Showing posts with label Corporate Bonds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corporate Bonds. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Investors' bets that have fueled the recent rally in corporate bonds and other riskier markets have been made mostly without the excessive borrowing

TO BE NOTED: From Reuters:

"
U.S. corporate bond rally unfazed by lack of leverage
Wed May 13, 2009 6:48pm EDT

By Tom Ryan and John Parry - Analysis

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Investors' bets that have fueled the recent rally in corporate bonds and other riskier markets have been made mostly without the excessive borrowing of the boom years that preceded the Panic of 2008.

The huge amounts of leverage provided to "hot money" investors, or hedge funds, in the bull market heyday has been unwound and the recent rally in corporate bonds marks a return of more traditional investors, analysts say.

De-leveraging of trillions of dollars in borrowed money lies at the heart of the global credit crisis. But corporate bonds' recovery, courtesy of more traditional investors like pension funds and insurers, is an early sign that securities markets can function without hefty amounts of borrowed money.

Hedge funds "were primarily credit driven and the more you listen to the shrinkage of the hedge fund community, the more you realize there is less and less leverage being used," said Tom Sowanick, chief investment officer at Clearbrook Financial LLC in Princeton, New Jersey.

The decimation of hedge funds is one reflection of the heavy price that investors who borrowed excessive amounts had to pay when the global financial crisis cut a swathe through riskier asset markets.

Such speculative investors' exposure was magnified by hefty borrowing, or "leverage." For example, before the global credit crisis erupted in summer 2007, some speculative investors borrowed about $30 for every $1 bet.

When those bets went badly awry in everything from mortgage-backed securities to other complex financial structures, that "leverage" had to be quickly paid back.

During the third quarter of 2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed, the financial system went into cardiac arrest and leverage -- the lifeblood of hedge funds -- dried up.

As leverage was withdrawn, the hedge fund industry suffered over $100 billion in redemptions in the first quarter of 2009 alone, according to Hedge Fund Research, Inc, a Chicago-based research firm. That was on top of the quarterly record $152 billion in redemptions during the fourth quarter of 2008 and a huge acceleration from negligible redemptions in the previous three quarters.

Traditional buyers such as pension funds and insurers, who are restrained by regulators from borrowing large amounts to make market bets, have propelled corporate bonds to a stellar rally so far this year.

Since late March, U.S. investment-grade corporate bond yield spreads over comparable Treasuries have rallied 158 basis points tighter to 442 basis points, according to Merrill Lynch data as of Tuesday.

While hedge funds will always have a presence in the corporate bond market, they won't reach the same level they did before the financial meltdown, said Sabur Moini, high yield portfolio manager at asset management firm Payden & Rygel in Los Angeles.

"They were the marginal buyers that were being provided tremendous and cheap leverage by the Street" and "all that has been washed out of the system," he said.

"The world going forward is going to be different; we're just not going to have the sort of leverage and cheap financing" seen prior to the financial meltdown, Moini said.

With the once-championed Wall Street broker-dealer model extinct and stricter oversight on the remaining depository institutions, it is hard to see how the huge amounts of leverage once offered to hedge funds could ever return, analysts say.

"In the same vein, the prime brokers aren't extending the same amount of credit and there are fewer of them" than before the global financial crisis started, Clearbrook Financial's Sowanick said.

"Where the big change comes from is the brokers, who were (leveraged) between 30 and 40 times. But because brokers are now banks, their leverage has been cut significantly," to about 10 times, he said.

One example is Merrill Lynch, which had been leveraged at between 30 and 35 times. Its leverage is likely about 10 times since Bank of America bought it in late September, Sowanick said.

(Reporting by Tom Ryan and John Parry; Editing by Dan Grebler)"

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

even though such risks are much reduced following government interventions at banks

TO BE NOTED: From the FT:

"
High-yield bonds feel thaw

By Aline van Duyn and Nicole Bullock

Published: April 27 2009 19:24 | Last updated: April 27 2009 19:24

The US high-yield market is finally starting to show signs of thawing.

Even as default rates soars to historic highs, investors have increased the amount of money invested in the market for risky corporate bonds, and yields in the high-yield or junk bond market have fallen sharply. It is a further sign of improving sentiment in credit markets and follows an earlier surge in issuance in the investment grade market.

Investments most easily tracked are those by mutual fund investors. Since December 2008 more than $8bn has been invested in the high-yield market by US retail investors, according to Goldman Sachs research.

Goldman Sachs analysts said: “On the one hand, the high yield cash market has outperformed to such a degree that it is one of the few asset classes to post a positive return year-to-date.

“On the other hand, the default rate has surged to an annualised rate of 14 per cent year-to-date, and March was among the worst months for default in the past 20 years. What gives?”

Analysts and investors say that, in spite of the overall reductions in yields in the junk bond market to levels last seen since October, there remain clear differences in the availability of credit. Specifically, the riskiest companies – those with ratings in the triple C range – continue to have trouble raising new money or completing debt exchanges.

Greg Hopper, portfolio manager at Artio Global Investors says: “The high-yield market was very cheaply priced at the end of last year, even if one assumed that we were going to have an Armageddon-like default rate.

“A lot of investors recognised that through the first few months of the year.”

Initially investors targeted beaten down bonds in the secondary market, but over the last month, there has been enough liquidity for bankers to start testing the appetite for new issuance, albeit for the strongest companies. HCA and Crown Castle have both sold more than $1bn in new debt.

Mr Hopper says: “Where there had been concern about companies being able to refinance, that concern is starting to fall away, beginning with the best quality companies.”

But investors should beware of buying junk indiscriminately, especially since the market has rallied. Like many other credit markets, high-yield is a picker’s market now. Martin Fridson, head of Fridson Investment Advisors, says many institutions have been wary of plunging into the high-yield market, even as retail investors have been buying into it, because of the risks that the rally might run out of steam.

Specifically, he says investors are still concerned about the potential for a renewed crisis among financial institutions, even though such risks are much reduced following government interventions at banks.

He says: “It is possible that the worst is over, but as long as the economy is still not improving, there remains a risk of a severe relapse of the financial system”.

Whether the rally is sustainable remains up for debate given the tightness of lending in general throughout the world and expectations of potentially the highest rate of corporate defaults.

Mr Hopper highlights three concerns: the health of the banking system, the threat that new issuance returns too strongly and floods the market or a disorganised bankruptcy of General Motors, which is the process of trying to restructure $27bn in unsecured junk debt.

He says: “If GM comes through this without having to go through Chapter 11 or if it goes through some sort of more orderly Chapter 11 that would provide further positive impetus to the high-yield market.

“If, on the other hand, the efforts to reorganise the auto industry unravel that could be a risk to the market. But it is more of a risk to the auto sector in particular than the whole high-yield universe.”

Even though issuance of high-yield bonds in April – at $7bn so far – looks set to be the highest since July of last year, credit is not yet available for the riskiest companies. Moreover European high yield markets have seen only one issue since June 2007.

Greg Peters, head of global fixed income research at Morgan Stanley, says: “We caution investors who correlate a thawing high yield new-issue market with the end of this credit crunch, as the financing markets are still fragile for levered corporates.”

Monday, April 27, 2009

European pension schemes are increasing their allocation to non-traditional asset classes to manage their risks more effectively

TO BE NOTED: Via All About Alpha:

United Kingdom
London, 21 April 2009

  • More schemes diversify into alternative asset classes to manage risk
  • Move from equities to bonds accelerated by last year’s market turbulence
  • Operational risks come under greater scrutiny
  • Governance processes are further tightened

Following last year’s unprecedented market conditions, European pension schemes are increasing their allocation to non-traditional asset classes to manage their risks more effectively, according to Mercer’s annual European Asset Allocation Survey. The survey of over 1,000 European pension funds with assets of €400 billion found that 35 percent of UK schemes and 60 percent of European schemes (excluding the UK) expect to introduce new investment opportunities into their portfolio to help manage future investment risk.

Tom Geraghty, European head of Mercer’s investment consulting business commented: “Despite being innately diverse in history, culture and regulatory requirements, European pension funds have all felt the effect of the last year’s market turmoil. The banking crisis and collapse of Lehman Brothers highlighted the operational risks associated with the investment of institutional assets and brought counterparty credit risks more into focus. Funds are now looking at ways to manage the risk inherent in their schemes, mainly through further diversification of their assets.”

Trends in asset allocation

The steady reduction in benchmark allocations to equities in markets with traditionally high exposures was accelerated by last year’s market turmoil. In the UK the allocation fell from 58 percent in 2008 to 54 percent in 2009 and in Ireland from 67 to 60 percent. The UK has also seen a signification decline in allocation to domestic equity over the last few years, from 57 percent of the total equity allocation three years ago to 51 percent in 2009. Exposure to equity markets remained low across other European markets.

Crispin Lace, principal at Mercer commented: “Both in the UK and Ireland the move away from equities is driven by both the market downturn and the increasing maturity of schemes. As schemes close they tend to reduce their exposure to equities in favour of bonds with the average closed scheme having a bond exposure that is around 10 percentage points higher than the average open scheme.”

While bonds continue to be the dominant asset class in most European countries, an increasing number of funds are diversifying to non-traditional investment opportunities. Allocations to alternative asset classes have increased from 10 to 11 percent in Germany, from 9 to 11 percent in the Netherlands and from 4 to 6 percent in the UK.

In the UK schemes favour hedge funds, GTAA and active currency. The percentage of schemes that had some form of strategic allocation to one or more of these opportunities varied from 5 – 9 percent depending on the asset. Interestingly, over 50 percent more UK schemes have allocated to these asset classes since the 2008 survey. According to the report, in the rest of Europe, schemes favour hedge funds (14 percent of schemes have an allocation), commodities (12 percent) and high yield bonds (10 percent).

Mr Lace said: “The pattern of allocation to non-traditional asset classes varies from market to market, due both to historical trends and preferences and to the level of sophistication of investors.”

Reviewing the impact of the market turmoil

Turbulent markets are prompting broad and deep reviews of all aspects of pension scheme policy. Over two thirds of respondents to the Mercer survey have either undertaken investment related reviews in 2008 or said they intended to do so in 2009. Of those, close to 70 percent reviewed their counterparty exposure risk in 2008 and over half reviewed their cash management. Over 70 percent expect to review stock lending programmes in 2009 and 46 percent plan to analyse transaction costs.

“Many schemes were not aware of the additional risk being run within their stock-lending programmes or collateral management programmes elsewhere in their portfolio,” said Mr Lace. “While many schemes did review their counterparty risk and stock lending exposure last year, the majority will continue to keep a close eye on this part of their portfolio to avoid any nasty surprises going forward.”

Improvements in governance structures

Governance structures continue to be strengthened as demonstrated by a 35 percent increase in companies with designated investment committees. In nearly 30 percent of cases, decisions on the hiring and firing of investment managers are delegated to an investment committee, while, in nearly 5 percent they are delegated to the consultant or other third-party specialist. The survey also showed a growing number of schemes formally reviewing their investment strategy at least once a year (16 percent).

Looking to the future – UK & Ireland

In both the UK and Ireland, 33 and 47 percent of schemes respectively have indicated they are planning a further decrease in equity exposure over the next 12 months. Irish schemes are looking to couple this with an increase in exposure to both government bonds (34 percent of schemes) and non-government bonds (12 percent). UK schemes envisage a different approach with 27 percent of schemes planning an increase in allocation to corporate bonds at the expense of government bonds where 18 percent plan to reduce their exposure.


ABOUT MERCER

Mercer is a leading global provider of consulting, outsourcing and investment services. Mercer works with clients to solve their most complex benefit and human capital issues, designing and helping manage health, retirement and other benefits. It is a leader in benefit outsourcing. Mercer’s investment services include investment consulting and investment management. Mercer’s 18,000 employees are based in more than 40 countries. The company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., which lists its stock (ticker symbol: MMC) on the New York, Chicago and London stock exchanges. For more information, visit www.mercer.com"

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

borrowing cost for corporations that have been able to maintain their AAA or AA rating (not many) has stayed relatively flat

TO BE NOTED: From EconomPic Data:

"Investment Grade Corporate Bond Yield

We've detailed similar thoughts here and here, but worth repeating. While the borrowing cost for corporations that have been able to maintain their AAA or AA rating (not many) has stayed relatively flat, for other Investment Grade borrowers... not so much.



Source: Barclays

Thursday, January 29, 2009

And when there's an almost-perfect hedge for the taking, which locks in profits for the taxpayer, it would be silly not to do it.

From Felix Salmon:

"
Let the Government Buy Corporate Bonds

What's the difference between spending hundreds of billions or even trillions of dollars on loans, on the one hand, and loaning out the money directly, on the other? All of the "bad bank" proposals have one thing in common: that the government buy up a huge quantity of loans of some description -- and take on the associated credit risk. So why not start lending money in the real economy, especially if that can be done without taking on any credit risk?

That's the idea of Tyler, over at Zero Hedge, who notes that companies like John Deere and Casino Guichard are issuing new bonds at spreads hundreds of basis points wide to where their credit default swaps are trading. The government -- or a state-owned bad bank -- could easily lend at lower rates than that, and fully hedge all the associated credit risk in the CDS market.

Politically, it might be hard for the government to get involved in the demonic CDS market. But on the other hand, the government's money would be going straight to companies which need the money and will spend it, rather than to banks which are likely to just sit on it.

Obviously, all such hedging would have to take place on a new CDS exchange, but that's no bad thing: it would help the exchange to get going. It would even be legal under the draconian standards being mooted by Collin Peterson, the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, which would not only ban all off-exchange CDS trading but would also require ownership of the underlying bonds.

What reason is there to believe that this arbitrage will continue to exist even once the CDS market has moved to an exchange? Isn't the negative basis entirely a function of counterparty risk?

The answer to that is yesbut. The real reason for the CDS basis is a kind of counterparty risk, but it's not the counterparty risk that we normally think of in the CDS market -- the risk that a bank will write protection and then go bust before it can pay out on it. Instead, it's an illiquidity premium in the cash bond market. The people playing the CDS basis trade tend to be banks, who tend to fund their cash bond positions in the overnight repo market -- and that is where their internal cost of funds has skyrocketed.

An institution with limitless liquidity, like the government, doesn't have that problem, and can happily hold cash bonds without having to pay a hefty Libor-OIS premium. If the government were to buy credit protection from banks, the market-rate counterparty-risk premium it would charge would be much smaller than the negative CDS basis. And if it were to be buying protection from an exchange, the counterparty risk involved would be smaller still.

A lot of the discussion surrounding the stimulus package has involved setting up new state-owned banks, whether they be infrastructure banks or bad banks or whatever. Surely one of these entities will find itself able to go out and lend money to the companies who are currently having to pay an enormous illiquidity premium when they issue new debt. It will be good stimulus spending: you can be sure the money is needed. And when there's an almost-perfect hedge for the taking, which locks in profits for the taxpayer, it would be silly not to do it."

The fool on the hill:

Felix, It's a damned fine idea, as is Social Security buying index funds now that the markets are low, but there isn't a chance in hell that this idea will go anywhere. If James Grant even sees their value, you'd think that other value investors would as well. We need to get these businesses loans and at lower rates, otherwise more jobs will be lost going forward as businesses have to get new loans on far worse terms as the earlier ones die off. Peston has been mentioning this I believe. Sadly, your proposal doesn't fit our current mania for spending government money unwisely and wastefully.

Anyway, keep it up. Stranger things have happened.

Wednesday, December 24, 2008

"But somewhere in there is a legitimate, rational debate."

Accrued Interest addresses Mark-To-Market:

"Mark-to-market accounting has got to be one of the most controversial topics of the year. Unfortunately, its also rife with bias and downright zealotry. You have on one side apologists for financial companies and/or people looking for a one-trick excuse for the whole financial meltdown. On the other hand, you have people who believe all of Wall Street is just lying and everything they own is worthless.


But somewhere in there is a legitimate, rational debate. ( TRUE )


First let's consider what accounting is supposed to achieve. Broadly speaking, accounting should have a few simple goals:


1) Accurately reflect the current economic situation of a firm.

2) Allow for comparison of a firm's results and position over time.

3) Allow for comparison of one firm to another.

4) Be as objective as possible.

( IT'S A GOOD LIST, BUT I WOULD INCLUDE THE NOTION OF SOCIAL CONFIDENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, A SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING THAT THE PUBLIC CAN TRUST AND BELIEVE IN, EVEN IF NOT INVOLVED IN THIS ISSUE PERSONALLY IN ANY WAY. IT COULD BE THAT MARK-TO- MARKET INSTILLS MORE CONFIDENCE IN THE SYSTEM )

Now let's consider how mark-to-market as a concept fits in with these goals. I call mark-to-market a "Liquidation Theory of Accounting." In other words, by marking all assets to where they could be sold, one is valuing a firm based on what it might be worth in liquidation( SELLING ).


This is clearly appropriate with any pool of assets intended to be traded in the open market( THAT NEED TO BE CONTINUALLY PRICED ). But in other assets, it isn't obvious that mark-to-market serves the 4 basic goals above. Take a life insurance company which bought the longest available Treasury Strip (5/15/2038) on August 8, when it was first trading. The position is an offset to their long-term liabilities, say the life insurance policy of a young person. For the sake of argument (and brevity) let's assume that the actuarial life of the policy holder is exactly 30-years, and the accrued interest on the strip will exactly cover the life policy with a small profit.


The strip was trading at $25.6 on 8/8, but is now about $42.5, an handsome 66% return( DUE TO CHANGES IN INTEREST RATES ).


But has the life company's economic situation changed? Is that firm 66% better off? We'd all agree that no, it isn't( THEY AREN'T GOING TO SELL IT. THEY MERELY KEEP GETTING THE SAME INTEREST AS BEFORE ). The basic economics of the firm haven't changed at all. They have the same liabilities and same cash flow stream. If we followed strict mark-to-market theory, we'd mark both the asset and the liability higher( BECAUSE THE STRIP IS WORTH MORE ), leaving the firm's balance sheet unchanged( SAME REVENUES ).


Or would we? Under current market conditions, "selling" the life insurance policy liability to another firm might be possible, but it would be highly unlikely to have the same gain as the Treasury position( IT WILL SELL FOR LESS ).


That example is very black and white, and of course, the real world is much more grey. Its easy to use a Treasury bond as an example, where we know the change in market value isn't reflective of a change in asset quality. But where there has been a real change in asset quality, the situation becomes more grey.


But still, mark-to-market still doesn't fully satisfy. Let's say that we have two firms, both have made loans to XYZ Retailer. But one is a bank which has made a traditional loan, and the other is a brokerage which holds a private placement bond. The broker almost certainly has to mark that loan to market, but the bank may not.


And in both cases, the rapid changing liquidity premium in the market place alters the "mark" for this asset. By this I mean, say the retailer is performing reasonably well, and thus the risk of non-payment remains remote. Given the weak economy, its obvious that the risk has increased by some degree, but given the extremely weak liquidity across fixed income products, the larger portion of the assets price decline would reflect liquidity( IT'S BECOME HARDER TO SELL, SO WORTH LESS. BUT THIS POINT CAN ALSO BE USED FOR FAIR VALUE, SINCE, IF THE BUSINESSES ARE HOLDING THESE ASSETS FOR THE LONG TERM, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THEY WILL GO UP IN VALUE OVER TIME, AND SO VALUING THEM BASED UPON TODAY'S MARKET PRICE ISN'T FAIR, ESPECIALLY IF IT LEADS TO HIGHER CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS THAT FORCE THE BUSINESS TO SELL SOME OF ITS ASSETS AT A DISCOUNTED PRICE ). If the firms don't intend to trade the loan, is the changing liquidity premium relevant( NOT REALLY )?


There are other problems. Say you are a bank that has a private loan to a company with traded CDS contracts. Your best mark-to-market estimate would be to price the loan based on the cost of hedging out the credit risk. But in many cases, the CDS and cash bond markets have decoupled. Many bonds are trading a drastically wider levels than the CDS market, owing in part to easier funding of CDS. Take Amgen, where cash bonds are trading at a LIBOR spread of nearly 300bps, but the CDS are around 90bps. On a 10-year loan, that implies a valuation differential of about 15 points!( GOOD POINT )

So here again, we have a situation where two firms can use "market" prices to price non-marketable assets, and come up with wildly different valuations. We hear mark-to-market and assume that the "market" is some kind of observable thing. But that is just not the case( TRUE. IT DEPENDS ON WHAT THE METHOD IS USED FOR ).

I argue that when the current fair value accounting standards were cooked up, a rapid change in liquidity premia was never envisioned( THE MARKET WOULDN'T MOVE MUCH ). It was assumed that the market would deliver an efficient price which was primarily reflective of the real economic risks of a security. Thus a change in price would reflect a change in risks. It makes perfect sense in theory, but clearly does not reflect economic reality for some firms, nor does is it creating balance sheets which are comparable across firms( THE LAST FACT IS IMPORTANT ).


But what's the alternative? Those that are calling for an end to mark-to-market are out of their mind. First of all, there is no clear alternative. Second, we have enough trouble trusting firms' balance sheets as it is. Imagine if mark-to-market were suddenly suspended! ( IT WON'T PASS MUSTER, ESPECIALLY IN A CLIMATE OF DISTRUST )

And it doesn't help that so many critics of mark-to-market in the recent past have been managers of firms who were, in fact, fudging the real economic position of their firm( THAT'S THE BOTTOM LINE ).

So I don't know what the answer is. And I don't blame accounting for the financial crisis that we're going through. But I'd like to see some better ideas."

My idea is to have both accounting procedures done, if warranted, with Mark-To-Market the necessary one. In a financial crisis of any kind, a business could apply for an exemption from Mark-To-Market for a time based upon Fair Value Standards. However, the Mark-To-Market must be available as well in order to feel satisfied that everything looks in order. I don't know how this could be done, but the problem doesn't seem unsolvable.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

"At least a crisis marked by a run out of risky US assets and into safe US assets. "

Brad Setser looks at Balance Of Payment Data:

At least a crisis marked by a run out of risky US assets and into safe US assets (THE FLIGHT TO SAFETY ). Right now Agency bonds — think Freddie and Fannie — are considered risky assets while Treasuries are not ( WHY ? BECAUSE THEY ARE EXPLICITLY GUARANTEED BY THE GOVERNMENT I PRESUME, WHILE THE AGENCY BONDS ARE IMPLICITLY GUARANTEED. TO ME, THIS UNCERTAINTY SPRINGS MAINLY FROM LEHMAN. I AM ALONE IN BELIEVING THIS APPARENTLY )

A run out of all US assets and the dollar would look very different.

The October TIC data tells a striking story — one marked by a massive surge in demand by both private and official investors for “safe” assets. Foreign investors bought $182 billion of Treasuries — including $147.4 billion of short-term Treasury bills. There is no real mystery why bill yields dropped so low even as the supply of bills surged. And foreigners added $207 billion to dollar bank accounts.

Sum that up and it works out to close to $400 billion in demand for safe dollar denominated assets. If that kind of monthly inflow is annualized it is a shockingly large number. ( THAT'S A MEASURE OF THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK AND ACCOMPANYING FLIGHT TO SAFETY )

It isn’t hard to figure out why the dollar rallied.

$400 billion in a month is far more than the US needs to cover its trade deficit. It allowed foreigners to reduce their holdings of Agencies by close to $75 billion (including a $25 billion fall in short-term Agencies), their holdings of long-term corporate bonds by $13 billion and their holdings of US equities by $6 billion without causing any strain on the dollar.

Indeed, the fall in foreign holdings of US corporate bonds and US equities (though not the outflow from the Agencies) could have been financed by the sale of $36 billion of foreign assets by US residents …

Usually I argue that the TIC data understates official flows. And this month’s data may well do so.

Some of the $35 billion in long-term Treasury bonds bought by UK investors were probably bought by central banks, and selling by central banks could have contributed to the $13.8b in net sales of long-term Agencies. But in broad terms I don’t doubt that private demand for “safe” US assets soared as a result of the crisis — and much of the inflow came from private investors seeking to increase their holdings of the most liquid dollar assets ( LIQUIDITY IS ALSO IMPORTANT AS A RESULT OF THIS CRISIS ).

In October, China was about the only central bank adding to its reserves (I suspect, it hasn’t formally released its reserves data). Most central banks were selling. That shows up in the US TIC data. South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Ukraine were all net sellers of long-term US Treasury bonds …

The big central bank flow was a reallocation away from Agencies toward Treasuries. And specifically toward short-term Treasury bills.

China increased its holdings of short-term Treasury bills by a stunning $56 billion while also buying $10 billion of long-term Treasuries. That flow alone would have been enough to cover the trade deficit in the absence of any offsetting outflows. Russia cut its holdings of short-term Agencies by a little over $22 billion while increasing its holdings of short-term Treasuries by almost $12 billion.

So much for talk that central banks are always a stabilizing presence the market. They clearly have destabilized the Agency market. The fall in demand for Agencies over the past three months — and most Agency demand has come from central banks until recently — has been sharper than than the fall in demand for US corporate bonds (think securitized subprime mortgages, the category “corporate bonds” in the BoP data includes asset-backed securities) after the crisis of last August.

The fall in demand for corporate bonds (the redline) is what generated a rather scary graph after the initial crisis last August. Things haven’t gotten any better since …

The Agency market is a rather important market. Increased lending by the Agencies offset the fall in demand for “private” mortgage-backed securities after the crisis last August. More recently, the absence of a “central bank bid” has kept Agency spreads wide even after the US Treasury bailout of Freddie and Fannie. And that in turn has pushed the US to adopt other measures to bring down long-term mortgage rates. The Fed and the Treasury are literally now buying the Agencies that foreign central banks are selling. Action, reaction …"

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

"That world, however, is in our past not our future. ": He's Not Running For Office On That, Is He?

I'm a big William Gross fan, so let's look at his latest post. I first noticed that he had a new one on Yves Smith's blog:

"Here I go again! Gosh it was only six years ago that I cemented my place in stock market history by predicting that the Dow would fall from 8,500 to 5,000, instead of going up to 14,000 where it peaked in October of 2007. Well, I could use the standard set of excuses: 1) No one else saw it coming, 2) I was misinterpreted, and taken out of context, 3) I was tired, overworked, and had family problems, or 4) I had just come out of rehab. But these days what really works is a full confession. I mean, like, uh, it was totally my fault and I take full responsibility. The fact is I was only off by 9,000 points. That’s my story, and I’m stickin’ to it."

See, I'm a Bond guy, and Stocks aren't really my game. So, although I screwed up royally before in predicting where stocks are going, it's still worth listening to what I have to say, because, even though I'm not a stock guy, I'm a very good bond guy. Needless to say, buyer be very aware.

"Well, fools rush in. This time though I’m definitely older and maybe a little bit wiser. No magic number, nor a specific target date from the Swami of the Dow. This one will be more conceptual, but still present a “take” that you can criticize or damn with faint praise. And no, despite the title, it doesn’t imply that the stock market is headed to 5,000 and that I was always right or just a little bit early. It only suggests that I’m readdressing the critical topic of equity valuation – that mysterious fragile flower where price is part perception, part valuation, and part hope or lack thereof. Press on, Swami.'

I'm certainly wiser, since I'm not going to give specific numbers, which are, unfortunately, specific, this time. I'm going more heuristic this time, adding a kind of Nostradamus tinge to my predictions. Oh, and by the way, equity evaluation is a messy business, involving problems such as Skepticism, the Uncertainty Principle, and Weakness Of The Will. So cut me some slack.

"Let me first announce a fundamental premise with which I think all rational investors would agree: I believe in stocks for the long run – but only if purchased at the right price. That statement packs a real punch. It says that capitalism is and will remain a going concern, that risk-taking – over the long run – will be rewarded, but only from a starting price that correctly anticipates the economy’s growth and its share of after-tax corporate profits within it. Acknowledging the above, let’s look at a few basic standards of valuation that historically have stood the test of time, to see if at least the price is right. "

Since it's a premise, if you don't agree to it, there's no point in going on. Here's the premise:

You buy a stock at a specific price. When you go to sell it, what matters is your profit, into which you need to take into account things like inflation, taxes on the sale, taxes on dividends perhaps, etc. Sometimes, holding a stock for a long time works very well, and sometimes it doesn't. If you buy an index, the same rules apply. You bought at one index level, and when you later sell at another level you will have to factor other things in besides the rise in it's price.

So, where are we now? Is this a good place to buy stocks?

"One of them is what is known as the “Q” ratio, or the value of the stock market relative to the replacement cost of net assets. The basic logic behind “Q” is that capitalism works. If the “Q” is above 1.0, then the market is valuing a company at more than it costs to reproduce it; stock prices should fall. If it is below 1.0, then stocks are undervalued because new businesses can’t be created at as cheap a price as they can be bought in the open market. In the short run, this ratio is volatile as shown below but it tends to be mean reverting, which is critical. As long as capitalism is a going concern, “Q” should mean revert to 1.0. If so, then oh, oh what a “Q”! Today’s Q ratio has almost never been lower and certainly not since WWII, implying extreme undervaluation, as seen in Chart 1."

First off, what's a ratio:

"A ratio is an expression which compares quantities relative to each other. The most common examples involve two quantities, but in theory any number of quantities can be compared. Mathematically they are represented by separating each quantity with a colon, for example the ratio 2:3, which is read as the ratio "two to three".

So, our ratio compares:
1) Price of stock
2) Price to replace net assets

"The ratio of stock prices to the current replacement values of the firms' underlying assets. Some analysts believe a relatively high Q ratio (higher than 1.0, although the level is subjective) indicates an overbought market. Also called Tobin's Q."

The level is subjective, eh. Fine. Take it with a grain of salt. Since we're talking money, add a handful of salt.

"Tobin's q
[1] is a ratio comparing the value of the stocks of a company listed in a financial markets with the value of a company's equity book value. The ratio was developed by James Tobin (Tobin 1969). It is calculated by dividing the market value of a company by the replacement value of the book equity:
Tobin's q = \frac{\text{(Equity Market Value + Liabilities Book Value)}}{\text{(Equity Book Value + Liabilities Book Value)}}

Another use for q is to determine the valuation of the market as a whole. The formula for this is: q=\frac{\text{value of stock market}}{\text{corporate net worth}}



A graph of Tobin's q for the US market from 1900 to 2003. By looking at the graph you can easily tell when the market was overvalued or undervalued. When Tobin's q spikes upward (like at 1929 or 1999) the market is expensive. The data was collected by Andrew Smithers.

Here's a criticism:

"Doug Henwood, in his book Wall Street, argues that the q ratio fails to accurately predict investment, as Tobin claims. "The data for Tobin and Brainard’s 1977 paper covers 1960 to 1974, a period for which q seemed to explain investment pretty well," he writes. "But as the chart [see right] shows, things started going away even before the paper was published. While q and investment seemed to move together for the first half of the chart, they part ways almost at the middle; q collapsed during the bearish stock markets of the 1970s, yet investment rose." (p. 145)"

Why did I include this? You don't need to analyze it. I don't. It's just to show that the graph and methodology Gross is using, although mapped out, is controversial, and you need to consider that when weighing his analysis.

One other reason. I'm a big fan of Willem Buiter, and this is his doctoral committee:

"Ph.D. in Economics with Distinction. Dissertation: Temporary Equilibrium and Long-Run Equilibrium. Dissertation Committee: James Tobin, Gary Smith, Katsuhito Iwai. Published by Garland Publishing, Inc., New York, 1979.
"

That's right, James Tobin. So, I put the Tobin reference in just for fun.

Okay, by this graph, stocks are undervalued. They generally are. Does that make sense. To me, not really.

"Another long-term standard of valuation comes from the good ol‘ P/E ratio, where earnings per share, or E, is compared as a function of P, or price. Chart 2, going all the way back to 1871, shows the same relatively massive undervaluation, not only in the U.S. but elsewhere. This has been a global bear market. Yet here one should be careful. The sage of rationality, Yale’s Robert Shiller, cautions us to look at earnings on an historical 10-year moving average to remove adverse or fortuitous cyclicality. When measured on this basis, P/E’s are cheap but less so, slightly below their mean average for the past century."



"Professor Shiller may be on to something, although even his 10-year approach may not be enough to adjust for our future economy and its functioning within the context of a delevering as opposed to a levering financial system. "

The economy and stocks are going down as we unwind from the build up. Ten years might not be a good guide, because, well, we don't know how long this unwinding will last.

"Recent Investment Outlooks and indeed, discussions in PIMCO’s Investment Committee and Secular Forums for the past several years have pointed to the necessity to view current changes as not only non-cyclical, but non-secular. They are, in fact, likely to be transgenerational. We will not go back to what we have known and gotten used to. It’s like comparing Newton and Einstein: both were right but their rules governed entirely different domains. "

First of all , were Newton and Einstein both right? I don't think so. However, we can use Newtonian Mechanics, suitably modeled, to solve real world problems, even today. But was he right? If equations are useful, are they automatically right? I don't find this very useful. Will we still be able to use the old models of analyzing stocks or not? What are the domains of stocks? Einstein's rules apply, only in very tiny ways, that allow Newtonian type equations to still be useful. Something like that.

"We are now morphing towards a world where the government fist is being substituted for the invisible hand, where regulation trumps Wild West capitalism, and where corporate profits are no longer a function of leverage, cheap financing and the rather mindless ability to make a deal with other people’s money. Welcome to a new universe stock market investors! In this rather “sheepish” as opposed to “brave” new world, here are some considerations that may affect Q ratios, P/E’s, and ultimately stock prices for years to come:"

This seems true. We shouldn't expect prices of stocks to look like they have in the 1990's and since. Returns will probably go down.

  • "Corporate profits have been positively affected for at least the past several decades by several trends that appear to be reversing. Leverage and gearing ratios – the ability of companies to make money by making paper – are coming down, not going up. In addition, the availability of cheap financing – absent government’s checkbook – will likely not return. Narrow yield spreads and low real corporate interest rates are gone. Last, but not least, the historical declines of corporate tax rates, shown graphically in Chart 3, will not likely continue downward in a Democratically-dominated Washington.

    I've no idea, but this seems right, or, at least, prudent.

  • "Globalization’s salutary growth rate of recent years may now be stunted. While public pronouncements from almost all major economies affirm the necessity for increased trade and policy coordination, and avoiding the destructive tendencies of one-off currency devaluations as a local remedy for global problems, investors should not bank on the free trade mentality of recent years to support historic growth rates. Already we are seeing separate ad hoc policy responses with very little cooperation. Not only does the EU’s approach differ from that of the U.S., but France is in many ways an odd man out within its own community. Asia is legitimately suspicious of any U.S. endorsed approach given the failure of America’s capitalistic model."

  • Could be.

    "Animal spirits, and with them the entrepreneurial dynamism of risk-taking has likely experienced a body blow. Not only have dancers on the financed-based dance floor been shown the exit à la Chuck Prince, but those that remain have been publicly chastened and handcuffed. Golden parachutes, options, executive compensation and bonuses themselves are now at risk. Care to climb to the throne of this new world? Well, yes, egos will always dominate, but the rules will be changed and hormone levels lowered."

    This sounds like Shiller. I'm most at home here. These kinds of dampening moods seem to change very quickly. A lot depends upon wars, etc.

    "The benevolent fist of government is imperative and inevitable, but it will come at a cost. The champion of free enterprise, Ronald Reagan, knew that growth of the private sector was in no small way dependent on deregulation and the lowering of tax rates. Now that those trends have necessarily come to an end, no rational investors should expect innovation and productivity to be unaffected. Profit and earnings per share growth will suffer."

    In the short term, yes, but we certainly did grow after WW II. That was a different world. Yes, but so is this.

    "My transgenerational stock market outlook is this: stocks are cheap when valued within the context of a financed-based economy once dominated by leverage, cheap financing, and even lower corporate tax rates. That world, however, is in our past not our future. More regulation, lower leverage, higher taxes, and a lack of entrepreneurial testosterone are what we must get used to – that and a government checkbook that allows for healing, but crowds the private sector into an awkward and less productive corner.
    "

    Let's think about that. Will young people, raised under those conditions, automatically reject them because of this crisis? Are we unwinding the whole system as well under this crisis?

    "Dow 5,000? We don’t have to go there if current domestic and global policies are focused on asset price support and eventual recapitalization of lending institutions. But 14,000 is a stretch as well. One only has to recognize that roughly 20% of bank capital is now owned by the U.S. government and that a near proportionate share of profits will flow in that direction as well. Better to own corporate bonds than corporate stocks, but that’s a story for another Investment Outlook."

    See, I'm a bond guy. Good points. He's a bit more pessimistic than me, but he's quite a bit wealthier. I'm a conservative financial person by nature. So, investing wise, to the extent that I do such a thing, this analysis didn't change anything I'll be doing in the near future.

    As to the economy and current trends, he does clearly map out some of the problems or changes ahead, generally flowing from more government involvement in the economy. But these are only trends and challenges, and I'd say that they're pretty clearly in view, for us to deal with as we will.

    Are stocks worth buying? If I could tell you I'd let you know.

    Finally, let's look at Yves points:

    "Gross does not mention that this last upturn saw an unprecedented portion of GDP growth going to corporate profits, as opposed to labor. Labor has had no bargaining power, and companies have been running as lean as possible in a nominally good economy. There will likely be some reversal of rules that worked against unions, but it is not clear whether this will help average workers much."

    I tend to believe that higher wages are good for the economy, but that's just me.

    "We noted before that in 1980, financial shares were a mere 8% of S&P 500 earnings versus over 40% at the stock market peak. The financial services industry will shrink as the economy delevers. Some of those earnings are not coming back."

    I'm actually wondering if these financial guys will end up more powerful before this whole thing unwinds.

    Wednesday, November 19, 2008

    Across The Fear

    The Fear and Aversion to Risk is staggering. From Across The Curve:

    "Anyway, the cash AAA bonds which I note above are super senior and are packaged for the bondholders’ enjoyment with 30 percent credit enhancement. They are designed to absorb enormous stress. I am not sure how much the landscape would need to mimic 1929 before these things are wounded but they are wounded, but they are designed to withstand a lot of pain.

    My belabored point is that at currents levels they are Libor + 1200 which is somewhere north of 14 percent.

    One participant citing that yield level noted that sales at these levels can only be motivated by fear and panic.

    There are some other factors involved in the panic. I mentioned the failure of the TARP to purchase assets. Anticipation of the TARP led some shorts to keep their powder dry. Those shorts are now happily establishing positions.

    Additionally, two loans which comprise a large portion of a deal in the index soured yesterday and that struck fear into the hearts of participants.

    And one participant noted the overall dismal state of the economy and noted that it was likely to lead to a glut of office space."

    And:

    "The corporate bond market had experienced a renaissance or revival of sorts over the last several weeks. The implosion in the CMBS market as well as the persistent weakness in the equity market has drained that sanguine attitude and substituted the melancholic mindset which had prevailed previously.Participants report that there is very little trading. Bid to offer spreads have widened and the little which does trade trades into the bid side."

    And:

    "By Gabrielle Coppola and Caroline Salas
    Nov. 19 (Bloomberg) — Yields on speculative-grade
    corporate bonds surpassed 20 percent for the first time in at
    least two decades as a declining economy increased the risk of
    default.
    “Prices are in a virtual freefall,” Fridson said.
    “Either the market is right and expecting a default rate
    considerably higher than it was in the Great Depression, or we
    have such profound dislocations and selling pressures going on
    that it really is creating extraordinary fundamental value.”
    “The risk premiums are just at a staggering level; the
    number is not something any of us expected to see,” he said,
    referring to the 20 percent yields. "

    And:

    "I had not watched the agency market today but it is undergoing an historic meltdown of its own. (I should sponsor a contest in which the winner supplies me with a synonym for meltdown which I am overusing. First prize is a free subscription to Acrossthecurve.com.) The 2 year benchmark widened 22 basis points today to finish at 180. Less than two weeks ago on November 7 it closed at 113. The five year benchmark sector widened 11 basis points today to finish at 155 basis points. The five year benchmark was 109 on November 7th. Ten year benchmarks are 9 basis points wider at 162 basis points. They closed at 115 on November 7,

    I use the November 7th date as that was about the low point following an episode of spread tightening following the previous widening. That date is also just prior to the announcement by Secretary Paulson that he was not unrolling the TARP and chose to spend his money by purchasing bank equities rather than illiquid and damaged assets.

    It was also just prior to the time in which the Secretary and several of his acolytes engaged in linguistic acrobatics in which they would not ever say that agencies are full faith and credit instruments. Lack of that explicit guarantee has led some large buyers to shun the sector."

    Now, from my view as a novelist and philosopher, there's something irrational at work here. The Human Agency type of explanation would recommend combating the irrational fear and aversion to risk. How to do that?

    For Corporate Bonds, I would think tax breaks down the line will help, but now? How about Agencies? Fully back them, or not? Into this mix the auto maker's bailout fits, which is why it is such a hard call in this crisis. But not to understand the effects of human agency in this crisis, is to resort to the kind of mechanistic explanation that got us into this mess in the first place, although not by itself, by any means.

    Tuesday, November 18, 2008

    "Foreign demand for any US bond with a smidgen of credit risk has disappeared."

    Brad Setser with a continuing theme, the flight from risk:

    "This is an example of what Calculated Risk calls cliff-diving. Foreign demand for any US bond with a smidgen of credit risk has disappeared. Indeed, the fall in demand for Agencies over the past three months is more severe than the fall in demand for US corporate bonds (think securitized subprime mortgages and other securitized housing and consumer debt) last August.

    Normally, this kind of fall-off in foreign demand would be associated not just with a credit crisis but also with a currency crisis. A country cannot finance a trade and current account deficit without financing, and two big sources of financing for the US deficit — foreign purchases of Agencies and US corporate bonds — has disappeared. The US, though, isn’t a normal country. The fall in demand for risky US assets was offset by a rise in demand for Treasuries and the sale of foreign assets by Americans."

    1)Trade & Current Account Deficit needs FINANCING
    2) FINANCING from Foreign Purchases of AGENCIES & US CORPORATE BONDS
    3) Without FINANCING = Credit & Currency Crisis
    4) FINANCING ( now ) from Foreign Purchases of TREASURIES & FOREIGN ASSETS

    "This data clearly shows a massive shift from Treasuries to Agencies.

    To complete the picture I added short-term t-bill purchases by private investors to the long-term purchases and short-term official purchases. Total Treasury purchases over the last 3 months totaled $214 billion. That’s huge."

    I think it's from AGENCIES to TREASURIES:

    "Combining that inflow with $92 billion in net sales of foreign assets by American investors implies that the “flight to Treasuries” and “deleveraging” combined to provide about $300 billion in net financing to the US. That, in broad terms, allowed the US to run a roughly $175-200b current account deficit and cover a huge outflow from the Agency market.

    China is particularly interesting case. SAFE clearly has added to the instability in the credit market over the past few months — and equally clearly contributed to low Treasury yields. That isn’t a criticism — it is just a statement of fact."

    Low TREASURY Yields from high demand:

    "At the end of July, China stopped buying Agencies and corporate bonds and started to pile into Treasuries. Over the last three months of data (i.e. the third quarter), the US data indicates that China has bought $81.1 billion in Treasuries ($45 billion short-term) and added $17.4 billion to its bank accounts — that is a flow of nearly $100 billion into the safest US assets China can find. Conversely, China sold $16 billion of Agencies, $1.8 billion of corporate bonds and a bit less than a billion of equity."

    See this post.

    "The September data also should put to rest all the talk about China retreating from Treasuries. The real issue is that China has retreated from the Agency market. True, September is a long time ago — but the Fed’s custodial data doesn’t suggest anything has changed since then.*

    I’ll conclude by looking at trends over a somewhat longer time horizon. Starting last August, foreign demand for most kinds of risky US assets dipped. There is a clear break in a chart showing rolling 12m purchases of corporate bonds and equities back then. More recently, Agencies got reclassified as a risk asset. There was a bit of a fall off in demand for Agencies last August — but the really big fall off has come recently.

    So the flight from risk started in August. Right now foreigners don’t seem to be interested in any kind of risky US asset.

    Instead they are buying Treasuries.

    And remember this is just a chart showing foreign purchases of long-term Treasuries. In addition to buying roughly $385 billion in long-term Treasuries, foreign investors snapped up another $240 billion (gulp) in short-term Treasuries. That works out to a net inflow in the Treasury market of over $600 billion …

    Of course, Treasuries aren’t entirely risk free. I don’t believe that there is a real risk the Treasury would default. Buying credit-default swap protection on the US is something by colleague Paul Swartz calls an end-of-the-world trade. But foreign investors holding long-term Treasuries are clearly taking a lot of currency risk — especially if they are buying in now, after the dollar has rallied …

    The US is taking a risk too. The rising stock of short-term bills held abroad does potentially leave the US more exposed to a rollover crisis."

    They're buying now when the DOLLAR IS HIGH.

    I'll say this again. I can understand the flight from risk.

    NB: This Post:

    "The plunging euro

    Why is the euro plunging against the dollar and the yen? Why are European banks coming under renewed pressure? Should the emerging financial and foreign exchange crisis of countries gravitating around the euro lead to new EU policy instruments?

    The euro is plunging against the dollar because investors, in their scramble for safety and liquidity, are flocking to US and, also to some extent, Japanese government bonds which are considered safer and more liquid than other government-backed paper available in the market – including public debt instruments issued by European governments. In other words, the constellation of separate markets for sovereign debt paper of unequal quality issued by European governments cannot compete with the US market for the huge global financial flows in search of a safe harbour."

    And this post:

    Saturday, October 25, 2008

    ``Any sense of rationality and fundamentals is thrown out the window.''

    Bloomberg on the flight to safety, with the emphasis on flight:

    "Dollar Gains Most Since 1992 on Concern Global Slump Deepening

    By Ye Xie

    Oct. 25 (Bloomberg) -- The dollar gained the most in 16 years against the currencies of six major U.S. trading partners as a global economic slowdown spurred demand for the greenback as a haven from losses in emerging markets.

    ``The foreign-exchange market is basically saying we are in a global recession and perhaps a very, very deep one,'' Richard Franulovich, a senior currency strategist at Westpac Banking Corp. in New York, said in an interview on Bloomberg Radio. ``Any sense of rationality and fundamentals is thrown out the window.''

    I'm going to start collecting quotes saying that fundamentals are being ignored, as well as quotes showing that investors consider government intervention.

    And this post
    :

    Saturday, October 25, 2008

    " Investors around the world fled stocks and rushed to the relative safety of the U.S. dollar"

    The effects of the crisis are spreading. See this post in the Washington Post:

    "Gloom about economic growth translated to low expectations for oil consumption. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries yesterday announced a cut of 1.5 million barrels a day in output -- a move that still failed to arrest the slide in crude prices. Meanwhile, copper prices fell to a three-year low.

    Investors around the world fled stocks and rushed to the relative safety of the U.S. dollar by pouring money into 30-year Treasury bonds, a refuge in times of uncertainty. That drove down the value of foreign currencies, from the ruble to the rupee and the zloty to the peso, forcing central banks to spend billions of dollars to prevent even further deterioration. The turmoil in currency markets threatened to reorder trade relations and complicate recovery efforts."

    "Assuming that firms want access to new funds, they just can’t afford to pay the surging costs (spreads)"

    Rebecca Wilder on News N Economics with an important post:

    "But today is a totally different scenario. Spreads started rising quickly in 2007 and remain at record levels in spite of the Fed's and the Treasury’s best attempt to calm credit markets. We have seen no reversion in the spreads, and the recession is just gaining ground!

    Assuming that firms want access to new funds, they just can’t afford to pay the surging costs (spreads). On November 14th, the high yield corporate spread was 1590 bps (basis points, or 15.9%) above a comparable Treasury; this is almost double the 2008 to-date average of 820 bps. Furthermore, on November 14th, the investment grade spread, 558 bps, was 82% higher than its 2008 to-date average.

    A closer look at 2008 re-iterates the surge in spreads since March 17 when the Fed facilitated the purchase of Bear Stearns. I remember talking to one of the fixed income managers after spreads started to descend through June 2008; he said that the Bear bailout would mark the turning point in credit markets. Oh how wrong we all were.

    The longer that the credit crisis persists, the longer will these spreads remain elevated at levels that are higher than what they would have been under a “normal recession”. And there lies the new-found risk to the economy: investment, for one, is going to suffer as long as the spreads remain elevated due to the credit crisis.

    Corporate spreads are off the charts, and new debt issuance is suffering greatly. With the marginal cost of issuing new debt at record levels and a full-blown recession underway, it makes sense that firms are cutting back. However, as long as the outlook on credit remains murky, these spreads have no chance of declining quickly like they did late in 2001. This brings me back to my original point: credit markets remain on red alert, which at this point, is exacerbating both the term and the depth of the recession.

    Look for a sharp decline in these spreads to signal a healthier credit system.

    Rebecca Wilder"

    Here's my comment:

    Don said...

    "Assuming that firms want access to new funds, they just can’t afford to pay the surging costs (spreads)."

    This means that they're having to paying higher interest to lenders? People buying their bonds? And this is because the risk of default is significantly higher? People are diving in safer bonds like gov. issued? Couldn't one then work on incentives to help with this? Cutting taxes on interest say? Something?

    Don the libertarian Democrat

    PS. Is there an ETF to follow these bonds I can put on my Yahoo ticker?

    Here's Rebecca's response:

    Hi Don,

    Good to hear from you!

    You said, “This means that they're having to paying higher interest to lenders? People buying their bonds? And this is because the risk of default is significantly higher? People are diving in safer bonds like gov. issued? Couldn't one then work on incentives to help with this? Cutting taxes on interest say? Something?”

    The answer is yes to all. Certainly, governments could reduce corporate taxes substantially to drive down investment costs. I bet that they will (hopefully).

    The series that I use is a corporate index of a huge pool (like 3,100 new issues) of current market spreads created by Lehman Brothers (Barclays) across investment grade and below investment grade firms. This data, unfortunately, is restricted by membership. A series that is not as “good” (meaning that it is a much smaller basket), but will give you the same story as the investment grade Lehman index, is the Moody’s seasoned Baa rate at the Fed’s website: http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/Current/

    Take that rate and subtract off a 10yr Treasury, and you have a similar measure of corporate spreads (although the Lehman series is far superior).

    Best and thanks for your comments!

    Rebecca