Showing posts with label Export Countries. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Export Countries. Show all posts

Sunday, January 11, 2009

" the China-trade-imbalance argument has gotten enough traction within China that suddenly the debate seems to have erupted into the spotlight"

More on China from Michael Pettis:

"As deficit( SPENDER ) countries contract, can surplus( SAVER ) countries be far behind? January 10th, 2009 by Michael | Filed under Fiscal debt and deficits, Hot money, Labor and unemployment, Policy.

The US loses the most jobs since 1945, the Financial Times headline blared out yesterday. According to the article:

The US economy lost more than half a million jobs in December for the second month running, figures showed on Friday, making 2008 the worst year for job losses since 1945 and intensifying pressure on Congress to pass a fiscal stimulus. The number of jobs lost during the year reached 2.6m, while the unemployment rate – 4.4 per cent before the credit crisis – jumped to 7.2 per cent in December, its highest level in 16 years.

Yesterday’s Telegraph was not a whole lot warmer on the subject of Europe. It had an article entitled “Europe’s economy contracts at rates not seen since 1930s,” which started off with:

German exports and industrial orders have both plunged at the steepest rate since modern records began and Spain’s unemployment has surged above three million, capping one of the most disastrous days for Europe’s economy since the Second World War.

It is pretty obvious that consumption in trade deficits countries is adjusting at a breakneck pace( A PROACTIVITY RUN ) – “adjusting” being a word often used by economist’s to mean “the party’s over”. The rising savings rate required by households to repair tattered balance sheets has not just meant an equivalent decline in consumption, since this rise is occurring so quickly that income is declining. The total drop in consumption is, and will continue to be, severe.

With consumption declining so quickly, and fiscal spending so far unable to keep pace, what does this do for countries exporting excess production? In some trade surplus countries – i.e. Germany – the predictions some of us had been making about the “second stage” in the crisis, in which trade surplus countries get hit with deeper and longer-lasting adjustments, seem already to be coming true. Exports are collapsing, and with no increase in domestic demand to compensate, it is pretty hard to imagine how businesses are going to cope( FORGIVE DEBT ).

For all the attempts by the government to keep confidence up, Chinese businesses, not surprisingly, are worried. Yesterday’s South China Morning Post had the following article:

Business confidence in the mainland plunged in the final three months of this year to an eight-year low as the mounting effects of the financial crisis weighed on exports and industrial output, an official survey showed on Friday. The business confidence index fell 29.2 points in the fourth quarter to 94.6, the National Bureau of Statistics said. That is the lowest reading since the start of 2001, the earliest date for which official figures are available.

Hardest hit were manufacturers, hurt by shrivelling demand in the United States and Europe and a weakening domestic property sector. Their sub-index plummeted 32.1 points from the third quarter to 87.2. That reading is in line with two purchasing managers’ surveys published earlier this month, which showed a continued contraction in the sector, as well as economists’ expectations that exports shrank more quickly in December.

The debate locally about what caused the trouble and what to do about it (and not incidentally, who to blame) continues strong, and recently two things seem to have been added to the stew. One, the China-trade-imbalance argument has gotten enough traction within China that suddenly the debate seems to have erupted into the spotlight. A number of local analysts, especially critics of both the left and the right, have been arguing that Chinese monetary and fiscal policies may have been part of the root cause of the imbalances that led to the crisis.( I DON'T ACCEPT THESE EXPLANATIONS )

Regular blog readers know that I won’t find this argument at all surprising, but local policymakers are inordinately sensitive to being blamed for anything, and the official position is that China is simply an innocent bystander in a problem wholly concocted and hatched elsewhere. However an increasing number of Chinese economists and academics seem to be challenging that position, so much so that the People’s Daily posted a rather angry editorial three days ago titled “U.S. blame game cannot change facts of financial crisis.” The article blasts Paulson and Bernanke for saying that “a failure to address the rise of emerging markets and resulting imbalances was partly to blame for the global financial crisis,” and concludes:

Imbalances in global trade and investment did have a role in the crisis but were not at the root of the problem. Loose supervision that helped pump excessive dollars into circulation was the root cause. When a morally upright person is mired in difficulties, he or she will engage in introspection rather than shift responsibility. China has moved to cope with the problem with a stream of measures and so have other large world economies.

It is not time to play a blame game. Regulators in the United States might not want to miss the chance that they failed to seize before the crisis, when property companies, investment banks and insurance companies juggled various financial products and Wall Street “elites” snatched tens of millions out of the bubble.( THESE ARE SIMPLY NECESSARY CONDITIONS, NOT THE CAUSES OR EXPLANATIONS OF OUR CRISIS )

It is hard to argue with these conclusions, but a cynic might wonder if any of the participants in the crisis would be considered, by this argument, “morally upright.”( TRUE )

The second thing we seem to be hearing a lot of is concerning capital flows and whether or not China is experiencing hot money outflows. We are all still trying to figure out what is happening to capital flows and to the composition of reserve accumulation (or is it reserve dissipation?). In a recent note, Logan Wright of Stone & McCarthy tries to back out the things we know to get some sense of what is happening to capital flows.

He concluded in an email to me that was attached to his research report that “outflows of around $100-150 billion for the quarter seem within the realm of possibility, but we won’t know anything until we see the data,” but was at pains to establish that he is only guessing. His guesses would be easier to dismiss if a SAFE official hadn’t made a rather surprising announcement four days ago. According to Bloomberg:

China faces a threat of “abnormal” cross-border capital flow because of global financial tumult, the country’s foreign exchange regulator said Tuesday.

I accidentally erased the article and can’t get it back, so I can’t quote much more from it, but I do remember finding the whole thing a little odd. There was no clear explanation of what was “abnormal”, but all the evidence suggests that money flows are not behaving as well as we would want them to. Other interesting official commentary last week included the following, from an article in Tuesday’s South China Morning Post:

The mainland’s financial position will be difficult in the year ahead as revenues fall and spending surges, Minister of Finance Xie Xuren warned yesterday. Painting the most sombre picture of the government’s finances in years, Mr Xie said that shrinking corporate profits caused by rapidly slowing economic growth, as well as tax cuts, would lead to a drop in revenue, while government measures to boost growth would add to spending.

“[It] will be a very difficult year,” Mr Xie told an annual national meeting on fiscal affairs in Beijing. “The problem of unbalanced income and expenditure will be prominent in 2009.” His warning came as an official revealed that the mainland’s giant state-owned enterprises had reported a rare decline in profits last year. “Profits of state-owned enterprises directly under the central government fell about 30 per cent year on year in 2008 to 700 billion yuan [HK$800 billion],” said Huang Shuhe , vice-chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission

Some of my older readers will remember last year when I argued that something a lot of analysts saw as a real strength – the huge surge in China’s fiscal revenues, which left the fiscal account more or less in balance – was, in my debt-trader-influenced pessimist’s eyes actually a real problem. If the fiscal account stayed in rough balance with fiscal revenues soaring by 30% a year, it seemed to me that any discrepancy between the rate of revenue growth and expense growth could lead to a sudden unexpected rise in the fiscal deficit, especially since in a downturn the pressure for revenues to decline and for expenses to rise would be unbearable.

The probability geek in me instinctively worries about very rapidly changing numbers, even when they are good, because there is a lot more room for things to go very bad. From what Mr. Xie is saying, the worry was on the mark. The growth rate of fiscal revenues and fiscal expenses have already sharply diverged, and this is even before the big spending plans have been put into place. The article goes on to say:

Ha Jiming , chief economist at China International Capital Corp, said the weakening financial position would cast doubt on the government’s much-vaunted economic stimulus package. The measures, including the 4 trillion yuan stimulus package and tax cuts, are to stem a rapid slowdown in economic growth, by boosting public spending and private consumption.

It claims that economists “expect the mainland will have a budget shortfall this year, with the deficit between 500 billion and 800 billion yuan.” I am nowhere near smart enough to predict what the deficit will be, but I am happy to bet anyone it will be a lot more than the current predictions.

Finally one last comment about recent interesting, and even surprising, government statements, is about a report last week in Laiowang, a Xinhua publication. According to an article on the topic in South China’s Morning Post:

The mainland faces surging protests and riots this year as rising unemployment stokes discontent among migrant workers and university graduates, a state-run magazine said in a blunt warning about unrest in this sensitive year. The unusually stark report was in this week’s Liaowang [Outlook] magazine, issued by Xinhua news agency, which laid out the hazards facing the mainland and ruling Communist Party as growth falters during the global economic crisis.

“Without doubt, now we’re entering a peak period for mass incidents,” a senior Xinhua reporter, Huang Huo, told the magazine, using the official euphemism for riots and protests. “In this year, Chinese society may face even more conflicts and clashes that will test even more the governing abilities of all levels of the party and government.”( A REAL WORRY )

This report has been so widely discussed that I don’t have a whole lot to add to it.

My last comments are about two recently published pieces. On yesterday’s Economists Forum on the Financial Times website Martin Wolf published my short version of a longer article also published today in Far Eastern Economic Review on the global balance of payments and the US-Chinese adjustments.

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Friday, January 2, 2009

"One very effective way to trigger global recession is trade protectionism"

From Rybinski.eu:

"Welcome to hell of protectionism in 2009
» » » » » » » » »

What really scares economists about the present crisis? That despite spending more than 11 trillion dollars (including guarantees) by governments and central banks the crisis will spiral into global recession and deflation. One very effective way to trigger global recession is trade protectionism( I AGREE ), when countries trying to protect their troubled industries impose import duty or non-tariff barriers on offshore producers. When one country does this then other countries follow with retaliation and trade collapses, more jobs are lost which leads to recession. We have seen this happening in 1930s.

See chart below (thanks go to David Wheelock from Fed St.Louis), which shows monthly value of imports in 75 countries between 1929 and 1933. Trade implosions happen, you have been warned.

protectionism_1930s.png

Economic theory does suggest that large country can effectively raise tariffs at the expense of other countries, see Wikipedia link which probably explains why China, USA, India, Indonesia, Russia and many others may wish to flirt with protectionism( OK ). There is vast literature explaining that trade has positive effects on incomes and standards of living, see old paper by Frankel and Romer for example and the largest living example is China, which successfully pursued export led growth model and reduced the extreme poverty by hundreds of millions, the only large and meaningful step towards fulfilling Millennium Development Goals, other parts of the world failed badly to reduce poverty, Sub-Saharan Africa is the stark example, despite receiving large aid from the World Bank and other donors.

Economic theory, evidence and experience suggets that if world falls into protectionsm trap it will be very difficult to avoid global recession. Recent International Herald Tribune article presents evidence that many Asian countries launched policies to protect their producers from foreign competition, a quote:

“In the last two weeks, Chinese officials have announced a series of measures to help exporters. State banks are being directed to lend more to them, particularly to small and medium-sized exporters. Government research funds are being set up. In Hong Kong, the chief executive plans to seek legislative approval by late January for the government to guarantee banks’ issuance of $12.9 billion worth of letters of credit for exports.

Particularly noteworthy have been Beijing’s steps to help labor-intensive sectors like garment production — industries from which China had been trying to wean itself as part of a move to climb the ladder of economic development toward higher-wage, more-skilled activities. Now China has become much more reluctant to relinquish the bottom rungs of the ladder to countries with even lower wages, like Vietnam, Indonesia and Bangladesh.For instance, China has been restoring export tax rebates for the textile sector that it had been phasing out. Municipal governments have also stopped raising the minimum wage, which had doubled over the last two years in some cities, reaching a peak of $146 a month in Shenzhen. “China will resort to tariff and trade policies to facilitate export of labor-intensive and core technology-supported industries,” said Li Yizhong, the minister of industry and information technology, at a conference on Dec. 19.” […]

“The third most populous country in Asia after China and India, Indonesia is already acting to limit imports of garments, electronics, shoes, toys and food — five large categories in which Indonesian producers are struggling to compete with China.Starting in the new year, importers of these products will have to be registered with the government, use only five designated ports for their shipments, arrange for a detailed inspection of goods before they are loaded on a ship or plane bound for Indonesia and then have every single container exhaustively inspected on arrival by Indonesia’s notoriously slow customs bureaucracy. The plan, designed to comply with WTO rules, was adopted after heavy lobbying by Indonesian manufacturers and labor unions.”

It does not look good. Welcome to hell of protectionism in 2009. Knock, knock. Who’s there? Recession.

Update

Another example of protectionism - trains manufacture - FT article"

I tend to agree that Saver/Export countries are tempted to do this because they do not want to change the Saver Country/Spender Country Symbiosis.

"the more the world’s biggest surplus country does to support its exports, the more frustrated the world’s deficit countries are likely to become …"

As I've been saying, I don't see the Saver/Export Countries giving up on the current arrangement easily or without a fight. From Brad Setser:

"As trade slows, China doesn’t rethink its growth strategy …

My title is a play on the New York Times’ online headline: “As Trade Slows, China Rethinks its Growth Strategy.” The print version of the Times carries a headline that more accurately reflects the content of Keith Bradsher’s story : “Juggernaut in Exports is Withering in China.”

Chinese exports were doing reasonably well in October but dipped in November and — if Korea’s December trade data offers any guide — will fall even more in December. Bradsher’s story documents the depth of the slowdown but doesn’t offer much evidence that China is “rethinking” its growth strategy. Bradsher reports:

“In the last two weeks, Chinese officials have announced a series of measures to help exporters. State banks are being directed to lend more to them, particularly to small and medium-size exporters. Government research funds are being set up. The head of the government of Hong Kong, Donald Tsang, plans to seek legislative approval by late January for the government to guarantee banks’ issuance of $12.9 billion worth of letters of credit for exports. Particularly noteworthy have been the Chinese government’s steps to help labor-intensive sectors like garment production, one of the industries China has been trying to move away from in an effort to climb the ladder of economic development with more skilled work that pays higher wages. But now China has become reluctant to yield the bottom rungs of the ladder to countries with even lower wages, like Vietnam, Indonesia and Bangladesh.

China has been restoring export tax rebates for its textile sector, for instance, which it had been phasing out. Municipal governments have also stopped raising the minimum wage, which doubled over the last two years in some cities, peaking at $146 a month in Shenzhen. “China will resort to tariff and trade policies to facilitate export of labor-intensive and core technology-supported industries,” Li Yizhong, the minister of industry and information technology, said at a conference on Dec. 19. “

Rather than trying to shift away from exports, the global slump seems to have prompted China to cling to its existing export-led growth strategy( TRUE ). China seems to be rethinking is its previous willingness to move out of low-end labor-intensive exports as higher-end export sectors expand. With jobs scarce, that no longer seems like a great idea. China also seems to be rethinking its exchange rate policy. Here too it seems to going back to the past. Over the past several months the RMB has been effectively repegged to the dollar — going up when the dollar went up (October) and going down when the dollar went down (December).( YES )

But the global environment is changing in ways that will make it harder for China to avoid a sharp downturn in its exports no matter what China does. And that isn’t just because China’s efforts to subsidize its exports and limit the RMB’s appreciation against the dollar may attract the ire of the US. Bradsher reports that Indonesia is keen to find ways to limit its imports from China that do not formally violate its WTO commitments ( HERE WE GO ).

In Indonesia, the third most populous country in Asia after China and India, the government is already acting to limit imports of garments, electronics, shoes, toys and food — five large categories in which Indonesian producers are struggling to compete with China. Starting in the new year, importers of these products will have to be registered with the government, use only five designated ports for their shipments, arrange for a detailed inspection of goods before they are loaded on a ship or plane bound for Indonesia and then have every single container exhaustively inspected on arrival by Indonesia’s notoriously slow customs bureaucracy. The plan, intended to comply with W.T.O. rules, was adopted after heavy lobbying by Indonesian manufacturers and labor unions.

h/t Rybinski

The jobs argument cuts both ways. Indonesia wants jobs for its rural migrants too.

China’s export sector hasn’t experienced a sharp cyclical downturn in a long time. In 2001 global trade did contract. But that contraction didn’t hit China all that hard. It came at a time when the electronics industry was migrating to China, allowing China to increase its share of a shrinking global market. Year-over-year export growth slowed from 25% at the peak of the .com boom in 2000 to 5% — but it didn’t turn negative. In dollar terms, the y/y increase in a rolling 12m sum of China’s exports went from $50b to $15-20b. But y/y exports never fell in dollar terms.*

But China now is a much much bigger share of global trade. China’s 2008 exports — in dollar terms — will be more than five times large than its 2000 exports. That means that China is now far more exposed to the global economic cycle than it was. And this cycle looks brutal.

Korea is reporting its biggest drop in industrial production in twenty-one years. That is the kind of data point that gets my attention. I was a bit surprised to hear that the current fall is sharper than the fall that accompanied Korea’s own crisis in 97/98.

The natural instinct of China’s policy makers is to do what they can to support employment in China’s export sector. But there are limits to how much China can do to offset the global fall in demand. And the more the world’s biggest surplus country does to support its exports, the more frustrated the world’s deficit countries are likely to become …( THAT'S IT )

Pettis is right. If the deficit countries are the ones most willing to use macroeconomic policy to support demand and the surplus counties are among the most reluctant to run expansionary macroeconomic policies (Germany) or among the most inclined to subsidize their exports (China), the likely result is a widening deficit (meaning non-oil deficit) in the deficit countries — i.e. bigger imbalances among the oil-importing economies– even as activity in all economies slows. That adds to the risk of future trade conflict. Signs of future trouble aren’t hard to find even now. ( ALL TRUE )

*1998 and early 1999 was a bit worse. Y/y export growth turned negative. But exports weren’t quite as large a share of China’s economy then — and perhaps as importantly, China wasn’t going off a long boom where exports only went up. Volatility was far more expected then."

This is all bad news, but the Saver Countries do need the Spender Countries. So, what remains to be seen are the actions or proposals that will come out of this odd scenario, where, essentially, the Saver countries don't really want to stop lending or funding the Spender countries, even as the Spender countries say that they would like to borrow and spend less. Obviously, this will happen because of the current crisis, but it's still hard for me to see a way out of this conundrum without every country becoming a Saver Country, which would be a very bad outcome, as I see it, in the short run.

Somewhere, going forward, the Saver Countries are going to have to make some tough decisions. For example, either to spend more, or let the Spender Countries selectively Default. Then, and this is what the Saver Countries want, the whole arrangement could continue.