Showing posts with label Fed's balance sheet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fed's balance sheet. Show all posts

Thursday, June 4, 2009

But remember, even printing money doesn't cause inflation unless that money reaches consumers.

TO BE NOTED: From Accrued Interest:

"SMACKDOWN WEEK: Now consumers are all but extinct

Today on SMACKDOWN we'll look at just how inflationary the Fed's programs have been to date.

My premise remains that consumer inflation occurs because consumer spend more nominal dollars. I won't go over the rationale for this viewpoint right now, you can read it here or here. Given this, any program will only be seen as inflationary if it puts cash into consumer pockets, or at the very least, results in goods being purchased.

The headline grabbers are stories like this one at the New York Times. They throw out numbers like $12 trillion and we all cry out inflation! But a large percentage of these figures are asset guarantees, such as the money market insurance program. These programs are clearly not inflationary as they never even involved any exchange of cash.

In order to see how much money may actually go into the economy, let's take a real look at the Fed's balance sheet. We know it has exploded in size:



We also know that most of the Fed's outlays have been funded by crediting bank reserves. That is, the Bernanke's old "electronic printing press." If printing money makes you shudder, you aren't alone.

But remember, even printing money doesn't cause inflation unless that money reaches consumers. I've said before: if the Fed mints a quadrillion new Sacagaweas and just sticks them in a vault at Ft. Knox, there is no inflationary impact.

Alright so what's in the Fed's balance sheet? What have they buying with all that printed money? (All figures represent an increase).



I've color coded this based on inflationary impact. The various shades of blue are non-inflationary. Starting at the top and moving to the left, the first is the Maiden Lane transactions. These are all related to Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts (note I added some AIG-related loans that technically aren't part of Maiden Lane LLC into this figure). Can't see how these impact inflation in any meaningful way. The next is related to dollar swaps with foreign central banks. Again, while I think this helps provide meaningful liquidity to the worldwide financial system, the impact on consumer inflation is minimal, even if the Fed is "crediting reserves" to help provide the cash. Finally we have "other" Fed activity, which involves stuff like the Fed's gold stock. Not an issue.

Term Auction Debt and the CP/money market programs are a little more nebulous. These plus the actual discount window is in green. The Term debt is mostly the TAF and the TSLF, both of which were meant as quasi-discount window loans to banks and primary dealers. Neither is as heavily used as it was in late 2008. I'd argue that the these term loans are merely replacing other types of borrowing that would otherwise have occurred in the capital markets. So while it is interfering in markets, it isn't inflationary. The commercial paper program is similar. If it just replaces private sector borrowing, it isn't inflationary.

Now wait a minute, you say, the market is over-leveraged. This kind of short-term debt is what helped get us into this mess! The private sector should be winding down! The Fed shouldn't be encouraging short-term borrowing of this nature. That's besides the point when you are thinking about inflationary impact. Inflation (or deflation) is caused by the change in effective money supply from one period to the next. If all the debt was suddenly drained from the system, it would surely be severely deflationary. So to the extent the Fed is substituting its own balance sheet for private lending, that's a neutral event in terms of inflation. Indeed, according to the Fed, financial debt grew at a 6% pace last year, down from 12% in 2007 and the slowest pace since 1991.

The other programs (in yellow) do have some inflationary impact. Securities held directly are, most notably, the Fed's mortgage, agency, and Treasury buying programs. (I've subtracted the decline in repo from this figure, since these new programs really replace the Fed's old repo-based programs.) When the Fed buys bonds, they are buying them from someone, and that cash eventually makes it into the system. I've argued that in fact, securities purchases are just a convenient means of pumping dollars into the economy. So it seems that an inflationary result is the goal.

Same with the TALF. The idea behind the TALF is to restart the ABS markets, which would provide cash directly for credit-based consumption. This is practically printing money and giving it to consumers. However, for better or worse, the TALF has been little used. It was supposed to be up to $1 trillion. It would be just as well to let him go, he's too far out of range.

Now let's add up the "inflationary" increase in the Fed's balance sheet. $528 billion.

Now let's compare that with some other key indicators of consumer behavior. The chart below compares the increase in the Fed's programs with the decrease in the other indicators. The decreasing elements have been inversed to illustrate the relative size.



The amount of inflationary Fed programs is slightly larger (in the scheme of the overall economy) than the decline in nominal GDP, consumer debt, and consumer spending. Now none of these figures are directly comparable, i.e., you can't say the inflationary impact is simply x - y. But comparing the relative size of each of these gives some sense of context.

Now if we add the decline in household assets...



Suddenly the Fed's activity seems like a drop in the bucket. And that figure is only through 12/31/08. We don't yet have the Fed's Flow of Funds report through 1Q. We know that household assets are continuing to decline, as evidenced by the continued drop in home prices.

Now we know that eventually consumers will regain their footing and start to spend (and borrow) again. So even if you agree that the Fed's actions aren't inflationary for now, they may become inflationary once the economy starts recovering. So its all about the exit strategy. That will be next time, on SMACKDOWN! "

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

So, there's little evidence now of inflationary pressures

TO BE NOTED: From Econbrowser:

"
In Search of ... Hyperinflationary Expectations

With large budget deficits in place and projected going forward, as well as the expansion of the Fed's balance sheet, there's been some talk of inflationary pressures, and even hyper-inflation [0] McCain. I wondered if these fears were manifested in survey- and market-based expectations measures.

For certain, there is little pressure apparent in short term forecasts like the WSJ and Survey of Professional Forecasters. This makes sense (at least if one believes in the Keynesian conception of an output gap [1]) given the amount of slack displayed in Figure 1.

piexppix1.gif
Figure 1: Median expected ten year inflation recorded as of second month of each quarter, from Survey of Professional Forecasters (blue, left scale), actual CBO-defined output gap (red line), and WSJ forecasted (purple triangle), in log percentage points. NBER defined recessions shaded gray; second recession assumed to end 2009Q3. Source: Cleveland Fed, BEA, GDP 2009Q1 advance release, and WSJ May survey [xls], and CBO potential GDP (9 January 2009).

I also plot the median expectation of ten-year inflation. Note that this measure has not budged much at all.

This data, of course, will not convince those skeptical of survey-based measures. What about market based measures? The standard approach is to subtract the TIPS yield from the Treasury yield. We know for a variety of reasons, this calculation can lead to misleading results. However, the Cleveland Fed has stopped publishing its adjusted series:

October 31, 2008

We have discontinued the liquidity-adjusted TIPS expected inflation estimates for the time being. The adjustment was designed for more normal liquidity premiums. We believe that the extreme rush to liquidity is affecting the accuracy of the estimates.

With that caveat in mind, Figure 2 displays the implied ten year expected inflation rate.

piexppix2.gif
Figure 2: Difference between ten year constant maturity Treasury yields and ten year constant maturity TIPS, monthly data. Series GS10 and FII10. Source: St. Louis Fed FRED.

Some people are looking to commodity prices as indicators of expected inflation. I'd say that making inferences this way is fraught with difficulties, because changes in such commodity prices will incorporate both relative price and price level effects.

So, there's little evidence now of inflationary pressures. That being said, there's plenty to worry about as time goes on (as Jim recounts). And even if inflationary expectations remain well anchored, we do have to keep an eye on possible crowding out due to higher interest rates (all of us, except Dick Cheney, who didn't ever worry about deficits as the Bush Administration ran up trillions in debt [3]).

Posted by Menzie Chinn "