Showing posts with label Disposing Of Assets At Fire Sale Prices. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Disposing Of Assets At Fire Sale Prices. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

so the idea that the sum of its parts will ever be worth a sliver of what we've pumped in is absurd.

TO BE NOTED: From Clusterstock:

"
Lousy Bids For AIG Asset Management Unit (AIG)
AIGstillwantsmore.jpg
AIG Apr 7 2009, 10:55 AM EDT
1.07 Change % Change
-0.03 -2.74%
It's funny that anyone still talks about AIG (AIG) paying back the taxpayer. The insurer has taken in far more money than its peak market cap, so the idea that the sum of its parts will ever be worth a sliver of what we've pumped in is absurd.

Still, they're still trying to salvage some parts for scraps. And yes, it does look like a firesale.

The Journal reports that bids for the company's asset management unit, which manages about $100 billion, have come in around $400-$800 million. That's far lower than typical valuations for these type of businesses. Normally with that much money in house, it might get bids for $1-$2 billion.

But alas, it's AIG and nobody knows how healthy the business really is, and whether customers are fleeing in droves. But hey, Ed Liddy, don't worry about selling "under market" or whatever. We'll take the $800 million please. That's like $2.50 for everyone in America."

Thursday, April 2, 2009

hiding behind claims the assets are too complex to value and anyway their market prices don’t capture their true long term worth

TO BE NOTED: More or less my view: from HousingWire:

"If you read the headlines (and most people don’t bother to go much farther beyond the headline than the lead paragraph –- to our collective disgrace), you already think FASB eased the rules for measuring fair value on Thursday. You might believe that it has at last caved in to pressure from banks and Congress, and decided to allow “preparers” and their auditors to use judgment when valuing illiquid assets.

Not so. They are reiterating for the third time that “fair value is the price that would be received to sell the asset in an orderly transaction (that is, not a forced liquidation or distressed sale) between market participants at the measurement date.”

And for the second time it is “highlighting and expanding on the relevant principles in FAS 157 that should be considered in estimating fair value when there has been a significant decrease in market activity for the asset.”

The first time, of course, was when they issued FAS 157. The second is the SEC/FASB staff clarifications on fair value accounting issued September 30, 2008. This is the third statement, second clarification and expansion.

Despite press reports on the Board meeting, the March 16 exposure guidance was toughened to reflect comment letters. In particular, staff recommended removing the “presumption that all transactions [in an inactive market] are distressed unless proven otherwise.” The handout and Board discussion acknowledged this proposed language confused people and might serve as a pretext to exclude relevant transaction information or preclude the use of pricing services or brokers in fair value measurement. The requirement to use all factors and information still stands.

Press reports on of FASB’s vote are also somewhat overreaching. The discussion centered on questions the staff had about possible changes to the proposed guidance and the kinds of language that might be added. In other words, precise sections of the next draft of the guidance were not read and voted on. Instead staff –- who do the writing of these things –- were given more guidance on what should be in the final guidance. I might be alone in this, but I’m hedging a bit on what was decided until I see FASB’s summary of decisions taken at the meeting (usually posted the evening of the meeting) and read the final FSP when it is issued, not before the end of next week.

Moreover, the discussion on Thursday clearly indicated that more tweaks and adjustments could occur as Board and staff continue to digest comment letters and each others’ opinions. And the door is not closed on comments, especially because normal due-process was foreshortened by the political pressure brought to bear on this traditionally independent standard setter.

Whatever the fine points of expansion and clarification provided in the final FSP might be, one can hope the third time is a charm and that there will be no further protest that FASB doesn’t allow preparers and auditors to use “significant professional judgment” in arriving at a fair value in a market where there has been a significant reduction in trading activity.

Inactive markets not the real issue

I didn’t come here to praise FASB, however, but to bury the notion that the devalued and disgraced RMBS securities on banks balance sheets are illiquid. Nor should the observable market prices be described as “fire sale” or “distressed sales.” ( NB DON )

Not that there have not been fire sales. There were some very large and visible fire sales last year as the biggest “sinners” in structured products (a blanket term that includes fairly vanilla non-agency RMBS and CMBS as well as CDO, CDO’s backed by CDS, CDS and so on) shed assets on their way to bankruptcy or acquisition (Merrill’s infamous 22-cents-on-the-dollar sale will come instantly to mind for many).

That those fire sales took place has provided a smoke screen, as it were, for banks and their enablers in Congress, free-enterprise, free-market “think tanks” and industry groups, and the media, to claim these markets are inactive.

The other mythos this crew hides behind is the notion that these riskier-than-first-thought assets are too complex to easily value( THANK THE LORD DON ) (please notice that I am not going to say “troubled,” “toxic” or, no not never, “legacy” with regard to this batch of soiled laundry).

First, there is plenty of pricing information on triple-A private RMBS and CMBS. They may not trade where banks holding lots of this paper at a loss wish they traded, but they do trade. Let’s get something clear, too — they NEVER traded with the kind of depth or frequency that Treasury, agency debt or Ginnie, Fannie and Freddie MBS do. Each bond is unique enough that it has to be manually evaluated — anything from a simple cash flow calculator that uses market conventions for prepayments and defaults – or elaborate option pricing models that take into account hundreds of different interest rate, credit performance and prepayment scenarios. The cash flow calculators are ubiquitous — the sophisticated tools are available at a market price.

They trade less frequently because significant sources of demand have been eliminated. Except for the big trading books at the big banks, banks have eliminated themselves as potential buyers on the re-trade. They also cannot sell held-to-maturity triple-As unless they are downgraded, they can’t realize much in the way of losses on available-for-sale triple-As. Ditto for insurance companies, though the rising tide may let them wriggle out of some clunkers.

What’s left is the subset of investors who are marked-to-market. Ergo they have experienced their losses. This would include money managers of various kinds of funds (mutual to pension) using what we call “real money” and leveraged investors — the hedge funds and private equity managers. This segment of the market can and does trade this paper. It has been slow, but their activity has been significant enough for trading desks on both sides of the trade to track market levels, make offers and attempt to buy paper from known holders. ( YES DON )

Most pertinently, sources on trading desks tell me they make “on the market” bids to banks for their paper and banks won’t sell. These same sources will explain that hedge funds are still the buyer on the margin, and prices have adjusted to reflect the hedge funds’ required yield –- typically 25 percent.

However, hedge funds used to achieve that yield by leveraging securities that traded at much higher prices, back when triple-A was assumed to mean risk-free (not a waiting game or playing chicken with a falling housing market). Now hedge funds’ traditional sources of leverage are gone. Security pricing has adjusted to reflect this loss of leverage.

To summarize: there are lots of tools for assessing the cash flow value, even for adjusting for credit, prepayment and interest rate risk. So market pricing would incorporate those factors, transactions will incorporate a “market view” of those risks. Those prices are further adjusted to satisfy the risk appetites of hedge funds that no longer can easily leverage to their required returns. There is necessarily a liquidity premium as well, but it is not sized on the assumption that only a fire sale will entice a buyer. It is sized given the fact that the securities must be manually examined and the field of buyers has shrunk.

The PPIP/TALF-expansion announced last week caused spreads to tighten and speculative buyers to build positions. It also triggered research from every major bond house left standing that (1) provided current market levels for the affected sectors –- either generically or for specific bond examples –- and (2) modeled expectations of price improvements when TALF and PPIP reintroduce leverage for secondary RMBS (originally rated triple-A) and triple-A CMBS.

For one thing, an illiquid market would not be graced with so much professional research. Nor would an illiquid market adapt so rapidly to the hope of new buyers (rather than the fact). In fact, if PPIP/TALF do nothing else, they should at last stop institutions that made bad investments (and, in the case of SIV, ABCP assets come home to roost, bad funding decisions) from hiding behind claims the assets are too complex to value and anyway their market prices don’t capture their true long term worth. ( GREAT JOB DON )

Editor’s note: Linda Lowell is a 20-year-plus veteran of MBS and ABS research at a handful of Wall Street firms. She is currently principal of OffStreet Research LLC.


Friday, January 16, 2009

"When I read others' work, I try to read between the lines and put it in the best possible light. "

Thank God for Felix Salmon, Paul Kedrosky, and Justin Fox:

"The case for nationalizing Citigroup and Bank of America, and getting Robert Reich a fact checker

A couple of commenters have pointed me to Robert Reich's list of "Criteria for TARP II." Nos. 3-6 seem the most important:

3. Prohibit any bank that gets TARP II funds from issuing dividends, purchasing other companies, or paying off creditors.

4. Bar any bank that gets TARP II funds from paying its executives, traders, or directors more than 10 percent of what they received in 2007.

5. Require that any bank getting TARP II funds be reimbursed by its executives, traders, and directors 50 percent of whatever amounts they were compensated in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. This compensation was, after all, based on false premises and fraudulant assertions, and on balance sheets that hid the true extent of these banks' risks and liabilities.

6. Insist that at least 90 percent of the TARP II money be used for new bank loans. If the banks cannot find suitable lenders, they should return the money.

Okay, all somewhat hard to execute, but I get where Reich is headed with them, and generally share at least his sentiments on 3 through 5. But then he writes something that makes me wonder if he's been paying any attention at all over the past few months:

You may judge these conditions harsh. I think them prudent. They may force a number of big banks to go into chapter 11 bankruptcy, which would not be the end of the world but perhaps the beginning. At least then we'd find out what was on their balance sheets, because they'd have no choice but to sell off some of their junk, even at fire-sale prices (believe me, if the price is low enough, there are investors around the world who will buy them( I AGREE HERE )); they'd have to negotiate with their creditors and pay some of them off; many of their CEOs would be fired and directors replaced, which they should have been already; and most of their shareholders would be wiped out, which is unfortunate for them but, hey, they took the risk. In other words, these provisions would force the banks to clean up their balance sheets.

Because of the danger of bank runs, banks don't go into Chapter 11 bankruptcy. They get taken over and wound down or sold by the FDIC( TRUE ). Lehman Brothers went into Chapter 11 because there is no FDIC for investment banks, and the messy result is widely agreed to have escalated the financial crisis to a new and global-economy-threatening level( I AGREE ). So Reich's exit scenario is impossible, and taxpayers are on the hook here no matter what. ( TRUE )

The issue now is not really whether the government ought to impose new conditions that will force more banks into deeper trouble, it's whether it should bite the bullet and simply nationalize the banks that pose the greatest risk( MY PLAN ). The government-appointed receiver or conservator or whatever he or she would be called could conceivably then impose the conditions Reich outlines, although I would think the much higher priority ought to be forcing the fire sale of troubled assets that Reich thinks would happen in his imaginary bankruptcy.( I AGREE. BUT THE FIRE SALE CONDITION IS THE IMPORTANT ONE )

Felix Salmon makes the non-imaginary case today for nationalizing Citigroup and Bank of America, Brad DeLong has been on the topic for a while, and I highly recommend Steve Randy Waldman's more general September post, Real capitalists nationalize. As for Reich, his heart seems to be in the right place, and like a lot of people I've moved closer to his worldview over the past year or two( ME TOO ). But his troubled relationship with facts—as documented by Jonathan Rauch in his classic takedown of Reich's memoir of his time as Labor Secretary—continues to amaze."

As I say, it's good that a few people have their heads screwed on. Most others have their heads up...I agree with Greg Mankiw. We should be decent and generous in debating policies and theories:

"Fama on Fiscal Stimulus

Eugene Fama is a stimulus skeptic.

In fact, he is even more skeptical than I am. I am willing to concede that many Keynesian effects work in the short run, although I prefer monetary policy to fiscal policy and, within fiscal policy, I prefer the use of tax instruments to government spending as a tool for short-run demand management( I LIKE A COMBINATION, AS THE STIMULUS SERVES MORE THAN ONE PURPOSE ). By contrast, I read Fama's article as a largely wholesale endorsement of the classical model with complete crowding out.

Update: Brad DeLong takes me to task for not taking Fama to task:

No, Greg. It's not an endorsement of any model. It's just a mistake. Fama mistakes the NIPA savings-investment accounting identity for a behavioral relationship( IT IS A BIG MISTAKE ) that constrains the behavior of investment: when the government deficit goes up, Fama says, private investment must go down by the same amount.

When the government deficit goes up, private savings could go up by more--and private investment could increase. Private savings could go up by less--and private investment would fall by less than the rise in the government deficit. Private savings could remain unchanged. Or private savings could fall. Determining which of these is most likely to happen would require a model of the economy of some sort--and Fama does not have one: all he has is an accounting identity that he does not understand.

This post reflects a fundamental difference between Brad's approach to the world and mine. When I read others' work, I try to read between the lines and put it in the best possible light. In particular, when I read the work of an economist as distinguished as Eugene Fama, I am reluctant to jump to the conclusion that I am vastly smarter than he is.( I WISH HE AND OTHER ACADEMICS WOULD APPLY THIS TO THE WORLD AT LARGE. SOME OF US ARE EDUCATED AS WELL, IF NOT DISTINGUISHED. )

In the case at hand, I think Fama's arguments make sense in the context of the classical model, the model presented in Chapter 3 of my intermediate macro textbook, even if Fama in his brief essay does not spell out all the details of that model. Unlike Fama, and like Brad, I would not stop at that model. To understand the present situation, I would go on to the Keynesian model presented in Chapter 9 to 11. But whether one leaves the classical model behind to embrace the Keynesian model is a judgment call. On this particular judgment call, Brad and I agree, but I am not eager to castigate those like Fama who reach differing judgments."

This is the true spirit of inquiry. I enjoy satire, but outright meanness bothers me. None us us are all that wise or all that good. We need to keep that in mind.

Monday, November 10, 2008

“We have more capital so we don’t have to sell good assets in bad markets,”

From the FT, I actually understand what Liddy of AIG is saying:

"Mr Liddy said that with the new plan, the authorities wanted to avoid a repeat of the credit markets paralysis that followed the collapse of investment bank Lehman Brothers, which went bankrupt just before the first rescue of AIG.

“The collapse of Lehman caused the credit markets to freeze up. Had AIG gone, it would have been even more significant,” Mr Liddy said.

Mr Liddy pledged to press on with a wide-ranging programme of asset sales aimed at raising funds to repay the $100bn in capital injected by the government.

He said the extension of the duration of the main government loan from two to five years and the cutting of the loan’s value from $85bn to $60bn would ensure AIG did not have to dispose of businesses at fire-sale prices.

“We have more capital so we don’t have to sell good assets in bad markets,” he said. AIG has not announced a single major disposal so far, partly because potential buyers have not been able to get funding."

Okay. I agree that Lehman was a big mistake, so Liddy is correct. I also understand the plan; namely, keep going until these tanked assets appreciate. Theoretically, the government could buy these assets cheaply and sell them for more later on. The theory is plain enough, but what about the execution?

The problem is that we have no clear idea of how much these assets will cost, or what we'll sell them for or when. And, if these terms need to be eased now, we, the taxpayers, should get substantially more later.

What is also clear is that AIG needs to be broken up into an entity that cannot demand a bailout on the supposed threat to the system. The problem of the free market model here is that an individual company can cause a tremendous ripple through our financial system if it gets too large. No point in debating that anymore. From my perspective, Lehman proved this.

Casey Mulligan claims that this can all be cleaned up by the DOJ enforcing anti-trust legislation. I suppose, in theory, it could, were there a DOJ that had the competence, resources, and laws, to do this. But one point needs to be made: Laws are no different than regulations. Oddly, they are both enforced by human agents. If regulators are suspect, surely anyone working in our legal system is. Both enforce rules. Period. It's preposterous to claim that we need a legal system to enforce contracts, but no regulations because it involves rules and regulators. A system of contracts is a set of rules enforced by human agents after being constructed by human agents. That's what a system of regulations are. Both limit and enforce human behavior.

Why am I going on about this? Because there is a concerted effort to reify and abstract this crisis that will lead to nothing good coming out of it. To the extent that human agents are left out of these explanations, we won't understand what has happened or how to keep it from happening again.

Listen to Mr. Liddy. He's telling it like it is, no matter how much we dislike hearing it. Listen to the agents involved in this crisis. They'll tell us what we need to hear, even when they're trying not to, if we are merely alert to the grammar and vocabulary that they employ.