Showing posts with label Thoma. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thoma. Show all posts

Saturday, May 30, 2009

In my heart of hearts, I'm pretty libertarian.

TO BE NOTED: From the Economist's View:

"Liberaltarians"

In my heart of hearts, I'm pretty libertarian. I really don't want government looking over my shoulder and telling me what I can and cannot do.

Where I part with many libertarians - perhaps due to my background - is in the idea that government is almost always at odds with liberty. In my case, government played a key role in providing me with opportunity - education is one example, without tuition of $100 per semester at a state school, I probably would not have gone to college - but the opportunities government provided me go beyond education (and also see the examples given in the article for women and minorities).

Governments also need to intervene to prevent monopoly and political power from building up. Without such interventions, power will tend to concentrate and we will likely be exploited in one way or another, so government needs to ensure that our opportunity to enter a particular business - that our economic opportunities generally - are not limited by these factors.

I'm doing this in a bit of a rush (during a seminar, but don't tell), so one more quick point. I was very disappointed in the silence from many libertarians when the Bush administration was taking away, one by one, many of the liberties we enjoy. It was hard not to conclude that for many, the label of libertarian is simply an excuse to be concerned with little more than their own pocketbook.

In any case, I agree with much of what Bruce Bartlett has to say:

Liberaltarians?, by Bruce Bartlett, Commentary, Forbes: I recently attended a dinner with a group of prominent liberal and libertarian bloggers to see if there is a community of interest that might lead to closer cooperation on some issues.

On the surface, there would appear to be potential for an alliance. Libertarians tend to be liberal on social issues, favoring such things as gay marriage and drug legalization; and also liberal on defense and foreign policy, opposing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and opposing torture and restrictions on civil liberties in the name of national security.

But libertarians are conservative on economic policy--favoring a free market with virtually no government intervention except the enforcement of contracts, and no government spending or taxes except those to pay for a very minimal police force and military.

Libertarians' views on social policy and national defense make them sympathetic to the Democrats, while their views on economic policy tend to align them with the Republicans. If one views social, defense and economic policy as having roughly equal weight, it would seem, therefore, that most libertarians should be Democrats. In fact, almost none are. Those that don't belong to the dysfunctional Libertarian Party are, by and large, Republicans.

The reason for this is that most self-described libertarians are primarily motivated by economics. In particular, they don't like paying taxes. They also tend to have an obsession with gold and a distrust of paper money. As a philosophy, their libertarianism doesn't extent much beyond not wanting to pay taxes, being paid in gold and being able to keep all the guns they want. Many are survivalists at heart and would be perfectly content to live in complete isolation on a mountain somewhere, neither taking anything from society nor giving anything.

An example of this type of libertarian thinking can be found on the Web site of a group called the Campaign for Liberty. It pays lip service to the libertarian philosophy on foreign and social policy, but says little about them. The discussion of economic policy, however, is much greater. But its only major proposal is abolition of the income tax. No ideas on how government spending would be cut to make this possible are put forward except to eliminate the congressional pay raise. Perhaps this group really believes that will be enough to abolish the income tax, but I suspect not. Whoever wrote these talking points is simply pandering to the stupid, the ignorant and the unsophisticated.

One is not likely to run into that type of libertarian at a Washington dinner party. These libertarians tend to be well-educated, arriving at his or her philosophy through reading obscure books or random contact with some libertarian in graduate school. They don't own guns--probably never even fired one, don't mind paying taxes too much, have no particular nostalgia for the gold standard and certainly would not choose to live in isolation on a mountaintop. They are cosmopolitan, urbane, articulate and interested in ideas more than just about anything else. They are not especially career-oriented--they are happy to be paid less than they probably could make as long as they don't have to compromise their principles and can do work that advances the cause. For the most part, they aren't family-oriented or religious, and they mostly fit the stereotype of a nerd.

But even these metro-libertarians tend to be more concerned about economics than social or foreign policy. The Cato Institute publishes an annual survey of economic freedom throughout the world, but produces no surveys of what countries have the most political or social freedom or those that have the most libertarian foreign policy.

Furthermore, economic freedom tends to be determined primarily by those measures for which quantifiable data are available. Since it is very easy to look up the top marginal income tax rate or taxes as a share of GDP, these measures tend to have overwhelming influence on the ratings. As a result, countries like Denmark, which are very free every way except in terms of taxes, end up being penalized. Conversely, authoritarian states like Singapore don't suffer for it because they have low taxes.

An unstated implication of these rankings is that freedom is the highest good--the thing that brings the greatest happiness to the most people. Since low taxes are taken as the sine qua non of a free society, one would therefore expect the happiest countries to be the lowest-taxed countries. In fact, this is not the case. Based on a recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, most of the world's happiest countries are high-tax countries.

Taxes and Happiness, 2006

Country Happiness Index Taxes/GDP

Denmark 8.0 / 49.1

Finland 7.6 / 43.0

Netherlands 7.6 / 39.3

Norway 7.5 / 43.9

Switzerland 7.5 / 29.6

New Zealand 7.4 / 36.7

Australia 7.4 / 30.6

Canada 7.4 / 33.3

Belgium 7.4 / 44.5

Sweden 7.4 / 49.1

United States 7.3 / 28.0

Source: OECD

At the liberaltarian dinner, many of the liberals persuasively argued that the pool of freedom isn't fixed such that if government takes more, then there is necessarily less for the people. Many government interventions expand freedom. A good example would be the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was opposed by libertarians like Barry Goldwater as an unconstitutional infringement on states' rights. Yet it was obvious that African Americans were suffering tremendously at the hands of state and local governments. If the federal government didn't step in to redress these crimes, who else would?

Since passage of the civil rights act, African Americans have achieved a level of freedom equal to that of most whites. Yet I have never heard a single libertarian hold up the civil rights act as an example of a libertarian success.

One could also argue that the women's movement led to a tremendous increase in freedom. Libertarians may concede the point, but conservatives almost universally view the women's movement with deep hostility. They think women are freest when fulfilling their roles as wife and mother. Anything that conflicts with those responsibilities is bad as far as most conservatives are concerned.

In short, there is a theoretical case to be made for liberals and libertarians at least continuing a dialogue. But for it to go anywhere, libertarians must scale back their almost single-minded focus on economic freedom as the sole determinant of liberty. They must work harder to defend civil liberties and resist expansion of the police state whether it involves suspected terrorists, illegal aliens or those who enjoy smoking marijuana.

Libertarians should also be more outspoken about America's disastrous foreign policy, which Obama seems to be doing very little to fix. This would seem like an obvious area for cooperation. The main problem seems that neither liberals nor libertarians are up to challenging the loudmouthed bullies on talk radio and Fox News who equate anything less than a 100% commitment to the "war on terror" as treasonous.

I believe there should be more balance in the libertarian strategy, with civil liberties and non-interventionism having closer to equal weight with economic freedom.

In return, liberals can learn something important about economics from libertarians. Liberals often turn to government to solve social problems simply because that is their default position. But often, there are private-sector alternatives that may in fact be superior. The rich diversity of America's states and localities shows there are many different ways of dealing with social problems that don't necessarily require more government.

I hope the dialogue continues.

Posted by Mark Thoma "

Saturday, April 18, 2009

This exercise was supposed to build confidence in the system

From the Economist's View:

"Bank Regulators Clash Over Endgame"

The bank stress tests are nearly complete, and there's apparently a debate over what to do with the stress test information on individual banks. Shouldn't Geithner have known what they were going to do with the stress test information before announcing the program in February? Or maybe figured out what those plans were over the last two months as they've been conducting the tests? Did they have plans and then realize they hadn't fully thought them through? Didn't we learn the dangers of going to battle without thinking carefully about the endgame and planning accordingly?

This exercise was supposed to build confidence in the system, but that doesn't happen when you put a policy in place before thinking it through thoroughly. Instead of testing banks, it's ending up as a test of Geithner's credibility as a policymaker, and instead of building confidence, it threatens to undermine it:

Bank Regulators Clash Over Endgame of U.S. Bank Stress Tests, by Robert Schmidt, Bloomberg: The U.S. Treasury and financial regulators are clashing with each other over how to disclose results from the stress tests of 19 U.S. banks, with some officials concerned at potential damage to weaker institutions.

With a May 4 deadline approaching, there is no set plan for how much information to release, how to categorize the results or who should make the announcements... While the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and other regulators want few details about the assessments to be publicized, the Treasury is pushing for broader disclosure.

The disarray highlights what threatens to be a lose-lose situation for Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner: If all the banks pass, the tests’ credibility will be questioned, and if some banks get failing grades and are forced to accept more government capital and oversight, they may be punished by investors and customers. ...

Fed officials have pushed for the release of a white paper laying out the methodology of the assessments in an effort to bolster their credibility. ... A statement on the methods is scheduled for release April 24. ... The 19 companies may get preliminary results as soon as April 24, a person briefed on the matter said.

Regulators, all of which regularly administer exams to the lenders they oversee, have privately expressed concern about the tests and whether they will be effective, the two people said.

While weaker banks deemed to need additional capital will be given six months to raise it, financial markets may have little more than six minutes of patience before punishing them if the information is publicly released, one official said.

Geithner has said he crafted the stress test program in an effort to provide more transparency about the health of banks’ balance sheets. ... How the market handles the results is a chief worry of banks and regulators... Banking lawyers and industry officials said that the Treasury needs to be very clear with the public about the reviews, which by their design test events that may not happen. ...

Posted by Mark Thoma"

Me:

“Will applications filed by QFIs or the names of applying QFIs be released publicly?

No. Treasury will not release the names of QFIs who apply for the CAP or those which
are not approved. Treasury will publish electronic reports detailing any completed
transactions, including the name of the QFI and the amount of the investment, as required
by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, within 48 hours of the
investment.”

And:

“What if a QFI needs capital in excess of the investment limit referred to above?
An institution that needs capital in excess of the investment limit referred to above is
deemed as needing “exceptional assistance.” In consultation with the appropriate Federal
banking agency, Treasury will determine whether an institution qualifies for “exceptional
assistance” on a case-by-case basis.
What will be the terms of transactions involving QFIs in need of exceptional
assistance?
QFIs falling under the “exceptional assistance” standard may have bank-specific
negotiated agreements with the Treasury Department.”

That's from CAP. In other words, the whole point was to assure that these banks would be carefully examined for problems, and then made whole or solvent. What we were supposed to hear in public was the amount of assistance, which could vary with the size and particular needs of each bank. The program was meant to instill confidence by assuring the necessary backing for solvency.

Now, just looking at the program as presented, it's asinine to announce who's in what shape. That would negate the point of issuing the blanket guarantee of solvency.

What's happened is that popular perception has latched onto the idea of "stress tests" being a test for who gets seized or something like that. But, think about it: Even if the govt was going to do that, they wouldn't tell us beforehand.

The program was meant to erase a stigma, not produce one. For one thing, we own a lot of Citi, which is trying to sell its assets. It will hardly make selling those assets easier if we announce exactly what they're getting and why.

Now, if you don't want the govt to help these banks, I can understand pissing on this arrangement. But if you do, why would you want to make the banks less able to do business than more?

Finally, unless we seize the banks in an FDIC sort of way, we are going to be left with a hybrid. In other words, if we simply own stock and have someone manage the bank for us until we sell it, that will still be a hybrid plan because the bank will be a private company with certain fiduciary responsibilities to all its shareholders. It's probably a better idea than CAP, but it has lots of risks, such as:
1) It's one thing for a private company to default, another for a govt to default. If we own it, foreign investors and countries expect us to guarantee it. That's why it could lose us a lot of money. We could just screw them, but that will have negative consequences.
2) We will involve ourselves in foreign politics. For example, we needed a retroactive govt law from Mexico to be able to take more than a 10% stake in Citi. That was popular with some people, while not for others. As well, selling Banamex could have currency issues. All of Citi's foreign holdings will involve a similar problem.
3) All other hybrid problems, like conflict of interest, will remain. After all, Geithner is not even from Wall Street, and he's being accused of collusion.

It is true that we can announce every detail of these tests, and that might be what happens. But it could well end up costing us a lot more money if the market and potential investors or buyers hold out for more money. I thought that we were trying to save money.

I'm no fan of this plan, but I'm also not a fan of us shooting ourselves in the foot over and over again. We're in a damnable mess, and there's no clean or easy way out. We've lots of bad choices to choose from. That's it.

I posted this on Yves Smith. The plan was not to show that some banks were in bad shape. That was the opposite of the plan. It's simply that public opinion is not with them on this plan, and is demanding some kind of accounting, as are some investors. However, again, the whole point of CAP was to make the banks solvent. Period.

Posted by: Don the libertarian Democrat

Saturday, April 4, 2009

guarantees that keep them whole even if, a priori, they had declared they wouldn't in order to avoid the negative fallout from such runs

TO BE NOTED: From the Economist's View:

"Why Creditors should Suffer Too"

Tyler Cowen:

Why Creditors Should Suffer, Too, by Tyler Cowen, Economic View, NY Times: The Obama administration’s proposals to reform financial regulation sound ambitious enough as they aim to bring companies like A.I.G. under a broader umbrella of government rule-making and scrutiny.

But there is a big hole in these proposals,... the new proposals immunize the creditors and counterparties of such firms by protecting them from their own lending and trading mistakes.

This pattern has been evident for months, with the government aiding creditors and counterparties every step of the way. Yet this has not been explained openly to the American public.

In truth, it’s not the shareholders of the American International Group who benefited most from its bailout; they were mostly wiped out. The great beneficiaries have been the creditors and counterparties at the other end of A.I.G.’s derivatives deals — firms like Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, Société Générale, Barclays and UBS.

These firms engaged in deals that A.I.G. could not make good on. The bailout, and the regulatory regime outlined by Timothy F. Geithner..., would give firms like these every incentive to make similar deals down the road. ...

What the banking system needs is creditors who monitor risk and cut their exposure when that risk is too high. Unlike regulators, creditors and counterparties know the details of a deal and have their own money on the line. ...

A simple but unworkable alternative is to let major creditors make their claims in the bankruptcy courts, as was done with Lehman Brothers. But that is costly for the economy and, after the fallout from the Lehman failure, politically impossible now. Instead, the key to effective regulatory reform is to find a credible means of imposing some pain on creditors.

Here is one possibility. The government has restricted executive pay at A.I.G. and banks receiving government funds, but this move fails to recognize that the richest bailout benefits go to creditors. Restricting compensation at these creditor firms would have more force — if it is done transparently, in advance and in accordance with the rule of law. A simple rule would be that some percentage of bailout funds should be extracted from the bonuses of executives on the credit or counterparty side of transactions.

Such a rule would make lenders more conservative, which would generally be a good thing. ...

Here is another option..., credit agreements should provide for the possibility of a future, prepackaged bankruptcy. Those agreements should require that the creditors themselves would suffer some of the damage — even if the government stepped in to bail out the afflicted firm.

There is a risk that these sacrifices will not be extracted when the time comes, but the prospect might still check the worst excesses of leverage. ...

This poses a very difficult public relations problem for the government, because the Federal Reserve and the Treasury do not want to discuss the importance of the creditors too publicly right now. ... The challenge isn’t easy, and we can’t start on it today, but one way or another a new regulatory plan has to move some risk back to creditors.

These seem like good ideas, but I'm not so sure that these options pose a threat that is credible enough to "check the worst excesses of leverage" as much as is needed. Given the propensity for bank runs in both the traditional and non-traditional banking sectors when depositors/creditors are threatened - they will want to get their money out of institutions that look to be headed for trouble, i.e. to stop being creditors, before the firm is declared insolvent and these restrictions cause them to incur losses that they would be protected from otherwise - would the government step in with guarantees that keep them whole even if, a priori, they had declared they wouldn't in order to avoid the negative fallout from such runs?

The possibility that the government would keep its word and enforce the losses, along with the possibility of being unable to get money out in time and then coming under the regulatory restrictions, ought to check behavior to some degree. But to get substantial effects we need to have a substantial probability that the government will keep its word about imposing losses. However, I'm not so sure that the belief that the government will keep its word is as widely held as is needed, particularly if too large to fail, politically powerful institutions are allowed to persist."

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

governments should undertake additional measures to boost financial asset prices

From the Economist's View:

"DeLong: Kick-Starting Employment

Brad DeLong:

Kick-Starting Employment, by J. Bradford DeLong, Commentary, Project Syndicate: Unemployment is currently rising like a rocket... In response, central banks should purchase government bonds for cash in as large a quantity as needed to push their prices up as high as possible. Expensive government bonds will shift demand to mortgage or corporate bonds, pushing up their prices.

Even after central banks have pushed government bond prices as high as they can go, they should keep buying government bonds for cash, in the hope that people whose pockets are full of cash will spend more of it...

In addition, governments need to run extra-large deficits. Spending ... boosts employment and reduces unemployment. And government spending is as good as anybody else's.

Finally, governments should undertake additional measures to boost financial asset prices, and so make it easier for those firms that ought to be expanding and hiring to obtain finance on terms that allow them to expand and hire.

It is this point that brings us to US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's plan to take about $465 billion of government money, combine it with $35 billion of private-sector money, and use it to buy up risky financial assets. The US Treasury is asking the private sector to put $35 billion into this $500 billion fund so that the fund managers all have some "skin in the game," and thus do not take excessive risks with the taxpayers' money.

Private-sector investors ought to be more than willing to kick in that $35 billion, for they stand to make a fortune when financial asset prices close some of the gap between their current and normal values. ... Time alone will tell whether the financiers who invest in and run this program make a fortune. But if they do, they will make the US government an even bigger fortune. ...

The fact that the Geithner Plan is likely to be profitable for the US government is, however, a sideshow. The aim is to reduce unemployment. The appearance of an extra $500 billion in demand for risky assets will reduce the quantity of risky assets that other private investors will have to hold. ... When assets are seen as less risky, their prices rise. And when there are fewer assets to be held, their prices rise, too. With higher financial asset prices, those firms that ought to be expanding and hiring will be able to get money on more attractive terms.

The problem is that the Geithner Plan appears to me to be too small - between one-eight and one-half of what it needs to be. Even though the US government is doing other things as well -fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing, and other uses of bailout funds - it is not doing everything it should.

My guess is that the reason that the US government is not doing all it should can be stated in three words: Senator George Voinovich, who is the 60th vote in the Senate - the vote needed to close off debate and enact a bill. To do anything that requires legislative action, the Obama administration needs Voinovich and the 59 other senators who are more inclined to support it. The administration's tacticians appear to think that they are not on board - especially after the recent AIG bonus scandal - whereas the Geithner Plan relies on authority that the administration already has. Doing more would require a legislative coalition that is not there yet.

We're losing, roughly, 600,000 jobs per month, which is about 20,000 per day. There are many costs associated with job loss, but I wonder how many foreclosures per day are generated from the loss of 20,000 jobs? And that's in addition to the foreclosures we'd have anyway.

The administration has an obligation to protect people from cyclical fluctuations in the economy, to help them avoid losing their jobs, their houses, and other sources of security. For example, if bank nationalization is the safer path to pursue ex-ante to stabilize the banking system, then that means convincing the 60th vote in the Senate, one way or the other, to support the action. If more fiscal stimulus, or a larger version of the Geithner plan is needed, then there should be no rest until the votes are there. If the "tacticians appear to think that they are not on board," or someone takes the time - as I hope they did - to ask them and finds out that, in fact, they aren't aboard, then do whatever it takes to change that.

Maybe the effort was there prior to the Geithner plan, and maybe the effort is there now to try to enhance the Geithner plan through legislative authority, to set the stage for a second stimulus in case it's needed, and to change the public perception of what has been done to date. Perhaps a lot of it is behind the scenes, and all that can be done, is being done. Maybe the administration is saving political capital for other things. But prior to the announcement of the Geithner plan, I had the impression that many of the minds within the administration that counted the most were already made up, or if not fully made up that they had a preference for clever market-based solutions (that the public had no hope of understanding, which makes obtaining the public's support much more difficult), and that stood in the way of a true full court press toward nationalization. As for now, I also wonder if concerns within the administration about the deficit are causing hesitation to pursue more aggressive policies. So I'm not so sure that Voinovich was and is (or will be) the only thing standing in the way.

Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, March 31, 2009 at 02:07 AM"

Me:

"Even though the US government is doing other things as well -fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing, and other uses of bailout funds - it is not doing everything it should."

I'll give credit to De Long for seeing that PPIP has an effect on QE, and is one of its benefits.

"Unemployment is currently rising like a rocket"

This is the real problem. If you follow a version of Fisher's Debt-Deflation model, we are currently in it. The unemployment figures are the result of a Proactivity Run, in which employers lay workers off in anticipation of worse times to come. In other words, they are laid off even faster than demand drops. In order to get out of this trap, we need to induce inflation. Inflation will end the Debt-Deflation and ease the laying off of workers. Models describing some natural level of downward spiral are fine, but are inconsistent with a Debt-Deflationary Spiral, precisely because no one knows or can predict its stopping point. This is not simply a lack of knowledge, but part of the inherent nature of Debt-Deflation.

Posted by: Don the libertarian Democrat

Sunday, March 29, 2009

the value of an economic theory should be judged according to its contribution to economic policy

TO BE NOTED: From the Economist's View:

"What Use is Economic Theory?"

Given the discussion below, it seems like a good time to rerun this, a post that was suggested in a comment from Hal Varian:

I've weighed in on this debate in this essay. My thesis is that economics should not be compared to physics but to engineering. Or, alternatively, not to biology but to medicine. That is, economics is inherently a "policy science" where the value of an economic theory should be judged according to its contribution to economic policy.

There are many who disagree with this view, but hey, let a thousand flowers bloom.

Here it is:

What Use is Economic Theory?, by Hal R. Varian, August, 1989: Why is economic theory a worthwhile thing to do? There can be many answers to this question. One obvious answer is that it is a challenging intellectual enterprise and interesting on its own merits. A well-constructed economic model has an aesthetic appeal well-captured by the following lines from Wordsworth:

Mighty is the charm
Of these abstractions to a mind beset
With images, and haunted by herself
And specially delightful unto me
Was that clear synthesis built up aloft
So gracefully.

No one complains about poetry, music, number theory, or astronomy as being ‘‘useless,’’ but one often hears complaints about economic theory as being overly esoteric. I think that one could argue a reasonable case for economic theory on purely aesthetic grounds. Indeed, when pressed, most economic theorists admit that they do economics because it is fun.

But I think purely aesthetic considerations would not provide a complete account of economic theory. For theory has a role in economics. It is not just an intellectual pursuit for its own sake, but it plays an essential part in economic research. The essential theme of this essay that economics is a policy science and, as such, the contribution of economic theory to economics should be measured on how well economic theory contributes to the understanding and conduct of economic policy.

1. Economics as a policy science

Part of the attraction and the promise of economics is that it claims to describe policies that will improve peoples’ lives. This is unlike most other physical and social sciences. Sociology and political science have a policy component, but for the most part they are concerned with understanding the functioning of their respective subject matters.

Physical science, of course, has the potential to improve peoples’ standards of living, but this is really a by-product of science as an intellectual activity.

In my view, many methodologists have missed this essential feature of economic science. It is a mistake to compare economics to physics; a better comparison would be to engineering. Similarly, it is a mistake to compare economics to biology; a better comparison is to medicine. I think that Keynes was only half joking when he said that economists should be more like dentists. Dentists claims that they can make make peoples’ lives better; so do economists. The methodological premise of dentistry and economics is similar: we value what is useful. None of the ‘‘policy subjects’’--- engineering, medicine, or dentistry---is much concerned about methodology, and economists, by and large, aren’t either.

When you think about it, it is quite surprising that there isn’t more work on the methodology of engineering or medicine. These subjects have exerted an enormous influence on twentieth century life, yet are almost totally ignored by philosophers of science. This neglect should be contrasted with with other social sciences where much time and energy is spent on methodological debate. Philosophy of science, as practiced in philosophy departments, seems to be basically concerned with physics, with a smattering of philosophers concerned with psychology, biology, and a few social sciences.

I think that many economists and philosopher who have written on economic methodology have not given sufficient emphasis to the policy orientation of most economic research. One reason for this is the lack of an adequate model to follow. There is no philosophy of engineering, philosophy of medicine or philosophy of dentistry---there is no model of methodology for a policy science on which we can build an analysis. The task of constructing such a theory falls to economists. This is, in my view, one of the most interesting problems for those concerned with methodological issues and the philosophy of the social sciences.

2. Role of theory in a policy science

Given my view that economics is a policy science, if I want to defend a practice in economics, then I must defend it from a policy perspective. So I need to argue about how economic theory is useful in policy. The remainder of the paper will consists of list of several such ways. The list is no doubt incomplete, and I would welcome additions. But perhaps it can help focus some discussion on why economists do what the do, and how theory helps them do it.

Theory as a substitute for data

In many cases we are forced to use theory because the data that we need are not available. Suppose, for example, we want to determine how a market price will respond to a tax. We could estimate this effect by running a regression of market price against tax rates, controlling for as many other variables as possible. This would give us an equation that we could use to predict how prices respond to changes in taxes.

We rarely have data like this; taxes just don’t change enough. But if people only care about the total price of a good, inclusive of tax---a theory---then we can use estimated price elasticities to forecast the response of price to the imposition of a tax.

This uses a theory about behavior---people will respond to the imposition of a tax in the same way that they respond to a price increase---in order to allow data on price responses to be useful. We can use the theory to forecast the outcome of an experiment that has never been done.

Here is another, slightly more esoteric example. Consider the assumption of transitivity of preferences mentioned briefly above. This theory asserts that if A chosen when {A,B} is available and B is chosen when {B,C} is available, then we can predict A will be chosen when {A,C} is available. This is certainly a theory about behavior; it may or may not be true.

If we had data on choices between all pairs of A, B, and C, then the theory wouldn’t be necessary. When we want to predict the choice out of the set {A,C} we would simply look at how the person chose previously---that is, we would just use brute induction. And we know why induction works---it has always worked in the past!

But we rarely observe all possible choices; typically we observe only a few of the possible choices. Theory allows us to interpolate from what we observe to what we don’t observe. In the case of the {A,B,C} example brute induction requires observing all choices the consumer could make from the various proper subsets available, which requires 3 choice experiments. But if the assumption of transitivity holds, then 2 choice experiments are all we need. The theory of consumer choice allows us to economize on the data.

Naive empiricism can only predict what has happened in the past. It is the theory---the underlying model---that allows us to extrapolate.

Theory tells what parameters are important and how we might measure them.

The Laffer curve depicts the relationship between tax rates and tax revenue. At some tax rates tax revenue decreases when the tax rate increases. It has been said that the popularity of the Laffer curve is due to the fact that you can explain it to a Congressman in six minutes and he can talk about it for six months.

The Laffer analysis demonstrates both good and bad economic theory. The bad theory is that inference that because the Laffer effect can occur it does occur. The good theory is that we can use simple supply and demand analysis to determine what magnitudes the elasticity parameters have to be for the Laffer effect to occur. We can then compare the magnitudes of estimated elasticities to estimated labor supply elasticities. In the simplest model a marginal tax rate of 50% requires a labor supply elasticity of 1 to get the Laffer effect. The theory tells us what the relevant parameters are; without the theory, one would have no idea of the relevant parameters are. Indeed, if one examines the rather sordid history of the use of the Laffer curve in public policy debates in the U.S. this becomes painfully clear.

For another example, consider the theory of investment in risky assets. I take it as given that risk is a ‘‘bad.’’ Therefore when wealth goes up, people may want to purchase less of it. On other hand, you can afford to bear more risk when you have more wealth. So an argument based on intuition alone shows that investment in a risky asset can go up or down when wealth increases. A systematic theoretical analysis shows what the comparative statics sign depends on: how risk aversion changes with wealth. So the risk aversion parameter is the one you want to estimate in order to predict how investment in risky assets changes with wealth. Conversely how investment changes with wealth tells you something about how risk aversion changes with wealth.

Theory helps keep track of benefits and costs

I indicated above that the sorts of optimizing models used by economists serve the purpose of providing guidance for policy choices. Indeed one of the important roles of economic theory is to keep track of benefits and costs. The idea of opportunity cost is a fundamental one in economics, and would be very difficult to use without a theoretical model of economic linkages.

This brings up the important point that the correct way to measure an economic benefit or cost can only be determined in light of a theoretical model of choice: a specification of what objectives and the constraints facing an economic agent.

Consider for example, the practice of computing present value or risk adjusted rates of return. These computations are only meaningful in light of a model of choice behavior. If the model of behavior does not apply, the policy prescription cannot apply either.

Benefit-cost analysis is only one small field of economics. But the idea behind benefit-cost analysis permeates all of economics. If economic agents are making choices to maximize something, then we can get an idea of what is being optimized by looking at agents’ choices. This objective function can then be used as an input to making policy decisions. In some cases, one may need a quantitative estimate of the objective function. In other cases, one may want to show that one kind of market structure, or tax structure, may do a better job of satisfying consumers’ objectives than another. But the basic framework of moving from individual objectives, to individual choice, to social objectives and social choice is common to many, many economic studies.

Theory helps relate seemingly disparate problems

If one describes a model in a purely mathematical way, it often happens that the underlying equations will describe a rich set of economic phenomena. The classic example of this phenomenon is the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. The concept of ‘‘good’’ can be interpreted as a physical commodity available at different times, locations, or states of nature. One theoretical model can thereby provide a model of intertemporal trade, location, and uncertainty.

Another example from general equilibrium theory is the First Welfare Theorem. This result shows the intimate relationship between the apparently distinct problems of equilibrium and efficiency.

A third example is that a formal analysis of the problem of second-degree price discrimination shows that it is equivalent to the design of an auction or the determination of optimal provision of qualities. Quality discrimination, auction design, and nonlinear price discrimination are essentially the same sort of problem.

Each of these insights came from examining an abstract theory. Once the the ‘‘irrelevant’’ details are stripped away, its becomes apparent that the same essential choice problem is involved.

Theory can generate useful insights

Let me illustrate this role of economic theory with an example. In the U.S. most interest receipts are taxable income, but many kinds of interest payments are tax deductible. This policy has been criticized as ‘‘subsidizing borrowing.’’ Does it?

The answer depends on the tax brackets of the marginal borrowers and lenders. If the tax brackets are the same, for example, the policy has no effect at all on the equilibrium after-tax interest rate. The supply curve tilts up due to the tax on interest income, but the demand curve tilts up by the same amount due to the subsidy on interest payments. This is a simple insight, but it would be very difficult to understand without a model of the functioning of the market for loans.

A theory that is wrong can still yield insight

Pure competition is certainly a ‘‘wrong’’ theory many markets; pure monopoly is a wrong theory for other markets. But each of these theories can be very useful for yielding significant insights for how a particular market functions. No theory in economics is ever exactly true. The important question is not whether or not a theory is true but whether it offers a useful insight in explaining an economic phenomenon.

In my undergraduate textbook I examine a very simple model of conversion of apartments to condominiums. One result of the model is that converting an apartment to a condominium has no effect on the price of the remaining apartments---since demand and supply each contract by one apartment.

This result can hardly be thought of as literally ‘‘true.’’ There are a host of reasons why converting an apartment to a condominium might influence the rent of remaining apartments. Nevertheless, it focuses our attention on a crucial feature of such conversions: they affect both the supply and the demand for apartments. The simple supply-demand framework shows us how to start thinking about the impact of condominium conversion on apartment prices.

Theory provides a method for solving problems

I take the method of neoclassical microeconomics to be 1) examine an individual’s optimization problem; 2) look at the optimal equilibrium configuration of individual choices; 3) see how the equilibrium changes as policy variables change.

This methods doesn’t always work---the models of behavior or equilibrium may be wrong. Or it may be that the specific phenomenon under examination is not fruitfully viewed as an outcome of optimizing, and/or equilibrium behavior. But any method is better than none. In the words of Roger Bacon: ‘‘More truth arises through error than confusion.’’

Methodological individualism is a limited way of looking at the world, no question about it. It probably doesn’t do very well in describing phenomenon such as riots or class loyalty. Certainly this sort of individualistic methodology works better for describing some sorts of behavior than others. But it is likely to add insight to all problems.

Theory is an antidote to introspection

Most people get their economic beliefs from introspection and their personal experience- --the same place that they get their beliefs about most things. Economic theory---and indeed science in general, can serve as an antidote to this kind of introspection.

Consider, for example, the widely held belief that all demand curves are perfectly inelastic. If the price of gasoline increases by 25%, a layman will argue that no one will change their demand for gasoline. He bases this argument on the fact that he would not change his demand for gasoline.

Indeed, it is perfectly possible that most people wouldn’t change their demand for gasoline...but some would. There are always some people at the margin; these people would change their demand. At any one time, most people are infra-marginal in most of their economic decisions. The marginal decisions are the ones that you agonize over. If the price were a little higher or a little lower, the results of your agonizing might be different, and this is what causes the aggregate demand curve to slope downward.

Another nice example of this phenomenon is free trade. It’s hard to convince a layman of the advantages of free trade since it is easy to see where the dollars go, but difficult to see where they come from. People have personal experience with imports of foreign goods of foreign goods; but they rarely encounter their own country’s exports unless they travel abroad extensively. Only by abstracting from introspection can we see the total picture.

A third example is the bias in perceptions of inflation: price moves are perceived to be exogenous from the viewpoint of the individual, but wage movements are personalized. Even if prices and wages move up by the same amount, people may feel worse off since they think that they would have gotten the wage increases anyway.

Verifying that something is obvious may show that it isn’t

One of the criticisms that economists have to deal with is that they spend a lot of time belaboring the obvious. Isn’t it obvious that demand curves slope down and supply curves slope up? But many theories that seem to be obvious turn out not to be. It may be obvious that demand curves slope down---but as the theoretical analysis shows, it is possible to have demand curves that don’t.

Economic theory shows that a profit-maximizing firm will decrease its supply when the output price decreases. But farmers often claim that removing milk price supports will increase the supply of milk since farmers will have to increase output to maintain the same income. The second effect sounds like it might be possible---after all, farmers wouldn’t advance the claim unless it had some plausibility. However, theory shows us that this particular claim cannot be true if the farmers attempt to maximize profits.

Strategic interactions are a good source of counterintuitive results. A simple analysis of a two-person zero-sum game shows that improving your backhand in tennis may lead to your using it less often.

It would seem that a public offer to match any competitor’s price is a sign of a highly competitive market. But when you think about the problem facing a cartel it is not so obvious. The prime problem facing a cartel is how to detect cheating on the agreed-upon prices and quotas. Offering to match a competitor’s price is a cheap way to gain information about what your competitors are doing. What appears to be a highly competitive tactic can easily be viewed as a device to support collusion.

Theory allows for quantification and calculation

According to Lord Kelvin, ‘‘When you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.’'[1]

Theoretical economics gives us a framework to calculate and quantify economic relations. Consider the Laffer curve mentioned above. Laffer gave the existence proof, but it took some theoretical calculations to see what magnitudes were important.

In fact, one of the major differences between economics and the other social sciences is that in economics you can compute. There is very little computation in sociology, political science, history or anthropology. But economics is filled with computation.

Economic theory is useful since you can use it to compute answers to problems. They aren’t always the right answers---that depends on whether the model you have is right. (Or, at least, whether it is good enough for the purposes at hand.) But a desideratum of a good model is that you can compute with it: the model can be solved to determine some variables as a function of other variables.

In my view, it is impossible to learn economic theory without solving lots of problems. Richard Hamming, a highly prolific electrical engineer, once gave me some excellent advice about how to write a textbook. He told me to assemble the exams and problem sets that you want the students to be able to solve by the time they had finished the course, and then write the book that would show them how to solve them. In general, I have tried to follow this advice, with, I think, some success.

Economics is amenable to experimental verification

Because neoclassical economic models enables one to compute answers to problems, it is possible to compare the answers you get with the outcomes of controlled experiments. In my view, experimental economics has been one of the great success stories of the last 20 years. We now have rigorous ways to test models of human behavior in the laboratory. Some standard models, such as supply and demand, have turned out to be much more robust than we would have thought 20 years ago. Other models, such as expected utility, have turned out to be less robust.

But this is to be expected---if there were no surprises from experiments, they wouldn’t be worth doing. The growth of experimental economics has led many theorists to construct theories that simple, concrete and testable, rather than theories that are complex, abstract, and general. And experience in observing human subjects in the laboratory has no doubt contributed to the current emphasis on investigating models of learning. Laboratory observations have also been instrumental in alerting us to theoretical dead ends, such as some of the more convoluted refinements of game-theoretic equilibrium concepts.

I expect that the interaction between theory and experimentation will continue to grow in the future. As economists become more comfortable with experimentation in the laboratory, they will also become better at identifying ‘‘natural experiments’’ in real-world data. Such developments can only lead to better models of economic behavior.

3. Summary

I have argued that in order to understand why economic theorists behave in the way they do one has to understand the role of economic theory’s contribution to policy analysis. The fact that economics is fundamentally a policy science allows one to explain many aspects of economic theory that are quite mysterious otherwise.
___________________
1 However, the same poet whose praise for abstraction and synthesis I quoted in the introduction also once said: ‘‘...High Heaven rejects the lore of nicely calculated less or more.’’

Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, March 29, 2009"

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

is there a single, predominate cause? I don't think so.

TO BE NOTED: From the Economist's View: A Fair Analysis: I would simply rank them differently than others:

"Who's the Villain in the Crisis?

Is there a single factor, or one predominant factor, that caused the crisis? I've been asked this a lot. Is there something we can point to and say that was the villain, that did it, that's who we should blame? Was it greedy CEOs, Greenspan and the Fed, lying homeowners, real estate agents with bad incentives, Chinese savers, the ratings agencies, the quants, the economists who didn't see it coming, the regulators who failed to regulate, is there a single, predominate cause?

I don't think so. For the crisis to have occurred, there must have been (1) a source of vast amounts of liquidity, (2) a reason for most of that liquidity to go to one sector, the housing sector, rather than being spread around to a variety of industries, and (3) a failure to detect and prevent the bubble from developing in the industry where the excess liquidity found a home.

The source of the excess liquidity is well known, it came from China, the oil producing countries, and low interest rate policy from the Fed. China could have accumulated less reserves, invested them at home, etc., and the US could have pursued a higher interest rate policy (but at what cost to the economy as it was trying to recover from the bursting of the tech stock bubble), that's true, and it might have made the bubble less severe, but were these things, and these things alone, the cause of the bubble?

There's no reason why the excess liquidity could not have been invested in a variety of industries rather than flowing mainly to housing. If that happens, the risks are spread far more broadly, and we don't have such a large bubble, one that endangers the broader economy when it pops. So we have to ask, why did the money flow almost entirely to one industry? It was the false perception that financial innovation could produce higher rewards without increasing risk, there were lots of complex mathematical models around to prove it, and there were ratings agencies to validate the claims. So the combination of excess liquidity with the false promise of higher returns without higher risk caused the money to flow into a particular industry rather than into a wide variety of investment opportunities. It was safe as houses.

But even that wasn't enough to produce a bubble by itself, we have to ask why the checks and balances within the housing sector, both from the market and from regulators, failed to stop the massive flow of money into these assets. The reason is that there were incentive problems all the way through the system. The homeowner gets a non-recourse loan which makes risks mostly one-sided, real estate agents are paid on commission giving them to incentive to maximize the number of houses sold at the highest price they can get, real estate appraisers were in the pocket of the real estate agents (that's obvious when you buy a house), if they don't give the values the agents are looking for, their phone stops ringing. The mortgage brokers were being paid, essentially, on commission and they were able to move these loans off their books - sell them as repackaged securities - so as to remove any long-run interest in the outcome of the loans (so they didn't care what the appraisers said). Their incentive was to sell as many loans as possible with no real concern for quality. Why did people buy these repackaged loans from banks and brokers? Here we come again to the ratings agencies and the poor risk assessment models, the culture within these institutions, moral hazard from implicit or explicit government guarantees, compensation structures, and so on. The incentives at just about every step of the process were to create as many loans as possible with little regard to quality, every check and balance that ought to be in place was missing. The market did not self correct, and regulators clearly fell down on the job, fixing any one of these incentives could have made a big difference by plugging up the pass-through of the excess liquidity from China and the Fed, but the regulators were absent. Whether this is due to incompetence, poorly structured regulatory procedures, or regulatory capture - money talks and nobody wanted to spoil the party - I don't know for sure. But the regulatory failures were clearly broad based.

So I can only narrow the villains down and place them into broad categories, I can't point fingers at any one of them and say you did it, you were the cause of this. The managers at places like AIG were part of the problem, and they surely don't deserve rewards for their performance, that is not the argument here, but they and others like them were only one part of the problems we now have, they didn't cause the problems by themselves. It was a combination of things working together that produced this crisis, that is, excess liquidity, very poorly structured incentives, and incorrect assessment of the risks all came together to produce the problems we are seeing. I wish I could point to a single villain, it would be easier in a many, many ways to be able to do that, but I don't think we can, and doing so runs the risk of delaying the reform that is needed by causing us to focus on only a small set of the larger set of "villains". There's plenty of blame - and reform - to spread around.

Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, March 18, 2009 at 10:08 AM"

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

The main selling point of the proposal is the introduction of a competitive process to minimize the costs of the program.

From Economist's View:

"Jump-Starting The Market For Troubled Assets"

Lucian Bebchuk describes his plan to establish a public-private partnership to restart the market for troubled assets. This plan was first described in a discussion paper “How to Make TARP II Work.”

The main selling point of the proposal is the introduction of a competitive process to minimize the costs of the program. Under the proposal, funds to buy troubled assets are established in the private sector, and the managers of newly established funds compete in two ways – "first, to participate in the government's funding program, and subsequently to buy banks' troubled assets."

In an email, Lucian Bebchuk also emphasizes that a recent WSJ story on the Obama administration's interest in using privately managed funds to buy troubled assets raised concerns about the possibility of over-paying for the assets (and hence excessively subsidizing private fund managers). He argues that an advantage of the competitive process embedded within his proposal is that it would "ensure that the program’s costs are kept at the minimum necessary to restart the market for troubled assets":

Jump-Starting The Market For Troubled Assets, by Lucian Bebchuk, Commentary, Forbes: Four weeks ago, Treasury Secretary Geithner announced the administration's interest in developing a plan ... with up to $1 trillion of public funds to partner with private capital to buy banks' "troubled assets." The announcement has met with substantial skepticism...

Despite the widespread doubts, an effective plan for a public-private partnership in buying troubled assets can be designed. The key is to have competition at two levels. First,... the government’s program should focus on establishing many competing funds that are privately managed and partly funded with private capital--and not creating one, large "aggregator bank"...

Second, at the level of allocating government capital among the competing private funds, potential fund managers should compete for government capital under a market mechanism resulting in maximum participation of private capital and minimum costs to taxpayers. ...

One approach under consideration is that of a public-private partnership in a large "aggregator" bank (the "bad bank"), funded with both public and private money. Because private managers will run it, the bad bank could arguably produce a lower risk of overpayment than would direct purchases by the government.

The main problem with an aggregator bank is that it adds only one additional buyer, albeit a big one, to the market. ... Instead, plan for restarting the market for troubled assets should be based on establishing a significant number of competing funds. Each of these funds should be privately managed and financed with both public and private capital, and the funds should have sufficient aggregate capital. ...

The existence of such a significant number of private buyers ... will produce a market for troubled assets with many potential sellers (banks) facing a significant number of potential buyers (the funds). And the profit share captured by the funds' private managers will provide these managers with powerful incentive to avoid overpaying for troubled assets. ...

The question that remains is how to induce the participation of sufficient private capital... This can be done by having the participating public capital assume more downside risk or, alternatively, capture less of the upside. And the critical issue is how to do so to the minimum extent necessary to obtain the desired capital.

To ensure that the government does not overspend, private managers should ... also compete upfront for the right to participate and receive funding from the government's program. Such a market mechanism can ensure that the government provides funding at a level and under terms that will be least costly to taxpayers...

Consider a simple scheme whereby the government's program provides capital to new funds in the form of debt financing ... with a non-recourse loan. ... To understand how such debt financing can induce private capital to invest in the private funds participating in the program, imagine that the government sets a very high level of 95% for the fraction of the participating funds' capital to be provided in such debt financing. With such large government participation, it will presumably be easy to get the private side of each fund ... to contribute the remaining 5% of the fund's capital as equity investment. In this case,... potential loss will be capped at 5% of the fund's capital...

While providing 95% of a participating fund's capital in the form of governmental debt financing is thus likely to be more than sufficient to attract private capital..., doing so would likely impose on taxpayers a higher expected cost than is necessary. How then should ... the fraction of participating funds' capital that the government will fund with debt financing--be determined? It should be set through a competitive bidding process. ...

The government should invite bids from private managers seeking to participate... Each bid should indicate first the maximum fraction of the fund's capital that the private side commits to contribute as private equity capital ... and second, the size of the fund the private side seeks to establish. ...

Once the bids are made, the government will set the level of its participation ... at the lowest level that can be set while still allowing for establishing funds that collectively have the total target capital for the program's initial round. Thus, for example, the government will set the equity contribution percentage at 40% and the government's debt financing at 60% if, given the received bids, the 40% level, but no higher level, will result in establishing private funds that collectively have the target level of aggregate capital. ...

By inducing private managers to compete at two levels--first, to participate in the government's funding program and subsequently to buy banks' troubled assets--the design proposed above can deliver the results the Treasury seeks. It will effectively restart the market for troubled assets and do so at the least cost to taxpayers.

Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, March 4, 2009 at 09:09 AM"

Me:

Way back when, in September, I think, I pointed out that the only point to involving the government in buying toxic assets was to subsidize it by transferring losses from the holders of the TAs to the taxpayer. Otherwise, there are plenty of private businesses capable of buying them. John Paulson has been doing so for months.

The only way that the government could get involved and not provide a subsidy was to hire John Paulson, William Gross, etc., surreptitiously, and let them buy up this crap for for us in secret. Of course, if this plan blows up, the black op aspect of it would be a political nightmare.

There is just no way to actually assess how much of a subsidy the government would end up providing beforehand. That's the problem. These assets have been labeled "toxic". If the program loses a lot of money, there's no way to spin it now other than we spent a lot of money on known crap. That's the problem. Otherwise, Nick Rowe's ideas about Bernanke betting on inflation seem good to me:

http://worthwhile.typepad.com/worthwhile_canadian_initi/2008/12/central-banks-should-bet-on-recovery-literally.html

Saturday, February 7, 2009

How to Repair a Failed System - voxeu.org

From Mark Thoma:

"links for 2009-02-07

On the post "Repairing a failed system", I like the idea of insurance for these implicit government guarantees:

"It will be good to know whether the financial system can even pay for the subsidies it receives.

* Recognise the negative externality of LCFIs. Then quantify the systemic risk of LCFIs and “tax” (through capital requirements or deposit insurance fees) their contributions to systemic risk rather than individual risk.

This is hard to do, but present regulations do not even claim to address the problem. The need for such systemic risk regulation, possibly by augmenting Central Bank agendas, is only underscored by the growing size of the few remaining players in the financial arena. "

I simply wonder how in the world you charge insurance for a systemic crisis. What do you use to compute the odds? It sounds like an enormous premium, or an amount that would help in a crisis, but not necessarily stop a run as the insurance should presumably do. Both these authors and Caballero don't seem to take this on. They seem to be assuming that it would be easy. I doubt that. Am I wrong?

Thursday, January 29, 2009

The fiscal stimulus ... will lay down the first steps of a massive generation-long technological overhaul...

From Mark Thoma:

"Sachs: 21st-Century Capitalism

Jeff Sachs seems to be pleased with the new administrations commitment to "a new age of sustainable development":

Rewriting the rulebook for 21st-century capitalism, by Jeffrey Sachs, CIF, The Guardian: One of President Barack Obama's historic contributions will be a grand act of policy jujitsu - turning the crushing economic crisis into the launch of a new age of sustainable development. ... Obama is already setting a new historic course by reorienting the economy from private consumption to public investments directed at the great challenges of energy, climate, food production, water and biodiversity.

The new president has taken every opportunity to underscore that the economic crisis will not slow, but rather will accelerate, the much-needed economic transformation to sustainability. ... The fiscal stimulus ... will lay down the first steps of a massive generation-long technological overhaul...

Obama has started with the most important first step: a team of scientific and technological advisers of stunning quality... He has also focused on two core truths of sustainable development: that technological overhaul lies at the core of the challenge, and that such an overhaul requires a public-private partnership for success. Taking shape, therefore, is nothing less than a new 21st-century model of capitalism ... committed to the dual objectives of economic development and sustainability...

Consider the challenge of a bankrupt automobile sector... In the Obama strategy, GM will not be closed to punish it... It's worth far too much as a world leader in the electric vehicles of the 21st century. ...

Conservatives are aghast. The bail-out of the auto industry was hard enough to swallow. Government investments in infrastructure and research and development are viewed with scorn, compared with the tried and true (if disastrously failed) tax cuts of the Bush era. Rightwing pundits bemoan the evident intention of Obama and team to "tell us what kind of car to drive". Yet that is exactly what they intend to do (at least with regard to the power source under the hood), and rightly so. Free-market ideology is an anachronism in an era of climate change, water stress, food scarcity and energy insecurity. Public-private efforts to steer the economy to a safe technological harbour will be the order of the new era.

There is plenty of room for blunders... Government activism can founder on the shoals of massive budget deficits, tax-cutting populism pushed by the right, politically motivated investments such as corn-based ethanol..., and more. Yet Obama is absolutely correct that we have no choice but to try. ...

A better, or, at least, different view:

"Rightwing pundits bemoan the evident intention of Obama and team to "tell us what kind of car to drive". Yet that is exactly what they intend to do (at least with regard to the power source under the hood), and rightly so."

This post is a plan for disaster. A massive commitment to spending without assessment along the way is foolish. It's much better to start off slow and show how the spending is working, both for reasons of common sense and political backing. It is also foolish to start telling people we're in the business of micromanaging more and more of their lives. At the very least, an approach like Sunstein and Thaler's would be more likely to work and gather approval.

Fortunately, I don't see our President as likely to follow Sach's advice. I like what he says about more money for the third world, but this clarion call for massive government intrusion and spending is off base.

By the way, I'm trying to understand how our current crisis leads one to believe that we need to spend massively for all time going forward. Sachs seems to believe that our current crisis shows that government can effectively spend and manage our money going forward. How does this follow?

Saturday, January 24, 2009

"Each used its bureaucratic clout to insulate itself from the pressures of capitalism. ..."

I keep getting no credit. This is my view:

"How Cronyism and Rent-Seeking Replaced 'Creative Destruction'"

Eliot Spitzer:

America's Fear of Competition, by Eliot Spitzer, Commentary, Slate: Although everybody claims to love the market, nobody really likes the rough-and-tumble of competition that produces the essential "creative destruction" of capitalism( TRUE ). At bottom, this abhorrence of competition and change are the common theme that binds together the near death of the American car industry, the collapse of the credit market, the implosion of the housing market, the SEC's disastrous negligence, the Madoff Ponzi scheme, and the other economic catastrophes of recent months.

Consider the examples of the SEC and GM, which would appear to have nothing to do with each other. The traditional critiques of the SEC have been that it was underfunded and didn't have up-to-date laws needed to regulate sophisticated financial transactions in evolving markets. That's not accurate. The SEC is a gargantuan bureaucracy of 3,500 employees and a budget of $900 million... And the ... powers of the SEC are so broad that it needs no additional statutory power to delve into virtually any market activity that it suspects is improper, fraudulent, or deceptive. ... The SEC has all the money and people and laws it needs. For ideological reasons, it just didn't want to do its job, and on the rare occasions when it did, it didn't know how.( YES )

GM's excuses—that its UAW contract and health care costs make it too top heavy to compete—are partially true but ignore a simple reality: These are the self-inflicted wounds of a company that chose a path of least resistance rather than confront the need for dynamism and innovation. ... The auto industry preferred protection to competition( YES ). And when it had to compete, it wasn't up to the task.

Both the SEC and GM refused to adapt from the world of the last century to the more dynamic new millennium. Each reacted the same way to competition: Instead of improving its product, it played defense. ... No one at the SEC seemed to ask the most important question: Given how the market is changing, what should we change to insure the integrity of the capital markets?

Instead, the SEC spent its energy preventing others from doing the work it should have done. Using the rather arcane doctrine of pre-emption, the SEC fought in the courts and on Capitol Hill to keep other enforcers at bay: Apparently, worse than having fraud in the marketplace was the possibility that an entity other than the SEC would appear to be more effective than the SEC at finding it.( TRUE )

For both the SEC and the auto industry, Congress was a place to find protection from meaningful competition. Each used its bureaucratic clout to insulate itself from the pressures of capitalism. ...( THAT'S MY VIEW! )

The result has been unfortunate: Over and over, we supplied the protection from needed change that these entities desired. Then, when the going got tough, neither the SEC nor GM was up to the task. By preventing the stern taskmaster of competition from forcing adaptation, we became complicit in their becoming dinosaurs. ... Both GM and the SEC need to see a change in market conditions as an opportunity—not a challenge to market share.

We must rebuild these two institutions. If we don't infuse them with a culture of change and love of competition, they will fail once again. ... This is a unique opportunity for President Obama and the Congress to take two seemingly different entities and force them to play by the real rules of capitalism...

Congress and the executive branch have, to a considerable extent, been devoted to business interests in recent years( YES ). In essence the argument is that what's good for business is good not just for America, but for the whole world. The ideological basis for this approach is that the interests of business and of greater society always coincide so that maximizing business interests maximizes social benefits at the same time, and that a hands off( WRONG. HANDS ON. ) approach from government is the best way to allow those coincident interests to express themselves.

Unfortunately, however, this ideological foundation incorporated a flawed understanding of the interaction between market structure and social benefits, particularly the ability of markets to self-correct when the market structures deviate from the socially optimal structure( WHAT'S THIS? ). The result of this, particularly as it came to be applied in the political arena, contributed to the existence of cronyism, rent-seeking, institutions that became too big, interconnected, and too powerful to fail, and other problems. Political power combined with rigid ideology built upon a false premise - the doctrine of immediate self-correction by markets - gave us a result that was far from the competitive ideal presented in textbooks, a world that was far from the ideal competitive model that produces such large benefits for society.( THIS IS NOT CORRECT. THEY DON'T WANT A FREE MARKET. )

I think there is some understanding that the approach of the past did not work, with the current state of the economy it's hard to argue that it did, and that we need to go in a new direction. And I'm sure we will try. But I wonder, when all is said and done, will anything really change?( NOT MUCH. IT'S HARD. THIS IS OUR SYSTEM )"

Spitzer gets it right, but Thoma doesn't. We don't have a free market system. Our businesses are not prepared to compete in one. The Investor Class believes in and counts on government intervention when things are going poorly for them. They will use free market arguments when it suits their interests, and national security or government intervention arguments when it suits their interests as well. It's called Rationale or Argument Shopping. There is no way to understand these bailouts without understanding this basic fact.

Friday, January 23, 2009

They thought that budget deficits would stimulate growth under all circumstances, not just those of a deflationary depression.

From Mark Thoma:

"Does Stimulus Stimulate?"

Bruce Bartlett:

Does Stimulus Stimulate?, by Bruce Bartlett, Forbes.com: ...The [Great Depression] didn't really end until both monetary and fiscal policy became expansive with the onset of World War II. At that point, no one worried any more about budget deficits, and the Fed pegged interest rates to ensure that they stayed low, increasing the money supply as necessary to achieve this goal.

It was then and only then that the Great Depression truly ended. As a consequence, economists concluded that an expansive monetary and fiscal policy, which had been advocated by economist John Maynard Keynes throughout the 1930s, was the key to getting out of a depression.

Keynes was right, but many of his followers weren't. They thought that budget deficits would stimulate growth under all circumstances, not just those of a deflationary depression( I AGREE WITH BARTLETT HERE, AS I'VE POSTED. BARRO DOESN'T SEEM TO GET THE NATURE OF A CALLING RUN, ALTHOUGH HE SAYS HE DOES. ). When this medicine was applied inappropriately, as it was in the 1960s and 1970s, the result was inflation.( NOT HERE. NOT YET. )

Economists then concluded that it was a mistake to pursue countercyclical fiscal policy, and the idea of "fine-tuning" became a derogatory term. ...

In the 1980s and 1990s, economists came around to the view that only monetary policy could act quickly enough to reverse or moderate a recession. ... [But...] As we have seen, the Fed could not prevent the greatest financial downturn the world has seen since 1929. This has revived the idea that fiscal policy must be the engine that pulls us out.

Somewhat surprisingly, there has been rather heated opposition to the very principle of fiscal stimulus... We have now had several tests of the Keynesian idea--most recently with last year's $300 tax rebate... According to a new paper by University of Michigan economists Matthew Shapiro and Joel Slemrod, only a third of the money was spent, thus providing very little "bang for the buck."( TRUE )

The failure of rebates has shifted the focus to public works and other direct spending measures as a means of stimulating aggregate spending. A study by Obama administration economists Christina Romer and Jared Bernstein predicts that the stimulus plan being debated in Congress will raise the gross domestic product by $1.57 for every $1 spent.

Such a multiplier effect has been heavily criticized by a number of top economists, including John Taylor of Stanford, Gary Becker and Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago and Greg Mankiw and Robert Barro of Harvard.( I LIKE ALL OF THESE PEOPLE ) The gist of their argument is that the government cannot expand the economy through deficit spending because it has to borrow the funds in the first place, thus displacing other economic activities( THIS IS WRONG ). In the end, the government has simply moved around economic activity without increasing it in the aggregate.( WRONG )

Other reputable economists have criticized this position as being no different from the pre-Keynesian view that helped make the Great Depression so long and deep. Paul Krugman of Princeton, Brad DeLong of the University of California at Berkeley and Mark Thoma of the University of Oregon have been outspoken in their belief that theory and experience show that government spending can expand the economy under conditions such as we are experiencing today( I AGREE WITH THEM IN THIS CASE. ).

I think the critics of an activist fiscal policy are forgetting the essential role of monetary policy as it relates to fiscal policy. As Keynes was very clear about, the whole point of fiscal stimulus is to mobilize monetary policy and inject liquidity into the economy. This is necessary when nominal interest rates get very low, as they are now, because Fed policy becomes impotent. Keynes called this a liquidity trap, and I think there is strong evidence that we are in one right now.( ZIRP )

The problem is that fiscal stimulus needs to be injected right now to counter the liquidity trap. If that were the case, I think we might well get a very high multiplier effect this year( I AGREE ). But if much of the stimulus doesn't come online until next year, when we are likely to be past the worst of the slowdown, then crowding out will greatly diminish the effectiveness of the stimulus, just as the critics argue. ... Thus the argument really boils down to a question of timing. ...( I AGREE COMPLETELY )

For this reason, I think there is a better case for stimulating the economy through tax policy than has been made. Congress can change incentives instantly by, for example, saying that new investments in machinery and equipment made after today would qualify for a 10% Investment Tax Credit...( MY IDEA )

Stimulus based on private investment also has the added virtue of establishing a foundation for future growth, whereas consumption spending( OFTEN ) does not. As economist Hal Varian of the University of California at Berkeley recently put it, "Private investment is what makes possible future increases in production and consumption. Investment tax credits or other subsidies for private sector investment are not as politically appealing as tax cuts for consumers or increases in government expenditure. But if private investment doesn't increase, where will the extra consumption come from in the future?"

I don't agree with all of this, e.g. the "government is always the problem" emphasis in the analysis, and casting the debate as a tradeoff between private investment and private consumption rather than between private sector activity (consumption or investment) and public investment overstates the case for private sector solutions. [These arguments from yesterday apply as well.]

I've never objected to tax cuts being part of the package -- I have also argued that the desire for an immediate impact may necessitate some tax cut components in order to maximize the prospects for a faster recovery. And as tax cuts go, there are far worse choices than an investment tax credit( GOOD. THEN JOIN US. ). But just as there's a limit to the number of public sector projects that are shovel ready, there's also a limit to the number of private sector projects that are ready to go (though the planning stage does involve some spending, just not as much as when the public or private sector investment projects are going full throttle)( YES ). There's also a question about how strong the reaction will be to a tax credit when the economic outlook is so gloomy( TRUE. IT MIGHT ONLY MARGINALLY HELP. BUT WE NEED TO TRY. ), a question that doesn't arise when government is making the investments. So, sure, let's get as much out of the private sector as we can, but we shouldn't rely solely upon the private sector response to a tax credit to turn things around( AGREED ). It's very unlikely to be enough on its own, and it may not provide much help at all, Thus, even with tax credits, the public sector response - government spending in particular - still needs to be aggressive."

I agree. Infrastructure investment also sends a positive message. Oh my God. I actually resorted to talking about how people might behave in the real world. A real benefit of the stimulus in Infrastructure ( I said $100 Billion ) would be emotional. I will spend more money if I FEEL LIKE IT. Crowding out, a purely mechanistic explanation, is a fairly useful model, no more, under normal circumstances. Using math to describe correlations between various economic factors doesn't make you a scientist. All that the math does, or any correlative reasoning, is give you some useful guides to understanding how people might react in various circumstances. Crowding out is NOT a law of nature. Adam Smith understood philosophy, politics, economics, history, etc. What education do many of these economists receive? They have a philosophy of math that is hilarious. Of course, so do many mathematicians and philosophers, so let's not go there.

Let me repeat my plan:
1) $100 Billion on infrastructure, to be built only when benefits exceed the costs.
2) Sales tax cut $200 Billion
3) Investment incentives $100 Billion
4) Social safety net spending is not included in my stimulus. It is simply money that needs to be spent as part of the social contract.