the market is rational, so they would not take risks that would threaten their very existence

TO BE NOTED: From Haaretz:

"Irrational everything

_{By Guy Rolnik}

Prof. Daniel Kahneman has dozens, perhaps hundreds, of stories about people's irrational behavior when it comes to making economic decisions. It's no wonder, because for dozens of years he and his late colleague Amos Tversky researched human behavior. Many of their studies concerned the making of financial decisions.

But the story Kahneman recalls when asked about the economic models at the root of the current financial crisis is actually taken from history, not an experiment. It concerns a group of Swiss soldiers who set out on a long navigation exercise in the Alps. The weather was severe and they got lost. After several days, with their desperation mounting, one of the men suddenly realized he had a map of the region.

They followed the map and managed to reach a town. When they returned to base and their commanding officer asked how they had made their way back, they replied, "We suddenly found a map." The officer looked at the map and said, "You found a map, all right, but it's not of the Alps, it's of the Pyrenees."

According to Kahneman, the moral of the story is that some of our economic models, perhaps those of the investment world, are worthless. But individual investors need security - maps of the Pyrenees - even if they are, in effect, worthless.

I first came to know Kahneman's work some 17 years ago, when I was studying for my bachelor's degree in economics at Tel Aviv University and took a course on the psychology of economics. At the time, Kahneman's course was considered entertaining and interesting, but marginal compared to "serious" economics courses, in which students learn that individuals make decisions rationally.

Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated, however, after many experiments done over many years, that individuals are irrational. Not only are they irrational, it's even possible to predict the irrational manner in which they will make economic decisions. Kahneman and Tversky found that people do not gather data in a systematic or statistical way, but usually make economic decisions based on "rules of thumb" - heuristics, to borrow the term they used.

For example, let's take two groups of people and ask the first if the tallest tree in the world is taller than 300 meters. Then let's ask them how tall the tallest tree in the world is. Then we repeat the exercise with the second group, asking them whether the tallest tree in the world is taller than 200 meters, and then how tall it is. At the end of the experiment, we find that the first group's average answer to the second question is, around 300 meters, and the second's is around 200 meters.

Why? Kahneman and Tversky say this is "anchoring": People tend to latch on to a certain "anchor" - usually one they come across by chance - instead of trying to use a more rational way to gather and process data and make economic decisions.

My second encounter with Kahneman came at a meeting of the World Economic Forum, in New York, in 2002. I spotted his name on the list of speakers and sent him an e-mail requesting an interview. He replied, "You must be mistaken. I am a professor of psychology, of no interest to anyone." Only after I insisted I knew exactly whom I was addressing, and that I remembered quite well his theory from my economics studies, did he agree to speak with me.

That year Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics; overnight, he became an international star, constantly quoted and cited. Today his theory of irrational decision making is considered an integral part of any discussion about economics.

'Nothing insightful to say'

But when I met him again two months ago at the World Economic Forum in Davos, he was the same modest Kahneman. "The truth is, I have nothing insightful to say," he warned me right off. "Nor am I involved in what they have been discussing at this session of the Forum. I've spent the last three days cloistered in my room writing. This is the first time I've ventured out. I must work."

When I asked him why he even bothered to come to Davos, he said, "I guess because Yossi Vardi kept asking me," referring to the veteran Israeli high-tech entrepreneur.

A few days before Davos, Kahneman appeared jointly with the mathematician Nassim Taleb in Munich. Taleb himself has become a major star during the current financial crisis, thanks to his books claiming that the financial establishment is unprepared to anticipate or handle various sudden events unfamiliar to historical statistics.

Not surprisingly, it turns out that Kahneman met Taleb five years ago in Rome, and the two men hit it off. They have since been exchanging ideas about our strange world, where economic models prove worthless in times of great crisis.

"People ignore the tremendous impact rare events can have on the decisions they make. People are simply unwilling to accept the fact that they are actually taking huge risks," Taleb says. "They prefer to cross the street with their eyes closed. Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, was driving a bus full of children with his eyes closed while he was in office. When you bet against rare events, over time you are always making a little bit of money. But when the rare event occurs, you lose big."

From Kahneman's point of view, the most important moment of the recent economic crisis came when Alan Greenspan admitted at a congressional hearing that his theory of the world had been mistaken. "Greenspan expected financial firms to protect their interests, because they are rational companies and the market is rational, so they would not take risks that would threaten their very existence," Kahneman says.

"Where did he go wrong? Because he did not distinguish between the firms and their 'agents' [their managers]. There is a huge gulf between the companies and their agents. Firms take the long view, while agents have short perspectives and take the short view. The compensation models of the corporation and their agents are different. The executives did not commit suicide when they took risks; it was the corporations managed by these agents that committed suicide.

"People are always asking me: 'Are the people who got caught up in the financial crisis idiots?' The answer is, the bank managers were not complete idiots. Greenspan's admission speaks for itself: The theory that a bank is some sort of rational agent that protects the public's interest is wrong. The assumption of rationality is a fallacious one in the first place, and in the second place, the assumption that a bank should be seen as a single, rational player is irrelevant. One must look at who is managing the bank - management that receives incentives to do things that are not connected to anybody's interests."

Not just optimism

The worlds of business and finance have long recognized the problem of conflicting interest between companies and executives; the surprising aspect of the world financial crisis, however, has been the behavior of millions of mortgage borrowers and investors. Here's where Kahneman's theory comes in.

"At the lowest level, you have the psychology of the borrowers - those who took out mortgages - who believed that the prices of real estate, of homes, would go up forever. This is an interesting phenomenon. It's not just optimism, it's not just that people believe what they're told; it goes deeper than this," he says.

"Psychology today differentiates between two methods of thinking: There is the intuitive method, and there is the rational one. The intuitive method is characterized by rapid learning, and it concludes very quickly that what has happened the last three times will happen forever, again and again."

Why is it that we believe that if it has happened three times, it will happen again?

"I once told a story about this: We once traveled from New York to Boston on a Sunday night, and we saw a car on fire on the side of the road. A week later, again on a Sunday night, we were traveling and again saw a car on fire in the same place. The fact is, we were less surprised the second time than the first because we had learned a rule: Cars burn at this spot.

"We find this everywhere - the speed at which people create rules, norms and expectations, even when they know it's ridiculous. This is the intuitive method at work. It remains true that whenever I travel, I always look for burning cars at that spot."

Over the last 40 years you have demonstrated that we never employ the statistical method of thinking, just the heuristic one - rules of thumb. Some economists today say the models were indeed based on statistics, but the problem is that they were based on statistics according to which the market goes up, rather than on long-term statistics.

"When it comes to finance, people link risk to volatility, but in reality, there is no connection between the two at all. There is a connection, but not when we're talking about huge risks. Greenspan and others believed that the global system - by virtue of its being global - was ipso facto more stable. Then it turned out that while it might have been more stable, it was also more extreme.

"In the last half year, the models simply didn't work. So the question arises: Why do people use models? I liken what is happening now to a system that forecasts the weather, and does so very well. People know when to take an umbrella when they leave the house, or when it will snow. Except what? The system can't predict hurricanes. Do we use the system anyway, or throw it out? It turns out they'll use it."

Okay, so they use it. But why don't they buy hurricane insurance?

"The question is, how much will the hurricane insurance cost? Since you can't predict these events, you would have to take out insurance against many things. If they had listened to all the warnings and tried to prevent these things, the economy would look a lot different than it does now. So an interesting question arises: After this crisis, will we arrive at something like that? It's hard for me to believe."

The financial world's models are built on the assumption that investors are rational. You have shown that not only are they not rational, they even deviate from what is rational or statistical, in predictable, systematic ways. Can we say that whoever recognized and accepted these deviations could have seen this crisis coming?

"It was possible to foresee, and some people did. There were quite a few smart people with a lot of experience who said bubbles are being created and they have to be allowed to burst by themselves. But it turns out that this bubble did not have to be allowed to burst by itself. I have a colleague at Princeton who says there were exactly five people who foresaw this crisis, and this does not include [Fed Chairman] Ben Bernanke. One of them is Prof. Robert Shiller, who also predicted the previous bubble. The problem is there were other economists who predicted this crisis, like Nouriel Roubini, but he also predicted some crises that never came to be."

He was one of those who predicted 10 crises out of three.

"Ten out of three is a pretty good record, relatively. But I conclude from the fact that only five people predicted the current crisis that it was impossible to predict it. In hindsight, it all seems obvious: Everyone seemed to be blind, only these five appeared to be smart. But there were a lot of smart people who looked at the situation and knew all the facts, and they did not predict the crisis."

Of all the observations and behaviors you have observed over the last 40 years - and you have observed many kinds of irrational behavior - which would you say is most responsible for the current crisis?

"Well, that's a good question, and it can be looked at from the lowest level: the borrowers, those who took out mortgages. What happened to them? They were really convinced that real estate prices would go up forever. How could they have believed such a thing? They believed it because people who had certain interests told them. They were not suspicious enough, and the market permitted it."

Of all your experiments, which demonstrates similar behaviors?

"The general phenomenon of suggestibility - when people believe too much in what is being suggested to them. It's related to the anchoring we saw before. How easy is it to influence people? You introduce a number into their heads, and they attribute importance to it when there really is none. There's a sucker born every minute."

So how do we deal with this? What are the lessons to be learned from this crisis?

"I think that in the future there will be rules obligating lenders to give much more information to borrowers. Financial firms' problems are less interesting from a psychological point of view. These are problems of agents and companies that economists already understand. The interesting psychological problem is why economists believe in their theory, but this is the problem with the theory, any theory. It leads to a certain blindness. It's difficult to see anything that deviates from it."

We only look for information that supports the theory and ignore the rest.

"Correct. That appears to be what happened with Greenspan: He had a theory under which the market operates, and that the market would correct itself."

A personal question. When you look at your own behavior in the world of economics, do you feel you make the same mistakes, or that you are aware and thus consider yourself immune?

"I am not immune, I am a coward. That's something else. Several years ago, I decided that I should not take any risks, that I want a European retirement, linked to the cost-of-living index. In the United States, there is no such thing. I asked an investment counselor to look into whether she could arrange a European retirement for me, something linked to the cost of living, without any risk. She threw me out of her office; she considered it something incompatible with American values."

So in what have you invested?

"Index-linked bonds. I know this is not popular. Many people think it's a mistake, but that's the mistake I make."

You've never owned stocks?

"I used to have a quarter to a third of my portfolio in stocks. Psychology teaches us that people like a combination of something safe and a gamble. I have something like that: a few stocks. But I don't advise anyone else to act that way."

Let's end with your story of the Swiss soldiers and the map of the Pyrenees. I know why the map helped the soldiers: it gave them confidence. But why didn't they use a map of the Alps? Why don't we use the right economic models, ones that are relevant to extreme cases as well?

"Look, it's possible that there simply is no map of the Alps, that there is nothing that can predict hurricanes."

‘green shoots’ sentiment currently doing the rounds

From Alphaville:

"Quote du jour, Roubini ‘green shoots’ edition Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Apr 21 12:57.

Nouriel Roubini on the ‘green shoots’ sentiment currently doing the rounds:

Related links:
The Susan Boyle Factor - FT Alphaville
Optimistically, pessimistic in the US - FT Alphaville

This entry was posted by Izabella Kaminska on Tuesday, April 21st, 2009 at 12:57 and is filed under Capital markets, People. Tagged with Geen shoots, nouriel roubini, Recession."

lies an ever-shifting horde of homeowners, bankers, business owners, unwitting investors -- in short, people

TO BE NOTED: From Knowledge@Wharton:

Hope, Greed and Fear: The Psychology behind the Financial Crisis Published : April 15, 2009 in Knowledge@Wharton

To explain the current economic crisis, the world of finance has a particular lexicon -- including, for example, credit default swaps, mark-to-market and securitized subprime mortgages. Psychologists, on the other hand, might use very different terms: hope, greed and fear.

The language of psychology helps to address the fact that behind every cut-and-dried statistic about falling home prices and other indicators of economic decline, lies an ever-shifting horde of homeowners, bankers, business owners, unwitting investors -- in short, people. And people often pay no heed to fine-tuned economic models by doing things that are not rational, are not in their best interest, and are justified not by numbers -- but by emotion.

"There are spreadsheets and financial statements and models and rules and regulations," said Carolyn Marvin, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communications. "On the other hand, there are these feelings we have."

Emotion, it can be argued, not only helped to lead America into the current economic crisis but may also be helping to keep it there. At a recent conference called, "Crisis of Confidence: The Recession and the Economy of Fear," sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania's Department of Psychiatry and the Psychoanalytic Center of Philadelphia, an interdisciplinary panel explored the psychological elements behind today's economy.

"Is there a systematic way to think about our feelings when it comes to the economy?" asked Marvin, the panel moderator. The word "confidence" itself has a double edge to it, encompassing optimism on the one hand and delusion on the other. And could there be a psychological tinge to economic vocabulary itself? "The powers that be are avoiding the word 'depression,'" Marvin pointed out, "which describes not only a state of the market but certainly a clinical condition."

Psychological factors are at work behind the crisis, the panel agreed, although each focused on a different element: mania and over-optimism behind the housing bubble, a lack of self-control by consumers hooked on debt, and the shock and feelings of betrayal of many Americans who thought they were making safe investments, but now find themselves facing a frightening and uncertain future.

'An Aspect of Mania'

Like so many others in history, today's economic crisis began with a bubble, according to Wharton finance professor Richard Herring. "Bubbles occur when people are willing to buy something simply because they believe they can sell it for a higher price. [Bubbles] often have an aspect of mania."

Property bubbles are nothing new, said Herring, who presented a chart of home prices during a 400-year period in Herengracht, a canal area in central Amsterdam. Over those centuries, real home prices increased annually by only 0.2% on average, "but in between, [they were] up 100%, down 50%. There was huge volatility."

Real estate booms and busts happen in very long cycles -- on average about every 20 years. Consequently, when housing prices are going up, few remember that they ever went down. This was certainly the case in the recent crisis, since housing prices only went up between 1975 and 2006. According to Herring, property markets are especially prone to booms and busts because of their nature: They have no central clearinghouse of information about prices, transaction costs are high and trading is infrequent, and the supply of property is relatively fixed in the short term. Because the cycles are decades long, it is difficult to tell what a piece of property should be worth in the long run. "We really don't know what the price should be, so it's always difficult to tell whether you are looking at a bubble or simply improving fundamentals of the economy."

Housing booms and busts are "almost always linked to the banking system," Herring added. "When something good happens in an economy, it tends to drive up real estate prices, and banks tend to lend to support that, because people now have collateral." Optimism about rising prices feeds the frenzy, and as an increasing number of novice investors enter the market, prices and enthusiasm also increase. "You get into this upward spiral that can take you a very long way for a very long time. You may ask where the supervisors and regulators are in all of this, and often, they tend to support it. They really like to see loans that are collateralized by real estate because it's tangible."

Call it "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness," Herring quipped, showing a slide of a half-built skyscraper from a recent property boom-gone-bust in Thailand, "but really it's the fallacy of misplaced concrete." Again, emotion plays heavily into the cycle. People suffer "disaster myopia," either because they simply can't imagine a downturn happening, or they assume the probability of it happening is so low that it really isn't worth worrying about, Herring stated.

Ever-rising Home Prices

"I think we agree that over-optimism is perhaps a lot of what got us into this mess," said Wharton business and public policy professor Jeremy Tobacman, a panel participant. "There was rampant over-optimism about housing prices."

Tobacman pointed to a survey by Case and Shiller in 2003 of homeowner attitudes in four major markets -- Boston, Milwaukee, Los Angeles and San Francisco. In all four markets, more than 80% of homeowners surveyed said they believed home prices would rise over the next few years. When homeowners were asked how much they expected the price to change in the next months, mean responses ranged from 7.2% in Boston to 10.5% in Los Angeles.

"Even more astonishing than these one-year numbers are the numbers for decades," Tobacman noted. When faced with the question, "On average over the next 10 years, how much do you expect the value of your property to change each year?" homeowners in Milwaukee said they expected prices to rise by 11.7%. Homeowners in San Francisco said they expected a 15.7% return.

People often make poor economic choices because they are overly optimistic about what they will do in the future, Tobacman said. For example, people transfer credit card balances over to cards with high long-term interest rates because they believe they will pay everything off before the much lower teaser rate expires. (Most don't.) Borrowers who default on payday loans typically pay interest amounting to 90% of the loan's principal before they finally give up and stop making payments.

One study of a health club found that members who worked out on average just four times a month chose to pay a monthly membership fee of $85, even though the gym also offered a pay-as-you-go rate of $10 per visit. "When people are polled about their beliefs [as to] what they're going to do, there is a radical refusal to accept reality," said Tobacman. "Myopia may be willful in that we don't want to contemplate undesired outcomes."

In the recent bubble, both buyers and lenders were overly optimistic about what the future would bring. Buyers ignored the possibility that they might not be able to keep up on payments because they assumed the prices of homes would go up and they would be able to sell or refinance. Likewise, lenders ignored the possibility of default because rising home prices had made it easy to get bad loans off the books. Tobacman shared a quote from John Kenneth Galbraith's The Great Crash, a history of the events leading up to the Great Depression: "The bankers were also a source of encouragement to those who wished to believe in the permanence of the boom. A great many of them abandoned their historic role as the guardians of the nation's fiscal pessimism and enjoyed a brief respite of optimism."

Said Tobacman: "I think the question is, when exactly does this powerful impetus to believe in a rosy future get disciplined by the market and when does it get out of hand?"

The explosion of consumer debt behind the crisis is also an issue of self-control, University of Pennsylvania psychology professor Angela Lee Duckworth noted. "It's a perennial human problem, to delay gratification. We all struggle, from little children to the oldest and wisest, with the problem of self-control."

Duckworth defined self-control as the ability to negotiate a situation in which there are two choices and one is obviously superior, but the other choice is nevertheless more tempting. For example, a dieter faced with a chocolate cake knows that it is best not to eat it, but often makes a choice to eat it anyway. In the case of the housing bubble, homebuyers failed to exercise self-control when they bought larger homes than they knew they could afford. Lenders failed to exercise self-control when they chose to write shaky mortgages in order to bank short-term profits.

For years, Americans have saved less and consumed more, Duckworth said. She pointed to the conclusion of a recent editorial in The Wall Street Journal by Chapman University research associate Steven Gjerstand and Chapman University economics professor and 2002 Nobel Laureate Vernon L. Smith: "A financial crisis that originates in consumer debt, especially in consumer debt concentrated at the low end of the wealth and income distribution, can be transmitted quickly and forcefully into the financial system. It appears that we're witnessing the second great consumer debt crash, the end of a massive consumption binge," the editorial stated.

Added Duckworth: "It seems that my father was right during those conversations around the dinner table when he would say, 'Americans are living beyond their means.' I guess we were. And I think that's in part because all human beings want to live beyond their means."

Self-control is an aptitude that changes dramatically over a lifetime, according to Duckworth. This is because the prefrontal cortex, the area of the brain that allows human beings to control impulses and delay gratification, matures more slowly than other parts of the brain. "Sub cortical regions and the brain stem are more or less online as soon as you're born, if not very soon after ... so emotion and impulse in these areas are functioning at full throttle" right away, she said. But the prefrontal cortex is not fully developed until a person is much older -- somewhere in the late 20s and possibly as late as the early 50s.

"There's a lag problem here, where we have our emotions and we have our impulses ... but you have to wait until you're at least 25 before the frontal cortex is in great shape to actually rein in those lower-level desires."

Studies by psychologist Walter Mischel that measure how well a preschool child could delay gratification (asking the child to choose between eating one marshmallow now or getting two later) predicted a range of outcomes that happened later in life, from SAT scores to divorce to use of crack cocaine, Duckworth noted. "I think that these almost unbelievable findings are in fact believable, because Walter Mischel was able to distill in a simple testing situation the classic human dilemma that we all face every day, which is: more later, or a little bit now?"

These and later studies on delayed gratification have shown that self-discipline is a bigger predictor of later success than other factors such as I.Q., Duckworth stated. A better understanding of the psychology of self-control could help "develop government policies that would presumably accommodate the realities of human nature."

A Question of Trust

"What happens when the bubble breaks, as it inevitably does?" Herring asked. The pendulum swings back to the other extreme. "People find it all too easy to imagine that bad things can happen to the market and they withdraw. And they tend to overshoot. They will act very, very risk averse for quite a long time until they are persuaded that [real estate] is once again a safe asset to hold."

According to David M. Sachs, a training and supervision analyst at the Psychoanalytic Center of Philadelphia, the crisis today is not one of confidence, but one of trust. "Abusive financial practices were unchecked by personal moral controls that prohibit individual criminal behavior, as in the case of [Bernard] Madoff, and by complex financial manipulations, as in the case of AIG." The public, expecting to be protected from such abuse, has suffered a trauma of loss similar to that after 9/11. "Normal expectations of what is safe and dependable were abruptly shattered," Sachs noted. "As is typical of post-traumatic states, planning for the future could not be based on old assumptions about what is safe and what is dangerous. A radical reversal of how to be gratified occurred."

People now feel more gratified saving money than spending it, Sachs suggested. They have trouble trusting promises from the government because they feel the government has let them down.

He framed his argument with a fictional patient named Betty Q. Public, a librarian with two teenage children and a husband, John, who had recently lost his job. "She felt betrayed because she and her husband had invested conservatively and were double-crossed by dishonest, greedy businessmen, and now she distrusted the government that had failed to protect them from corporate dishonesty. Not only that, but she had little trust in things turning around soon enough to enable her and her husband to accomplish their previous goals.

"By no means a sophisticated economist, she knew ... that some people had become fantastically wealthy by misusing other people's money -- hers included," Sachs said. "In short, John and Betty had done everything right and were being punished, while the dishonest people were going unpunished."

Helping an individual recover from a traumatic experience provides a useful analogy for understanding how to help the economy recover from its own traumatic experience, Sachs pointed out. The public will need to "hold the perpetrators of the economic disaster responsible and take what actions they can to prevent them from harming the economy again." In addition, the public will have to see proof that government and business leaders can behave responsibly before they will trust them again, he argued.

"Once a person has been traumatized, promises ... are experienced as dangerous -- not safe -- because they require trust to believe," said Sachs. "It is up to the victim to decide when she can trust again. This takes time."

"how do we explain an increase in optimism? "

Here's another take by Lawrence H. White on Casey Mulligan's notion of Optimism causing the Housing Bubble:

"If I understand him rightly, I don’t much disagree with Professor Mulligan. We agree that Federal Reserve policy acted to promote the housing price boom by lowering real interest rates. The difficult question is: what share of the boom can we attribute to monetary policy, and what share to other independent sources? Applying Professor Mulligan’s way of computing the impact of lower real interest rates alone on the present discounted values of houses, correct anticipation in 2002 of real T-bill rates — which were about to go 200 basis points lower for the next three years — can account for only around a six percent rise in house prices. Thus the milder-discounting effect by itself accounts for only a fraction of the actual run-up in prices observed, assuming correct anticipations. The present-value calculation is straightforward.

We can get a bit more impact out of lower interest rates by noting that the lowering of mortgage lending standards implied an even larger drop in risk-adjusted mortgage rates than in risk-free Treasury rates. Market participants did not have any clear basis in historical time series for anticipating that this drop would reverse itself soon.

Still, I agree that the joint hypothesis “real interest rate anticipations were correct and they alone fully explain the rise in house prices” is untenable. Of course, we already knew that anticipations of house prices could not have been correct, given that nobody would pay $300,000 for a house in 2006 that he knew would be worth only $200,000 two years later. "

I agree with this. No Spigot Theory.

"Professor Mulligan reasonably proposes to attribute the bulk of the rise in house prices to some kind of ex-post-mistaken (but not necessarily irrationally exuberant) anticipations, offering the hypothesis that “it was optimism that raised housing prices, not much of anything tangible during the boom. Whether it was optimism about future interest rates, future tastes, or future technology is more of a quibble.” Optimism about “tastes” here includes optimism about the future growth of demand in particular local housing markets. Something like that would seem to be required to explain why the house price boom was so highly concentrated in a few states. We can’t explain such concentration by appealing only to optimism about technology or national economic policy variables.

An appeal to optimism, of course, doesn’t really explain events but simply gives us a reframed question: how do we explain an increase in optimism? I suggest that optimism (regarding whatever) during this period was not independent of the rising rate of aggregate nominal income growth that was being fueled by Fed policy. Expansionary monetary policy may have (at least cyclically) effects on relative prices and real variables, like the real demand for houses, through income channels, not only through its effect on the real interest rate. I anticipate, and agree, with Professor Mulligan’s likely response that more needs to be done to quantify these other effects."

There seems good reason to believe that their was such an overabundance and overly magnified aspect of Wishful Thinking in this current situation. However, for the explanation, we need to understand the presuppositions, assumptions, and context of this explosion of Wishful Thinking. I believe that a lot of it comes down to an overestimation of what government can do, and simply thinking of the actors in this drama as free market adherents misses the true nature and assumptions of their belief system, which includes plenty of government intervention when it's in their interest.

"that it was optimism that raised housing prices, not much of anything tangible during the boom."

I often find myself agreeing with Casey Mulligan, although I'm not sure why. But once again, I agree with his basic point:

"Professor White showed that one-year real interest rates were low during the housing boom. That’s a good starting point because, if the Fed can affect anything real, it is the short-term interest rate. Now let’s use that information to demonstrate that the impact on housing prices is minimal.

Since I will demonstrate that the housing-price impact is small, I will assume that the supply of housing is fixed; an elastic supply of housing would only reduce the price impact below what I calculate here.

Each house in place today produces services for a number of years. To a good approximation, we can assume that each house lasts forever, except that it depreciates exponentially (but slowly). The market value of the house is the present value of those services. Low interest rates can raise housing prices (although not much), because future services are discounted less.

Suppose that annual real interest rates were going to be one percentage point (100 basis points) lower for a year. Then the cost of buying a house, holding it for a year, and then selling it would be essentially one percent less. The low one-year interest rate would not affect the selling price at the end of the year because, by assumption, the reduction lasted only for a year and the next buyer will be back to normal interest rates. So the source of benefit from the low rate is that the initial buyer reduces the carrying cost for a year.

A 100-basis-point-lower interest rate for one year would justify paying about $202,000 for a house that would ultimately be worth $200,000. A 100-basis-point-lower interest rate for two years would raise purchase prices by about two percent. (Actually, it would be less, because of the discounting of the second year, not to mention the supply response.) A 200-basis-point reduction for two years would raise purchase prices by less than four percent, etc.

Thus, interest-rate reductions for a short horizon do raise housing prices, but not much by the standards of this recent housing boom when housing prices were tens of percentage points higher (according to Case-Shiller, practically 100 percent higher). A house that would ultimately be worth $200,000 was actually selling for something in the neighborhood of $300,000.

Perhaps Professor White would argue that market participants expected short term interest rates to remain low for much longer than a couple of years. If so, he is on shaky ground. First, such a claim is at odds with long-term interest-rate data. As I indicated in my article, long-term mortgage rates were not low during the housing boom. It’s not hard to find commentary from those years recognizing the low short-term rates were not expected to last."

I agree with this. The low interest rates do not explain this crisis. At best, they are a necessary condition.

"Second, such a claim gets closer to my hypothesis: that it was optimism that raised housing prices, not much of anything tangible during the boom. Whether it was optimism about future interest rates, future tastes, or future technology is more of a quibble."

What does optimism mean?

1.	a disposition or tendency to look on the more favorable side of events or conditions and to expect the most favorable outcome.

2.	the belief that good ultimately predominates over evil in the world.

3.	the belief that goodness pervades reality.

4.	the doctrine that the existing world is the best of all possible worlds.

It would seem that it is 1 that he means. The most favorable outcome in:
1) Interest Rates
2) Future Tastes
3) Future Technology

I prefer "wishful thinking":

interpretation of facts, actions, words, etc., as one would like them to be rather than as they really are; imagining as actual what is not.

I prefer this phrase because I believe that people knew that they were taking risks, but chose to ignore them. There was a real disposition to ignore reality and history and even common sense.I'm not quite sure that they were optimistic. There was too much uncertainty in the world and too little faith in the Bush Administration for optimism. I hope that I'm making the difference clear.

I believe that much of this malady has to do with a general belief in the incompetence of the Bush Administration. So, my views, they don't qualify as a theory, predict that there will be a major change in the perception of our situation after we have left President Bush behind. The swearing in of President Obama should lead to more optimism, if you will, than we see now. I don't like how many predictions I've given on this blog. Perhaps it's time to sign off.