So, there's little evidence now of inflationary pressures

TO BE NOTED: From Econbrowser:

"In Search of ... Hyperinflationary Expectations

With large budget deficits in place and projected going forward, as well as the expansion of the Fed's balance sheet, there's been some talk of inflationary pressures, and even hyper-inflation [0] McCain. I wondered if these fears were manifested in survey- and market-based expectations measures.

For certain, there is little pressure apparent in short term forecasts like the WSJ and Survey of Professional Forecasters. This makes sense (at least if one believes in the Keynesian conception of an output gap [1]) given the amount of slack displayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Median expected ten year inflation recorded as of second month of each quarter, from Survey of Professional Forecasters (blue, left scale), actual CBO-defined output gap (red line), and WSJ forecasted (purple triangle), in log percentage points. NBER defined recessions shaded gray; second recession assumed to end 2009Q3. Source: Cleveland Fed, BEA, GDP 2009Q1 advance release, and WSJ May survey [xls], and CBO potential GDP (9 January 2009).

I also plot the median expectation of ten-year inflation. Note that this measure has not budged much at all.

This data, of course, will not convince those skeptical of survey-based measures. What about market based measures? The standard approach is to subtract the TIPS yield from the Treasury yield. We know for a variety of reasons, this calculation can lead to misleading results. However, the Cleveland Fed has stopped publishing its adjusted series:

October 31, 2008

We have discontinued the liquidity-adjusted TIPS expected inflation estimates for the time being. The adjustment was designed for more normal liquidity premiums. We believe that the extreme rush to liquidity is affecting the accuracy of the estimates.

With that caveat in mind, Figure 2 displays the implied ten year expected inflation rate.

Figure 2: Difference between ten year constant maturity Treasury yields and ten year constant maturity TIPS, monthly data. Series GS10 and FII10. Source: St. Louis Fed FRED.

Some people are looking to commodity prices as indicators of expected inflation. I'd say that making inferences this way is fraught with difficulties, because changes in such commodity prices will incorporate both relative price and price level effects.

So, there's little evidence now of inflationary pressures. That being said, there's plenty to worry about as time goes on (as Jim recounts). And even if inflationary expectations remain well anchored, we do have to keep an eye on possible crowding out due to higher interest rates (all of us, except Dick Cheney, who didn't ever worry about deficits as the Bush Administration ran up trillions in debt [3]).

Posted by Menzie Chinn "

sheer hypocrisy of many Congressional Republicans who, having never uttered a peep about the huge deficits under George W. Bush

TO BE NOTED: From the NY TIMES:

"It’s No Time to Stop This Train

By ALAN S. BLINDER

CONTRARY to what you may have heard from some doomsayers, 2009 is not 1930 redux. What we must guard against, instead, is 2010 or 2011 becoming another 1936.

Realistically, there is little danger that the economy is heading toward a repeat performance of the Great Depression — when real gross domestic product in the United States declined 27 percent and unemployment soared to 25 percent. What we have is bad enough: our worst recession since the 1930s. But unless our leaders behave unbelievably foolishly, we will not repeat the tragic slide into the abyss of 1930 to 1933 — for two main reasons.

First, our economy has many built-in safeguards that did not exist back then — like unemployment insurance, Social Security and federal deposit insurance, to name just three. These programs serve as safety nets that cushion the fall. And while they are certainly not strong enough to prevent recessions, they should be enough to prevent another depression.

The more important reason is that Barack Obama, Timothy F. Geithner and Ben S. Bernanke are not Herbert Hoover, Andrew Mellon and Eugene Meyer. (Who’s that? Mr. Meyer was the Federal Reserve chairman from September 1930 to May 1933.) In stark contrast to the laissez-faire crowd that ruled the roost in 1930 and 1931, our current economic leaders are not waiting for the sagging economy to right itself. Rather, they have taken numerous extraordinary steps already — and stand ready to do more if necessary.

That’s the good news. But even if another depression is next to impossible, there is still the danger that next year, or the year after, might turn into 1936. Let me explain.

From its bottom in 1933 to 1936, the G.D.P. climbed spectacularly (albeit from a very low base), averaging gains of almost 11 percent a year. But then, both the Fed and the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt reversed course.

In the summer of 1936, the Fed looked at the large volume of excess reserves piled up in the banking system, concluded that this mountain of liquidity could be fodder for future inflation, and began to withdraw it. This tightening of monetary policy continued into 1937, in a weak economy that was ill-prepared for it.

About the same time, President Roosevelt looked at what seemed to be enormous federal budget deficits, concluded that it was time to put the nation’s fiscal house in order and started raising taxes and reducing spending. This tightening of fiscal policy transformed the federal budget from a deficit of 3.8 percent of G.D.P. in 1936 to a surplus of 0.2 percent of G.D.P. in 1937 — a swing of four percentage points in a single year. (Today, a swing that large would be almost $600 billion.)

Thus, both monetary and fiscal policies did an abrupt about-face in 1936 and 1937, and the consequences were as predictable as they were tragic. The United States economy, which had been rapidly climbing out of the cellar from 1933 to 1936, was kicked rudely down the stairs again, and America experienced the so-called recession within the depression. Real G.D.P. contracted 3.4 percent from 1937 to 1938; the total G.D.P. decline during the recession, which lasted from mid-1937 to mid-1938, was even larger.

The moral of the story should be clear: Prematurely changing fiscal and monetary policies — from stepping hard on the accelerator to slamming on the brake — can be hazardous to the economy’s health.

Wow, we’ve learned a lot since the ’30s, right? Well, maybe not. For the echoes of 1936 are being heard right now, even before the current recession hits bottom.

If you’ve been paying attention, you know that a number of critics of the Fed are sounding alarms over the huge stockpile of excess reserves it has created — more than $775 billion at last count. What these critics are fretting about now is exactly what goaded the Fed into action in 1936: that the vast pool of loose money will ultimately be inflationary. The clear inference is that some of it should be withdrawn before it’s too late.

On the fiscal side, many of President Obama’s critics are complaining vociferously about the huge federal budget deficits. Try to ignore, if you can, the sheer hypocrisy of many Congressional Republicans who, having never uttered a peep about the huge deficits under George W. Bush, are suddenly models of budget probity. But whatever the motives, the worries of today’s deficit hawks sound eerily reminiscent of Roosevelt in 1936 and 1937.

FORTUNATELY, Mr. Bernanke is a keen student of the Great Depression who will not allow the Fed to repeat the errors of 1936-37. But his critics, both inside and outside the Fed, are already branding his policies as dangerously inflationary, and no Fed chairman wants to be called an inflationist.

Similarly, I hope and believe that President Obama will not transform himself from the spendthrift Roosevelt of 1933 to the deficit-hawk Roosevelt of 1936 — at least not until the economy is back on solid ground. That said, a growing flock of budget hawks are already showing their talons. They will have their day — but please, not yet.

To avoid a replay of the policy disasters of 1936-37, both the Fed and our elected officials must stay the course. Mark Twain once explained that, while history does not repeat itself, it often rhymes. We don’t want any rhymes just now.

Alan S. Blinder is a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve. He has advised many Democratic politicians."

“it is hard to visualize a meaningful reduction in the size of the federal government’s budget deficit without a substantial increase in revenues,”

TO BE NOTED: From the WSJ:

"Warning: Tax Hikes Ahead – Eventually

So says Roger Kubarych of the New York office of Unicredit. “it is hard to visualize a meaningful reduction in the size of the federal government’s budget deficit without a substantial increase in revenues,” he writes in a note today. ‘Otherwise, upward pressures on US interest rates will become harder and harder to resist.

His argument:

• Budget deficits projected in White House and congressional budgets are huge. “Above $1.8 trillion in the current fiscal year, 13% of GDP, followed by gradual reductions that would still leave the estimated deficit above $650 billion (just over 4% of GDP) by 2012. From then on, deficits would expand indefinitely.



• Borrowing from abroad cannot continue to increase forever. “Past experience suggests that the US government has increasingly depended on foreign private and official purchases of Treasury securities to finance its deficits. But access to foreign funding is not unlimited, and domestic savings are insufficient to take their place.”
• A deficit reduction effort is likely after the recession ends. “It is highly likely President Obama will face the unenviable task of proposing new taxes, perhaps even including European-style value-added taxation. This week, the president took the first step toward grappling with that challenge by announcing a Task Force on tax reform to be led by presidential counselor Paul Volcker. The Volcker group has until December to figure out what to recommend.”

“While part of the mandate is to close loopholes in the existing system, there is little doubt that the Volcker group will look at such issues as the Social Security payroll tax, which is now the only federal tax paid by some 40% of workers, and pros and cons of introducing a European-style value-added tax or a nationwide sales tax, both to raise revenues and to encourage a shift over time from consumption to savings.”

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