"The dollar doesn’t have to go south if all the economies reflate at the same time.”

I like William Gross, so here's a chance to quote him from Bloomberg:

"By Ye Xie

Dec. 11 (Bloomberg) -- The dollar fell to a six-week low against the euro and yen as the cost of borrowing in the U.S. currency tumbled, signaling less demand for year-end funding.

The greenback also dropped after a report showed the U.S. trade deficit unexpectedly widened in October. The Swiss franc dropped against the euro and yen after the central bank reduced its main interest rate to a four-year low of 0.5 percent.

“Dollar liquidity and funding concerns are starting to fade,” said Shaun Osborne, chief currency strategist in Toronto at TD Securities Inc., a unit of Canada’s second largest bank. “These factors have been important sources of support for the dollar in the past few months.”

The U.S. currency fell 1.7 percent to $1.3243 per euro at 8:40 a.m. in New York, from $1.3023 yesterday. It dropped 1.6 percent to 91.28 yen from 92.76. The euro traded at 120.77 yen, compared with 120.78 yen.

The cost of borrowing in dollars for three months in London fell to the lowest level in more than four years. The London interbank offered rate, or Libor, that banks say they charge each other for such loans slid 0.1 percentage point to 2 percent, the lowest level since September 2004, British Bankers’ Association data showed. That’s still one percentage point above the Fed target, up from an average of 16 basis points in the seven years to August 2007, when the credit freeze began.

“From a fundamental basis, there’s a case for avoiding the dollar,” said Adrian Schmidt, a London-based senior foreign- exchange strategist at the Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, the fourth-biggest currency trader. “For the moment the dollar’s on the back foot.”

How interesting.

"The ICE’s Dollar Index, which tracks the greenback against the euro, the yen, the pound, the Canadian dollar, the Swiss franc and Sweden’s krona, fell 1.2 percent at 84.449, below the 55-moving-day average of 84.5, as traders took advantage of the low liquidity to test how far it may fall, Hardman said. They will drive the dollar to $1.345 per euro this year, he said.

The dollar has gained 11 percent against the euro in 2008 as the credit-market seizure and $980 billion of losses on mortgage-related securities worldwide led investors to repatriate overseas investments to the U.S. and seek funding in the greenback.

The yen gained versus all 178 currencies tracked by Bloomberg this year as the global recession encouraged Japanese investors to bring funds back home and global equities plunged.

Japan’s currency jumped 21 percent versus the dollar, 34 percent against the euro and 66 percent against Brazil’s real as the financial crisis prompted investors to reverse carry trades, in which they purchase higher-yielding assets funded in countries where borrowing costs are lower. Japan’s benchmark rate of 0.3 percent is the lowest among major economies.

The U.S. trade deficit expanded 1.1 percent to $57.2 billion in October from a revised $56.6 billion in September, the Commerce Department said today in Washington. The gap was projected to narrow to $53.5 billion from an initially reported $56.5 billion in September, according to the median forecast in a Bloomberg News survey of 70 economists.

The U.S. budget deficit in November swelled to $164.4 billion, from $98.2 billion in the year-earlier period, as the government used taxpayer money to shore up the financial system by buying stakes in banks, the Treasury Department reported yesterday. Government revenue fell 4.2 percent, while spending soared 24 percent."

Let's see what Gross says:

"The dollar may extend its decline as the U.S. government increases its budget deficit by spending “trillions of dollars” to revive the economy, said Bill Gross, manager of the world’s biggest bond fund at Pacific Investment Management Co. in Newport Beach, California.

“There’s some risk” for the dollar to weaken, Gross said in an interview on Bloomberg Television yesterday. “It is fair to say other economies are doing much the same thing. The dollar doesn’t have to go south if all the economies reflate at the same time.”

Let's hope for "reflation" ( Another term. Yikes. ) , I suppose.

"An investor I know, repulsed by prevailing government yields, has a timelier description – “return-free risk”.

I'm a big James Grant fan. Here he is in the FT:

"US Treasuries are the investment asset of the year. The less they yield, the more their fans adore them. Then, again, these fearful days, yield seems to have nothing to do with investment calculation. Purported safety is all."

This is what I have called an overreaction, based on an overdone fear and aversion to risk, and the accompanying flight to safety. I don't get it, and it's killing me, because I couldn't invest in this situation even if I wanted to.

“Super-safe Treasuries”, the papers call these emissions of a government that, this year, will take in $2,500bn but spend $3,500bn. “Toxic assets” is how the same papers characterise orphaned mortgage-backed securities—or, for that matter, secured bank loans, convertible bonds, junk bonds or almost any other kind of debt obligation not bearing the US imprimatur.

“There are no bad bonds, only bad prices,” the traders used to say. They should say it again, only louder. In the spring of 1984, long-dated Treasuries went begging at yields of nearly 14 per cent in the context of an inflation rate of just 4 per cent. Those, too, were fearful times, the recollected horror being the great inflation of the 1970s. Inflation was ineradicable, the bondphobes said. Now a new generation of creditors espouses the opposite proposition. Deflation is baked in the cake, they say.

The truth is that no investment asset is inherently safe. Risk or safety is an attribute of price. At the right price, a lowly convertible bond is a safer proposition than an exalted Treasury. Watching the government securities market zoom, many mistake price action for price."

This just seems like basic common sense to me, so I can't really judge the opposing point of view fairly. It's how I feel about Taleb. I just so basically agree with him that I can't really argue the points against him fairly.

"Yes, Treasuries might conceivably redeem the hopes of their besotted admirers. Maybe a deflationary chasm is about to swallow us all. Never before has the US been so leveraged. And—just possibly—never before were lending standards so reckless as the ones that brought joy to so many astonished mortgage applicants in 2005 and 2006."

As you know, I don't believe this scenario is likely.

"In their magnum opus Security Analysis Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd advise that “bonds should be bought on their ability to withstand depression”. They wrote that in 1934. So far is that rule from being honoured by today’s financiers that not a few bonds—and boxcars full of mortgages – could hardly withstand prosperity. Two urgent questions present themselves. One: does something far worse than recession loom? Two: does that certain something definitely spell much lower interest rates?"

A few months ago, when Megan McArdle did her Depression Reading List, I recommended reading Graham. I got zero positive feedback.

"We can’t know, but we can at least observe. What I observe is a monumental push to reflate. The Federal Reserve is creating more credit in less time than it has ever done before – in the past three months the sum of its earning assets, known in the trade as Reserve Bank credit, has grown at the astounding annual rate of 2,922 per cent. Are the bond bulls quite sure that these exertions will raise no inflationary sweat?"

You know my position. We should reflate, and inflation will result.

"Evidently, they are—at least, forward swap rates betray no such concern. The market’s best guess as to what the 10-year Treasury will yield in 10 years’ time is 2.78 per cent, never mind the famous (and now, as it seems, prophetic) remark of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke that the Fed could drop dollars out of a helicopter in a deflationary pinch."

They're ready to fly, fly, fly. The 10 yr situation is flight to safety well beyond the safe point.

"The non-Treasury departments of the credit markets have crashed. No surprise then that prices and values are deranged. Market makers have closed up shop for the year, while hedge funds cower in fear of redemptions. You’d suppose that professional investors – doughty seekers of value – would be combing through the debris for bargains. Alas, no. Most seem content to lend money to Henry Paulson (subsequently to Timothy Geithner) at 2 per cent or 3 per cent."

I agree. Anyone want to let me try my hand at a Hedge Fund?

"In corporate debt and mortgages, anomalies and non sequiturs abound. They are especially prevalent in convertible bonds. More so than even the average stressed-out fund manager, convertible arbitrageurs have been through the mill. It was they—and almost they alone—who owned convertibles. Now many of these folk must sell them."

Here's another reason I love Grant. He writes things like "anomalies and non sequiturs abound". He's right, and he's just used a phrase that I wish I had written. Every Buiter column makes me feel that way.

"Few buyers are presenting themselves, however, though extraordinary bargains keep popping up. Thus, at the end of October, a Medtronic convertible bond with a 1.5 per cent coupon with the debt maturing in April 2011 briefly traded at 80.75. This was a price to yield 10.6 per cent, an adjusted spread of 1,600 basis points over the Treasury curve (adjusted, that is, for the value of the options embedded in the convert, notably the option to exchange it for common stock at the stipulated rate). Contrary to what such a yield might imply, A1/AA minus rated Medtronic, the world’s top manufacturer of medical devices for the treatment of heart disease, spinal injuries and diabetes, is no early candidate for insolvency. Almost every day brings comparable examples of risks not borne by people who, in this time of crisis, have come to define risk as “anything not guaranteed by Uncle Sam”."

I tell you what. I would buy these Corporate Bonds now if I knew how. Does anybody know?

“Risk-free return” is the standard tag attached to the government’s solemn obligations. An investor I know, repulsed by prevailing government yields, has a timelier description – “return-free risk”.

That's enough. That's another phrase I agree with and wish that I'd written. Return Free Risk.