Showing posts with label Shiller. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shiller. Show all posts

Thursday, June 18, 2009

increasingly difficult for governments to keep telling their citizens that they can’t have an affordable home because of land restrictions

TO BE NOTED: From the Gulf Times Via Free Exchange Via Economist's view:

Unlearned lessons from the housing bubble
Every major country of the world has abundant land in the form of farms and forests, much of which can be converted someday into urban land

By Robert J Shiller/New Haven, US

A construction worker building a new home in Hayward, California. The kinds of expectations for real estate prices that have informed public thinking during the recent bubbles were often totally unrealistic
There is a lot of misunderstanding about home prices. Many people all over the world seem to have thought that since we are running out of land in a rapidly growing world economy, the prices of houses and apartments should increase at huge rates.

That misunderstanding encouraged people to buy homes for their investment value – and thus was a major cause of the real estate bubbles around the world whose collapse fuelled the current economic crisis. This misunderstanding may also contribute to an increase in home prices again, after the crisis ends. Indeed, some people are already starting to salivate at the speculative possibilities of buying homes in currently depressed markets.

But we do not really have a land shortage. Every major country of the world has abundant land in the form of farms and forests, much of which can be converted someday into urban land. Less than 1% of the earth’s land area is densely urbanised, and even in the most populated major countries, the share is less than 10%.

There are often regulatory barriers to converting farmland into urban land, but these barriers tend to be thwarted in the long run if economic incentives to work around them become sufficiently powerful. It becomes increasingly difficult for governments to keep telling their citizens that they can’t have an affordable home because of land restrictions.

The price of farmland hasn’t grown so fast as to make investors rich. In the United States, the price of agricultural land grew only 0.9% a year in real (inflation-adjusted) terms over the entire twentieth century. Most of the benefit from land for investors has to be from the profit that agribusiness can make from their operations, not just from the appreciation of the price of land.

Despite a huge 21st century boom in cropland prices in the US that parallels the housing boom of the 2000’s, the average price of a hectare of cropland was still only $6,800 in 2008, according to the US Department of Agriculture, and one could build 10-20 single-family houses surrounded by comfortable-sized lots on this land, or one could build an apartment building housing 300 people.

Land costs could easily be as low as $20 per person, or less than $0.50 per year over a lifetime. Of course, such land may not be in desirable locations today, but desirable locations can be created by urban planning.

Many people seem to think that the US experience is not generalisable, because the US has so much land relative to its population. Population per square kilometre in 2005 was 31 in the US, compared with 53 in Mexico, 138 in China, 246 in the United Kingdom, 337 in Japan, and 344 in India.

But, to the extent that the products of land (food, timber, ethanol) are traded on world markets, the price of any particular kind of land should be roughly the same everywhere. Farmers will not be able to make a profit operating in some country where land is very expensive, and farmers would give up in those countries unless the price of land fell roughly to world levels, though corrections would have to be made for differing labor costs and other factors.

Shortages of construction materials do not seem to be a reason to expect high home prices, either. For example, in the US, the Engineering News Record Building Cost Index (which is based on prices of labour, concrete, steel, and lumber) has actually fallen relative to consumer prices over the past 30 years. To the extent that there is a world market for these factors of production, the situation should not be entirely different in other countries.

An even more troublesome fallacy is that people tend to confuse price levels with rates of price change. They think that arguments implying that home prices are higher in one country than another are also arguments that the rate of increase in those prices should be higher there.

But, the truth may be just the opposite. Higher home prices in a given country may tend to create conditions for falling home prices there in the future.

The kinds of expectations for real estate prices that have informed public thinking during the recent bubbles were often totally unrealistic. A few years ago Karl Case and I asked random home buyers in US cities undergoing bubbles how much they think the price of their home will rise each year on average over the next ten years. The median answer was sometimes 10% a year.

If one compounds that rate over 10 years, they were expecting an increase of a factor of 2.5, and, if one extrapolates, a 2000-fold increase over the course of a lifetime. Home prices cannot have shown such increases over long time periods, for then no one could afford a home.

The sobering truth is that the current world economic crisis was substantially caused by the collapse of speculative bubbles in real estate (and stock) markets – bubbles that were made possible by widespread misunderstandings of the factors influencing prices.

These misunderstandings have not been corrected, which means that the same kinds of speculative dislocations could recur. - Project Syndicate

lRobert Shiller, Professor of Economics at Yale University and Chief Economist at MacroMarkets LLC, is co-author, with George Akerlof, of Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism.

Sunday, June 7, 2009

Such long, steady housing price declines seem to defy both common sense and the traditional laws of economics

TO BE NOTED: From the NY Times:

Why Home Prices May Keep Falling

HOME prices in the United States have been falling for nearly three years, and the decline may well continue for some time.

Even the federal government has projected price decreases through 2010. As a baseline, the stress tests recently performed on big banks included a total fall in housing prices of 41 percent from 2006 through 2010. Their “more adverse” forecast projected a drop of 48 percent — suggesting that important housing ratios, like price to rent, and price to construction cost — would fall to their lowest levels in 20 years.

Such long, steady housing price declines seem to defy both common sense and the traditional laws of economics, which assume that people act rationally and that markets are efficient. Why would a sensible person watch the value of his home fall for years, only to sell for a big loss? Why not sell early in the cycle? If people acted as the efficient-market theory says they should, prices would come down right away, not gradually over years, and these cycles would be much shorter.

But something is definitely different about real estate. Long declines do happen with some regularity. And despite the uptick last week in pending home sales and recent improvement in consumer confidence, we still appear to be in a continuing price decline.

There are many historical examples. After the bursting of the Japanese housing bubble in 1991, land prices in Japan’s major cities fell every single year for 15 consecutive years.

Why does this happen? One could easily believe that people are a little slower to sell their homes than, say, their stocks. But years slower?

Several factors can explain the snail-like behavior of the real estate market. An important one is that sales of existing homes are mainly by people who are planning to buy other homes. So even if sellers think that home prices are in decline, most have no reason to hurry because they are not really leaving the market.

Furthermore, few homeowners consider exiting the housing market for purely speculative reasons. First, many owners don’t have a speculator’s sense of urgency. And they don’t like shifting from being owners to renters, a process entailing lifestyle changes that can take years to effect.

Among couples sharing a house, for example, any decision to sell and switch to a rental requires the assent of both partners. Even growing children, who may resent being shifted to another school district and placed in a rental apartment, are likely to have some veto power.

In fact, most decisions to exit the market in favor of renting are not market-timing moves. Instead, they reflect the growing pressures of economic necessity. This may involve foreclosure or just difficulty paying bills, or gradual changes in opinion about how to live in an economic downturn.

This dynamic helps to explain why, at a time of high unemployment, declines in home prices may be long-lasting and predictable.

Imagine a young couple now renting an apartment. A few years ago, they were toying with the idea of buying a house, but seeing unemployment all around them and the turmoil in the housing market, they have changed their thinking: they have decided to remain renters. They may not revisit that decision for some years. It is settled in their minds for now.

On the other hand, an elderly couple who during the boom were holding out against selling their home and moving to a continuing-care retirement community have decided that it’s finally the time to do so. It may take them a year or two to sort through a lifetime of belongings and prepare for the move, but they may never revisit their decision again.

As a result, we will have a seller and no buyer, and there will be that much less demand relative to supply — and one more reason that prices may continue to fall, or stagnate, in 2010 or 2011.

All of these people could be made to change their plans if a sharp improvement in the economy got their attention. The young couple could change their minds and decide to buy next year, and the elderly couple could decide to further postpone their selling. That would leave us with a buyer and no seller, providing an upward kick to the market price.

For this reason, not all economists agree that home price declines are really predictable. Ray Fair, my colleague at Yale, for one, warns that any trend up or down may suddenly be reversed if there is an economic “regime change” — a shift big enough to make people change their thinking.

But market changes that big don’t occur every day. And when they do, there is a coordination problem: people won’t all change their views about homeownership at once. Some will focus on recent price declines, which may seem to belie any improvement in the economy, reinforcing negative attitudes about the housing market.

Even if there is a quick end to the recession, the housing market’s poor performance may linger. After the last home price boom, which ended about the time of the 1990-91 recession, home prices did not start moving upward, even incrementally, until 1997.

Robert J. Shiller is professor of economics and finance at Yale and co-founder and chief economist of MacroMarkets LLC."

Friday, May 29, 2009

Milton Friedman embarrassed some of his sound money followers by advocating indexed contracts

TO BE NOTED: From the FT:

"
Inflation can act as a safety valve

By Samuel Brittan

Published: May 28 2009 19:57 | Last updated: May 28 2009 19:57

Are we faced with inflation or deflation? It seems to depend on which analyst you read and on which day of the week. Complaints about a new inflation due to, say, government money creation or budget deficits come hot on the heels of moans that deflation is still a menace. Looking at actual numbers adds to the confusion. On the UK official consumer price index, year-on-year inflation was still 2.3 per cent this April, slightly above the government’s 2 per cent target. On the traditional and more comprehensive retail prices index, it was -1.2 per cent.

Can we just say, then, that as there are both inflationary and deflationary fears, policy is on the right lines and we are enjoying rough price stability? Unfortunately we cannot. For great uncertainty about the direction and size of price movements is itself a danger to economic stability.

Not enough attention has been paid to the fact that after their recent plunge, oil and commodity prices are creeping up again. It was the effect of rising prices in these areas in generating inflation that accounts for the slowness of some central banks to shift last year from restrictive to expansionary policies. A renewed upsurge in primary product prices would make life more difficult for central banks’ monetary strategy. But this is not the most important danger. The real worry is that shortages of energy and basic commodities may be imposing real speed limits on world growth well before anything like full employment is regained.

Let us go back to the problem of uncertain overall price movements. There is a long history of indexation proposals for living with inflation. Milton Friedman embarrassed some of his sound money followers by advocating indexed contracts. In the UK the income tax starting points have been indexed to inflation since the 1970s, although the government has the option of suspending indexation when revenue needs are pressing. Social security benefits have long been indexed to inflation, earnings or some hybrid of the two.

There was a long battle during the Thatcher period in the 1980s over whether the government should issue indexed gilts. A long-time governor of the Bank of England, Gordon Richardson, was fiercely opposed as he regarded it as a moral surrender to inflation. But one of his successors, Eddie George, was happy to see the government push them through and was worried mainly that they were not as popular as they should have been. Some 30 per cent of the UK national debt is now in indexed bonds, as is 10 per cent of US debt.

My own view was that refusal to index out of a moralistic disapproval of inflation was akin to refusing to stop knocking one’s head against a brick wall in the hope that the wall would go away. The main snag about indexation lay in the indexation of wages. There are circumstances in which real wages need to rise less quickly than usual or even to fall. This is difficult enough to accomplish when pay talks centre informally on the “cost of living”. It will be far more so if it comes to renegotiating a formally indexed pay agreement.

The indexation discussion has been revived by an American economist, Robert Shiller, with the aid of Lawrence Kay, who has adapted the argument to British conditions. (“The Case for a Basket”, Policy Exchange). One novelty is that the case is now presented as a way of dealing with deflationary as well as inflationary threats. If you buy a widget on an indexed basis you do not have the embarrassment of asking the seller for a reduction because prices in general have fallen. This happens automatically. A second and more important innovation is that he suggests a new unit of account, which he calls the basket, defined to retain its value whatever national inflation indices do. He believes that the failure to supply such a unit is one reason why indexation has not caught on. “It is far easier for most people to say ‘I will lend you 500 baskets at 3 per cent interest’ than to say ‘I will lend you £500 at an interest rate equal to 3 per cent plus the percentage change each month of the CPI’.”

Prof Shiller’s main modern example of such a basket is Chile’s Unidad de Fomento. But the separation of the unit of account from money used as means of exchange goes back a long time. From the time of Charlemagne, trade and contracts in Europe were based on imaginary or ghost monies that were ultimately based on the silver denarius, which no longer circulated or was even seen.

If a unit of account different from the coin of a realm is to be introduced, it would be better to find a more appealing name than “basket”. I cannot imagine anyone being thrilled to be told by his employer that he had been awarded a pay increase of 0.2 baskets.

But the real snag about indexation remains the problem of wages. As Keynes, Prof Shiller himself and many others have observed, workers accept more readily a real wage cut arising from a rise in the general level of prices than an actual reduction in what they are paid. Prof Shiller tries hard to find a unit in which workers could accept with good grace a reduction in real pay; but I do not think he succeeds. In some circumstances a little bit of old-fashioned inflation is the best safety valve available.

Write to samuel.brittan@ft.com
More columns at www.ft.com/samuelbrittan"

Sunday, May 3, 2009

a depression seems to be related to a fundamental world view, and not just to the latest economic indicator

TO BE NOTED: From the NY Times:

"Economic View
Depression Scares Are Hardly New

WHAT is the chance that the current downturn will morph into another Great Depression? That question has been preoccupying people for months.

The popular mood has a huge impact on the economy, so it’s worth noting what many people seem to forget: Depression scares come and go. And by one authoritative measure, the current outbreak of concern has been surprisingly mild.

The University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers have included in their regular measurements this specific question about fear of a prolonged depression:

“Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely — that in the country as a whole we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?”

The Michigan surveyors produce a confidence score from the answer to this question. (It is one of the five ingredients in their combined Index of Consumer Sentiment, which is much more widely followed.) A high score on the question means that the answers tilted toward continuous good times, with a low score tilting toward unemployment or depression. Since 1960, the average score has been 94.

If we define a depression scare as any time the score is below 65, there have been four such scares since 1951. They were in the periods from 1974 to 1975, during which 47 was the lowest score; from 1978 to 1982, with a low of 41; from 1990 to 1992, with a low of 54; and from 2008 to 2009, with a low (to date) of 59. Note that so far, at least, the worst reading in the current scare has not been as bad as those of the previous episodes.

In each case, the scare’s significance is further confirmed by electronically counting in news databases the number of articles containing the word pair “great depression.” There were huge peaks in the count during these periods.

A study of the Michigan survey data published in 2004 by Nicholas Souleles at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania has confirmed that individual answers to the depression question can help in consumer-spending forecasts. He concluded that people who answered this question more positively tended to have bigger increases in spending.

The good news is that from March to April this year, the score on this question jumped to 81, from 63, implying that the scare has ended, at least for now.

But that upward trend cannot be trusted to continue. Historically, big jumps in the score have tended to reverse themselves in later months. When people’s fear reaches depression level, the underlying emotion seems to persist for years, despite occasional oscillations.

That is probably because fear of a depression seems to be related to a fundamental world view, and not just to the latest economic indicator, which may temporarily reduce anxiety.

A review of prominent events in the depression scares of 1974-75 and 1978-82 suggests that they stemmed at least in part from a sense that inflation was dangerously out of control. During both periods, inflation moved into the double-digit range. There was widespread concern that the Federal Reserve had no good options and might need to plunge the economy into a depression to control inflation.

And in these two periods, energy crises — the first and second “oil shocks” — contributed to the negative outlook.

The scare of 1990-92 had a different profile. Ravi Batra’s best-selling 1987 book, “The Great Depression of 1990,” did not cause that scare, but some of its predictions were vindicated by events: There was the biggest one-day stock market crash ever, in 1987; a real estate bust after a boom; widespread savings-and-loan failures; and a government bailout. The financial system seemed unstable, and there was concern that domestic jobs were threatened by the new trend of outsourcing.

LIKE its predecessors, the current depression scare is characterized by serious problems that won’t easily go away. After the bursting of bubbles in the stock market and housing market, balance sheets everywhere are out of whack, and millions of people are insolvent. So it’s hard to expect that there will be a sudden and impressive recovery of confidence.

But why is this new depression scare apparently weaker than the others, as measured by the confidence scores? Why aren’t people reporting more fear these days, since there are far more stories of business failure or near failure than there were during the other scares?

One can only speculate. Now that oil prices have moderated, it’s possible that most people have less vivid worries than they did in 1974-75 or 1979-82 because their economic problems are not evident every time they shop or drive their cars.

During those earlier two scares, out-of-control inflation was widely visible, but today many people haven’t personally experienced rising unemployment and foreclosures. And it’s possible that the optimistic tone of the president and the Fed has assuaged some fears, and that people might believe that the government is fixing their problems.

This time, the reasons to fret about a possible depression may seem less concrete. For most people, the worries that consume economists and accountants, about things like bank stress-test results or the “OIS-Libor spread,” are rather hard to comprehend.

As Franklin D. Roosevelt famously said during the Great Depression, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” Let’s hope that is true, and that the relative complacency in the general population is good news for the economy. Let’s not expect any sudden return to full confidence, but instead hope that a real crisis of fear may be avoided if government policy succeeds.

Robert J. Shiller is professor of economics and finance at Yale and co-founder and chief economist of MacroMarkets LLC."

Friday, April 24, 2009

This process will take years to complete since, if properly done, it should get at the heart of the regulatory structure.

TO BE NOTED: From The WSJ:

"Good Government and Animal Spirits

Every talented player understands the importance of a strong referee.

The principal long-term result of the current financial crisis should be improved financial regulation. After the immediate crisis is over, we need to restructure our fragmented system. This process will take years to complete since, if properly done, it should get at the heart of the regulatory structure.

[Commentary] Chad Crowe

This is not as radical as it sounds, for while many observers equate U.S.-style capitalism with unconstrained free markets, the story is more complicated. Americans have long understood that for the economy to work well, government must play an important supporting role. They've also long understood the important role that self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as trade associations and exchanges, play in cooperation with government regulation.

An understanding of animal spirits -- the human psychology and culture at the heart of economic activity -- confirms the need for restoring the role of regulators as guiding hands in a healthy, productive free-enterprise system. History -- including recent history -- shows that without regulation, animal spirits will drive economic activity to extremes.

The debate about the proper role of government in the economy goes far back in American history. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Democrats were fiercely opposed to government intervention, while the Whigs thought that the government should provide the backdrop for a healthy capitalism. On the federal level, this would mean support for a bank of the United States and a system of national roads, as part of the "American System" advocated by Henry Clay starting in the 1820s and supported by John Quincy Adams. Andrew Jackson and later Martin van Buren were against such federal government intrusions.

Controversy about the proper relationship of the government and the economy has continued since then. The recent economic turmoil has brought back to the table many questions that had been considered settled. People are seeking new answers, urgently.

There have been several major shifts in American history on this large issue: at the time of the Revolution; after the elections of Andrew Jackson and, later, of Abraham Lincoln; at the end of Reconstruction; during the Great Depression; and after the election of Ronald Reagan. Now we hope and expect we are seeing a shift that will be remembered in association with Barack Obama. If the president (with the help of Congress and our SROs) brings about this shift, it will be something far more important than the soon-to-be-forgotten stimulus and the bailouts he has overseen to date.

At the end of the 1980s, our economic system was remarkably well-adapted to weather any storm. For example, massive numbers of S&Ls failed during the decade. But government protections isolated this collapse into a microeconomic event that, while it cost taxpayers quite a bit of money, only rarely cost them their jobs.

Then the economy changed -- as it always does -- challenging the regulations that were in place. The housing market illustrates this perfectly.

Commercial and savings banks used to have reason to be careful initiating mortgages -- they would most likely hold the debt for years. But banks would increasingly sell the mortgages they initiated to others. And regulation did not adapt to reflect this change in the financial structure. The regulatory failure led to a profound systemic instability in our economy, which accounts for the severity of our economic crisis. Devising new regulatory structures that will allow financial innovation to proceed and yet prevent new such systemic problems is the major challenge to our creative capitalism today.

Public antipathy toward regulation supplied the underlying reason for this failure. The U.S. was deep into a new view of capitalism. Americans believed in a no-holds-barred interpretation of the game. We had forgotten the hard-earned lesson of the 1930s: Capitalism can give us real prosperity, but it does so only on a playing field where the government sets the rules and acts as a referee.

Contrary to a widespread impression the current situation is not really a crisis of capitalism. Rather we must recognize that capitalism must live within certain rules. And our whole view of the economy, with all of its animal spirits, indicates why the government must set those rules. It may be true that in the classical economic paradigm there is full employment. But with animal spirits, waves of optimism and pessimism cause large-scale changes in aggregate demand. Since wages are determined partly by considerations of fairness, these changes in demand do not translate uniformly into shifts in prices and tend to cause shifts in employment. When demand goes down, unemployment rises. It is the role of the government to mute those changes.

Moreover, entrepreneurs and companies do not just sell people what they really want. They also sell people what they think they want, and not infrequently what they think they want turns out to be snake oil. Especially in financial markets, this leads to excesses, and to bankruptcies that cause failures in the economy more generally. All of these processes are driven by stories. The stories that people tell to themselves -- about themselves, about how others behave, and even about how the economy as a whole behaves -- all influence what they do. These stories vary over time.

Such a world of animal spirits justifies the economic intervention of government. Its role is not to harness animal spirits but really to set them free, to allow them to be maximally creative. A brilliant player wants a referee, for only when the game has appropriate rules can he really show his talents. While the sports of baseball and football haven't changed much in the last century, the economy has -- and American financial regulation hasn't had an overhaul in 70 years. The challenge for the Obama administration, along with the U.S. Congress and our SROs, is to invent a new and better American version of the capitalist game.

Mr. Akerlof is the 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics and a professor at the University of California, Berkeley. Mr. Shiller is professor of economics and finance at Yale University and chief economist at Macromarkets LLC. They are co-authors of the recently published "Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism" (Princeton)."

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

fix a system that broke when our animal spirits got out of bounds.

TO BE NOTED: From Bloomberg:

"Depression Lurks Unless There’s More Stimulus: Robert Shiller

Commentary by Robert Shiller

April 15 (Bloomberg) -- In the Great Depression of the 1930s the U.S. government had a great deal of trouble maintaining its commitment to economic stimulus. “Pump- priming” was talked about and tried, but not consistently. The Depression could have been mostly prevented, but wasn’t. Ultimately, the reason for this policy failure was inadequate understanding of the relevant economic theory.

In the face of a similar Depression-era psychology today, we are in need of massive pump-priming again. We appear to be in a much better situation due to the stronger efforts to date. Still, there is a danger that, because of a combination of faulty economic theory and inadequate appreciation of human psychology, as well as deep public anger, we will not continue with such stimulus on a high enough level.

We desperately need to be persistent, keeping our government response adequate for the problem at hand on a sufficient scale and for sufficient time.

George Akerlof and I lay out how economic theory needs to be changed in “Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism” (2009). It shows that the most basic questions can only be answered if we take into account how psychology affects fundamentals such as our sense of fairness or corruption in our economic transactions, which helps determine how trusting or wary we are at any given time.

Following John Maynard Keynes, we call such motivations animal spirits.

Confidence is Key

Our theory of animal spirits is centered on confidence, and the vicious downward cycle of loss of confidence leading to decline in economic activity and then to more loss of confidence. This cycle is fed by the proliferation of stories of failure that spread like a virus by word of mouth over months and years. Moreover, our theory emphasizes that the sense that our society is basically fair can become wounded, and if that happens will not heal for many years.

In our analysis of the current economic crisis, we conclude that the government should have two targets. One would be a joint fiscal-monetary policy target. The same kind of expansionary policies embodied in the government expenditure stimulus and tax cuts that are already being tried have to be done on a big enough scale and for a long enough time in the future.

Gauging Success

Following this target, aggregate demand should be sufficiently high that firms producing good products at a price the public would want to pay will be able to sell them. And if this target is met, skilled labor willing to work at a wage that makes it profitable to sell such products will be able to get a job.

The government should also have a credit target. Once again, we are calling for more of the same kinds of existing policies, but there should be an explicit measure of their success, and until that is reached, the scale and time frame of such policies need to be extended.

The Federal Reserve has to be the lender of last resort and to provide credit in circumstances like we have today. Businesses and consumers, who in normal times would be good credit risks with legitimate needs, should find credit available at reasonable terms. Achieving this requires new approaches, like those announced by the Bernanke Fed and the Obama administration, but on a continuing and even larger scale.

Outrage Creates Dangers

But we have lived for years in a system that tolerated the high-flying inequalities of the current financial system to play itself out, without protest. Where was the outcry then? Why should it not be much more generally targeted? We had two large tax cuts at the federal level that gave highly disproportionate tax advantages to those at the very top. It even gave special provision for extremely low tax rates, much lower than you or I pay on our regular wage income, to managers of hedge funds.

In this crisis, acceptance of these measures is being replaced with outrage. It is increasing the blood pressure of the public, and that can’t continue without damage to our system. Compensation practices in the U.S. need to be made fairer. Vast earnings shouldn’t go virtually untaxed, while the middle class is paying a sizable fraction of each extra dollar in taxes. Only then will the government have the mandate to restore our banking and securities institutions to their proper strong role in our economy.

Shutting Hoovervilles

It is now time to stimulate demand. It is also time to repair the credit system. Those are the two targets that must be hit to get us out of the current economic slump, and to restore confidence. It will be costly to meet both of these targets, and it will require new legislation to give enhanced regulatory powers to deal with a greatly changed financial system, now in a systemic slump.

It is time to face up to what needs to be done. The sticker shock involved will be large, but the costs in terms of lost output of not meeting either the credit target or the aggregate demand target will be yet larger.

It would be a shame if we are so overwhelmed by anger at the unfairness of it all that we do not take the positive measures needed to restore us to full employment. That would not just be unfair to the U.S. taxpayer. That would be unfair to those who are living in Hoovervilles in Sacramento and Fresno, California, and elsewhere; it would be unfair to those who are being evicted from their homes, and can’t find new ones because they can’t find jobs. That would be unfair to those who have to drop out of school because they, or their parents, can’t find jobs.

It is now time to keep our eye on the ball and set clear targets to fix a system that broke when our animal spirits got out of bounds.

(Robert Shiller is the Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics and Professor of Finance at Yale University, and Chief Economist at MacroMarkets LLC. The opinions expressed are his own.)

To contact the writer of this column: Robert.shiller@yale.edu"

Wednesday, April 8, 2009

in the absence of a government takeover of the private debt. The answer is that in that case the debt deflation process is not likely to stop soon

TO BE NOTED: From Naked Capitalism: These are my views too:

"
Keynes' savings paradox, Fisher's debt deflation and the banking crisis

By: Paul de Grauwe

The world economy is experiencing a downward spiral in output and international trade that has not been seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The most striking feature of this downward spiral is the breathtaking speed at which industrial production, world trade and GDP is declining in the world since the end of 2008.

How can such a rapid deceleration of economic activity be explained? The answer has to do with different deflationary spirals that feed on themselves and amplify each other.

Four deflationary spirals

There are four deflationary spirals presently at work in the world economy, i.e. the Keynesian savings paradox, Fisher’s debt deflation, the cost cutting deflation, and the bank credit deflation. Each of these deflationary spirals can be dealt with when they occur in isolation. They become lethal when they interact with each other.

Keynesian savings paradox.

When one individual desires to save more, and he is alone to do so, his decision to save more (consume less) will not affect aggregate output. He will succeed to save more, and once he has achieved his desired level of savings he stops trying to save more.

When the desire to save more is the result of a collective lack of confidence (animal spirits) the individual tries to build up savings when all the others do the same. As a result, output and income decline and the individual fails in his attempt to increase savings. He will try again, thereby intensifying the decline in output, and failing again to build-up savings. There is thus a coordination failure: if the individuals could be convinced that their attempts to build up savings will not work when they all try to do it at the same time, they would stop trying, thereby stopping the downward spiral.

Somebody must organize the collective action. An individual agent will not do this because the cost of collective action exceeds his private gain.

Fisher’s debt deflation:

When one individual tries to reduce his debt, and he is alone to do so, this attempt will generally succeed. The reason is that his sales of assets to reduce his debt will not be felt by the others, and therefore will not affect the solvency of others. The individual will succeed in reducing his debt.

When the desire to reduce debt is driven by a collective movement of distrust, the simultaneous action of individuals to reduce their debt is self-defeating (Fisher(1933)). They all sell assets at the same time, thereby reducing the value of these assets. This leads to a deterioration of the solvency of everybody else, thereby forcing everybody to increase their attempts at reducing their debt by selling assets.

Here also there is a coordination failure. If individuals could be convinced that their attempts to reduce their debt will no work when they all try to do this at the same time, they would stop trying and the deflationary cycle would also stop. An individual, however, will have no incentive to organize such a collective action.

Cost cutting deflation

When one individual firm reduces its costs by reducing wages and firing workers in order to improve its profits, and this firm is alone to do so, it will generally succeed in improving its profits. The reason is that the cost cutting by an individual firm does not affect the other firms. The latter will not react by reducing their wages and firing their workers.

When cost cutting is inspired by a collective movement of fear about future profitability the simultaneous cost cutting will not restore profitability. The reason is that the workers who earn lower wages and the unemployed workers who have less (or no) disposable income will reduce their consumption and thus the output of all firms. This reduces profits of all firms. They will then continue to cut costs leading to further reductions of output and profits.

There is again a coordination failure. If firms could be convinced that the collective cost cutting will not improve profits they would stop cutting their costs. But individual firms have no incentives to do this.

Bank credit deflation:

When one individual bank wants to reduce the riskiness of its loan portfolio it will cut back on loans and accumulate liquid assets. When the bank is alone to do so (and provided it is not too big), it will succeed in reducing the riskiness of its loan portfolio. The reason is that the strategy of the bank will not be felt by the other banks, which will not react. Once the bank has succeeded in reducing the riskiness of its loan portfolio it will stop calling back loans.

When banks are gripped by pessimism and extreme risk aversion the simultaneous reduction of bank loans by all banks will not reduce the risk of the banks’ loan portfolio. There are two reasons for this. First, banks lend to each other. As a result when banks reduce their lending they reduce the funding of other banks. The latter will be induced to reduce their lending, and thus the funding of other banks. Second, when one bank cuts back its loans, firms get into trouble. Some of these firms buy goods and services from other firms. As a result, these other firms also get into trouble and fail to repay their debt to other banks. The latter will see that their loan portfolio has become riskier. They will in turn reduce credit thereby increasing the riskiness of the loan portfolio of other banks.

There is again a coordination failure. If banks could be convinced that the simultaneous loan cutting does not reduce the risk of their loan portfolio they would stop cutting back on their loans and the negative spiral would stop. They have no individual incentives, however, to engage in collective action.

The four deflationary spirals that we described have the same structure. The actions by economic agents create a negative externality that makes these actions self-defeating. This spiral is triggered by a collective movement of fear, distrust or risk aversion (animal spirits; see Akerlof and Shiller(2009) for a fascinating analysis). Individuals (savers, firms, banks) are unable to internalize these externalities because collective action is costly. There is thus a failure to coordinate individual actions to avoid a bad outcome.

Cyclical movements in optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) have always existed. Why do these now lead to such a breakdown of coordination?

The four deflationary spirals we identified, although similar in structure, are different in one particular dimension. The savings paradox and the cost deflation can be called “flow deflations”. They arise because consumers and firms want to change a flow (savings and profits). The other two involve the adjustment of stocks (the debt levels and the levels of credit). We call them “stock deflations”. Problems arise when the flow and stock deflations interact with each other.

In “normal” recessions such as the ones we have experienced in the postwar period prior to the present crisis, only the flow deflations were in operation. There had not been a preceding period of excessive debt accumulation and unsustainable levels of bank loans. As a result, households, firms and banks were not trying to adjust their balance sheets. The pessimism of households and firms was related to expected shortfalls in income and profits, and led to increased savings and cost cutting. In such an environment in which the stock levels were perceived to be right, there were sufficient automatic equilibrating mechanisms that prevented these two flow deflations from leading to an unstoppable downward spiral. The most important equilibrating mechanism occurred through the banking system.

When banks function normally they have a stabilizing force on the business cycle. The reason is that in a recession the central bank typically reduces the interest rate making it easier for banks to lend. In normal circumstances, when banks are not in the process of cleaning up their balance sheets, they will be willing to transmit this interest rate decline into a reduction of the loan rate. As a result, banks will engage in automatic “distress lending” to firms and households. Households will be less tempted to increase their savings. In addition, private investment by firms will be stimulated, i.e. firms will be willing to dissave, thereby mitigating the deflationary potential provoked by the savings paradox. (In De Grauwe(2009) I show this in the context of a simple IS-LM analysis).

The interest rate decline will also mitigate the cost cutting dynamics. This is so because it improves the profit outlook for firms, giving them lower incentives to go on cutting costs. Thus when the banking system functions normally, there are self-equilibrating mechanisms that prevent the flow deflations from degenerating into uncontrollable downward spirals.

The problem the world economy faces today is that flow and stock deflations interact and reinforce each other. The period prior to the crisis was one of excessive buildups of private debt and banks’ assets. The result of these excessive buildups of private debt and balance sheets is that the stock deflation processes described in the previous section operate with full force. As a result, the equilibrating mechanism that exists in normal recessions does not function. The lower interest rates engineered by central banks are not transmitted by the banking sector into lower loan rates for consumers and firms. In addition, we now are confronted by the interaction of the flow and stock deflations. This interaction amplifies these deflationary processes. This interaction, which is especially strong in the US, can be described as follows. Because of excessive debt accumulation of the past, households desire to reduce their debt levels. Thus they all attempt to save more. As argued earlier, these attempts are self-defeating. As a result, households fail to save more, and thus fail to reduce their debt. This leads them to increase their attempts to save more. The fact that the banks do not pass on the lower deposit rates into lower loan rates makes things worse. There are no incentives for firms to increase their investments (no dissaving). Nothing stops the deflationary spiral.

The interaction goes further. The deteriorating conditions in the “real economy” feed back on the banking system. Banks’ loan portfolios deteriorate further as a result of increasing default rates. Banks reduce their lending even further, etc. In De Grauwe(2009) it is shown that a banking sector that is in the grips of credit deflation and deleveraging can destabilize the economy and can push the economy into a true deflationary spiral.

The irrelevance of modern macroeconomics

Modern macroeconomics as embodied in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models (DSGE) is based on the paradigm of the utility maximizing individual agent who understands the full complexity of the world. Since all individuals understand the same “Truth”, modern macroeconomics has taken the view that it suffices to model one “representative individual” to fully represent reality. Thus as a consumer the agent continuously maximizes an intertemporal utility function and is capable of computing the implications of exogenous shocks on his optimal consumption plan, taking full account of what these shocks will do to the plans of the producers. Similarly, producers compute the implications of these shocks on their present and future production plans taking into account how consumers react to these shocks. Thus in such a model coordination failures cannot arise. The representative agent fully internalizes the external effects of all his actions. When shocks occur there can be only one equilibrium to which the system will converge, and agents perfectly understand this (Woodford(2009)).

Deflationary spirals as we have described them in the previous sections cannot occur in the world of the DSGE-models. The latter is a world of stable equilibria. It will not come as a surprise that DSGE-models have not produced useful insight allowing us to understand the nature of the present economic crisis. Yet vast amounts of intellectual energies are still being spent on the further refining of DSGE-models.

Collective action to stop the deflationary spirals

The common characteristic of the different deflationary spirals is a coordination failure. The market fails to coordinate private actions towards an attractive collective outcome. This market failure can in principle be solved by collective action. Such a collective action can only be organized by the government. Let us analyze what this collective action must be to deal with the different forms of deflation.

The key to economic recovery is the stabilization of the banking sector. As argued earlier, a banking sector that is in the grips of credit deflation and deleveraging can destabilize the economy and can push the economy into a true deflationary spiral.

There is no secret about how the bank credit deflation can be stopped. Here are the principles (see Hall and Woodward(2009) for a more detailed analysis). First, bad loans should be separated from good loans, putting the former in separate entities (“bad banks”) to be managed by specialized management teams whose responsibility it is to dispose of these assets. Losses on these bad assets are inevitable, and so is the inevitability that the taxpayer will be asked to foot the bill.

The good loans remain on the balance sheet of the “good bank”. The hope is that this good bank, freed as it is from the toxic assets, will feel liberated and will be willing to take more risk so that the credit flow can start again. One can doubt, however, that a privately run good bank will have sufficient incentives to start lending again. The reason is that extreme risk aversion and a desire to “save the skin” of the shareholders will restrain the managers of the good bank in extending loans. If that is what the managers of the good bank do, the bank credit deflation process described earlier will not stop. This leads to the issue of whether it is not desirable to (temporarily) nationalize the good bank. Such nationalization would take away the paralyzing fear that new bank loans put the bank’s capital (and its shareholders) at risk.

There is a second reason why the government may want to temporarily nationalize the good bank. The bad bank – good bank solution carries the risk of socializing the losses while privatizing the profits. Indeed, the losses of the bad bank will necessarily be borne by the taxpayers. If the good bank remains in private ownership the expected future profits will be handed out to the shareholders. But these profits will be realized only because the toxic assets have been separated and the losses on these assets have been borne by taxpayers. It is therefore more reasonable to make sure that these future profits are given back to the taxpayers.

The resolution of the bank crisis along the lines discussed in the previous paragraphs is a necessary condition for the recovery. It will also make the use of other macroeconomic policies easier and more effective. These other macroeconomic policies must be geared towards resolving the other deflationary processes. Let us discuss these consecutively.

The Keynesian savings paradox

The collective action failure implicit in the Keynesian savings paradox calls for the government to do the opposite of what private agents do, i.e. to dissave. Dissaving by the government is a necessary condition for making it possible for private consumers to succeed in their attempts to save more.

A well-functioning banking sector reduces the need for dissaving by the government. When the banking sector works well, the consumers’ attempts to save more leads to a lower interest rate and induces firms to invest more (they dissave). As a result, the required dissaving by the government is reduced correspondingly.

Fisher’s debt deflation

Government action is required to solve the coordination failure implicit in the debt deflation process. This can be done by taking over private debt and substituting it with government debt. In doing so, the government makes it possible for the private sector to reduce its debt level. The private sector will then stop attempting (unsuccessfully) to reduce its debt level. The debt deflation process can stop.

The issue that arises here is whether the substitution of private by government debt will not lead to unsustainable government debt levels. There are two aspects to this issue. Let us first look at the debt levels of the public and private sectors in the eurozone. These are shown in figure 1. The most remarkable feature of this figure is how low the government debt is relative to private debt. In addition, the government debt is the only one that has declined (as a percent of GDP) during the last 10 years. This contrasts with the debt of households and especially the debt of financial institutions that has increased significantly and that stood at 250% of GDP in 2008. This is three times higher than the debt of the government which stood at approximately 70%. We conclude that more than the public debt, the private sector’s debt has become unsustainable. The process of substitution of private debt by public debt can go on for quite some time before it reaches the levels of unsustainability of the private debt.

Figure 1

Source: European Commission

The second dimension to the sustainability issue of government debt arises from the question of what will happen in the absence of a government takeover of the private debt. The answer is that in that case the debt deflation process is not likely to stop soon. As a result, output and income are likely to go down further. This will negatively affect tax revenues and will increase future budget deficits, forcing governments to increase their debt. Refusing to stop the debt deflation dynamics by issuing government debt today will not prevent the government debt from increasing in the future. The same problem of sustainability of the government debt will reappear.

To conclude it is useful to formulate a methodological note. The effectiveness of fiscal policies has been very much analyzed by economists. It appears from the empirical evidence that fiscal policy is limited in its effect to boost the economy. This evidence, however, is typically obtained from equilibrium models estimated during “normal” business cycle movements (see e.g; Wieland(2009), Cogan, et al. (2009)). In the context of the flow and stock deflations that are disequilibrium phenomena and that at the core of the present economic downturn, fiscal policy becomes an instrument to stabilize an economy that otherwise can become unstable. This feature is absent from modern macroeconomic models that are intrinsically stable. The evidence obtained from these models may not be very relevant to gauge the effectiveness of fiscal policies in the present context.

Paul de Grauwe is professor of economics, Catholic University of Leuven.

References

Akerlof, G., and Shiller, R., (2009), Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 264pp.

Cogan, J, Tobias, C, Taylor, J, and Wieland, V., (2009), “New Keynesian versus Old Keynesian Government Spending Multipliers”, CEPR Discussion Paper 7236, March 2009.

De Grauwe, P. (2009), Keynes’ Savings Paradox, Fisher’s Debt Deflation and the Banking Crisis, http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ew/academic/intecon/Degrauwe/PDG-papers/Work_in_progress_Presentations/Flow-Stock%20Deflations.pdf

Fisher, I, (1933), The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, Econometrica, 1, October, pp. 337-57.

Hall, R., and Woodward, S., (2009), The right way to create a good bank and a bad bank, www.voxeu.org/index.php

Minsky, H., (1986), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, McGraw Hill, 395pp.

Wieland, V., (2009), The fiscal stimulus debate: “Bone-headed” and “Neanderthal”? http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3373

Woodford, Michael (2009), “Convergence in Macroeconomics: Elements of the New Synthesis”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 267-279"

Friday, April 3, 2009

our best guide to recovery from our present distress, not least because of its common-sense psychology

TO BE NOTED: From The New Republic:

"Shorting Reason

Richard A. Posner, The New Republic Published: Wednesday, April 15, 2009


Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism

By George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller

(Princeton University Press, 264 pp., $24.95)

The economics profession has been greatly embarrassed by the economic crisis. The crisis began last September, with the crash of the banking industry (broadly defined, as it should be in this deregulatory era, to include investment banks and other financial intermediaries besides commercial banks), and of the stock market and other financial markets. It has since grown into the first depression since the 1930s, if one may judge from its global sweep, the pervasive anxiety that it has engendered among government officials as well as the business community and the public at large, and the trillions of dollars that nations have desperately committed to fighting it. The economists had assured us that there would never be another depression in the United States, because economics had discovered how to prevent depressions: if economic activity dropped, the Federal Reserve had only to push down interest rates, for this would induce banks to lend and consumers and businessmen to borrow, and the borrowed money would be used to finance consumption and production, restoring output to its level before the crash. Academic and government economists specializing in the business cycle were as surprised by the September collapse and the ensuing downward spiral of the economy as anyone, and were unprepared with plans for arresting it. Six months later they cannot agree on what should be done to recover from it. Not knowing what will work, the government is trying everything.

The idea that monetary policy--raising interest rates (and therefore reducing the amount of money in circulation, because interest is the price of putting money into circulation rather than hoarding it) to check inflation, and lowering interest rates to check economic downturns--holds the key to moderating the business cycle, and therefore to preventing depressions as well as inflations, has been falsified. The Federal Reserve has pushed interest rates way down, but the amount of lending has been tepid and economic activity has continued to fall--hence the bailouts of banks and other financial institutions and the $787 billion stimulus package recently enacted by Congress. The stimulus, a program of deficit spending, seeks to replace the loss of private demand, and the resulting decline in economic activity, brought about by the economic crisis. It seeks to do this by public works, such as the construction and repair of highways and other transportation infrastructure, designed to increase employment, and by tax cuts and welfare payments, which are intended to increase incomes directly and by doing so to stimulate spending.

In 1936, John Maynard Keynes argued in his great book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money that government could use deficit spending to replace private demand with public demand, and by doing so put a nation's unemployed to work. Over time, this position has encountered increasing opposition. Many influential economists came to oppose deficit spending on public projects, which injects the government deep into the economy and creates a risk of inflation and high taxes in the future. Increasingly economists favored the monetarist approach, championed most famously by Milton Friedman, which teaches that the proper management of the money supply is all that is needed to avert depressions, and that it can do so painlessly.

But now that monetarism has received a sharp blow to its solar plexus, much of the economics profession has thrown its support to the idea of a fiscal stimulus (while rightly critical of many of the details of the stimulus package enacted by Congress). Which is to say, it has thrown its support to Keynesianism. In Animal Spirits, two distinguished liberal economists, reflecting on the current depression, marry Keynes to "behavioral economics" and offer the resulting union as a replacement for conventional monetarist economics, and for rational-choice theory more broadly.

George A. Akerlof's and Robert Shiller's book is short, and aimed at the general reader (though the end notes and bibliography are strictly for economists), but it is intended to be taken seriously as a work of economic theory. Akerlof is an expert on frictions in consumer and employment markets. Shiller is an expert on speculative excesses, and he was one of the few economists to warn about the danger of the housing bubble that brought the economy low.

Their thesis is that the key to understanding depressions, and the ups and downs of the economy more generally, is psychology, which they call "animal spirits." They relate this emphasis on psychology to the new field of economics called "behavioral economics," which rejects the "rational man" model of conventional economic theory in favor of what its proponents consider a more realistic picture of human motivations and capacities. Akerlof and Shiller believe that if people were rational, there would be no depressions; but there are depressions, and so the rational model must be inadequate.

They want a pedigree, or a sacred text, to lend authority to their thesis, and they want to champion the liberal Keynes over the conservative Friedman. Hence their appropriation of the term "animal spirits" from a famous passage in The General Theory: "Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits--of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.... Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism fades, enterprise will fade and die.... It is our innate urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance."

Akerlof and Shiller think that by "animal spirits" Keynes meant "noneconomic motives and irrational behaviors," and they imply that he wanted government to "countervail the excesses that occur because of our animal spirits." This is a misreading. The passage in The General Theory is not about excesses, and it does not argue that "animal spirits" should be damped down. It is about the danger of paralysis in the face of uncertainty ("if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism fades, enterprise will fade and die"). As Keynes's biographer Robert Skidelsky explains, The General Theory argues that "actual output is normally below 'potential' output; in depressions disastrously so. It is only in moments of 'excitement' that the economic machine works at full blast. This helps explain why economic progress has been so slow and fitful."

Keynes picked up from the American economist Frank Knight the distinction between calculable risk, the sort of thing on which insurance premiums are based, and uncertainty in the sense of a risk that cannot be quantified. (Keynes had published a treatise on probability theory in 1921.) The fact that businessmen would venture to invest at all in the face of uncertainty was a puzzle, and the explanation, Keynes argued, lay in emotion. You would have to be high-spirited--say, like Columbus--to embark on a costly, uncertain venture. In other words: nothing ventured, nothing gained.

What happens in a depression, and makes it a psychological event as well as an economic and political one, is that the economic environment becomes so uncertain that people freeze. Not only are businessmen afraid to invest, but consumers are afraid to spend; instead they hoard cash. Right now our banks, dubiously solvent and harassed by an angry Congress, are hoarding. Consumers are hoarding, too; the savings rate has shot up, and the increased savings are taking safe and rather inert forms--CDs, money market accounts, government securities, even currency and gold--that do not stimulate investment. Until animal spirits revive, the economy will not recover.

Keynes thought that if government put the unemployed to work, their animal spirits would rise, along with those of the contractors who hired the unemployed to perform the government's contracts. Even more important, people who were still employed but afraid they would soon be unemployed would regain confidence if unemployment fell and the threat to their own jobs thus receded. Feeling more confident about their future, they would begin to spend, and business would begin to invest. The vicious cycle of falling consumption, production, and employment would turn into a virtuous cycle of rising consumption, production, and employment. Keynes worried about stock market speculation, because he thought that speculators based their decisions on guesses about the psychology of other investors rather than on which companies had the best prospects and therefore should attract new investment. But he did not relate speculation to an excess of animal spirits.

Akerlof and Shiller believe that the key to understanding depressions lies in motives or behaviors that they regard as non-rational or irrational. They list "confidence," "fairness," "money illusion," the temptation to "corruption, " and susceptibility to "stories" and treat all of these as manifestations of "animal spirits." Only "confidence" comes within shouting distance of Keynes's understanding of animal spirits. But Akerlof and Shiller give it a negative charge that is alien to Keynes.

People buy common stock when stock prices are rising. They (notoriously) bought houses during the early 2000s when house prices were rising. Since almost no one can predict the ups and downs of the stock market or the housing market, these purchases must have been motivated, Akerlof and Shiller argue, by something other than a rational investment strategy. But this is not at all obvious, or implied by Keynes's usage. Stocks have generally been a good investment, at least when held for a considerable period. And since no one is able to time market turns, no one knows when the market is overpriced and therefore when one should sell rather than buy. Indeed, the idea of selling at the "top" of the market is incoherent, because if it were known that stock prices had peaked, no one would buy. Buying stock, or buying a house, is at any time a guess about the future, a venture into the unknown. Yet that does not imply irrationality.

In the early 2000s, interest rates were very low because of a mistaken decision by Alan Greenspan (but who knew?); and since a house is a product purchased with debt (a mortgage), houses became a more than usually attractive investment. The housing stock expands only slowly because it is so durable, so the increase in demand for houses outran the increase in supply (new housing starts), causing prices to rise. Since very few economists and no government officials warned of a bubble, it was not irrational for people to think that houses were a good investment, even though house prices had risen steeply since the 1990s.

They were wrong. But mistakes and ignorance are not symptoms of irrationality. They usually are the result of limited information. Ben Bernanke, in October 2005, just before the housing bubble began to leak air, denied that the rise in housing prices was a bubble. Was he irrational? That the errors of experts can lead to disaster is hardly a novelty, but it does not follow that only an irrational person would heed the advice of experts.

Akerlof and Shiller rightly associate booms with "new era" thinking, but wrongly deem such thinking irrational. Stocks soared in the late 1920s because it was a period of rapid economic growth based on rapidly rising labor productivity and new products such as the massproduced automobile, new methods of retailing such as the chain store, and new methods of finance such as installment buying and the purchase of common stock on margin. There was no reason to think that existing stock prices reflected an exaggerated expectation of increased wealth in so dynamic an era. The late 1990s were likewise heralded as a new era, this time on the basis of expectations that the computer would transform the economy. The early 2000s seemed to most people still another new era, this one based on the seemingly magical conjunction of low interest rates with low inflation, rising asset values, and new financial instruments that were believed to enable greater lending and borrowing with less risk. In all three cases the new era turned out, at least in the short run, to be a false dawn, and an asset-price crash ensued. Given the uncertainty of the economic environment, stressed by Keynes, such disappointments are not surprising, and they do not show that investors are irrational.

Nor are booms the result, as Akerlof and Shiller curiously argue, of "corruption scandals." They think that economic downturns are preceded by increases in corruption, and they give examples. The oddest is the widespread violation of the prohibition laws in the 1920s, but they also note the financial scandals exposed by investigations of Wall Street that Congress conducted in the ensuing depression. They think that mortgage fraud was a major cause of the present crisis. How all this relates to animal spirits is unclear, but in any event they are wrong about the causality. Warren Buffett had it right: until the tide goes out, you cannot know who is swimming naked. A crash exposes frauds; it is rarely caused by them. Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme fell apart when, as a consequence of the stock market crash last fall, his investors--their wealth diminished and their animal spirits crushed--tried to withdraw money from his phony hedge fund. The scheme itself was not a cause of the crash.

There was more than the usual amount of mortgage fraud during the housing bubble, but it was not the cause of many millions of people overpaying for houses, as we know with the benefit of hindsight that they did. Cheap credit and soaring house values were the immediate causes of the bubble and of all that followed when it burst. The underlying causes were the deregulation of financial services; lax enforcement of the remaining regulations; unsound decisions on interest rates by the Federal Reserve; huge budget deficits; the globalization of the finance industry; the financial rewards of risky lending, and competitive pressures to engage in it, in the absence of effective regulation; the overconfidence of economists inside and outside government; and the government's erratic, confidence-destroying improvisational responses to the banking collapse.

Some of these mistakes of commission and omission had emotional components. The overconfidence of economists might even be thought a manifestation of animal spirits. But the career and reward structures, and the ideological preconceptions, of macroeconomists are likelier explanations than emotion for the economics profession's failure to foresee or respond effectively to the crisis.

That animal spirits droop in a bust is no more anomalous than that they soar in a boom. To freeze and to hoard is a perfectly sensible reaction to an increase in economic uncertainty, whether one is a businessman or a consumer. It is individually rational behavior, though bad for the economy. Rich women think they are helping the economy by cutting down on luxury purchases; they are merely increasing unemployment in retailing.

While for Keynes "confidence" (or "animal spirits") was the key to getting out of a depression, for Akerlof and Shiller it is something to be chilled down in order to prevent booms that might turn into busts. This inversion of Keynes may explain the strangest statement in the book: that "both presidents are heroes of ours," the two presidents being Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt. Both are "heroes" because both ran budget deficits and created new agencies to regulate the economy.

But there is a significant historical difference that Akerlof and Shiller overlook. In the three years of depression during which Hoover was president, confidence drained out of the economy. The depression touched bottom at the end of his term, and turned around within days of Roosevelt's inauguration. As Gauti Eggerstsson recently explained in the American Economic Review, Hoover's adherence to the gold standard, and his determination to keep government small (so no Keynesian stimulus) and raise taxes to try to balance the budget, created a rational expectation of continued economic contraction, dampening the economy's animal spirits. Roosevelt's decision, made promptly upon his taking office, to go off the gold standard (in effect), push up prices (in order to end deflation), and engage in massive (for the time) deficit spending, created an expectation of economic recovery. This expectation had positive effects on the economy even before the new policies could take effect. Roosevelt restored confidence, which Hoover had killed, and renewed confidence restarted the economic engine.

A weakness of Akerlof's and Shiller's book is a failure to define their target: the rational model of human behavior. If rationality means omniscience, then it is indeed an unsound premise for economic reasoning. If it means reasoning unaffected by emotion, then it misunderstands emotion. The word "emotional" has overtones of irrationality, but actually emotion is at once a form of telescoped thinking (it is not irrational to step around an open manhole "instinctively" without first analyzing the costs and benefits of falling into it) and a prompt to action that often, as in the case of investment under uncertainty, cannot be based on complete or even good information and is therefore unavoidably a shot in the dark. We could not survive if we were afraid to act in the face of uncertainty.

Irrationality is not the courage to act. Irrationality is to be found in the cognitive quirks that we owe to the human brain having evolved in a very different environment from our present one. We are poor at evaluating low-probability events because in the ancestral environment (as evolutionary biologists call it) there was little that could be done about such events. The sense of the irrational that merchants exploit--that a price of $5.99 is meaningfully less than $6.00--is a trace of the limited value in that environment of being able to evaluate fine differences. These quirks do not explain depressions.

As one reads this book, one has the sense that deep down Akerlof and Shiller believe that being rational is the same as being right. That is a mistake. It prevents them from entertaining the possibility that what has now plunged the world into depression is a cascade of mistakes by rational businessmen, government officials, academic economists, consumers, and homebuyers, operating in an unexpectedly fragile economic environment, and that what is retarding recovery is not the "unreasoning fear" of which Franklin Roosevelt famously spoke but the rational fears--the reasoning fear, to use Roosevelt's idiom--of businesspeople, consumers, and officials who confront economic uncertainties for which no one had prepared them.

Akerlof and Shiller invoke "fairness" and "money illusion" to explain the puzzling behavior of employment and wages in a depression. It may seem obvious that employment would fall in a depression. But it is not. If demand for a firm's products falls, the firm will have less revenue, and therefore it will have to cut its costs, including its labor costs, to survive. So why not just cut its workers' wages and explain to them why? If they stalk off in anger, the employer should have no difficulty in hiring replacements at the lower wage, for in the unsettled conditions of a depression it will be attractive to other workers. Or suppose, as often happens in a depression (and may still happen in our current one), the general price level falls. In a deflation, the same amount of money buys more, because prices are lower. So one might expect an employer to say to his employees, "Since the purchasing power of the dollar has risen, I am going to cut your wage, as otherwise, by receiving the same amount of money when its purchasing power has increased, you would be receiving a wage increase, which makes no sense in a depression." (Among the paradoxes of depression is that we want wages to fall, so that producers will have lower costs and will therefore produce more and so hire more workers. This is not understood by the politicians who are pushing for legal changes that will encourage unionization. They should wait until we are out of the woods.)

Wages do fall in a deflation, but not as far as prices; and employers do generally prefer to economize on labor costs by laying off workers rather than by reducing their wages. The resistance of workers to having their wages cut in a deflation, a resistance that in the Great Depression of the 1930s produced a sharp rise in real incomes for many workers while others were on breadlines, is ascribed by Akerlof and Shiller to workers' sense of "fairness"--of their sense of entitlement to their existing wage--and to "money illusion," by which they mean the failure to distinguish between the amount of money one receives as a wage (the nominal wage) and the purchasing power of the wage (the real wage). They also argue that employers deliberately "overpay" their workers in order to boost morale and loyalty. But this does not explain why nominal wages are not cut during a depression in order to maintain (not cut) real wages.

There is a simpler explanation for unemployment in depressions, one that dispenses with irrationality. A worker who, rather than being paid a flat wage, is paid a percentage of his firm's income would be unlikely to complain when his wage dropped in a depression; he would know that his wage was variable, and he would plan his life accordingly. But if paid a fixed wage, he is likely to count on it as a steady source of income. Since depressions are rare and have unpredictable consequences, he will not have been able to protect himself from the consequences of a depression-induced cut in his wage. He is going to be upset to find that he is working as hard or harder but being paid less, and he will not be reassured by being given a lecture on deflation and purchasing power, because he will not understand or believe it. And whereas wage cuts make the entire work force unhappy, layoffs make just the laid-off workers unhappy, and since they are no longer on the premises they do not demoralize the remaining work force by their unhappy presence. The employer, for this and other reasons--such as wanting to economize on benefits and overhead and induce the remaining workers to work harder lest they be laid off too--is likely to prefer laying off workers to cutting wages. (Unemployment insurance is a factor as well.)

This explanation for unemployment in depressions is consistent with Akerlof and Shiller in giving weight to cognitive and emotional factors (workers do not understand deflation, unhappy workers can demoralize the workplace), but it avoids jargon and condescension and the fascination with irrationality. Yet it may be too simple to please an academic economist. One reason why Keynes fell into disfavor among academic economists, and why Akerlof and Shiller want to dress him in the garb of a behavioral economist, is that although he was a brilliant economist and remains a hero of liberal economists, he was not a formal or systematic thinker. He belonged to the era before economists insisted on mathematizing the discipline. The General Theory is beautifully written--and full of loose ends and puzzling omissions. Keynes was a self-taught economist and a part-time academic. He had a rich and varied non-academic life as a government official and adviser, journalist, speculator, academic administrator, and member of the Cambridge Apostles and the Bloomsbury group. Having observed how people, including himself, behaved in the real world, he was unself-conscious about incorporating into economic theory such unsystematized and untheorized concepts as "animal spirits" (and its opposite, "liquidity preference"--the desire to hoard cash rather than spend or invest it).

The complexity of a modern economy has defeated efforts to create mathematical models that would enable depressions to be predicted and would provide guidance on how to prevent them or, failing that, to recover from them. The insights of behavioral economics have not done the trick, either. Shiller is to be commended for spotting bubbles, but few if any other behavioral economists noticed them; and he and Akerlof offer no concrete proposals for how we might recover from the current depression and prevent a future one. They want credit loosened, but so does everyone else--so did Keynes, who criticized our government for tightening credit in the early stages of the Great Depression.

We will discover soon enough whether the measures taken by the Obama administration are reviving the animal spirits of producers and consumers. The intentions are good. But the lack of focus, the partisan squabbling, the dizzying policy oscillations, the delays in execution, and the harassment of bankers are bad. By increasing the uncertainty of the business environment, these things are dampening the animal spirits--the courage to reason and act in the face of an uncertain future. Seventy-three years after the publication of The General Theory, it may still be our best guide to recovery from our present distress, not least because of its common-sense psychology.

Richard A. Posner "