Showing posts with label Volcker. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Volcker. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Volcker who famously urged the administration, "To take time to think this through. There is a temptation to act quickly."

TO BE NOTED:

The Deal

"So whatever happened to Paul Volcker?
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volcker,paul125x100.jpgAs the details pile up about what Treasury will formally recommend on regulatory reform Wednesday, you do have to wonder what happened to Paul Volcker and his suggestion in February of a new kind of "Glass-Steagall-like" separation of financial institutions. Volcker, who heads up Obama's Economic Recovery Advisory Board, made the comments at a conference, setting off some discussion among the pundits. Then, silence. Volcker himself hasn't been seen very much -- certainly not like Treasury's Tim Geithner and the seemingly irrepressible head of the Council of Economic Advisors, Larry Summers. A piece on The Huffington Post in May did report that Volcker is talking to the economics team in Treasury and advising Obama, but his office space in the Executive Office Building is empty and the HuffPo suggested that if he has an "office," it's that of CEA member Austen Goolsbee in the White House.

What does Volcker's disappearance mean? Who can tell? The most obvious speculation is that forces within the Treasury, or the White House effectively deep-sixed anything as fundamental as separating high-risk institutions to more traditional utility banks. In fact, that may well be part and parcel of the air of compromise and expedience that hangs over the entire reform process. With a few exceptions like the disappearing Office of Thrift Supervision, most of the lineup of regulators will remain the same. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission will survive, a consumer products commission will be set up, and a council of regulators will sit over everything, like some regulatory board of directors. It's still a little unclear how much power the Federal Reserve will accumulate, though it seems probable that it will get some role as a systemic overseer.

This entire setup appears fragmented and inefficient, the worst of both worlds. It's also bound to be expensive. Why anyone thought that a council of regulators was a good idea beyond political expedience is beyond me. Nothing that's been leaked so far, however, involves any kind of fundamental alteration in the financial system itself.

A separation of financial institutions akin to Glass-Steagall had a number of complexities and difficulties, but it did try to wrestle with the management of risk question and the trade-off between safety and competitiveness. What we seem to be heading for is an intensely Balkanized regulatory apparatus attempting to supervise a financial system that has converged even more than before Bear Stearns Cos.' collapse. Even if the Fed does prove to be an effective systemic regulator -- and its record as a regulator is spotty at best -- how this council will operate in a crisis is a little scary. Half the folks on this council are currently engaged in desperate attempts to undermine each other, or are fighting over Vikram Pandit's future or on the oversight of derivatives. Some dislike each other; others simply want to establish bureaucratic dominance. All this will only get worse as Congress, with its cast of intense self-interested characters, swings into action.

Meanwhile, it would be good to hear what Volcker has to say, and to reveal what exactly happened to his interest in a return to a Glass-Steagall-like arrangement. After all, it's Volcker who famously urged the administration, "To take time to think this through. There is a temptation to act quickly." - Robert Teitelman

Robert Teitelman is the editor in chief of The Deal."

banks and nonbanks in dealing with the present crisis is that moral hazard may, I am afraid, become more deeply embedded

TO BE NOTED:

The Wall Street Journal

Moral Hazard and the Crisis

Volcker: Hedge funds don't need to be regulated like banks.


Editor's note: The following is from the keynote address by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker to a meeting of the International Institute of Finance in Beijing, June 11:

Another important common concern is the "too big to fail" syndrome -- the presumption that an institution is so large or so inter-connected with counterparties that its creditors (possibly even shareholders) must be protected. One unfortunate consequence of the massive public assistance provided both banks and nonbanks in dealing with the present crisis is that moral hazard may, I am afraid, become more deeply embedded.

We can, and we should, take steps to limit the need and possibility of official "bailouts." One approach would be to set clear policy limits to access to the "official safety net." Deposit insurance and central bank liquidity facilities are properly confined to deposit-taking institutions. It is, after all, those institutions that remain the backbone of the financial system. They provide basic essential services, meeting the needs of households, businesses and other institutions for credit, for a safe and liquid repository for their funds, and for both everyday and complex payment services.

Historically, the need for continuity in those functions has provided the rationale for close government supervision and protection. In my view, it is unwarranted that those same institutions, funded in substantial part by taxpayer-protected deposits, be engaged in substantial risk-prone proprietary trading and speculative activities that may also raise questions of virtually unmanageable conflicts of interest.

Hedge funds and private-equity funds have an entirely legitimate role to play in providing liquidity and innovation in our capital markets. I do not believe they need to be so closely supervised and regulated as depository institutions. A presumption of government protection and support for financial institutions outside the "safety net" should be avoided. Nor by the same token should hedge funds or private-equity funds indirectly benefit from official support by sponsorship or ownership by a banking institution. ( NB DON )

The possibility that failure of a large hedge fund or trading organization might present a systemic risk can be reduced by way of speeding timely resolution of troubled nonbanking institutions. Such authority already exists in the United States for insured banking institutions by means of appointing a "conservator" or "receiver" empowered to maintain continuity of services pending a more lasting resolution of a failing institution.

There is a growing international consensus that hedge funds and equity funds beyond some de minimus size should at least be required to register, with the implication of limited reporting requirements. There may be a few instances in which such funds become so large as to suggest official capital and leverage requirements would be appropriate. Hedge and private-equity funds are necessarily dependent on banks for credit and operational needs. Encouraged by supervisory and risk-management processes, such funds could be appropriately monitored and controlled through those banking relationships.

One other hotly contested matter deserves mention. There isn't much doubt that attempts to enforce strict application of mark-to-market accounting procedures has contributed to confusion, uncertainty and inconsistencies among financial institutions. There is a strong case for reviewing the application of so-called fair value standards to commercial banks, insurance companies and perhaps certain other regulated financial institutions.

The problem is not only the difficulty of measuring value in highly disturbed market conditions. More broadly, strict mark-to-market accounting -- entirely appropriate for trading operations and investment banks -- may introduce a degree of volatility in reporting incompatible with the basic and essential business model of banks, which inherently intermediate maturity and credit risks.

At the same time, we should demand international consistency and professional judgment in setting accounting standards. Both are today jeopardized. Political bodies in Europe or the United States or any other country are simply not the appropriate venue for reaching well-considered judgments that can be enforced internationally. Instead, we need a bit of patience as the International Accounting Standards Board carefully reviews the application of "fair value" to banks and those other institutions subject to close official scrutiny in reporting.

This has been a heavy talk after a splendid dinner in this Great Hall. My excuse is simple, you have a very long, very technical agenda, and I am delighted to be able to get a few words in first.

I appreciate your attention."

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

“We’re in a government-dependent financial system; I never thought I would live to see the day… We’ve got to fight to get away from that.”

TO BE NOTED: From Real Time Economics:

"
By Phil Izzo

When talk at the Journal’s Future of Finance Initiative turned to inflation, participants turned the resident expert: Paul Volcker. He had a lot to say.

The former Federal Reserve chairman touched on a number of subjects ranging from the Fed’s communication strategy to China’s concerns about the U.S. debt load. The latter sparked questions over whether the U.S. could default on its debt — it effectively had done that at least once, Yale professor Robert Shiller noted. When President Roosevelt took the U.S. off the gold standard and unilaterally devalued the dollar, the move wiped out some 75% of dollar-denominated debt. “Maybe I shouldn’t even mention this,” Shiller joked.

Volcker, who as head of the White House’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board is a key adviser to President Obama, expressed concerns about inflation as a way of dealing with mounting debt. “One historic way of getting yourself out of this situation — or trying to — is to inflate. Either you do it deliberately or you allow it to happen,” he said. “And if we permit that to happen then I think all these dollars will come tumbling down on us.” He said the U.S.’s greatest strength is its history and reputation, and suggested that shouldn’t be put at risk.

He also critiqued the Fed. “I get a little nervous when I see the Federal Reserve announcements that they want have the amount of inflation that’s conducive to recovery,” Volcker said. “I don’t know what ‘the amount of inflation that’s conducive to recovery’ would be appropriate. I’d much rather they say that they want to maintain stability in the currency, which is conducive to confidence and recovery.”

As for China’s criticism of the U.S., Volcker was unsympathetic. “I think the Chinese are a little disingenuous to say, ‘Now isn’t it so bad that we hold all these dollars.’ They hold all these dollars because they chose to buy the dollars, and they didn’t want to sell the dollars because they didn’t want to depreciate their currency. It was a very simple calculation on their part, so they shouldn’t come around blaming it all on us.”

The 81-year-old elder statesman commented on the current state of the U.S. economy: “We’re in a government-dependent financial system; I never thought I would live to see the day… We’ve got to fight to get away from that.”

Saturday, February 28, 2009

All of these officials have to survive a Senate confirmation hearing in a brutal political environment

From the Economics Of Contempt:

"Understaffing at Treasury

Paul Volcker is obviously right that it's shameful that the Treasury Department is so badly understaffed right now (the "Treasury Officials" page is hilarious):
"There is an area that I think is, I don't know, shameful is the word," Paul Volcker said this morning at a Joint Economic Committee hearing. "The Secretary of the Treasury is sitting there without a deputy, without any undersecretaries, without any, as far as I know, assistant secretaries responsible in substantive areas at a time of very severe crisis. He shouldn't be sitting there alone."
Felix Salmon agrees (the same Salmon who called the lack of detail in Geithner's banking rescue "inexplicable" a couple weeks ago). Salmon considers this a huge blunder by the Obama administration, as well as an indication that the Obama administration is being managed inefficiently.

This isn't the Obama administration's fault. The reason Geithner is sitting there alone is that the top 33 positions in the Treasury Department are Senate-confirmable, and not only does that slow down the hiring process by introducing political factors into the search, but the Senate confirmation process also takes a long time. The following Treasury positions are Senate-confirmable:

Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Undersecretary for Domestic Finance
Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions
Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets
Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy
Undersecretary for International Affairs
Assistant Secretary for International Financial Markets and Investment Policy
Assistant Secretary for International Economics and Development
General Counsel
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs

All of these officials have to survive a Senate confirmation hearing in a brutal political environment, especially for anyone who has ever worked on Wall Street (at any point during his/her life). Even if the Obama administration announced nominees for all of these positions tomorrow, it would still take weeks to get them all confirmed—and that's assuming they all do get confirmed, which isn't a foregone conclusion in the current environment.

People seem to be surprised that the Treasury is understaffed. Do people think entire federal executive departments are magically staffed in the first week or something? The Treasury won't be fully staffed until June at the earliest, and it's one of the smallest executive departments. Washington is slow. Always has been, always will be. "

Me:

Blogger Don said...

Can't people be hired to do work before they are confirmed? Departments often go out and hire independent contractors. Or is that they can't leave their current positions until they are confirmed? It does seem possible for Geithner to have been able to hire help, although he would not have a full staff.

Don the libertarian Democrat

February 28, 2009 4:58 PM

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

We should use that opportunity to make sure they stay as parts, and don't re-assemble into Citi-sized godzillas again.

From Yves Smith:

"Guest Post: "Dear Mr. Volcker: It's the Banks, Stupid"

Listen to this article. Powered by Odiogo.com
Guest blogger and former Congressional staffer Lune was kind enough to provide this post on Volcker's testimony before the Senate Banking Committee today. Enjoy!

From Lune:


Paul Volcker, former Fed chief and currently the head of President Obama's Economic Recovery Advisory Board, and the chairman of the Group of Thirty, testified to the Senate Banking Committee in today's hearing on the U.S. financial regulatory system. As summarized by the NY Times, Volcker made the following recommendations:
Mr. Volcker called for the end of the mortgage lending giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as hybrid public-private enterprises, saying instead that Washington should assist borrowers through "clearly designated government agencies."

He also called for the registration of hedge and equity funds of any substantial size, as well as periodic reporting and disclosure from such firms.

For banks and other firms that are large enough to shake the entire financial system if they fail, he called for "particularly close regulation and supervision, meeting high and common international standards."

There were other ideas discussed as well:

Among the ideas considered Wednesday was the creation of a super regulatory agency, perhaps within the Federal Reserve, which would be charged with coordinating responses among the diverse alphabet-soup of agencies overseeing financial companies....

House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank has said the first priority in overhauling financial regulation is to set up an entity to oversee systemic risks of the kind that wreaked havoc on Wall Street last year.

Mr. Volcker's recommendations are largely drawn from the Group of 30's report which lists the following core recommendations:
1. Gaps and weaknesses in the coverage of prudential regulation and supervision must be eliminated. All systemically significant financial institutions, regardless of type, must be subject to an appropriate degree of prudential oversight. (Recommendations 1 through 5.)

2. The quality and effectiveness of prudential regulation and supervision must be improved. This will require better-resourced prudential regulators and central banks operating within structures that afford much higher levels of national and international policy coordination. (Recommendations 6 through 8.)

3. Institutional policies and standards must be strengthened, with particular emphasis on standards for governance, risk management, capital, and liquidity. Regulatory policies and accounting standards must also guard against procyclical effects and be

4. consistent with maintaining prudent business practices (Recommendations 9 through 12.)

5. Financial markets and products must be made more transparent, with better-aligned risk and prudential incentives. The infrastructure supporting such markets must be made much more robust and resistant to potential failures of even large financial institutions. (Recommendations 13 through 18.)

While Volcker's proposals are reasonable, they fail to deal substantively with one of the primary reasons for the regulatory failures we have seen so far. Those failures have not been from the lack of statutory authority invested in such agencies as the Fed and the SEC, but rather the lack of will to exercise that authority.

The Fed already has broad authority to investigate banks and supervise lending standards. And the SEC has ample jurisdiction to investigate such scandals as the ongoing Madoff affair.

Yet both have been asleep at the switch. As a previous article in this blog noted, Greenspan blocked proposals from his own Fed Governors to investigate predatory lending well before the current crisis (quoting from the WSJ):
Edward Gramlich, who was Fed governor from 1997 to 2005, said he proposed to Mr. Greenspan in or around 2000, when predatory lending was a growing concern, that the Fed use its discretionary authority to send examiners into the offices of consumer-finance lenders that were units of Fed-regulated bank holding companies.

"I would have liked the Fed to be a leader" in cracking down on predatory lending, Mr. Gramlich, now a scholar at the Urban Institute, said in an interview this past week. Knowing it would be controversial with Mr. Greenspan, whose deregulatory philosophy is well known, Mr. Gramlich broached it to him personally rather than take it to the full board.

"He was opposed to it, so I didn't really pursue it," says Mr. Gramlich, a Democrat who was one of seven Fed governors.

Similarly, the Madoff affair, including today's testimony of SEC officials before Congress, shows the extent to which the SEC outright ignored whistleblowers' information and attempts to get the agency to investigate gross abuses.

In today's crisis mode, there is virtually no limit on the government's ability to intervene in the financial industry. Yet we're still getting bad proposals such as the TARP and the bad-bank models which commit trillions of public funds to Wall St. with no significant reform of the practices that got us in our current mess. This is not due to a lack of authority to create a better response.

Mr. Volcker and the Group of 30 are correct that we need to reform the regulatory structure. But the problem today isn't so much with the structure itself as the fact that that structure is so thoroughly captured by the industry it's supposed to regulate, that any authority vested in it becomes toothless.

In particular, the creation of a "systemic risk" regulator smacks of trying to isolate all the bad-cop duties of the regulators into one underfunded, powerless authority so that the rest of the agencies don't have to do the unpleasant task of standing up to the banks when they get too big. That way, they can focus instead on serving as boosters for the industry that they will lucratively enter once their terms in government are over.

Who will stand up for the systemic risk regulator, and give it real power and influence? No one in Congress will ever get campaign contributions serving as the protector and benefactor of a regulatory agency whose sole purpose is to say "No". Especially when by definition, the systemic-risk regulator will have to say "No" to enormous financial players with lots of money available to spend on extensive lobbying.

It is telling that in the case of financial firms that are so large and entrenched that they become Too Big To Fail, Volcker can only suggest "particularly close regulation and supervision, meeting high and common international standards." Pardon me, but I thought that was what they were supposed to be subjected to right now. Why haven't they been, and what in Volcker's recommendations will actually succeed in doing it in the future?

While structural reforms are necessary, I assert the real answer to preventing the next crisis is to prevent any one firm from becoming Too Big To Fail in the first place. The advantages to the financial system of creating giant banks, aside from the stratospheric executive compensation that follows, appear to be nil. Indeed, most of the Too Big To Fail banks in this world are insolvent, and rapidly taking the world's economy and governments with them. Eventually, most of them will be brought under (de facto if not necessarily de jure) public receivorship, broken up, and sold as parts.

We should use that opportunity to make sure they stay as parts, and don't re-assemble into Citi-sized godzillas again.

Volcker took a courageous stand as Fed chief when he raised interest rates to stamp out inflation, even at the cost of real economic pain. And similarly, he has been one of the few inside-the-beltway economists who quickly realized the magnitude and dimensions of the current economic crisis. He should call up that courage once again and use his considerable reputation and influence to force the current goliaths to disassemble from their current Too Big To Fail sizes. Otherwise, all his reasonable recommendations on regulatory reform will be quickly made toothless by the financial industry and the government officials who serve it."

Me:

Don said...

"We should use that opportunity to make sure they stay as parts, and don't re-assemble into Citi-sized godzillas again."

When Wachovia got in trouble, the FDIC called in Citi. When TARP was passed, Wells-Fargo used the TARP tax provisions to enter the bidding process and won.The tax provisions were to encourage private takeovers. When Lehman was failing, I believe the B of A and Barclays were called in. In other words, the process is to sell failing banks or investment firms to larger ones, presumably because they have the resources to buy them or take them over. What would happen in the future?

I'm no expert, but this is the only solution that seems to avert a reversion to the above scenario:

http://blogs.ft.com/wolfforum/2009/01/putting-an-end-to-financial-crises/#more-315

"With the government ready to absorb losses, banks are talking outrageous risks knowing that Uncle Sam will cover them if things go south. Raising the trivially low capital requirements of banks, as Paul Volker’s Group of Thirty Commission just proposed, won’t change this behaviour.

What will change this behaviour is to not let it happen. Banks should be allowed to initiate only conforming, i.e., government-approved, AAA-rated mortgages and business loans. These would be long-term, fixed-rate loans with 20 per cent-down and payments below 25 per cent of income.

The government, via the Federal Financial Authority, would use tax records to verify loan payment-to-income ratios. It would also spot check collateral. Once approved, the banks would bundle and sell “their” loans within mutual funds.

Again, traditional bank runs wouldn’t arise. And today’s bank runs, which entail lenders and equity investors avoiding risky banks, wouldn’t either. Why? Because banks would bear zero risk. Mutual fund owners would bear risk, but not the banks. And these lenders would know they were buying government-approved AAA-rated loans, not Bear Stearns‘ CDOs.

This limited purpose banking is a modern version of narrow banking proposed by Frank Knight, Henry Simons, and Irving Fisher. Banks would hold deposits, cash checks, wire money, originate loans, and market mutual funds, including money market funds with no guarantee of par value redemption.

With limited purpose banking, financial crises would largely disappear. Banks would never fail, never stop originating loans, never expose the public to massive liabilities, and never see their stock values evaporate. Banks would be stable, boring economic cogs - like gas stations.

The Fed would also gain full control of the money supply. To expand the money supply, the Fed would continue buying treasuries from the public and supplying cash. But banks wouldn’t be multiplying and contracting M1 (cash plus demand deposits) based on their ever changing decisions about lending deposited funds.

Milton Friedman, who also advocated narrow banking, blamed the Depression on the Fed’s failure to offset the M1 money multiplier’s collapse. In the past year the M1 multiplier has contracted by over 40 per cent, forcing the Fed to double base money. If the multiplier shoots back up, we could see the money supply and prices explode.

What about investment banks, brokerage firms, hedge funds, and insurance companies? What’s their right financial order?

Again, regulate to purpose. Investment banks take companies public and assist in mergers and acquisitions. They shouldn’t be permitted to invest in their clients’ companies. Brokerage firms are here to help us buy and sell assets, not to gamble on spreads. Hedge funds are here to help limit risk exposure. They aren’t here to insure these risks themselves. Finally, insurance companies are here to diversify risk, not write insurance against aggregate shocks.

The FFA and “less is more” limited purpose banking won’t prevent asset markets from occasionally going nuts. But the functioning of financial markets will no longer be in question. Nor will con artists, parading as “financial engineers,” ever again be free to wreak havoc on the nation’s finances and its citizenry.

Christophe Chamley is a member of Boston University and the Paris School of Economics. Laurence J. Kotlikoff is professor of economics at Boston University"

Unfortunately, no FT experts ( I've sent in a few comments by mistake, and now just for the pleasure of having someone guffaw at my venturing an expert comment )responded to this idea on Economists Forum, so I didn't get any sense of how possible this would be.

This only deals with the banks, and bubbles and market distortions could still occur, but it seems that we have to be talking about this kind of change going forward. Given how well the banks have lobbied so far, I don't see tinkering as anything more than a bump in the road for big banks.

Don the libertarian Democrat


Thursday, January 15, 2009

"a host of measures that would dramatically expand government control over banking and investment in the United States."

From the Washington Post:

"Obama Adviser Presents Plan to Alter Global Financial System

By Anthony Faiola
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, January 15, 2009; 12:27 PM

NEW YORK -- A top economic adviser to the incoming Obama administration unveiled a plan today to radically rethink the global financial system, including a host of measures that would dramatically expand government control over banking and investment in the United States.( HERE WE GO )

The plan -- which recommends limiting the size of banks( IF THEY ARE GUARANTEED, I AGREE ), setting guidelines for executive pay( SHOULD BE DONE BY SHAREHOLDERS. BUT I'M OK WITH IT IF THE BANK IS GUARANTEED ) and regulating hedge funds( SUPERVISING I APPROVE OF ) -- offers the first hint of the kind of changes to the financial system President-elect Barack Obama might push for in the coming weeks and months. Obama has pledged to present a comprehensive series of changes to prevent a repeat of the current financial crisis before world leaders gather in London for a major economic summit in April.

The report today was issued by the Group of 30, an organization of international economists and policy makers. But the recommendations were immediately seen by observers as a building block to an Obama plan because the lead author is Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve during the Carter and Reagan administrations who will serve as a special Obama White House adviser. Part of Volcker's role is to help mastermind what could ultimately be the biggest overhaul of the U.S. financial system in decades.

Volcker said he would press the new administration to consider the measures, "but it's up to the administration to decide what they want to do."

The proposal offers 18 major recommendations that would insert government regulators into the board rooms of financial institutions as never before. The plan recommends vastly increased oversight of major banks, going as far as to recommend the end of an era of mega banks whose size makes their failure potentially catastrophic to the global financial system. To limit their size and scope, banks, the document states, should be prohibited from managing hedge funds or private equity funds.( AGAIN, IF GUARANTEED, FINE )

In addition, major mutual funds should be required to operate as commercial banks, subjecting them to stricter government oversight. Those that choose not to comply should be forced to sell only relatively safe financial instruments offering investors low risk, and, most probably, limited room for outsized profits.( IF GUARANTEED, YES )

The document suggests that venture capital groups and rating agencies should also face a battery of government regulators.( WON'T WORK. SUPERVISION MIGHT. )

"The issue posed by the present crisis is crystal clear: How can we restore strong, competitive, innovative financial markets to support global economic growth without once again risking a breakdown in market functioning so severe as to put the world economies at risk?" Volcker said in a statement. "We hope that our proposals, which explicitly relate to the weaknesses that have become evident in the financial system over the last year, will be a useful contribution to the debate about needed reforms both by private financial institutions and by public authorities."

The proposal suggests that the U.S. government should clarify the status of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, either making them into government agencies or regulating them as independent mortgage brokers.( I AGREE COMPLETELY )

The plan's recommendations for greater international cooperation on regulation and the creation of new laws to oversee( SUPERVISION IS FINE ) exotic financial derivatives echo similar calls from major world leaders made during an emergency economic summit in Washington on Nov. 15. With cautious support by President Bush, plans are moving forward, for instance, to enhance international cooperation in overseeing major banks( A GOOD IDEA ). But European leaders have eagerly awaited a signal from Obama about what his plan for creating a new set of rules for the global financial system might look like.

It remains unclear how many of the recommendations will ultimately make their way into Obama's final plan, but the proposal released today could lift the spirits of Europeans who have called for stricter government oversight on executives' pay and risk management in financial institutions -- an area where the Bush administration has offered only tepid support. The report today calls for government to enforce systematic board-level reviews for executive pay and the creation of new parameters for a firm's risk tolerance."

As I've said, I differentiate between Guaranteed Financial Concerns and Non-Guaranteed Financial Concerns. The guaranteed businesses should have stricter rules and supervision in order to protect the taxpayer. I would prefer that we have a separate category for non-guaranteed concerns that will allow more leeway and innovation. In order to have such a category at all, I would be willing to accept size and asset limitations.

Sunday, December 21, 2008

""I don't know anybody involved who thought he could predict these turning points."

Via Marginal Revolution, Drake Bennett on the Boston Globe discusses the current state of Economics:

"THE DEEPENING ECONOMIC downturn has been hard on a lot of people, but it has been hard in a particular way for economists. For most of us, pain and apprehension have been mixed with a sense of grim amazement at the complexity( CONNECTEDNESS ) of what has unfolded: the dense, invisible lattice connecting house prices ( A BUBBLE ) to insurance companies( POOR DECISIONS ) to job losses( MANY PREEMPTIVE ) to car sales( LIKE HOUSES, FINANCED THROUGH CREDIT WHICH IS NOW HARD TO GET ), the inscrutability of the financial instruments( VASTLY OVERSTATES THE COMPLEXITY ) that helped to spread( HIDE ) the poison, the sense that the ratings agencies and regulatory bodies were overmatched( TRY CONFLICT OF INTEREST ) by events, the wild gyrations( AMIDST THE WILD GYRATION'S OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES ) of the stock market in the past few months( NO MENTION OF FRAUD AND GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES ). It's hard enough to understand what's happening, and it seems absurd to think we could have seen it( WE MIGHT HAVE TRIED PREPARING FOR IT ) coming beforehand. The vast majority of us, after all, are not experts ( THANK GOD ).
(Getty Images, Globe Staff photo illustration)

But academic economists are. And with very few exceptions, they did not predict the crisis, either( WERE THEY SUPPOSED TO? ). Some warned of a housing bubble, but almost none foresaw the resulting cataclysm. An entire field of experts dedicated to studying the behavior of markets failed to anticipate what may prove to be the biggest economic collapse of our lifetime. And, now that we're in the middle of it, many frankly admit that they're not sure how to prevent things from getting worse( THAT'S SIMPLY THE TRUTH ).

As a result, there's a sense among some economists that, as they try to figure out how to fix the economy, they are also trying to fix their own profession. The discussion has played out in blog posts and opinion pieces, in congressional testimony and at conferences and in working papers. A field that has increasingly been defined, at least in the public eye, by quirky studies explaining the economics of our everyday lives - most famously in the best-selling book "Freakonomics" - has turned decisively, in the last couple months, to more traditional economic turf. And at economics powerhouses like Harvard, MIT, and the University of Chicago, faculty lunch discussions that once might have centered on theoretical questions and the finer points of Bayesian analysis are now given over to dissecting bailout plans. Long-held ideas - about the stability of the business cycle, the resilience of markets, and the power of monetary policy - are being challenged ( GOOD ).

"Everyone that I know in economics, and particularly in the worlds of academic finance and academic macroeconomics, is going back to the drawing board( AGAIN, TRY A NOTEBOOK )," says David Laibson, a Harvard economist. "There are very, very, very few economists who can be proud( THAT'S SILLY )."

A few are suggesting, as well, that there are deeper problems in the discipline. Economists are asking aloud whether the field has grown too specialized, too abstract - and too divorced, in some sense, from the way real-world economies actually function( TRUE, BUT THAT HAS MORE TO DO WITH NOT RECOGNIZING OR CARING ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY ). They argue that many of the models used to explain and predict the dynamics of financial markets or national economies have been scrubbed clean, in the interest of theoretical elegance( THERE'S A POINT TO THIS AT THE KANTIAN LEVEL OF EXPLANATION ), of the inevitable erraticism of human behavior( THAT'S WHY WE NEED HUMAN AGENCY EXPLANATIONS, WHICH ARE EXISTENTIAL ). As a result, the analytical tools of the trade offer little help in a crisis, and have little to say about the sort of collapses that led to this one( IF THEY TURNED TO POLITICAL ECONOMY, THEIR HELP WOULD BE QUITE USEFUL ).

"You can't just say, 'I have a model for tremors that works great, I just can't explain earthquakes,'( YOU JUST DID ) " says Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard economist who has studied financial crises.

Historically, periods of severe economic distress have shaken up economics, and helped drive its evolution. And in the midst of the current crash, there is an urgent search for approaches and models that might better illuminate how to speed the recovery and forecast future meltdowns, and that might help us better understand the unruly flow of money.( UNRULY, ERRATICISM, GYRATIONS,INSCRUTABIlITY,DENSE,LATTICED,TREMORS, SCRUBBED CLEAN, DISSECTING, CATACLYSM, DEEPER PROBLEMS,BUBBLE, COLLAPSE, PREVENT, EARTHQUAKES, ETC. AND THAT'S JUST SO FAR )

The question of how well economists can model crises takes on an even greater importance because of the central role economic experts will play in Barack Obama's administration - not only at the Federal Reserve, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Treasury, but in the Economic Recovery Advisory Board, a newly formed body created by the president-elect and headed by former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker. Obama has a reputation as someone who places a great deal of stock in expertise and the power of data ( THAT'S GOOD. JUST MAKE SURE TO DIVERSIFY YOUR PORTFOLIO. SAY, BY ADDING THIS BLOGGER AS COURT JESTER FOR FINANCES ). For better or worse, the evolving understanding of economic breakdowns will have ample opportunity to test itself against the real thing( ISN'T THAT WHAT IT'S SUPPOSED TO DO? EVEN WITH MATH YOU SHOULD TRY ).

Along with everything else they have done, the financial meltdown and attendant economic slump have spurred unprecedented political attention and participation on the part of economists ( THEY'RE BETTER THAN MANY OTHERS ).

"In my lifetime as an economist I've never seen economists so engaged by what's going on," says Richard Thaler of the University of Chicago. "At the University of Chicago people always talk economics at lunch, but for the last three months they've all been talking about the crisis and the bailout, and writing op-eds( HAVE YOU TRIED STUDYING AT ALL? )."

This is something of a change. The topics economists study often have little to do with the average person's economic life - as in most any academic field, practical relevance can have little to do with what questions are deemed most interesting and rewarding. This divergence was exacerbated, many economists say, during the span of almost uninterrupted economic growth that began in the late 1980s, a period when many of the more practical questions in economic policy-making came to be seen as having been settled( NOTHING IS WRITTEN ). For years, leading economic figures like Larry Summers and Alan Greenspan argued that the United States had more or less( THE QUALIFYING SOUNDS A NOTE OF SKEPTICISM FOR ALL WHO CARE TO HEAR. I'M RATHER LIKE ODYSSEUS IN THAT REGARD, AND ONLY THAT ) brought the business cycle to heel ( THEY'RE LIKE TRAINERS IN THIS MODEL ).

Partly as a result, many bright young economists turned to questions that were quirkier, or more purely mathematical. To the wider public, the most visible ramification of this was the boom in papers and books about the economics of everyday life - the best-known practitioner was Steven Levitt of the University of Chicago, but economists like Ray Fisman of Columbia, Edward Miguel of UC Berkeley, and Justin Wolfers of the University of Pennsylvania also worked at least partly in this vein. In often ingenious studies, they used economics as a forensic tool to examine family dynamics, speed-dating, parking scofflaws, basketball games, or the life choices of street criminals.

For those who stayed on more traditional economic turf, however, the trend was toward narrower questions, and more abstract ones. Financial economists set out to figure out why it is that stocks earn more than bonds, or to devise better ways of calculating "beta," the correlation between the price of a single asset and the price of the market it was part of. Others took on the surprisingly difficult question of defining what, exactly, money is.

Wolfers, being an economist, describes these intellectually challenging but less policy-relevant questions as a sort of scholarly "luxury good." "During good times we all consume more luxuries," he says, "but during a bad economy, it feels to macroeconomists that what we should be doing is stuff to help today."

Some economists have suggested that this focus may account for why so many failed to see the warning signs of the financial crisis, and to predict the size and scope of its fallout.

Others see a broader problem in that the sort of behavior we've seen in everyone from home buyers to investment bankers in recent months is hard to fit into economists' analytical tools. The models that macroeconomists - those who study national and regional economies in their entirety - rely on do a poor job of describing the messiness of an actual market in flux( THAT'S WHY WE NEED A HUMAN AGENCY EXPLANATION ). Many, for example, only have one variable for an interest rate, even though in times of economic turmoil the gap between various rates often widens so far that it's difficult to say what "the" interest rate actually is. As a result, economists end up oversimplifying such situations when they model them - or simply avoid studying them at all.( THAT'S POLITICAL ECONOMY )

"We have a very restrictive set of language and tools, and we tend to work on the problems that are easily addressed with those tools ( THIS IS TRUE OF ALL HUMAN ENDEAVOR )," says Jeremy Stein, a financial economist at Harvard. "Sometimes that means we focus on silly questions and ignore greater ones( SO DOES MODERN PHILOSOPHY )."

Today there is a move to hone and rethink the models that describe the huge interlocking wheels of the economy, and to find a way to include the human tendencies that can bring them grinding to a halt. Some economists are looking to the methods and findings of psychology, others are applying themselves to the tricky task of modeling bubbles, a relatively neglected topic. Whatever the approach, the study of financial crises is likely to be a predominant question for the newest generation of economists. ( POLITICAL ECONOMY AND HUMAN AGENCY EXPLANATIONS ARE ALL THAT IS NEEDED,AND ALL THAT WE CAN EXPECT )

"I guarantee that over the next couple of years you are going to see lots of papers on banking crises and financial blowups," says Andrew Lo, a financial economist at MIT's Sloan School of Management.

In addition, others predict, there's likely to be a sharp migration among young economists into these fields. "Banking has been an incredibly important field that has not been hot for some time," says Edward Glaeser, a Harvard University economist. "What's happened is that banking is sexy again ( BECAUSE OF A CRISIS. NOW THAT'S PARADOXICAL )."

Already, the crisis is reshaping long-running debates. It has chastened believers in the self-correcting abilities of the free market - Alan Greenspan said as much before Congress in October - and emboldened those who see the need for more active government intervention( TRUE ).

In a sense, it's a debate that has been seesawing back and forth from crisis to crisis over the past century. Classical economics was devastated by the Great Depression, and in the years afterward gave way to the ideas of the British economist John Maynard Keynes: that individually rational economic decisions could add up to collectively disastrous consequences, that the "stickiness" of prices and wages could lead to long-term unemployment and stagnation, and that the government, as a result, has to step in to kick-start the economy.

The stagflation of the 1970s, while mild compared with the Depression, swung the pendulum back. It was Milton Friedman, a sharp critic of Keynesianism and a fervent advocate of unfettered free markets, who solved the seeming paradox of simultaneous inflation and high unemployment by realizing the deadening power of people's expectation of future inflation, and it was Friedman's proposed solution - sharply restricting the money supply - that eventually, albeit painfully, solved the problem.

Today's crisis has brought Keynes back to the center of the discussion, but some economists also see it driving the field into new territory. Up until very recently, the study of market bubbles was marginalized - there was no widely accepted definition of what a bubble was, and some economists, believers in the complete rationality of markets, argued that bubbles didn't even exist( BRILLIANT ). Today, however, there is a growing sense that understanding bubbles is vital to understanding markets - among those making the case is Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, who, as head of the Princeton economics department, made a point of hiring young economists interested in the topic( GOOD FOR HIM ).

Over the same time period, the field of so-called behavioral economics has risen to prominence, led by, among others, Thaler, Laibson, and Robert Shiller, a Yale economist who warned of both the housing bubble and, in 2000, the dot-com bubble. By borrowing the insights and methods of psychology, behavioral economics focuses on all the ways in which humans fail to act as the rational, self-interested beings that economic models call for - we aren't good at thinking about the future, we're susceptible to peer pressure, we overestimate our abilities and underrate the odds of bad things happening. It's a set of traits that describes perfectly the behavior of many of the people who, in a cascade of self-defeating decisions, helped create the subprime crisis. ( A GOOD APPROACH )

"People used to think that these behavioral effects were small anomalies that turned up in experiments but washed out in the real world," says Tyler Cowen, an economist at George Mason University not himself affiliated with behavioral economics. "But there's a sense( TRYING LOOKING AND IT WILL BE MORE THAN THAT ) in which they get multiplied in the real world."

For now, behavioral economics remains a critique without a real alternative. That may be starting to change: Lo has developed what he calls the "adaptive markets hypothesis," a model that he argues reflects both the rationality of the investor in good times and the blind panic of the bad( MIGHT HELP ).

Nonetheless, for some economists, the lessons of the crisis are likely to be smaller, though no less humbling. These scholars argue that they're facing not a new challenge but a familiar nemesis.

"What we're experiencing now is a good old-fashioned financial panic," says Jeffrey Kling, an economist at the Brookings Institution. "This is perhaps the biggest scale, but on some level it's not that different( A SLIGHT SIMILARITY )."

Robert Lucas, an economist and Nobel laureate at the University of Chicago and a champion of the rationality of markets, doesn't see much fundamental change coming out of the crisis, either. What it has reminded us of, he argues, is simply the impossibility of seeing these events in advance ( TRUE ).

"I don't know anybody involved who thought he could predict these turning points. Do macroeconomists know as much as we thought we did?" he asks. "Of course not( NO ONE DOES )."

By this logic, the problem isn't how economists see the world so much as it is what we expect of economics ( NOT MUCH ).

Laurence Ball, an economist at Johns Hopkins, makes a similar point. "Nobody ever sees anything coming," he says. "Nobody saw stagflation coming, nobody saw the Great Depression coming, nobody saw Pearl Harbor or 9/11 coming. Really big, bad things tend to be surprises( OTHERWISE THEY WOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED )."

A little chastening isn't bad, but, please, no hand wringing.

Friday, November 14, 2008

"to underestimate the amount of risk they faced and overestimate the amount of leverage they could handle"

Thomas F. Cooley gives the general consensus view of risk in Forbes:

"There is another, deeper possible link between the Great Moderation and the financial crisis that is worth thinking about, because it may help to inform the financial regulation of the future. The idea is simply that the decline in volatility led financial institutions to underestimate the amount of risk they faced and overestimate the amount of leverage they could handle, thus essentially (though unintentionally) reintroducing a large measure of volatility into the market.

Financial institutions typically manage their risk using what they call value at risk or VaR. Without getting into the technicalities of VaR (and there is a very long story to be told about the misuse of these methods), it is highly likely that the Great Moderation led many risk managers to drastically underestimate the aggregate risk in the economy. A 50% decline in aggregate risk is huge, and after 20 years, people come to count on things being the same.

Risk managers are supposed to address these problems with stress testing--computing their value at risk assuming extreme events--but they often don't. The result was that firms vastly overestimated the amount of leverage they could assume, and put themselves at great risk. Of course, the desperate search for yield had something to do with it as well, but I have a hard time believing that the managers of Lehman, Bear Stearns and others knowingly bet the firm on a systematic basis. They thought the world was less risky than it is. And so, the Great Moderation became fuel for the fire.

If there is a moral to this story it is probably to do with the filters we put on historical events. Succession and causality are often confused. As are the limits on our ability to think historically. What we see right now is only the great conflagration that consumes us, leaving us little appetite, and even less oxygen, to moderate our responses and hold onto a broad historical outlook."

I don't credit this, and now I think that I can explain why.

Many years ago, I read an essay which I've tried to find, but can't, about the modern conflict between Great Britain and the IRA. The essay started by stating that each side dated the conflict differently. For Great Britain, it began in the 20th Century, but for the IRA, it began in the 17th Century. The differences in dating led to completely opposite developments in the narrative and explanation of the problem.

So, when Cooley says this:

"Take, for example, "the Great Moderation."

The last really sharp recession in the United States was from 1981 to 1982, when real output fell by more than 4% below trend, and the unemployment rate rose to over 10%. It is often referred to as the Volcker Recession because it was triggered in part by then Fed Chairman Paul Volcker's efforts to squeeze inflation out of the U.S. economy.

Following that recession, something remarkable happened. The volatility in the U.S. economy declined sharply. Even though we have had two recessions in the ensuing years--in 1991 and 2002--both were relatively mild and short-lived.

Surprisingly, the U.S. economy remained dramatically more stable in spite of some major disruptions in financial markets in the U.S. and abroad over the same period. There was a major stock market crash in the U.S. in October 1987; the Mexican Financial Crisis in 1994; the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and 1998; the Russian debt crisis and the Long-Term Capital Management crisis in 1998 and the bursting of the dot-com bubble. In addition, there were the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the U.S. got itself involved in two wars. In short, there were many dramatic events both in the U.S. and abroad--and yet the aggregate U.S. economy was relatively calm."

He leaves out the S & L Crisis. To me, the obviously most important factor. The implicit and explicit government guarantees to intervene in a crisis. So, we approach the history of this debacle from, not only philosophical differences, but historical differences. To me, the most important fact is how humans react to crises in real life, and what they are actually acting upon.

I've used this example before. Take illegal immigration. It's illegal. What do the government's actions over the last 20 years tell you about any implicit or explicit guarantees about whether the illegal immigrants will basically all allowed to remain in the end?

I don't know how to resolve this difference.

Monday, November 10, 2008

"Where are Austan Goolsbe, Jason Furman and Peter Orszag? Where are Jo Stiglitz and Paul Krugman?"

Oh my God this post is good. Willem Buiter on President Obama's economic team:

"A few features of this list jump out at the reader:

They’re old! The mean age is 61.9 years and the median is 60. Old age is good. I plan to enjoy it extensively and expect to be listened to respectfully by young whippersnappers. But even so… The youngest member is 49 years old. Were there no persons in their early 40s, their 30s or their late 20s who could brighten up this sexagenarian coterie?

Too few serious economists! There are far too few members with an serious background in economics, capable of grasping the complexities of the financial crisis, budgetary policy, monetary policy, international trade and global financial issues, tax reform, prioritising infrastructure spending, the economics of education, health insurance, health care, education and the environment. Experience running a business is of no help when it comes to preparing for and planning broad structural economic reforms. Most of this Transition Economic Advisory Board appears completely out of its depth - dead wood at best - a ball and chain at worst. I count only four of the 17 members as card-carrying, qualified economists – Roger Ferguson, Larry Summers, Laura Tyson and Paul Volcker. Where are Austan Goolsbe, Jason Furman and Peter Orszag? Where are Jo Stiglitz and Paul Krugman? If they are otherwise engaged, there are dozens of intelligent, wise and politically savvy younger economists who could play a useful role in the presidential transition process. Far too many lawyers! I count eight of them."

Any lawyers read my blog? Please don't take this personally:

"Except for a depressingly small minority among them, lawyers know nothing. They are incapable of logic. They don’t know the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions or between type I and type II errors. Indeed, any concept of probability is alien to them. They don’t understand the concepts of opportunity cost and trade off. They cannot distinguish between normative and positive statements. They are so focused on winning an argument through technicalities, that they no longer would recognise the truth if it bit them in the butt. If you are very lucky, a lawyer will give you nothing but the truth. You will never get the truth, let alone the whole truth. Things have degenerated to the point that lawyers and the legal profession not only routinely undermine justice, but even the law.

But the American political system is completely dominated by this largely socially unproductive and parasitic profession. Consider the membership of the House and the Senate (according to the Congressional Research Service 170 members of the House (out of 435) and 60 Senators (out of 100) are lawyers). Consider the professional training and background of past and future presidents (including Obama, 26 out of 44 presidents were lawyers) - and weep."

Here's the payoff:

"The one beacon of hope in this fog of mediocrity is Paul Volcker, a truly great man with more character, intelligence and vision than the rest of the Board put together. But can he, on his own, salvage this wreck in the making? I hope so, but I doubt it.

To summarize: the members of Obama’s Transition Economic Advisory Board are too old, too uninspiring and too much part of the problem to deliver the change America needs and to keep alive the hope that Obama may have inspired through his election. A wasted opportunity."

Here's my comment:

Too good! The post is brilliant, even though I like Robert Reich. Can I print the comments about lawyers as a broadside?

Posted by: Don the libertarian Democrat | November 10th, 2008 at 11:06 pm

Thursday, November 6, 2008

How Many Times Do I Have To Say Blinder?

I make one last push for Blinder via the NY Times:

"Democrats close to the Obama team told The New York Times that they believed the likeliest choices for Treasury secretary would be Lawrence H. Summers, who held the post in the Clinton administration, and Timothy F. Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

The Wall Street Journal added former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and Robert Rubin, another former Clinton Treasury secretary and director and senior counselor of Citigroup to the list.

In addition to Mr. Geithner, Mr. Summers and Mr. Volcker, Reuters said that the short list for Treasury includes former Clinton administration adviser Laura Tyson."

Here's my comment:

I’ve suggested Alan Blinder. I’m getting a little tired of being ignored. A word to the wise for the Obama administration: you’re going to need my support , so don’t disappoint me.

— Posted by Don the libertarian Democrat

Monday, October 6, 2008

Volker On Treasury

From the Floyd Norris blogging:

"The best lines, as usual, came from Mr. Volcker, the only living ex-Fed chairman who still has a good reputation for financial wisdom.

“The Treasury has become the lender of last resort in the United States, which I think is appropriate,” he said."

If the treasury is going to have this role, then that needs to be taken into account into how we setup and manage our financial system. That seems bedrock to me.

Am I wrong?


Floyd Norris Of NY Times Live Blogs

Great live blogging today by Floyd Norris of the NY Times:

"The risk there is that it would not work, or at least not seem to work, and the chorus about “pushing on a string” would grow louder. But I doubt the central banks will be able to stand by if the market carnage continues very long. There is certainly enough economic weakness to justify action, and plunging commodity prices provide reasons to put aside inflation concerns."

"So we may soon have the government deciding which companies deserve short-term loans, and at what interest rates. Does this remind anyone else of central planning systems?"

"Mr. Volcker’s skepticism of the new financial system has been well known for years, and was ignored by its biggest fan, Alan Greenspan, who succeeded Mr. Volcker at the Fed.

Mr. Volcker recalled the “intense lobbying process” that had largely allowed markets to supplant banks as providers of funding with minimal regulation.

“In the U.S., the market took over,” he said. “The market has flopped.” When things got tough, he added, “everybody is running back to Mother, the commercial banking system.”

"It strikes me that is a hopeless task. There is little stability left to maintain. The Paulson plan is an effort to restore some stability. Europe has yet to come up with anything similar, as can be seen in this updated version of the article I and colleagues wrote for today’s paper."

"Couldn’t he admit that, with hindsight, that was a serious mistake?"

"The state of the financial system is feeding over to economies around the world, reducing demand and threatening to produce deep recessions. There is no way to know how much that is affecting the market, but it must be playing a part."

"I’ve never seen poll results that negative. CNN says that the sampling error could be up to 4.5 percentage points, but these numbers are horrid even if you assume they overstate the gloom by more than that."

"He thinks the Fed will cut rates to 1 percent or lower, from 2 percent now. "

Great job!