Showing posts with label Credit ratings agencies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Credit ratings agencies. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

“Ratings”, a general counsel for Fitch once told a congressional committee, are “the world’s shortest editorials”

From Alphaville:

"Rating the first amendment

Floyd Abrams is defending the rating agencies.

Since time immemorial (well, Enron’s collapse) the rating agencies have steeled themselves against accusations of bias and mis-rating with a powerful defence: their right, under the first amendment, to express opinions and - as journalists - to do so under the freedom of the press.

“Ratings”, a general counsel for Fitch once told a congressional committee, are “the world’s shortest editorials”.

Abrams, says Gawker, is “one of the nation’s premier defenders of the First Amendment” and he is now representing S&P in the myriad cases the rating agency has had brought against it by investors who lost millions - if not billions (and indeed, in aggregate, trillions) - from the failure of the agency’s debt ratings.

Naturally he’s been engaged with the brief to protect the rating agency’s rights under the first amendment. Here he is speaking to NPR (the transcript is worth reading in full):

I believe all sorts of entities deserve first amendment rights. Even though they’re unpopular, rating agencies express opinions, and as such they should be as entitled to First Amendment protections as other people. It’s not a bad thing, it’s not an ignoble thing, and yes-I think it ought to be protected.

The question is whether the rating agencies deserve their status as straight-forward reporters of opinion, or whether, in fact, they are something more. Hitherto, legal challenges to the rating agencies have hinged around proving one key thing: whether the agencies can be counted as sub-underwriters or not. If they are, then they have a fiduciary duty to investors who have depended upon their opinions.

The first amendment defence is actually shakier than it looks. So far, it has only been upheld in the lower US courts. A full fight over the legal status of the rating agencies has not yet been had out.

The issue has long been debated. Intelligent people have come down on both sides. But this time there is a new arrow in the quiver for those seeking to challenge the raters. Whereas before the agencies were challenged for getting it wrong over Enron, or else, more recently, for being biased in their assessment of municipal bond issues, the real issue is with structured finance.

Attorney David Grais, who is debating the rating agencies with Abrams on NPR, puts forward the following analogy:

…in the arena of structured finance, it’s as though the rating agencies are in the kitchen helping to cook the meal. And then when the meal comes out, they sit down, eat the meal and then write a rating of it, or a review of the meal. That’s when, in my opinion, they lose the protection of the First Amendment.

In fact, we’d go further. The agencies didn’t just help cook the meal, they wrote the recipes.

Related links:
Rating cows
- FT Alphaville
Exclusive: Moody’s error gave top ratings to debt products
- FT Alphaville

Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat Jun 3 23:16
"rating agencies express opinions"

I'm expressing my opinion in this post. Ratings Agencies are grading a product. It's the difference between movie reviews and grading beef. If Standard and Poor's, what an appropriate name, are merely the Siskel ( Alav Ha-Shalom ) & Ebert of credit, they would be providing entertainment, and nothing more.

Tuesday, May 12, 2009

But it’s a shambles by design. You are taking on capital, reserving some of it, and lending it out. The whole system is levered

TO BE NOTED: From Portfolio:

The $58 Trillion Elephant in the Room

The roots of this year’s financial crisis go back to a small team of bankers at J.P. Morgan in New York. Now, their invention—credit derivatives—has helped bring down Wall Street and has left Morgan with its biggest exposure of all.
Interactive timeline
Though it hasn’t been around long, the derivatives market nevertheless has managed to do some serious damage. A timeline of how it came about. See All Video & Multimedia
Elephant and man in office setting
Last Trade:34.94Change:-0.89-2.55%
Industry:
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Primary executive:
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Summary:
A financial holding Company whose activities are organized, for management reporting purposes, into six business segments: … View More

At a time when the reputation of bankers has been shredded, Bill Demchak is a throwback. The day I meet him, the financial world is once again poised on the brink of destruction. The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 358 points the day before and is already down another 150 this morning. Yet the green-eyed Demchak, in pleated khakis hiked up unfashionably high onhis waist, seems preternaturally calm—especially for a man who, unwittingly, has had a hand in bringing Wall Street to its knees.

Demchak, now the vice chairman of PNC Financial in Pittsburgh, returned to his hometown in 2002 to help rescue the bank after it became mired in an accounting scandal. Under Demchak and the rest of its new management team, PNC has avoided most of the terrible mistakes of its Wall Street peers by spurning bad mortgages, dubious off-balance-sheet deals, and questionable corporate loans. It’s now one of the best-performing banks in the country.

But before he had this life, Demchak had another, as the leader of a small group at J.P. Morgan in New York that pioneered the kind of financial instruments that eventually led to this autumn’s wreckage on Wall Street. The J.P. Morgan team created and then industrialized credit derivatives, which have enveloped the global markets, growing to a mind-numbing $58 trillion worth of credit contracts. They have spread and morphed in ways that Demchak never intended but always feared.

Long celebrated as a way for banks to diffuse their risks, the credit derivatives invented by Demchak’s team have instead multiplied them. The new credit vehicles encouraged banks and other financial firms to take on riskier loans than they should have; helped increase leverage in the global financial system; and exposed a much wider array of financial firms to the risk of default. (View an interactive timeline of derivatives.)

Credit derivatives aren’t, of course, solely to blame for the pandemic that has helped bring down Wall Street. They didn’t single-handedly force Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to bulk up on toxic debt, dooming them to collapse. But they made the financial world more complex and more opaque. Ultimately, they have exacerbated the market panic, as financial firms and regulators have belatedly come to grips with the enormity of the problems. Merrill Lynch ultimately capitulated to a sale because investors had no confidence that the firm had a handle on what its problems were. When the federal government took over A.I.G. in September, it was largely because of the insurance behemoth’s exposure to credit-default swaps, a type of derivative that flourished in the wake of Demchak and his team’s creations. By mid-September, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson was forced into proposing the largest bailout in U.S. history. Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Christopher Cox (S.E.C. No Evil, October) called for regulating credit derivatives.

Morgan’s derivatives project began in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 as an attempt to protect the bank from bad loans. Demchak’s innovations worked—for his bank. Morgan came to dominate this corner of the financial world while preserving a culture of prudence. Morgan—deemed to be so safe that it snagged two of the victims of the financial-system collapse, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual—is still swimming in credit derivatives, far more than any other firm on Wall Street, though the bank says it’s hedged. As of the second quarter of 2008, the bank had written derivatives contracts backing credit valued at $10.2 trillion, roughly three-quarters the size of the U.S. economy.

But Demchak’s innovation has a more troubling legacy. J.P. Morgan, rather than being inoculated, was actually becoming the Patient Zero of Wall Street, eventually carrying the credit virus to the far corners of the global financial system. The structure of the first derivatives deal wasn’t as solid as Demchak’s team had intended. That initial, flawed financial instrument was later replicated thousands of times by J.P. Morgan and other banks, with the same defects repeated and magnified over and over again.

The creation of credit derivatives, only a decade ago, is more responsible than anything else for binding the global financial world together more closely. Now some of the trailblazers are puzzling over what has been wrought. “How can we have a financial system so precariously balanced after such an extraordinarily profitable period?” asks Andrew Donaldson, a former colleague of Demchak’s who runs an asset management firm in London.

Demchak spends his days in an unassuming office in PNC’s headquarters, situated amid a slightly seedy collection of streets in downtown Pittsburgh. Demchak warned for years about excesses in lending and is now baffled by, and even somewhat contemptuous of, his peers’ disastrous mistakes: “At the end of the day, I’m never going to be—knock on wood—a guy you see in the paper and say, ‘Look at this stupid, self-serving decision.’ ”

Later, as he thinks back to 1997 and the days in New York when his team helped get the derivatives market off the ground, he lights up. “Oh, God,” Demchak says. “It was absolutely the best time ever in my life.”

In the mid-1990s, Demchak, along with his boss, Peter Hancock, an effervescent Briton, became converts to the closest thing the banking industry has had to a religious reformation. Back then, relationships drove the commercial-banking business. Glad-handing bankers with tight connections to corporate boardrooms made the rain.

These guys never met a loan from a corporate client they would turn down, even if they weren’t sure it would be profitable in the long run.

Hancock and Demchak’s creed was simple: Banks should know whether their loans were going to make money. The pair insisted that loans be priced to their current value in the market. Because of the legacy of the old relationship bankers, J.P. Morgan was struggling. The problem, in the view of the stock market, was that the bank had the wrong clients. They were sleepy American icons, some of whom John Pierpont Morgan himself had lent to and even helped build. Though bank officials were promising Wall Street that it could generate returns of 20 percent, the return on many of its loans was much lower, forcing the bank to run the race while dragging lead weights on its ankles.

The Asian financial crisis highlighted the problem. Morgan lost money on loans to Asian companies. That prompted the bank to take a look at all of its corporate lending practices, abroad as well as at home. When it did, top executives came to a sobering realization: Not only was J.P. Morgan not making nearly enough profit on these blue-chip corporate loans, the bank had also made far too many of them. Most weren’t loans at all but lines of credit promising funds at some later date. Hancock and Demchak realized that in a crisis, many of these companies would probably ask J.P. Morgan for access to the money they were promised. Worse, they wouldn’t do it unless they were on the brink of collapse—exactly the wrong time for a banker to make a loan. The bankers who made those loans thought the odds of that happening were too small to even consider. “The old banking mentality viewed them as riskless,” Demchak says. But the mentality was wrong.

Morgan realized it needed to act quickly to reduce its exposure. It had to free up capital for more profitable business. But it couldn’t sell the loans without alienating its longtime, blue-chip customers.

Demchak put the new religion into action. “Demchak was the first person I know of who had the vision that the credit-derivatives market could be anything like it is today,” says Charles Pardue, who worked for Demchak at J.P. Morgan before moving to a hedge fund in London.

Over the coming months, Demchak would put his assault team of math whizzes and marketers to work on fixing the problem. Within the bank, the project was called the Credit Transformation.

Demchak received crucial help from his lieutenant, Blythe Masters, a rising star and formidable presence at the bank. She interned at Morgan while still in college at Cambridge, in Britain, and joined the bank after graduating. Ultracompetitive and driven with a passion for debate, she would give talks and seminars proselytizing about the promise and power of credit derivatives, ultimately becoming their “poster child,” according to credit-­markets consultant Eileen Murphy.

“When you are doing something new, it gets done only by imposing your force of will,” says a former colleague of Masters’. “She was that person.”

Wall Street likes to call its innovations “technologies” to convey a weighty sense of importance. What Demchak and Masters did was combine two of these technologies—securitization and credit derivatives—for the first time.

Securitization has been around since the 1970s. In such a transaction, a group of loans—for example, mortgage, credit card, or corporate loans—is bundled together and sliced up into pieces called tranches. The lowest portion, called the equity, is exposed to the first losses. The next slice up is exposed to the following losses, and so on, until you get to the top. The slices are usually rated by the rating agencies. (Often, the media and even some on Wall Street colloquially refer to tranches of securitizations as derivatives; they aren’t. Tranches are securities backed by a pool of cash-producing assets.)

The Demchak group’s breakthrough was to inject a little magic into standard securitizations. Instead of putting a particular loan into the sliced-up instrument—say, a 30-year loan to I.B.M.—it put a piece of J.P. Morgan’s exposure to I.B.M. into it. For this, the team used credit-default swaps, a burgeoning form of credit derivative. In a C.D.S. transaction, the buyer is protected against a default. These contracts had been floating around in small, experimental form for several years, having been created by Bankers Trust, a scrappy cowboy investment bank.

Demchak’s team was the first to take them wholesale, using credit-default swaps in a huge deal. They mashed up J.P. Morgan’s exposure to more than 300 giant corporations, created an off-balance-sheet vehicle, then sold slices of that to investors. The vehicle then protected J.P. Morgan from defaults. In effect, Morgan was paying insurance premiums to investors who now were on the hook if one of Morgan’s clients went belly-up. “The innovation of not being tied to specific loans or bonds is what made the credit-derivatives market what it is today,” says Romita Shetty, who was part of Demchak’s team at J.P. Morgan.

Development on the project continued slowly through the second half of 1997, involving painstaking and tedious legal and accounting work, quantitative analysis, and hand-holding and persuasion of banking regulators and credit-rating agencies. Demchak and Masters wanted their first deal to hit the market by the end of the year so that Morgan could get credit for it when the bank reported its earnings. The period was so intense that Masters, an avid equestrienne, at one point took a conference call from atop her horse.

Finally, in December 1997, Demchak’s team closed on this first big credit-derivatives deal, the Broad Indexed Secured Trust Offering, or Bistro for short. Insurance companies and banks, the initial customers, were enthusiastic, snapping it up in just two weeks. The deal was enormous for the time, off-loading more than $9.7 billion of J.P. Morgan’s exposure. Morgan had succeeded in reducing its balance-sheet risk and was able to free up capital to buy its stock back.

J.P. Morgan would go on to launch a credit-­derivatives assembly line, becoming the Henry Ford of the new financial market. Throughout the 1990s, the bank was a major player in persuading lawmakers to allow the derivatives markets to remain unregulated—a move regulators are now reevaluating. Bistro helped J.P. Morgan traders in London kick-start the expansion of the “single-name” C.D.S. market, where individual contracts that cover just one company or entity trade hands. This market became liquid and deep by the early 2000s. “We had 100 people,” Demchak recalls. “We helped create the regulatory framework, the legal and accounting framework, and we did billions. We industrialized the product.”

J.P. Morgan continues to dominate the world of derivatives. It has derivatives contracts tied to $90 trillion of underlying securities. Of that, $10.2 trillion are credit-derivatives contracts. Those mind-boggling totals are somewhat misleading. They reflect what is called the “notional” amount in the world of derivatives, based on the underlying amount of the contract, not its current value. When offsetting contracts are taken into account, that figure is whittled down to a much smaller—though still enormous—$109 billion of derivatives, of which $26 billion are credit derivatives. That’s the amount the bank could lose if all its trading partners went out of business, an extremely remote event. But the exposure is climbing, up 17.4 percent from the end of 2007. That’s equal to 20 percent of the bank’s net worth.

Bistro “was the most sublime piece of financial engineering that was ever developed. It was breathtaking in terms of beauty and elegance,” says Satyajit Das, a risk consultant and the author of Traders, Guns, and Money, a financial history. But “in many ways,” Das adds, “J.P. Morgan created Frankenstein’s monster.”

For J.P. Morgan, Bistro worked wonderfully. But even in that first deal, the weaknesses in structured finance and credit derivatives that would come to the fore in the 2007 credit-market crash were already there.

Despite its blue-chip assets, Bistro didn’t perform pristinely. The initial slice, the equity layer that Morgan retained as a cushion against trouble, was so thin that it couldn’t weather even one default from one of the bigger companies in the bundle. That ultimately happened, wiping the slice out entirely. The investors who were one notch up, in what’s called the mezzanine layer, lost money as well. Even the buyers of the top-rated tranches, which were thought to be rock solid, had to endure bumpy periods before they got their money back.

During that first major deal, the credit-rating agencies, which were supposed to be impartial, were already deeply enmeshed in the give-and-take of the process. A former Morgan banker who helped create Bistro recalls that Standard & Poor’s was giving the bank a tough time. The rating firm would run the deal through its models, and “each time, it came up with disastrous results. We did some tinkering and all of a sudden, it could rate the deal,” the banker says.

The pattern was set. The rating agencies would become integral to the creation of the structures. Standard & Poor’s says questioning that first deal was appropriate and stands by its original rating. It further says it doesn’t get involved in structuring deals. But the close relationships between the rating agencies and the Wall Street firms were heavily criticized following widespread mortgage-related securities failures after the housing bubble burst.

After Bistro, investors and regulators embraced derivatives as ways to free up capital to make more loans. Banks around the world used the structures to off-load their own credit risk. Competitors rushed to copy Morgan and Bistro.

The knockoffs and followups were even more flawed than the original model. The second Bistro deal, in 1998, suffered credit downgrades. One of the big deals that followed fast on Bistro’s heels was York Funding, a Credit Suisse structure. “They stuffed it with the worst possible credits,” recalls a former rating-agency employee who examined the deal.

One major problem was that banks had the ability to substitute loans in and out of the structure, as long as the loans had the same credit rating. This allowed managers to scour their books for a loan that looked shaky but still retained a good credit rating and swap it in for a healthier one. The tranche’s credit rating would remain the same, making the whole deal look better on paper than it actually was.

Ultimately, the game became less about reducing risk and more about fooling regulators and the rating agencies. “From 1999 to 2000, there was a lot of innovation for innovation’s sake. A lot of products game the rating agencies and game the regulatory capital requirements,” says a former J.P. Morgan banker who was involved with Bistro.

Warning signs piled up. After the tech bubble burst in 2000, myriad similar deals performed terribly. Some were backed by corporate loans. Many were Bistro-like constructs with credit derivatives. As a class, they hadn’t made it through a cycle of corporate defaults profitably, the acid test of any stable credit product. In his recounting of the period, Das writes, “The credit models failed miserably.”

Despite the obvious failure of the first round of this wizardry, Wall Street was at it again by 2003, this time with mortgages. Investment banks sold billions of structured securities, made up mostly of housing loans to subprime customers with shaky credit. As the market got going, Wall Street bundled leveraged loans made to companies that had junk ratings from the credit-rating agencies. At the peak in 2006, Wall Street issued $89 billion worth of Bistro-like structures called synthetic collateralized-debt obligations. Many of the $415 billion worth of the main type of C.D.O. carried embedded credit derivatives as well.

It’s not surprising that they failed again. Investors and financial firms lost hundreds of billions of dollars as part of the housing and corporate loan meltdown. Only then did the credit-rating agencies come under assault for being too closely involved in helping Wall Street create the complex structures. It took until this year for the structured-finance market to come to a screeching halt.

Today, the financial markets are living in the slipstream of the Bistro deal. “People like to talk about what a shambles the banking system is. But it’s a shambles by design. You are taking on capital, reserving some of it, and lending it out. The whole system is levered,” says a former J.P. Morgan banker. After Bistro, it became more so.

The practice of crafting loans that banks had no intention of keeping on their own balance sheets wasn’t invented by J.P. Morgan, nor was the credit-derivatives market solely responsible for making it possible. Certainly, not all the lending excesses, especially in mortgages, can be laid at the feet of the complex Wall Street structures that used derivatives. But Bistro spread the popularity of this “originate and distribute” model. This experience taught the banking industry that loans designed to be sold to investors for a quick profit performed much more poorly than loans that banks had to keep. ( NB DON )

In addition to keeping the very small piece of Bistro’s first-loss equity slice, J.P. Morgan retained part of the very top slice. Demchak’s team christened it “super­senior.” His group knew that there were risks, though slight, in keeping exposure to these slices. A.I.G., Merrill Lynch, and bond insurers MBIA and Ambac ignored them. Knowingly or not, these firms followed the Bistro deal, retaining super­senior exposure on their books to billions of dollars’ worth of structures in recent years. These companies thought—erroneously—that the slices were so unlikely to default that they needn’t set aside much capital for that eventuality.

The problem was that the underlying assets propping these slices up weren’t blue-chip loans but rather loans to subprime borrowers and junk companies. The supersenior slices turned out to be enormously risky, exposing these companies to huge losses.

Bankers have lost their heads in the past several years. The financial system has run amok. When the federal government took control of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the takeover was deemed a “credit event,” triggering the credit-default swaps that other companies held as insurance against such an event. A week later, Lehman filed for bankruptcy, shrouding the market in an even greater fog. And then, investors in A.I.G. panicked. The insurance giant had written hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of protection on the supersenior slices of mortgage-backed securities. Because of its high credit rating, A.I.G. hadn’t needed to post any initial collateral. But as the market sent the cost of default protection soaring, A.I.G.’s trading partners demanded collateral from the insurer. A.I.G. didn’t have it. Credit-rating agencies downgraded the insurance company, requiring that it post even more collateral. This left A.I.G. teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, and in an unprecedented intervention, it had to be nationalized by the federal government. For the first time, the C.D.S. market shrank in the first half of the year, after doubling every year since 2001.

Bistro had tied the world together, taking credit risk from the banks and passing it on to anyone who wanted it. For years, proponents of credit derivatives, including then-Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and current chair Ben Bernanke, had celebrated the way they spread risk. Everyone might share a little bit of risk, but no firm would collapse from it. Yet in this credit crisis, everyone has become infected.

You can almost detect a crisis of faith in Demchak. In the past eight years, he’s seen one market failure after another. First came the Chase takeover of J.P. Morgan. Chase’s stock soared in the ’90s as investors credulously rewarded its growth. Although it was able to take over the languishing J.P. Morgan, Chase had exposure to almost every big blowup in the wake of the bursting of the 1990s stock market bubble. Much of Demchak’s good work to off-load risk was for naught. (After Demchak left J.P. Morgan in 2002, almost every member of his team followed except Masters, who now runs the bank’s commodities businesses and is regarded as a possible C.E.O. candidate one day.)

Then the credit markets ran wild, with bankers handing out loans that Demchak knew could never be profitable. Today, the markets are gripped with what he sees as an oft-irrational panic, driving prices to fluctuate wildly.

Since Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the dominant ideology governing the financial world has been what George Soros calls “market fundamentalism”—the belief that we should trust the market when deciding how to allocate our resources. We’ll all be better off, the argument goes, if capital is allowed to flow wherever the prices call for it, with as little central planning and governmental interference as possible.

But we have had two great investment bubbles, first in the stock market and now in the credit markets. For the first time in a generation, even some bankers question whether the markets know anything. If they can’t be trusted, what’s going to replace them?

“I used to be the biggest advocate of marking everything to market at all times, because it keeps everyone honest,” Demchak says, referring to the practice of recording the value on the books at the current value. But he saw markets overreacting, swinging from euphoria to pessimism. Now he thinks the fates of great companies are in the hands of inexperienced traders speculating in thin markets. A colleague com­plained to Demchak recently that “some 24-year-old kid is going to mark me down or up 100 million bucks today. How is that?”

Demchak understands his colleague’s frustration. “He is right.”

Friday, March 27, 2009

But complexity alone would generate independent errors in ratings, not ratings that were systematically upward-biased and subsequently downgraded

TO BE NOTED: From Vox:

"
The origin of bias in credit ratings

Vasiliki Skreta Laura Veldkamp

Understanding the origins of the crisis requires understanding the failures of the market for ratings. This column explains how conflicts of interest and shopping for the best rating produced biased assessments of complex assets, whereas these bad incentives had not plagued ratings of simpler assets. We need to rethink how ratings are provided, lest the next bout of financial innovation trigger another round of ratings inflation and subsequent financial market turmoil.


Most market observers attribute the recent credit crunch to a confluence of factors – excess leverage, opacity, improperly estimated correlation between bundled assets, lax screening by mortgage originators, and market-distorting regulations. Credit rating agencies were supposed to create transparency, provide the basis for risk-management regulation, and discipline mortgage lenders and the creators of structured financial products by rating their assets. Understanding the origins of the crisis requires, at least in part, understanding the failures of the market for ratings. Proposed explanations for ratings bias have broadly fallen into three categories.

It was an honest mistake

New financial instruments were being traded, and rating agencies had no historical return data for these instruments on which to base their risk assessments. These new instruments had a degree of complexity that even financial professionals acknowledged was “far above that of traditional bonds" (Adelson, 2007) and “dizzying" (Zandi 2008). But complexity alone would generate independent errors in ratings, not ratings that were systematically upward-biased and subsequently downgraded in 2008. For this story to make sense, it must be that many raters made the same mistake. For example, they underestimated the correlation of defaults, particularly in residential mortgage-backed securities. This led them to underestimate the risk of a geographically diverse pool of mortgages and to assign such assets inflated ratings.

Agencies were beholden to asset issuers

A host of recent papers explore the conflict of interest that arises when rating agencies' fees are paid by asset issuers. Damiano, Li, and Suen (2008), Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2008), Becker and Milbourn (2008), and Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2008) investigate the extent to which reputation effects can discipline rating agencies who may feel compelled to deliberately inflate their ratings, either to maximise their consulting fees or because the issuer could be shopping for the highest rating.

Asset issuers shopped for ratings

Since, with few exceptions, an asset issuer decides which ratings will be published, he or she can choose to publish only the most favourable rating(s). Former chief of Moody's, Tom McGuire, explains, “The banks pay only if [the ratings agency] delivers the desired rating… If Moody's and a client bank don't see eye-to-eye, the bank can either tweak the numbers or try its luck with a competitor like S&P, a process known as ratings shopping."

Why the trouble emerged recently

While all three of these explanations likely played some role in creating ratings bias, only the first explains why an upward bias appeared recently. Asset issuers have been paying for credit ratings since the 1970s, and, until recently, ratings upgrades were more common than downgrades. Does this mean that the conflict of interest and ratings shopping were not possible sources of the ratings inflation of the last few years and should therefore not be the subject of new regulation?

Our research (Skreta and Veldkamp 2009) looks for a trigger that could explain why the incentive to shop for ratings might have remained dormant until recently. The trigger we identify is an increase in asset complexity. Suppose each rating agency issues an unbiased forecast of an asset's value but asset issuers can shop for ratings. If the announced rating is the maximum of all realised ratings, it will be a biased signal of the asset's true quality. The more ratings differ, the stronger are issuers' incentives to selectively disclose (shop for) ratings.

For simple assets, agencies issue nearly identical forecasts. Asset issuers then disclose all ratings because more information reduces investors' uncertainty and increases the price they are willing to pay for the asset. For complex assets, ratings may differ, creating an incentive to shop for the best rating. There is a threshold level of asset complexity at which shopping becomes optimal and ratings inflation emerges. Furthermore, the link between asset complexity and ratings shopping can work in both directions. An issuer who shops for ratings might want to issue an even more complex asset, to get a broader menu of ratings to choose from. This, in turn, makes shopping even more valuable.

A similar effect might have prompted a recent resurgence in asset issuers pressuring rating agencies to generate favourable ratings. If the guidelines for rating an asset are straightforward and all rating agencies must rate an asset the same way, then there is little pressure an issuer can exert. But if assets become more complex and there are now judgment calls to be made, the agency can legally come to many possible conclusions about what the rating should be. This creates the possibility for conflicts of interest that were previously not present or not so severe. Thus, an increase in asset complexity could have prompted rating shopping by asset issuers and manipulation by ratings agencies. The pattern of downgrades and defaults in the last few years confirms this relationship between asset complexity and over-optimistic ratings – complex CDOs had significantly higher default rates than simple corporate bonds with identical ratings. Similarly, mortgage-backed securities, whose underlying credit risk, correlation risk, and pre-payment risk are notoriously difficult to assess, experienced more widespread downgrades than assets based on other collateral types (Mason and Rosner 2007).2

What does the relationship between asset complexity and the incentives to bias ratings mean for future regulatory efforts? First, the conflict of interest that induces rating agencies to inflate ratings and the ability of asset issuers to shop for the best rating can each independently produce ratings bias. Dealing with one of these problems without addressing the other is unlikely to solve the problem. Second, just because these effects did not produce upward bias in ratings in the 1980s and ‘90s does not mean that the problems in the rating market structure are harmless. There is good reason to think that such incentives were latent and only emerged when assets were sufficiently complex that regulation was no longer detailed enough to keep them in check. Finally, the ability of ratings manipulation and shopping to affect asset prices only exists when the buyers of assets are unaware of the games being played by the issuer and rating agency. While that was likely the case for some buyers two years ago, today major market participants must have some awareness of the perils of relying on selectively disclosed ratings. If investors mentally discount ratings, then this problem has corrected itself. However, if we forego this opportunity to rethink how ratings are provided, the next bout of financial innovation could trigger another round of ratings inflation and the financial market turmoil that ensues.

Footnotes

1 On 26 January 2008, the New York Times quoted Moody's CEO saying “In hindsight, it is pretty clear that there was a failure in some key assumptions that were supporting our analytics and our models." He said that one reason for the failure was that the information quality given to Moody's, both the completeness and veracity, was deteriorating. See also page 10 of the Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff's Examinations of Select Credit-rating Agencies, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 8 July 2008.

2 Other collateral types that began to be securitised well after mortgages are far less complex. The first non-mortgage securitisation was equipment leases, followed by credit cards and auto loans, and, more recently, home equity, lease finance, manufactured housing, student loans, and synthetic structures. All of those types of collateral illustrate tranching structures that are measurably simpler than those for RMBS. They had correspondingly lower default rates for similarly-rated assets.

References

Adelson (2007), Director of structured finance research at Nomura Securities. Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, September 27, 2007.

Becker, Bo and Todd Milbourn, “Reputation and Competition: Evidence from the Credit Rating Industry," 2008. HBS finance working paper 09-051.

Bolton, Patrick, Xavier Freixas, and Joel Shapiro, “The Credit Ratings Game," 2008. NBER Working Paper No. 14712

Damiano, E, H Li, and W Suen, “Credible Ratings," Theoretical Economics, 2008, 3, 325-365.

Mason, Joseph R. and Josh Rosner, ”Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions," 2007. SSRN Working Paper #1027475.

Mathis, Jerome, Jamie Mc Andrews, and Jean Charles Rochet, “Rating the Raters," 2008. Toulouse Working Paper.

Skreta, Vasiliki and Laura Veldkamp, “Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation," 2009. NBER working paper # 14761.

Zandi, Mark (2008) "Financial Shock," FT Press, July 2008"

Sunday, January 25, 2009

"We have to start taking accounting fraud seriously. It is a crime. It is a felony. It is the "weapon of choice" among financial control frauds."

Yves Smith:

"Obama's Financial Reform Proposals: Less Than Meets the Eye

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Team Obama has started to preview some of its financial reform proposals. And if the New York Times has represented it accurately, it falls far short of what is called for.

Consider the opening sentence of the article:
The Obama administration plans to move quickly to tighten the nation’s financial regulatory system.

If all the Obama administration intends to do is tinker around( MY FEAR AS WELL ) the margins of our existing framework, the US will make perilous little headway in cleaning up the financial system. In the Great Depression, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 were bold, root and branch reforms that proved to be remarkably effective and lasting.

That isn't to say we have to start from a blank sheet of paper, but the powers that be need to be willing to question and probe our existing institutional arrangements more deeply than they seem willing to.

Let's go through some relevant sections of the Times' story:
Officials say they will make wide-ranging changes, including stricter federal rules for hedge funds, credit rating agencies and mortgage brokers, and greater oversight of the complex financial instruments that contributed to the economic crisis....

A theme of that report [by an international committee headed by Paul Volcker], that many major companies and financial instruments now mostly unsupervised must be swept back under a larger regulatory umbrella, has been embraced as a guiding principle by the administration, officials said.

Yves here. So far, motherhood and apple pie circa 2009, but look at the particulars:
Officials said they want rules to eliminate conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies ...The core problem, they said, is that the agencies are paid by companies to help them structure financial instruments, which the agencies then grade....

Yves here. Notice the problem has been defined narrowly: rating agency conflicts. No consideration of rating agency competence( I WOULD SAY THAT THE NATURE OF RATING IS WHAT NEEDS TO BE STUDIED.) (they were unduly dependent on issuer input for some structured products), or the depth of the conflicts (even if you change the pay arrangements, rating agencies have long been a revolving door, with the best staff going to Wall Street. Even in a brave new world of lower financial firm pay, that pattern will still persist. And staff will therefore still have an incentive not to be as tough as they might need to be.

Back to the article:
The administration is also preparing to require that derivatives like credit default swaps, a type of insurance against loan defaults that were at the center of the financial meltdown last year, be traded through a central clearinghouse and possibly on one or more exchanges. That would make it significantly easier for regulators to supervise their use.

We have long been in favor of getting as many OTC products as possible traded on exchanges. But thee is a second issue with credit default swaps. The size of the market is so large relative to the size of the underlying volume of bonds that it has produced significant distortions in the pricing of bonds in new issues (there was a period last summer when the correlation models were blowing up, and one of the side effects was that AAA issuers were suddenly facing insanely high spreads if they financed due to the arbitrage the cash and derivative markets (see here and here for more detail). Similarly, the financial press too often last summer took up financial firm CEO claims that evil stock short sellers were driving down the prices of their stocks, when in fact, CDS were a better vehicle and the cognisenti argued were a far more likely culprit( GOOD JOB YVES ).

The justification for financial "innovation" is that it lowers the cost of financing, improves liquidity, and produces other benefits to the real economy. But there are numerous examples of CDS creating distortions to the detriment of the real economy. Thatt suggests that some thought should be given as to whether and how measures might be put in place to reduce the size of the CDS market (personally, I think the justifications for its existence are weak, but I see no willingness in the Obama crowd to make bold moves in this arena).( I OF COURSE BLAME PEOPLE )

Another reason to rein in the CDS market is that the scale of the risks involved may be too large even for an exchange. As we noted last fall:
The most valuable element of moving CDS to an exchange, as far as lowering systemic risk is concerned, is centralized clearing, since if anyone defaults, the counterparty is the exchange, not an individual firm. Thus regulators have been moving forward as quickly as possible to set up a central clearinghouse. In particular, the CME Group proposed acting as a clearlinghouse, which means that its members would absorb the losses if any counterparty failed. Some rival proposals suggested setting up a new clearinghouse, which is a much sounder design, but would take longer to implement.

However, some savvy and influential and savvy CME members are now objecting to the idea, arguing that the additional risk of CDS clearing on top of their existing CME obligations is more than the members can realistically support. Moreover, they contend that putting together CDS and futures under the same umbrella is too much risk in one venue, and will increase, not reduce systemic risk.

The article recites a host of rather conventional ideas that have been bandied about that Team Obama has latched on to, such as requiring hedge funds to register with the SEC. Bernie Madoff was registered; the SEC skipped his normal inspection and ignored a detailed letter by one Harry Markopolos ("The World's Largest Hedge Fund is a Fraud") that concluded that the Madoff funds were most likely a Ponzi scheme. So exactly what is this going to accomplish? Eliot Spitzer in an article at The Big Money tells us that the SEC is not serious about enforcement:
The traditional critiques of the SEC have been that it was underfunded and didn't have up-to-date laws needed to regulate sophisticated financial transactions in evolving markets. That's not accurate. The SEC is a gargantuan bureaucracy of 3,500 employees and a budget of $900 million—vast compared with the offices that actually did ferret out fraud in the marketplace. And the general investigative powers of the SEC are so broad that it needs no additional statutory power to delve into virtually any market activity that it suspects is improper, fraudulent, or deceptive. After each business scandal (Enron, Wall Street analysts, Madoff …), the SEC claims a need for more money and statutory power, yet those don't help. The SEC has all the money and people and laws it needs. For ideological reasons, it just didn't want to do its job, and on the rare occasions when it did, it didn't know how.

Now in theory, with a new SEC chief, the SEC might get a bit more aggressive, but even in the Clinton era, reform minded Ted Levitt was reined in by Congress that threatened to SEC budgets if it made life too hard for Wall Street (and Democrat Joe Lieberman was the biggest perp). So aside from some cosmetic moves, I doubt much will change here.
Now let us return to the Times article, which illustrates that the underlying problem:
Officials said that the proposals were aimed at the core regulatory problems and gaps that have been highlighted by the market crisis. They include lax government oversight of financial institutions and lenders, poor risk management efforts by banks and other financial companies, the creation of exotic financial instruments that were not adequately supported by their issuing companies, and risky and ill-considered borrowing habits of many homeowners whose homes are now worth significantly less than their mortgages.

In other words, this is a symptom oriented, patchwork approach( TRUE ). And it misses some of the underlying drivers: the opaqueness and complexity of many of the new instruments, texcessive leverage (oh wait, the powers that be think excessive leverage is the solution) and widespread accounting fraud.( TRUE. BUT, IN REALITY, ONLY SUPERVISION AIMED AT COMPREHENDING THESE INNOVATIONS WILL WORK. )

For instance, how could Lehman have collapsed with what turned out to be a hole in its balance sheet of in excess of $100 billion when its financial statements gave no clue of problems of that size? And as we noted at the time, its executives were claiming, forcefully, that everything was OK, the converse of what was actually the case (see here, here and here for examples).( THIS IS FRAUD )

Or consider the views of William Black (a bank regulator during the S&L crisis who went after Lincoln Savings, owned by the powerful Charles Keating. Black's efforts were thwarted but he was eventually vindicated) on Merrill:
Thain portrayed himself as a hero of capitalism and the embodiment of a successful CEO deserving of millions of dollars in bonus compensation because he "sold" Merrill to B of A -- minimizing the losses of Merrill's shareholders. There was, of course, criticism of the scale of these bonuses, but no fundamental rejection of his claim to be a hero.

The lack of rejection illustrates why we are in crisis. We need to be blunt. Thain transferred a loss that risk capital is supposed to bear to the taxpayers of the United States (not B of A). He was able to transfer that loss to the taxpayers because Merrill, under his leadership, engaged in monumental accounting fraud (which means it also engaged in securties fraud)( I AGREE ). We have to start taking accounting fraud seriously. It is a crime. It is a felony. It is the "weapon of choice" among financial control frauds. It causes staggering direct losses and indirectly, by eviscerating trust, it causes entire markets to shut down. This should not surprise economists. We make things crimes in large part because they produce material negative externalities. ( THIS IS MY POSITION )

So, Thain "was part of the problem." The fact that he could (A) lead such a massive fraud and (B) think that he should be rewarded with many billions of dollars for defrauding the citizens of the United States shows two key reasons why the crises keep getting worse( SPOT ON. ). Our most elite business leaders now embody traits we used to understand were loathsome. The fact that this is not obvious even to skilled, sceptical financial reporters shows how serious a problem we face.( I COULDN'T AGREE MORE )

Until we start talking addressing the root causes, these financial "reforms" will prove as effective as trying to treat gangrene with antibiotics. "( I AGREE )

Tuesday, January 6, 2009

"We call this "circling the wagons" because what this argument does is shift the blame."

From Forbes:

"Treasury's Paulson Gets It Wrong

Brian S. Wesbury and Robert Stein 01.06.09, 12:01 AM ET

In a recent interview with the Financial Times, U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson blamed the credit crisis on global imbalances. Specifically, he repeated a storyline popularized by Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke: that a global savings glut (otherwise known as an imbalance) pushed interest rates down around the world and drove( NO ONE HAD TO DO THIS. IT'S A MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. ) investors toward riskier and more leveraged investment activities( I DON'T CREDIT THIS THEORY AT ALL ).

We call this "circling the wagons" because what this argument does is shift the blame( I AGREE, ONLY I THINK THAT IT SHIFTS THE BLAME AWAY FROM INDIVIDUAL HUMAN DECISIONS. ). It shifts the blame off of the Fed, which pushed interest rates down too far in 2002-2004( I DON'T CREDIT THIS EXPLANATION EITHER, FOR THE SAME REASONS GIVEN ABOVE ABOUT THE GIANT SLOSHING POOL OF MONEY. ). It also lets the Fed off the hook for using the phrase "considerable period" back in 2003 when the federal funds rate was 1%--that was how long it said it wanted to hold interest rates low. That language was designed to lower long-term interest rates by basically double-daring( YOU HAVE TO ACCEPT A DARE? ) hedge funds and investment banks to use massive leverage--borrow short at low rates and buy long at higher rates.

It lets rating agencies, which are sanctioned by the federal government, slide despite their huge mistakes( CRIMES. BUT I AGREE. ). It whitewashes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the politicians who supported their ability to hold mortgage rates down artificially( STILL NO EXCUSE FOR BAD LOANS. ANOTHER MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION. ). It also ignores rules and regulations, such as the Community Reinvestment Act (which forced banks( COME ON ) to make low income loans) and mark-to-market accounting (which artificially( SENSIBLY ) pushed up capital ratios at financial institutions in the early 2000s as the Fed cut interest rates and risk spreads narrowed as leverage increased).

Most important, it fans fears( THEY'RE ALREADY WELL-FANNED ) of global financial markets, free trade and free markets in general. If this argument influences the policy debate, it will lead toward protectionism or devaluation, both of which would harm the U.S. economy.

The Greenspan/Bernanke/Paulson theory suggests that China (in particular), as well as other countries holding massive reserves, created a glut of savings and low interest rates. The way China accumulated these dollars was by running a trade surplus. Never mind that the U.S. was running a deficit exactly equal to the rest of the world's surplus and the last time we looked, exactly equal meant "balanced."( THE SPENDER COUNTRY/SAVER COUNTRY SYMBIOSIS ) Never mind that, because what the Treasury Secretary is supporting is an argument that the trade deficit is a problem. This creates another support for those who want to see a U.S. devaluation or the introduction of more barriers to trade.

Despite the high level of support for this "global imbalances" argument, we remain skeptical. First, the Fed controls short-term interest rates. And when the Fed signals that it will hold rates low for a considerable period (as in 2003), this encourages( AT BEST. IT DOESN"T DETERMINE. ) what Mr. Paulson called the "mis-pricing" of risk.

Second, if China (or other high trade surplus countries) used accumulated dollars to purchase goods and services from the U.S., those dollars would not disappear, they would still be in circulation.

So the idea that somehow there is a glut of money because one country or another is holding a big stash ignores the fact that no matter what that country did with the money it would still exist. If it were spent it would represent sales, profits, incomes and savings for some other entity. For every debit, there must be a credit. For every trade surplus, there must be a deficit. For every so-called imbalance on one side of the ocean, there exists an equal but opposite imbalance on the other side of the ocean. There are no leaks; the world, when it comes to dollars, is a closed system.

While we understand the desire to circle the wagons and shift blame, the idea that a global savings glut destroyed the economy is seriously wanting( I AGREE. NOT USEFUL. ). We hope this is not the only explanation for our current financial crisis that policy-makers employ. The underlying cause of a crisis is important to understand. If policy-makers are mistaken, then policy responses will be flawed.( THIS IS TRUE, BUT THEY ARE ALSO WRONG IN FOLLOWING MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS OF THE CRISIS, WHICH ARE ALL OF LITTLE USE. )

Brian S. Wesbury is chief economist, and Robert Stein senior economist, at First Trust Advisors in Lisle, Ill. They write a weekly column for Forbes.com."

Sunday, January 4, 2009

"The funny thing is, there’s nothing all that radical about most of these changes"

From the NY Times:

"
The End of the Financial World as We Know It " By MICHAEL LEWIS and DAVID EINHORN

"AMERICANS enter the New Year in a strange new role: financial lunatics. We’ve been viewed by the wider world with mistrust and suspicion on other matters, but on the subject of money even our harshest critics have been inclined to believe that we knew what we were doing. They watched our investment bankers and emulated them: for a long time now half the planet’s college graduates seemed to want nothing more out of life than a job on Wall Street.

This is one reason the collapse of our financial system( IT'S TRUE. THE CRISIS STEMS FROM ITS BEGINNING HERE. ) has inspired not merely a national but a global crisis of confidence( THAT'S IT. THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK. )Good God, the world seems to be saying, if they don’t know what they are doing with money, who does?

Incredibly, intelligent people the world over remain willing to lend us money( THEY ARE BUYING US TREASURIES IN A FLIGHT TO SAFETY ) and even listen to our advice; they appear not to have realized the full extent of our madness. We have at least a brief chance to cure ourselves. But first we need to ask: of what?

To that end consider the strange story of Harry Markopolos. Mr. Markopolos is the former investment officer with Rampart Investment Management in Boston who, for nine years, tried to explain to the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bernard L. Madoff couldn’t be anything other than a fraud. Mr. Madoff’s investment performance, given his stated strategy, was not merely improbable but mathematically impossible( THAT'S NOT GOOD ). And so, Mr. Markopolos reasoned, Bernard Madoff must be doing something other than what he said he was doing.

In his devastatingly persuasive 17-page letter to the S.E.C., Mr. Markopolos saw two possible scenarios. In the “Unlikely” scenario: Mr. Madoff, who acted as a broker as well as an investor, was “front-running” his brokerage customers. A customer might submit an order to Madoff Securities to buy shares in I.B.M. at a certain price, for example, and Madoff Securities instantly would buy I.B.M. shares for its own portfolio ahead of the customer order. If I.B.M.’s shares rose, Mr. Madoff kept them; if they fell he fobbed them off onto the poor customer( FRAUD ).

In the “Highly Likely” scenario, wrote Mr. Markopolos, “Madoff Securities is the world’s largest Ponzi Scheme.” Which, as we now know, it was.

Harry Markopolos sent his report to the S.E.C. on Nov. 7, 2005 — more than three years before Mr. Madoff was finally exposed — but he had been trying to explain the fraud to them since 1999. He had no direct financial interest in exposing Mr. Madoff — he wasn’t an unhappy investor or a disgruntled employee. There was no way to short shares in Madoff Securities, and so Mr. Markopolos could not have made money directly from Mr. Madoff’s failure. To judge from his letter, Harry Markopolos anticipated mainly downsides for himself: he declined to put his name on it for fear of what might happen to him and his family if anyone found out he had written it. And yet the S.E.C.’s cursory investigation of Mr. Madoff pronounced him free of fraud.

What’s interesting( COLLUSION ) about the Madoff scandal, in retrospect, is how little interest anyone inside the financial system had in exposing it. It wasn’t just Harry Markopolos who smelled a rat. As Mr. Markopolos explained in his letter, Goldman Sachs was refusing to do business with Mr. Madoff; many others doubted Mr. Madoff’s profits or assumed he was front-running his customers and steered clear of him. Between the lines, Mr. Markopolos hinted that even some of Mr. Madoff’s investors may have suspected that they were the beneficiaries of a scam( YEP ). After all, it wasn’t all that hard to see that the profits were too good to be true. Some of Mr. Madoff’s investors may have reasoned that the worst that could happen to them, if the authorities put a stop to the front-running, was that a good thing would come to an end( I THINK THAT THIS IS LIKELY ).

The Madoff scandal echoes a deeper absence inside our financial system, which has been undermined not merely by bad behavior( FRAUD, NEGLIGENCE, FIDUCIARY MISMANAGEMENT, AND COLLUSION ) but by the lack of checks and balances( INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ) to discourage it. “Greed” doesn’t cut it as a satisfying explanation for the current financial crisis. Greed was necessary but insufficient; in any case, we are as likely to eliminate greed from our national character as we are lust and envy( I AGREE. IT DOESN'T EXPLAIN IT. ). The fixable problem isn’t the greed of the few but the misaligned interests of the many.

A lot has been said and written, for instance, about the corrupting effects on Wall Street of gigantic bonuses. What happened inside the major Wall Street firms, though, was more deeply unsettling than greedy people lusting for big checks( TRUE ): leaders of public corporations, especially financial corporations, are as good as required to lead for the short term.

Richard Fuld, the former chief executive of Lehman Brothers, E. Stanley O’Neal, the former chief executive of Merrill Lynch, and Charles O. Prince III, Citigroup’s chief executive, may have paid themselves humongous sums of money at the end of each year, as a result of the bond market bonanza. But if any one of them had set himself up as a whistleblower — had stood up and said “this business is irresponsible and we are not going to participate in it” — he would probably have been fired. Not immediately, perhaps. But a few quarters of earnings that lagged behind those of every other Wall Street firm would invite outrage from subordinates, who would flee for other, less responsible firms, and from shareholders, who would call for his resignation. Eventually he’d be replaced by someone willing to make money from the credit bubble( I AGREE ).

OUR financial catastrophe, like Bernard Madoff’s pyramid scheme, required all sorts of important, plugged-in people to sacrifice our collective long-term interests for short-term gain. The pressure to do this in today’s financial markets is immense. Obviously the greater the market pressure to excel in the short term, the greater the need for pressure from outside the market to consider the longer term( NO.THE GOVERNMENT IS IN CHARGE OF THE LONGER TERM. ). But that’s the problem: there is no longer any serious pressure from outside the market. The tyranny of the short term has extended itself with frightening ease into the entities that were meant to, one way or another, discipline Wall Street, and force it to consider its enlightened self-interest.

The credit-rating agencies, for instance.

Everyone now knows that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s botched( COLLUSION AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST ) their analyses of bonds backed by home mortgages. But their most costly mistake — one that deserves a lot more attention than it has received — lies in their area of putative expertise: measuring corporate risk.

Over the last 20 years American financial institutions have taken on more and more risk, with the blessing of regulators, with hardly a word from the rating agencies, which, incidentally, are paid by the issuers of the bonds they rate( YEP ). Seldom if ever did Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s say, “If you put one more risky asset on your balance sheet, you will face a serious downgrade.”

The American International Group, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, General Electric and the municipal bond guarantors Ambac Financial and MBIA all had triple-A ratings. (G.E. still does!) Large investment banks like Lehman and Merrill Lynch all had solid investment grade ratings. It’s almost as if the higher the rating of a financial institution, the more likely it was to contribute to financial catastrophe( THIS MAKES SENSE, BECAUSE THE POINT WAS TO INCREASE LEVERAGE, WHICH IS EASIER TO DO WITH A BETTER RATING. ). But of course all these big financial companies fueled the creation of the credit products that in turn fueled the revenues of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.

These oligopolies( A CARTEL ), which are actually sanctioned by the S.E.C., didn’t merely do their jobs badly. They didn’t simply miss a few calls here and there. In pursuit of their own short-term earnings, they did exactly the opposite of what they were meant to do: rather than expose financial risk they systematically disguised it( FRAUD, ETC. ).

This is a subject that might be profitably explored in Washington. There are many questions an enterprising United States senator might want to ask the credit-rating agencies. Here is one: Why did you allow MBIA to keep its triple-A rating for so long? In 1990 MBIA was in the relatively simple business of insuring municipal bonds. It had $931 million in equity and only $200 million of debt — and a plausible triple-A rating.

By 2006 MBIA had plunged into the much riskier business of guaranteeing collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s. But by then it had $7.2 billion in equity against an astounding $26.2 billion in debt. That is, even as it insured ever-greater risks in its business, it also took greater risks on its balance sheet.( INCREASED LEVERAGE WAS THE OBJECT OF CDOs )

Yet the rating agencies didn’t so much as blink. On Wall Street the problem was hardly a secret: many people understood that MBIA didn’t deserve to be rated triple-A. As far back as 2002, a hedge fund called Gotham Partners published a persuasive report, widely circulated, entitled: “Is MBIA Triple A?” (The answer was obviously no.)

At the same time, almost everyone believed that the rating agencies would never downgrade MBIA, because doing so was not in their short-term financial interest. A downgrade of MBIA would force the rating agencies to go through the costly and cumbersome process of re-rating tens of thousands of credits that bore triple-A ratings simply by virtue of MBIA’s guarantee. It would stick a wrench in the machine that enriched them. (In June, finally, the rating agencies downgraded MBIA, after MBIA’s failure became such an open secret that nobody any longer cared about its formal credit rating.)

The S.E.C. now promises modest new measures to contain the damage that the rating agencies can do — measures that fail to address the central problem: that the raters are paid by the issuers.( EXACTLY )

But this should come as no surprise, for the S.E.C. itself is plagued by similarly wacky incentives. Indeed, one of the great social benefits of the Madoff scandal may be to finally reveal the S.E.C. for what it has become.( COLLUSION )

Created to protect investors from financial predators, the commission has somehow evolved into a mechanism for protecting financial predators with political clout from investors( THAT'S IT. ). (The task it has performed most diligently during this crisis has been to question, intimidate and impose rules on short-sellers — the only market players who have a financial incentive to expose fraud and abuse.( I AGREE. ))

The instinct to avoid short-term political heat is part of the problem; anything the S.E.C. does to roil the markets, or reduce the share price of any given company, also roils the careers of the people who run the S.E.C. Thus it seldom penalizes serious corporate and management malfeasance( THIS IS WHY THE SECOND MAJOR CAUSE OF THIS CRISIS, FRAUD, ETC., BECAME AN EPIDEMIC. ) — out of some misguided notion that to do so would cause stock prices to fall, shareholders to suffer and confidence to be undermined. Preserving confidence, even when that confidence is false, has been near the top of the S.E.C.’s agenda.

IT’S not hard to see why the S.E.C. behaves as it does. If you work for the enforcement division of the S.E.C. you probably know in the back of your mind, and in the front too, that if you maintain good relations with Wall Street you might soon be paid huge sums of money to be employed by it.( TRUE )

The commission’s most recent director of enforcement is the general counsel at JPMorgan Chase; the enforcement chief before him became general counsel at Deutsche Bank; and one of his predecessors became a managing director for Credit Suisse before moving on to Morgan Stanley. A casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that the whole point of landing the job as the S.E.C.’s director of enforcement is to position oneself for the better paying one on Wall Street.( IT IS. THAT'S OUR SYSTEM. CRONYISM AND COLLUSION. )

At the back of the version of Harry Markopolos’s brave paper currently making the rounds is a copy of an e-mail message, dated April 2, 2008, from Mr. Markopolos to Jonathan S. Sokobin. Mr. Sokobin was then the new head of the commission’s office of risk assessment, a job that had been vacant for more than a year after its previous occupant had left to — you guessed it — take a higher-paying job on Wall Street.

At any rate, Mr. Markopolos clearly hoped that a new face might mean a new ear — one that might be receptive to the truth. He phoned Mr. Sokobin and then sent him his paper. “Attached is a submission I’ve made to the S.E.C. three times in Boston,” he wrote. “Each time Boston sent this to New York. Meagan Cheung, branch chief, in New York actually investigated this but with no result that I am aware of. In my conversations with her, I did not believe that she had the derivatives or mathematical background to understand the violations( I'M TELLING YOU THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO BE GAUSS ).”

How does this happen? How can the person in charge of assessing Wall Street firms not have the tools to understand them? Is the S.E.C. that inept? Perhaps, but the problem inside the commission is far worse — because inept people can be replaced. The problem is systemic. The new director of risk assessment was no more likely to grasp the risk of Bernard Madoff than the old director of risk assessment because the new guy’s thoughts and beliefs were guided by the same incentives( YES. PRESUPOSITIONS. ): the need to curry favor with the politically influential and the desire to keep sweet the Wall Street elite( THE INVESTOR CLASS. BUT, GUYS, THAT'S OUR SYSTEM. HELLO. ).

And here’s the most incredible thing of all: 18 months into the most spectacular man-made financial calamity in modern experience, nothing has been done to change that, or any of the other bad incentives that led us here in the first place.( WE'D HAVE TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM. )

SAY what you will about our government’s approach to the financial crisis, you cannot accuse it of wasting its energy being consistent or trying to win over the masses. In the past year there have been at least seven different bailouts, and six different strategies. And none of them seem to have pleased anyone except a handful of financiers.( TOTALLY TRUE )

When Bear Stearns failed, the government induced JPMorgan Chase to buy it by offering a knockdown price and guaranteeing( ESSENTIAL ) Bear Stearns’s shakiest assets. Bear Stearns bondholders were made whole and its stockholders lost most of their money.

Then came the collapse of the government-sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both promptly nationalized( ESSENTIAL ). Management was replaced, shareholders badly diluted, creditors left intact but with some uncertainty. Next came Lehman Brothers, which was, of course, allowed to go bankrupt. At first, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve claimed they had allowed Lehman to fail in order to signal that recklessly managed Wall Street firms did not all come with government guarantees( THEY DO. THEY WERE FOOLED BY THEIR OWN SELF-DELUSIONS. ); but then, when chaos ensued, and people started saying that letting Lehman fail was a dumb thing to have done, they changed their story and claimed they lacked the legal authority to rescue the firm.

But then a few days later A.I.G. failed, or tried to, yet was given the gift of life with enormous government loans. Washington Mutual and Wachovia promptly followed: the first was unceremoniously seized by the Treasury, wiping out both its creditors and shareholders; the second was batted around for a bit. Initially, the Treasury tried to persuade Citigroup to buy it — again at a knockdown price and with a guarantee( ESSENTIAL ) of the bad assets. (The Bear Stearns model.) Eventually, Wachovia went to Wells Fargo, after the Internal Revenue Service jumped in and sweetened the pot with a tax subsidy.( FROM TARP )

In the middle of all this, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. persuaded Congress that he needed $700 billion to buy distressed assets from banks — telling the senators and representatives that if they didn’t give him the money the stock market would collapse. Once handed the money, he abandoned his promised strategy, and instead of buying assets at market prices, began to overpay for preferred stocks in the banks themselves. Which is to say that he essentially began giving away( THAT'S IT ) billions of dollars to Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and a few others unnaturally selected for survival. The stock market fell anyway. ( NO ONE COULD FIGURE OUT EXACTLY WHAT THE HELL THEY WERE DOING )

It’s hard to know what Mr. Paulson was thinking as he never really had to explain himself, at least not in public. But the general idea appears to be that if you give the banks capital they will in turn use it to make loans in order to stimulate the economy( HE KNEW BETTER ). Never mind that if you want banks to make smart, prudent loans, you probably shouldn’t give money to bankers who sunk themselves by making a lot of stupid, imprudent ones( THAT'S WHY THE SWEDISH PLAN WAS BETTER ). If you want banks to re-lend the money, you need to provide them not with preferred stock, which is essentially a loan, but with tangible common equity — so that they might write off their losses, resolve their troubled assets and then begin to make new loans, something they won’t be able to do until they’re confident in their own balance sheets. But as it happened, the banks took the taxpayer money and just sat on it( YES. A CREDIT STIMULUS WITHOUT THE STIMULUS. ).

Continued at "How to Repair a Broken Financial World."

Michael Lewis, a contributing editor at Vanity Fair and the author of “Liar’s Poker,” is writing a book about the collapse of Wall Street. David Einhorn is the president of Greenlight Capital, a hedge fund, and the author of “Fooling Some of the People All of the Time.” Investment accounts managed by Greenlight may have a position (long or short) in the securities discussed in this article."

"Continued from "The End of the Financial World As We Know It"

Mr. Paulson must have had some reason for doing what he did. No doubt he still believes that without all this frantic activity we’d be far worse off than we are now. All we know for sure, however, is that the Treasury’s heroic deal-making has had little effect on what it claims is the problem at hand: the collapse of confidence in the companies atop our financial system.( ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF TARP AND ALL THE OTHER GOVERNMENT ACTIONS IS THAT THEY ARE HARD TO ASSESS. )

Weeks after receiving its first $25 billion taxpayer investment, Citigroup returned to the Treasury to confess that — lo! — the markets still didn’t trust Citigroup to survive. In response, on Nov. 24, the Treasury handed Citigroup another $20 billion from the Troubled Assets Relief Program, and then simply guaranteed( ESSENTIAL ) $306 billion of Citigroup’s assets. The Treasury didn’t ask for its fair share of the action, or management changes, or for that matter anything much at all beyond a teaspoon of warrants and a sliver of preferred stock. The $306 billion guarantee was an undisguised gift. The Treasury didn’t even bother to explain what the crisis was( IT'S A CALLING RUN ), just that the action was taken in response to Citigroup’s “declining stock price.”

Three hundred billion dollars is still a lot of money. It’s almost 2 percent of gross domestic product, and about what we spend annually on the departments of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development and Transportation combined. Had Mr. Paulson executed his initial plan, and bought Citigroup’s pile of troubled assets at market prices, there would have been a limit to our exposure, as the money would have counted against the $700 billion Mr. Paulson had been given to dispense. Instead, he in effect granted himself the power to dispense unlimited sums of money without Congressional oversight. Now we don’t even know the nature of the assets that the Treasury is standing behind. Under TARP, these would have been disclosed.

THERE are other things the Treasury might do when a major financial firm assumed to be “too big to fail” comes knocking, asking for free money. Here’s one: Let it fail.( NO )

Not as chaotically as Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail. If a failing firm is deemed “too big” for that honor, then it should be explicitly nationalized( THAT'S THE ANSWER ), both to limit its effect on other firms and to protect the guts of the system. Its shareholders should be wiped out, and its management replaced. Its valuable parts should be sold off as functioning businesses to the highest bidders — perhaps to some bank that was not swept up in the credit bubble. The rest should be liquidated, in calm markets. Do this and, for everyone except the firms that invented the mess, the pain will likely subside.( THAT WAS AND IS MY SOLUTION. IT ALSO FULFILLS BAGEHOT'S PRINCIPLES )

This is more plausible than it may sound. Sweden, of all places, did it successfully in 1992( AS I'VE SAID, IT WORKED ). And remember, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have already accepted, on behalf of the taxpayer, just about all of the downside risk of owning the bigger financial firms. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve would both no doubt argue that if you don’t prop up these banks you risk an enormous credit contraction — if they aren’t in business who will be left to lend money? But something like the reverse seems more true: propping up failed banks and extending them huge amounts of credit has made business more difficult for the people and companies that had nothing to do with creating the mess( TRUE ). Perfectly solvent companies are being squeezed out of business by their creditors( A CALLING RUN ) precisely because they are not in the Treasury’s fold( GUARANTEED ). With so much lending effectively federally guaranteed, lenders are fleeing anything that is not.( IN ALL HONESTY, THEY WANT THE GUARANTEES. )

Rather than tackle the source of the problem, the people running the bailout desperately want to reinflate the credit bubble, prop up the stock market and head off a recession. Their efforts are clearly failing: 2008 was a historically bad year for the stock market, and we’ll be in recession for some time to come. Our leaders have framed the problem as a “crisis of confidence”( IT IS THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK ) but what they actually seem to mean is “please pay no attention to the problems we are failing to address.”

In its latest push to compel confidence, for instance, the authorities are placing enormous pressure on the Financial Accounting Standards Board to suspend “mark-to-market” accounting( IN ODER TO END THE CALLING RUN BY, WEll, ENDING THE CALLING. OF COURSE, THIS MIGHT WELL NOT WORK ). Basically, this means that the banks will not have to account for the actual value of the assets on their books but can claim instead that they are worth whatever they paid for them.

This will have the double effect of reducing transparency and increasing self-delusion (gorge yourself for months, but refuse to step on a scale, and maybe no one will realize you gained weight). And it will fool no one. When you shout at people “be confident,” you shouldn’t expect them to be anything but terrified.

If we are going to spend trillions of dollars of taxpayer money, it makes more sense to focus less on the failed institutions at the top of the financial system and more on the individuals at the bottom. Instead of buying dodgy assets and guaranteeing deals that should never have been made in the first place, we should use our money to A) repair the social safety net, now badly rent in ways that cause perfectly rational people to be terrified( I AGREE ); and B) transform the bailout of the banks into a rescue of homeowners.( THIS IS TERRIBLY HARD )

We should begin by breaking the cycle of deteriorating housing values and resulting foreclosures. Many homeowners realize that it doesn’t make sense to make payments on a mortgage that exceeds the value of their house. As many as 20 million families face the decision of whether to make the payments or turn in the keys. Congress seems to have understood this problem, which is why last year it created a program under the Federal Housing Authority to issue homeowners new government loans based on the current appraised value of their homes.

And yet the program, called Hope Now, seems to have become one more excellent example of the unhappy political influence of Wall Street. As it now stands, banks must initiate any new loan; and they are loath to do so because it requires them to recognize an immediate loss. They prefer to “work with borrowers” through loan modifications and payment plans that present fewer accounting and earnings problems but fail to resolve and, thereby, prolong the underlying issues. It appears that the banking lobby( STILL VERY POWERFUL ) also somehow inserted into the law the dubious requirement that troubled homeowners repay all home equity loans before qualifying. The result: very few loans will be issued through this program.( TRUE )

THIS could be fixed. Congress might grant qualifying homeowners the ability to get new government loans based on the current appraised values without requiring their bank’s consent. When a corporation gets into trouble, its lenders often accept a partial payment in return for some share in any future recovery. Similarly, homeowners should be permitted to satisfy current first mortgages with a combination of the proceeds of the new government loan and a share in any future recovery from the future sale or refinancing of their homes. Lenders who issued second mortgages should be forced to release their claims on property. The important point is that homeowners, not lenders, be granted the right to obtain new government loans. To work, the program needs to be universal and should not require homeowners to file for bankruptcy.( MAYER/HUBBARD. IT HAS PROBLEMS THOUGH. )

There are also a handful of other perfectly obvious changes in the financial system to be made, to prevent some version of what has happened from happening all over again. A short list:

Stop making big regulatory decisions with long-term consequences based on their short-term effect on stock prices. Stock prices go up and down: let them. An absurd number of the official crises have been negotiated and resolved over weekends so that they may be presented as a fait accompli “before the Asian markets open.” The hasty crisis-to-crisis policy decision-making lacks coherence for the obvious reason that it is more or less driven by a desire to please the stock market. The Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the S.E.C. all seem to view propping up stock prices as a critical part of their mission — indeed, the Federal Reserve sometimes seems more concerned than the average Wall Street trader with the market’s day-to-day movements. If the policies are sound, the stock market will eventually learn to take care of itself. ( YES AND NO. THE MARKETS TELL US WHAT THE PRESUPPOSITIONS THAT INVESTORS WORK UNDER ARE. SINCE THEY HAVE THE MONEY, THEIR VIEW IS IMPORTANT. )

End the official status of the rating agencies. Given their performance it’s hard to believe credit rating agencies are still around. There’s no question that the world is worse off for the existence of companies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. There should be a rule against issuers paying for ratings. Either investors should pay for them privately or, if public ratings are deemed essential, they should be publicly provided. ( SOMETHING OF THIS SORT )

Regulate credit-default swaps. There are now tens of trillions of dollars in these contracts between big financial firms. An awful lot of the bad stuff that has happened to our financial system has happened because it was never explained in plain, simple language( HERE I AGREE. BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN. THAT'S WHY I SAY THAT IT'S FRAUD, ETC. ). Financial innovators were able to create new products and markets without anyone thinking too much about their broader financial consequences — and without regulators knowing very much about them at all. It doesn’t matter how transparent financial markets are if no one can understand what’s inside them. Until very recently, companies haven’t had to provide even cursory disclosure of credit-default swaps in their financial statements.

Credit-default swaps may not be Exhibit No. 1 in the case against financial complexity, but they are useful evidence. Whatever credit defaults are in theory, in practice they have become mainly side bets on whether some company, or some subprime mortgage-backed bond, some municipality, or even the United States government will go bust. In the extreme case, subprime mortgage bonds were created so that smart investors, using credit-default swaps, could bet against them. Call it insurance if you like, but it’s not the insurance most people know. It’s more like buying fire insurance on your neighbor’s house, possibly for many times the value of that house — from a company that probably doesn’t have any real ability to pay you if someone sets fire to the whole neighborhood( THAT WAS MY EXAMPLE. HOWEVER, I'VE POSTED ON CASES IN WHICH I BELIEVE CDSs MAKE SENSE. BUT LEWIS IS NOW MUCH BETTER ON THIS THAN IN HIS LAST ARTICLE. ) . The most critical role for regulation( OR SUPERVISION ) is to make sure that the sellers of risk have the capital to support their bets.

Impose new capital requirements on banks. The new international standard now being adopted by American banks is known in the trade as Basel II. Basel II is premised on the belief that banks do a better job than regulators of measuring their own risks — because the banks have the greater interest in not failing. Back in 2004, the S.E.C. put in place its own version of this standard for investment banks. We know how that turned out. A better idea would be to require banks to hold less capital in bad times and more capital in good times( THIS IS A VERSION OF MY VALUE INVESTING SUPERVISION, SO I LIKE IT. ). Now that we have seen how too-big-to-fail financial institutions behave, it is clear that relieving them of stringent requirements is not the way to go.

Another good solution to the too-big-to-fail problem is to break up any institution that becomes too big to fail.( GOOD LUCK )

Close the revolving door between the S.E.C. and Wall Street( GOOD LUCK ). At every turn we keep coming back to an enormous barrier to reform: Wall Street’s political influence. Its influence over the S.E.C. is further compromised by its ability to enrich the people who work for it. Realistically, there is only so much that can be done to fix the problem, but one measure is obvious: forbid regulators, for some meaningful amount of time after they have left the S.E.C., from accepting high-paying jobs with Wall Street firms.

But keep the door open the other way. If the S.E.C. is to restore its credibility as an investor protection agency, it should have some experienced, respected investors (which is not the same thing as investment bankers) as commissioners. President-elect Barack Obama should nominate at least one with a notable career investing capital, and another with experience uncovering corporate misconduct( A VERY GOOD IDEA ). As it happens, the most critical job, chief of enforcement, now has a perfect candidate, a civic-minded former investor with firsthand experience of the S.E.C.’s ineptitude: Harry Markopolos.

The funny thing is, there’s nothing all that radical about most of these changes( COMMON SENSE OR BANKING AND INVESTOR 101. I AGREE. ). A disinterested person would probably wonder why many of them had not been made long ago. A committee of people whose financial interests are somehow bound up with Wall Street is a different matter."

A much better article than the last one by Lewis. My disagreement is on the importance of the government guarantees, being, for me, paradoxically, the problem and the solution.