Showing posts with label OTC Derivatives. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OTC Derivatives. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 2, 2009

major participants in the derivatives market have agreed to what amounts to a significant overhaul of the OTC universe.

TO BE NOTED: From Alphaville:

"
Wall Street makes significant concessions on OTC derivatives

Apoplectic regulators like CFTC chairman Gary Gensler - on the job for all of a week and already condemning the evils of credit default swaps - ought to welcome the news that major participants in the derivatives market have agreed to what amounts to a significant overhaul of the OTC universe.

Wall Street banks have committed to the following, according to a statement from the New York Fed issued on Tuesday (emphasis FT Alphaville’s):
* Recording all OTC derivatives transactions in trade repositories: Registering the complete universe of OTC derivatives trades in either central counterparties or trade repositories will improve the ability of regulators to monitor the OTC derivatives market and will increase transparency to the public. The signatories have committed to record all of their credit derivatives trades by mid-July and to establish centralized reporting infrastructures for interest rate and equity derivatives.

* Expanding CDS central clearing to customers by mid-December 2009: A key regulatory priority is to extend the risk reduction benefits of CDS Central Counterparties (CCPs) to all market participants. Dealer clearinghouse participants have committed to provide their clients* with access to any viable CDS CCP solution no later than December 15, 2009.

(*By “clients” read “hedge funds”)
* Expanding central clearing to a wider range of OTC derivative products: Market participants have set near-term targets to expand central clearing support for credit and interest rate derivative products. Expanding central clearing support for standardized OTC derivatives instruments will maximize the credit risk reduction and operational efficiency benefits provided through use of prudently managed, financially strong and regulated CCPs.

* Strengthening counterparty risk management: Major dealers have committed to implement daily reconciliation of portfolios, a requisite practice for robust counterparty credit risk management, by June 30, 2009. In addition, by September 30, 2009, market participants will publish a standard mechanism for timely and fair resolution of valuation disputes.

* Establishing broad-based and transparent industry governance: The industry commits to enhance its newly-established governance structure to ensure that a broad range of market participants will be included in open, transparent decision-making processes that fairly balance the interests of dealers and their customers.

* Continuing to drive operational performance improvements: Market participants have committed to improve operations in four key areas: matching trades on trade date, increased automation, increased standardization and continued reduction of trade confirmation backlogs.

Of course, not all of these are new - dealers have been promised to reduce trade confirmation backlogs for the better part of a decade - but they are notably more specific. Crucially, this is the first time industry participants have set dates and timelines for achieving their various “operational efficiencies.”

Wall Street’s letter to the Fed laying out its commitments is here; a summary (in handy table format) is here.

Related links:
BlueMountain set to earn $817m on CDS - Bloomberg
Central counterparties and CDS risk, a contrarian argument - FT Alphaville
US calls for OTC derivatives regulation - FT

Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat Jun 2 23:02
I'd like to know how this would help in a panic. The reason that CDSs and CDOs froze was because they were sitting right on the bottom of the Flight to Safety totem pole. In other words, in a Flight to Safety, they lost a good part of their worth, especially as compared to other assets. That left the owners of them in a quandary. Whether to sell or hold onto them. The crisis was a huge disparity between bid and ask. That will happen next time as well, if we have a Flight to Safety. The reason is simple: Safe is relative to other assets and the financial context. You cannot stop this reordering and revaluation of assets in a panic. You can only hope to smooth it out. This might help marginally, but, unless the assets are immediately callable, I don't see how.

Tuesday, December 23, 2008

"it’s a very important beginning for this wholly unregulated product class…"

Shopyield with an important post on the CDS Market:

"
Central platform

Excellent progress today on CDS… in a roundabout way the SEC has exempted the DTCC owned LCH.Clearnet to clear credit default swaps in a central counterparty platform… a central place for trades to come together… it’s a very important beginning for this wholly unregulated product class…( I AGREE )

~~~~ ” …. Today’s announcement is an important step in our efforts to add transparency and structure to the opaque and unregulated multi-trillion dollar credit default swaps market,” said SEC Chairman Christopher Cox. “These conditional exemptions will allow a central counterparty to be quickly up and running, while protecting investors through regulatory oversight. Although more needs to be done in this area legislatively, these actions will shine much-needed light on credit default swaps trading.”( EXCELLENT )

… Erik R. Sirri, Director of the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, said, “These temporary and conditional exemptions are the best way to facilitate the prompt establishment of a central counterparty for CDS transactions.” ( VERY GOOD NEWS )

“Their limited duration will allow the Commission and its staff to gain more direct experience with the development of the centrally cleared CDS market, while the conditions to the exemptions will give the Commission the ability to oversee the CDS market after the central counterparty becomes operational.”…. ” ~~~~

Now that the DTCC is publishing weekly CDS figures we can map the market as it migrates from an OTC dealer market to a hybrid OTC/exchange traded space… congrats to all the parties involved… it looks like many parties had a hand in this process…

The day prior ~~~~ “ … Liffe, the global derivatives business of NYSE Euronext (NYX) and LCH.Clearnet Ltd (LCH.Clearnet), the global central counterparty (CCP), jointly announce that they have today launched credit default swap (CDS) index contracts on Bclear.

With this launch, Liffe becomes the first exchange to offer clearing of CDS contracts. The launch also marks a significant expansion of Bclear from a successful equity derivatives service to a wider cross-asset class platform. ( GOOD )

The contracts reference ISDA 2003 Credit Derivative definitions, and in the case of credit events settle using the Final Price of ISDA Credit Event Auctions. The CDS clearing offered via Bclear will initially cover the Markit iTraxx Europe, Market iTraxx Crossover and Markit iTraxx Hi-Vol indices….” ~~~~

From Securities Law Professor…

~~~~ “SEC Approves Exemptions for Central Counterparty in CDS

The SEC today approved temporary exemptions allowing LCH.Clearnet Ltd. to operate as a central counterparty for credit default swaps with the expectation of stabilizing financial markets by reducing counterparty risk and helping to promote efficiency in the credit default swap market. The Commission developed these temporary exemptions in close consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the U.K. Financial Services Authority.

The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets has stated that the implementation of central counterparty services for credit default swaps was a top priority. In furtherance of this goal, the Commission, the FRB and the CFTC signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November 2008 that establishes a framework for consultation and information sharing on issues related to central counterparties for credit default swaps.

The temporary exemptions will facilitate central counterparties such as LCH.Clearnet and certain of their participants to implement centralized clearing quickly, while providing the Commission time to review their operations and evaluate( THIS IS WHAT THEY SHOULD DO ) whether registrations or permanent exemptions should be granted in the future. The conditions that apply to the exemptions are designed to provide that key investor protections and important elements of Commission oversight apply, while taking into account that applying all the particulars of the securities laws could have the unintended consequence of deterring the prompt establishment and use of a central counterparty.” ~~~~

CDS indices represent a significant share of trading (from the DTCC Trade Information Warehouse Data) data for week ending 12/19/08.

Buyer Type x Seller Type
TOTAL FOR ALL CDS (Credit Default Single Names)
Seller Type
Dealer Non Dealer/Customer Totals
Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts
Buyer Type Dealer 12,102,928,122,740 1,581,743 1,238,098,385,882 173,746 13,341,026,508,622 1,755,489
Non Dealer/Customer 1,390,920,038,541 206,193 20,956,526,689 2,457 1,411,876,565,230 208,650
TOTAL 13,493,848,161,281 1,787,936 1,259,054,912,571 176,203 14,752,903,073,852 1,964,139

Buyer Type x Seller Type
TOTAL FOR ALL CDX (Credit Default Index)
Seller Type
Dealer Non Dealer/Customer Totals
Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts
Buyer Type Dealer 9,064,083,272,401 108,873 911,914,643,912 25,076 9,975,997,916,313 133,949
Non Dealer/Customer 1,006,324,321,097 23,473 4,810,148,836 170 1,011,134,469,933 23,643
TOTAL 10,070,407,593,498 132,346 916,724,792,748 25,246 10,987,132,386,246 157,592

Buyer Type x Seller Type
TOTAL FOR ALL CDT (Credit Default Tranche)
Seller Type
Dealer Non Dealer/Customer Totals
Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts
Buyer Type Dealer 3,115,741,737,343 61,209 157,215,648,879 4,774 3,272,957,386,222 65,983
Non Dealer/Customer 116,235,673,813 3,159 670,021,930 18 116,905,695,743 3,177
TOTAL 3,231,977,411,156 64,368 157,885,670,809 4,792 3,389,863,081,965 69,160

Tuesday, November 25, 2008

"Credit-recovery swaps are trading on the debt of about 70 companies"

I don't know why this strikes me as funny, except that the ingenuity of investors astonishes someone like me who has no such skills. From Bloomberg:

"Nov. 25 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co., which helped turn bets on company defaults into a $47 trillion market, are among banks offering wagers on the amount investors may recover from bonds after borrowers go bankrupt. "

First of all, notice the use of the word "wager". Yep, Derivative Dribble isn't going to like that. It sounds a bit like me. Anyway, we now have, are you ready, DRSs, i.e., Default-Recovery Swaps.

Now, given the wonderful explanations on Derivative Dribble, and so knowing that anything on earth that can go up or down and be measured can become a Derivative, I should have expected this.

So, we now have a Derivative on CDSs. Hello.

"Credit-recovery swaps are trading on the debt of about 70 companies, including automaker General Motors Corp. and bond- insurer MBIA Inc. That’s up from 40 during the summer, according to Mikhail Foux, a strategist at Citigroup in New York.

The contracts, barely traded in 2006, are now worth about $10 billion as more companies fail to repay debts, Foux said. Also known as recovery locks, the agreements are bought as insurance by sellers of credit-default swaps, such as banks, hedge funds and insurers."

So, DRSs=Recovery Locks. They are an insurance policy on CDSs, which are an insurance policy on mortgage defaults. So, I assume, if your CDS doesn't pay, or defaults, then you get paid. I'm getting dizzy.

How long will it take to have insurance on DRSs?

“The market definitely has potential to grow,” Foux said. “As we see more defaults -- and there’s no doubt we’re going to see more defaults -- you’re going to see more recovery swaps trading.”

Try and control your glee, for God's sake. Hey, how can they figure odds on defaults of CDSs, when no one else can? Wouldn't they need to know that to write insurance on them? And how can they trade? That means they're priced. How can you price them without some idea of how many CDSs are going to default?

"Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan officials declined to discuss their role in the market. '

Yeh, some people earlier lost money on these derivatives you're writing derivatives on. It's in the news. Give it a read. And, no, we don't want to be seen profiting on this distress. Can you say "Bad publicity"?

"Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox blames speculation in credit-default swaps for contributing to almost $1 trillion in global financial losses. Some sellers of the contracts buy recovery locks to protect what they may get back on bonds when companies default. "

How do they know what they might get back?

"Holders of recovery swaps agree to exchange a preset fixed rate for the actual amount received by bondholders after a default. The investor getting the fixed amount will benefit if the payment they get is lower than the rate agreed. "

How are they figuring these things?

"The Oct. 10 derivative industry auction on bankrupt Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s credit-default swaps set a value of 8.625 cents on the dollar for the New York investment bank’s debt, according to Creditfixings.com. '

Okay. You got nine cents on the dollar. Yikes.

"A credit-default derivative seller could have bought a recovery lock to ensure a 20 percent recovery rate on Lehman debt three days before the firm’s Sept. 15 bankruptcy, Foux said. The seller would thus have received 11.375 cents on the dollar from the recovery contract."

That sounds like a better deal, less the premiums and fees. Yep, an extra 11 cents. Good work, if you did that.

"MBIA, of Armonk, New York, trades at a recovery value of about 26.5 cents on the dollar, down from 40 cents at the beginning of the year, Foux said. Detroit-based GM, the largest U.S. automaker, is valued for a recovery of about 15 cents, about half what it was on Jan. 1. "

I'm shocked that they had these things at the beginning of the year. And they were betting on getting back only 40%? At the beginning of this year? And it's only declined 15 cents?

"Many credit-default contracts written early this year assumed a 40 percent recovery rate in pricing deals, Foux said.

MBIA spokesman Jim McCarthy and GM spokeswoman Julie Gibson each declined comment."

No ever comments on these things from the company being "wagered on". I guess if you figure something's going to default, you're not going to bet on getting a lot back.

"Recovery locks for Tribune, the newspaper publisher and broadcaster taken private by billionaire Sam Zell, are trading at about 7 cents on the dollar, down from about 14 cents in September, Foux said. Contracts for MGM Mirage, the biggest casino operator in Las Vegas, are trading at about 27 cents, compared with about 37 cents in September. "

No TARP money, maybe, explains this drop. Or just the general downturn? Can we write Derivatives on government bailouts? Calling Derivative Dribble.

"Tribune spokesman Gary Weitman declined to comment. MGM Mirage spokesman Alan Feldman didn’t immediately return a call seeking comment. "

Do any of these people ever answer their phones?

"Seventy U.S. companies have defaulted through Nov. 11, more than four times as many as in all of last year, according to a Nov. 17 Standard & Poor’s report. "

No Frank Sinatra songs for this year.

“One would expect much lower recovery rates as default rates soar,” Diane Vazza, head of S&P’s global fixed income research group, said in an e-mail. '

Hey, somebody answered an e-mail. I guess the likelihood of default helps determine the recovery rate. Less money to go around when these things settle.

"S&P cited an “inverse correlation” between defaults and investor recoveries in a February 2007 report. "

That's interesting.

"When default rates are less than 2 percent, more than half of defaulted debt recovers more than 70 percent of face value, according to the rating company.

When defaults are greater than 8 percent, more than half such debt recovers less than 40 percent, S&P estimated."

I can only figure that the pool of money to settle is smaller if there are more defaults. Any other explanation?

"Investors use credit-default swaps to protect themselves or speculate on the value of company debt. The market grew 100-fold to more than $62 trillion between 2001 and the end of 2007."

In other words, CDSs can be:
1) Actual insurance
2) A bet on the likelihood of default

It's 2 that troubles the average person. It certainly can be used to determine risk, since that's what 2 is based upon, but most people, I'll wager, see it as a side bet.

"In case of a default, swap sellers must pay buyers the difference between the amount being protected and the value of the defaulted bond, as determined by an industry auction."

In that sense, it's like insurance.

"Specifics about recovery-lock contracts aren’t generally available because they are made privately and don’t trade on an exchange. The contracts date back to 2005, when a Fitch Ratings report said investors were starting to use them to lock in returns after defaults. "

So, this all was beginning in 2005. I wonder if they'll have to be on an exchange going forward?

"The International Swaps and Derivatives Association established standard documents for deals in 2006. The New York- based trade group doesn’t keep records on the size of the market.

“There has not yet been member demand for us to track recovery swaps,” said spokeswoman Cesaltine Gregorio.

“Nobody thought about hedging the recovery rate” when default rates were low and recoveries stable, said Philip Gisdakis, a Munich-based credit strategist at UniCredit SpA."

Wouldn't the demand be to see how they're doing, so that I could invest in them? No average investors need apply. How about just doing it because it interests me?

“Typically, investors thought recovery rates for financial companies should be in the range of 80 to 85 percent,” Gisdakis said. “With Lehman below 10 percent and with other financials at very low recovery rates, that’s something that is completely new.”

Well, yeh, which is why I thought those 40% rates at the beginning of the year were scary.

"Recovery swaps aren’t traded heavily because bid-offer spreads “remain wide,” Tim Backshall, chief strategist at Credit Derivatives Research LLC in Walnut Creek, California said in an e-mail. That means it’s hard to find a price that satisfies traders on both sides of a deal. "

I'm surprised that they can be priced at all, with so little information to go on, unless you can correlate these things with other, more definable, numbers.

“It is definitely more of a buy-and-hold security than a traded security in this environment,” Backshall said. "

In other words, it's more insurance than speculation.

"The bid-ask spread for MBIA and GM debt is about 6 percentage points, according to Foux. By comparison, the companies’ credit-default swap bid-ask spreads are about 2 percentage points, according to CMA Datavision prices. "

Now, that interests me. You have an idea about one number, which you base the second on, but the second is iffier. It makes sense, but the spread seems too wide. Oh well.

Have I convinced anyone to buy DRSs?

Friday, November 21, 2008

"The IMF said in October it expects banks around the world to need $675 billion in order to recapitalize."

What's the level of Counterparty Risk in the OTC. From Zubin Jelveh's Odd Numbers:

"In February, Barlcays estimated that if one major institution went down, there would most likely be between $36-$47 billion in losses due to counterparty risk in the credit default swap market as risk was repriced. A similar CDS study by BNP Paribas put the figure at $150 billion in potential losses.

But the repricing of risk extends just beyond the CDS market, IMF economists Miguel A. Segoviano and Manmohan Singh argue in a new working paper. Using data on banks' counterparty positions before the Bear Stearns collapse, the pair calculate the potential loss to the financial system from a repricing of risk across the entire OTC derivatives market:

in the case of a single institution failure, the total loss could be as high as $300-$400 billion depending on the [institution]; but when cascade effects are taken into account, the total loss could rise to over $1,500 billion.
And that's just the potential losses from the derivatives and not the underlying assets. The IMF said in October it expects banks around the world to need $675 billion in order to recapitalize."

Here's the paper:

"The financial market turmoil of recent months has highlighted the importance of counterparty
risk. Here, we discuss counterparty risk that may stem from the OTC derivatives markets and
attempt to assess the scope of potential cascade effects. This risk is measured by losses to the
financial system that may result via the OTC derivative contracts from the default of one or
more banks or primary broker-dealers. We then stress the importance of “netting” within the
OTC derivative contracts. Our methodology shows that, even using data from before the
worsening of the crisis in late Summer 2008, the potential cascade effects could be very
substantial. We summarize our results in the context of the stability of the banking system and
provide some policy measures that could be usefully considered by the regulators in their
discussions of current issues."

Okay. Let's go.

"In this paper we are interested in counterparty risk that may stem from the OTC derivatives
markets. The financial market turmoil of recent months has highlighted the importance of
such risk. The risk is measured by losses that may result via the OTC derivative contracts to
the financial system from the default (or fail) of one or more banks or broker dealers. Thus,
in order to quantify counterparty risk, we calculate (expected) losses absorbed by the system
under two different scenarios (described in Section II.D). For the estimation of (expected)
losses, we define (i) the exposure of the financial system to specific financial institutions
(FIs); and (ii) propose a novel methodology to estimate the probability that given that a
particular institution (counterparty) fails to deliver, other institutions in the system would
also fail to deliver."

The risk of :
1) A particular bank failing
2) If a particular banks fails, what would the fallout be

"Counterparty risk largely stems from the creditworthiness of an institution. In the context of
the financial system that includes banks, broker dealers, and other non-banking institutions
(e.g., insurers and pension funds), counterparty risk will be the cumulative loss to the
financial system from a counterparty that fails to deliver on its OTC derivative obligation.
Thus, in order to estimate the potential cumulative loss in the system, we need to quantify
two variables (i) the exposure of the financial system (EFS) to a particular institution or
institutions that would fail to deliver; and (ii) the probability that given that a particular
institution (counterparty) fails to deliver, other institutions in the system would also fail to
deliver."

I think they just said that.

"We define the exposure of the financial system to the failure of a particular counterparty as
the liabilities of a particular institution (counterparty) to others in the financial system
stemming from its OTC derivatives that have not been netted under a master netting
agreement (e.g., International Swaps and Derivatives Association) or cross margining
agreements where margin/cash is assigned and netted across product categories."

I wonder how they're going to do that.

"Notional amounts are defined as the gross nominal value of all OTC derivative deals
concluded and not yet settled on the reporting date. These amounts provide a measure of the
size of the market, but do not provide a measure of risk. Risk in derivatives stems from
various other variables including price changes, volatility, leverage and hedge ratios,
duration, liquidity, and counterparty risk."

See, I already don't like the number of variables.

'The OTC derivatives market is tailored to clients’ needs and thus goes beyond what is
available in the standardized contracts that exchanges offer. Assuming anywhere from 1-25
basis points bid/ask spread on the notional value traded (about $ 600 trillion), dealers derive a
significant income from OTC derivatives markets. Thus banks and prime brokers have a
vested interest in protecting their franchise, and therefore limit transparency and
standardization. However, if indeed the results of our scenarios are illustrative, counterparty
risk is large (and especially large where cascade effects result in more than one bank or prime
broker failing). In addition, the re-pricing risk following a counterparty failure cannot be
easily quantified. Pressure to re-hedge at such times will be enormous and perhaps
unaffordable, which could lead to unanticipated pressures on the financial system."

So, this could be really bad. I can't seem to be able to copy the graphs and such, so read it yourself.

Solutions:

1) Capital requirements across products and banks
2) A Clearing House
3) Easy to sell capital, that can be passed on
4) Standardize contracts

They all seem reasonable, but are they necessary. Maybe only 2 and 3, but 1 is advisable.

Friday, October 24, 2008

Credit Default Swaps: "Much Ado About Nothing "

Via Across The Curve, a great post on credit default swaps by Charles Davi:

"Much Ado About Nothing

So what is the big deal about these credit default swaps? Surely, there must be something terrifying and new about them that justifies all this media attention? Actually, there really isn’t. That said, all derivatives allow risk to be magnified (which I plan to discuss in a separate article)."

Please read the post and the blog. They're excellent.

As I've said, we need to make sure that we either have transparency and collateral for anything that magnifies risk or shifts it to others, or it must be minimally regulated to insure this.

Here's my comment:

“So, for anyone who owns the underlying bond, a CDS will allow them to protect the principal on that bond in exchange for sacrificing some of the yield on that bond.”

This just looks like insurance.

A. If AIG defaults, B has to go out and buy $100 million par value of AIG bonds.
B. B has to pay out $500,000 per month for the life of the agreement and receives nothing.

Why couldn’t this transaction be tied to anything? Wheat, currency, anything that I’d have to buy if it’s devalued? In other words, if you don’t own it, peg it to anything. Is there some reason to peg it to bonds or mortgages, as opposed to anything else?

If my question doesn’t make sense, don’t answer it. If you don’t want it on the blog but can answer me, please email me. Thanks, Don

And here's his answer, which is very clear and interesting:

"Hi Don,

Great name! Yes, it does look like insurance. At at a bilateral level, it is. However, insurance regulations don’t work in swap markets. Here’s why:

http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/10/21/the-regulatory-gong-show-new-york-struts-and-frets-its-hour-upon-the-stage/

Derivative contracts can indeed be linked to any objectively observable and measurable event, e.g., the occurrence of a hurricane. These types of things exist. They’re called “weather bonds.”

I’m writing a piece on “synthetic instruments” which will discuss things like this so keep an eye out for it!"

I'm going to, and you should as well.