an increase in cash available should cause the price level to rise, but only if you hold the savings rate constant

TO BE NOTED: From Accrued Interest:

"Inflation: Not this ship, sister

Alright so the Fed isn't going to defend the 10yr at 3%, and in fact appears to be targeting the belly of the yeild curve. That doesn't change the fundamental problem of deflation. Near term, based entirely on technicals, I've made a small short play in Treasuries. But I'm really just looking for a new entry on the long-side.

Almost exactly 2-years ago, I made my now famous (in my own mind) analogy of inflation to a Monopoly game. Basically my point was inflation wasn't about the price of any given property (or good) but the price of all the properties. Allowing any given good (at the time it was energy) to rise isn't, in and of itself, inflation.


Now there is fear that the Fed and Treasury's activities, especially the Fed's recent panache for "crediting bank reserves" (which means printing money). Here is the chart for M1 and M2 up 14% and 9% respectively in the last year.

Back to my Monopoly analogy. We might think of the M's as the actual multi-colored cash that each player has. As I demonstrated two years ago, an increase in cash available should cause the price level to rise, but only if you hold the savings rate constant.


Speaking more technically, you could say that an increase monetary base would have some multiplied impact on transactable money. In your textbook from college, this only involved banks and their willingness to lend. Actually, most often text books assume banks want to lend as much as they are legally allowed, which isn't the case right now. But I digress.


The securitization market makes this all much more complicated. The supply of loanable funds isn't just a function of cash in the banking system, but also cash invested in the shadow banking system. Right now net new issuance in ABS (meaning new issuance less principal being returned in old issues) is negative, meaning supply of funds from the shadow banking system is contracting.

This contraction of funds doesn't show up anywhere in the Ms, at least not directly, but obviously it matters in terms of consumers ability to buy goods. And it isn't just about availability of credit, which had everything to do with liquidity. Its about demand for credit also. Consumers want to save, they don't want to borrow right now. The following chart of household liabilities shows consumers actually decreased their total liabilities in 2008, the first year-over-year outright decline since the Federal Reserve began keeping the data in 1952.

Consumers are like a Monopoly player who has mortgaged all his properties. Passing GO doesn't cause him to buy more houses, it causes him to unmortgage his properties! That isn't inflation!


Getting back to consumers, it isn't clear to me that consumers are actually running out of money. Check this chart of the Household Financial Obligation Ratio, basically a debt service coverage ratio for consumers.

So consumers might not have to repay debt all at once, which is nice. It means a second-half recovery of sorts remains in play. But the large losses in assets coupled with out-sized debt ratios are going to cause consumers to keep saving at an elevated level. Check out liabilities as a percentage of disposable income.

This isn't a perfect ratio, since liabilities is a stock and income is a flow. But with declining asset values (both homes and financial assets), means that consumers are actually going to have to rely on incomes to pay debt service. Or for that matter to qualify for loans. So I'd think this ratio moves back toward 100%. That implies $3.6 trillion. TRILLION. It will be repaid over time to be sure, but it will remain a continual drag on consumer spending levels.

So keep this in mind when you think about the size of Fed/Treasury programs. $3.6 trillion. Are we worried about $800 billion for the "Stimulus Package" or the $1 trillion revised TALF? Not in terms of inflation.

I'm looking forward to the day when I'm worried about inflation. It isn't today."

CMBS as eligible collateral for TALF loans will help prevent defaults on economically viable commercial properties

TO BE NOTED: From HousingWire:

"Here Comes the Commercial Bailout

Posted By DIANA GOLOBAY
May 4, 2009 8:26 am

After months of watching from the sidelines, there are two newcomers to the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) playground.

The Federal Reserve on Friday announced commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and securities backed by insurance premium finance loans as of June are eligible collateral for TALF participation. The additions are aimed at stimulating lending in the commercial real estate and small business sector by allowing private investors to purchase securities with a matching government investment.

“The CMBS market came to a standstill in mid-2008,” Fed officials said in [1] a media statement. “The inclusion of CMBS as eligible collateral for TALF loans will help prevent defaults on economically viable commercial properties, increase the capacity of current holders of maturing mortgages to make additional loans, and facilitate the sale of distressed properties.”

Although the Fed pointed out that CMBS accounted for nearly half of new commercial mortgage originations in 2007, the CMBS market itself seems to have grown less appealing in recent weeks, with Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services [2] warning in early April of a coming slide in CMBS as the economic recession appears set to take a bite out of one of the few remaining real estate classes to survive much of the turmoil in financial markets worldwide.

“Since September/October 2008, Standard & Poor’s has witnessed significant deterioration in the credit performance of the CMBS transactions it rates,” said credit analyst James Manzi. “The economic recession combined with the absence of readily accessible financing in the capital markets has, in our opinion, skewed the credit risks related to the performance of CMBS sharply to the downside, and in excess of what we expected at origination or in our prior scenario analysis.”

Of course, the Fed’s announcement to include CMBS in the latest round of alphabet soup programs designed to provide liquidity and confidence to the financial markets means government regulators hope to stem further deterioration. The Fed also said the inclusion of ABS backed by insurance premium finance loans to small businesses should facilitate the flow and affordability of credit to small businesses.

The Fed also authorized 5-year loans as of June to purchase CMBS, ABS backed by student loans and by loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration. Up to $100bn of TALF loans could have 5-year maturities.

The Fed said in February it planned to expand the program; Friday’s announcement moves TALF along toward that goal.

Write to Diana Golobay at [3] diana.golobay@housingwire.com."

Unless the Legacy Loan Program winds up buying assets at $90 or more, banks won't sell.

TO BE NOTED: From Accrued Interest:

"PPIP: Maybe you'd like it back in your cell?

The big question surrounding the toxic asset plan is will banks sell? I've put a little pencil to paper here and come up with some actual numbers.

First of all, I expect the Legacy Securities Program will work wonderfully. Sellers will flock to it like Jawas to a stray astromech droid. This program is aimed at securities which have been severely impaired from both a credit and liquidity perspective. CLOs, RMBS, ABS, CMBS, etc. The program should succeed in turning these programs into just liquidity impaired. In effect, it will separate the red ones with the bad motivators from the blue ones in prime condition. That will be key to an eventual economic recovery. It should foster a healthy new issue market for RMBS, ABS and CMBS (don't know that CLOs can come back), which will help get the velocity of money back to a more normal level.

Obviously having ready buyers able to earn impressive ROEs should improve the value of the underlying assets. Financial institutions have already marked these securities to market, an improvement in the actual value of the instruments ought to result in an improvement of balance sheets. This will particularly benefit financials who invested primarily at the top of the asset-backed capital structure. It will also benefit those that hold more risk in securities (such as brokerages Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley and possibly some P&C insurers) and less those that hold risk in loans (such as almost all banks). Even there, much of Goldman and Morgan's risks are tied to the equity markets, not to debt markets. Same goes for life insurance, generally speaking.

That brings us to the with the Treasury's Legacy Loan Program. I expect this to go over like the exotic twi'lek dancer's routine in Jabba's palace. The plan will indeed increase the theoretical price at which banks could sell loans. That's fine, but its short help. Loans haven't been marked to market. Instead, they are held at book value less an allowance for expected loss.

I've done some deep dives on bank residential loan portfolios. Getting detailed data is a challenge, but basically I tried to figure out what percentage of the bank's current portfolio is "challenged." High CLTV, bad geographics, low FICO, etc. You can make a relatively safe assumption that most of the loss reserve is pledged to those kinds of loans. Anyway, I can't find any big banks that are holding, say home equity loans at less than 90% of face. Unless the Legacy Loan Program winds up buying assets at $90 or more, banks won't sell.

So will the PPIF's pay $90? I doubt it. Take home equity loans as an example. Start with the following assumptions:

• PPIFs get loans at 1mo-LIBOR +50bps. Its hard to say exactly what the cost of funds might be, but worth noting that FDIC paper trades around L+20.
• 6-1 leverage, which is the max allowed under the program. I think its reasonable that non-delinquent, prime loans would get the max leverage.
• Assume the loans float at Prime-flat.
• Assume the loans are 1-2 years old, and will repay over the course of 6 years. To make it easy I'm going to assume equal payments per month.
• The pool of loans will suffer 10% cumulative losses, all of which occur in the first two years. I won't write down the losses as they occur, simply take away the interest. That's consistent with a hold-to-maturity IRR calculation.
• Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I'm assuming that the PPIF equity investors are targeting an IRR of 20%.

The result? $82.5.

That price will render it impossible for most banks to sell. For example, based on Bank of America's recent earnings presentation, it has something like $250 billion of prime, non-delinquent home equity loans with 90%+ LTV. I'd call this the kind of stuff that isn't exactly toxic, but selling could improve BAC's risk exposure significantly. Say they effectively have a $90 mark on these. If they sell at $82, they'd suffer an 8% loss versus their capital, or $20 billion. BAC has core equity capital of $48 billion. You do the math.

I don't expect commercial loans to be much better. Now a lot of commercial stuff has large loan loss reserves, and therefore sales would more easily be accretive to capital. But commercial loans are also present an information asymmetry problem. You can put a zillion residential loans into a pool and get some semblance of diversification. You can then look at average stats and get some idea of the make-up of the loans: geo diversification, average FICO, etc. A bank that is selling a commercial loan is telling you they don't want that commercial loan anymore.

This isn't to say the toxic asset plan will have no positive impact, but it is likely to be more indirect than investors are currently hoping. The best chance banks have for decreasing their residential loan portfolios is a revived securitization market, which is the primary aim of the TALF. Banks may be more willing to sell a portion of their home equity loans as a senior security, with the bank retaining a subordinate position. In that case, the bank might retain the upside while still freeing up some capital. In addition, a revived securitization market would give the market confidence that banks have enough liquidity to hold their loan portfolios to maturity.

It will also help banks who have made larger writedowns, especially those that made acquisitions. At the time of acquisition, the bank has to write down the loan to fair market value. In the case of J.P. Morgan's acquisition of WaMu, or Wells Fargo's acquisition of Wachovia, there would be no motivation to under-estimate the FMV decline. Those banks could therefore enjoy improved capital positions from certain sales. "