Showing posts with label Clearinghouse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Clearinghouse. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

not being able to hedge currency risk through the use of a derivative can leave a company exposed to fluctuations in currency markets

TO BE NOTED: From the WSJ:

"
By RENé M. STULZ

The dictionary defines a derivative in the field of chemistry as "a substance that can be made from another substance." Derivatives in finance work on the same principle. But if you read the headlines these days, you might think derivatives were made from arsenic by Wall Street institutions bent on causing financial destruction.

There are two sides to derivatives -- one positive and beneficial, one exploitive and negative. Of the latter, the most visible example today comes to us courtesy of the American International Group (AIG) and reveals what happens when a lightly regulated but highly interconnected financial institution ends up positioned in a way that it cannot survive a housing crash and then such a crash occurs.

The other side of derivatives, however, involves the less-publicized but widespread use of these financial instruments in ways that benefit companies. Derivatives have been immensely valuable tools and will be instrumental in providing the liquidity needed to jump-start the economy. Derivatives are used by a vast number of U.S. companies, both small and large, to manage various risks that arise in connection with their businesses.

From the perspective of Main Street companies, derivatives are not just about high finance, quants and politics, but about investing in America's core industries, jobs and economic recovery. Companies find that over-the-counter derivatives are essential to their day-to-day operations. Derivatives help insulate them from risk, which allows them to borrow capital at better prices than they would otherwise. And derivatives are more useful than ever in these days of unusual volatility in financial markets.

For example, not being able to hedge currency risk through the use of a derivative can leave a company exposed to fluctuations in currency markets. Without derivatives companies could see movements in exchange rates turn a profitable export contract into a money-losing agreement.

In its current annual report, Caterpillar Inc. makes the case for why it relies on derivatives: "Our risk management policy . . . allows for the use of derivative financial instruments to prudently manage foreign currency exchange rate, interest rate, commodity price and Caterpillar stock price exposures."

For those unfamiliar with market jargon, credit default swaps, which are most often in the news, are simply financial contracts between two parties. If, for example, you own bonds in a company and are worried that the company will default, you can manage your risk and protect your holdings with a credit default swap. Under it, you would make regular payments to maintain the contract. If the company does not default, you're out-of-pocket the payments. But if the company does default, the swap serves as a form of insurance by giving you the right to exchange the questionable bonds for the principal amount, or to be reimbursed in other ways. There's nothing exotic or complex about these contracts. They can be highly valuable for Main Street firms, because they enable them to protect themselves against the failure of large customers.

However, Main Street firms cannot afford derivatives unless there is a competitive market for them with participants willing to take the opposite position. Restricting access to derivative markets, which is being proposed by some in Congress as well as by some regulators, would make the costs of derivatives prohibitively expensive and eliminate liquidity.

That derivatives benefit our financial system and our national economy is well established. Twenty-nine of the 30 companies that make up the Dow Jones Industrial Average use derivatives. According to data from Greenwich Associates, two-thirds of large companies (those that have sales of more than $2 billion) use over-the-counter derivatives and more than half of all mid-size companies (those that have sales between $500 million and $2 billion) are very active in derivatives markets. Derivatives are necessary and helpful tools for companies seeking to manage financial risk.

The most important benefit of derivatives is that they allow businesses to hedge risks that otherwise could not be hedged. This does a number of positive things. It transfers risk, allowing firms to guard against being forced into financial distress. It also frees lenders to offer credit on better terms, giving companies access to funds that they can use to keep their doors open, lights on and, even, invest in new technologies, build new plants, or hire new employees.

It's important for regulators not to overreact by pushing for counterproductive new rules. The regulators, after all, were no better at foreseeing the current crisis than the private sector, proving that regulation has obvious limits and cannot replace efforts by financial institutions to devise risk-management approaches that enable them to cope with crises in the financial markets of the 21st century.

At the same time, some sensible regulations are in order. With the interconnectedness of markets today and the systemic problems facing the world's economies, there is a lot that can be done to limit systemic risks. One beneficial step would be for Congress to adopt some version of a systemic-risk regulator that would place every participant in the financial markets that poses a systemic risk, including derivatives traders, under federal regulatory oversight.

Unbelievably, the arm of AIG that dealt with derivative products was not subject to serious scrutiny by a federal agency with relevant experience. A systemic-risk regulator, or markets-stability regulator, should oversee every kind of financial institution that is found to be systemically important, including banks, broker-dealers, insurance companies, hedge funds, private equity funds and others. That regulator should have the authority to ensure that such financial institutions have sufficient capital to reduce the risks they pose to the financial system, to examine parent companies and subsidiaries, and to bring enforcement actions.

Additionally, a clearinghouse for standardized credit default swaps was launched in March, and other competitor clearinghouses are under construction. Clearinghouses clear and settle trades and limit the risk to the larger financial system if any one dealer, like AIG, fails to meet its obligations. A clearinghouse also allows regulators to monitor the exposure firms have to these products, while simultaneously ensuring that each firm posts the necessary collateral to cover its obligations under its trades.

However, clearinghouses should be reserved for established and standardized derivatives, leaving participants in capital markets free to engage in bilateral contracts for derivatives that fulfill specific needs as well as for new products. Further, use of a clearinghouse should not be compulsory, but capital-requirement regulations should recognize that derivatives positions that are not put through a clearinghouse may pose greater systemic risks than those that are.

The subprime mess triggered one of the most destructive financial crises in decades. It's not surprising, then, that the hunt is on for culprits. But derivatives are not the culprit. They had little to do with the rise and collapse of housing prices. Wider availability of housing derivatives would have actually reduced the impact of the collapse of housing prices if homeowners had been able to hedge against possible decreases in home values.

Our businesses need derivatives. Most of us choose to drive cars even though they sometimes crash. But we also insist that cars are made as safe as it makes economic sense for them to be, and that speed limits and other rules of the road are enforced. The same logic should apply to derivatives.

Mr. Stulz is a professor of finance at the Fisher College of The Ohio State University."

Friday, November 21, 2008

Geithner Speaks

The new Secretary of the Treasury opined in the FT last June:

"
Reducing risk in the financial system

By Timothy Geithner

Published: June 8 2008 23:30 | Last updated: June 8 2008 23:30

Since last summer, we have lived through a severe and complex financial crisis. Why was the financial system so fragile? What can be done to make the system more resilient in the future?"

My God, June seems like a different universe ago.

"The world experienced a financial boom. The boom fed demand for risk. Products were created to meet that demand, including risky, complicated mortgages. Many assets were financed with significant leverage and liquidity risk and many of the world’s largest financial institutions got themselves too exposed to the risk of a global downturn. The amount of long-term illiquid assets financed with short-term liabilities made the system vulnerable to a classic type of run. As concern about risk increased, investors pulled back, triggering a self-reinforcing cycle of forced liquidation of assets, higher margin requirements, increased volatility."

I'm impressed. I basically believe the same thing.
1) The investment products were created to meet the demand, not the other way around
2) Too little capital is a main culprit
3) Mismatched assets and liabilities
4) In order to meet capital requirements, financial institutions needed to sell unsaleable investments

"What should be done to strengthen the system in the future? First, when we get through this crisis we have to increase the shock absorbers held in normal times against bad macroeconomic and financial outcomes. This will require more exacting expectations on capital, liquidity and risk management for the largest institutions that play a central role in intermediation and market functioning. They should be set high enough to offset the benefits that come from access to central bank liquidity, but not so high that they succeed only in pushing more capital to the unregulated part of the financial system."

A. Higher capital ( Yes )
B. Easier saleability ( Yes )
C. Less risk ( Yes )

I don't buy the pushing.

"Second, we have to improve the capacity of the financial infrastructure to withstand default by a big institution. This will require taking some of the risk out of secured funding markets, increasing resources held against default in the centralised clearing house, and encouraging more standardisation, automation and central clearing in the derivatives markets."

A: Clearinghouse ( Yes )
B: Standardization ( I guess. I don't see this as terribly important as long as people know what they are doing )

"Third, the regulatory framework cannot be indifferent to the scale of leverage and risk outside the supervised institutions. I do not believe it would be desirable or feasible to extend capital requirements to leveraged institutiions such as hedge funds. But supervision has to ensure that counterparty credit risk management in the supervised institutions limits the risk of a rise in overall leverage outside the regulated institutions that could threaten the stability of the financial system. And regulatory policy has to induce higher levels of margin and collateral in normal times against derivatives and secured borrowing to cover better the risk of market illiquidity."

I agree with this. I favor a wide funnel to capture all investments that involve third parties and magnify risk, but assessing them should suffice. Regulation might not be necessary.

"Fourth, we need to streamline and simplify the US regulatory framework. Our system has evolved into a confusing mix of diffused accountability, regulatory competition and a complex web of rules that create perverse incentives and leave huge opportunities for arbitrage and evasion. The blueprint by Hank Paulson, Treasury secretary, outlines a sweeping consolidation and realignment of responsibilities."

Absolutely ( A Cowen word ). Minimal and Effective Regulation.

"The institutions that play a central role in money and funding markets – including the main globally active banks and investment banks – need to operate under a unified framework that provides a stronger form of consolidated supervision, with appropriate requirements for capital and liquidity. To complement this, we need to put in place a stronger framework of oversight authority over the critical parts of the payments system – not just the established payments, clearing and settlements systems, but the infrastructure that underpins the decentralised over-the-counter markets.

Because of its primary responsibility for the stability of the overall financial system, the Federal Reserve should play a central role in such a framework, working closely with supervisors in the US and in other countries. At present the Fed has broad responsibility for financial stability not matched by direct authority and the consequences of the actions we have taken in this crisis make it more important that we close that gap."

I agree. There needs to be some international supervision. Not a world government.

"Finally, we need a stronger capacity to respond to crises. The Fed has put in place a number of innovative new facilities that have helped ease liquidity strains. We plan to leave these in place until conditions in money and credit markets have improved substantially.

We are examining what framework of facilities will be appropriate in the future, with what conditions for access and what oversight requirements to mitigate moral hazard risk. Some of these could become a permanent part of our instruments. Some might be best reserved for the type of acute market illiquidity experienced in this crisis.

Authority to pay interest on reserves would give the Fed the ability to respond to acute liquidity pressure in markets without undermining its capacity to manage the federal funds rates in line with the federal open market committee’s target."

I've offered my Bagehot Plan, which I say would severely minimize moral hazard.

1) Clear rules and conditions of intervention

2) Early moral hazard intervention to weed out problem businesses quickly and unmercifully

3) Onerous conditions of intervention

"The big central banks should put in place a standing network of currency swaps, collateral policies and account arrangements that would make it easier to mobilise liquidity across borders quickly in a crisis."

This is a good idea.

"As we reshape the incentives and constraints for risk-taking in the financial system, we have to recognise that regulation has the potential to make things worse. Regulation can distort incentives in ways that may make the system less safe. One of the strengths of our system is the speed with which we adapt to challenge. It is important that we move quickly to adapt the regulatory system to address the vulnerabilities exposed by this financial crisis. We are beginning the process of building the necessary consensus here and with the other main financial centres."

Yes. Over-regulation is a serious concern.

What did he miss?
1) The implicit and explicit government guarantees to intervene
2) Fraud, negligence, fiduciary mismanagement

Still, I'm impressed, especially since he said this in June.

"The IMF said in October it expects banks around the world to need $675 billion in order to recapitalize."

What's the level of Counterparty Risk in the OTC. From Zubin Jelveh's Odd Numbers:

"In February, Barlcays estimated that if one major institution went down, there would most likely be between $36-$47 billion in losses due to counterparty risk in the credit default swap market as risk was repriced. A similar CDS study by BNP Paribas put the figure at $150 billion in potential losses.

But the repricing of risk extends just beyond the CDS market, IMF economists Miguel A. Segoviano and Manmohan Singh argue in a new working paper. Using data on banks' counterparty positions before the Bear Stearns collapse, the pair calculate the potential loss to the financial system from a repricing of risk across the entire OTC derivatives market:

in the case of a single institution failure, the total loss could be as high as $300-$400 billion depending on the [institution]; but when cascade effects are taken into account, the total loss could rise to over $1,500 billion.
And that's just the potential losses from the derivatives and not the underlying assets. The IMF said in October it expects banks around the world to need $675 billion in order to recapitalize."

Here's the paper:

"The financial market turmoil of recent months has highlighted the importance of counterparty
risk. Here, we discuss counterparty risk that may stem from the OTC derivatives markets and
attempt to assess the scope of potential cascade effects. This risk is measured by losses to the
financial system that may result via the OTC derivative contracts from the default of one or
more banks or primary broker-dealers. We then stress the importance of “netting” within the
OTC derivative contracts. Our methodology shows that, even using data from before the
worsening of the crisis in late Summer 2008, the potential cascade effects could be very
substantial. We summarize our results in the context of the stability of the banking system and
provide some policy measures that could be usefully considered by the regulators in their
discussions of current issues."

Okay. Let's go.

"In this paper we are interested in counterparty risk that may stem from the OTC derivatives
markets. The financial market turmoil of recent months has highlighted the importance of
such risk. The risk is measured by losses that may result via the OTC derivative contracts to
the financial system from the default (or fail) of one or more banks or broker dealers. Thus,
in order to quantify counterparty risk, we calculate (expected) losses absorbed by the system
under two different scenarios (described in Section II.D). For the estimation of (expected)
losses, we define (i) the exposure of the financial system to specific financial institutions
(FIs); and (ii) propose a novel methodology to estimate the probability that given that a
particular institution (counterparty) fails to deliver, other institutions in the system would
also fail to deliver."

The risk of :
1) A particular bank failing
2) If a particular banks fails, what would the fallout be

"Counterparty risk largely stems from the creditworthiness of an institution. In the context of
the financial system that includes banks, broker dealers, and other non-banking institutions
(e.g., insurers and pension funds), counterparty risk will be the cumulative loss to the
financial system from a counterparty that fails to deliver on its OTC derivative obligation.
Thus, in order to estimate the potential cumulative loss in the system, we need to quantify
two variables (i) the exposure of the financial system (EFS) to a particular institution or
institutions that would fail to deliver; and (ii) the probability that given that a particular
institution (counterparty) fails to deliver, other institutions in the system would also fail to
deliver."

I think they just said that.

"We define the exposure of the financial system to the failure of a particular counterparty as
the liabilities of a particular institution (counterparty) to others in the financial system
stemming from its OTC derivatives that have not been netted under a master netting
agreement (e.g., International Swaps and Derivatives Association) or cross margining
agreements where margin/cash is assigned and netted across product categories."

I wonder how they're going to do that.

"Notional amounts are defined as the gross nominal value of all OTC derivative deals
concluded and not yet settled on the reporting date. These amounts provide a measure of the
size of the market, but do not provide a measure of risk. Risk in derivatives stems from
various other variables including price changes, volatility, leverage and hedge ratios,
duration, liquidity, and counterparty risk."

See, I already don't like the number of variables.

'The OTC derivatives market is tailored to clients’ needs and thus goes beyond what is
available in the standardized contracts that exchanges offer. Assuming anywhere from 1-25
basis points bid/ask spread on the notional value traded (about $ 600 trillion), dealers derive a
significant income from OTC derivatives markets. Thus banks and prime brokers have a
vested interest in protecting their franchise, and therefore limit transparency and
standardization. However, if indeed the results of our scenarios are illustrative, counterparty
risk is large (and especially large where cascade effects result in more than one bank or prime
broker failing). In addition, the re-pricing risk following a counterparty failure cannot be
easily quantified. Pressure to re-hedge at such times will be enormous and perhaps
unaffordable, which could lead to unanticipated pressures on the financial system."

So, this could be really bad. I can't seem to be able to copy the graphs and such, so read it yourself.

Solutions:

1) Capital requirements across products and banks
2) A Clearing House
3) Easy to sell capital, that can be passed on
4) Standardize contracts

They all seem reasonable, but are they necessary. Maybe only 2 and 3, but 1 is advisable.

"We need new safe-fail policies to prevent inevitable institutional failures from snowballing into economic crises.

Here's a pretty good argument for putting Derivatives on an exchange or Clearinghouse from Benn Steil in the FT:

"The global financial crisis is rightly prompting calls for a rethink of how we regulate financial institutions and markets. Most such calls are focused on what might be called “fail-safe” regulations, designed to reduce the risk that institutions will make reckless lending and investment decisions. Even libertarian-leaning policymakers and thinkers, such as Alan Greenspan, are now concerned with the capacity of our globally connected financial system to spread failures of risk management from one institution to another."

I hadn't heard them called Fail Safe Regulations until now, but the point is well taken. We want regulation to keep these kinds of financial crises from occurring. A global approach makes sense to me. No, it's not global government.

"In this crisis, institutions that bought up buckets of complex mortgage-linked securities found themselves facing huge losses as house prices fell. Their counterparts and clients, fearing the worst, provoked the worst by ceasing to do business with them. Others who wrote insurance against their failures-to-pay (credit default swaps) then lost huge sums as well, fuelling the fires of system-wide panic and default. But better regulation of lending standards and risk management, the argument goes, will prevent such systemic problems in the future.

History does not provide much comfort here. In financial markets, there are always new risks to take and new ways for risk management models and procedures to break down. Fail-safe approaches can also go too far: witness Japan in the early 1990s, when heavy-handed government intervention effectively shut down financial innovation. Furthermore, government policy promoting imprudent risk-taking – witness long-standing US congressional support for failed mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – can overwhelm regulations intended to control it."

I think that the cause of the problem was the search for investments that needed less capital requirements, not the investments themselves.

His two main points I agree with:

1) It's hard to stop financial innovation, since its intent is to evade current regulations

2) Over-regulation is a serious problem

"The key is to supplement prudent fail-safe interventions with safe-fail ones: interventions that recognise that institutional failures will continue to occur and that focus on limiting the systemic damage after they do."

Here's "prudent" again, meaning nothing specific, but it will work.

"A case in point is the mammoth global derivatives markets. Despite wild swings in prices, derivatives exchanges have not contributed one iota to market instability. This is because exchange-traded contracts are centrally cleared and trader defaults – which are rare because of continuously adjusted margin requirements – are absorbed by well-capitalised clearing houses. Compare the 2006 collapse of hedge fund Amaranth, whose derivatives exposures were on-exchange, with the 2008 collapses of Lehman Brothers and AIG, both of which had large exposures in non-cleared, over-the-counter CDSs. Amaranth’s derivative defaults had trivial systemic ripples, while those of Lehman and AIG created major shockwaves. AIG invisibly built up huge under-collateralised sell positions on the back of a faulty credit rating. Yet if those contracts had been transacted on a trading platform with central clearing, margin calls would have short-circuited the strategy well before the company’s September collapse. US and European regulators (whose institutions comprise the vast bulk of OTC trading) should require central clearing once volume barriers in a contract are breached. This will not prevent an institution from losing large sums in derivatives trading, but will stop its default from spreading big losses to others that may be far removed from the original transactions."

This is the argument for an Exchange or Clearinghouse. It's pretty convincing to me.

"There are safe-fail macroeconomic counterparts as well. In August 2007, former Salvadoran finance minister Manuel Hinds and I spoke out at a Reykjavik conference in favour of Iceland unilaterally “euroising”. At the time, the country had more than enough foreign exchange reserves to redeem all the krona in the country for euros at the then-current exchange rate. This would not have stopped the three large Icelandic banks from overextending, but it would have prevented national financial catastrophe. Countries that have adopted one of the two main internationally accepted currencies – the dollar (Panama, El Salvador and Ecuador) or the euro (think in particular of Italy, Portugal and Greece) – have effectively eliminated the risk of currency crisis (that is, not being able to pay short-term foreign debts for lack of access to “hard currency”)."

That's interesting. It seems that the choice is between the Dollar and Euro. But eliminating a currency crisis is important.

"If we are wise and fortunate, in the future we will have corporate governance, capital standards and monetary policy regimes that better constrain the dangerous build-up of excessive leverage among consumers, banks and governments. But that is not enough. We need new safe-fail policies to prevent inevitable institutional failures from snowballing into economic crises."

Notice the focus on excess leverage. That's the main point, I believe.

Thursday, November 13, 2008

"Committee Holds Hearing on Hedge Funds and the Financial Market"

From the testimony today in Congress Under Waxman:

First, Kenneth Griffin:

"At financial institutions, we often take risk by investing in securities.
However, we have all seen the consequences of taking imprudent risk. Failures to
understand and manage risk can be severe, as we have seen far too often in recent
weeks." ( Agree )

"In this crisis, the concept of "too interconnected to fail" has clearly replaced the concept
of "too big to fail." The rapid growth in the use of derivatives has created an opaque
market whose outstanding notional value is measured in the hundreds of trillions of
dollars. As a result, there is great concern about the systemic effects of the failure of
anyone financial institution.
In the area of credit default swaps, for example, there is an estimated 55 trillion dollars of
outstanding notional contracts between market participants. This number is almost four
times the GOP of our country"

Too interconnected to fail ( Agree ) Derivative and CDS stuff ( BS )

"The creation of central clearing houses to act as intermediaries and guarantors of
financial derivatives such as credit default swaps represents a straightforward solution to
the issues inherent in today's opaque over-the-counter market. Of greatest importance,
such a clearing house will dramatically reduce systematic risk -- allowing us to step away
from the "too interconnected to fail" paradigm. Numerous other benefits will accrue to
our economy. Regulators, for example, will have far greater transparency into this vast
and important market." ( Agree, everyone does )

"I believe, and have said before, that our financial markets work best when they are
competitive, fair, transparent and stable. Proper regulation is critical. But the best
regulation is created with an eye toward unleashing opportunities, not limiting
possibilities. To achieve this, Congress, regulators and industry must all work together.
Our markets are complex and they must be well understood if they are to be well
regulated. We must solve the serious issues we face but in a way that does not stifle the
best innovative qualities of our financial markets." ( Agree, but "proper" regulation, like Bush's same use, it BS for saying nothing specific. It's like saying we'll pass good laws )

From John Paulson:

"Hedge funds are an important investment category for investors as returns are generally noncorrelated with the traditional market" ( Sounds good )

"The Institute, launched with a $15 million grant from investment management firm Paulson &
Co. Inc., will provide funding and training to organizations that help homeowners negotiate
alternatives to foreclosure. The majority of the funds will be grants to support direct legal
assistance to borrowers in 10 or more states to fight foreclosure, predatory lenders and abusive
loan servicers. It will do this primarily by providing money to top non-profit legal-aid groups and
law school clinics.
Formation of the Institute comes as the rate of subprime foreclosures, already alarmingly high,
is set to accelerate. Analysts have predicted that as many as 1.7 million foreclosures will occur
in the next two to three years. Within the next eighteen months, up to four million subprime
borrowers will see their monthly mortgage payments jump approximately 40% as initial "teaser"
interest rates expire. Servicers and lenders have largely refused to modify these abusive
subprime loans. According to a recent study by Moody's, only 1% of loans that reset to a higher
interest rate were modified by servicers. lenders and servicers are simply not modifying these
mortgages in sufficient numbers to help homeowners.
"legal resources available to help struggling families fall far short of that needed to address the
millions of abusive loans that have been made in recent years," said Martin Eakes, Chief
Executive Officer of CRL. "By providing funding and other support for attorneys who can
review loan documents and negotiate with loan servicers, we believe that many more
homeowners will be able to stay in their homes."

Since this is mainly legal help, and the loans are called abusive, maybe we should be doing what I say, which is examine the legality of these loans.

"There are major problems with the Treasury plan. First, by buying banks' worst
assets at above-market prices, taxpayers take an immediate economic loss -while
transferring wealth to shareholders and executives of the very institutions
that brought on the financial crisis.
Second, this plan puts too much discretionary power in the hands ofTreasury
officials. Who determines what financial assets are purchased and at what prices?
Who determines which bank gets to benefit from these taxpayer subsidies? Will
bank shareholders continue to receive dividends, and executives continue to get
paid huge bonuses?
When financial institutions borrow massive amounts ofmoney to invest in assets
that are now found to be illiquid arid poorly performing, it is not the
responsibility oftaxpayers to bear the resulting losses. These losses should be
borne by the shareholders.
Iftaxpayers have to step in and provide capital to keep operating enterprises that
the government decides are key to the functioning of the economy as a whole,
taxpayers must receive protection."

The only thing here odd is the determination of prices. Clearly he has no clue who or how it will be done. Why not just say that.

"Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said at the Senate Banking Committee hearing
this week, "[the] Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac [interventions] worked the way
they were supposed to." These enterprises continued to function, maintaining homeowner access to and lowering the cost of mortgage financing. However,
managements of these companies had to leave and forfeit the compensation
packages they had negotiated.
Shareholders had their dividends blocked and remain first in line to bear losses,
as they should have been. Taxpayers came both first and last ~:.. first to get paid
backJ as the new preferred stock is senior to all shareholders; and last in realizing
losses, as common and other preferred equity would be extinguished before the
taxpayers would be at risk.
This mechanism M_ purchases of senior preferred stock with warrants in troubled
institutions -- addresses the problems with the Treasmy plan. The financial
market is stabilized, companies get recapitalized, failures are avoidedJ debt
securities are supported, and time is gained for illiquid assets to mature.
The institutions continue to function, their cost of funding will decline as equity
capital increases, and innocent third parties like bank depositors, broker/dealer
clients and insurance-policy holders are all protected. The only difference is that
potential losses are kept with the shareholders where they belong."

Here's the explanation of why they're leaving management intact. They want to keep the company structure intact, and they already did this with Fannie/Freddie, so there's a precedent.

"The Treasury plan would also entail larger outlays than the Preferred plan. By
allowing all banks to sell their worst assets to Treasury at inflated prices,
taxpayers would be subsidizing healthy banks which have access to private
capital (Goldman SachsJ J.P. MorganJ Wells Fargo, and Bank ofAmerica, for
example) as well as banks that don't have a private alternative. But under a
Preferred plan, only banks that don't have a private alternative will be given
federal assistance. This would reduce the outlay otherwise required to solve the crisis."

We all pretty much hated it.

"Few people familiar with the issues deny that Treasury action is needed to
stabilize the financial markets. However, the question is who should bear the
cost?
Under the Treasury plan the taxpayer pays the price. Under a Preferred plan, the
shareholders of the firms who created the problems bear the first loss. Who do
you think should pay?"

Now, I think that the statement that Treasury action is needed shows that he believes that a bailout in this kind of crises was and is the best thing to do. I'm saying he believed that would be the case if needed before this crisis happened.

George Soros:

"The crisis was generated by the financial system itself. This fact-that the defect was
inherent in the system-eontradicts the prevailing theory, which holds that financial markets
tend toward equilibrium and that deviations from the equilibrium either occur in a random
manner or are caused by some sudden external event to which markets have difficulty adjusting.
The severity and amplitude of the crisis provides convincing evidence that there is something
fundamentally wrong with this prevailing theory and with the approach to market regulation that
has gone with it. To understand what has happened, and what should be done to avoid such a
catastrophic crisis in the future, will require a new way of thinking about how markets work."

( Total BS: Pure Mechanistic Thinking )

"Consider how the crisis has unfolded over the past eighteen months. The proximate
cause is to be found in the housing bubble or more exactly in the excesses of the subprime
mortgage market. The longer a double-digit rise in house prices lasted, the more lax the lending
practices became. In the end, people could borrow 100 percent of inflated house prices with no
money down. Insiders referred to subprime loans as ninja loans-no income, no job, no
questions asked." ( Correct: Poor Loans: Human Agency: Forget Talk Of Systems )

"Some highly leveraged hedge funds collapsed and some lightly regulated financial institutions declared bankruptcy" ( Correct: Undercapitalized: Human Agency: Forget Talk Of Systems )

"In quick succession, a variety of esoteric credit marketsranging from collateralized debt obligations [CDOs] to auction-rated municipal bonds-broke down one after another."

( Incorrect: Esoteric Has Nothing To Do With It )

"The deepest fall of all came in September, caused by the disorderly bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in which holders of commercial paper-for example, short-term, unsecured
promissory notes-issued by Lehman lost their money."

( Agree )

"With the financial system in cardiac arrest, resuscitating it took precedence over
considerations of moral hazard-i.e., the danger that coming to the rescue of a financial
institution in difficulties would reward and encourage reckless behavior in the future"

( Disagree: Moral Hazard Had Already Been Compromised: No Going Back )

"When that was not enough, the American and European financial authorities committed themselves not to allow any other major financial institution to fail" ( Agree )

"Unfortunately the authorities are always lagging behind events" ( Agree )

"First, financial markets do not reflect prevailing conditions accurately; they provide a picture that is always biased or distorted in one way or another. Second, the distorted views held by market participants and expressed in market prices can, under certain circumstances, affect the so-called fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect. This two-way circular connection between market prices and the underlying reality I call reflexivity.
While the two-way connection is present at all times, it is only occasionally, and
in special circumstances, that it gives rise to financial crises. Usually markets correct their own
mistakes, but occasionally there is a misconception or misinterpretation that finds a way to
reinforce a trend that is already present in reality and by doing so it also reinforces itself. Such
self-reinforcing processes may carry markets into far-from-equilibrium territory. Unless
something happens to abort the reflexive interaction sooner, it may persist until the
misconception becomes so glaring that it has to be recognized as such. When that happens the
trend becomes unsustainable and when it is reversed the self-reinforcing process starts working
in the opposite direction, causing a sharp downward movement."

Wow. I agree with this:

1) People misunderstand things
2) Sometimes very badly

Ignore the engineering jargon. Totally inappropriate.

"Take for example credit default swaps (CDSs), instruments intended to insure
against the possibility of bonds and other forms of debt going into default, and whose price
captures the perceived risk of such a possibility occurring. These instruments grew like Topsy
because they required much less capital than owning or shorting the underlying bonds.
Eventually they grew to more than $50 trillion in nominal size, which is a many-fold multiple of
the underlying bonds and five times the entire US national debt. Yet the market in credit default
swaps has remained entirely unregulated."

( Agree: but he misses the point. CDS's filled the need, which were investments with less capital. Something else would have worked if they didn't. It wasn't the investment, it was the need which created the investment )

"Since the risk management models used until now ignored the uncertainties inherent in reflexivity, limits on credit and leverage will have to be set substantially lower than those that were tolerated in the recent past"

( This borders on the absurd. He just admitted the investments fit the desired lack of capital. Forget this model BS. They weren't complex so much as undercapitalized. That's what they were designed for. Their complexity was due to using less capital. He writes like he's Foucault. )

I can't take anymore. Soros wore me out. I'd rather read Hegel.

Tuesday, November 11, 2008

"it is ready to begin clearing CDS contracts as soon as it receives regulatory approval"

From Bloomberg, Fed to control clearinghouse for CDS market:

"Nov. 11 (Bloomberg) -- The Federal Reserve is working on a plan that would give it authority to regulate the clearing of trades for the $33 trillion credit-default swap market, according to people with knowledge of the proposal.

The Fed, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are discussing a memorandum of understanding that lays out oversight of clearinghouses that would become the central counterparty to credit-default swap trades, said the people who asked not to be named because the discussions are private.

The SEC and CFTC would also share trading information under the plan, the people said.

``The main concern is systemic risk and that's much more in the Fed's wheelhouse than the SEC or CFTC,'' said Craig Pirrong, a finance professor at the University of Houston who studies futures markets. ``The Fed is the natural place for it to go.''

The Fed has been pushing the industry to form a clearinghouse that would absorb losses should a market maker fail. Regulators stepped up their efforts after the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September and the near-collapse of American International Group Inc. The New York Fed has been meeting with groups including CME Group Inc., Intercontinental Exchange Inc. and NYSE Euronext to press them to accelerate their progress."

The two items that interest me are:

1) The concentration on systemic risk ( Yes )

2) Industry absorb losses ( Yes, if I understand this )