Showing posts with label FOMC Statement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FOMC Statement. Show all posts

Thursday, April 9, 2009

Fed really had no other choice. Moreover, as we’ll discuss, this is the beginning of monetization actions by the Fed. They’re just getting warmed up.

TO BE NOTED: From Financial Sense:

"I've Got Friends In Low Places

BY BRIAN PRETTI

I have to admit that Fed actions announced at the last FOMC meeting very much took me by surprise. Point being, I did not expect the Fed to begin monetization so soon. But surprised I should not have been. Not by a long shot. To be honest, Fed monetization of Treasury debt was inevitable in the current cycle. The recent global capital flow and realized/expected Treasury issuance numbers over the last half-year really tell the whole story quite elegantly. So although there has been plenty of ranting and raving about Fed monetization, myself included, I think it’s much more important to our forward investment decision making to simply address this fact objectively and unemotionally. The Fed really had no other choice. Moreover, as we’ll discuss, this is the beginning of monetization actions by the Fed. They’re just getting warmed up. THE issue now is not the monetization itself, but rather how monetization will influence investment risk and opportunities. I'll divide up in sections the highlight points I believe tell the story of the need for the Fed to monetize and why they will not be able to stop any time soon.

THE TREASURY CALENDAR

To the point, the top clip of the chart below chronicles the issuance of US Treasuries since the beginning of 2006. Alongside is the quarterly level of like period purchases of US Treasuries by the foreign community. As I note in the chart, 3Q and 4Q of last year mark the highest nominal dollar levels of Treasury purchases by the foreign community on record. But these purchase levels were simply dwarfed by the $1 trillion+ issuance of Treasuries over the last half of 2008.

0409.01

The bottom clip of the chart takes the same data and presents it as foreign purchases of UST’s as a percentage of actual Treasuries issued by quarter since 2006. The “rule” in this view of life is that the foreign community has consistently purchased well in excess of 50% of total Treasuries issued. In fact, from 3Q of 2007 through 2Q of 2008, the foreign community purchased Treasuries at a rate well in excess of 100% of total Treasuries issued. But as is absolutely clear, all of this has changed starting in the middle of last year. The bottom line today is that foreign buying of Treasuries, although at record levels in nominal dollars, has not been able to keep up with what has been and will continue to be for some time Treasury issuance on steroids. Although I will not drag you through yet another data review, you’ll have to trust me when I tell you that domestic buying of Treasuries has not and will not make up the gap. As of today, total domestic ownership of Treasuries rests at a level below that of the foreign community. The Fed is now quite simply the plug figure between projected Treasury issuance, foreign buying and levels of domestic Treasury ownership. The fact is that the Fed had no choice but to come into play right now. And so here we are. No conspiracies, no mysteries, no ranting and raving, simply the factual numbers.

Very quickly, as of right now, the OMB (Office of Management and Budget) has projected at worst an annualized $1.8 trillion deficit for the US later in the current year. From this alone we know Treasury issuance will be incredibly large. Well beyond what the foreign community would ever have the chance of soaking up. In the OMB’s view of life and under the Administration’s budget planning, expectations are for 3%+ GDP growth in 2010 and over 4% in 2011. Although we’ll have to see what happens ahead, I personally believe there is zero chance these GDP numbers will be hit. Zero. As such, the Administration’s belief/projection that the US budget deficit will fall back below $1 trillion in 2010 is wishful thinking at best and probably lunacy at worst. Point being Treasury issuance over the next few years at least should indeed be well beyond current “projections.” If anyone thinks the shortfall between projected Treasury issuance and the ability of the foreign community to soak up this issuance will somehow narrow any time soon, they are dreaming. Given the mosaic produced by putting all of these facts together, I see a picture of a US Fed who has just begun to monetize the Federal debt. Although I am absolutely guessing at this point, before the current cycle is over, Treasury monetization by the Fed may end up being five to six times what has already been announced and begun with the current $300 billion. That’s an appetizer. Don’t be surprised as this is exactly what the real numbers are pointing to dead ahead. And this of course assumes the foreign community at least keeps purchasing at levels we’ve experienced over the last year or so, which is no guarantee at all.

THE CHINA SYNDROME

We all know that at the margin China has been the key foreign buyer of US Treasuries over the current decade. From 2000 through January of this year, China accounted for 37.4% of all Treasuries purchased by foreign entities. As of now, they are the largest holder of US Treasuries on planet Earth, holding 24% of all Treasuries owned by the foreign sector. Bottom line? China’s global capital flows at the margin are extremely important. Let’s face it, it’s China who could change the dynamics of what we talked about above for the better or for a whole lot worse as we move forward. They carry the largest stick and their forward actions will be the key factor influencing just how much monetization of Treasuries the Fed will necessarily need to undertake. Again, not want to undertake, but need to undertake.

The top clip of the next chart looks at actual year-by-year purchases of US Treasuries by China. 2008 was simply off the charts. Although we do need to remember that in many senses Treasury buying in 2008 was in large part about the “safety trade” as opposed to what might be seen as mercantilist economics (essentially financing the purchasing of your exports), it’s hard to imagine China could again experience a 50% year over year increase in their US Treasury holdings in 2009. The estimated 2009 number I present in the chart is simply January’s experience annualized. Be forewarned this is a guess at best based on one-month data. From my standpoint, there is simply no way China can keep up the level of Treasury purchases we saw last year, especially when trade flows are falling like a rock and China needs to commit stimulus funds domestically.

0409.02

Finally, the bottom clip of the above chart puts China’s prior purchases of Treasuries in perspective relative to total Treasury issuance over the period shown. Again, there is just no way China or the foreign community as a whole could ever dream of keeping up with current and to come Treasury issuance. The numbers are simply self-explanatory. You may have seen that just before the Geithner disguised bank bailout toxic asset plan was announced a few Monday’s back, China put out a press release reaffirming their commitment to US debt purchases. Again, the numbers belie the perceptual intent of that message as new Treasury issuance will be far too large to be sopped up by Chinese purchasing. As always, watch what they do, not what they say.

TRADING PLACES

Quick one. You know full well by now that the US trade deficit has been shrinking very rapidly over the last five months. In good part the price of oil is a factor, but equally important has been the literal collapse in global trade. When a country like China tells us its year over year exports have fallen by 25%, is there really a need for further explanation? I didn’t think so. In short, a dramatic fall off in global trade means less dollars being “exported” and exchanged for goods and services, and ultimately less global foreign reserves that may potentially be recycled back into US financial assets. The trade related monetary “juice” the foreign community, and especially China, has in its pockets both now and ahead very simply argues for a lower level of foreign buying of total US assets, not just Treasuries. And this is exactly what we are experiencing right now and should continue to experience for some time to come.

0409.03

So there you have it in terms of the short explanation as to why Fed monetization was inevitable and will continue to be ahead. The foreign and domestic communities will simply not be able to soak up all of the Treasury issuance to come. And so here we now stand with the Fed as truly the buyer of last resort, in addition to being the lender of last resort. There will be no “next buyer.” Ultimately, although we’re not there yet, the ability of the US to deficit spend will rest upon the ability of the Fed to monetize sovereign debt. I just have one reminder to you as we continue to move through this very special cycle, that ability is not unlimited and not without serious longer-term consequences. Of course from an investment standpoint, it’s these potential unintended consequences that eat up most of our current investment thinking time.

Everything's All Right, I'll Just Say Goodnight And I'll Show Myself To The Door

Very briefly while we are on the subject, the issue of foreign capital flows and the ability of the foreign community to continue purchasing US Treasuries ahead is certainly a crucial monitor point in my ongoing assessment of US investment outcomes, but we also need to be aware of the rhythm of foreign investment in the broader US financial markets and specific asset classes. I’ve been through this data before so I’ll just show you one updated chart. The bottom line is that the foreign community has been heavy sellers of US agency paper, corporate paper and US equities over the last four to six months. They may not be able to keep up with Treasury issuance in their Treasury buying activity, but they are literally blowing out agency and corporate debt as well as equities in as of now almost uninterrupted fashion. The current level of foreign sales of US agency and corporate paper has never been seen before in nominal dollars. Important why? As we also heard in the Fed‘s FOMC communiqué, they are about to print and buy back another $750 billion in MBS (mortgage backed securities) paper. This is on top of the $600B in MBS purchases they announced just a short while ago. Funny thing about monetization, once it begins it can take on a life of its own in almost geometric fashion. It’s a very dangerous road to cross, but one that must be crossed at least in the land of Treasuries as I showed you above. The Fed also announced that they are considering additional purchases to include corporates and “distressed” securities. Point being, in part they fully realize that they are perhaps needing to monetize other assets being sold by the foreign community.

The chart below is a look at the longer-term foreign community purchases of all US financial assets. Interestingly, the twelve-month moving average (a measure I prefer as it smoothes out monthly “noise”) peaked in June of 2007, exactly one month prior to the July 2007 Bear Sterns twin hedge fund blowups that were in hindsight the initial rumblings of a US credit cycle about to come apart at the seams. Does action of the foreign community since that time relative to their US financial asset holdings say something about trust and faith in the US financial system from an outsiders perspective?

0409.04

The Road Ahead

The Fed moving into all out monetization mode is a new construct for today’s investment community. We’re going to be navigating ahead with few historical guideposts. The poster child reference point for quantitative easing in the modern era is clearly the experience of Japan, and that’s not necessarily a comforting experiential outcome. As I'm sure you already know, Japan was very late in the game in its own post equity and real estate bubble reconciliation cycle when it decided to pull the QE monetary policy trigger. As the chart below shows us, the Bank of Japan officially announced its intention to print money to buy sovereign debt on March 19 of 2001. Within a month of the announcement, the Nikkei had rallied just over 19%. Post the rally peak, the Nikkei never saw this level again for four and one half years and proceeded to lose almost 48% of its value over the next year and three quarters post the initial QE announcement rally.

0409.05

But I believe there are a number of absolutely key differential points we need to keep in mind when trying to benchmark what will be significant US quantitative easing efforts ahead, as I discussed above, against the experience of Japan. In my mind THE key differential is that Japan began their quantitative easing during a period in which the country as a whole was running a very large surplus. Conditions for the US could not be a further polar opposite at the moment. Japan began their QE efforts when household savings in Japan was quite high and had been for year’s prior. Again, quite the opposite of the current US circumstances. Bottom line? Japan began QE from a position of internal financial strength. The US now begins QE after not having been able to internally fund its own borrowing for many moons, being already heavily indebted and in a big deficit position. And so now deficit spending in the US is to move into hyper drive, supported in large part by Fed sponsored QE? A huge contrast point to the experience of Japan.

From my perspective, I see Japan’s experience as country that chose to undertake QE as a proactive monetary policy choice. And it did so from a position of surplus and savings rich financial strength. Alternatively, as I hope I made clear above, the Fed is not moving to QE as a proactive choice or within the context of greater US financial surplus and savings strength, but is rather being forced to undertake QE as quite simply there is no other buyer large enough to finance US Treasury issuance to come. In my mind, a glaring differential and potentially a key differentiation point in terms of forward economic and financial market outcomes. Without sounding melodramatic, please do not forget these key points. I believe that to blindly assume a relatively benign outcome for the US in terms of forward interest rates, global capital flows and currency valuation, as very much was the case for Japan post embarking on QE, will be a huge mistake.

Like the initial experience in Japan, US equities have so far responded favorably to the supposedly magic drug of monetization. But we need to ask ourselves in the larger picture, can US equities build an intermediate or longer term bull market case based on the rationale of massive government deficit spending supported by a Fed that will print money to fund that deficit spending? Can it really be that within the context of the global economy of the moment, the key competitive advantage of the US is a printing press? Make no mistake about it, monetization can positively influence economic and financial market outcomes for a time. We need to respect this fact. Greenspan proved this in spades during the late 1990’s pre-Y2K liquidity extravaganza in the US. As you’ll remember, the NASDAQ doubled. Of course the aftermath was none too pleasant, and continues as such to this day. As I mentioned above, I believe the key to navigating the investment environment ahead is to anticipate the unintended consequences of current government spending and Fed actions. Over the years it has been my experience that the most important drivers of asset prices are not the outcomes that can be seen and/or anticipated by the many, but rather the unseen outcomes that only the few dare anticipate. Hasn’t this exactly been the case since equity market highs of 2007? I believe it will continue to be so ahead.

Brian Pretti"

Every Thursday afternoon, the chart will be updated with the latest data released by the Fed.

TO BE NOTED: From the WSJ:

"By Phil Izzo



In response to the most severe crisis in financial markets since the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve has expanded its balance sheet to unprecedented heights.

At the Federal Open Market Committee meeting last month, officials decided to increase the balance sheet further through purchases of some $1 trillion in Treasurys and mortgage securities. Minutes to the latest meeting show that FOMC members were concerned about a worsening economic outlook and took forceful action in response.

In an effort to track the Fed’s actions, Real Time Economics has created an interactive graphic that will mark the expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet. Every Thursday afternoon, the chart will be updated with the latest data released by the Fed.

In an effort to simplify the composition of the balance sheet, some elements have been consolidated. Portfolios holding assets from the Bear Stearns and AIG rescues have been put into one category, as have facilities aimed at supporting commercial paper and money markets. The direct bank lending group includes term auction credit, as well as loans extended through the discount window and similar programs.

Central bank liquidity swaps refer to Fed programs with foreign central banks that allow the institutions to lend out foreign currency to their local banks. Repurchase agreements are short-term temporary purchases of securities from banks, which are looking for liquidity and agree to repurchase them on a specified date at a specified price.

Click and drag your mouse to zoom in on the chart. Clicking the check mark on categories can add or remove elements from the balance sheet."

Wednesday, April 8, 2009

Overall, most participants viewed downside risks as predominating in the near term, mainly owing to potential adverse feedback effects

TO BE NOTED: From the Fed:

"
Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee

March 17-18, 2009

A meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee was held in the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, March 17, 2009, at 2:00 p.m. and continued on Wednesday, March 18, 2009, at 9:00 a.m.

PRESENT:
Mr. Bernanke, Chairman
Mr. Dudley, Vice Chairman
Ms. Duke
Mr. Evans
Mr. Kohn
Mr. Lacker
Mr. Lockhart
Mr. Tarullo
Mr. Warsh
Ms. Yellen

Mr. Bullard, Ms. Cumming, Mr. Hoenig, Ms. Pianalto, and Mr. Rosengren, Alternate Members of the Federal Open Market Committee

Messrs. Fisher, Plosser, and Stern, Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of Dallas, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis, respectively

Mr. Madigan, Secretary and Economist
Ms. Danker, Deputy Secretary
Mr. Luecke, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Skidmore, Assistant Secretary
Ms. Smith, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Alvarez, General Counsel
Mr. Baxter, Deputy General Counsel
Mr. Sheets, Economist
Mr. Stockton, Economist

Messrs. Altig, Clouse, Connors, Kamin, Slifman, Sullivan, Weinberg, Wilcox, and Williams, Associate Economists

Ms. Mosser, Temporary Manager, System Open Market Account

Ms. Johnson, Secretary of the Board, Office of the Secretary, Board of Governors

Mr. Frierson, Deputy Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Board of Governors

Mr. Struckmeyer, Deputy Staff Director, Office of the Staff Director for Management, Board of Governors

Ms. Bailey and Mr. English, Deputy Directors, Divisions of Banking Supervision and Regulation and Monetary Affairs, respectively, Board of Governors

Mr. Blanchard, Assistant to the Board, Office of Board Members, Board of Governors

Messrs. Leahy, Nelson, Reifschneider, and Wascher,1 Associate Directors, Divisions of International Finance, Monetary Affairs, Research and Statistics, and Research and Statistics, respectively, Board of Governors

Mr. Gagnon, Visiting Associate Director, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors

Mr. Oliner, Senior Adviser, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors

Mr. Lewis, Economist, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors

Ms. Beattie,1 Assistant to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Board of Governors

Ms. Low, Open Market Secretariat Specialist, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors

Mr. Williams, Records Management Analyst, Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors

Mr. Sapenaro, First Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Messrs. Fuhrer and Rosenblum, Executive Vice Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and Dallas, respectively

Messrs. Hilton and Schweitzer, Senior Vice Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Cleveland, respectively

Messrs. Clark, Gavin, Klitgaard, and Yi, Vice Presidents, Federal Reserve Banks of Kansas City, St. Louis, New York, and Philadelphia, respectively

Mr. Weber, Senior Research Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Developments in Financial Markets and the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet
The Manager of the System Open Market Account reported on recent developments in domestic and foreign financial markets. The Manager also reported on System open market operations in Treasury securities and in agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) during the period since the Committee's January 27-28 meeting. By unanimous vote, the Committee ratified those transactions. There were no open market operations in foreign currencies for the System's account during the period since the Committee's January 27-28 meeting.

Staff reported on recent developments in System liquidity programs and on changes in the System's balance sheet. As of March 12, the System's total assets and liabilities were about $2 trillion, close to the level of that just before the January 27-28 meeting. Holdings of agency debt and agency MBS had increased, while foreign central bank drawings on reciprocal currency arrangements had declined. Credit extended by the Commercial Paper Funding Facility also had declined, as 90-day paper purchased in the early weeks of the program matured and a large portion was not renewed through the facility. Primary credit extended by the Federal Reserve was about unchanged, and credit outstanding under the Term Auction Facility increased somewhat over the period as the February auctions experienced higher demand than previous auctions. In contrast, credit extended under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility declined somewhat over the intermeeting period, and credit extended under the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility edged down.

Most meeting participants interpreted the evidence as indicating that credit markets still were not working well, and that the Federal Reserve's lending programs, asset purchases, and currency swaps were providing much-needed support to economic activity by reducing dislocations in financial markets, lowering the cost of credit, and facilitating the flow of credit to businesses and households. Participants discussed the prospective further increase in the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, with a focus on the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) and open market purchases of longer-term assets.

The launch of the TALF was announced on March 3. In the initial phase of the program, the Federal Reserve offered to provide up to $200 billion of three-year loans, on a nonrecourse basis, against AAA-rated asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by newly and recently originated auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration, and, potentially, certain other closely related types of ABS. The Federal Reserve and the Treasury had previously announced their expectation that the program would be expanded to accept other types of ABS. The demand for TALF funding appeared likely to be modest initially, and some participants saw a risk that private firms might be reluctant to borrow from the TALF out of concern about potential future changes in government policies that could affect TALF borrowers. However, other participants anticipated that TALF loans would increase over time as financial market institutions became more familiar with the program. Most participants supported the expansion of the lending capacity of the TALF, subject to receiving additional capital from the Treasury, and the inclusion of additional categories of recently issued, highly rated ABS as acceptable collateral. However, some participants expressed concern about the risks that might arise from the possible extension of the TALF to include older and lower-quality assets, noting, in particular, the greater uncertainty over the value of such assets.

The Federal Reserve's programs to buy direct debt obligations of the federal housing agencies and agency-guaranteed MBS were on track to reach their initial targets of $100 billion and $500 billion, respectively, by the end of June. Participants agreed that the asset purchase programs were helping to reduce mortgage interest rates and improve market functioning, thereby providing support to economic activity. Some participants stated a preference for communicating the Committee's intention regarding such purchases in terms of the growth rate of Federal Reserve holdings rather than a dollar target for total purchases. However, others noted that the pace of MBS issuance was likely to be especially brisk over the next few months, in part because of the Administration's new Making Home Affordable program, and observed that it could be advantageous to be able to front-load purchases to accommodate the pattern of mortgage refinancing. Participants also discussed the relative merits of increasing the Federal Reserve's purchases of agency MBS versus initiating purchases of longer-term Treasury securities. Some participants remarked that experience suggested that purchases of Treasury securities would have effects across a variety of long-term debt markets and should ease financial conditions generally while minimizing the Federal Reserve's influence on the allocation of credit. However, purchases of agency securities could have a more direct effect on mortgage rates, thus providing greater benefits to the housing sector, and on private borrowing rates more generally. Also, some participants were concerned that Federal Reserve purchases of longer-term Treasury securities might be seen as an indication that the Federal Reserve was responding to a fiscal objective rather than its statutory mandate, thus reducing the Federal Reserve's credibility regarding long-run price stability. Most participants, however, saw this risk as low so long as the Federal Reserve was clear about the importance of its long-term price stability objective and demonstrated a commitment to take the necessary steps in the future to achieve its objectives.

In light of the economic and financial conditions, meeting participants viewed the expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet that might be associated with these and other programs as appropriate in order to foster the dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability. It was noted that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve will seek legislation to give the Federal Reserve tools in addition to interest on reserves to manage the federal funds rate while providing the funding necessary for the TALF and other key credit-easing programs.

The Committee also took up a proposal to augment the existing network of central bank liquidity swap lines by adding several temporary swap lines that could provide foreign currency liquidity to U.S. institutions, analogous to the arrangements that currently provide U.S. dollar liquidity abroad. There was no evidence that these institutions were encountering difficulty in meeting foreign currency obligations at this time, but these facilities would be available should pressures develop in the future. The Committee unanimously approved the following resolution:

"The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to enter into additional temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with the Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank to support the provision of liquidity in British pounds, euros, Japanese yen, and Swiss francs. The swap arrangements with each foreign central bank shall be subject to the following limits: an aggregate amount of up to £30 billion with the Bank of England; an aggregate amount of up to €80 billion with the ECB; an aggregate amount of up to ¥10 trillion with the Bank of Japan; and an aggregate amount of up to SwF 40 billion with the Swiss National Bank. These arrangements shall terminate no later than October 30, 2009, unless extended by mutual agreement of the Committee and the respective foreign central banks. The Committee also authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to provide the foreign currencies obtained under the arrangements to U.S. financial institutions by means of swap transactions to assist such institutions in meeting short-term liquidity needs in their foreign operations. Requests for drawings on the central bank swap lines and distribution of the foreign currency proceeds to U.S. financial institutions shall be initiated by the appropriate Reserve Bank and approved by the Foreign Currency Subcommittee."

Staff Review of the Economic and Financial Situation
The information reviewed at the March 17-18 meeting indicated that economic activity had fallen sharply in recent months. The contraction was reflected in widespread declines in payroll employment and industrial production. Consumer spending appeared to remain at a low level after changing little, on balance, in recent months. The housing market weakened further, and nonresidential construction fell. Business spending on equipment and software continued to fall across a broad range of categories. Despite the cutbacks in production, inventory overhangs appeared to worsen in a number of areas. Both headline and core consumer prices edged up in January and February.

Labor market conditions continued to deteriorate. Private payroll employment dropped considerably over the three months ending in February. Employment losses remained widespread across industries, with the notable exception of health care. Meanwhile, the average workweek of production and nonsupervisory workers on private payrolls continued to be low in February, and the number of aggregate hours worked for this group was markedly below the fourth-quarter average. The civilian unemployment rate climbed 1/2 percentage point in February, to 8.1 percent. The labor force participation rate declined in January and February, on balance, likely in response to weakened labor demand. The four-week moving average of initial claims for unemployment insurance continued to move up through early March, and the level of insured unemployed rose further.

Industrial production fell in January and February, with cutbacks again widespread, and capacity utilization in manufacturing declined to a very low level. Although production of light motor vehicles turned up in February, it remained well below the pace of the fourth quarter as manufacturers responded to the significant deterioration in demand over the past few months. The output of high-tech products declined as production of computers and semiconductors extended the sharp declines that began in the fourth quarter of 2008. The production of other consumer durables and business equipment weakened further, and broad indicators of near-term manufacturing activity suggested that factory output would continue to contract over the next few months.

The available data suggested that real consumer spending held steady, on balance, in the first two months of this year after having fallen sharply over the second half of last year. Real spending on goods excluding motor vehicles was estimated to have edged up, on balance, in January and February. In contrast, real outlays on motor vehicles contracted further in February after a decline in January. The financial strain on households intensified over the previous several months; by the end of the fourth quarter, household net worth for the first time since 1995 had fallen to less than five times disposable income, and substantial declines in equity and house prices continued early this year. Consumer sentiment declined further in February as households voiced greater concerns about income and job prospects. The Reuters/University of Michigan index in early March stood only slightly above its 29-year low reached in November, and the Conference Board index, which includes questions about employment conditions, fell in February to a new low.

Housing activity continued to be subdued. Single-family starts ticked up in February, and adjusted permit issuance in this sector moved up to a level slightly above starts. Multifamily starts jumped in February from the very low level in January, and the level of multifamily starts was close to where it had been at the end of the third quarter of 2008. Housing demand remained very weak, however. Although the stock of unsold new single-family homes fell in January to its lowest level since 2003, inventories continued to move up relative to the slow pace of sales. Sales of existing single-family homes fell in January, reversing the uptick seen in December. Over the previous 12 months, the pace of existing home sales declined much less than that of new home sales, reflecting in part increases in foreclosure-related and other distressed sales. The weakness in home sales persisted despite historically low mortgage rates for borrowers eligible for conforming loans. After having fallen significantly late last year, rates for conforming 30-year fixed-rate mortgages fluctuated in a relatively narrow range during the intermeeting period. In contrast, the market for nonconforming loans remained severely impaired. House prices continued to decline.

Business spending on transportation equipment continued to fall from already low levels, and demand both for high-tech equipment and software and for equipment other than high-tech and transportation dropped sharply in the fourth quarter. In January, nominal shipments of nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft declined, and new orders fell significantly further. The fundamental determinants of equipment and software spending worsened appreciably: Business output dropped, and rising corporate bond yields boosted the user cost of capital in the fourth quarter. After holding up surprisingly well through most of last year, outlays on nonresidential structures began to show declines consistent with the weak fundamentals for this sector. In real terms, investment declined for most types of buildings over the previous few months. Census data on book-value inventory investment for January suggested that firms had further pared their stocks; however, sales continued to fall more quickly than inventories, apparently exacerbating the overhangs that developed in the second half of 2008.

The U.S. international trade deficit narrowed in December and January, as a steep fall in imports more than offset a decline in exports. All major categories of exports decreased, especially sales of industrial supplies, machinery, and automotive products. All major categories of imports decreased as well, with large declines in imports of oil, automotive products, and industrial supplies. The drop in the value of oil imports reflected a lower price. Imports of automotive products declined as automakers made significant production cutbacks throughout North America.

Output in the advanced foreign economies contracted in the fourth quarter, with large reductions in real gross domestic product (GDP) in all the major economies and a double-digit rate of decline in Japan. Trade and investment in those countries were particularly weak. Indicators of economic activity, especially industrial production, suggested that the pace of contraction accelerated late in the fourth quarter and into the first quarter. Economic activity in emerging market economies also weakened significantly in the fourth quarter. Exports, industrial production, and confidence indicators dropped notably in both Latin America and emerging Asia. Incoming data for January and February suggested a further significant decline in the first quarter.

In the United States, overall consumer prices increased in January and February, led by an increase in energy prices, after posting sizable declines late last year. Excluding the categories of food and energy, consumer prices edged higher in January and February after three months of no change. The producer price index for core intermediate materials dropped for a fifth month in February, reflecting, in part, weaker global demand and steep declines in the prices of a wide variety of energy-intensive goods, such as chemicals and plastics. Low readings on overall and core consumer price inflation in recent months, as well as the weakened economic outlook, kept near-term inflation expectations reported in surveys well below their high levels in mid-2008. In contrast, measures of longer-term expectations remained close to their averages over the past couple of years. Hourly earnings continued to increase at a moderate rate in February.

The Federal Open Market Committee's decision at the January meeting to leave the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged was widely anticipated by investors and had little impact on short-term money markets. Over the intermeeting period, the path for the federal funds rate implied by futures rates shifted down somewhat, on net, mostly on incoming news about the financial sector and the economic outlook. Yields on nominal Treasury coupon securities increased over the period, reportedly because market participants had assigned some probability to the possibility that the Federal Reserve would establish a purchase program for longer-term Treasury securities that was not, in fact, forthcoming; yields were also reported to have responded to concerns over the federal deficit and the growing supply of Treasury securities. Yields on longer-term inflation-indexed Treasury securities increased more than those on their nominal counterparts, leaving longer-term inflation compensation lower over the period, and inflation compensation at shorter horizons was little changed. Poor liquidity in the market for Treasury inflation-protected securities continued to make these readings difficult to interpret.

Conditions in short-term funding markets were mixed over the intermeeting period. In unsecured interbank funding markets, spreads of dollar London interbank offered rates (Libor) over comparable-maturity overnight index swap rates trended higher, on net, especially at longer maturities, and forward spreads increased, evidently on renewed concerns about the financial condition of some large banks. Conditions in the commercial paper (CP) market continued to improve, on balance, over the intermeeting period. Spreads on 30-day A2/P2-rated CP trended down further, and those on AA-rated asset-backed commercial paper remained at the lower end of the range recorded over the past year. Conditions in repurchase agreement markets for most collateral types improved over the period, but volumes remained low.

Trading conditions in the secondary market for nominal Treasury coupon securities showed some limited signs of improvement. Average bid-asked spreads for on-the-run nominal Treasury notes were relatively stable near their pre-crisis levels. Daily trading volumes for on-the-run securities, however, inched lower, and spreads between the yields of on- and off-the-run 10-year Treasury notes remained very high.

Broad equity price indexes dropped significantly, on balance, over the intermeeting period amid continued concerns about the health of the financial sector, uncertainty regarding the efficacy of government support to the sector, and a further weakening of the economic outlook. Bank stock prices were particularly hard hit, and the credit default swap (CDS) spreads of many banks rose above the peaks recorded last fall on anxieties about the financial conditions of the largest banking firms. Stock prices of insurance companies dropped sharply over the period, reflecting concerns about the adequacy of their capital positions. On March 2, American International Group, Inc. (AIG), reported losses of more than $60 billion for the fourth quarter of last year, and the Treasury and the Federal Reserve announced a restructuring of the government assistance to AIG to enhance the company's capital and liquidity to facilitate the orderly completion of its global divestiture program.

Measures of liquidity in the secondary market for speculative-grade corporate bonds worsened somewhat over the period but remained significantly better than in the fall of 2008. Spreads of yields on both BBB-rated and speculative-grade bonds relative to those on comparable-maturity Treasury securities were little changed on net. The investment- and speculative-grade CDS indexes widened significantly, on net, over the intermeeting period. Gross bond issuance by nonfinancial firms was very strong in January and February, as investment-grade issuance more than doubled from its already solid pace in the fourth quarter; speculative-grade issuance, however, remained sluggish. Trading conditions in the leveraged syndicated loan market improved slightly, but issuance continued to be very weak. The market for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) also remained under heavy stress. Indexes of CDS spreads on AAA-rated CMBS widened to record levels, as Moody's downgraded a large portion of the 2006 and 2007 vintages after a reevaluation of its rating criteria.

The debt of the domestic private nonfinancial sector, which was about unchanged in the fourth quarter of last year, was estimated to have remained about flat in the first quarter. Household debt appeared to have contracted in the first quarter for the second quarter in a row, primarily as a result of declines in both consumer and home mortgage debt. Declines in consumer and mortgage debt stemmed, in turn, from very weak household spending, the continued drop in house prices, and tighter terms and standards for loans. Business debt was projected to expand at a moderate pace in the first quarter, largely because of a burst of corporate bond issuance. Reflecting heavy borrowing by the Treasury, total debt of the domestic nonfinancial sector was projected to have continued to expand in the first quarter, but at a pace below that recorded in the fourth quarter of last year.

The rise in M2 slowed in February from the rapid pace recorded over the previous few months. Liquid deposits, while decelerating, continued to expand briskly. Savings deposits increased while demand deposits decreased. Retail money funds fell in February, reflecting sizable outflows from Treasury-only funds, which generally provided low yields. Small time deposits also contracted, as the institutions that had been bidding aggressively for these retail funds stopped doing so. The expansion in currency remained robust.

Bank credit continued to decline in January and February, and commercial and industrial (C&I) loans decreased over these months. The February Survey of Terms of Business Lending indicated that C&I loan rate spreads over comparable-maturity market instruments rose modestly overall from the November survey. Commercial real estate loans outstanding also declined over the first part of 2009. In contrast, consumer loans on banks' books jumped over the first two months of the year because of sizable increases at a few banks that purchased loans from their affiliated finance companies. In addition, some banks brought consumer loans that had previously been securitized back onto their books. After 12 consecutive months of contraction, residential mortgage loans on banks' books increased in February, likely a result of the pickup in refinancing activity. In contrast, the rise in home equity loans slowed noticeably in January and February.

Among the advanced foreign economies, headline equity price indexes generally fell significantly over the period, with the sharpest drops in the banking sector. In particular, European bank shares fell steeply as earnings reports for the fourth quarter came in weaker than expected and fears about the exposure of many western European banks to emerging Europe increased. The major currencies index of the dollar rose, on net, over the intermeeting period; foremost among the contributors to the rise was a significant appreciation of the dollar against the yen. Financial conditions in emerging markets also worsened, with their exchange rates and equity prices generally falling and CDS premiums rising a bit on balance.

Several foreign governments and central banks took further steps to support their financial markets and economies. The Bank of England announced its intention to purchase substantial quantities of government and corporate bonds through its Asset Purchase Facility, after which yields on long-term British gilts fell significantly. In addition, the British government launched its Asset Protection Scheme, which insured assets placed in the scheme by the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Bank. The Bank of Japan stated that it would resume purchases of equities held on banks' balance sheets, announced plans to purchase corporate bonds, and began its previously announced purchases of commercial paper. The Swiss National Bank announced that it would purchase both domestic corporate debt and foreign currency to increase liquidity.

Staff Economic Outlook
In the forecast prepared for the meeting, the staff revised down its outlook for economic activity. The deterioration in labor market conditions was rapid in recent months, with steep job losses across nearly all sectors. Industrial production continued to contract rapidly as firms responded to the falloff in demand and the buildup of some inventory overhangs. The incoming data on business spending suggested that business investment in equipment and structures continued to decline. Single-family housing starts had fallen to a post-World War II low in January, and demand for new homes remained weak. Both exports and imports retreated significantly in the fourth quarter of last year and appeared headed for comparable declines this quarter. Consumer outlays showed some signs of stabilizing at a low level, with real outlays for goods outside of motor vehicles recording gains in January and February. Financial conditions overall were even less supportive of economic activity, with broad equity indexes down significantly amid continued concerns about the health of the financial sector, the dollar stronger, and long-term interest rates higher. The staff's projections for real GDP in the second half of 2009 and in 2010 were revised down, with real GDP expected to flatten out gradually over the second half of this year and then to expand slowly next year as the stresses in financial markets ease, the effects of fiscal stimulus take hold, inventory adjustments are worked through, and the correction in housing activity comes to an end. The weaker trajectory of real output resulted in the projected path of the unemployment rate rising more steeply into early next year before flattening out at a high level over the rest of the year. The staff forecast for overall and core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation over the next two years was revised down slightly. Both core and overall PCE price inflation were expected to be damped by low rates of resource utilization, falling import prices, and easing cost pressures as a result of the sharp net declines in oil and other raw materials prices since last summer.

Meeting Participants' Views and Committee Policy Action
In the discussion of the economic situation and outlook, nearly all meeting participants said that conditions had deteriorated relative to their expectations at the time of the January meeting. The slowdown was widespread across sectors. Large declines in equity prices, a further drop in house prices, and mounting job losses threatened to further depress consumer spending, despite some firming in the recent retail sales data and forthcoming tax reductions. Business capital spending was weakening in an environment of uncertainty and low business confidence. Of particular note was the apparent sharp fall in foreign economic activity, which was having a negative effect on U.S. exports. Credit conditions remained very tight, and financial markets remained fragile and unsettled, with pressures on financial institutions generally intensifying this year. Overall, participants expressed concern about downside risks to an outlook for activity that was already weak. With regard to the outlook for inflation, all participants agreed that inflation pressures were likely to remain subdued, and several expressed the view that inflation was likely to persist below desirable levels.

District business contacts indicated that production and sales were declining steeply. Some industries that previously were less affected, such as agriculture and energy, had begun to suffer the effects of the slowdown. Businesses reported that bank financing was becoming more expensive and more difficult to obtain. Expenditures were being cut substantially for a wide range of capital equipment, and spending on nonresidential structures had recently turned down. Inventory liquidation was continuing, but inventory-sales ratios remained elevated as sales slowed. Against this backdrop, participants anticipated further employment cutbacks over coming months, though perhaps at a gradually diminishing rate.

Several participants said that the degree and pervasiveness of the decline in foreign economic activity was one of the most notable developments since the January meeting. In light of this development, it was widely agreed that exports were not likely to be a source of support for U.S. economic activity in the near term.

Participants did not interpret the uptick in housing starts in February as the beginning of a new trend, but some noted that there was only limited scope for housing activity to fall further. Nonetheless, large inventories of unsold homes relative to sales and the prospect of a continued high level of distressed sales would continue to hold down residential investment in the near term. Several participants noted the tentative signs of stabilization in consumer spending in January and February. However, others suggested that strains on household balance sheets from falling equity and house prices, reduced credit availability, and the fear of unemployment could well lead to further increases in the saving rate that would damp consumption growth in the near term.

Overall, most participants viewed downside risks as predominating in the near term, mainly owing to potential adverse feedback effects as reduced employment and production weighed on consumer spending and investment, and as the weakening economy boosted the prospective losses of financial institutions, leading to a further tightening of credit conditions.

Looking beyond the very near term, a number of market forces and policies now in place were seen as eventually leading to economic recovery. Notably, the low level of mortgage interest rates, reduced house prices, and the Administration's new programs to encourage mortgage refinancing and mitigate foreclosures ultimately could bring about a lower cost of homeownership, a sustained increase in home sales, and a stabilization of house prices. The household saving rate, which had already risen considerably, would eventually level out and cease to hold back consumption growth. Business inventories would come into line with even a low level of sales, and the pressure on production from inventory drawdowns would diminish. Fiscal and monetary policies were likely to contribute significantly to aggregate demand in coming quarters. Participants expressed a variety of views about the strength and timing of the recovery, however. Some believed that the natural resilience of market forces would become evident later this year. Others, who saw recovery as delayed and potentially weak, were concerned about a possible further rise in the saving rate and a very slow improvement in financial conditions. Some participants also cautioned that, because of the poor functioning of the financial system, capital and labor were not being allocated to their most productive uses, and this failure threatened to damp the recovery and reduce the potential growth of the economy over the medium term.

Participants saw little chance of a pickup in inflation over the near term, as rising unemployment and falling capacity utilization were holding down wages and prices and inflation expectations appeared subdued. Several expressed concern that inflation was likely to persist below desired levels, with a few pointing to the risk of deflation. Even without a continuation of outright price declines, falling expectations of inflation would raise the real rate of interest and thus increase the burden of debt and further restrain the economy.

Some indicators, including share prices and CDS spreads of financial institutions, suggested a worsening of financial market strains since January. However, for the most part, participants viewed conditions in financial markets as little changed but remaining extraordinarily stressed. The large volume of issuance of investment-grade corporate bonds in recent weeks was a notable bright spot. Participants shared comments received from financial industry contacts on their experiences with and concerns about recent government programs to stabilize the financial system. These contacts feared that uncertainties about future actions the government might take and future regulations it might impose were making it more difficult to plan and were discouraging participation in government efforts to stabilize the financial system. Participants agreed that a credible and widely understood program to deal with the troubles of the banking system could help restore business and consumer confidence. Many viewed the strengthening of the banking system as essential for a sustained and robust recovery.

In the discussion of monetary policy for the intermeeting period, Committee members agreed that substantial additional purchases of longer-term assets eligible for open market operations would be appropriate. Such purchases would provide further monetary stimulus to help address the very weak economic outlook and reduce the risk that inflation could persist for a time below rates that best foster longer-term economic growth and price stability. One member preferred to focus additional purchases on longer-term Treasury securities, whereas another member preferred to focus on agency MBS. However, both could support expanded purchases across a range of assets, and several members noted that working across a range of assets and instruments was appropriate when the effects of any one tactic were uncertain. Members agreed that the monetary base was likely to grow significantly as a consequence of additional asset purchases; one, in particular, stressed that sustained increases in the monetary base were important to ensure that policy was consistently expansionary. Members expressed a range of views as to the preferred size of the increase in purchases. Several members felt that the significant deterioration in the economic outlook merited a very substantial increase in purchases of longer-term assets. In contrast, the potential for a large increase over time in the size of the balance sheet from the TALF program was seen as supporting a more modest, though still substantial, increase in asset purchases. Ultimately, members agreed to undertake additional purchases of agency MBS of up to $750 billion and of agency debt of up to $100 billion, and they also agreed to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities. The Committee believed that purchases of these amounts would help to promote a return to economic growth and price stability. The period for conducting the agency debt and MBS purchases was extended from the next three months to the next nine months; members agreed to allow the Desk flexibility within this horizon to respond to market conditions. Treasury purchases were to be conducted over the next six months. Members also noted the recent launch of the TALF, and they agreed to include in the Committee's statement an indication that the range of assets accepted as eligible collateral for the TALF was likely to be expanded. Committee members decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and to communicate to the public the Committee's view that the federal funds rate was likely to remain exceptionally low for an extended period.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the Committee voted to authorize and direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until it was instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the System Account in accordance with the following domestic policy directive:

"The Federal Open Market Committee seeks monetary and financial conditions that will foster price stability and promote sustainable growth in output. To further its long-run objectives, the Committee seeks conditions in reserve markets consistent with federal funds trading in a range from 0 to 1/4 percent. The Committee directs the Desk to purchase GSE debt, GSE-guaranteed MBS, and longer-term Treasury securities during the intermeeting period with the aim of providing support to private credit markets and economic activity. The timing and pace of these purchases should depend on conditions in the markets for such securities and on a broader assessment of private credit market conditions. The Committee anticipates that the combination of outright purchases and various liquidity facilities outstanding will cause the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet to expand significantly in coming months. The Desk is expected to purchase up to $200 billion in housing-related GSE debt by the end of this year. The Desk is expected to purchase at least $500 billion in GSE-guaranteed MBS by the end of the second quarter of this year and is expected to purchase up to $1.25 trillion of these securities by the end of this year. The Committee also directs the Desk to purchase longer-term Treasury securities during the intermeeting period. Over the next six months, the Desk is expected to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities. The System Open Market Account Manager and the Secretary will keep the Committee informed of ongoing developments regarding the System's balance sheet that could affect the attainment over time of the Committee's objectives of maximum employment and price stability."

The vote encompassed approval of the statement below to be released at 2:15 p.m.:

"Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in January indicates that the economy continues to contract. Job losses, declining equity and housing wealth, and tight credit conditions have weighed on consumer sentiment and spending. Weaker sales prospects and difficulties in obtaining credit have led businesses to cut back on inventories and fixed investment. U.S. exports have slumped as a number of major trading partners have also fallen into recession. Although the near-term economic outlook is weak, the Committee anticipates that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, together with fiscal and monetary stimulus, will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable economic growth.

In light of increasing economic slack here and abroad, the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued. Moreover, the Committee sees some risk that inflation could persist for a time below rates that best foster economic growth and price stability in the longer term.

In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability. The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and anticipates that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. To provide greater support to mortgage lending and housing markets, the Committee decided today to increase the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion. Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months. The Federal Reserve has launched the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses and anticipates that the range of eligible collateral for this facility is likely to be expanded to include other financial assets. The Committee will continue to carefully monitor the size and composition of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet in light of evolving financial and economic developments."

Voting for this action: Messrs. Bernanke and Dudley, Ms. Duke, Messrs. Evans, Kohn, Lacker, Lockhart, Tarullo, and Warsh, and Ms. Yellen.

Voting against this action: None.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the Committee would be held on Tuesday-Wednesday, April 28-29, 2009. The meeting adjourned at 1:35 p.m. on March 18, 2009.

Conference Call
On February 7, 2009, the Committee met by conference call in a joint session with the Board of Governors to discuss the potential role of the Federal Reserve in the Treasury's forthcoming financial stabilization plan. After hearing an overview of the version of the plan envisioned at the time of the meeting, meeting participants discussed its principal elements and shared a range of perspectives on its implications for financial markets and institutions. The Federal Reserve's primary direct role in the plan would be through an expansion of the previously announced TALF, which would be supported by additional funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In the current environment, it was anticipated that such an expansion would provide additional assistance to financial markets and institutions in meeting the credit needs of households and businesses and thus would support overall economic activity. While several participants expressed some concern that the expansion of the TALF program could increase the Federal Reserve's exposure to credit risk, the program's requirements for highly rated collateral that would exceed the value of the related loans, in combination with the added TARP funds as a backstop against losses, were generally seen as providing the Federal Reserve with adequate protection. Participants also discussed the implications of the expanded TALF program for the Federal Reserve's balance sheet over time. Participants agreed it would be important to work with the Treasury to obtain tools to ensure that any reserves added to the banking system through this program could be removed at the appropriate time."

Monday, April 6, 2009

I think the Fed knows this; hence, they avoid the loaded term quantitative easing in favor of credit easing.

TO BE NOTED: From Tim Duy's Fed Watch

"
More on Inflation Expectations

Thinking about the issues raised in my piece last week, it is worthwhile to spend more time on actual inflation and inflation expectations within the context of the Fed's policy of "credit easing." Consider as a starting point the recent work by John Williamson at the San Francisco Fed who concludes:

This analysis highlights the central roles of economic slack and inflation expectations in the risk of deflation over the next several years. The evidence indicates that a substantial increase in slack can lead to deflation, but the depth and duration of the deflation depends on how well anchored inflation expectations are. Two policy implications can be drawn from this and other research on deflation. First, a central bank should take appropriate actions to stem the emergence of substantial slack in the economy and thereby reduce the risk of deflation. Second, it should clearly communicate its commitment to low positive rates of inflation. An example of such communication is the Federal Open Market Committee's recently released long-run inflation forecasts. Such words, backed by appropriate actions, reinforce the anchoring of inflation expectations and reduce the chances of a deflationary spiral.

Conventional wisdom of the Fed's policy describes quantitative easing as an effort to boost inflation expectations. This flows from the fact that the Fed Funds rates is at zero, therefore further decrease in the real rate can only be achieved by boosting inflation expectations. To me, however, the Fed has not committed to a program of raising inflation expectations. Instead, they are reiterating their existing commitment to a low, stable rate of inflation. Consider the most recent FOMC statement:

In light of increasing economic slack here and abroad, the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued. Moreover, the Committee sees some risk that inflation could persist for a time below rates that best foster economic growth and price stability in the longer term.

In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability.

There is some risk of suboptimal inflation rates, and therefore they will conduct policy conducive to raising inflation. But what rate of inflation? Is there any sense that the Fed is actually trying to change the expectations of their policy goals? Not in the minutes from the previous meeting, where they clearly define their expectations for inflation under appropriate monetary policy:

Minutessnip

It would appear that the Fed is attempting to anchor inflationary expectations in a range consistent with conventional understanding of the Fed's implicit inflation target of 1.7-2% (note that this implied the Fed see a floor on the real rate of -2%). If actual inflation is substantially less than this target, the Fed would be expected to ease policy accordingly. Otherwise, they would be accommodating declining inflation, which would challenge their commitment to their target. Their commitment to stable inflation would not be credible, and expectations would become unanchored in a deflationary direction.

Consider this commitment further via the Fed minutes:

Many participants noted some risk of a protracted period of excessively low inflation, especially if inflation expectations were to move down in response to lower actual inflation and increasing economic slack, and a few even saw some risk of deflation. Several others, however, anticipated that longer-run inflation expectations would remain well anchored, supported in part by the Federal Reserve's aggressive expansion of its balance sheet and the resulting growth of the monetary base, and therefore thought it unlikely that inflation would decline below levels they saw as consistent with the dual goals of price stability and maximum employment.

Yes, there is a risk of deflation, so policymakers will expand the balance sheet accordingly to prove their commitment to low and stable inflation. Notice the theme - to maintain credibility, the monetary authority needs to behave consistent with their commitments. In this framework, the Fed had little other choice but to expand the balance sheet aggressively if they want to avoid expectations of deflation.

Has the Fed been successful in anchoring expectations? Deflation concerns stem in part from the sharp drop in year-over-year inflation:

Fedwatch0404094

The TIPS market, however, is now waiving off deflation concerns:

Fedwatch0404093

In the context of the above discussion, the widening of the 10 TIPS breakeven looks consistent with a successful Fed policy to anchor expectations, which, again, differs from changing where that anchor lays. Likewise, the public perception does not appear to be tilted toward deflation:

Fedwatch0404092

Interestingly, the public's near term inflation expectation is well above the drop experienced in the wake of 9/11. It is worth noting that the rapid disinflation of late last year has somewhat reversed in recent months:

Fedwatch0404091

It is also worth thinking about what would have happened if the Fed did not do this:

040609fedwatch2

Given that the velocity of the monetary base did this:

040609fedwatch1

Now, credibility cuts both ways. The above analysis suggests that the Fed has so far staved off deflationary expectations by acting in a manner consistent with its inflation target. But suppose inflation rises above that target - perhaps velocity explodes, so that inflation rises even if output remains at suboptimal levels (something akin to Johnson and Kwak's emerging market scenario). Then the Fed would need to maintain its commitment to the inflation target by contracting the balance sheet. From the minutes:

Moreover, some noted a risk that expected inflation might actually increase to an undesirably high level if the public does not understand that the Federal Reserve's liquidity facilities will be wound down and its balance sheet will shrink as economic and financial conditions improve.

Policymakers are already considering the removal of their liquidity injections. In other words, they have not committed to a permanent increase in the money supply. Indeed, I believe this is why Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke describes policy as credit easing not quantitative easing. The latter implies permanence. From the minutes:

Several participants indicated that they thought the FOMC should explore establishing quantitative guidelines or targets for a monetary aggregate, perhaps the growth rate of the monetary base or M2; in their view such guidelines would provide useful information to the public and help anchor inflation expectations. Others were skeptical that a single quantitative measure could adequately convey the Federal Reserve's current approach to monetary policy because the stimulative effect of the Federal Reserve's liquidity-providing and asset-purchase programs depends not only on the scale but also on the mix of lending programs and securities purchases. In addition, a few participants noted that the sizes of some Federal Reserve liquidity programs are determined by banks' and market participants' need to use those programs and thus will tend to increase when financial conditions worsen and shrink when financial conditions improve; the size and composition of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet needs to be able to adjust in response.

Again, the Fed has committed to nothing other than to maintain a balance sheet consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations. Note too that this does not imply a complete reversal of the balance sheet expansion; if the velocity of money remains low, then some part of the balance sheet expansion can be permanent and not lead to an increase in expectations of the Fed's inflation target.

The risk is that the Fed commits a policy error by not allowing the balance sheet to contract sufficiently to offset any increase in inflationary pressures. There is a reasonable risk of such an outcome. Consider the first half of 2008, when the Fed continued to ease policy even as inflation, and inflation expectations, was rising dramatically. Had that situation continued, the Fed would have been accommodating increased inflation expectations, thereby threatening their perceived commitment to low and stable inflation. Instead, the Fed got "lucky" and the global economy collapsed, sending inflation downward as commodity prices collapsed. Would the Fed get so "lucky" again?

I think, however, the more likely risk is that the Fed's independence is compromised and they politically cannot shrink the balance sheet in a timely fashion. As I have argued, policymakers understand this risk, and are vociferously reiterating their independence. This too helps keep expectations in check.

Another risk is that policymakers deliberately attempt to reset the inflation target to a higher rate. This may become the policy choice if policymakers believe they need to reduce real rates below the -2% floor implied by the current target (effectively, the Fed chooses the inflation solution to the debt overhang). Resetting the inflation target, I believe, would amount to a commitment by the Fed to a permanent increase in the money supply growth rate. But I doubt it would be easy - how could a new target be credible if the Fed abandons the current target? An attempt to set a new target, I fear, would lead inflation expectations to become fully unanchored. I think the Fed knows this; hence, they avoid the loaded term quantitative easing in favor of credit easing.

Bottom line: The conduct of Fed policy is consistent with a commitment to the existing inflation target. The increase in the monetary base, in this framework, was necessary to prevent expecatations from shifting in the direction of deflation. But credibility works both ways; they need to remain ready to withdraw liquidity should inflation pressures emerge. The repeated claims that the expansion of the balance sheet is not permament is consistent with credibly committing to the existing target. There remains, however, plenty of room for policy error, and not to mention the now omnipresent fear that the Fed has sacrificed its independence."

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

I think that the Fed is very capable of taking back the added liquidity

TO BE NOTED: From News N Economics:

"Some random thoughts on inflation (deflation)

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

I was in Mexico for one week and the only news-related materials I had were two March issues of the Economist; and fortunately, this is poolside reading for me. Anyway, the March 19th edition had a nice article about quantitative easing and the associated inflation angst and featured this chart to the left. The article inspired me to think a little more about why the Fed is taking such extreme balance sheet risk: inflation.

Recently, the Federal Open Market Committee shocked markets by announcing its intent to buy Treasuries in excess of the nominal 0.25% federal funds target, and to increase the MBS and agency coupon purchases by $850 billion. In spite of a 0.2% annual inflation rate in February, recent Fed policies like these have sparked fears of inflation, even hyperinflation. From the Economist:

On March 18th America’s inflation rate was reported at 0.2%, year on year, in February. The same day the Fed said “inflation could persist for a time” at uncomfortably low levels. Yet some economists and investors insist high inflation, even hyperinflation, is lurking in the wings. They have two sources of concern. The first is motive: the world is deleveraging, ie, trying to reduce the ratio of its debts to income. Policymakers might secretly prefer to do that through higher inflation, which lifts nominal incomes, than through the painful processes of cutting spending and retiring debt, or default. The second is captured by the Fed’s announcement that it plans to purchase $300 billion in Treasury bonds and an additional $850 billion of mortgage-related debt, bringing such purchases to $1.75 trillion in total, all paid for by printing money. The Fed is doing what it is doing - quantitative easing - in an attempt to restore functionality to credit markets and to accommodate a low and falling money multiplier in order to secure price stability. Banks are hoarding funds (excess reserve balances one year ago were $1.8 billion and $771.2 billion now), which has been exacerbated by the Fed's paying interest on reserves, but nevertheless, reserves are surging. The result has been a collapse in the money multiplier, which disrupts the process by which the Fed's monetary policy measures (adding base to the system) are turned into money.

The chart above shows that the money multiplier has stabilized, but rests at very low levels. This is the bear faced by the Fed, and the primary reason for its extreme measures of late.

But contemporaneously, inflation expectations have taken a likewise turn for the worse. As falling inflation expectations become embedded into current behaviors (buying decisions or interest rate setting), the macroeconomy suffers. When oil was peaking in July of last year, the Fed watched inflation expectations closely for signs of pressure. And now, the Fed is watching those same expectations on the way down.

The chart illustrates market inflation expectations for each year over the next 10 years, as measured by the nominal 10-yr Treasury minus its inflation protected counterpart (TIPS). Admittedly, inflation expectations have improved significantly from their 0.04% low in November 2008 to 1.34% at the end of March. However, the market still expects just 1.34% annual inflation over the next 10 years, which is far below the Fed's new quasi inflation target of 1.7%-2.0%, and obviously a big concern.

This is why the Fed and central banks around the world are building up their balance sheets: inflation (deflation) risk. In the U.S. and according to the Taylor Rule, a nominal interest rate target based on current inflation, inflation expectations, and the output gap, the Fed should cut the federal funds target, the Fed's short-term interest rate to induce monetary stimulus, to -8%. Since that is impossible (a zero lower bound), the Fed is doing everything it can to support price stability.

I think that the Fed is very capable of taking back the added liquidity; and furthermore, I presume that the paying interest on reserve balances is part of the Fed's exit strategy. However, we will know in a year or two if the Fed gets it right. But know this: a $2 trillion balance sheet is just the beginning.

Rebecca Wilder"

Tuesday, December 16, 2008

"The Fed will continue to make it up as it goes"

I read the FOMC Statement and was going to scan what there was to scan, but this redaction by David Merkel on the Aleph Blog is fun, and, he disagrees with me:

"Redacted FOMC Statement

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower its establish a target range for the federal funds rate 50 basis pointsof 0 to 1/4 percent.

The pace of economic activity appears to have slowed markedly, owing importantly to a decline in consumer expenditures. Business equipment spending and industrial production have weakened in recent months, and slowing economic activity in many foreign economies is damping the prospects for U.S. exports. Moreover, the intensification of financial market turmoil is likely to exert additional restraint on spending, partly by further reducing the ability of households and businesses to obtain credit.

Since the Committee’s last meeting, labor market conditions have deteriorated, and the available data indicate that consumer spending, business investment, and industrial production have declined. Financial markets remain quite strained and credit conditions tight. Overall, the outlook for economic activity has weakened further.

Meanwhile, inflationary pressures have diminished appreciably. In light of the declines in the prices of energy and other commodities and the weaker prospects for economic activity, the Committee expects inflation to moderate further in coming quarters to levels consistent with price stability.

Recent policy actions, including today’s rate reduction, coordinated interest rate cuts by central banks, extraordinary liquidity measures, and official steps to strengthen financial systems, should help over time to improve credit conditions and promote a return to moderate economic growth. Nevertheless, downside risks to growth remain. The Committee Federal Reserve will monitor economic and financial developments carefully and will act as needed to promoteemploy all available tools to promote the resumption of sustainable economic growth and to preserve price stability. In particular, the Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.

The focus of the Committee’s policy going forward will be to support the functioning of financial markets and stimulate the economy through open market operations and other measures that sustain the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet at a high level. As previously announced, over the next few quarters the Federal Reserve will purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand its purchases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant. The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities. Early next year, the Federal Reserve will also implement the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses. The Federal Reserve will continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to further support credit markets and economic activity.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; Timothy F. Geithner, Vice ChairmanChristine M. Cumming; Elizabeth A. Duke; Richard W. Fisher; Donald L. Kohn; Randall S. Kroszner; Sandra Pianalto; Charles I. Plosser; Gary H. Stern; and Kevin M. Warsh.

In a related action, the Board of Governors unanimously approved a 5075-basis-point decrease in the discount rate to 1-1/4/2 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, New York, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. The Board also established interest rates on required and excess reserve balances of 1/4 percent.

The Upshot

  • We’re done with Fed Funds in entire. ( GOOD. IT WAS WORTH A SHOT )
  • On to quantitative easing. (Japan had the advantage of running a current account surplus… how will it work for us with a deficit?) ( PICK UP THE PACE )
  • The princely rate of 1/4% gets paid on all reserve balances at the Fed, both required and excess. ( HIGHLY COMICAL )
  • The Fed is looking at deflation, not price stability. ( AS IT SHOULD )
  • The Fed will possibly invest more into long Treasuries, with uncertain prospects. ( LIFE IS UNCERTAIN )
  • The Fed will continue to make it up as it goes, and keep expanding its balance sheet, adding liquidity where it wills, and replace functions of the private lending markets in the name of fixing the lending markets. ( THAT'S ABOUT IT. ONLY, THE PRIVATE LENDING MARKETS WANT HELP. THEY PAID FOR IT, AND THEY'RE GETTING IT. WHAT WORRIES THEM IS BEING LEFT ON THEIR OWN )
Oddly, I believe that my plan is more likely to get us to where he and I both want to go.