the program to circumvent many of the restrictions laid out by the Fed,” the story asserted. And on it goes, citing as its source the ever-convenient “people familiar with the matter.”

I haven’t seen the Barclay’s presentation that the WSJ reporter, Liz Rappaport, claims to have seen, but I suspect this nefarious new vehicle was much more akin to a closed-end mutual fund or other pooled investment vehicle (both of which were explicitly and from the get-go eligible to participate in TALF).

Nonetheless, Warren took the story at its word, [2] telling a March 31 Senate Finance Committee hearing that TALF poses substantial downside for taxpayers while offering substantial rewards to a small number of private parties, and subsidizes the continuation of practices that were a primary cause of the crisis. She complained that the documents posted on Treasury’s website (actually it’s the New York Fed’s) contradict press reports! As if a WSJ scribbler were more credible!

The upshot, she told the hearing, was that she had “opened an inquiry into” the TALF, demanding more information from the Treasury. That inquiry apparently contained 11 questions, answered on April 1 in a letter to Warren from Ben Bernanke (Fed chair) and William C. Dudley (New York Fed president). [3] The letter was subsequently made public on the New York Fed website on April 7.

I’ve already written about this flap at length in “Save TALF,” my Kitchen Sink column for the May 2009 issue of HousingWire Magazine. Read it if you can get your hands on it (and you can, [4] right here). And be sure to check out the Fed’s “Responses to March 20 Inquiry,” too.

Meanwhile, I’ve no time to reprise my contempt for that March slime-slinging grandstanding episode. Warren has moved on — and so must I. She’s taken her innuendo-decorated attacks on the TALF directly to the American people.

You can [5] catch the video on YouTube, where for seven minutes she summarizes the Executive Summary of the COP’s [6] May 7 Oversight Report, “Reviving Lending to Small Businesses and Families and the Impact of the TALF.”

The money shot in this video comes early, when she says TALF stands for Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. She says it all in one breath, smiles and pauses for effect: “Try saying that quickly three times.” Out there in the Heartland, they gotta think it’s nothing but a government tax-and-spend tongue twister!

According to Warren, TALF is iffy and disappointing. The program, she says, raises two important questions: Is it well designed to help market participants meet the credit needs of households and businesses? And will it make a significant impact on access to credit for these sectors of the economy?

Intelligent design?

With regard to design, there are “some reasons why investors would not want to participate,” she claims. First of all, the report asserts, there are restrictions on a borrower’s ability to sell the securities, “so that investors are ‘locked in’ to their investment for a number of years.”

I guess Warren and her compatriots did not check the [7] TALF FAQs on the New York Fed’s website. Here, it clearly states (1) a TALF loan is prepayable (which would release the collateral) and (2) if the collateral is sold, the TALF loan can be transferred to an eligible borrower with prior consent of the Fed (until the program terminates, currently scheduled for the end of this year). Doesn’t sound very locked-in to me.

Another feature that would discourage borrowers, saith the COP, is that interest rates on TALF loans may be higher than investors can get from other lenders. This is either an urban myth, or a lie.

The TALF, like several other emergency liquidity programs conducted out of the New York Fed, was designed to substitute, temporarily, for customary private market financing mechanisms that have broken down and do not presently exist. Prior to the credit crunch, leveraged investors (like hedge funds, proprietary trading desks and so forth) typically financed their purchases of ABS in the repo (purchase-repurchase) market — also with haircuts, secured, no recourse, etc. but with margin calls and much shorter term, so borrowers compensated by continuously rolling over their repos. This source of funding from private dealers vanished with the credit crisis. As a result, the hedge and opportunity fund investors who once used leverage to reach their target returns on equity (ROE) have lowered their bids (substantially) to achieve the same yields outright.

Why, non-financial readers might be asking, should taxpayers subsidize leveraged investors? Everyone on the right and the left has figured out it’s a handout to the rich, after all.

Answer: Because it’s expedient. These investors, who don’t use “real money” like bank and insurance company portfolios, pension or mutual funds, are the buyers on the margin, the buyers who buy, for instance, when securities cheapen because the other investors have fully allocated their real money. The buyer on the margin effectively establishes a floor on pricing. The existence of that floor means that returns are less volatile; lower volatility signals less risk to real money investors; and that fact is a substantial encouragement for real money investors to participate.

By the way, much of the “fire sale” pricing that opponents of mark-to-market accounting rant about reflects the fact that leveraged buyers were forced to sell as the repo financing dried up in 2008. The new floor — to achieve absolute yields of 15%, 20%, 25% on high quality paper — sets the market values that in turn have consumed bank capital (hold that thought, we come back to TALF’s role in lifting market prices).

Dealer repo financing for non-government securities is slowly returning, but it is not as attractively-priced or as readily available as TALF. Stop and think: if it were, no one would be borrowing at TALF, hedge funds would be growing again, and asset prices would have risen to reflect the leveraged bid. WE WOULDN’T BE TALKING ABOUT THIS.

Great expectations, unmet?

Warren’s summary concludes, “With these uncertainties, and the fact that so far there have been fewer issuances under the program than expected, it is not yet clear that the program has been well-designed to meet its purpose.”

Who expected? What specific loan volume was expected? I haven’t seen that number in published Fed documents. (That doesn’t mean it’s not there. I am fallible.) I did see many headlines after the first March operation and several after the April operation, holding up small borrowings — $4.7 billion and $1.7 billion, respectively — as proof the program was floundering. I know the COP gets lots of its information from headlines, so that’s probably where they learned expectations weren’t being met. And I suppose demand might look a bit paltry when you’ve announced you’ll lend up to $1000 billion (ok, $1 trillion), you’re about a third of the way to the program’s sunset and only $17 billion (add $10.6 billion in May) have been taken down.

But the fact is, the program is a success. Let me quote from an actual well-informed and experienced market analyst writing in Citigroup Securitized Products’ April 9 Monthly:

The inaugural TALF sale was a success by any measure – more than $8 billion priced in a total of four ABS transactions. Roughly $8 billion in one week is a very satisfactory number – there is only so much ABS supply the market can absorb in one week because four deals within a few days taxes the market’s ability to perform sufficient credit analysis and diligence. Real money accounted for about 40% of purchases, which is a good sign that a good mix of investors are returning – the first step to restoring a true market. The meaningful presence of real money investors is great news because it demonstrates progress in restoring a genuine ABS market with a diverse investor base. But the true measure of the programs success for us remains the 300 to 300bp of spread tightening that the market underwent in the weeks ahead of the program implementation.

The surge in issuance has continued — by mid-May, Citigroup analysts noted over $30 billion had been priced across most major non-real estate ABS sectors since TALF launched. Some of these sectors — credit cards and student loans for example — had been virtually dry for 4-6 months, while others, like autos, had been running on one cylinder.

Spreads continue to tighten — almost too fast to track, notes one fixed income analyst I like to read. Another analyst spotted AAA ABS spreads over 500bp tighter since TALF was announced. And lower rated paper, the stuff TALF doesn’t finance, has begun tightening too, by hundreds of basis points as well. Adding CMBS to the list of TALF-able assets triggered tightening in AAA paper on the order of 400 to 900bp (depending on average life).

There is a simple mechanical linkage between security yields and interest rates on the underlying loans: the lower the yield the market accepts, the lower the rate the lender needs to charge the borrower. As this market continues to stabilize, even the COP should be able to find evidence that borrowing rates are coming down (the latest G.19 Consumer Credit release from the Federal Reserve has preliminary March data suggesting rates are coming down at auto finance companies).

This tide lifts all boats

Tighter spreads don’t simply foreshadow lower borrowing rates. They also raise the market value of that old bugaboo “the toxic assets clogging balance sheets and financial markets.” In mid-May, the Citigroup analysts compared an estimate of mark-to-market losses on a broad universe of securitized assets (they have the detailed security databases needed to perform experiments like this) as of January 09 and May 09. They saw improvements from 2.1% on subprime ABS, to 7% on like consumer ABS (not as heavily discounted by the market as many other sectors), about 16% on Alt-A and 20% on CMBS (which have been bludgeoned).

What this means is that investors who are holding “legacy” securitized assets are less underwater. Banks have more tangible capital because they have smaller unrealized losses. It also encourages trading — buyers and sellers emerge when there is a gain to be taken (mark-to-market investors already took the hit) and or anticipated (bonds trading closer to their economic value as demand improves).

Considering how little lending (how little risk assumed by taxpayers, how little subsidizing of the hardly deserving) has actually been needed to achieve these results, the COP should be slapping Bernanke, Dudley and Geithner on the back! ( NB DON )

Innuendo, rhetoric and propaganda

Inside the May 7 report, the COP discusses the disappointing demand for TALF loans, conceding that New York Fed officials “also argue that many participants have stayed away from TALF financing because their regulatory regimes do not currently permit them to borrow to buy asset-backed securities.”

Please notice that the word “argue” is a rhetorical device in that sentence deployed to cast doubt on what the New York Fed and other capital market experts know to be a fact.

The next sentence is a back-handed slam, pure COP muddle-speak: “It is difficult to draw a line in evaluating the level of demand for TALF-funded securitizations between systemic problems and issues created by the design of TALF itself.” (Note to the COP: that sentence needed more commas to be readable.)

This is also rhetoric, of the sort that would encourage readers to doubt that any design could meet the TALF’s purposes. (BTW, the specific incentives had by and constraints on individual investors and varieties of investors are not “problems,” they are realities.)

Posing as experts

The report sweetly begins by claiming that most Americans only learned there was a practice called asset securitization when the subprime MBS triggered the financial crisis. This must go double for the COP and its staff! For a group that has set itself up to critique the TALF and the securitization markets TALF is intended to revive, the COP hasn’t enough facts in hand to do the job.

What bothers me most is the repeated mischaracterization of the TALF as a securitization program. (Who knows — if securitization is a dirty enough word on Main Street, maybe the COP can rouse opposition to TALF just by calling it a securitization program.) Under this so-called securitization program, the COP explains that “securitized pools still may be issued in tranches — usually based on differing times for repayment in the case of auto loans and in some cases for student loans.”

The whole business of tranching (dividing the principal and interest from the collateral pool among two or more discreet bond classes) is a technical tidbit that doesn’t add to the discussion, but it sounds expert and cool. It’s unnecessary, but it stems from (or perpetuates) a profound misunderstanding. Despite the reference to tranching, TALF does not specify structuring strategies. There is nothing “regulatory” about TALF. It’s just an emergency, short run source of liquidity for ABS investors who currently use leverage or can be constituted to take advantage of TALF leverage. It accepts existing security conventions in the various eligible product sectors.

You think I’m nuts, I’m reading too much into what could just be sloppy writing? The report babbles on: “These terms represent an improvement over prior securitization structures.”

NO, TALF does not improve on structuring strategies. From among the set of bond structures the market –- issuers and investors –- have come to accept over time, the TALF defines some as eligible and specifies haircuts based on underlying collateral and average life. Issuers and their investment bankers are still free to create any structures backed by any assets they like, but TALF funds are for a subset that meets specific criteria intended to balance the benefits of the program with the risk assumed by the Fed and Treasury.

Calling TALF “a securitization program” allows the COP further opportunities to mislead and misinform. For example, it can list, as a so-called improvement over prior securitization structures: “Second, the value of pools cannot be inflated by cloaking their credit risks through the use of third-party instruments such as credit default swaps.”

Someone help these people! This statement has no basis in reality. The COP doesn’t know what it’s talking about. That doesn’t happen, not in consumer ABS, not in SBA securities, not in MBS. Credit support doesn’t “cloak risks” or “inflate pool values,” and credit default swaps are not a common source of third-party credit support in asset securitizations.

Credit enhancement

The Fed’s guidelines simply require that collateral achieve a AAA rating without the benefit of third-party credit enhancement. This is plain old pragmatism: the presence of a third-party guarantee requires performing a separate credit evaluation of the third-party, an expensive and cumbersome process unsuitable for an emergency liquidity program.

Furthermore, most existing third-party guarantors have problems of their own. Most bond insurers have already been famously brought to the brink of extinction by the guarantees they placed on the private RMBS and CDOs earlier in this sad decade. Most mortgage insurers, for their part, are seeing their creditworthiness erode as well, rendering pool insurance of little comfort to investors. Letters of credit — a bank product — wouldn’t help to offset default risk in the collateral in the current environment, either.

Regardless, third-party credit enhancement was never employed to cloak, conceal or otherwise obfuscate the value of pools. The presence of third-party credit support would be discussed very straightforwardly in the rating reports, the prospectus and any marketing literature permitted under SEC regulations. And if anything, the presence of third-party credit enhancement would be a tip-off that the assets were less-than-prime credits.

Investors typically had internal limits on the amount of paper they would accept from each third-party guarantor (you would hear, for example, “Sorry, full up on XYZ Guarantee right now”). Presumably, their due-diligence in this regard included actual credit analysis and not simply requiring grade from the purveyors of ratings, but that’s another issue — and nothing to do with TALF.

CDS on the brain

Please notice that my discussion of third-party credit enhancement does not mention CDS. This reflects the reality that CDS were not used in asset securitizations as credit protection. The COP, however, does think they were. That the AAA-rating may not rely on third-party credit enhancement provokes this footnote (number 157):

This condition appears to rule out the use of letters of credit, guarantees or credit default swaps or other derivatives to boost the creditworthiness of a pool of assets sought to be securitized.

Very aware my own memory could be flawed (I was not in my Wall Street career an ABS or subprime MBS analyst, per se), I checked with a few folks who examined oodles of ABS deals of all kinds. CDS were not used as internal credit protection. (An investor could hedge, an external protection, with CDS — but that’s the investor’s business, not a feature of the securitization.) Neither were other derivatives used as credit support.

Interest-rate swap contracts were regularly included in deals to transform fixed rate payments from assets into the floating rate coupons demanded by many investors. Investors would separately evaluate the swap provider. Nothing was concealed. Only an outsider to financial markets would misunderstand this mechanism. (And readers, by now you recognize the footnote’s phrase “appears to rule out” as a rhetorical device designed to make you suspect TALF won’t somehow let CDS and other guarantees sneak in.)

I think it more likely that the COP is trying to poison readers against securitization in general by invoking the well publicized use of CDS in CDOs (as synthetic collateral). The COP has already (in that March inquiry I mentioned at the outset) tried to make a case that TALF encourages the revival of the CDO market. (It does not!) There are all kinds of asset securitizations, the practices have evolved to fit the underlying assets and investor requirements, all substantively different. It is a fear mongering tactic to conflate consumer ABS with CDOs or, as the COP does in other sections of the report, even subprime MBS.

As a matter of fact, synthetic collateral is explicitly not eligible for TALF funding, despite such fear mongering by the COP. The COP acknowledges this in a further gratuitous denigration of asset securitizations: “The prohibition against synthetic securities removes from TALF securitization one of the most serious flaws in the securitization system before the crisis began.”

It was a flaw, but not one that in any fairness should be laid at TALF’s door. What this is, instead, is good propaganda. By labeling securitization a multiple-flawed system and the TALF a securitization program, it’s easy impugn the TALF for not dealing fully with those flaws. So it’s no surprise that, after such study and evaluation careless and biased self-dealing, the COP concluded that “it is not yet clear the program has been well-designed to meet its purpose.”

More credit for families and small businesses?

Back to the video (and its associated executive summary). The other question the COP poses is “whether any securitization program, no matter how well designed, is likely to help market participants meet the credit needs of small businesses and households.”

I apologize if this close reading of the text is tedious, but I believe words are weapons, and it’s rhetoric time again for the COP. Lawyer Warren, if you put it like that, how close is that to “asked and answered?” Saying “no matter how well designed” pretty much telegraphs the three-word answer: Not Very Likely.

Speaking of business credit, here’s how the COP reasons it:

• Credit for small businesses has contracted, but it’s not clear if the contraction reflects the creditworthiness of the borrowers, or tightening by the banks.
• If it’s creditworthiness, TALF can’t fix it.
• And even if TALF does provide more funds for lenders to lend, asset-backed securities have never been a significant source of funding for small business. (The COP’s right on this point, though it should hardly count against the TALF. Loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration, or SBA, do not lend themselves to economic securitizations. For one thing, despite the government guarantee they have relatively high interest rates, which must be stripped away to create the par-priced security investors demand. Extracting the value in the interest-rate residual can be difficult, even in robust market conditions.)

Indeed, the SBA program falls short as a source of critically-needed funding for small businesses. I know it’s so, because I have entrepreneurial friends who investigated and quickly ruled out SBA loans for their businesses. The COP has taken field trips (on our dime) and gathered testimony from small businessmen and come to the same conclusion. Their findings are discussed in the body of the report. In fact, they are wasted in this report, because this report is about the TALF. Please read the report and tell me if you don’t think the COP would have better served the small businesses of America by leaving TALF out of it and focusing on the tangle of red tape and buck passing that constitutes SBA lending.

I think it’s shabby logic to conclude the TALF is a bad idea because the SBA loan program is a bust.

That said, let’s just mention that TALF also is intended to siphon cash into dealer floor plan and equipment lease securities. These aren’t big sectors of the ABS market either, but they do put capital market funds into small businesses. The COP report spares them not even a nod.

No help for households, either

Regarding consumer credit, the COP contends that “it is noteworthy that even with the sharp contraction in the securitization market, consumer lending has shown only a modest decrease.” Moreover, that contraction is mostly in credit cards and other revolving debt, not in installment loans such as automobile and student loans. The implication is that TALF isn’t necessary, because the pace of securitization isn’t related to the total amount of credit outstanding.

This kind of argument used to be called lying with statistics. The COP’s supporting data refers to outstanding debt, not new lending. Outstanding debt changes slowly. It takes months for outstandings to register a significant change in current loan volumes.

Even the media has done a better job than the COP of publicizing the fact that households are paying down expensive credit card debt and restraining consumption. They’re not buying new cars — they’re still paying off the old ones (which are still included in outstanding installment debt)!

The COP is ignoring the facts that car sales slowed enough last year to bankrupt manufacturers and that financing — qua loans or leases — is a critical component of most car purchases. The COP also is ignoring the fact that the manufacturers use captive finance subsidiaries to make those loans and leases and that these finance companies are the significant issuers of auto ABS, not banks. Why else would the government be trying to keep GMAC going? Not because the global financial system will rock with its passing as it did with the death of Lehman, but because GMAC makes new car loans!

As a matter of fact, auto lending has been the biggest beneficiary of the TALF-driven securitization renaissance. Data published by Citigroup Securitized Products Strategy analysts indicates that as of mid-May, auto deals amounted to $13.4 billion, almost 40% of 2009 y-t-d issuance. By comparison, over the same period last year, auto deals totaled $16.8 billion, about 23% of total ABS issuance. Other ABS sectors, by contrast, although revived, still significantly lag past years’ issuance, and total issuance is less than half what it was over the same period last year.

(I think I’ve made my point, but for extra credit, readers should compare auto sales reported by manufacturers who have been issuing TALF-able ABS. Watch TV too — you’ll see that the most aggressive financing advertised is coming from the makers whose finance subs have been bringing TALF-able deals to market.)

The COP also concludes in its uninformed way that TALF is irrelevant for student lending. The issue: Congress has cut subsidies for Federal Family Education Loans (FFELP), the public-private program the Administration wants to get rid of (to focus on the reportedly more efficient direct federal loan program). COP says:

Through TALF, the government is effectively lending money to the private lenders to lend to students, at the same time that the government is reducing incentives for private lenders. Some question why TALF is necessary or appropriate in light of the new law and the Administration’s proposal.

Those are my italics. I didn’t want you to miss that “logic.” So what if FFELP loans go away? Fully private student loan ABS are also eligible for TALF financing. And private loans are a critical component of student financial aid. According to the College Board, in 2006-7, private loans made up 24% of total education loans in 2006-07, up from 6% percent a decade earlier. Many of these private lenders are banks, but a significant number of non-bank finance companies specializing in student lending rely on securitization for the funds they lend.

And who are “some?” Why can’t a body empowered to hold hearings name names? Some smacks of that ever-present “sources familiar with the matter,” the invention of any lazy journalist. Or the result of a dip into the Twitter-scape. The COP could be quoting the midnight ramblings of anyone on earth with a Blogger account.

The COP’s report is over 60 pages long, and I could write as many pages dissecting its layered dishonesties. It’s a hatchet job and I am outraged, as a taxpayer and patriot, that this is how the COP performs its mission.

When Warren was appointed head COP, I was delighted. On paper, she’s the antithesis of Paulson and Wall Street, as pro-consumer, educated, even intellectual, as we could ever have hoped. In practice, however, she has an agenda of her own and if the evidence doesn’t fit, she and her staff will invent it.

Editor’s note: Linda Lowell is a 20-year-plus veteran of MBS and ABS research at a handful of Wall Street firms. She is currently principal of OffStreet Research LLC, and is a columnist for Market News International and HousingWire Magazine."

Sunday, May 31, 2009

Geithner, 47, also said that the rise in yields on Treasury securities this year “is a sign that things are improving”

TO BE NOTED: From Tim Duy's Fed Watch:


"
A Return to a Nasty External Dynamic?

At the moment, the economic dynamic is exceedingly complicated. An understatement, I fear. The crosscurrents in the data and the markets are treacherous, and I suspect will have Fed officials scratching their heads. Hold steady with existing plans? Step up the liquidity provisions? More actively engage plans to tighten policy? The latter option seems almost inconceivable; for the moment, the debate will focus on the issue of further easing. At this point, I think the Fed will sit tight, allowing further easing to come from the already active TALF program, rather than expanding outright purchases of Treasuries.

The core issue is the steep rise in Treasury yields, which apparently were kept in check only by the expectation that the Fed would continued to gobble up the endless stream of securities issues by the US Treasury. The Fed sank that hypothesis at the last FOMC meeting, and a subsequent statement by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke made clear that the Fed does not have a 3% target on 10 year Treasury yields. Since then, yields have climbed as high as 3.75% before prices rebounded today, bringing yields down to 3.61%. Should we be concerned with the gains?

Brad DeLong argued a few weeks ago that the Fed's reluctance to cap rates was a policy error in the making. Indeed, it would seem that rising yields are toxic for debt heavy balance sheets, especially where housing is concerned. Officials repeatedly point to the importance of supporting housing prices, a policy that would be undermined as rising Treasury yields boost mortgage rates higher. And while we have seen some stability in recent months in existing homes sales - of which foreclosures and distressed sales are no small part - the recent Case-Shiller data makes clear that housing markets remains under severe pricing pressure:

Home prices in 20 major metropolitan areas fell in March more than forecast as foreclosures surged, threatening to extend the housing slump.

The S&P/Case-Shiller home-price index decreased 18.7 percent from March 2008, matching the drop in the year ended in February. The measure declined 19 percent in January, the most since data began in 2001.

In contrast is the view that rising yields signal an unambiguously positive environment in future months, a sentiment echoed by US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner:

Geithner, 47, also said that the rise in yields on Treasury securities this year “is a sign that things are improving” and that “there is a little less acute concern about the depth of the recession.”

Likewise, Alan Blinder is confused by thoughts that the Fed would attempt to control yields at all:

Blinder said he’s “more dubious” about the Treasury purchases themselves. Any reduction in long-term rates makes it more difficult for U.S. banks to generate earnings to make up for what the Fed estimated earlier this month would be $600 billion in losses under adverse economic conditions. “It makes it harder for them to earn their way out,” he said.

So we are stuck with two apparently contrasting views. On one hand, rising long rates and the related steepening of the yield curve should indicate improving economic conditions - after all, rising yields simply imply that market participants are gaining confidence to put their money to work in more risky endeavors. The steeper yield curve should boost bank earnings and, in time, encourage lending. On the other hand, higher yields may undermine support for the housing market, thus extending the downturn. The Wall Street Journal believes the Fed is choosing the positive spin:

Federal Reserve officials believe the recent sharp rise in yields on U.S. Treasury bonds could reflect a mending economy and a receding risk of financial catastrophe, suggesting the central bank won't rush to react -- even though some investors see danger in the government's rising cost of borrowing.

The WSJ is most likely correct. Indeed, I too want to believe the first story; the steep yield curve should be a clear signal that economic activity is poised to soar. Two things are holding me back. First, the 10-2 spread went positive in mid-2007, which should have indicated that the expected Fed easing later that year would catch fire and the economy would be clear of recession territory by mid-2008. Oops - the signal was premature. Something was different (just as I had come to embrace the yield curve's signals). My second concern is that rising yields indicate capital is fleeing the US, and the shape of the yield curve is being influenced significantly by shifts in patterns of foreign central bank purchases. And while the resulting depreciation of the Dollar will support US growth over time, the transition can be very disruptive. Interestingly, the Wall Street Journal story quoted above does not point to this possibility.

As Brad Setser highlights, the current dynamic is eerily similar to that of late 2007 and early 2008. In hindsight, this should have been anticipated. Financial market stability has improved dramatically as Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Geithner have made clear that no major US bank will be allowed to fail. It just won't happen. That stability makes way for a reversal of the flight to safety, and the Dollar comes under pressure, and, with it, US Treasuries. The reversal must be strong - note how Treasuries sank this week despite a clear escalation in North Korean rhetoric, which should have driven some safety trades. Moreover, with the US consumer widely expected to not be a driver of growth going forward, market participants look toward the emerging markets for growth. In essence, the Fed's ZIRP policy combined with stable financial markets once again makes the Dollar carry trade attractive. Since old habits die hard, this should "force" foreign central banks to accumulate Treasury assets - and it has. ( NB DON )

In this scenario, stable financial markets are now pushing for further reduction in the US external deficit. To be sure, while the deficit is much smaller, it still exists . And, once again, it looks like much of the world, from the Fed to the Treasury to the emerging market central banks, are resisting the adjustment as it requires continued soft domestic demand in the US to limit imports. Eventually, that resistance will reveal itself. For example, additional US weakness will be offshored to those regions not supporting the Dollar - hence Euro and Yen strength. And commodity prices might catch a stronger bid. Indeed, this explains the gains in oil in recent weeks.

But Brad identifies an important twist on that story:

Third, the rise in central bank reserves isn’t translating into a rise in demand for longer-term US bonds. Central banks are just buying short-term bills. That presumably is one of the reasons why long-term rates are rising now – while they remained (surprisingly) low back in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Central banks weren’t willing to buy long-term notes at 2% — or even at 3%. Maybe they just didn’t want to lock in low rates. Maybe they feared a mark-to-market capital loss if rates rose. Or maybe they fear that inflation will rise, eroding the real value of longer-term claims. In some sense, it doesn’t matter. The dynamics of the market changed …

Brad has more in a subsequent post. It is almost as if foreign central banks know that the endgame of everyone's behavior is inflation, and thus avoid longer dated securities. Not a particularly comforting thought - but one consistent with the steady rise in the 10 year Treasury-TIPS breakeven spread. Perhaps too foreign central banks realize that if the Fed is no longer willing to be a buyer of last resort of longer dated Treasuries, why should they?

How will the Fed behave in this environment? Presumably, if inflation expectations were to rise significantly, policymakers would need to respond by chasing long rates. After all, they have made clear that the target range is 1.7-2%, and want to anchor inflation expectations at those levels. With this in mind, expect policymakers to continue to emphasize their readiness to wind down their programs and raise the Fed Funds rates, when necessary, in order to combat inflation. Also, policymakers will likely turn attention toward commodity prices, particularly oil - saying something to the effect that they are keeping their attention on energy costs, but remain focused on the wide output gap, which suggests disinflation pressure in wages and core prices.

It remains difficult, however, to imagine that the Fed is truly ready to start reversing policy in the near term. Despite green shoots, US economic growth remains anemic. The green shoots really don't look all that green. Initial jobless claims may have peaked, but they are certainly not dropping at a rate consistent with a strong rebound. Hovering just above 600,000 claims a week promises to sustain weak employment reports in the months ahead, as long as rising unemployment. Can we see a policy reversal with unemployment rates on the rise? Consistent with ongoing job market weakness, policymakers continue to commit to a sustained period of near zero rates. See Federal Reserve Vice Chair Donald Kohn last week:

In my view, the economy is only now beginning to show signs that it might be stabilizing, and the upturn, when it begins, is likely to be gradual amid the balance sheet repair of financial intermediaries and households. As a consequence, it probably will be some time before the FOMC will need to begin to raise its target for the federal funds rate. Nonetheless, to ensure confidence in our ability to sustain price stability, we need to have a framework for managing our balance sheet when it is time to move to contain inflation pressures.

Moreover, the financial stability we have seen in recent months is clearly dependent on the willingness of the Fed to commit large quantities of liquidity in various guises. Policymakers are wary that financial markets can stand on their own, and will not be eager to speed up their eventual withdrawal. Start-stop policy would certainly impose a fresh policy uncertainty that could trigger a new chapter in the crisis. No, policymakers will not change course unless a new disorderly Dollar-commodity price dynamic emerges. Even then, Bernanke kept the accelerator to the floor as such a dynamic took hold in the early part of 2008. I would imagine that the bar to policy reversal is very high at this point.

What about additional easing? From Bloomberg:

“The market expects the Fed to enhance buying of Treasuries very soon,” wrote David Ader, head of U.S. government bond strategy at Greenwich, Connecticut-based primary dealer RBS Greenwich Capital, in a note to clients. “The bear market in Treasuries is having an impact on other things. Mortgages were the most notable victim.”

I was expecting more easing last month, believing the output gap would prod policymakers forward. And there is no indication that the Fed is planning to back off the TALF program (they are even expanding it too include "legacy" but possibly soon to be "toxic" assets.) But I am now wary that the Fed will increase the size of the expected Treasury bond purchases at this juncture. This is especially the case if they view rising rates as consistent with economic healing. Moreover, questions of outright monetization of the debt would intensify if the Fed appeared to be compensating for a lack of sufficient demand from the private sector, thereby driving more market participants, including central banks, out of the market.

So where does this leave us? In a environment pushed and pulled by contradictory trends:

  • The wide US output gap suggests there is plenty of room for monetary and fiscal stimulus to operate without triggering higher interest rates. Yet rates have moved higher, and while I can’t say that 3.7%, or even 4.7%, or even 5.7%, would be surprising given the pace of Treasury issuance, the rapidity and direction of the move should give one pause - especially given the likelihood of prolonged US economic weakness. The rate increase should give policymakers pause, too.

  • The continued existence of the current account deficit suggests the US remains dependent on capital inflows. To be sure, the need is not as great as a year ago, but significant nonetheless. Failure to attract those inflows would trigger downward pressure on bonds and Dollars.

  • Greater financial stability should force market participants out of low yielding assets. But, absent a safety flight to US Dollars, there is no reason those assets have to be in the US. Low short term rates - and the Fed's promise to keep those rates low for an extended period of time - open up opportunities for a Dollar carry trade that yields capital outflows.

  • If so, we would expect downward pressure on the Dollar and upward pressure on long rates. The former supports export growth and import compression, while the latter helps prevent the decline from becoming disorderly by attracting capital into the Dollar and by further import compression (slower domestic demand).

  • If foreign central banks choose to resist these trends, we would expect global reserves to rise. We are seeing this. The shift to purchasing at the shorter end of the yield curve, however, indicates that global central banks are wary of taking on additional Treasury risk. Perhaps they are finally beginning to choke on the debt.

  • Downward pressure on the Dollar, in addition to the liquidity provided by central bank reserve accumulation, should put upward pressure on commodities. This is particularly evident in oil prices. This will increase headline inflation, and with it inflation expectations among the general public.

  • US labor market weakness appears inconsistent with a sustainable inflation dynamic; thus, rising oil prices simply cut into domestic demand. Thus, the Fed will be inclined to hold policy steady, rather than exacerbating oil driven weakness by tightening. Tightening policy would also reverse the evolving stability in financial markets and threaten a new credit crunch. And given the Fed's willingness to accept a benign view of the yield increase, they are not likely to increase Treasury purchases. Policy on hold. This may again have the side effect of putting relentless downward pressure on the Dollar. This is probably necessary to achieve further rebalancing of economic activity, but I suspect in the near term it will be disruptive. Alternatively, the dynamic could be reversed again by a new crisis that drove flows back to Dollars. There may be so much directionless liquidity flowing through the global financial system that it just starts constantly shifting here and there, looking for a home.

Bottom Line: I want to believe that the rapid reversal of Treasury yields is a benign, even positive, event. This is likely the Fed's view; consequently, the will hold steady on policy( NB DON ). Challenging this benign view is that the reversal appears to be lock step with a return to dynamics seen in 2007 and 2008 - exceedingly low US rates encouraging Dollar outflows, stepping up the pace of foreign central bank reserve accumulation and putting upward pressure on key commodity prices. I worry that policymakers have forgotten the external dynamic that was hidden by the crisis induced flight to Dollars last fall. Indeed, capital outflows (indicated by a foreign central bank effort to reverse those flows) would signal that much work still needs to be done to curtail US consumption to bring the global economy back into balance. Policymakers are unprepared for this possibility. "

Thursday, May 21, 2009

Fed is counting on the legacy TALF program to bring down risk premiums on commercial mortgages and help spur new loan originations

TO BE NOTED: From Bloomberg:

"Commercial Mortgage Bonds Rally on Fed’s Legacy Assets Plan


By Sarah Mulholland

May 21 (Bloomberg) -- Yields on bonds backed by commercial mortgages plummeted relative to benchmark interest rates to the lowest in more than six months amid growing confidence in a U.S. plan to purge bank balance sheets of existing debt tied to hotels, shopping centers and office buildings.

The gap, or spread, on top-rated bonds backed by commercial mortgages narrowed 82 basis points yesterday, or 12.3 percent, to about 5.83 percentage points more than benchmark interest rates, according to data from Bank of America Corp. That’s the lowest since Nov. 5. The debt reached a record high 15.29 percentage points over benchmarks on Nov. 20.

The Federal Reserve released terms May 19 for so-called legacy assets backed by commercial real estate to be included in its Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, as part of a government plan to revive credit and end the recession. The first deadline for investors to submit applications for loans to buy bonds issued before Jan. 1 is in late July.

“Having clarity on the timing helps,” said Aaron Bryson, a commercial mortgage-backed securities analyst at Barclays PLC in New York. “There was some fear that the legacy program wouldn’t get off the ground, and having the details takes that off the table.”

Spreads on AAA commercial-real estate securities have fallen by about 4.9 percentage points since the Fed first said it would fund the purchase of older securities, Bank of America data show. Spreads may tighten further, said Chuck Mather, managing director at Sorin Capital Management LLC, a Stamford, Connecticut-based hedge fund specializing in commercial real estate.

‘Positive Surprises’

“There were some positive surprises,” in the Fed’s announcement, Mather said. “The haircuts were more favorable to investors than had been anticipated.”

The so-called haircut, or how much cash an investor will have to put up to buy the bonds, will be calculated as a percentage of par, not market price. Buyers will have to pay more equity to purchase debt that’s trading at lower prices, reflecting the view that bonds trading at a large discount are riskier.

Spreads on AAA bonds backed by credit-card and auto loan payments have narrowed by as much as 4.4 percentage points since the Fed unveiled TALF in November, JPMorgan Chase & Co. data show. Top rated credit-card asset-backed debt is trading at about 1.4 percentage point more than benchmark rates. Similar auto-loan securities are trading at about 1.2 percentage point more than the benchmark. Investors had sought $15.9 billion in loans to purchase asset-backed debt including auto-loan and credit-card bonds as of May 13.

Lower Risk Premiums

The Fed is counting on the legacy TALF program to bring down risk premiums on commercial mortgages and help spur new loan originations, though it won’t enable lending on its own, said Spencer Haber, chief executive officer of H/2 Capital Partners, a commercial-real estate fixed-income manager with $2.4 billion in assets under management.

“Bringing down AAA spreads is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to restarting the origination markets,” Haber said in a telephone interview from his office in Stamford, Connecticut.

It takes longer to create a pool of commercial mortgages to securitize than it does to achieve a critical mass of auto-loan or credit-card debt, Haber said, and banks have to be willing and able to take on the risk of holding the loans on their books. Additionally, there have to be buyers for the lower-rated bonds

Sales of commercial-mortgage bonds plummeted last year as the cost to sell the bonds became too high for investment banks to write new loans to bundle into bonds, choking off funding to borrowers. A record $237 billion in debt backed by commercial real estate was sold in 2007, compared with $12.2 billion last year, according to JPMorgan. There have been no sales of the debt so far in 2009, Bloomberg data show.

The first deadline for investors to request loans for newly issued commercial mortgage-backed securities is June 2.

To contact the reporter on this story: Sarah Mulholland in New York at smulholland3@bloomberg.net"

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner outlined where TARP money has been allocated and how much is left

TO BE NOTED:

Need a Real Sponsor here

Where Is TARP Money Going? How Much Is Left?

In congressional testimony this morning, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner outlined where TARP money has been allocated and how much is left. Here is Treasury’s estimate:

Projected Use of TARP/Financial Stability Plan Funds by Administration as of May 18, 2009

Programs Announced Under Previous Administration

AIG

$40 billion

Citi/Bank of America (TIP and Guarantees)

$52.5 billion

Autos

$24.9 billion

Capital Purchase Program


$218 billion

TALF 1.0

$20 billion

Subtotal

$355.4 billion

Programs Announced Under Obama Administration

Housing

$50 billion

AIG (Second Investment)

$30 billion

Auto Suppliers

$5 billion

Additional Autos

$10.9 billion

Expansion of Consumer and Business Lending Initiative *

TALF Asset Expansion (New Issuance) **

$35 billion

Unlocking SBA Lending Markets

$15 billion

Public Private Investment Program ***

TALF for Legacy Securities

$25 billion

Other PPIP Programs for Legacy Assets

$75 billion

Subtotal

$245.9 billion

Total Committed (Without Potential Repayments)

$601.3 billion

Total Remaining (Without Potential Repayments)

$98.7 billion

Conservative Estimate of Potential Repayments

$25 billion

Total Committed (Including Potential Repayments)

$576.3 billion

Total Remaining (Including Potential Repayments)

$123.7 billion

Additional Funding

Additional Support for the Auto Industry

Capital Assistance Program

* The Consumer and Business Lending Initiative also includes the $20 billion committed to TALF under the previous administration and the $25 billion committed to TALF for legacy securities under the PPIP, amounting to an overall total of $80 billion under TALF and $95 billion under the CBLI.

** New assets made eligible under the expansion of TALF include commercial mortgage-backed securities, mortgage servicing advances, loans or leases relating to business equipment, leases of vehicle fleets, and floor plan loans.

*** The Public-Private Investment Program was announced at a level of $75 to $100 billion, which includes $75 billion in additional resources for the PPIP program on top of $25 billion devoted to TALF for Legacy Securities."

Thursday, April 30, 2009

five-year commitments could hamper the central bank's ability to withdraw money from the financial system down the road

TO BE NOTED:

Need a Real Sponsor here

Fed Hopes 5-Year TALF Loans Will Help Real-Estate Market


By JON HILSENRATH and LINGLING WEI

The Federal Reserve is preparing to announce new terms on one of its lending programs that officials hope will help revive the commercial-real-estate market, according to people familiar with the matter.

The program is the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF, in which investors are given low-cost loans from the Fed and in turn use the money to buy securities backed by consumer debt. The loans in this program are three-year loans and so far have been aimed at car debt, credit-card debt and other consumer loans. The Fed is preparing to announce new loans with five-year terms to better match the needs of investors in commercial-mortgage-backed securities, an effort to boost that sector.

Officials have been reluctant to make such long-term loans, for fear five-year commitments could hamper the central bank's ability to withdraw money from the financial system down the road. They have been looking to design the expansion so the loans are less appealing in later years.

An announcement with the new terms could come as early as Friday, though, as with many of the Fed's rescue programs, discussions are often subject to last-minute changes that could alter those plans.

The $700 billion CMBS market has rallied in the past month on hopes TALF would be used to restart the market. Yields on triple-A CMBS bonds have fallen to about 10% from 12%, according to Trepp, which tracks commercial-property debt markets.

Bringing down the yields on existing debt is critical to spark new lending because, as long as investors can buy top-rated CMBS that yield as much as junk bonds, it would be unprofitable for banks to make new loans. That is because they would have to offer higher yields to attract investors, wiping out their profits.

Policy makers believe it is critical to get credit flowing to the $6.5 trillion real-estate industry because a massive amount of commercial-real-estate debt is coming due.( NB DON )

Write to Jon Hilsenrath at jon.hilsenrath@wsj.com and Lingling Wei at lingling.wei@dowjones.com"

Thursday, April 23, 2009

Paddy Hirsch explains what shadow banking is and why it's important enough to warrant its own bailout

Marketplace Whiteboard

Shadow banking

The shadow banking system is a key component of the U.S. economy, but the financial crisis has frozen it solid. Senior Editor Paddy Hirsch explains what shadow banking is and why it's important enough to warrant its own bailout, called the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF.

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Tuesday, April 21, 2009

he’s also worried that the whole thing could easily become a front for money launderers

From Reuters:

"TARP datapoint of the day
Posted by: Felix Salmon
Tags: regulation

The SIGTARP’s quarterly report to Congress (that’s Neil Barofsky, for those keeping track at home) runs to 250 densely-written pages. The news coverage is concentrating, rightly, on the fact that Barofsky is already investigating no fewer than 20 fraud cases associated with TARP funds, and also the rather alarming fact that PPIP fund managers might actually be forced to accept compensation caps after all. (If that does happen, you can be sure that Pimco, BlackRock, and the rest will immediately pull out of the scheme, leaving it doomed to failure.)

But there’s lots more where that came from. Not only is Barofsky worried about PPIP participants gaming the system, he’s also worried that the whole thing could easily become a front for money launderers:

Because of the significant leveraging available and the inherent imprimatur of legitimacy associated with PPIP and TALF, these programs present an ideal opportunity to money-laundering organizations. If a criminal organization can successfully invest $10 million of illicit proceeds into a PPIF, not only does the organiza- tion enjoy the possibility of profi ting through the Government-backed leverage, but any eventual distributions from the PPIF are successfully laundered because they appear to be PPIF investment gains rather than drug, prostitution, or illegal gambling proceeds.

The good news is that Congress has people like Barofsky and Elizabeth Warren’s Congressional Oversight Panel staffed up and keeping a close eye on Treasury’s bright ideas. The bad news is that it’s far from clear that Treasury has either the staffing or the inclination to pay much attention, let alone to implement their recommendations. Maybe once Treasury’s political appointeees are in place it will be a bit more helpfully responsive to (and grateful for) these extremely good reports."

Me:

“Saturday, October 4, 2008

Problems With The Bailout
From the NY Times article “For Treasury Dept., Now Comes Hard Part of Bailout”, I see the following problems with the plan as envisaged:

1) Possible conflicts of interest with the administrators of the plan.

2) Overpaying for assets.

3) Doesn’t do enough to ease credit markets or makes it worse.

4) When the assets are eventually sold, there is a huge and unanticipated loss.

5) Lobbying by hedge funds, etc.

Are there others? ”

These are inherent problems in any government/private sector hybrid plan. The recent past has shown this. You cannot rid the arrangement of them. All that you can do is get people to try and supervise the process closely. These issues also turned up in the Fed’s MBS purchases program.

“Conflicts of Interest
The first area of vulnerability is that the private parties managing the PPIFs might
have a powerful incentive to make investment decisions that benefit themselves at
the expense of the taxpayer”

“Collusion
A closely related vulnerability is that PPIF managers might be persuaded, through
kickbacks, quid pro quo transactions, or other collusive arrangements, to manage
the PPIFs not for the benefit of the PPIF (and taxpayers), but rather for the benefit
of themselves and their collusive partners.”

Both of these I call Conflict Of Interest. They are inherent in hybrids.

“Money Laundering
National and international criminal organizations — from organized crime, to narcotics
traffickers, to large-scale fraud operations — are continually looking for opportunities
to make their illicit proceeds appear to be legitimate, thereby “laundering”
those proceeds.”

And? This applies to any financial business in the US.

The solutions:

“Treasury should impose strict conflict-of-interest rules upon PPIF managers across all programs…

Treasury should mandate transparency with respect to the participation and management of PPIFs.

Treasury should require PPIF managers to provide PPIF equity stakeholders (including TARP) “most-favored nations clauses,” requiring that the fund
managers treat the PPIFs (and the taxpayers backing the PPIFs) on at least as favorable terms as given to all other parties with whom they deal.

In order to prevent money laundering and the participation of actors prone to abusing the system, Treasury should require that all PPIF fund managers have
stringent investor-screening procedures, including comprehensive “Know Your Customer” requirements”

In other words, watch out. Come on. If you don’t like the plan, it’s riddled with demons. These same kinds of problems turn up in all areas of government largess. Fraud, Collusion, Negligence, and Fiduciary Mismanagement, are essential areas of worry in financial concerns. Period.

If you don’t trust the FDIC and Treasury and the Fed now, why would you trust them to do anything right, including seizing banks?

- Posted by Don the libertarian Democrat

Wednesday, April 8, 2009

The thing that really worries me long-term is that we fall into a deflationary spiral

TO BE NOTED: From Accrued Interest:

"TALF: Anoat system?

This is the second time I've made an Anoat allusion in a week. That has to be a record of some kind.

Anyway, how worried should we be about the lack-lustre start to the TALF? The thing that really worries me long-term is that we fall into a deflationary spiral, which really would result in Great Depression: Episode II. As you can see in this graph...


... bank reserves have sky-rocketed. Meaning that while the Fed has been busy "crediting bank reserves (i.e. printing money) to pay for their programs, banks have been shoving that money under the proverbial mattress.

The so-called shadow banking system is even worse. The ABS market has completely collapsed (at least until the TALF, more on that coming). Thus all spigots to consumer credit have slowed to a trickle. That has serious implications for the de facto money supply, which by my estimation is sharply negative.

TALF aims to reverse that. We might not be able to force banks to lend, and maybe we really want them to rebuild capital anyway. And we do want consumers to save and rebuild their own balance sheets. But we also don't want them to over-save. That's how we become Japan. But if we get a decent new issue ABS market doing, then at least consumers who can afford credit can access credit.

The TALF was supposed to work by basically giving a tax-payer subsidized free lunch. A nearly guaranteed arbitrage. But in fact, no one is showing up at the Fed to take out TALF loans.

Its worrisome, but we shouldn't panic yet. First, we don't really care how much the Fed lends under the TALF program. We actually only care that the ABS market gets back on its feet. So far, we've only had very high quality ABS deals get done since the TALF: a couple auto loan deals, a couple credit card deals, and a student loan deal back by the Department of Education.

ABS traders I've talked to say there is plenty of demand for those deals, but for whatever reason it isn't TALF demand. Its possible that buyers have other funding options away from the TALF. Amidst worries about Congressional interference in compensation and other BS, I'd sure as hell take some other funding option even if it were at a higher cost. The ability to bring back my girlfriend from the dead just isn't worth making a deal with Darth Pelosi.

There is also supposedly strong secondary demand for ABS, which is stuff that wouldn't be TALF eligible anyway. Its almost like a market that's properly functioning! People are looking for good bonds at decent spreads!

Anyway, its possible that the TALF actually revives the market without being used heavily. This is basically what happened with the Fed's commercial paper program. It revived that market at least to the point where the top issuers can access the market.

So the thing to watch is not TALF loans, which I'm sure is what the media will focus on. Watch ABS issuance. "

But to say that these were justifiable sovereign defaults does not mean that they were not sovereign defaults. Similar circumstances could arise agai

TO BE NOTED: BUITER:

"
The green shoots are weeds growing through the rubble in the ruins of the global economy

April 8, 2009 3:20am

The Great Contraction will last a while longer

This financial crisis will end. The Great Contraction of the Noughties also will come to an end. But neither the financial crisis nor the contraction of the global real economy are over yet. As regards the financial sector, we are not too far - probably less than a year - from the beginning of the end. The impact of the collapse of real economic activity and of the associated dramatic increase in defaults and insolvencies by non-financial enterprises and households on the loan book of what is left of the banking sector will begin to show up in the banks’ financial reports at the end of the summer and in the autumn. By the end of the year - early 2010 at the latest - we will know which banks will survive and which ones are headed for the scrap heap. With the resolution of the current pervasive uncertainty about the true state of the banks’ balance sheets and about their off-balance-sheet exposures, normal financial intermediation will be able to resume later in 2010.

Governments everywhere are doing the best they can to delay or prevent the lifting of the veil of uncertainty and disinformation that most banks have cast over their battered balance sheets. The banking establishment and the financial establishment representing the beneficial owners of the institutions exposed to the banks as unsecured creditors - pension funds, insurance companies, other banks, foreign investors including sovereign wealth funds - have captured the key governments, their central banks, their regulators, supervisors and accounting standard setters to a degree never seen before.

I used to believe this state capture took the form of cognitive capture, rather than financial capture. I still believe this to be the case for many, perhaps even most of the policy makers and officials involved, but it is becoming increasingly hard to deny the possibility that the extraordinary reluctance of our governments to force the unsecured creditors (and any remaining non-government shareholders) of the zombie banks to absorb the losses made by these banks, may be due to rather more primal forms of state capture.

History teaches us that systemic financial crises are protracted affairs. A most interesting paper by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The Aftermath of Financial Crises”, using data on 10 systemic banking crises (the “big five” developed economy crises (Spain 1977, Norway 1987, Finland, 1991, Sweden, 1991, and Japan, 1992), three famous emerging market crises (the 1997–1998 Asian crisis (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand); Colombia, 1998; and Argentina 2001)), and two earlier crises (Norway 1899 and the United States 1929) reaches the following conclusions (the next paragraph paraphrases Reinhart and Rogoff).

First, asset market collapses are deep and prolonged. Real housing price declines average 35 percent over six years; real equity price declines average 55 percent over a downturn of about 3.5 years. Second, the aftermath of banking crises is associated with large declines in output and employment. The unemployment rate rises an average of 7 percentage points over the down phase of the cycle which lasts on average over four years. Output falls (from peak to trough) an average of over 9 percent, but the duration of the downturn averages around 2 years.

Nothing more can be expected as regards a global fiscal stimulus. Indeed, the G20 delivered nothing in this regard. It would have been preferable to maintain the overall size of the planned (or rather, expected) global fiscal stimulus but to redistribute the aggregate (about $5 trillion over 2 years, as measured by the aggregated changes in the national fiscal deficits) in accordance with national fiscal spare capacity (I believe the World Bank calls this ‘fiscal space’). This would mean a smaller fiscal stimulus for countries with weak fiscal fundamentals, including the US, Japan and the UK, and a larger fiscal stimulus for countries with strong fiscal fundamentals, including China, Germany, Brazil and, to a lesser degree, France.

The effect of the Great Contraction on potential output growth

Furthermore, a likely consequence of the fiscal stimuli we have already seen or are about to experience is a negative impact on the medium- and long-term growth potential of the global economy. The reason is that, if fiscal solvency is to be maintained, there will have to be some combination of an increase in the tax burden and a reduction in non-interest public spending in most countries when this contraction is over. The inevitable effect of the crisis and the contraction is a higher public debt burden and therefore a larger future required primary government surplus (as a share of GDP). Almost any increase in the tax burden will hurt potential output - just the level of the path of potential output if you are a classical growth groupie, both the level and the growth rate of the path of potential output if you are an adept of the endogenous growth school.

In the study of Reinhart and Rogoff cited earlier, the authors conclude that the real value of government debt tends to explode following a systemic financial crisis, rising an average of 86 percent in major post–World War II episodes. The principal cause of these public debt explosions is not the costs of “bailing out” and recapitalizing banking system. The big drivers of these public debt burden increases are rather the collapse in tax revenues that comes with deep and prolonged output contractions (the operation of the automatic stabilisers) and discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal policies.

For political expediency reasons, cuts in public spending are likely to fall first on maintenance, public sector capital formation and other forms of productive public expenditure, including spending on education, health and research. Welfare spending in cash or in kind is likely to be the last to be cut. The result is again likely to be a lower level (or level and growth rate) of the path of potential output.

The risk of ’sudden stops’ in the overdeveloped world

In a number of systemically important countries, notably the US and the UK, there is a material risk of a ’sudden stop’ - an emerging-market style interruption of capital inflows to both the public and private sectors - prompted by financial market concerns about the sustainability of the fiscal-financial-monetary programmes proposed and implemented by the fiscal and monetary authorities in these countries. For both countries there is a material risk that the mind-boggling general government deficits (14% of GDP or over for the US and 12 % of GDP or over for the UK for the coming year) will either have to be monetised permanently, implying high inflation as soon as the real economy recovers, the output gap closes and the extraordinary fear-induced liquidity preference of the past year subsides, or lead to sovereign default.

Pointing to a non-negligible risk of sovereign default in the US and the UK does not, I fear, qualify me as a madman. The last time things got serious, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, both the US and the UK defaulted de facto, and possibly even de jure, on their sovereign debt.

In the case of the US, the sovereign default took the form of the abrogation of the gold clause when the US went off the gold standard (except for foreign exchange) in 1933. In 1933, Congress passed a joint resolution canceling all gold clauses in public and private contracts (including existing contracts). The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 abrogated the gold clause in government and private contracts and changed the value of the dollar in gold from $20.67 to $35 per ounce. These actions were upheld (by a 5 to 4 majority) by the Supreme Court in 1935.

In the case of the UK, the de facto sovereign default took the form of the conversion in 1932 of Britain’s 5% War Loan Bonds (callable 1929-1947) into new 3½ % bonds (callable from 1952) on terms that were unambiguously unfavourable to the bond holders. Out of a total of £2,086,000,000 outstanding, £1,500,000,000, or something over 70%, was converted voluntarily by the end of 1932, thanks both to the government’s ability to appeal to patriotism and joint burden sharing in the face of economic adversity and to ferocious arm-twisting and ‘moral suasion’.

I believe both defaults were eminently justified. There is no case for letting the interests of the holders of sovereign debt override the interests of the rest of the community, regardless of the financial, economic, social and political costs involved. But to say that these were justifiable sovereign defaults does not mean that they were not sovereign defaults. Similar circumstances could arise again.

While I consider an inflationary solution to the public debt overhang problem (and indeed to the private debt overhang problem) to be more likely in the US and even in the UK than a sovereign default (or ‘restructuring’, ‘conversion’ or ‘consolidation’, as it would undoubtedly be referred to by the defaulting government), neither can be dismissed as out of the question, or even as extremely unlikely.

Central banks: a mixed bag

Central banks, with the notable exception of the procrastinating ECB, are doing as much as they can through quantitative easing and credit easing to deal with the immediate crisis. Unfortunately, some of them, notably the Fed, are providing these short-term financial stimuli in the worst possible way from the point of view of medium- and longer-term economic performance, by surrendering central bank independence to the fiscal authorities.

When the Fed lends on a non-recourse basis to the private sector with only a $100 bn Treasury guarantee for a possible $1 trillion dollar Fed exposure (as with the TALF), when the Fed purchases private securities outright with just a similar 10-cents-on-the-dollar Treasury guarantee or when the Fed is party to an arrangement that transfers tens of billions of dollars to AIG counterparties - money that is likely to be extracted ultimately from the beneficiaries of other public spending programmes or from the tax payer, either through explicit taxes or through the inflation tax - the Fed is acting like an off-balance sheet and off-budget special purpose vehicle of the US Treasury.

When the Chairman of the Fed stands shoulder-to-shoulder or sits side-by-side with the US Treasury Secretary to urge the passing of various budgetary proposals - involving matters both beyond the Fed’s mandate and remit and beyond its competence - the Fed is politicised irretrievably. It becomes a partisan political player. This is likely to impair its ability to pursue its monetary policy mandate in the medium and long term.

The G20 wind egg

The global stimulus associated with the increase in IMF resources agreed at the G20 meeting earlier this month will be negligible unless and until these resources actually materialise. The statements, declarations and communiqués of the G20, including the most recent ones highlight the gaps between dreams and deeds.

Even the promise of an immediate increase in bilateral financing from members of $250 bn is not funded yet. Only $200 have been promised firmly - $100 bn by Japan and $100 bn by the EU. Prime Minister Brown announced that the PRC had committed another $40 bn, but apparently he had forgotten to clear this with the Chinese.

As regards the plan to incorporate in the near term, the immediate financing from members into an expanded and more flexible New Arrangements to Borrow would be increased by up to $500 billion (that is by another $250 bn). Unfortunately, nobody has volunteered any money yet. It therefore has no more substance than past commitments by the international community to fund the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals.

Then there is the promise that the G20 will consider market borrowing by the IMF to be used if necessary in conjunction with other sources of financing, to raise resources to the level needed to meet demands. That is classic official prittle-prattle - suggesting the IMF borrow without providing it with the resources (capital) to engage in such borrowing.

There is also $6 bn for the poorest countries, to be paid for by IMF gold sales and profits. Nice, but chicken feed.

Finally there is the decision to support a general allocation of SDRs equivalent to $250 billion to increase global liquidity, $100 billion of which will go directly to emerging market and developing countries. The problem is that this requires the approval of the US Congress, which is deeply hostile to any additional money for any of the Bretton Woods institutions. A special allocation of SDRs is also out of the question, because the US has not yet ratified the fourth amendment to the IMF’s articles (approved by the IMF’s Board of Governors in 1997!).

So apart from the $240 bn (or perhaps only $200 bn) already flagged well before the G20 meeting, the only hard commitment to additional resources (or to resources that have any chance of being available for lending and spending during the current contraction) is the $6 bn worth of alms for the poor from the sale of IMF gold. That’s what I call a bold approach!

The Multilateral Development Banks may well be able to increase their lending by $100 bn as announced by the G20, even with existing capital resources.

The increase in trade credit support announced at the G20 meeting is very modest indeed - $250 bn could be supported (mainly through guarantees, I suppose) over the next two years.

As regards protectionism, we must be grateful for the vast difference between today’s relatively mild manifestations and the virulent protectionism of the 1930s. But again, the last few G20 meetings have yielded not a single concrete protectionism-reducing measure.

Conclusion

There are signs that the rate of contraction of real global economic activity may be slowing down. Straws in the wind in China, the UK and the US hint that things may be getting worse at a slower rate. An inflection point for real activity (the second derivative turns positive) is not the same as a turning point (the first derivative turns positive), however. And even if decline were to end, there is no guarantee that whatever growth we get will be enough to keep up with the growth of potential. We could have a growing economy with rising unemployment and growing excess capacity for quite a while.

The reason to fear a U-shaped recovery with a long, flat segment is that the financial system was effectively destroyed even before the Great Contraction started. By the time the negative feedback loops from declining activity to the balance sheet strenght of what’s left of the financial sector will have made themselves felt in full, financial intermediation is likely to be severely impaired.

All contractions and recoveries are primarily investment-driven. High-frequency inventory decumulation causes activity to collapse rapidly. Since inventories cannot become negative, there is a strong self-correcting mechanism in an inventory disinvestment cycle. We may be getting to the stage in the UK and the US (possibly also in Japan) that inventories stop falling an begin to build up again.

An end to inventory decumulation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for sustained economic recovery. That requires fixed investment to pick up. This includes household fixed investment - residential construction, spending on home improvement and purchases of new automobiles and other consumer durables. It also includes public sector capital formation. Given the likely duration of the contraction and the subsequent period of excess capacity, even public sector infrastructure spending subject to long implementation lags is likely to come in handy. A healthy, sustained recovery also requires business fixed investment to pick up.

At the moment, I can see not a single country where business fixed investment is likely to rise anytime soon. When the inventory investment accelerator goes into reverse and starts contributing to demand growth, and when the fiscal stimuli kick in, businesses wanting to invest will need access to external financing, since retained profits are, after a couple of years of declining output, likely to be few and far between. But with the banking system on its uppers and many key financial markets still disfunctional and out of commission, external financing will be scarce and costly. This is why sorting out the banks, or rather sorting out the substantive economic activities of new bank lending and funding, that is, sorting out banking , must be a top priority and a top claimant on scarce public resources.

Until the authorities are ready to draw a clear line between the existing banks in western Europe and the USA, - many or even most of which are surplus to requirements and have become parasitic entities feeding off the tax payer - and the substantive economic activity of bank lending to non-financial enterprises and households, there will not be a robust, sustained recovery."

a type of special purpose vehicle – in which hedge funds can take stakes. These SPVs can then borrow money from the Fed

TO BE NOTED: From the FT:

"
Hedge funds seek loopholes in Talf rules

By Aline van Duyn and Michael Mackenzie in New York

Published: April 7 2009 17:08 | Last updated: April 7 2009 17:08

Fund managers were reluctant to take part in the Federal Reserve’s programme to boost consumer lending on Tuesday, as the scheme entered its second round.

The $1,000bn effort at restoring lending in the asset-backed securities market saw demand for loans fall to $1.7bn from $4.7bn, despite the list of eligible securities being expanded for the April round.

The $1.7bn total demand for loans under the term asset-backed securities loan facility (Talf) was split between loans for securities backed by auto loans and loans for credit card asset-backed securities. It is designed to enable investors to seek financing using new bonds backed by auto loans and credit card debt as collateral.

Analysts said the programme was being overwhelmed by investor concerns over restrictions linked to receiving government subsidies, suggesting a near-term recovery in the securitised markets remains distant.

“The unwillingness of private investors to take part either reflects early teething problems or suggests that the Fed will need to find other ways of injecting liquidity into the economy, perhaps via expanded Treasury bond purchases,” said analysts at UBS.

Low issuance and tepid demand for loans under the Talf comes at a time when some investors are seeking ways to circumvent restrictions on hiring skilled foreign workers.

Some hedge funds and private equity investors have balked at borrowing money from the Fed amid concerns it could subject them to scrutiny. The paperwork that accompanies Talf funding is another sticking point.

This comes in spite of the potential returns on some of the securities available under the Talf reaching over 30 per cent in some cases.

By offering cheap loans, the Fed can allow hedge funds to boost the returns available on low-risk securities backed by auto loans and credit card receivables. By buying these securities, banks can take the loans off their balance sheets and make room for fresh lending.

However, authorisation for the Talf is granted through the US’s recent stimulus bill. Inserted in an effort to boost jobs for US employees, the stimulus bill imposes restrictions on recipients of funds on the number of foreign workers that can be employed using H1B visas. The restrictions also apply to investors borrowing money from the Talf.

Lawyers are working on setting up legal entities – a type of special purpose vehicle – in which hedge funds can take stakes. These SPVs can then borrow money from the Fed.

Lawyers said they were unsure whether such SPVs would avoid H1B visa restrictions.

Lawyers are working on setting up SPVs through which hedge funds could invest as a way to avoid scrutiny and wading through documents which accompany the Talf deals."