Showing posts with label Counterparty risk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Counterparty risk. Show all posts

Sunday, April 26, 2009

imposing a uniform procedure for settling CDS contracts when a company goes into default

TO BE NOTED: From Alea:

"Hazards of the Flat Hazard Rate

I missed that one early, but it’s a good read.
This paper is not meant as a criticism of the proposed standardization of the conversion method but as a warning on the confusion this may generate when the method is not used carefully.
Charting a Course Through the CDS Big Bang, from Fitch:

The proposed flat hazard rate (FHR) conversion method is to be understood as a rule-of-thumb single-contract quoting mechanism rather than as a modelling device.
For example, an hypothetical investor who would put the FHR converted running spreads into her old running CDS library would strip wrong hazard rates, inconsistent with those coming directly from the quoted term structure of upfronts.
This new methodology appears mostly as a device to transit the market towards adoption of the new upfront CDS as direct trading products while maintaining a semblance of running quotes for investors who may be suffering the transition. We caution though that:

the conversion done with proper hazard rates consistent across term would produce different results;
the quantities involved in the conversion should not be used as modelling tools anywhere;
for highly distressed names with a high upfront paid by the protection buyer, the conversion to running spreads fails unless, as we propose, a third recovery scenario of 0% is added to the suggested 20% and 40%.

When the upfront is very high, the conversion method fails to produce a corresponding positive running spread if ( upfront + fixed recovery ) is larger than 1. The only possibility to get a positive flat hazard rate to do the conversion is to lower the recovery rate.

You can test that for yourself here, enter an upfront > (1-R) i.e 61 for Snr with R= 40%, and there is no (positive) running spread with FHR.

Related:
The CDS Big Bang"

The CDS Big Bang

Key changes:
1) Restructuring credit event: out
2) Standardised fixed coupons 100/500
3) Standard coupon dates
4) Effective dates: t minus 60 for credit events or t minus 90 for succession events
5) Accrual dates, trade with full coupon, protection seller will pay accrued from previous coupon date
6) Hardwired auction settlement

Markit has the best explainer so far.
The CDS Big Bang: Understanding the Changes to the Global CDS Contract and North American Conventions

And:

"CDS market’s Big Bang arrives

By Nicole Bullock and Michael Mackenzie in New York and Gillian Tett in London.

Published: April 7 2009 19:05 | Last updated: April 7 2009 19:05

The credit derivatives industry faces a Big Bang on Wednesday and on Tuesday participants were rushing to sign up to a new protocol designed to counter the intense criticism that has emanated from political and regulatory quarters over the industry’s alleged role in contributing to the market crisis.

Scale of systemic CDS riskAt the 11th hour, dealers and investors besieged the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ahead of implementing a self-styled “Big Bang” protocol.

This protocol, which has been adopted by some 1,500 players – mostly in recent days, if not hours – aims to introduce more consistency into the credit default swaps market by imposing a uniform procedure for settling CDS contracts when a company goes into default (see box). It also tries to impose more standardisation by introducing set coupons for contracts – a measure that will initially be limited to the US, but could later spread into Europe.

“The benefit of the Big Bang is to facilitate the migration of trades to a central clearing counterparty (CCP),” said Brian Yelvington, senior macro strategist at CreditSights. “Every change made to the contracts makes them more suitable for a CCP – so broadly, the market should benefit from having that risk mutualised and having a central repository for trade data.”

Jason Quinn, a director in credit trading at Barclays Capital, said there was some trepidation in the industry about the mechanics of changing the way the CDS contracts are traded in the US. He added that the industry has automated some key components of the switch and firms like Barclays have been working with investors for months to help them prepare for the changes.

In the wake of last year’s brutal financial turmoil, the protocol will reorganise how credit derivatives contracts work around the world. And while the details of these measures are highly complex and technical, the essential aim is to put the industry on a more robust footing – and show that the scale of outstanding risk is far smaller than politicians initially thought.

Efforts are also intensifying to put CDS trades through a centralised platform in a bid to reduce counterparty risk – an endeavour which becomes much easier once standardised contracts are in place. The Intercontinental Exchange, for example, is running one clearing system in tandem with other banking groups, and has already managed to clear over $60bn worth of contracts.

Last, but not least, initiatives are intensifying to “tear up” (or cancel) outstanding CDS contracts which offset each other. This week Trioptima, for example, will announce that it has “netted” another $5,500bn contracts in the first quarter. As a result, the outstanding size of the market currently appears to be shrinking in size (see chart) - a trend industry leaders hope will, in itself, help allay political concern.

Raf Pritchard, chief executive officer at TriOptima North America said: “The big bang protocol is compelling the compression of a variety of different instruments as banks look to reduce their risk.”

Whereas dealers were somewhat reluctant in the past to reduce their outstanding derivatives exposure, the increased attention by regulators and balance sheet constraints at banks has heralded a big change in attitudes.

Optimists in the industry insist that these measures should calm the critics of the CDS world. Last year fears were rife that the CDS sphere could pose a systemic threat. In the event, however, the CDS market continued trading during the financial crisis – and contracts written on Lehman Brothers and other bankrupt groups have hitherto settled smoothly. Pessimists, however, say that it is still far from clear that the measures are dramatic or speedy enough to allay all attack.

One key reason why the industry has been so slow to adopt infrastructure changes until now is that ISDA has traditionally tended to be dominated by bankers who work on the trading side of the business.

Dealers had every incentive to keep the market opaque and bespoke, which boosted margins – and profits, while downplaying infrastructure issues. Thus, when groups such as BlueMountain Capital, a large hedge fund, have campaigned for change in the past, they have encountered resistance.

“The buyside will be a very significant part of what we do going forward in a more formalised manner,” says Robert Pickel, chief executive officer at ISDA.

The US Federal Reserve also seems determined to hand more power to investors. At a meeting of the key CDS players last week, for example, New York Fed officials insisted on including non-bankers .

As the industry becomes more commoditised, it could well slash margins for the banks. The transformation of contracts to meet the new standards, or to simply “tear up” deals, will generate additional costs, which some banks have not budgeted properly for.

If the CDS sector continues to expand, that decline in margins might be offset by a rise in volumes. The interest rate swaps business, for example, continues to generate healthy profits for some banks, even though it has become commoditised in recent years.

But judging whether the market will continue to expand remains extremely hard – not least because the politics of regulation remain wildly volatile, in the CDS sphere as everywhere else."

Thursday, April 16, 2009

In 2009, US insurers will have $31.7bn of funding-agreement backed notes maturing.

TO BE NOTED: From Alphaville:

‘Unprecedented stress’ for US life insurers

Causing some consternation among US Life Insurance investors on Thursday should be a report released by rating agency Standard & Poor’s yesterday. No punches are pulled:

The dramatic rise in the expected level of corporate defaults reflects our opinion of the weak credit profiles of many corporations going into this period of economic contraction. Given these difficult economic conditions, we believe that life insurers’ bond holdings, commercial mortgages, and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) could experience unprecedented stress in the next 12-18 months. Based on the combination of these factors, we are maintaining our negative outlook on the sector.

That assessment comes on top of S&P’s February slew of Life Insurer downgrades.

The story is much the same as that we have written about previously at FT Alphaville: fears over credit losses in insurers’ massive portfolio’s brought about by a rapidly deteriorating corporate default outlook.

As S&P notes though (emphasis ours):

We believe that strong liquidity and an insurer’s willingness and ability to hold portfolio investments to maturity should provide the necessary bridge for insurers to get beyond the current distressed fixed-income markets. Nonetheless, our capital adequacy analysis now quantitatively considers the projected economic losses on certain assets.

And in spite of apparent optimism about most insurers’ liquidity positions, S&P does seem to be aware of… issues:

Given the disarray in the credit and capital markets, most insurers’ financial flexibility has decreased in the past six months. The ability to access the markets varies by company and from day to day. The market dislocations are hampering two areas that are particularly important to financial flexibility: liquidity and access to the capital markets. The systemic concern regarding counterparty risk is generally heightened for financial firms. In addition, a lack of liquid markets for many securities has depressed overall access to liquidity for any corporations and financial institutions.

At which point it’s probably worth joining some dots with another S&P report, also out yesterday:

Funding-Agreement-Backed Note Issuance Stalls In First-Quarter
2009 15-Apr-2009

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services did not rate any funding-agreement-backed notes in the first quarter of 2009.

Funding-Agreement backed notes are structured securities peculiar to the insurance industry. In a nutshell, they are investable, tradable securities, backed by payment obligations - funding-agreements - issued by insurance companies. Even though they are pretty vanilla, and even though the funding-agreements backing the notes typically sit above regular senior debt in an insurer’s capital structure, investors, it seems, are staying away. S&P continues:

As for the rest of 2009, so far, one deal closed this month, but we are not aware of any additional issuances. What is unique about this issuance was that this was the first note with a short-term put option that noteholders could exercise. Unlike extendible notes that typically did not redeem until one year after the option not to extend the notes was exercised, this issuance has a minimum redemption period (from notification to repayment) of 15 days. Although we don’t expect that one issuance by itself will raise liquidity or other concerns, given the problems the life insurance industry has had with guaranteed investment contracts with short-term puts, we will be watching to see if more notes like this are issued.

In 2009, US insurers will have $31.7bn of funding-agreement backed notes maturing. Given issuance so far has been so thin, it doesn’t seem wholly unreasonable to assume there’s going to be something of a liquidity squeeze then. In which case, just how strong, will the Life Insurers’ “necessary bridge” over troubled markets be?

Related links:
Life insurers: terrible bond investors
- FT Alphaville
SELL Insurers
- FT Alphaville
Valuing insurers
- FT Alphaville
Valuing insurers, part deux
- FT Alphaville

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

the only alternative is to allow the banks a zombie existence cannibalizing the “toxic” assets left over from the structuring excesses of the boom

TO BE NOTED: From Inner Workings:

"
And another reminder: what happens if the insurers ago? April 15th, 2009
By
David Goldman

The answer is, “everything,” including the most mundane transactions in trade — because everything requires insurance. This from the FT this morning:

The front page of Wednesday’s FT runs with the following story - that the UK government’s forthcoming budget is to include a “supply-chain insurance plan”:
The scheme will form a centrepiece of the Budget initiatives to help small to medium-sized businesses cope with the recession. Its unveiling marks the culmination of months of negotiations with insurers spearheaded by Lord Mandelson, the business secretary.

The initiative responds to concerns that hundreds of supply chains are threatened by the recession-fuelled reduction in credit insurance, which protects companies that supply goods on credit against the risk that they will not get paid.

Industry has been lobbying for the government to step in for months. The EEF manufacturers’ organisation warned weeks ago: “The speed at which credit insurance is being withdrawn threatens the supply chains that are the heart of the UK’s manufacturing base.”

Supply-chain insurance is crucial to the functioning of the economy and is really one of those things that has been somewhat ignored in the financial crisis so far, what with all the other credit-linked troubles around.

The point is that forms of credit - trust - are critical to lubricating trade. The collapse of the Baltic Dry Index months ago was the thin end of the wedge: global shipping ground to a halt as participants in the market found themselves unable to secure crucial letters of credit from banks and commodity brokers that mitigated counterparty risk.

In fact, as with so much in this crisis, much of the recent ructions in trade credit can be traced back to the activities of very small specialist units at financial sector firms. In the case of trade credit and surety, the activities of the reinsurers are crucial. And the reinsurers are pulling back.

FT Alphaville understands that Swiss Re has cut 45 of 65 jobs in its credit and reinsurance department, with a view, we believe to quitting the trade credit insurance and surety bond reinsurance sector entirely by year end.

Swiss Re confirmed to FT Alphaville that activities are being reduced but precise numbers could not be confirmed. “We will continue to accommodate the needs of key core multi-line clients” a spokesman for the company said.

The numbers might seem small, but such re departments are of huge importance.

Much like the way AIG FP functioned, trade credit and surety reinsurance operations write contracts with, effectively (though not necessarily we stress, directly) a huge amount of leverage, based on the notion that such contracts being written are virtually risk free. (Indeed historically the industry was renowned for reinsurance contracts that came with secret confidential ’side letters’, hidden from regulators, promising in legally binding terms that their contracts would never be exercised). Just as AIG’s 650 people were a primary force in the explosive growth of the multi-trillion dollar CDS market, so too are small trade credit and surety reinsurance departments like Swiss Re’s, then, critical for the functioning of trillions of dollars of global trade credit insurance further down the chain.

And while Swiss Re is not the largest reinsurance player in the trade credit space, it’s pullback is nonetheless instructive. It seems representative of a broader trend - one that has the potential to be so damaging that the UK government is forced to make filling the vacuum in the trade credit space a centrepiece of its upcoming historic budget.

Indeed, brokers, trade credit insurers and surety bond companies are all understood to be very worried about the declining availability of reinsurance - which is critical to their own ability to continue to operate effectively. The government’s move should hopefully do something to fill the vacuum - but until details about what price, terms and conditions new reinsurance - government sponsored or otherwise - are available, trade insurers and indeed trade full stop will continue to languish.

Of course it was a pyramid scheme: of course the insurers who allow a load of kasha to get from Minsk to Pinsk should not have owned the bottom of the banks’ capital structure, and so forth. No-one should have owned bank preferred shares but misers living in caves in the Swiss alps living exclusively on home-grown goats’ milk, so that the vaporization of these securities under nationalization would not even have gone noticed. Bank subordinated debt should have been sold exclusively to the hoards of sleeping dragons who would not hear the crash of the isser thousands of miles away. We know that now. My recommendation is that Larry Summers and Timothy Geithner should be deputized to find sufficient dragons and Swiss misers to place the $135 billion in TARP capital injections to the banks….

…but in the meantime, the only alternative is to allow the banks a zombie existence cannibalizing the “toxic” assets left over from the structuring excesses of the boom."

Monday, April 6, 2009

ome banks used the monolines to hedge their exposure to CDO tranches while they waited to offload them to investors

TO BE NOTED: From A Credit Trader:

"
The Monoline Delusion

"monoline n. a company specializing in a single type of financial business, such as credit cards, home mortgages, or a sole class of insurance" DON

In late 2007, as the monoline act of the crisis drama played out, credit traders were being repeatedly pulled off the desk to attend two kinds of meetings. In both they heard bad news.

prices

CDO Writedowns
In the first type of meetings, heads of trading desks would say they were writing down their exposure to a particular monoline. For instance, in the case of ACA, the ugly stepchild of the monoline business, Merrill wrote down $3.1bn in exposure, CBIC wrote down $2, Calyon $1.7bn and Citi $900mm in the fourth quarter of 2007 when ACA was downgraded from A to CCC. Prior to that, the banks had reported having little net exposure to CDO’s as their long bond positions were matched by CDS hedges.

table

The problem was, of course, that the hedges, or short positions, were done mostly with monolines. Merril, for example, gave their net CDO exposure only as $7bn, which consisted of $30bn gross CDO exposure against $23bn of hedges. What the bank omitted to say was that $20bn of those hedges were on with monolines. Assuming, 50% losses on the CDOs and a default by the monoline, real exposure was actually more than double the declared amount.

sellbuy

Lehman

Estimates of net CDO protection written by monolines come to around $125bn of mostly super-senior but also some junior super-senior and mezz exposure. Assuming 40%/60% recoveries, losses from monolines defaults would come out to around $50bn. This is a conservative assumption as

  1. not all monolines would default
  2. the banks hold some collateral / have collateral agreements in place (AAA monolines had much less strict collateral posting provisions and it appears even ACA, which due to its A rating was required to post collateral, won forbearance agreements from its counterparties)
  3. the banks hold hedges against the monolines (though this will have been recognized long before the writedowns on the cash assets as vanilla CDS on liquid names are marked-to-market)

Without going into detail, the case of Merrill is particularly disheartening from a risk management perspective as it appears to have committed two basic mistakes. Just as the investors were becoming wary of CDO’s, and ABS CDO’s in particular given the apparent weakness in the housing market, one division of Merrill continued accumulating cash ABS assets just as another division was failing to find buyers for the securitized products.

Why Merrill was aggresively buying up assets it knew could no longer be offloaded is puzzling and speaks of disincentives in the firm. At some point though, the bank did realize that this practice was not a particularly wise strategy and if it couldn’t find buyers of the cash assets it was going to find a seller of CDO protection. At that point the only insurer willing to stick its neck out was ACA (XL Capital having walked away) which was even then on particularly shaky ground. Merril put on $10bn of hedges with the firm, however, soon after ACA was downgraded and the bank was again swimming naked.

The obvious question is why did banks have exposure to monolines in the first place? The short answer is the negative basis trade (isn’t it always?).

negbasis

Moody's

The slightly longer answer is that, as mentioned, above some banks used the monolines to hedge their exposure to CDO tranches while they waited to offload them to investors.

  1. For example, say a bank comes out with a $1.5bn issue of a CDO but can only find interest for half the size. The internal trading desk, whether it wanted or not, would have to hold whatever wasn’t placed.
  2. Another reason was that a monoline wrapped tranche could be marketed as a higher quality product (super-AAA rather than a plain AAA) and so could reach a broader set of investors.
  3. Also, buying protection from monolines was often the only way to manage the risk of CDO assets as single-name CDS on ABS CDOs hadn’t come into the existence (or at least standardized existence) yet.
  4. Finally, this trade was attractive from a regulatory capital perspective and, more importantly, was positive carry which meant that holding it on the books seemed like a good strategy given the cheap balance sheet cost and a failure to recognize that funding costs may rise in the future.

Monoline Risk
The second type of meetings that credit traders were ushered into were with internal sales teams who marketed wrapped products to the banks’ clients. These were typically municipal bonds, including the poster child of muni distress: auction-rate securities. Prior to the monoline crisis, banks and investors were not particularly concerned with proper valuation of the credit risk in these securities as the monolines stood ready to pay up if the issuer were unable to do so.

However, with the monolines faring far worse than the issuers whose credit risk they were guaranteeing, investors began discounting the wrap and focusing on the underlying risk in the products. Suddenly, salespeople, whose eyes would glaze over at any mention of credit risk, were forced to understand first and second-to-default basket products and the concept of default correlation.

In a way, these “vanilla” folks had a better sense of what was happening than the more “exotic” CDO originators. They understood the fact that the guarantees offered by monoline wraps were largely illusory and offered no protection or diversification of risk.

Prior to the crisis, monoline wraps were viewed as monoline risk. This leap of faith required two assumptions: first, that the rating of the monoline was higher than the rating of the product it was insuring – this seems commonsense (ignoring for the moment the controversy over artificially low muni ratings), however this is an assumption that went out the window in the case of ACA-insured CDO tranches. The second assumption was that the default risks of the monoline and the underlying product were uncorrelated. I go into this in more detail below, but siffice it to say that in the extreme case of perfect correlation between the two entities, the monoline is expected to default at the same time as the underlying product, suggesting that the wrap added no extra protection. If 100% correlation seems high, consider the fact that the monolines were thinly capitalized relative to the risk they guaranteed (something that was made clear after the fact) and that both the monoline and the product were fundamentally exposed to systemic risk, a scenario in which both would and did suffer massive losses.

The Monolines’ Way-ward Ways
In my AIG post, I’ve described the concept known as “way-ness” which, essentially, requires us to consider the likely state of the world in the scenario a given entity of product defaults. This is particularly relevant in managing counterparty risk. For example, all else equal, you would much rather have an airline client sell you puts on WTI than calls. This is because a lower oil price (though not too low) is more likely to boost airline profits and the company would have less difficulty in making good on the put contracts.

What are the considerations for monoline way-ness risks:

  1. An important question a bank has to ask itself each time it does a trade with a client that may expose it to counterparty risk (i.e. a derivative rather than a fully funded trade) is what is the client’s motivation for doing the trade. For example, if a client is punting in the market in an attempt to make up for heavy losses on other trades, the bank should be more cautious. In recent years, municipal insured penetration has steadily declined, driven by increased investor risk appetite (less need for wraps) and a perception by municipalities of a fundamental bias in the rating methodology for their sector. This has led the monolines to expand into new markets and consider new business opportunities just as the price of risk was hitting new lows. Rating agencies were also keen to expand the structured products business for which they gathered high fees. They may also have influenced the monolines to pursue the business as a way to diversify their revenue stream and ultimately keep their AAA ratings. Also, a client that is aggresively pursuing highly leveraged opportunities outside of its historic mandate, for example a corporate putting on exotic curency trades, is particularly at risk as it points to possibly broken risk controls and poor risk management. As the market discovered later, the monolines that were particularly aggressive in bidding for structured finance business, such as ACA, were the ones that would be less able to withstand losses in a stress environment
  2. penetr

  3. The key difference between the staid muni bond insurance business and the new CDO tranche insurance business that monolines were underwriting has to do with the static/dynamic mark-to-market risk profiles of the two products. This is an important consideration as the mark-to-market gains and losses are linked to the capital the insurer is required to hold as well as the collateral it may be required to post. An insurance provider prefers a lower mark-to-market sensitivity (and hence less onerous capital charges and potential collateral calls) if the product it is insuring performs badly, all else equal. For example, for a typical bond, the MTM sensitivity decreases as the credit risk worsens (since the duration of the bond decreases) – exactly what the insurer prefers. In the case of a super-senior tranche, however, the MTM sensitivity will actually increase – precisely in the worst possible time (since the delta of the tranche will increase). To provide intuition for this, consider the tranche as a initially deep-out-of-the-money option on expected loss. The wider spreads rise, the closer the super-senior tranche is to suffering impairment and hence the higher its sensitivity to credit spreads. So, as the performance on these tranches suffers, the insurers would be marginally more on the hook for each basis point wider in spread. An attempt by the insurer to delta-hedge its exposure is likely to lead to losses since the monoline would be hedging a negative-gamma position and locking in losses with each rebalancing trade as spreads move.
  4. If at some point, monolines decided to offload their super-senior tranche exposure because of their view of the market or as a preventative measure to shed risk, they would likely find it very difficult to do so. The scenario in which super-senior tranches are under stress is a scenario when liquidity is at a premium and buyers of risk are on the sidelines.
  5. Going back to the point briefly mentioned above, super-senior tranches are likely to sufer in a “systemic” crisis environment – precisely the one in which we find outselves today. This environment is the one where the monoline itself would be struggling, unable to source new business as issuance and risk appetite dry up. It would be difficult for the monoline to find new sources of revenue to offset the bleeding in cash due to collateral postings or recapitalization efforts.
  6. Poor performance of super-senior tranches would put additional stress on the monolines which may ultimately lead to ratings downgrades – precisely what we have seen in the last few years. Ratings downgrades would automatically trigger collateral calls and increased capital cushions, precisely when the monolines would be least able to afford it. Though rating agencies try to rate companies “through the business cycle”, the fact is that there are more downgrades than upgrades during recessions.
  7. The hedging of monoline exposure by banks will increase the stress on these companies. Since the monoline spreads are correlated to super-senior tranches, banks having counteparty exposure to these insurers found that their exposure increased as credit spreads widened. This caused them (at least for the one who were actively hedging their exposure) to buy protection on the monolines exacerbating the perception of monoline risk in the market and leading to a self-fulfilling spiral.
  8. Recoveries in an environment of high defaults would be lower than average putting further pressure on monolines.
  9. An alternative to buying protection on the monolines to manage the banks’ exposure was to buy protection on the underlying bonds in the CDO. This was not possible in the early stages of the market as single-name ABS CDOs did not trade. However, in the last few years liquidity improved and banks were able to source protection. However, buying protection on CDS will likely push cash bond and CDO spreads wider which will increase banks’ exposure and cause further MTM losses to the monolines
  10. We should differentiate willingness from ability to pay. Insurance companies are generally loath to make payouts on policies, so it is not surprising that we would witness monolines balking at making payouts on the CDO tranches. Merrill, sued SCA over $3bn of CDS positions. AIG has also tried to wiggle out of some protection it wrote. This is not surprising as none of the insurers ever considered it remotely possible to have to pay out on these contracts which contributed to insufficient reserves and lax risk management. There is also some controversy over side letters suggesting that neither the insurer nor the insured expected cash to change hands on these contracts.
  11. Though few people take ratings very seriously (especially now), the fact was that Merril entered into contracts with ACA (then A-rated) to buy protection on a AAA underlying. The ratings suggest that ACA is more likely to default than the product on which it is providing insurance. This is actually worse than “buying insurance on the Titanic from someone on the Titanic”.

The monoline crisis provides a textbook case for the do’s and don’ts of managing counterparty risk and why some banks ended up suffering much more than if they had pursued a more sound risk management strategy. Greed will get you every time…"

Monday, February 16, 2009

And those failures feed the downspiral of activity and psychology.

From Yves Smith:

"Companies Paring Exposures to Risky Counterparts

Listen to this article. Powered by Odiogo.com
As much as some optimists would like to find evidence of recovery, it is far more likely that the US will see a further deterioration in economic activity. We have not yet seen much in the way of bankrupticies and debt restructuring. Until this sort of thing becomes sadly routine, the bottom is not yet nigh.

One sign that conditions are worsening is that major companies are cutting their exposures to business partners they deem to be in peril. This is a corporate version of the paradox of thrift. While this activity may seem laudable as far as each actor is concerned, it will have the effect of pushing some enterprises over the edge. And those failures feed the downspiral of activity and psychology.

From the Financial Times:
The world’s biggest companies are terminating contracts with customers they fear will collapse, a report will show on Monday in a sign of the turmoil spreading through global supply chains.

Of the 337 international corporates surveyed by accountancy firm Ernst & Young, most of which turn over more than $10bn a year, the majority said important customers were in financial distress and were taking longer to pay than usual.

A quarter said one or more key customers had gone into bankruptcy while almost on in ten said suppliers had gone out of business. As a result, a third of the companies surveyed have stopped trading with customers they perceived as high risk.

John Murphy, global managing partner of markets at Ernst & Young, said managers would have to scrutinise the health of even ultra-safe trading partners very carefully. “A company’s risk profile can change almost overnight,” he said.
Me:

Blogger Don said...

This is bad news, since it is the definition of a Calling Run. It basically defines Debt-Deflation. Companies have been doing this for a while, but it might actually be getting worse. Yikes.

Don the libertarian Democrat

February 16, 2009 2:56 PM

Tuesday, December 23, 2008

"it’s a very important beginning for this wholly unregulated product class…"

Shopyield with an important post on the CDS Market:

"
Central platform

Excellent progress today on CDS… in a roundabout way the SEC has exempted the DTCC owned LCH.Clearnet to clear credit default swaps in a central counterparty platform… a central place for trades to come together… it’s a very important beginning for this wholly unregulated product class…( I AGREE )

~~~~ ” …. Today’s announcement is an important step in our efforts to add transparency and structure to the opaque and unregulated multi-trillion dollar credit default swaps market,” said SEC Chairman Christopher Cox. “These conditional exemptions will allow a central counterparty to be quickly up and running, while protecting investors through regulatory oversight. Although more needs to be done in this area legislatively, these actions will shine much-needed light on credit default swaps trading.”( EXCELLENT )

… Erik R. Sirri, Director of the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, said, “These temporary and conditional exemptions are the best way to facilitate the prompt establishment of a central counterparty for CDS transactions.” ( VERY GOOD NEWS )

“Their limited duration will allow the Commission and its staff to gain more direct experience with the development of the centrally cleared CDS market, while the conditions to the exemptions will give the Commission the ability to oversee the CDS market after the central counterparty becomes operational.”…. ” ~~~~

Now that the DTCC is publishing weekly CDS figures we can map the market as it migrates from an OTC dealer market to a hybrid OTC/exchange traded space… congrats to all the parties involved… it looks like many parties had a hand in this process…

The day prior ~~~~ “ … Liffe, the global derivatives business of NYSE Euronext (NYX) and LCH.Clearnet Ltd (LCH.Clearnet), the global central counterparty (CCP), jointly announce that they have today launched credit default swap (CDS) index contracts on Bclear.

With this launch, Liffe becomes the first exchange to offer clearing of CDS contracts. The launch also marks a significant expansion of Bclear from a successful equity derivatives service to a wider cross-asset class platform. ( GOOD )

The contracts reference ISDA 2003 Credit Derivative definitions, and in the case of credit events settle using the Final Price of ISDA Credit Event Auctions. The CDS clearing offered via Bclear will initially cover the Markit iTraxx Europe, Market iTraxx Crossover and Markit iTraxx Hi-Vol indices….” ~~~~

From Securities Law Professor…

~~~~ “SEC Approves Exemptions for Central Counterparty in CDS

The SEC today approved temporary exemptions allowing LCH.Clearnet Ltd. to operate as a central counterparty for credit default swaps with the expectation of stabilizing financial markets by reducing counterparty risk and helping to promote efficiency in the credit default swap market. The Commission developed these temporary exemptions in close consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the U.K. Financial Services Authority.

The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets has stated that the implementation of central counterparty services for credit default swaps was a top priority. In furtherance of this goal, the Commission, the FRB and the CFTC signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November 2008 that establishes a framework for consultation and information sharing on issues related to central counterparties for credit default swaps.

The temporary exemptions will facilitate central counterparties such as LCH.Clearnet and certain of their participants to implement centralized clearing quickly, while providing the Commission time to review their operations and evaluate( THIS IS WHAT THEY SHOULD DO ) whether registrations or permanent exemptions should be granted in the future. The conditions that apply to the exemptions are designed to provide that key investor protections and important elements of Commission oversight apply, while taking into account that applying all the particulars of the securities laws could have the unintended consequence of deterring the prompt establishment and use of a central counterparty.” ~~~~

CDS indices represent a significant share of trading (from the DTCC Trade Information Warehouse Data) data for week ending 12/19/08.

Buyer Type x Seller Type
TOTAL FOR ALL CDS (Credit Default Single Names)
Seller Type
Dealer Non Dealer/Customer Totals
Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts
Buyer Type Dealer 12,102,928,122,740 1,581,743 1,238,098,385,882 173,746 13,341,026,508,622 1,755,489
Non Dealer/Customer 1,390,920,038,541 206,193 20,956,526,689 2,457 1,411,876,565,230 208,650
TOTAL 13,493,848,161,281 1,787,936 1,259,054,912,571 176,203 14,752,903,073,852 1,964,139

Buyer Type x Seller Type
TOTAL FOR ALL CDX (Credit Default Index)
Seller Type
Dealer Non Dealer/Customer Totals
Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts
Buyer Type Dealer 9,064,083,272,401 108,873 911,914,643,912 25,076 9,975,997,916,313 133,949
Non Dealer/Customer 1,006,324,321,097 23,473 4,810,148,836 170 1,011,134,469,933 23,643
TOTAL 10,070,407,593,498 132,346 916,724,792,748 25,246 10,987,132,386,246 157,592

Buyer Type x Seller Type
TOTAL FOR ALL CDT (Credit Default Tranche)
Seller Type
Dealer Non Dealer/Customer Totals
Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts Gross Notional (USD EQ) Contracts
Buyer Type Dealer 3,115,741,737,343 61,209 157,215,648,879 4,774 3,272,957,386,222 65,983
Non Dealer/Customer 116,235,673,813 3,159 670,021,930 18 116,905,695,743 3,177
TOTAL 3,231,977,411,156 64,368 157,885,670,809 4,792 3,389,863,081,965 69,160

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

"Trade-related credit is issued primarily by banks via “letters of credit,” the purpose of which is to secure payment for the exporter."

Galina Alexeenko and Sandra Kollen with a fascinating post on Macroblog about letters of credit:

"Now that the mystery has been solved concerning whether we are in recession or not, our attention can turn to monitoring the conditions that might signal the contraction’s end. A nice assist in this endeavor comes from the “Credit Crisis Watch” at The Big Picture, which includes an extensive list of graphs summarizing ongoing conditions in credit markets.

In case that list is not extensive enough for you, allow us to add one more item to the list: the condition of trade finance. International trade amounts to about $14 trillion and, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 90 percent of these transactions involve trade financing. Trade-related credit is issued primarily by banks via “letters of credit,” the purpose of which is to secure payment for the exporter. Letters of credit prove that a business is able to pay and allow exporters to load cargo for shipments with the assurance of being paid. Though routine in normal times, the letter of credit of process is yet another example of how transactions between multiple financial intermediaries introduce counterparty risk and the potential for trouble when confidence flags."

The Letter Of Credit is proof that there will be payment when the goods shipped are received at their destination.

"This is how it works: Company A located in the Republic of A wants to buy goods from Company B located in B-land. Company A and B draw up a sales contract for the agreed sales price of $100,000. Company A would then go to its bank, A Plus Bank, and apply for a letter of credit for $100,000 with Company B as the beneficiary. (The letter of credit is done either through a standard loan underwriting process or funded with a deposit and an associated fee). A Plus Bank sends a copy of the letter of credit to B Bank, which notifies Company B that its payment is available when the terms and conditions of the letter of credit have been met (normally upon receipt of shipping documents). Once the documents have been confirmed, A Plus Bank transfers the $100,000 to Bank B to be credited to Company B.

Letter of Credit Process

In general, exporters and importers in emerging economies may be particularly vulnerable since they rely more heavily on trade finance, and in recent weeks, the price of credit has risen significantly, especially for emerging economies. According to Bloomberg, the cost of a letter of credit has tripled for importers in China, Brazil, and Turkey and doubled for Pakistan, Argentina, and Bangladesh. Banks are now charging 1.5 percent of the value of the transaction for credit guarantees for some Chinese transactions. There have been reports of banks refusing to honor letters of credit from other banks and cargo ships being stranded at ports, according to Dismal Scientist".

This has obviously slowed down trade.

"These financial market woes are clearly spilling over to “global Main Street.” The Baltic Dry Index, an indirect gauge of international trade flows, has dropped by more than 90 percent since its peak in June as a result not only of decreased global demand but also availability of financing that demand, according to Dismal Scientist.

Baltic Dry Index

In the words of the WTO’s Director-General Pascal Lamy, “The world economy is slowing and we are seeing trade decrease. If trade finance is not tackled, we run the risk of further exacerbating this downward spiral.” Since about 40 percent of U.S. exports are shipped to developing countries, the inability of the importers in those countries to finance their purchases of U.S.-made goods can’t help the U.S. exports sector, which is already suffering from falling foreign demand as the global economy slows."

This is a serious problem.

"At VoxEU, Helmut Reisen sums up the situation thus:

“As a mid-term consequence of the global credit crisis, private debt will be financed only reluctantly and capital costs are bound to rise to incorporate higher risk. Instead, solvent governments and public institutions will become the lenders of last resort.”

That process has begun. In the last 12 months, according to the WTO, export credit agencies have increased their business by more than 30 percent, with an acceleration since the summer. The increase in this activity, the WTO reports, is being backed by governments of some of the world’s largest exporters, such as Germany and Japan.

Most recently, to support exports of products from the United States and China to emerging economies, both countries decided on December 5 to provide a total of $20 billion through their export-import banks. The program will be implemented in the form of direct loans, guarantees, or insurance to creditworthy banks. Together, the United States and China expect that these efforts will generate total trade financing for up to $38 billion in exports over the next year.

The sense one gets from The Big Picture charts is that at least some hopeful signs have emerged in developed-economy credit markets. Going forward, progress in markets directly related to trade flows between developed and emerging economies may well be an equally key indicator of how quickly we turn the bend toward recovery."

Interesting.

Tuesday, December 9, 2008

"as it is a particularly appropriate time for all of us to be at a conference focused on risk management and risk modeling for financial institutions.

Yesterday, Eric S .Rosengren of the Boston Fed gave a talk focusing on some principles for future regulatory reform, which I found out about on the WSJ:

"I am very pleased to be with you today, as it is a particularly appropriate time for all of us to be at a conference focused on risk management and risk modeling for financial institutions. I am very pleased to be with you today, as it is a particularly appropriate time for all of us to be at a conference focused on risk management and risk modeling for financial institutions.[Footnote 1] As you know, many banks around the world have, of late, found themselves needing equity infusions from governments, or expanded guarantees for their liabilities."

Actually, a more appropriate time for a conference on risk management and modeling is when things are seemingly going very well, but this is now a step in the right direction.

Banks have needed:
1) Money from government
2) Implicit guarantees made explicit

"A widespread need for banks’ recapitalization has occurred at least twice in the past century, and in many countries has occurred much more frequently than that. Many banks’ risk models were supposed to be calibrated for “once-in-a-thousand-years” events; however, these models seriously underestimated risk."

They not only underestimated risk, but, in doing so, were magnifying risk. That's the reason a " Once-in-a-thousand-year" event occurred in about five years.

"Certainly there is much still to study and understand about the recent financial turmoil that emerged in the summer of 2007. But it seems abundantly clear, and not all that surprising, that risks calibrated from a few years of data from good times can dramatically under-estimate risk exposure for a particular asset, as well as the high correlation of risks across asset classes during periods of significant stress. "

When you read how little data they had to base their predictions on, there's no way but to consider that ridiculous and negligent behavior. You have to ask what incentives or goals predisposed people to accept such preposterous presumptions.

"Furthermore, while capital models were intended to suggest minimum capital requirements that would keep institutions sound during risky times, the models were frequently used to justify expansion of dividends and stock buybacks, because they suggested that banks were overcapitalized during boom times. So this conference occurs at a good time, as we all try to re-evaluate how best to model and manage risk."

Lowering capital requirements is inherently risky. Period. This was a conscious and obvious attempt to find investments with lower capital requirements. Period.

"And it is not only our risk models that need to be reevaluated. Our regulatory framework clearly needs to be reconsidered, in light of recent events. Both in the U.S. and globally, we had in place a complex set of regulations and supervisory structures intended, in part, to increase the likelihood that financial intermediaries would remain well capitalized without government assistance. Like the risk models, bank regulators did not foresee the dramatic illiquidity that could emerge during a period of acute financial turmoil – nor the changes in the value of assets on balance sheets, or the degree of correlation of those asset values."

We've had a system, at least since the S & L Crisis, of implicit and explicit government guarantees to intervene in a financial crisis. We've had a pretty well established set of precedents from the S & L Crisis and Tech Bubble that fraud, negligence, fiduciary mismanagement, and collusion, are rarely and arbitrarily prosecuted. We've had a regulatory structure that did not do much regulating, and which was easily influenced by lobbying. Put those in your risk pipe and smoke it.

"While regulatory reform proposals are already beginning to surface, I see value in first evaluating the principles that should frame the discussion. Before we begin to work on regulatory details we need to evaluate whether the problem was poor execution of a well-considered regulatory framework, or that important principles were absent from the framework. While in my view the recent experience shows elements of both, I want to focus today on regulatory principles rather than their implementation."

It's more like the pool is being drained down to the level where regulatory reform proposals are being taken seriously. Was the problem:
1) Poor enforcement of good rules
2) Poor rules
3) A combination of both ( Yes. And he agrees )

He will focus on 2. Better to focus on rules than people. They might be offended.

"But before discussing regulatory principles, I would like to briefly discuss our current economic situation, in order to put the recent crises in context.

Recent Economic Conditions

Many countries have already experienced two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth and the NBER has recently declared that the U.S. entered the recession at the end of last year. In the U.S., GDP in the second quarter was positive, helped in part by a fiscal stimulus package. In the third quarter, GDP declined by 0.5 percent, and it looks like in the fourth quarter it will decline somewhat more significantly – since consumer and investment spending appear to be dropping quite precipitously. This is due, in part, to the interplay of developments in asset markets and the real economy. U.S. consumers – and, increasingly, consumers across Europe – have been buffeted by declining housing prices and falling stock prices. The resulting loss of consumer wealth, coupled with a rapidly rising unemployment rate, suggests the holiday buying season will not be robust as was hoped earlier this year."

What's with the constant use of "robust"? We're in a recession.

"The likelihood of further weakening of labor markets, and a reluctance of consumers or businesses to increase spending until economic conditions are more certain, together imply a continued difficult environment for banks. There are several conditions necessary for financial markets to resume a more normal state, and I would like to briefly discuss each."

Fire away.

"First, we need short-term credit markets to return to normalcy. Conditions in short-term credit markets have improved significantly since the end of September. As shown in Figure 1, rates in the market for high-grade financial commercial paper have resumed a more normal relationship to the Federal Funds rate target, compared to the mid September to mid October timeframe. This improvement in what was a very large spread has been greatly aided by the various short-term credit facilities established by the Federal Reserve to help reduce the stress in short-term credit markets. These facilities have also enhanced the ability of financial firms and issuers of commercial paper to extend the maturities on commercial paper issues (see Figure 2), which at the end of September had become dependent on overnight financing. The facilities have also reduced the risk that financing would not be available over the year end, as many commercial-paper issuers have now financed themselves beyond that point. But despite these improvements, short-term credit markets remain strained. Figure 3 shows that the spread between Libor[Footnote 2] and the Overnight Index Swap rate has fallen from its late-September peak but remains well above the level that prevailed prior to the outbreak of financial turmoil in summer of 2007."

This makes sense.

"Second, we need to see some improvement in the housing market before financial markets will resume a more normal state. In the U.S., residential investment began declining in the first quarter of 2006 and has declined in each quarter since. And as Figure 4 shows, house prices have declined nationally, and in some markets the declines have already exceeded 25 percent. A number of proposals have been floated to help stem foreclosures, but to date there has been relatively modest progress – faced, as we are, by the dual problems of falling housing prices and rising unemployment. Stabilization in house prices and a drop in foreclosures would help the overall economy as well as the banking sector that is exposed to construction loans, residential mortgage loans, and mortgage-backed securities."

This makes sense. How to do this is where we disagree.

"Third, officials must take into account – and develop policies and actions that reflect – the degree to which monetary policy tools are currently deployed. The stance of U.S. monetary policy reflects our rate reductions, with the Federal Funds rate target currently at 100 basis points. Given that interest rates cannot be negative, further monetary-policy actions are limited by the zero lower bound for interest rates. While other monetary policy tools can be employed, increasingly many observers and commentators are suggesting that fiscal stimulus will be an important element of economic recovery."

The word"deployed" again. Strange. We need a stimulus. Yes.

"Principles to Guide the Design of Regulatory Structure

With actions already taken to stabilize short-term credit conditions, and the widely-reported likelihood of further fiscal measures, I would hope that over the next year there can be a broader discussion of lessons learned from our recent problems, and what measures can be taken to reduce the risk of a recurrence. There can sometimes be a tendency to move to proposals for regulatory design before building a consensus on the underlying principles that should guide the debate. To that end, I would like to use my remaining time to discuss a few key principles that I hope will inform the many proposals that are likely to emerge."

I agree that principles should be developed first.

"Principle 1:
Financial regulation must be more clearly focused on the key goal of macroeconomic stability as well as the safety and soundness of individual institutions.

I lead with this principle, because I believe it has not necessarily received sufficient attention in our current regulatory structures. There is a clear link between the financial regulation of institutions and the stability of markets and the macroeconomy. Some countries have had frequent and severe banking crises, while other countries have been much more successful at weathering periods of international financial turmoil.

On the one hand, too conservative a regime of financial regulation can stymie innovation and creativity, thus preventing borrowers and lenders from interacting in the most efficient ways. On the other hand, inadequate oversight can cause periods of financial turmoil that are quite destructive to the financial infrastructure and the real economy. Future regulatory design must allow for innovation without increasing risks to the financial infrastructure and the real economy."

This is what I believe. The main objective should be to examine financial innovations as they occur as to whether they:

1) Transfer Risk

2) Magnify Risk

Whether regulation or supervision is needed is secondary to a clear and thorough examination of the new financial products or arrangements.

"Principle 2:
Because it is a key determinant of macroeconomic stability, systemic financial stability must receive greater focus, with roles and responsibilities during a financial crisis more clearly articulated.

Regulatory structures should be designed to minimize the probability of systemic disruption or instability. In the future, the definition of a “systemically important” firm must be clear in advance, and the regulatory structure should be designed to minimize the chance that such firms will take actions that would put systemic stability at risk. In addition, should a crisis arise despite the best efforts of regulators, the conditions and processes to “save” such firms must be well understood in advance."

I agree with this and have said so over and over. All government guarantees must be made explicit and agreed upon beforehand, as well as there being a minimal but clear and effective mode of regulation, involving rationalization and oversight of the regulators themselves as to their effectiveness and competence.

"Importantly, care must be given to the design of rescue options to minimize the incidence of moral hazard, or additional risk-taking by a party that is insured, “saved,” or otherwise insulated from the consequences of its activities. Of course, the best way to avoid moral hazard is to avoid crisis situations in which organizations need “saving.” The next best way is to have well-defined processes in place in advance, which minimize the effects of moral hazard.[Footnote 3]"

This is the most important point for me. We need to clearly differentiate between businesses that have government guarantees and those that don't, and regulate risk accordingly. What I've called Bagehot's Principles need to be applied, including killing off insolvent businesses quickly and effectively to enforce moral hazard as an ongoing regime. If you let it slide, your actions will overcome your words, and moral hazard will be significantly increased.

One addition to Bagehot's Principles might be:

We might save your bank, but you and and the people responsible for the bank's problems will not be saved, and might even suffer personal losses.

"Essential to determining which institutions are systemically important is a comprehensive view of what you might call the “financial entanglements” – interdependencies – among financial instruments and institutions.[Footnote 4] In an ideal situation, financial institutions could fail or have their assets transferred to other organizations with little disruption to counterparties or markets. Recent experience indicates that the uncertainty around counterparty risk in non-exchange-traded transactions is significant during periods of market stress. And it is difficult to ascertain the true extent of counterparty risk and whether a failure will result in significant disruptions in markets where the financial institution serves as a key player."

This is key, if for no other reason that, and this seems silly saying this, a financial institution can actually know what it has in assets and liabilities from day to day.

"In the U.S., the central bank can provide liquidity to the marketplace, but decisions to take on credit risk that pose substantial risks to taxpayers should ideally be in the hands of the Treasury Department, with oversight by Congress. However, during this period of financial turmoil the Treasury Department did not have the pre-existing authority to intervene expeditiously in such a crisis situation. The result was that the central bank became directly involved in urgent, time-sensitive issues that involved significant credit risk."

We need one agency to be in charge.

"To be better prepared for systemic problems, “standing” fiscal and monetary facilities are needed, to provide the ability to react more quickly than was possible of late. Until the passage of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), the U.S. Treasury Department did not have the ability to react to emerging problems as quickly as it would have liked. Similarly, many of the Federal Reserve facilities required significant accounting, legal, and back-office infrastructure that took some time to put in place."

We should plan for crisis management situations.

"In addition, as you all know, liquidity has been provided to institutions and markets where previously the central bank had little direct regulatory involvement. For example, facilities that were needed to provide liquidity to investment banks and money-market funds were established despite the absence of direct regulatory oversight by the Federal Reserve at the time the facility was initiated. Also, markets such as those for asset-backed commercial paper and unsecured commercial paper were not markets in which the Federal Reserve was actively engaged prior to the crisis. In the future, it would be ideal to clarify in advance which institutions and markets could require liquidity, and make sure the central bank has sufficient information about these institutions and markets to better serve in its role as lender of last resort."

This is also key, and follows from making everything explicit and agreed to beforehand.

"
Principle 3:

Liquidity risk must receive greater policy focus in determining regulatory structures.

At the outset of the recent financial turmoil, many observers assumed that liquidity risk was well contained. In the case of investment banks, many of their assets were financed by repurchase agreements – short-term loans that were fully collateralized. Because the repurchase agreements were collateralized, most parties assumed there was a relatively low risk of a “run” because the collateral could always be sold in the event of a default. However, concerns with valuations of assets used for repurchase agreements resulted in many investors refusing to continue to lend even overnight once the counterparty was feared to be at risk of failure."

You have to be able to sell assets in order to get the money you need back.

"In addition, money market mutual funds were assumed to have relatively little liquidity risk, because they were constrained by regulations that compel them to hold only investment-grade securities of short duration. However, after one well-known money market mutual fund announced that its investors would not be able to redeem their entire principal (“breaking the buck”), many funds faced a wave of redemption requests they had great difficulty meeting – until action was taken to put in place temporary U.S. Treasury insurance as well as a new Federal Reserve liquidity facility."

People have to believe that they can get their money back when they need it.

"The financial turmoil has highlighted the reality that our regulatory structure had not fully anticipated the types of liquidity shocks that have occurred. Going forward, more attention should be focused on ensuring that the causes of liquidity disruptions are better understood, and that we are better equipped to avoid liquidity problems.[Footnote 5]"

Financial institutions need to be able to sell assets in order to meet capital requirements.

"Also, we must be cognizant of an issue that has compounded these liquidity problems – the interaction with accounting rules. Regulatory and accounting frameworks need to consider how best to address periods of sustained illiquidity."

Mark-to-market, Etc.?

"In order to prevent bank runs, many countries have not only insured bank deposits but have also guaranteed other liabilities. We need to better understand how best to structure liabilities to avoid the need for such debt guarantees in the future. In the recent turmoil, for many institutions it was the unexpected lack of a stable and fluid market for short-term debt to finance their balance sheets that created liquidity problems.[Footnote 6]"

We'd rather not have the government get involved.

"
Principle 4:

Careful thought must be given to coordinating the work of the various domestic and international regulators in the design of the regulatory structure.

In the United States there exists a patchwork of overlapping regulators. Much of our regulatory design results from reactions to the Great Depression. Given all the changes that have occurred since then, it is probably appropriate to take a fresh look at our regulatory structure – not just the bank-regulatory agencies but also the inter-relationship of their work with that of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board."

This is what I've already called Rationalization.

"Ideally, a new structure would minimize the adverse effects of competing regulatory goals. It will also need to consider how different regulatory bodies can be better coordinated so that information moves more freely between them. Also, international coordination is becoming much more important, as firms have become more global. And as with monetary policy, I believe that to the extent possible, creating independent regulatory agencies with clear mandates is critical to success."

Same point, including ones I've already made about how regulations should be framed.

"
Principle 5:

Responsibility for strengthening market infrastructure should receive more attention in regulatory design.

The current crisis has highlighted the need for better transparency. If every transaction is unique, it becomes difficult to determine valuations during periods of illiquidity. To the extent possible, contracts governing securitization should be standardized, with clearly defined steps to resolve competing interests when the underlying assets lose value."

I don't mind this, but frankly doubt its usefulness. Better, it should happen, but room should be left for some innovation.

"Similarly, contracts between institutions provide less transparency than transactions through exchanges. Exchange-traded assets provide a price that is widely observable – on contracts for assets that are clearly defined. To the extent that more assets move to be exchange-traded, counterparty risk is reduced, and transparency is increased."

This I agree with.

"I also believe that payment and settlement activities need greater oversight. The back-office difficulties involved in unwinding complex trades that were not exchange-traded highlight the need for more attention to settlement activities."

It might also deter graft.

"Conclusion Of course, these five principles are not the only ones of import. Others may stress other very worthy points taken from the lessons of the recent episode. For example that financial regulation must be grounded in an understanding of institutional relationships – “real world” details, which clearly do matter. "

You know you're in a strange situation when someone feels it necessary to remind everybody that we need to deal with the "real world".

"Or, as I mentioned when discussing moral hazard, that financial regulation needs to do a better job of recognizing the role of incentives. For example, compensation structures affect actions – as is evident in situations where short-term risk-taking is rewarded very lucratively and losses are not borne by the originators of the risk."

That's addressed by my addition to Bagehot's Principles.

"The current crisis provides the opportunity and impetus to reexamine a regulatory framework that originated in the Great Depression. While I believe there is a clear need to redesign the current regulatory structure, it is important that we not lose important features of the current market. It is critical that any regulatory design not stifle the industry’s innovation and creativity. However, the regulatory structure needs to be more adaptable to innovations – in order to ensure that new safety and soundness, and systemic, concerns are not ignored. And it needs to be aware of the details of the evolving financial-market structure."

That's why we need to focus on principles, and on our ability to discern what investment products are doing.

"Additional regulations do run the risk of moral hazard where the presence of a safety net creates an incentive to take additional risk. While any countercyclical monetary, fiscal, or regulatory policy runs this risk, it should be minimized. Ideally, situations requiring public support should occur only after losses have been borne by equity holders, and existing management and directors have been held responsible for the losses."

This is the main cause of the crisis for me. It stemmed from the self deception involved in the implicit guarantees, that everyone in the financial world believed were explicit. Everyone was pretending that these guarantees weren't there, while everyone was acting as if they were. This allowed a fairy tale view of what risk there was in the system, which led to an unnaturally childish view of risk by the individuals involved, since, if everything got scary, the investors had a fairy godmother called the government to bail them out. The fairy tale world turned out to be the one with no government guarantees, not the one that people were pretending wasn't real. We need a very onerous and specific set of principles for the government to be involved, and enforce moral hazard religiously from the outset. No more self deception and fairy tales, please.

"To the extent a new regulatory structure reduces counterparty risk, or requires offsets in capital for transactions involving significant counterparty risk, the likelihood of spillover effects from one firm’s failure should be significantly reduced. Ideally a new structure will reduce the likelihood of future financial turmoil of the length and severity of current financial problems."

We should raise capital requirements, and have a system in which capital can easily be raised if needed. An interesting talk.

"Thank you for having me join you today, and thank you for the opportunity to share my views on principles to guide the redesign of U.S. financial regulation."


↑ top

Complete speech, with exhibits pdf

X Footnote 1
Of course, the views I express today are my own, not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee (the FOMC).
X Footnote 2
The London Interbank Offered Rate.
X Footnote 3

In a recent speech Chairman Bernanke, while stressing the importance of market discipline and the problem of moral hazard, said that "the failure of a major financial institution at a time when financial markets are already quite fragile poses too great a threat to financial and economic stability to be ignored. In such cases, intervention is necessary to protect the public interest. The problems of moral hazard and the existence of institutions that are 'too big to fail' must certainly be addressed, but the right way to do this is through regulatory changes, improvements in the financial infrastructure, and other measures that will prevent a situation like this from recurring. Going forward, reforming the system to enhance stability and address the problem of 'too big to fail' should be a top priority for lawmakers and regulators." The Chairman’s speech, Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis, is available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm.

X Footnote 4

I discussed the benefits that central bank policymakers gain from having supervisory roles and relationships in a speech in Seoul in March. “Bank Supervision and Central Banking: Understanding Credit During a Time of Financial Turmoil” is available on the Boston Fed’s website at http://www.bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2008/032708.htm

X Footnote 5
For more on issues of liquidity, liquidity-risk concerns, and systemic risk, see speeches entitled “Liquidity and Systemic Risk” and “The Impact of Financial Institutions and Financial Markets on the Real Economy: Implications of a Liquidity Lock.’”
X Footnote 6
Some observe that another lesson of the recent turmoil involves possible over-reliance on short-term debt throughout the financial system.
X Figure 1:
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Rate and the Federal Funds Target Rate
July 1, 2008 - November 28, 2008
figure 1
Source: Federal Reserve Board / Haver Analytics
X Figure 2:
Commercial Paper Issuance
July 2, 2007 – November 28, 2008
figure 2
Source: Federal Reserve Board / Haver Analytics
X Figure 3:
Spread: One-Month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Rate
January 1, 2007 - November 28, 2008
figure 3
Source: Financial Times, Bloomberg / Haver Analytics
X Figure 4:
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices: Composite and Selected Metropolitan Areas

January 2001 - September 2008
figure 4
Source: S&P/Case-Shiller / Haver Analytics

Friday, November 21, 2008

"The IMF said in October it expects banks around the world to need $675 billion in order to recapitalize."

What's the level of Counterparty Risk in the OTC. From Zubin Jelveh's Odd Numbers:

"In February, Barlcays estimated that if one major institution went down, there would most likely be between $36-$47 billion in losses due to counterparty risk in the credit default swap market as risk was repriced. A similar CDS study by BNP Paribas put the figure at $150 billion in potential losses.

But the repricing of risk extends just beyond the CDS market, IMF economists Miguel A. Segoviano and Manmohan Singh argue in a new working paper. Using data on banks' counterparty positions before the Bear Stearns collapse, the pair calculate the potential loss to the financial system from a repricing of risk across the entire OTC derivatives market:

in the case of a single institution failure, the total loss could be as high as $300-$400 billion depending on the [institution]; but when cascade effects are taken into account, the total loss could rise to over $1,500 billion.
And that's just the potential losses from the derivatives and not the underlying assets. The IMF said in October it expects banks around the world to need $675 billion in order to recapitalize."

Here's the paper:

"The financial market turmoil of recent months has highlighted the importance of counterparty
risk. Here, we discuss counterparty risk that may stem from the OTC derivatives markets and
attempt to assess the scope of potential cascade effects. This risk is measured by losses to the
financial system that may result via the OTC derivative contracts from the default of one or
more banks or primary broker-dealers. We then stress the importance of “netting” within the
OTC derivative contracts. Our methodology shows that, even using data from before the
worsening of the crisis in late Summer 2008, the potential cascade effects could be very
substantial. We summarize our results in the context of the stability of the banking system and
provide some policy measures that could be usefully considered by the regulators in their
discussions of current issues."

Okay. Let's go.

"In this paper we are interested in counterparty risk that may stem from the OTC derivatives
markets. The financial market turmoil of recent months has highlighted the importance of
such risk. The risk is measured by losses that may result via the OTC derivative contracts to
the financial system from the default (or fail) of one or more banks or broker dealers. Thus,
in order to quantify counterparty risk, we calculate (expected) losses absorbed by the system
under two different scenarios (described in Section II.D). For the estimation of (expected)
losses, we define (i) the exposure of the financial system to specific financial institutions
(FIs); and (ii) propose a novel methodology to estimate the probability that given that a
particular institution (counterparty) fails to deliver, other institutions in the system would
also fail to deliver."

The risk of :
1) A particular bank failing
2) If a particular banks fails, what would the fallout be

"Counterparty risk largely stems from the creditworthiness of an institution. In the context of
the financial system that includes banks, broker dealers, and other non-banking institutions
(e.g., insurers and pension funds), counterparty risk will be the cumulative loss to the
financial system from a counterparty that fails to deliver on its OTC derivative obligation.
Thus, in order to estimate the potential cumulative loss in the system, we need to quantify
two variables (i) the exposure of the financial system (EFS) to a particular institution or
institutions that would fail to deliver; and (ii) the probability that given that a particular
institution (counterparty) fails to deliver, other institutions in the system would also fail to
deliver."

I think they just said that.

"We define the exposure of the financial system to the failure of a particular counterparty as
the liabilities of a particular institution (counterparty) to others in the financial system
stemming from its OTC derivatives that have not been netted under a master netting
agreement (e.g., International Swaps and Derivatives Association) or cross margining
agreements where margin/cash is assigned and netted across product categories."

I wonder how they're going to do that.

"Notional amounts are defined as the gross nominal value of all OTC derivative deals
concluded and not yet settled on the reporting date. These amounts provide a measure of the
size of the market, but do not provide a measure of risk. Risk in derivatives stems from
various other variables including price changes, volatility, leverage and hedge ratios,
duration, liquidity, and counterparty risk."

See, I already don't like the number of variables.

'The OTC derivatives market is tailored to clients’ needs and thus goes beyond what is
available in the standardized contracts that exchanges offer. Assuming anywhere from 1-25
basis points bid/ask spread on the notional value traded (about $ 600 trillion), dealers derive a
significant income from OTC derivatives markets. Thus banks and prime brokers have a
vested interest in protecting their franchise, and therefore limit transparency and
standardization. However, if indeed the results of our scenarios are illustrative, counterparty
risk is large (and especially large where cascade effects result in more than one bank or prime
broker failing). In addition, the re-pricing risk following a counterparty failure cannot be
easily quantified. Pressure to re-hedge at such times will be enormous and perhaps
unaffordable, which could lead to unanticipated pressures on the financial system."

So, this could be really bad. I can't seem to be able to copy the graphs and such, so read it yourself.

Solutions:

1) Capital requirements across products and banks
2) A Clearing House
3) Easy to sell capital, that can be passed on
4) Standardize contracts

They all seem reasonable, but are they necessary. Maybe only 2 and 3, but 1 is advisable.