Showing posts with label Information Arbitrage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Information Arbitrage. Show all posts

Friday, March 20, 2009

The AIG bonus kerfuffle is beyond absurd, but what else would you expect from a flawed bailout program with conflicted motives littering the landscape

From Information Arbitrage:

"
Note to the Administration: The AIG Flap is Because of YOU

The AIG bonus kerfuffle is beyond absurd, but what else would you expect from a flawed bailout program with conflicted motives littering the landscape? Congress and the Treasury should be ashamed of themselves: they've committed hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars yet work to undermine its value and efficacy, in real time. A casual observer from another planet looking at the recent flap would invariably say: short the US - or at least its legislators.

Consider a few observations:

  • They (Congress, Treasury and the Administration(s)) entered into a bailout program with the stated (and reiterated) idea that sick institutions must be kept alive, e.g., preserving value for common stock and debt holders;
  • They initially worked to minimize the Government ownership associated with bailout funds, hurting the US taxpayer's return on investment while ostensibly allowing the recipients free rein over how to deploy the funds;
  • When it became clear that the capital injections were insufficient for the largest and most troubled institutions, more funds were committed on the same unstructured basis as before;
  • When even these amounts were deemed inadequate, either more money was put in (AIG) or senior claims were converted to subordinate claims (Citigroup's investors' conversion of preferred shares into common stock);
  • As ownership in bailed out instituions crept up, notwithstanding the earlier desire not to have the Government involved in the management of bailed out firms, Congress decided it was time to pass judgment on how the businesses were being run; and
  • Now we have a Congress smelling blood (and a PR opportunity), passing odd and abusive legislation to convey their moral outrage (hypocracy, anyone?), while simultaneously damaging the US taxpayers' massive investment in the bailed out firms (and any firm either forced or desperate enough to take Government money).

President Obama, Congress and our friends at Treasury, you can't have it both ways. Either you are making investments and letting the private sector decide what to do with it or you are taking control and restructuring troubled businesses. By choosing a middle-of-the-road strategy, you have guaranteed failure. Troubled institutions are not getting fixed, and you have wasted US taxpayer money and damaged investor sentiment. All of this could have been avoided by supporting a Good Bank/Bad Bank initiative from the outset (one Government-controlled Bad Bank; many Good Banks). This would have enabled you to:

  • Clearly segregate illiquid bad assets from the sound operating businesses, focusing US taxpayer dollars on bridging the liquidity gap for the Bad Bank while raising private capital for the Good Banks;
  • Replace legacy managements and Boards of Directors to avoid the PR damage and ongoing concerns about the stewardship of restructured institutions;
  • Hire a team to work out the Bad Bank over months and years, paying a small management fee and carry on the assets sold while staying out of the management and compensation policies of the privately-funded Good Banks;
  • Avoid micro-managing private institutions with massive public ownership and driving the value of the public stakes into the ground.

I'm hoping it is abundantly clear that the Government's plan for handing sick institutions has been an unmitigated disaster. The primary argument against Good Bank/Bad Bank - the difficulty valuing the illiquid, bad assets - almost looks like a joke today. Yes, it would have been difficult. But yes, it could have been done. The collateral damage associated with the Administration's handling of AIG and Citigroup is only just beginning to be felt. What is now a public relations circus which makes for entertaining reading is anything but funny: it threatens the value of the bailout funds already deployed and has boxed the Government into a corner. Congratulations on showering your moral outrage on AIG; the fact that this issue could have arisen is simply indicative of your ongoing failure."

Me:

This was bound to happen because it's a hybrid plan, in which the government and AIG have different interests and timetables. Let's remember the plan. It was to give AIG a bridge loan ( although we bought basically bought it, and it was more like a collateral loan ) which would allow AIG to keep going until the TAs appreciated, and to keep AIG from selling its Asian holdings and such. The problem is that keeping them going is costing more and more, and the appreciation of the TAs and holding out on a fire sale is looking more and more dubious.

The one place that I disagree with you is that AIGs not being able to raise capital could have caused a collateral run. To that extent, somebody was going to foot the bill to keep those CDSs from exploding. So, I believe that we should have done more or less what you said, but it still would have cost a lot of money. I think that the government has been reluctant to make that obvious.

Thursday, March 19, 2009

the top performing hedge fund manager will live on and thrive, Government regulation be damned

TO BE NOTED: From Information Arbitrage:

"
The Hedge Fund Industry: Going Where?

If there was ever an industry in turmoil, Hedge Funds 2009 squarely falls into this category. Characterized by terrible press, awful returns, massive capital outflows and threatened regulation, the future of the industry appears in doubt. Or does it? Notwithstanding these challenges to its role in the investing landscape, I believe its future is secure albeit in a somewhat different form: fewer multi-strategy firms, particularly where strategies have vastly different liquidity profiles; capitulation of the public hedge fund complexes; a massive shake-out across the fund-of-funds industry; and a quest for truly orthogonal investment approaches and data sets. I do not see the absolute level of hedge fund compensation as being at risk, but the timing and manner of payment, e.g., matching the timing of incentive compensation with realization of gains. But for those who are sounding the death knell of the hedge fund industry, think again.

The hedge fund will rise again and preserve its role as a differentiated alpha generator - but only for those which generate REAL alpha for those that are willing to pay. But the shape of the industry may change as well. While the 2000s witnessed the creation of a barbell (small funds and mega-complexes) with the middle being squeezed, we may see the renaissance of the mid-sized hedge fund, one with enough resources to compete but at a size where true, uncorrelated alpha can be generated.

From the investor perspective, here are some of the ways in which hedge funds - as an industry - failed:

  • Lack of positive absolute returns
  • Significant correlation with broad market indices
  • Absence of beneficial diversification from multi-strategy funds
  • Liquidity profiles out-of-line with investor expectations

The theory behind hedge funds (get it, "hedge" funds) was to generate attractive returns in any market environment, and to fully align the motives of the general and limited partners. Many in the industry, however, strayed from these objectives. "Crowded" trades (e.g., piling into the same trades as your buddies); off-the-hook asset growth (where management fees far exceed the costs necessary to run the business; and a relative returns, "benchmark beating" mindset. These conspired to damage the reputation and status of the hedge fund industry, and justifiably so. Further, you had the IPO-ing of several hedge funds both here and in Europe, which continued to dilute the hedge funds' original mission. There is an inherent conflict between being an alpha generator and an asset manager striving for growth, and those that went public clearly lost their way. Succession planning and a currency for incentivizing employees? Garbage. Top ticking a trade, scooping out liquidity playing the "greater fools" game? Absolutely. Sheer size also didn't help with correlation, because as more assets flowed into a strategy only two things could happen: liquidity would suffer as positions got chunkier (and more risky), or positions became more diversified, returns would fall and correlations would rise. Either way, a bad outcome.

Almost by definition, hedge funds have to become smaller. Generating real alpha on a $10 billlion+ fund? Good luck. On $500 million, perhaps $1-2 billion, tops? Much more likely. Separate funds could fall under a single complex, as long as each strategy could be invested in individually such that investors could create the risk/reward/liquidity profile they want. If the days of the long/short fund with a 20% carve-out for illiquid assets isn't gone, it should be. Create a side-car fund that can be subscribed to separately if the liquid long/short book wants to size up in a particular trade (which effectively becomes illiquid), or finds an attractive PIPE or private equity opportunity in its area of expertise. But the commingling of assets with vastly different liquidity characteristics simply doesn't work, and recent market events have shined a bright light on this unanticipated and disastrous liquidity mismatch.

I think the fund-of-funds industry will undergo a massive shakeout, as its denizens have become "the rating agencies of the hedge fund world," replete with conflicts, systemic breakdowns and breaches of fiduciary duty. Who in their right mind would be comfortable ceding due diligence responsibility to a fund-of-funds after what we've seen over the past 18 months? They are getting paid handsomly for doing essentially one thing: homework. Unfortunately, it appears as if their dog ate it. Again and again and again. And while it's not fair to paint an entire industry with a broad brush, the breakdown is so pervasive and the breach of trust so great that it's not clear who will - and deserves - to survive. What could have been a rallying cry for the fund-of-funds industry - "We didn't put our investors into Madoff because our due diligence turned up too many red flags" - has become a source of derision and humiliation. Caveat emptor, friends.

But when the dust settles there are still a few immutable truths:

  • Sophisticated investors have trilions to put to work, and a hedged approach to investment will be more desirable than ever
  • Investors will be less convinced that mega-funds are a source of true alpha, and will work to create diversified portfolios of individual managers meeting their criteria
  • Great managers do exist who are willing to more closely align their motives with those of their LPs, e.g., matching investment liquidity and incentive compensation horizons
  • Great managers, however, are a very scare commodity, and will continue to garner 2/20-type fees as they do today

While tomorrow's trends are unlikely to look like those of yesterday, the top performing hedge fund manager will live on and thrive, Government regulation be damned."