"Did Pimco stay out of the tender offer to the end?"

Felix Salmon has this one covered:

"GMAC, the Fed, and Moral Hazard

The GMAC announcement on December 10 was quite unambiguous. The headline alone told you everything you needed to know:

GMAC Announces That the Results of Its Exchange Offers Are Insufficient To Meet Regulatory Capital Requirements To Become a Bank Holding Company

GMAC went on to explain:

The Federal Reserve has required GMAC to, among other things, achieve a minimum amount of total regulatory capital of $30 billion in connection with its application. In order for such condition to be satisfied, among other things, the estimated overall participation in the offers would be required to be approximately 75% on a pro rata basis. The Federal Reserve has informed GMAC that if GMAC is unable to meet these capital requirements, it will not approve GMAC's application to become a bank holding company.

As a result, GMAC extended its offer to bondholders until December 26, in what I thought at the time was a game of chicken between GMAC's bondholders and its majority shareholder.

On December 24, with the tender offer over in all but name, the Fed announced that it was going to allowe GMAC to become a bank holding company after all. It was clearly in close contact with GMAC: did it have inside knowledge that the 75% acceptance level had been reached? Or was the Fed's decision contingent on that happening?

Actually, it turns out that the Fed was happy to let GMAC become a bank regardless of whether or not the tender offer succeeded. In the game of chicken, neither the bondholders nor Cerberus( FORMER BUSH TREASURY SECRETARY SNOW WORKS THERE, AMONG OTHERS. I MIGHT OWE JAMES HENLEY AN APOLOGY. ) needed to blink, since the Fed simply climbed down from its previous stance( BAD NEWS ). Bloomberg reports today:

The Federal Reserve last week approved GMAC's application to become a bank holding company. GMAC said yesterday that the Fed's approval didn't hinge on the debt swap.

Yep, a 180-degree about-face from its stance a couple of weeks ago. Back then, it was crucial that the debt swap go through in order to get Fed approval; now, it really doesn't matter either way. ( KABUKI? )

It's actually worse than that, though. The Fed clearly spent a large amount of time approving GMAC's application to become a bank holding company: the order announcing the fact is 15 pages long, and densely-argued. But it looks very much as though the Fed delayed making the announcement until the bond exchange was all but over: it essentially conspired with GMAC to keep the decision secret so that GMAC could continue to threaten bondholders with the Fed's earlier statement and thereby get them to tender into the exchange( COLLUSION ).

Now the Fed is actually quite good at keeping secrets. But it's also very close to Pimco, which was the largest of the bondholders refusing to tender into the exchange as of December 10. Did Pimco stay out of the tender offer to the end( WHEN I SAW THIS STORY ABOUT PIMCO, I ACTUALLY THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE GOING TO TAKE A HIT. SILLY ME. )? Did they know or strongly suspect that GMAC would be allowed to become a bank holding company even if the exchange offer failed? Are they now essentially free-riding on all the bondholders who took the Fed's earlier statement at face value, and tendered into the exchange believing that the only other option was bankruptcy?( EXCELLENT QUESTIONS )

These are important questions, because this is not the last time that bondholders are going to be asked to give up money they're owed in order to save a company. In fact, a much bigger bond exchange is looming: one from GM itself( PLEASE DON'T TELL ME THAT ). And nowhere are moral hazard considerations more important than when it comes to the tactics of distressed-debt exchanges. If a bailout is coming anyway, then a smart bondholder will always stay out of any exchange. And if most bondholders are smart, then no distressed company can effect a significant debt reduction without declaring bankruptcy.( THIS HAS BEEN MY FEAR ALL ALONG )

The Fed has set a nasty precedent here -- one which will make it much harder for GM to negotiate effectively with its bondholders. The government is now so deeply invested in both GM and GMAC that it's hard to see how it won't blink a second time if and when bondholders refuse to go along with their debtor company's restructuring plans. Which raises the specter of the worst kind of bailout of all: one in which the primary beneficiaries aren't GM's workers and dealers, but rather its bondholders, who have been paid very well in recent years to take GM default risk.( ANOTHER EXCELLENT POINT )

There's one other option. GM is still current on its debt payments, which means it is allowed to buy up its debt at distressed levels in the secondary market. Since GMAC now has access to Fed liquidity, there might be some way in which it can start buying up those bonds and cancelling them. But even that would consitute a rescue of holdouts who don't sell at these levels and just hold on to their bonds.

This whole tale is really rather sordid -- as Henry Blodget says this morning, it even approaches the level of an illegal check-kiting scheme. I do hope that come January 20 we'll see no more deals like this one. But I'm not holding my breath, especially given that Tim Geithner must have signed off on this decision."

This is terrible news on so many fronts. I've said over and over that I'm a big William Gross fan. But if Pimco, which has already been hired by the government for various things, has just gotten bailed out from taking a hit, and if Gross were buying Toxic Assets or whatever for TARP, charges of Conflict Of Interest would surely have been raised( I do realize that such a scenario might not have led to this GMAC bailout at all. But who knows? ). Not only that, this automaker's bailout cannot be seen to be another financial sector bailout. Its only use is as a jobs bill, and a sign that the government is not engaged in cronyism. Oh, what am I saying? That's the main characteristic of the Bush Administration.

Here's Blodget on Clusterstock:

"Treasury GMAC Bailout A Fraudulent "Kiting" Scheme?

Henry Blodget | Dec 30, 08 7:36 AM

The Bush Administration seems determined to extend the US auto industry's life until January 21st come hell or high water. The latest sign of this desperation? The Treasury just bailed out GMAC with $5 billion of taxpayer TARP money that it doesn't really have ( IS THAT LEGAL? ).

NYT: The Treasury Department injected $5 billion into GMAC, the automobile financing company, as part of a deal announced Monday night that will let GMAC convert itself into a bank holding company to reduce its borrowing costs and thus borrow money at low rates from the Federal Reserve...

In shoring up GMAC, the Treasury resorted to using money from the Troubled Asset Relief Fund, the $700 billion rescue program for financial institutions that Congress approved in early October.

The Treasury had already allocated all the $350 billion that Congress authorized for the first half of the program. But even though the Treasury Department has not yet requested the second half of the money, officials said they could provide the financing to GMAC because they have not actually used all of the money allocated for recapitalizing banks.

Catch that? This sounds equivalent to writing $1,100 of checks on a checking account with $1,000 in it because only $900 of the checks have already been cashed. In the real world, this is called "check kiting," and it's illegal.

(Note also when the GMAC bailout was announced: After GMAC already had the money. Much harder for angry outsiders to reverse a decision like this than to stop it before it is made).

So will the Treasury now at least ask for the remaining $350 billion of the TARP to cover commitments it has already made, or will it try to pass that buck to Obama, too?"

Take a wild guess?

"Intransigence and unhelpfulness, it seems, is being rewarded. Which is not a good omen for the forthcoming negotiations with GM's bondholders."

Felix Salmon notes some very bad news:

"A Victory for GMAC Holdouts?

It looks like anybody who refused to participate in the GMAC bond tender offer is going to end up feeling pretty smug:

The U.S. Treasury said it will purchase a $5 billion stake in GMAC LLC, the financing arm of General Motors Corp...
Separately, GMAC said it has accepted all bonds tendered in a debt swap designed to reduce its debt load.
"Once the offers are settled, which we expect to do promptly, results will be disclosed," said spokeswoman Gina Proia in an e-mail.

In order to be able to accept the tendered bonds, I think that GMAC must have managed to reach the 75% hurdle. But the holdouts -- the 25% or less of bondholders who didn't tender their bonds into the offer -- are now going to find themselves with GMAC debt which is senior to the preferred equity that Treasury is buying.

Since there's very little chance of GMAC defaulting to the Treasury, or forcing it into a restructuring of its stake, those bondholders' coupon payments are probably pretty safe for the time being. And, of course, they're significantly higher than the coupon payments that the people who did tender into the exchange offer are going to receive. Intransigence and unhelpfulness, it seems, is being rewarded. Which is not a good omen for the forthcoming negotiations with GM's bondholders."

Since I've been claiming that investors, lenders, borrowers, etc., have been holding out for better offers from government intervention, this is not good news. When the price of Toxic Assets fell after TARP passed them by, and Lenders started renegotiating mortgages more quickly after it became clear that the government couldn't decided on a large government renegotiation plan, I started hoping that this recalcitrance would ease. Now, I'm not so sure.

"Wells’ acquisition of Wachovia in late September fended off an earlier government-assisted bid from Citigroup"

From the FT, some deals are finalizing:

"Shareholders are on Tuesday expected to vote in favour of two bank deals forged at the height of the financial crisis, helping to mark the end of a transformative year for the US banking industry.

The fire sales of Wachovia and National City took place under regulatory pressure to stabilise the banks’ deposit bases after heavy mortgage-related losses led to concerns over capital. For the buyers – Wells Fargo( VIA TARP ) and PNC Financial respectively – the deals are strategic victories, emblematic of how stronger players have used the crisis to expand.

Wells’ acquisition of Wachovia in late September fended off an earlier government-assisted bid ( FROM THE FDIC )from Citigroup, winning regulatory support both by giving Wachovia’s shareholders a better price and getting the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation off the hook for Wachovia’s losses( WHICH IS WHY THEY SOUGHT OUT CITIGROUP. HOWEVER, ONE WONDERS IF THE FDIC WILL HAVE CREDIBILITY IN DOING THIS GOING FORWARD, OR INVESTORS WILL DOUBT THEIR ABILITY TO SEAL THE DEAL ).

The deal will create a national retail banking powerhouse( TOO BIG TOO FAIL ), greatly expanding Well’s West Coast franchise east of the Mississippi river and creating a coast-to-coast network of 12,200 branches – larger than those of Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase.

PNC, based in Pittsburgh, will become the 8th-largest US depository institution( TOO BIG TO FAIL. BOTH HAVE JUST PURCHASED GOVERNMENT INSURANCE ).

The deals were the first to take advantage of a tax ruling that allows acquirers to use the built-in losses of target banks to reduce their own taxable income, a factor that helped clinch the Wells-Wachovia transaction in ­particular( TARP. PAULSON'S CHANGES ).

PNC’s acquisition of National City for $5.58bn in cash and stock was also facilitated by a $7.7bn capital commitment from the US Treasury under its capital purchase programme( DO TELL ). PNC, which had shied away from doing a deal without government assistance( AND YOU STILL BELIEVE THAT THESE PEOPLE DESPISE GOVERNMENT? ), said this allowed it to acquire National City using “attractively priced” government money to help cope with the potential effects on its balance sheet.

Wells Fargo received $25bn under the Treasury’s programme( GOVERNMENT AID. AGAIN ), but said it still intended to raise $20bn of new capital to help fund its acquisition. Wells raised a total of $12.6bn, at a heavy discount, in November.

Yet, while the deals are blockbusters for Wells and PNC, neither is without risks. In both cases, the greatest of these lies with managing the targets’ troubled mortgage portfolios.

Wells is set to take on Wachovia’s $312bn portfolio of residential and commercial mortgage debt, on which Wells expects to take a $40bn writedown when the deal closes and a total of $60bn worth of losses over the life of the portfolio. PNC expects National City’s portfolio to experience $20bn of losses.

Wells’ integration with Wachovia will also proceed in the shadow of continued legal costs from its skirmish with Citigroup. Citi has vowed to pursue its claim for up to $60bn in damages “vigorously”( DUE TO THE FDIC VS TARP DEVELOPMENT ).

● The US Federal Reserve Board on Monday approved commercial finance firm CIT Group’s bid to become a bank holding company( JOIN THE CLUB ), clearing the way for it to access up to $2.5bn in capital from a financial rescue programme, Reuters reports from Washington."