Showing posts with label Milhov. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Milhov. Show all posts

Monday, April 6, 2009

little doubt that euphoria in some markets at some point will lead to a disconnect between fundamental values and current prices.

TO BE NOTED: From Antonio Fatas and Ilian Mihov on the Global Economy

"Bubbles and Systemic Risk

There is a wide-spread concern that the current monetary easing plants the seeds for the next bubble and therefore for the next financial meltdown. The logic is clear – between 2001 and 2004 Greenspan lowered interest rates to clean up the dot.com bust and as a result of the low interest rates a bubble in the housing market materialized. Over the past few months, Bernanke went well beyond Greenspan’s expansionary policy by lowering rates to 0%, by starting credit “defrosting“ programs as well as by implementing the so-called “quantitative easing”. The ultimate side effect of these efforts to resuscitate the economy must be again a bubble.

Whether a bubble will develop or not in the immediate future is not entirely clear. In this entry, however, I want to use these concerns in order to put up two topics for discussion: (1) Not all bubbles are the same; (2) The big issue is systemic risk – with or without bubbles.

1. Not all bubbles are born equal. The fact that a bubble may develop does not necessarily mean that we will get to the same catastrophic dynamics as in the past two years. Suppose that a bubble develops in the market for gold and the price goes to $3000 per ounce. At some point investors may realize that demand is faltering, they will start selling their holdings of gold and the bubble will deflate. Although for some investors the collapse of this bubble will generate uncomfortable redistribution of wealth, it is not going to lead necessarily to a financial meltdown. Even the dot.com bubble did not generate the same kind of dynamics as the ones we saw after 2007. The gold bubble and the dot.com bubble are very different from the house price bubble. In my view, the key distinction is whether the bursting of the bubble generates systemic risk for the banking sector. One of the fundamental reasons for the severity of the current recession is that credit markets froze because banks had too much uncertainty about their survival probability and they stopped lending. In plain words, the collapse of the bubble had implications for the entire economic and financial system. Not all bubbles have such effects.

Inevitably, there will be more bubbles in the future. There is little doubt that euphoria in some markets at some point will lead to a disconnect between fundamental values and current prices. Whether policy makers should address a bubble and by what means depends to a large degree on the risk of having an economy-wide meltdown once the bubble starts deflating.

2. From regulation to systemic risk policy? The dynamics of the vicious circle between the contraction of the real economy and the disintegration of the financial sector is reminiscent of the dynamics that led to the severity of the Great Depression. Roosevelt arrested these dynamics by implementing four policy changes: (1) financial restructuring (after the banking holiday); (2) expansionary monetary policy (allowed by the suspension of the gold standard); (3) fiscal expansion (i.e. the New Deal; I know that it had a small contribution to the recovery, but at least fiscal policy was not in the way of other policies); (4) regulatory changes (the Glass-Steagall act, etc.). Since the start of the toxic interaction between the financial collapse and the real economy contraction after the collapse of Lehman brothers, I have argued that policy makers have to act in the same four dimensions in order to stabilize the economic activity. This is hardly an original thought, but it is useful to remember that these were also the actions of the Roosevelt government.

At an event organized by INSEAD on April 3, 2009, I made the same argument and in a panel discussion after my presentation, Sir Andrew Large – a former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England – suggested that there is a fifth item that should be added to this list: policy related to systemic risk.

So far systemic risk has been in the realm of regulation. We can think of various restrictions on lending, leverage, capital adequacy ratios, etc., which are designed to minimize the risk of a system-wide collapse. The point of Sir Andrew Large was that these are static measures, but given the sharp increase in financial innovation and the rapid changes in financial markets, shouldn’t we think of a policy body that continuously reviews and changes some of these ratios on a dynamic basis? In the way that monetary policy changes interest rates, the new policy authority will have a set of instruments to deal with developments that raise systemic risk in the economy. Naturally, this body will be in charge of addressing bubbles that have systemic implications. However, it will not be just a bubble-buster, since systemic risk can arise even in periods without bubbles.

There are certainly pros and cons in implementing such a dramatic institutional change and I am sure that I do not do justice here to the ideas of Sir Andrew Large. But I think that this is a very original idea and it deserves further consideration.


Ilian Mihov

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

In normal circumstances, this increase in the base will create too much liquidity in the system

TO BE NOTED: From Antonio Fatas and Ilian Mihov on the Global Economy
"Will there be hyperinflation in the US?:

Often in discussions of the policy actions undertaken by the Fed in response to the financial crisis a concern is raised that the massive injections of liquidity will create inflation and even hyperinflation in the near future. This concern is based on the assumption that the money created by the Fed will translate at some point into purchasing power that will put pressure on prices to go up. Indeed from September 10, 2008 to December 31, 2008 the monetary base in the US – i.e. a narrow measure of money supply controlled by the Fed – has doubled from about $840 billion to over $1.68 trillion. In normal circumstances, this increase in the base will create too much liquidity in the system, which will increase lending, spending, and inflation. In the current environment, however, this is not happening. The money created by the Fed is stored in banks’ vaults (or technically, kept as deposits in the Fed). As a result, there is almost no increase in broader measures of money.

The graph below illustrates this quite vividly: Banks are required to keep a certain amount of deposits as cash in their vaults or as deposits in the central bank. It is in their interest to keep as little cash as possible because by not lending the money they lose the opportunity to earn interest. In normal times the US banking sector keeps about $2 billion in excess reserves (the dark blue area is hard to see before September 15, 2008) – i.e. cash above and beyond of what is required by regulators. In the post-Lehman six months the excess reserves have ballooned from $2 billion to over $600! In mid-March, the commercial banking sector in the US was required by law to keep about $57 billion dollars in reserves (light blue area), but the actual reserves are $670 billion.



In fact this graph shows why liquidity creation does not create inflationary pressure, but it also shows the biggest problem in dealing with the crisis: the lack of lending. We have seen this kind of piling up of reserves in a couple of other episodes – the Great Depression and the long slowdown in Japan in the 1990s and early 2000s.

What if banks start lending? Won’t this create inflation? If the Fed realizes that the money that they have injected in the economy creates inflationary pressures (i.e. lending resumes), then they can slowly or quickly (it is their choice) mop up the excess liquidity. They can do this in several ways – by closing down some of the newly created lending facilities or by a straightforward and simple increase in interest rates (and open-market operations). Will it work? It did in Japan. The next chart shows the near-doubling of the monetary base during the quantitative easing from 2002 to 2006. As the quantitative easing came to an end because the economy started growing and lending resumed, the central bank promptly withdrew the excess money and thus avoided the rise of inflation.
Ben Bernanke has made it clear several times that the increase in liquidity is only temporary and it can be promptly reversed to avoid inflation. If economic growth resumes and banks start pushing this liquidity to consumers and firms, there is little doubt that the Fed will react promptly to reduce the risk of inflation.

Ilian Mihov