massive monetary easing and zero policy rates; quantitative easing; unconventional monetary and credit actions

TO BE NOTED: From Forbes:

"Light At The End Of The Tunnel ...
Nouriel Roubini, 04.02.09, 12:01 AM ET

I was interviewed on Tuesday on CNBC's "Squawk Box" on my views on the economy, the stock market, the problems with the banks, the Geithner plan and whether there's light at the end of the tunnel.

As I pointed out in the interview, the rate of economic contraction will slow from the -6% of the first quarter to a figure closer to -2%. And next year the economic recovery will be so weak--growth below 1% and the unemployment rate peaking at 10%--that it will still feel like a recession even if we may be technically out of it. So, compared with the bullish consensus that sees positive growth at 2% by the third and fourth quarters of this year and a return to potential growth by 2010, my views are consistently more bearish.

Still, compared with the sharp contraction in U.S. and global growth in the first quarter of this year, the rate of economic contraction will slow down for the U.S. and other advanced economies by year-end. That is only a mild improvement in what is still a severe U-shaped recession, with a very weak and tentative recovery by 2010.

I also pointed out on CNBC that the stock market has predicted six out of the last zero economic recoveries. For the last 18 months, we've had six bear market rallies, and at the beginning of each one of these suckers' rallies the delusional perma-bulls repeated that this was the beginning of a bull market rally. And for six times these perma-bulls were totally wrong as the rally fizzled and new lows were reached. And for six times I correctly pointed out that these were bear market rallies.

But such perma-bulls have no shame in showing up over and over again on CNBC and talking up their books and being proved wrong over and over again. As I have never been a "perma-bear," in spite of the "Dr. Doom" nickname, I will be the first one to call the bottom of this severe recession and the bottom of the bear market when I see sustained evidence of robust and consistent economic recovery.

I see the latest rally as another bear market rally, as over the next few months, the news--macro news, earnings news, financial news, corporate default news, financial firms insolvency news and so on--will be worse than expected by the consensus. Look how wobbly the stock market was on Monday when the expected news that the Big Three are in Big Trouble led to a 3% to 4% market fall. Do you listen to Tim Geithner, who says that some banks need "large amounts of assistance," and who is now pushing--like Bernanke--for fast-track Congressional approval of a law that will allow the takeover of systemically important financial institutions and bank holding companies? This market recovery has still very shaky legs, and it will continue to lurch until the U.S. and global economic recovery does occur and is more robust and sustained.

The global economic contraction is still very severe: In the Eurozone and Japan there is no evidence of "green shoots" or positive second derivatives; and in the U.S. and China such evidence is still very, very weak. So investors and markets are way ahead of actual improvements in economic data. And the idea that stock prices are forward-looking and bottom out six to nine months before the end of a recession is incorrect.

First, we've already had six bear market rallies and, despite the "prediction" of stock prices, not a single economic recovery. Second, in 2001 a short and shallow eight-month recession was over by November, but stock prices kept falling for another 16 months until March 2003. This time around, the recession will be of at least 24 months duration--three times as long and five times as deep, in terms of GDP contraction, as the one in 2001. This time the deflationary forces are global, not just in the U.S. and Japan. This time we have the worst financial and banking crisis since the Great Depression, while in 2001 there was no banking crisis. This time we've got the worst housing recession since the Great Depression, with home prices still bound to fall another 15% to 20% for a cumulative fall of 40% to 45%. This time corporate default rates on junk bonds are predicted by Moody's to peak at 20%, not the 13% of the previous recession.

Thus, the idea that a weak U.S. and global recovery with massive deflationary pressures and a severe financial crisis and massive corporate defaults will lead to a robust recovery of earnings and a sharp persistent bull-market rally in equities is totally far-fetched.

As I have argued before, the risk of an L-shaped near-depression will be significantly reduced if aggressive policy actions were undertaken. That risk of near-depression is now lower than it was three months ago--but not gone altogether--as policy makers in the U.S. and globally have finally gotten religion and taken out all their policy bazookas, missiles, rockets and artillery and started to use them.

These more aggressive and front-loaded policies include massive monetary easing and zero policy rates; quantitative easing; unconventional monetary and credit actions to reduce the spread between market rates and government bond yields; significant--if in some cases still insufficient--fiscal policy stimulus; policies to restore credit growth and reduce the credit crunch; policies to clean up toxic assets of banks; policies to recapitalize banks and take over the insolvent ones; policies to reduce the tsunami of foreclosures and reduce the debt servicing and debt burden of distressed households; policies to support emerging market economies under stress; and policies of appropriate regulatory forbearance to restore credit and liquidity in financial market.

These policies will not restore positive growth in advanced economies until next year, but will reduce the rate of economic contraction to a more moderate pace by the end of 2009. Thus, as I noted earlier, the rate of the advanced economies' economic contraction will slow down from the peak contraction of this year's first quarter (-6%) to a more modest contraction in the fourth quarter (-2%) and a very weak positive growth (0% to 1% in U.S., Europe and Japan) in 2010 with still sharply rising unemployment rates peaking at 10% in these advanced economies. This will be an improvement compared with the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of the 2009 collapse of global economic activity, but still a much more bearish scenario than the bullish case of positive and high (2%) growth by the third and fourth quarters and return to potential growth by 2010.

So the road ahead is still very, very bumpy. The worst for the degree of economic contraction may be behind us by the second or third quarter of this year, but there will not be any robust and sustained recovery as the damage of the financial and real excesses of the last few years will have lasting effects on actual and potential growth for the U.S. and global economies. And the burden of trillions of dollars of additional fiscal deficits and debts in advanced and emerging economies will be a drag on actual and potential growth for years to come.

But if aggressive policy actions are accelerated after the G-20 meeting in London, one can expect a slow and painful process of mending the U.S. and global economy that will still take a long time. That will, however, allow us to see the light at the end of the tunnel some time next year, first for the real economies, next for financial markets and finally for the financial system and its wounded institutions.

Nouriel Roubini, a professor at the Stern Business School at New York University and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, is a weekly columnist for Forbes."

"This is the sort of thing of which political revolutions are made"

Rod Dreher gets it:

"Dr. Doom speaks:

U.S. financial losses from the credit crisis may reach $3.6 trillion, suggesting the banking system is "effectively insolvent," said New York University Professor Nouriel Roubini, who predicted last year's economic crisis.

"I've found that credit losses could peak at a level of $3.6 trillion for U.S. institutions, half of them by banks and broker dealers," Roubini said at a conference in Dubai today. "If that's true, it means the U.S. banking system is effectively insolvent because it starts with a capital of $1.4 trillion. This is a systemic banking crisis."

More:

"The problems of Citi, Bank of America and others suggest the system is bankrupt," Roubini said. "In Europe, it's the same thing."

Meanwhile, Financial Times columnist is so angry at the mess bankers have made that he counsels, only half in jest, it would appear, that it's time to "Shoot the bankers and nationalize the banks." Get your Trotsky on, lad!

More seriously, if Obama is ultimately forced to nationalize American banks, he had damn well better throw the entire leadership class of those failed institutions out on their ear. It is revolting, the idea that those top bankers could have driven their institutions into the ditch, and still be in the driver's seat after the taxpayers, at monumental expense to themselves and their children and children's children, will have hauled them out.( THAT'S IT )

This is the sort of thing of which political revolutions are made."

I agree. This could turn very ugly if the government is seen as rewarding an incompetent and even fraudulent financial sector, while leaving average citizens out in the cold. A bad brew.

"But desperate times lead to desperate actions by desperate policy makers."

Roubini on ZIRP:

"The Fed decision to cut the Fed Funds range to 0%-0.25% has formalized the fact that, over the last month, the Fed had already moved to a zero-interest-rate policy, or ZIRP, and started a policy of quantitative easing (QE) as its balance sheet has surged over the last few months from $800 billion to over $2 trillion.

The Fed is now undertaking even more unorthodox policy actions. These actions are occurring while the U.S. and the global economy are at risk of a protracted bout of "stag-deflation" (stagnation and deflation).

While it is now fashionable to talk about such deflationary risks (and the latest U.S. Consumer Price Index figures confirm that we are entering into deflation ) some of us were worrying about the coming deflation well before the mainstream--concerned with short-run and unsustainable increases in commodity prices--discovered the deflationary risks in the global economy.

It was clear to those who saw, early on, the risks of a severe U.S. and global recession, that deflationary rather than inflationary pressures would emerge alongside a slack in goods, labor and commodity markets. Welcome to the world of stag-deflation or, as Paul Krugman would put it, the world of "depression economics."

So what is the outlook for 2009? And what is the likely policy response to the risks of a global stag-deflation?

The outlook for the U.S. and the global economy is now very bleak and getting worse as the global economy experiences its worst recession in decades. In the U.S., recession started last December and will last at least 24 months until next December--the longest and deepest U.S. recession since World War II, with the cumulative fall in gross domestic product possibly exceeding 5%.

In comparison, the last two recessions in 1990-91 and 2001 lasted only eight months each and the cumulative fall in GDP was only 1.3% and 0.4%, respectively. There is also a risk that this deep and protracted U-shaped recession (the mainstream consensus view of a V-shaped short and shallow recession is now out the window) may morph into a more severe Japanese style L-shaped recession unless aggressive fiscal policy and recapitalization of the financial system is enacted.

The recession in other advanced economies (the euro zone, the U.K., other European economies, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) started in the second quarter of this year, before the financial turmoil in September and October further aggravated the global credit crunch. This contraction has become even more severe since then. I don’t expect growth in the advanced economies to recover before the end of 2009.

There is now also the beginning of a hard landing (growth well below potential) in emerging markets as the recession in advanced economies, falling commodity prices and capital flight all take their toll on growth.

Indeed, the world should expect a recession (growth in the -1 to -2% range) in Russia and a near recession (growth close to zero) in Brazil next year, owing to low commodity prices. There will also be a very sharp slowdown in China and India that will be the equivalent of a hard landing for these countries. In China the latest figures for electricity use, exports and imports suggest that the economy is already close to the hard landing scenario of a growth rate of 5%. The deceleration of growth in China is much more rapid than expected.

Other emerging markets in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe will not fare better and some may experience full-fledged financial crises. More than a dozen emerging-market economies now face severe financial pressures: Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine in Europe; Indonesia, South Korea and Pakistan in Asia; and Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador (a country that has just defaulted on its sovereign debt) in Latin America.

What is the policy response in the U.S. and other countries to this risk of a global stag-deflation?

The Fed decision to cut the target for the Fed Funds rate to the 0% to 0.25% range is just underwriting what was already obvious and happening in reality: While the target Fed Funds was until Tuesday still 1%, in the last few weeks--following the massive increase in liquidity by the Fed--the actual Fed Funds was already trading at a level literally close to 0%.

So the Fed just formalized what had already been happening for weeks now, i.e., that the Fed Funds rate was already zero and that the Fed had already moved to quantitative and qualitative easing (QE) in the form of a massive increase in the monetary base and aggressive use of monetary policy to reduce short-term and long-term market rates that are stubbornly high in a sign that the credit crunch is severe and worsening.

I predicted early in 2008 that the Fed Funds rate "would be closer to 0% than to 1%" in the midst of a severe recession. Now, 12 months into this severe recession--a recession that will last at least another 12 months (if not, as is possible, much longer)--the Fed Funds rate is already down to 0% (the beginning of the zero-interest-rate-policy, or ZIRP, for the U.S.) and the Fed has moved into uncharted unorthodox monetary policy as a severe stag-deflation is taking place.

And, as predicted by me over a month ago, the Fed is now committed to keep the Fed Funds rate close to zero for a long time (as a way to push lower long term Treasury yields); purchasing agency debt and agency MBS in massive amounts; and even considering purchasing long-term Treasuries as a way to push lower long-term government bond yields that are already falling sharply.

More aggressive policy actions may be undertaken by the Fed as a severe credit crunch shows no signs of relenting. In a 2002 speech on deflation, Ben Bernanke spoke even of helicopter drops of money, monetizing fiscal deficits and even buying equities.

The latter actions have already been partially undertaken: The Fed is effectively already monetizing U.S. fiscal deficits as the purchase of markets assets is financed with the Fed printing presses rather than the TARP program. And now, with the Fed considering the purchase of long-term Treasuries, such monetization of deficits will be made more formal.

Also, since the TARP has been turned into a program to recapitalize financial institutions (and thus boost their capital and market value), the U.S. has already effectively intervened indirectly in the equity market (by partially nationalizing a good part of the financial system). Once the Fed starts to buy the long-term Treasuries financing the TARP program, this indirect Fed purchase of U.S. equities will be even clearer.

While Fed actions to reduce mortgage rates--via purchases of agency debt and agency MBS--are partially successful as long-term mortgage rates are falling, most of the Fed purchases of private assets have been so far limited to very high-grade securities.

Thus, the gap between the yield on high-grade commercial paper purchased by the Fed and the one that the Fed is not purchasing is sharply rising; ditto for the gap between agency MBS and private label MBS. Also, while long-term Treasury yields are sharply falling, the spread of corporate bonds--both high-yield and high-grade--relative to Treasuries remains huge as a sign of a severe credit crunch.

Thus, as a next step, the Fed may be soon forced to walk down the credit curve and start buying private short-term and long-term securities with lower credit ratings. That would mean the Fed will take on even more credit risk than it is already taking on today while purchasing illiquid private assets. But desperate times lead to desperate actions by desperate policy makers."

This post seemed to be simply a list of what's happening. Not much to disagree with. As for the predictions, I've no idea.

Some Really, Really Scary Things Were Not Facing

I guess that it's all in how you see things. In the 1930s, Totalitarianism was a real possibility. It was not clear to people that Capitalism could survive in any form. For my religion, it wasn't clear any of its adherents would be alive. There were plans for a museum dedicated to its extinction. Most of the vaccines that have extended our lives weren't around. A war of tremendous loss had been recently fought, and a worse war was on the horizon. The decisions made about the economy and how to deal with it were made in that context. There is no way to meaningfully compare the decisions of the 1930s to our time except in very tenuous ways. In abstracting out some principles and policies that might help us, we are losing the most meaningful aspects that influenced those decisions. The look back at the 1930s is more like a search for a narrative similar to ours, which can give us hope that our narrative ends as well for us as did that earlier saga.

This is what I call the Existential Situation or Context or Background to our time. It is similar to the concept that Wittgenstein, Austin, Merleau-Ponty, and their modern followers use to understand Human Agency in all its facets. That's why, when reading the article on Fortune entitled "8 Really, Really Scary Predictions, I wasn't at all frightened. If the economic conditions were to lead to enormous and awful social transformations, then I'd be very worried. But, so far, I don't see that happening. Some do. But, to dip into our 1930s narrative, they are akin to the people in the 1930s who were sure that the only choice was between Communism and Fascism. The role of the individual and human agency to determine the fate of the world was lost on them, and so they only saw the world as competing systems, a competition in which Communism and Fascism were far more ruthless and cunning and therefore destined to survive at the expense of a weak and decadent Capitalism. Jot that down in your notebook for reference.

The list has a few of my favorites:
William Gross
Jim Rogers
Nouriel Roubini
and I'm going to add Robert Shiller and Meredith Whitney, who, although I've criticized them mostly on this blog, I actually like and respect. That's the Paradox Of Human Agency out of which all interesting thought arises.

First, Roubini:

"We are in the middle of a very severe recession that's going to continue through all of 2009 - the worst U.S. recession in the past 50 years. It's the bursting of a huge leveraged-up credit bubble. There's no going back, and there is no bottom to it. It was excessive in everything from subprime to prime, from credit cards to student loans, from corporate bonds to muni bonds. You name it. And it's all reversing right now in a very, very massive way. At this point it's not just a U.S. recession. All of the advanced economies are at the beginning of a hard landing. And emerging markets, beginning with China, are in a severe slowdown. So we're having a global recession and it's becoming worse."

Everything has a bottom. The point is to keep our heads and focus on what works as we try this and that policy. Roubini's view is less Pessimistic than Mechanistic, which is unusual for him.

"Sherif Ali: Truly, for some men nothing is written unless THEY write it."

William Gross:

"While 2008 will probably be best known as the year that global stock markets had their values cut in half, it was really much, much more. It was a year in which every major asset class - stocks, real estate, commodities, even high-yield bonds - suffered significant double-digit percentage losses, resulting in the destruction of over $30 trillion of paper wealth. To blame this on subprime mortgages alone would be to dismiss an era of leveraging that encompassed derivative structures of all types, embodying a belief that economic growth was always and everywhere a certainty and that asset prices never go down. As 2008 nears its conclusion, we as an investor nation have been forced to face a new reality. Wall Street and Main Street are fearful that a recession may be replaced by a near depression.

The outcome essentially depends on the ability of the Obama administration to rejuvenate capitalism's "animal spirits" by substituting the benevolent fist of government for the now invisible hand of Adam Smith. Federal spending and guarantees in the trillions of dollars will be required to fill the gap created by the deleveraging of private balance sheets. In turn, lenders and investors alike must begin to assume risk as opposed to stuffing money in modern-day investment mattresses. The process will take time. Twelve months of the Obama Nation will not be sufficient to heal the damage of a half-century's excessive leverage. The downsizing of private risk positions - replaced by government credit - will also result in reduced profit margins and a slower rate of earnings growth after the bottom is reached. "

I agree with Gross. The revival of the "animal spirits" is the key to solving our malady. We must have policies that target and fight the enormous fear and aversion to risk and the accompanying flight to safety. We should be walking, not running.

"Sherif Ali: Have you no fear, English?
T.E. Lawrence: My fear is my concern. "

Now Shiller:

"We don't currently have anywhere near the level of unemployment that we had in the 1930s, but otherwise there are many similarities between today's environment and the Great Depression, with things happening today that we haven't seen since then. First of all, there's the magnitude of the stock market's move up and down. The real (inflation-corrected) value of the S&P 500 nearly tripled from 1995 to 2000, and by November 2008 was down nearly 60% from its 2000 peak. The only other comparable event was the one in the 1920s where real stock prices more than tripled from 1924 to 1929 and then fell 80% from 1929 to 1932. Second, we've had the biggest housing bust since the Depression. Third, we've seen 0% interest rates. We've actually seen briefly negative short-term interest rates. That hasn't happened since 1941. There was a period from 1938 to 1941 when we were bouncing around at zero and sometimes negative, but that hasn't happened since.

And the list goes on: Our numbers don't go back as far as the Depression, but consumer confidence is plausibly at the lowest level since then. Volatility of the stock market in terms of percentage changes day-to-day is the highest since the Depression. In October 2008 we saw the biggest drop in consumer prices in one month since April 1938. Another thing is that it's a worldwide event, as it was in the Depression.

I'm optimistic that we'll do better this time, but I'm worried that we're vulnerable. One of the lessons from the Depression is that things can smolder for a long time. What I'm worried about right now is that our confidence has been hurt, and that's difficult to restore. No matter what we do, we're trying to deal with a psychological phenomenon. So the Fed can cut interest rates and purchase asset-backed securities, but that only works in really restoring full prosperity if people believe that we're back again. That's a little hard to manage."

I agree completely, of course, that we're dealing primarily with a psychological or human agency problem. Our focus and policies should focus on that.

"[Lawrence has just extinguished a match between his thumb and forefinger. William Potter surreptitiously attempts the same]
William Potter: Ooh! It damn well 'urts!
T.E. Lawrence: Certainly it hurts.
Officer: What's the trick then?
T.E. Lawrence: The trick, William Potter, is not minding that it hurts."

Now Jim Rogers:

"We are in a period of forced liquidation, which has happened only eight or nine times in the past 150 years. The fact that it's historic doesn't make it any more fun, of course. But it is a pretty interesting time when there is forced selling of everything with no regard for facts or fundamentals at all. Historically, the way you make money in times like these is that you find things where the fundamentals are unimpaired. The fundamentals of GM are impaired. The fundamentals of Citigroup are impaired.

Virtually the only asset class I know where the fundamentals are not impaired - in fact, where they are actually improving - is commodities. Farmers cannot get a loan to buy fertilizer right now. Nobody's going to get a loan to open a zinc or a lead mine. Meanwhile, every day the supply of commodities shrinks more and more. Nobody can invest in productive capacity, even if he wants to. You're going to see gigantic shortages developing over the next few years. The inventories of food worldwide are already at the lowest levels they've been in 50 years. This may turn into the Great Depression II. But if and when we come out of this, commodities are going to lead the way, just as they did in the 1970s when everything was a disaster and commodities went through the roof."

I have said over and over that, just as on the trip up, people were disregarding the fundamentals, so they are doing on the way down. We need to be able to see more clearly.

"Prince Feisal: Gasim's time has come, Lawrence. It is written.
T.E. Lawrence: Nothing is written.
Sherif Ali: You will not be at Aqaba, English! Go back, blasphemer... but you will not be at Aqaba!
T.E. Lawrence: I shall be at Aqaba. That, IS written.
[pointing to forehead]
T.E. Lawrence: In here. "

Now Meredith Whitney:

"What the federal government has done so far- with TARP, bailing out Citigroup, etc. - has stemmed the bleeding, but what it hasn't done is fundamentally alter the landscape. Yes, there's been a tremendous amount of capital thrown into the system, but my concern is that it's just going to plug the holes. It's not going to create new liquidity, which is what the system so desperately needs.

When the government announces these plans, investors get excited and hopeful. But details have been slim, and while I appreciate the government saying, "We've been wrong here. Let's try something different," the strategy changes have not solved anything. So far we've had TARP 1.0, TARP 2.0, and TARP 3.0, and I'm certain there will be a 4.0, a 5.0, and a 6.0. There has to be, because the companies cannot raise the capital they need, which means that the default provider of capital has to be the federal government.

What happens in 2009? Frankly, it's hard for me to predict what's going to happen next week, never mind next year. What I will say is that I expect all these banks to be back in the market looking for more capital. We'll also have a wholesale restructuring of our banking system, probably toward the end of 2009. There will be banks getting smaller, banks going away, and banks consolidating. At the same time, though, I think you'll see more new banks created. We've already seen more applications. And it's a great idea: You start with a clean balance sheet and make loans today with today's information. Plus, right now you've got a yield curve that's good for lending."

A very pragamtic and sensible approach. And I agree with her about the banks.

Let's throw in a few more points. Wilbur Ross:

"We are clearly in a serious recession, and more aggressive action is needed to turn things around. The federal government initially underestimated the scale of the mortgage and housing crises and later panicked into an ever-changing series of ad hoc measures that at best dealt with some of the effects of the original crises. But homeowners have now lost $5 trillion, and 12 million families have mortgages in excess of the value of their homes. Therefore the economy will not stabilize until mortgages are adjusted down to the value of homes, with affordable payment schedules, and until new mortgages become available across the home-price spectrum. Till then, the poverty effect of falling house prices and unemployment moving up toward 7% will hold consumer spending back from its former 70% contribution to our economy.

I'm optimistic about the choices that President-elect Obama has made for his economic team, and I've got some suggestions for what they should do. Hopefully the new Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner, will incentivize lenders to restructure mortgages by guaranteeing half of the reduced principal amount and sharing among the government, homeowners, and lenders any subsequent appreciation. Lenders would gain liquidity by selling the Treasury-guaranteed portion of the loan, and government would receive annual insurance premiums to further protect it against loss. That would cost taxpayers nothing now and probably little or nothing in the future.

Addressing unemployment is paramount. Detroit needs government support in order to implement independently verified concessions from all stakeholders - not just labor - which are sufficiently large to permit profitable operations even if auto sales remain as low as 11 million cars per year. A pre-negotiated bankruptcy may be necessary in order to implement the restructuring, but both the industry and the economy are too fragile to withstand the domino effect that a free-fall bankruptcy would have on a car company, its dealers, and its suppliers.

In addition, to avoid reversal of the 242,000 jobs created by state and local governments in the past 12 months, Washington should provide or guarantee funding for sorely needed infrastructure projects that would create immediate construction jobs and meaningful amounts of permanent jobs.

If President Obama promptly and decisively resolves these problems, whether or not he adopts my recommendations, and restores public confidence, he can end the recession by early 2010. If not, the economy will languish for a long time. Given the economic uncertainty, investors who are too worried to buy equities might consider tax-exempt bonds with yields around 6%, equivalent to almost 10% before federal, state, and local taxes."

I like this response. It seems politically very close to my own, and he also focuses on the ad hoc nature of the government's response.

"Prince Feisal: You, I suspect, are chief architect of this compromise. What do you think?
Mr. Dryden: Me, your Highness? On the whole, I wish I'd stayed in Tunbridge Wells. "

John Train:

"I presume that although we are in a severe recession it will not decompose into a full-scale depression, because that is what everyone is afraid of and desperate to avoid. Wall Street likes to say that the market has anticipated five of the last three recessions - the point being that a market crash frightens the authorities into taking necessary action.

Keynes observed that pragmatic businessmen often could not imagine that they were the slaves of defunct economists, but ironically, never is this more true than today of Keynes himself. So we run a huge deficit to postpone the worst. That means inflation, so bonds are unsatisfactory.

Investment opportunity is the difference between the reality and the perception. And since many equities are priced as though a depression might be on the way, many of them are attractively priced."

The difference between perception and reality. Another epistemologist manque. I agree. That's basically the problem. We need to learn to see again.

"Auda abu Tayi: [as Lawrence sets out across the desert with Daoud and Faraj] You will cross Sinai?
T.E. Lawrence: Moses did!
Auda abu Tayi: And you will take the children?
T.E. Lawrence: Moses did! "

Sheila Bair:

"The private-label mortgage-backed securitization markets are a prime example. Trillions of dollars of investor money funded millions of mortgages that borrowers had little chance of repaying. Investors relied heavily on ratings agencies, which in turn relied too heavily on mathematical models instead of analyzing the underlying loans. To be sure, borrowers, brokers, lenders, securitizers, as well as state and federal regulators, all bear responsibility for the widespread deterioration in lending standards. But the problem was compounded by the fact that those ultimately holding the risk - the investors - did not look behind their investments at the quality of the mortgages themselves. If they had, they would have seen high loan-to-value ratios, little income documentation, burdensome fees, and steep payment resets. They would have seen mortgages unaffordable from the beginning, originated based on the assumption that home prices would continue to rise and borrowers would refinance. Of course, we now know that as home prices began to depreciate, borrowers were unable to refinance, leading to massive foreclosures and further price declines. This self-reinforcing downward spiral is at the core of the economic problems we face today.

We will dig out of this. And when we do, I hope for a back-to-basics society - where banks and other lending institutions promote real growth and long-term value for the economy, and where American families have rediscovered the peace of mind of financial security achieved through saving and investing wisely. We need to return to the culture of thrift that my mother and her generation learned the hard way through years of hardship and deprivation. Those are lessons learned that the current crisis is teaching us again."

This is all true. It was actual human decisions that caused the mess. What we need to do is find the presuppositions that they were working under and whether their actions are something worse than lack of foresight and stupidity.

"Club Secretary: I say, Lawrence. You are a clown!
T.E. Lawrence: We can't all be lion tamers. "

Did you find this all that scary? Troubling and needing a mountain of compassion and hard work, but not necessarily scary. Imagine no FDIC at all.

So, that's my take. And, paradoxically, I used the example of British actions in WW I which can be said to have led to many of our current maladies worldwide.

"T.E. Lawrence: The truth is: I'm an ordinary man. You might've told me that, Dryden. "

"Oh, sorry, AT LEAST twenty reasons. I also don't think I've ever read Roubini say his tally of woes was less than comprehensive."

Now back to Yves Smith:

"Roubini's Latest "Why Things Are Hopeless" List Hits New Record, 20 Items!

I have not made a formal tally of Roubini's various lists of why the economy is going (and will continue to go) to hell in a handbasket, but recent sightings suggest his typical list is eight to twelve reasons.

However, in his latest missive, on the subject of why the consumer is toast, Roubini outdoes himself and comes up with twenty reasons. Oh, sorry, AT LEAST twenty reasons. I also don't think I've ever read Roubini say his tally of woes was less than comprehensive."

Here's the thing. I actually thought about listing his predictions, but found it too rough a row to hoe. But not Yves:

"In case you are new to this line of discussion, "falling consumption" in the absence of big time government countermeasures, equals "memorably bad downturn."

Is there some secret significance to this development? Numerologists and technical analysts are encouraged to weigh in. Personally, I think his list does boil down to a dozen or so reasons, but be sure to read down to his last point, where he draws his bottom line, a peak to trough fall in GDP of 10%. He needed 20 reasons to steel readers for his conclusion.

And I am really not making fun of Roubini. It is merely that because his messages are so consistently grim and have so far proven correct, one needs to find comic relief where one can.

From RGE Monitor:

One can count at least 20 separate or complementary causes that will sharply reduce consumption in the next several years:

· The US consumer is shopped-out having spent for the last few years well above its means.

· The US consumer is saving-less as the already low household savings rate at the beginning of this decade went to zero/negative by 2006 and has now to raise to more sustainable levels.

Yves here. I hate to be a pedant, but one and two are more or less the same reason."

Read the rest, and I have Roubini in an earlier post.

Here's my comment:

"Don said...

"Is there some secret significance to this development? Numerologists and technical analysts are encouraged to weigh in."

I'm no expert in Gematria, but I think that it means we should have stored seven years worth of grain, or something like that.

Don the libertarian Democrat

November 16, 2008 11:45 AM

"Just to put the 17 bank failures this year into perspective, here are insured bank failures by year since the FDIC was founded:"

From Calculated Risk:

Just to put the 17 bank failures this year into perspective, here are insured bank failures by year since the FDIC was founded:

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

Of course the size of the failed banks, and the cost to the FDIC, also matter.

The failure today, Freedom Bank, was a small bank by asset size ($287 million). Still the size of the cost to the FDIC is pretty amazing compared to the size of the bank (cost estimated at between $80 million and $104 million). Many analysts expect over 100 bank failures. Dr. Roubini expects "hundreds of banks" to fail in the cycle. If so, we are just getting started.

Note: there are 8,451 FDIC insured banks as of Q3 2008."

Was this enough moral hazard? I'd like to see the record of banks that were saved.