Showing posts with label Inflation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Inflation. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 9, 2009

And presently, I don’t believe the reason that rates are backing up has to do with a lack of confidence in the Federal Reserve

From Alphaville:

"
Treasuries out of line with interest rate expectations

The curious case of rising Treasury bond yields continues to attract various theories and explanations in the market. The latest doing the rounds is that it may have nothing to do with rising interest rate expectations at all. Rather, it is more about the yield curve becoming the function of an exceptional rate of supply, as well as some unusual market dynamics stemming simply from, well, unusual times.

Barclays Capital points out the Fed would otherwise have to raise rates to as much as 5.5 per cent by the end of next year to meet current market expectations based on the two-year yield. They suggest this is somewhat unrealistic given ongoing rising unemployment and negative pressures on the economy.

Among those backing the over-supply theory on Tuesday was also Dallas Federal Reserve president Richard Fisher. He told Fox Business news (our emphasis):
Long-term, as Milton Friedman said, sustainable inflation is a monetary phenomenon so we are going to have to be careful as an institution — the Federal Reserve — to make sure that we pull things back in, at the right time…And presently, I don’t believe the reason that rates are backing up has to do with a lack of confidence in the Federal Reserve. I think it has to do largely with a very simple phenomenon, supply and demand. There’s an enormous need for the Treasury to borrow. You mentioned the numbers earlier. Today about $35 billion will be financed through operations, $65 billion this week as you mentioned. Probably a trillion over this remainder of this fiscal year and under these circumstances, rates are indeed backing up as you mentioned in the Treasury sector, particularly at the longer end of the yield curve. I don’t think it’s unusual. I don’t think it’s wrong. I don’t think it’s odd. It’s just happening.”

In agreement too were primary treasury dealers. According to a Bloomberg survey, 15 of the 16 US government security dealers said policy makers would likely keep the target for overnight loans between banks in a range of zero to 0.25 percent this year. Bloomberg quoted one of the dealers as saying:

“The market seems wrong on this one,” said Eric Liverance, head of derivatives strategy in Stamford, Connecticut, at UBS AG, one of the dealers. UBS predicts that the Fed will remain on hold until June 2010. “High unemployment and a continued bad housing market will prevent the Fed from raising rates.”

Nevertheless, some still remain sceptical that massive supply alone can by enough of an explanation to justify the bond-yield conundrum. David Rosenberg of Gluskin Sheff writing on Tuesday was among those seeing some genuine inflationary forces at play. As he wrote:

The question is what is driving yields higher and what will cause the run-up to stop? Well, much is being made of supply and massive Treasury issuance, and to be sure, this has accounted for some of the yield backup but not nearly all of it — after all, Aussie bond yields has soared more than 100bps despite the country’s fiscal prudence. Clearly, the ‘green shoots’ from the data has been a factor forcing real rates higher. The doubling in oil prices and the rise in other commodity prices has generated some increase in inflation expectations, and the 40%+ move in equity prices and sustained spread narrowing in the corporate bond market has triggered a flight out of safe-havens (like Treasuries), and part of the move has been technical in nature owing to convexity-selling in the mortgage market with refinancings plummeting since early April. But, he added, those forces could easily be reversed by the end of the year:

Where we think the greatest potential will be is in inflation expectations — they should reverse course in coming months. Three different articles in today’s Wall Street Journal (WSJ) lead us to that conclusion: • More Firms Cut Pay to Save Jobs (page A4) • To Sustain iPhone, Apple Halves Prices (B1) • In Recession Specials, Small Firms Revise Pricing (B5)

The sudden flattening of the curve experienced in the last two sessions, meanwhile, did see something of a reversal on Tuesday. But, according to Barcap, that doesn’t necessarily mean the market should be counting on more steepening in the near-term.

As they explain, the continued unwinding of “steepener” trades on profit-taking, could very easily push front-end yields higher once again:

Barcap Treasury report

But while yields on traditional bond securities stay elevated, overnight rates in the Treasury repo market appear to be heading lower. Dow Jones reported on Monday that two-year treasury issues are now also so sought after that like just like 10-year securities they have begun trading at negative rates. As the wire report stated:

1601 GMT [Dow Jones] There’s still a severe shortage of 10-year Treasurys in overnight repo. And now the two-year’s also quoted negative, at -0.05%, though not as deeply as the -2.65% rate on the benchmark, according to GovPx. A negative rate means borrowers are paying an additional premium to get their hands on the security. All other issues trading close to 0.30% general collateral.

Related links:
Treasury sell-off goes short
- FT Alphaville
“The adjustment in the US Treasuries market is THE story in financial markets”
- FT Alphaville
US Treasuries selling off, benchmark yield curve hits record wide - FT Alphaville



Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat Jun 9 20:57
What you're saying then, is that, for example, when people buy 2 year bonds from the govt, some people are buying because:
1) They think that the interest rate of the bond reflects the interest rate expected for the next two years:
"interest rate expectations"
2) There aren't enough 2 year buyers for the govts needs, so it has to raise the price by paying a higher interest rate:
"an exceptional rate of supply"
So, one group is holding out for higher interest because they know that the govt needs to pay them more right now, while the other group is holding out because they don't want to buy a bond at a yield below inflation going forward.
But shouldn't there be more demand if investors were certain that inflation was going to be below these yields? And shouldn't inflation hawks want a rate safely above the expected rate of inflation? Couldn't this then just be an equilibrium between the two? Or what am I missing? Everything?

Saturday, May 16, 2009

This week, the hard economic data reminds us that the global recession is ongoing

TO BE NOTED: From News N Economics:

"World Economic Reports (May 8-15): still heading down, but "not as fast" story gaining traction

Friday, May 15, 2009

This week, the hard economic data reminds us that the global recession is ongoing: exports remain deep in the red; retail sales disappoint; inflation gets a small energy bump but still down; and industrial production declines. However, the data are consistent with the story of a slowing economic decline, foretold by several the "green shoot" survey reports (see last week's World Economic Reports).

Industrial Production: Still heading down, but at a slower rate

The chart illustrates the industrial production index for Germany and the UK (seasonally adjusted), and the growth rate for Malaysia and India (to adjust for seasonal variations) through March 2009. The rate of decline is slowing in Germany - actually, Germany's index went unchanged over the month - and the UK, improving over the year in Malaysia, but still heading down in India. A stabilization in the industrial sector may be afoot: the cliff diving is likely complete.

Exports: Same as industrial production...stabilization?

The chart illustrates annual export growth through March for Canada, Germany, Malaysia, and the US, and through April for China. Although China, Malaysia, and Canada turned down on an annual basis, the precipitous decline seems to have passed. We look for a trend to show stabilization.

Retail Sales: Struggling

The chart illustrates annual retail sales growth through April for China and the US, and through March for Singapore. Retail sales are struggling to make way. We wait to see if the various stimulus packages will get consumers back to the stores and auto dealerships; but let's not hold our breath quite yet.

Inflation: Energy and food prices create some volatility

The chart illustrates annual inflation through April 2009. Clearly, the momentum is down on a sharp drawback in aggregate demand. However, the recent bump in energy and food is creating some volatility (some upward momentum against the downward pressure). Norway is experiencing stronger-than-expected inflation, as the economy fairs better than others; but don't worry, inflation will probably fall, too.

The headline of the day:
Eurozone economy took a dive in Q1

The chart compares Eurozone GDP to US GDP: ironic that the US is the epicenter of the global economic crisis,; was able to pass on the pain simply through trade flows; and now foreign economies take a sharper U-turn.

Overall, the global economic decline appears to be slowing; however, the recovery is still tentative.

Rebecca Wilder"

Friday, May 15, 2009

inflation has disappeared and we are wondering if and when it will come back

TO BE NOTED: From Supply and Demand (in that order):

"Inflation, We Need You

When his mom would leave the house shopping for a few hours, my toddler son used to go the window and yell out "Mommy, I need you!"

That's pretty much where our economy is right now: inflation has disappeared and we are wondering if and when it will come back. This morning the BLS released the April CPI, which (seasonally adjusted) was lower than March. The seasonally adjusted CPI has fallen month-to-month five out of the last seven months.

The chart below shows the seasonally adjusted CPI (blue) for 2008-9 and the seasonally unadjusted CPI (red) for the 1929-30 (sorry, no seasonal adjustment is available for 1929-30).


Thursday, May 14, 2009

The paradox of high inflation is that it can make stocks, claims on productive assets very cheap

TO BE NOTED: From ducati998:

"Liquidity, velocity and stocks

snoopytyping_800x600

M2_velocity

The function of money is to facilitate exchange, and eliminate barter, thus speeding up, and expanding trade. The demand for money is increased by the following two conditions:

*Increase in productivity
*Increase in prices

The demand for money falls when the opposite conditions are operant:

*Fall in productivity
*Fall in prices

The Federal Reserve and Treasury have been increasing the volume of money within the system. Productivity has been falling, curtailed by falling demand for products & services that have excess capacity. The money supply has continued to grow.

fredgraph

Who are the recipients of the increased money supply? One of the rules of inflation is that the early recipients of new money, are allowed to buy assets with the new money thus essentially buying at a discount. The later you enter the chain, the greater the expropriation of your wealth that you will suffer.

The banks, auto-makers, and any other lame ducks that you can think of. Essentially anyone who was profilgate and stupid in combination.

What will they do with the new money? Hoarding will take place in some instances, but, many will buy assets with the money, to take advantage of a small window of opportunity of increased buying power that the new money affords.

Stocks have been rising, but the common concensus would seem to indicate that it is not Mutual Fund Managers, Pension Fund Managers etc who are driving the market. However, the banks have on aggregate, have been simply hoarding, rebuilding their capital ratios via Federal Reserve interest payments on said reserves.

Surplus money, or liquidity, needs to find a home. Rising asset prices, provide such a home. Rising prices remove liquidity, and by definition drive an increase in the demand for money.

The surplus money or liquidity, in pushing prices higher therefore eliminates the surplus supply of money, creating in time a deficit. A money deficit can be corrected through selling products/services.

What happens though when money is continuously pumped into the system? Prices will continue to rise. The Federal Reserve and other Central Banks, have not yet considered slowing the creation of new money, as, the economy, and particularly unemployment remain critical issues to their re-election, albeit, for Obama, 2.5yrs away.

Time will play a factor within the advent of an increase in liquidity and rising prices, as it takes time for the increased liquidity to leak out. Banks, as previously alluded, are not buying, rather, they are hoarding, rebuilding Balance Sheets.

Treasury paper, for psychological reasons, has been a recipient of much liquidity, although, with a failed auction last week, this asset class may well start leaking liquidity back into alternate assets. Banks, Pension Funds and Sovereign holders constitute major players.

China, is not happy. China has already made noises with regard to replacing the US dollar as the Reserve Currency. China will not be blind to the threat of increased liquidity within the Banks and what it must eventually mean. As a country in surplus, as opposed to a US deficit, China can withdraw liquidity, at no discount, due to US liquidity provision via Quantitative Easing, and reallocate this liquidity, [this holds true for Petro-dollars etc]

Where would this liquidity flow to?

The paradox of high inflation is that it can make stocks, claims on productive assets very cheap. Asia and South American inflations of recent times bear this out.

Although the official inflation rate is negligible, the creation of so much new money has created the potential of a serious inflation should it be released, highly possible."

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Given the choice, erring on the side of inflation would be less catastrophic than erring on the side of deflation.

TO BE NOTED: From the Economist:

"Deflation in America

The greater of two evils
May 7th 2009
From The Economist print edition


Inflation is bad, but deflation is worse


MERLE HAZARD, an unusually satirical country and western crooner, has captured monetary confusion better than anyone else. “Inflation or deflation,” he warbles, “tell me if you can: will we become Zimbabwe or will we be Japan?”

How do you guard against both the deflationary forces of America’s worst recession since the 1930s and the vigorous response of the Federal Reserve, which has in effect cut interest rates to zero and rapidly expanded its balance-sheet? On May 4th Paul Krugman, a Nobel laureate in economics, gave warning that Japan-style deflation loomed, even as Allan Meltzer, an eminent Fed historian, foresaw a repeat of 1970s inflation—both on the same page of the New York Times.

There is something to both fears. But inflation is distant and containable, while deflation is at hand and pernicious.


Fears about deflation do not rest on the 0.4% decline in American consumer prices in the year to March. Although this is the first such annual decline since 1955, it is the transitory result of a plunge in energy prices. Excluding food and energy, core inflation is 1.8%. Rather, the worry is of persistent price declines that characterise true deflation. With unemployment nearing 9%, economic output is further below the economy’s potential than at any time since 1982. This gap is likely to widen. House prices are not part of America’s inflation index but their decline is forcing households to reduce debt (see article), which could subdue economic growth for years. As workers compete for scarce jobs and firms underbid each other for sales, wages and prices will come under pressure.

So far, expectations of inflation remain stable: that sentiment is itself a welcome bulwark against deflation. But pay freezes and wage cuts may soon change people’s minds. In one poll, more than a third of respondents said they or someone in their household had suffered a cut in pay or hours. The employment-cost index rose by just 2.1% in the year to the first quarter, the least since records began in 1982. In 2003, during the last deflation scare, total pay grew by almost 4%.

Does this matter? If prices are falling because of advancing productivity, as at the end of the 19th century, it is a sign of progress, not economic collapse. Today, though, deflation is more likely to resemble the malign 1930s sort than that earlier benign variety, because demand is weak and households and firms are burdened by debt. In deflation the nominal value of debts remains fixed even as nominal wages, prices and profits fall. Real debt burdens therefore rise, causing borrowers to cut spending to service their debts or to default. That undermines the financial system and deepens the recession.

From 1929 to 1933 prices fell by 27%. This time central banks are on the case. In America, Britain, Japan and Switzerland they have pushed short-term interest rates to, or close to, zero and vastly expanded their balance-sheets by buying debt. It helps, too, that the world has abandoned the monetary straitjacket of the gold standard it wore in the 1930s.

Yet this anti-deflationary zeal is precisely what alarms people like Mr Meltzer. He worries that the price of seeing off deflation is that the Fed will be unable or unwilling to reverse itself in time to prevent a resurgence of inflation.

Fair enough, but inflation is easier to put right than deflation. A central bank can raise interest rates as high as it wants to suppress inflation, but it cannot cut nominal rates below zero. Deflation robs a central bank of its ability to stimulate spending using negative real interest rates. In the worst case, rising debts and defaults depress growth, poisoning the economy by deepening deflation and pressing real interest rates higher. Central banks that have lowered rates to nearly zero are now using unconventional, quantitative tools, but their efficacy is unproven. Given the choice, erring on the side of inflation would be less catastrophic than erring on the side of deflation.

That said, there is a legitimate concern that when the time comes to raise interest rates, the Fed may hold back because of political pressure or fear of fracturing financial markets. The Fed was too slow to raise interest rates after its deflation scare in 2003. Yet that is best addressed by strengthening the Fed. Barack Obama should nominate credible, independent people to the two vacant seats on the Federal Reserve Board, and bat away suggestions that the 12 reserve-bank presidents, who are not confirmed by Congress, lose their say in monetary policy. Congress should let the Fed issue its own debt, which would give it scope to tighten monetary policy without disorderly sales of the illiquid private debt it has taken on.

Affirming the Fed’s political independence and equipping it with better tools would help the central bank combat inflation when the time comes. It would also lessen the risk that it tightens prematurely just to demonstrate its resolve."

Friday, May 8, 2009

an increase in cash available should cause the price level to rise, but only if you hold the savings rate constant

TO BE NOTED: From Accrued Interest:

"Inflation: Not this ship, sister

Alright so the Fed isn't going to defend the 10yr at 3%, and in fact appears to be targeting the belly of the yeild curve. That doesn't change the fundamental problem of deflation. Near term, based entirely on technicals, I've made a small short play in Treasuries. But I'm really just looking for a new entry on the long-side.

Almost exactly 2-years ago, I made my now famous (in my own mind) analogy of inflation to a Monopoly game. Basically my point was inflation wasn't about the price of any given property (or good) but the price of all the properties. Allowing any given good (at the time it was energy) to rise isn't, in and of itself, inflation.


Now there is fear that the Fed and Treasury's activities, especially the Fed's recent panache for "crediting bank reserves" (which means printing money). Here is the chart for M1 and M2 up 14% and 9% respectively in the last year.




Back to my Monopoly analogy. We might think of the M's as the actual multi-colored cash that each player has. As I demonstrated two years ago, an increase in cash available should cause the price level to rise, but only if you hold the savings rate constant.


Speaking more technically, you could say that an increase monetary base would have some multiplied impact on transactable money. In your textbook from college, this only involved banks and their willingness to lend. Actually, most often text books assume banks want to lend as much as they are legally allowed, which isn't the case right now. But I digress.


The securitization market makes this all much more complicated. The supply of loanable funds isn't just a function of cash in the banking system, but also cash invested in the shadow banking system. Right now net new issuance in ABS (meaning new issuance less principal being returned in old issues) is negative, meaning supply of funds from the shadow banking system is contracting.

This contraction of funds doesn't show up anywhere in the Ms, at least not directly, but obviously it matters in terms of consumers ability to buy goods. And it isn't just about availability of credit, which had everything to do with liquidity. Its about demand for credit also. Consumers want to save, they don't want to borrow right now. The following chart of household liabilities shows consumers actually decreased their total liabilities in 2008, the first year-over-year outright decline since the Federal Reserve began keeping the data in 1952.




Consumers are like a Monopoly player who has mortgaged all his properties. Passing GO doesn't cause him to buy more houses, it causes him to unmortgage his properties! That isn't inflation!


Getting back to consumers, it isn't clear to me that consumers are actually running out of money. Check this chart of the Household Financial Obligation Ratio, basically a debt service coverage ratio for consumers.




So consumers might not have to repay debt all at once, which is nice. It means a second-half recovery of sorts remains in play. But the large losses in assets coupled with out-sized debt ratios are going to cause consumers to keep saving at an elevated level. Check out liabilities as a percentage of disposable income.





This isn't a perfect ratio, since liabilities is a stock and income is a flow. But with declining asset values (both homes and financial assets), means that consumers are actually going to have to rely on incomes to pay debt service. Or for that matter to qualify for loans. So I'd think this ratio moves back toward 100%. That implies $3.6 trillion. TRILLION. It will be repaid over time to be sure, but it will remain a continual drag on consumer spending levels.

So keep this in mind when you think about the size of Fed/Treasury programs. $3.6 trillion. Are we worried about $800 billion for the "Stimulus Package" or the $1 trillion revised TALF? Not in terms of inflation.

I'm looking forward to the day when I'm worried about inflation. It isn't today."

Thursday, May 7, 2009

Equity investments are preferable to debt, a contributor to the current financial crisis, Taleb said.

TO BE NOTED: From Bloomberg:

"Global Crisis ‘Vastly Worse’ Than 1930s, Taleb Says (Update1)

By Shiyin Chen and Liza Lin

May 7 (Bloomberg) -- The current global crisis is “vastly worse” than the 1930s because financial systems and economies worldwide have become more interdependent, “Black Swan” author Nassim Nicholas Taleb said.

“This is the most difficult period of humanity that we’re going through today because governments have no control,” Taleb, 49, told a conference in Singapore today. “Navigating the world is much harder than in the 1930s.”

The International Monetary Fund last month slashed its world economic growth forecasts and said the global recession will be deeper than previously predicted as financial markets take longer to stabilize. Nouriel Roubini, 51, the New York University professor who predicted the crisis, told Bloomberg News yesterday that analysts expecting the U.S. economy to rebound in the third and fourth quarter were “too optimistic.”

“Certainly the rate of economic contraction is slowing down from the freefall of the last two quarters,” Roubini said. “We are going to have negative growth to the end of the year and next year the recovery is going to be weak.”

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told lawmakers May 5 that the central bank expects U.S. economic activity “to bottom out, then to turn up later this year.” Another shock to the financial system would undercut that forecast, he added.

‘Big Deflation’

The global economy is facing “big deflation,” though the risks of inflation are also increasing as governments print more money, Taleb told the conference organized by Bank of America- Merrill Lynch. Gold and copper may “rally massively” as a result, he added.

Taleb, a professor of risk engineering at New York University and adviser to Santa Monica, California-based Universa Investments LP, said the current global slump is the worst since the Great Depression that followed Wall Street’s 1929 crash.

The Great Depression saw an increase in global trade barriers and was only overcome after President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal policies helped revive the U.S. economy.

The world’s largest economy may need additional fiscal stimulus to emerge from its current recession, Kenneth Rogoff, former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, told Bloomberg News yesterday.

“We’re going to get to the point where recovery is just not soaring and they’re going to do the same again,” he said. “We’re going to have a very slow recovery from here.”

Fiscal Stimulus

The U.S. economy plunged at a 6.1 percent annual pace in the first quarter, making this the worst recession in at least half a century. President Barack Obama signed a $787 billion stimulus plan into law in February that included increases in spending on infrastructure projects and a reduction in taxes.

Gold, copper and other assets “that China will like” are the best investment bets as currencies including the dollar and euro face pressures, Taleb said. The IMF expects the global economy to shrink 1.3 percent this year.

Gold, which jumped to a record $1,032.70 an ounce March 17, 2008, is up 3.6 percent this year. Copper for three-month delivery on the London Metal Exchange has surged 55 percent this year on speculation demand will rebound as the global economy recovers from its worst recession since World War II.

Commodity prices are also gaining amid signs that China’s 4 trillion yuan ($585 billion) stimulus package is beginning to work in Asia’s second-largest economy. Quarter-on-quarter growth improved significantly in the first three months of 2009, the Chinese central bank said yesterday, without giving figures.

Credit Derivatives

China will avoid a recession this year, though it will not be able to pull Asia out of its economic slump as the region still depends on U.S. demand, New York University’s Roubini said.

Equity investments are preferable to debt, a contributor to the current financial crisis, Taleb said. Deflation in an equity bubble will have smaller repercussions for the global financial system, he added.

“Debt pressurizes the system and it has to be replaced with equity,” he said. “Bonds appear stable but have a lot of hidden risks. Equity is volatile, but what you see is what you get.”

Currency and credit derivatives will cause additional losses for companies that hold more than $500 trillion of the securities worldwide, Templeton Asset Management Ltd.’s Mark Mobius told the same Singapore conference today.

“There are going to be more and more losses on the part of companies that have credit derivatives, those who have currency derivatives,” Mobius, who helps oversee $20 billion in emerging-market assets at Templeton, said at the conference. “This is something we’re going to have to watch very, very carefully.”

Taleb is best known for his book “The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.” The book, named after rare and unforeseen events known as “black swans,” was published in 2007, just before the collapse of the subprime market roiled global financial institutions.

To contact the reporters on this story: Chen Shiyin in Singapore at schen37@bloomberg.net; Liza Lin in Singapore at Llin15@bloomberg.net."

A policy mistake made by some major central bank may bring inflation risks to the whole world

TO BE NOTED: From Alphaville:

"
Quote du jour: fears of competitive devaluation

A policy mistake made by some major central bank may bring inflation risks to the whole world. As more and more economies are adopting unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing, major currencies’ devaluation risks may rise.

- People’s Bank of China quarterly report, May 6 (via Bloomberg)

The PBC has been getting gradually more vocal in its criticisms of the Fed and the BoE. Things cant be great if you’ve got a mountain of US Treasuries, of course.

We’ll be watching to see what the BoE has to say about QE - if anything - at noon.

And:

"China Says Global Easing Policies Risk Devaluation (Update2)

By Sandy Hendry

May 6 (Bloomberg) -- Global central banks risk inflation, currency devaluation and a “big consolidation” in bond markets by pumping cash into their economies, the People’s Bank of China said in its quarterly monetary policy report.

The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England this year started quantitative easing, or printing money to buy government bonds, a policy that the Bank of Japan pioneered to revive its economy at the start of the decade. The European Central Bank’s 22-member board, which meets tomorrow, is split on whether it should buy financial assets to tackle its recession.

“A policy mistake made by some major central bank may bring inflation risks to the whole world,” China’s central bank said in the report today. “As more and more economies are adopting unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing, major currencies’ devaluation risks may rise.”

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao expressed concern in March that the dollar will weaken, eroding the value of China’s holdings of Treasuries, as the U.S. borrows unprecedented amounts to spend its way out of recession. China’s Treasury holdings climbed 52 percent in 2008 and stood at about $744 billion as of the end of February, according to U.S. government data.

“In the medium and long term, as the financial markets stabilize and economies gradually recover, increasing inflation expectations, rising interest rates and central bank’s liquidity-absorbing operations may cause a ‘big’ consolidation in bond prices,” the central bank’s statement said.

Bernanke

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told the congressional Joint Economic Committee yesterday that inflation will “remain low” even as a recovery gets underway because businesses will be slow to build back production and payrolls.

ECB council member Athanasios Orphanides yesterday said the financial crisis needs “drastic” measures. Orphanides and fellow member George Provopoulos from Greece have indicated they may support cutting the target rate to less than 1 percent and buying debt to pump money into the economy.

ECB Executive Board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi said on April 28 that policy makers should be “wary of the possible side-effects” of unconventional measures.

The euro may rise against the dollar because ECB policy makers will probably decide against introducing so-called quantitative easing when they meet May 7, Bank of Tokyo- Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. said.

“The failure to move to quantitative easing in the near term should help support the euro, especially against the dollar, given the Federal Reserve’s contrasting aggressive monetary easing approach,” Lee Hardman, a foreign-exchange strategist in London at Bank of Tokyo, wrote in a note yesterday.

To contact the reporter on this story: Sandy Hendry in Hong Kong at shendry@bloomberg.net"

Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat May 7 15:08
I keep quoting this speech, which pretty much details China's position on QE in a financial crisis:

http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=138

"2. The role and contribution of China, as a responsible big country, in Asian financial crisis

In order to mitigate the impact of Asian financial crisis and help crisis-stricken Asian countries walk out of the plight, then China's Premier Zhu Rongji promised, on behalf of the Chinese government, to the world that the RMB would not depreciate, followed by a series of active measures and policies.



(1) China made vigorous efforts to participate in the IMF's rescue operations to help related Asian countries. After the outbreak of financial crisis, under the arrangement framework of the IMF, the Chinese government provided a total of over US$4 billion assistance to Thailand, as well as export credit and emergency free medicine assistance to Indonesia and other East Asian countries, although China had inadequate foreign exchange reserves at that time.



(2) China actively cooperated with relevant parties to participate in and advance regional cooperation. At the sixth ASEAN informal leaders' meeting, then China's President Jiang Zhemin unveiled three proposals of strengthening regional cooperation to refrain the crisis from spreading, reform and improve international financial system, and respect self-selected measures of relevant countries and areas to overcome financial crisis. At the second informal ASEAN+China, Japan and Korea leaders' meeting and the informal ASEAN+China leaders' meeting, then Vice President Hu Jintao emphasized that East Asian countries should vigorously engage in reform and adjustment of financial system, with the most pressing need to intensify the management and supervision over short-term capital flow. He called on the East Asian countries to strengthen exchange on macroeconomic issues such as financial reform, have dialogue between deputy finance ministers and deputy governors of central bank, and form expert team at appropriate time to launch in-depth research on specific measures on managing short term capital flow. The above measures adopted by the Chinese government received positive response and support from most crisis-stricken countries.



(3) China promised that the RMB would not depreciate. Being a highly responsible country, the Chinese government made the decision of no depreciation of the RMB with an aim of safeguarding regional stability and promoting development, which played a pivotal role in maintaining economic and financial stability of the Asian countries and the world at large, as well as Asian countries' economic recovery and regaining of rapid growth in later years.



(4) China implemented policies to boost domestic demand and stimulate economic growth. While sticking to no depreciation of the RMB, the Chinese government took a wide range of measures to boost domestic demand and stimulate economic growth, which safeguarded health and stability of domestic economic growth, mitigated difficult situation in the Asian economies, and fueled recovery of Asian economy.



The adoption of these measures by the Chinese government embodied that as a part of Asia, China had a full awareness of collective interests and responsibility and has made its due contribution to the rapid recovery and regaining of growth momentum of the Asian economy."

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

The US can disregard its creditors’ concerns for the time being without worrying about a dollar collapse

From Naked Capitalism:

"Andy Xie: "If China loses faith the dollar will collapse"

Listen to this article. Powered by Odiogo.com
It's easy for Americans to pooh-pooh bearish talk about the dollar. Yet the sterling was once the reserve currency, and has fallen, what, by 80% since it lost its standing.

With increasingly dubious accounting and lax enforcement, the US capital markets no longer stand out by virtue of being better regulated. Yes, they still may be deeper and more liquid. But overseas buyers have to look hard at foreign exchange risk. The direction for the dollar in the long term is certain to be down. Overextended debtors trash their currencies (see the Great Depression, the Nordic and Swedish banking crises, and the Asian crisis for a few of many examples).

What is interesting about the Xie piece is that even the stalwart Chinese retail investor has become leery of the dollar. Despite th logic of "oh if you sell, you only hurt yourself", the flip side is if you become certain you are indeed holding a depreciating asset, it makes sense to exit. You want to be early, not late, out.

And that logic, if it starts to take hold, in classic run on the bank fashion, could lead to a disorderly fall in the dollar. It isn't clear what the trigger might be, but Bob Shiller contends that sudden flights from markets don't necessarily require an event to kick them off. And given that Willem Buiter, who though fond of colorful writing, is hardly an extremist, foresees a collapse in dollar assets if the US fails to contain its fiscal deficit, talk of a dollar plunge isn't a a radical view.

From the Financial Times:
Emerging economies such as China and Russia are calling for alternatives to the dollar...Because the magnitude of the bad assets within the banking system and the excess leverage of its households are potentially huge, the Fed may be forced into printing dollars massively, which would eventually trigger high inflation or even hyper-inflation and cause great damage to countries that hold dollar assets...

....emerging economies...have amassed nearly $10,000bn (€7,552bn, £6,721bn) in foreign exchange reserves, mostly in dollar assets. Any other country with America’s problems would need the Paris Club of creditor nations to negotiate with its lenders on its monetary and fiscal policies to protect their interests. But the US situation is unique: it borrows in its own currency, and the dollar is the world’s dominant reserve currency. The US can disregard its creditors’ concerns for the time being without worrying about a dollar collapse.

The faith of the Chinese in America’s power and responsibility, and the petrodollar holdings of the gulf countries that depend on US military protection, are the twin props for the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese, including those in the mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas, may account for half of the foreign holdings of dollar assets....

The Chinese love affair with the dollar began in the 1940s when it held its value while the Chinese currency depreciated massively. Memory is long when it comes to currency credibility. The Chinese renminbi remains a closed currency and is not yet a credible vehicle for wealth storage. Also, wealthy ethnic Chinese tend to send their children to the US for education. They treat the dollar as their primary currency.

The US could repair its balance sheet through asset sales and fiscal transfers instead of just printing money. The $2,000bn fiscal deficit, for example, could have gone to over-indebted households for paying down debts rather than on dubious spending to prop up the economy. When property and stock prices decline sufficiently, foreign demand, especially from ethnic Chinese, will come in volume. The country’s vast and unexplored natural resource holdings could be auctioned off. Americans may view these ideas as unthinkable. It is hard to imagine that a superpower needs to sell the family silver to stay solvent. Hence, printing money seems a less painful way out.

The global environment is extremely negative for savers. The prices of property and shares, though having declined substantially, are not good value yet and may decline further. Interest rates are near zero. The Fed is printing money, which will eventually inflate away the value of dollar holdings. Other currencies are not safe havens either. As the Fed expands the money supply, it puts pressure on other currencies to appreciate. This will force other central banks to expand their own money supplies to depress their currencies. Hence, major currencies may take turns devaluing. The end result is inflation and negative real interest rates everywhere. Central banks are punishing savers to redeem the sins of debtors and speculators. Unfortunately, ethnic Chinese are the biggest savers.

Diluting Chinese savings to bail out America’s failing banks and bankrupt households, though highly beneficial to the US national interest in the short term, will destroy the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese demand for the dollar has been waning already. China’s bulging foreign exchange reserves reflect the lack of private demand for dollars...

America’s policy is pushing China towards developing an alternative financial system. For the past two decades China’s entry into the global economy rested on making cheap labour available to multi-nationals and pegging the renminbi to the dollar. The dollar peg allowed China to leverage the US financial system for its international needs, while domestic finance remained state-controlled to redistribute prosperity from the coast to interior provinces. This dual approach has worked remarkably well. China could have its cake and eat it too. Of course, the global credit bubble was what allowed China’s dual approach to be effective; its inefficiency was masked by bubble-generated global demand.

China is aware that it must become independent from the dollar at some point. Its recent decision to turn Shanghai into a financial centre by 2020 reflects China’s anxiety over relying on the dollar system. The year 2020 seems remote, and the US will not pay attention to something so distant. However, if global stagflation takes hold, as I expect it to, it will force China to accelerate its reforms to float its currency and create a single, independent and market-based financial system. When that happens, the dollar will collapse."
Me:

Don said...

"America’s policy is pushing China towards developing an alternative financial system."

China has two main complaints against the US:
1) We're using our currency to help us get out of this crisis
2) We don't guarantee assets, such as bonds
They have already taken numerous steps:
1) Swap lines in their own currency
2) A regional bailout fund
3) Telling everyone that we're unreliable, and it's working

Although we are still a flight to safety port, the flight from agencies to treasuries, from implicit to explicit guarantees, was not a good deal for us. It was a deflationary move of some magnitude, and showed the beginnings of lack of trust in us.
Oddly, Geithner's mocked total guarantee is exactly what the Chinese wanted and expected. China believes that being the economic powerhouse brings with it certain responsibilities. In the Asian Crisis, for example, China believes that it never used its currency for its benefit, or reneged on deals. The Chinese claim that this is acting responsibly, while we, in this crisis, are not.
The threat of defaulting on bonds, loans, especially if we are de facto running or backing these companies, is very irresponsible from the Chinese perspective.
Truly, the Chinese are making headway in this crisis worldwide in portraying us as irresponsible, and not worthy of having the position in the world financial system that we do. It will matter going forward because of foreign investment, and the desire for US goods.
But hey, let's keep telling ourselves that we have the upper hand, right up until the point that we don't. If people don't believe that much of the world blames us for this crisis, they're going to be in for a rude awakening. Solving our crisis at the expense of foreign countries and investors seems a really poor move.

Don the libertarian Democrat

May 5, 2009 10:33 AM

From the FT:

"
If China loses faith the dollar will collapse

By Andy Xie

Published: May 4 2009 19:28 | Last updated: May 4 2009 19:28

Emerging economies such as China and Russia are calling for alternatives to the dollar as a reserve currency. The trigger is the Federal Reserve’s liberal policy of expanding the money supply to prop up America’s banking system and its over-indebted households. Because the magnitude of the bad assets within the banking system and the excess leverage of its households are potentially huge, the Fed may be forced into printing dollars massively, which would eventually trigger high inflation or even hyper-inflation and cause great damage to countries that hold dollar assets in their foreign exchange reserves.

The chatter over alternatives to the dollar mainly reflects the unhappiness with US monetary policy among the emerging economies that have amassed nearly $10,000bn (€7,552bn, £6,721bn) in foreign exchange reserves, mostly in dollar assets. Any other country with America’s problems would need the Paris Club of creditor nations to negotiate with its lenders on its monetary and fiscal policies to protect their interests. But the US situation is unique: it borrows in its own currency, and the dollar is the world’s dominant reserve currency. The US can disregard its creditors’ concerns for the time being without worrying about a dollar collapse.

The faith of the Chinese in America’s power and responsibility, and the petrodollar holdings of the gulf countries that depend on US military protection, are the twin props for the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese, including those in the mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas, may account for half of the foreign holdings of dollar assets. You have to check the asset allocations of wealthy ethnic Chinese to understand the dollar’s unique status.

The Chinese love affair with the dollar began in the 1940s when it held its value while the Chinese currency depreciated massively. Memory is long when it comes to currency credibility. The Chinese renminbi remains a closed currency and is not yet a credible vehicle for wealth storage. Also, wealthy ethnic Chinese tend to send their children to the US for education. They treat the dollar as their primary currency.

The US could repair its balance sheet through asset sales and fiscal transfers instead of just printing money. The $2,000bn fiscal deficit, for example, could have gone to over-indebted households for paying down debts rather than on dubious spending to prop up the economy. When property and stock prices decline sufficiently, foreign demand, especially from ethnic Chinese, will come in volume. The country’s vast and unexplored natural resource holdings could be auctioned off. Americans may view these ideas as unthinkable. It is hard to imagine that a superpower needs to sell the family silver to stay solvent. Hence, printing money seems a less painful way out.

The global environment is extremely negative for savers. The prices of property and shares, though having declined substantially, are not good value yet and may decline further. Interest rates are near zero. The Fed is printing money, which will eventually inflate away the value of dollar holdings. Other currencies are not safe havens either. As the Fed expands the money supply, it puts pressure on other currencies to appreciate. This will force other central banks to expand their own money supplies to depress their currencies. Hence, major currencies may take turns devaluing. The end result is inflation and negative real interest rates everywhere. Central banks are punishing savers to redeem the sins of debtors and speculators. Unfortunately, ethnic Chinese are the biggest savers.

Diluting Chinese savings to bail out America’s failing banks and bankrupt households, though highly beneficial to the US national interest in the short term, will destroy the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese demand for the dollar has been waning already. China’s bulging foreign exchange reserves reflect the lack of private demand for dollars, which was driven by the renminbi’s appreciation. Though this was speculative in nature, it shows the renminbi’s rising credibility and its potential to replace the dollar as the main vehicle of wealth storage for ethnic Chinese.

America’s policy is pushing China towards developing an alternative financial system. For the past two decades China’s entry into the global economy rested on making cheap labour available to multi-nationals and pegging the renminbi to the dollar. The dollar peg allowed China to leverage the US financial system for its international needs, while domestic finance remained state-controlled to redistribute prosperity from the coast to interior provinces. This dual approach has worked remarkably well. China could have its cake and eat it too. Of course, the global credit bubble was what allowed China’s dual approach to be effective; its inefficiency was masked by bubble-generated global demand.

China is aware that it must become independent from the dollar at some point. Its recent decision to turn Shanghai into a financial centre by 2020 reflects China’s anxiety over relying on the dollar system. The year 2020 seems remote, and the US will not pay attention to something so distant. However, if global stagflation takes hold, as I expect it to, it will force China to accelerate its reforms to float its currency and create a single, independent and market-based financial system. When that happens, the dollar will collapse.

The writer is an independent economist based in Shanghai and former chief economist for Asia Pacific at Morgan Stanley"

And:

Don said...

Walter,

Yes. That's why I said 'believe'. Let me get you the best place that they've argued this:

http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=138

"2. The role and contribution of China, as a responsible big country, in Asian financial crisis

In order to mitigate the impact of Asian financial crisis and help crisis-stricken Asian countries walk out of the plight, then China's Premier Zhu Rongji promised, on behalf of the Chinese government, to the world that the RMB would not depreciate, followed by a series of active measures and policies.



(1) China made vigorous efforts to participate in the IMF's rescue operations to help related Asian countries. After the outbreak of financial crisis, under the arrangement framework of the IMF, the Chinese government provided a total of over US$4 billion assistance to Thailand, as well as export credit and emergency free medicine assistance to Indonesia and other East Asian countries, although China had inadequate foreign exchange reserves at that time.



(2) China actively cooperated with relevant parties to participate in and advance regional cooperation. At the sixth ASEAN informal leaders' meeting, then China's President Jiang Zhemin unveiled three proposals of strengthening regional cooperation to refrain the crisis from spreading, reform and improve international financial system, and respect self-selected measures of relevant countries and areas to overcome financial crisis. At the second informal ASEAN+China, Japan and Korea leaders' meeting and the informal ASEAN+China leaders' meeting, then Vice President Hu Jintao emphasized that East Asian countries should vigorously engage in reform and adjustment of financial system, with the most pressing need to intensify the management and supervision over short-term capital flow. He called on the East Asian countries to strengthen exchange on macroeconomic issues such as financial reform, have dialogue between deputy finance ministers and deputy governors of central bank, and form expert team at appropriate time to launch in-depth research on specific measures on managing short term capital flow. The above measures adopted by the Chinese government received positive response and support from most crisis-stricken countries.



(3) China promised that the RMB would not depreciate. Being a highly responsible country, the Chinese government made the decision of no depreciation of the RMB with an aim of safeguarding regional stability and promoting development, which played a pivotal role in maintaining economic and financial stability of the Asian countries and the world at large, as well as Asian countries' economic recovery and regaining of rapid growth in later years.



(4) China implemented policies to boost domestic demand and stimulate economic growth. While sticking to no depreciation of the RMB, the Chinese government took a wide range of measures to boost domestic demand and stimulate economic growth, which safeguarded health and stability of domestic economic growth, mitigated difficult situation in the Asian economies, and fueled recovery of Asian economy.



The adoption of these measures by the Chinese government embodied that as a part of Asia, China had a full awareness of collective interests and responsibility and has made its due contribution to the rapid recovery and regaining of growth momentum of the Asian economy."

Now, of course, there's something amusing about China saying that it doesn't use currency considerations in its planning. However, they're making a more salient point, which is that they did not use their currency for their own advantage during a crisis.

Bottom line, whether true or not, China is getting very good at playing the capitalist game very fast. They have problems, but, even so, they do make some at least plausible sounding criticisms against the US in this crisis.

Take care,

Don the libertarian Democrat

Sunday, May 3, 2009

promised "a massive public works program" to return Panama to growth

TO BE NOTED: From Reuters:

Photo
«»1 of 16Full Size

By Mica Rosenberg and Sean Mattson

PANAMA CITY (Reuters) - Supermarket tycoon Ricardo Martinelli swept to victory in Panama's presidential election on Sunday, bucking a trend of left-wing leadership wins in Latin America.

The conservative opposition candidate's business experience swayed voters worried about their livelihoods in a global recession that has stunted Panama's recent stellar economic growth.

The electoral tribunal declared Martinelli the winner as results showed him taking an unassailable lead of 61 percent of the votes, against 37 percent for Balbina Herrera of the ruling center-left Revolutionary Democratic Party.

The government has struggled to rein in crime and high prices and Martinelli managed to win over many low-income voters.

"We can't continue to have a country where 40 percent of Panamanians are poor," he said in a victory speech.

While the government launched an ambitious $5.25 billion expansion of the canal and is liked by foreign investors, Martinelli is seen as more friendly toward business.

Panama, which uses the dollar as its currency, last year suffered its highest inflation levels since the early 1980s.

Inflation has since tamed as economic growth slows down but voters anger at higher prices has lingered.

"Every 15 days I go to the market and food prices are higher. You can't buy meat anymore," said Oreida Sanchez, 36, a teacher, after voting for Martinelli in the capital's run-down neighborhood of Calidonia.

Anti-American leftists like Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have advanced in Latin America in recent years but Panama has long had close ties to the United States, which built the Panama Canal and ousted dictator Gen. Manuel Noriega in 1989.

Herrera was once close to Noriega, which rankled with some voters. She conceded defeat and promised to be a strong opposition.

Convicted of drug trafficking and money laundering by a U.S. court, Noriega is now in a Florida jail.

ECONOMY DAMPENED

Panama's economy has led Latin America with growth of around 10 percent in recent years, fueled by U.S.-Asia trade through its transoceanic canal and robust banking activity.

But 2009 growth could slow to 3 percent or less as the global crisis hits credit and shipping.

Martinelli, 57, a U.S.-educated and self-made businessman who owns the dominant Super 99 supermarket chain, has promised "a massive public works program" to return Panama to growth.

He wants to build ports, highways and a Panama City subway.

Some worry that Martinelli might not be able to keep his business life separate from running the country.

"I have my doubts about the cost of living. Because he's in the groceries business, he won't be interested in bringing prices down," said Gabriel Tunon, 59, an accountant.

Demand for luxury apartments in the skyscrapers that dominate Panama City's skyline is dropping. Builders say some projects are on hold and half-built condos are up for sale.

In a parallel parliamentary vote on Sunday, Herrera's PRD has a well-established political base that might give it a majority in the 71-seat Congress, creating an opposition that could complicate Martinelli's rule.

The magnate would impose a flat tax of between 10 percent and 20 percent to appeal to foreign investors keen for a clearer tax code, but the measure would raise taxes on Panama's thriving banking and insurance sectors.

Panama has agreed a free trade accord with the United States, which has been held up in the U.S. Congress by concerns about Panamanian labor rights and tax evasion.

Current President Martin Torrijos will hand over power to Martinelli in July. (Additional reporting by Elida Moreno; Editing by Doina Chiacu)

Banks responded to higher reserve requirements by reducing their lending and holding fewer bonds

TO BE NOTED: From the FT:

"
Real risk in reversing money supply

By Edward Chancellor

Published: May 3 2009 14:16 | Last updated: May 3 2009 14:16

The recovery in the world’s stock markets has coincided with a bold monetary experiment. The aim of quantitative easing is to offset deflationary forces and free up credit markets. There’s a risk, however, that any gains enjoyed by investors today may be reversed when central banks remove the excess liquidity created by current emergency measures. Past attempts to soak up liquidity have produced varying degrees of pain.

Quantitative easing involves a forced increase in the money supply by the central banks. Investment strategists in the US and elsewhere have generally applauded this policy. Bonds should benefit from the appearance of a large price-insensitive purchaser, they say. Equities will gain as corporate financing costs decline.

Although US and UK government bonds have reversed some of their initial gains since quantitative easing was announced in early March, global stock markets have soared. Credit spreads on the riskiest corporate bonds have declined and the market for new high yield issues has reopened. Morgan Stanley notes that money supply is growing in countries that are implementing quantitative easing – a sign that the policy is gaining traction.

Everyone accepts that at some stage central banks will have to reverse this monetary experiment. Otherwise, excess bank reserves will fuel inflation.

Goldman Sachs economists argue that owing to the great slack in the global economy there will be no need to remove quantitative easing for several years. Besides, when the time comes to take away the monetary punchbowl, the Federal Reserve can simply allow many of the securities sitting on its balance sheet to mature and be paid off.

However, the central banks have recently been acquiring bonds with longer maturities. Any sudden attempt to remove excess liquidity by off-loading these bonds could roil the markets. If bond yields spiked higher, then heavily-indebted governments will see their fiscal position deteriorate rapidly. In short, there is a danger that the apparent gains from quantitative easing will be reversed when the policy is removed.

Two historical episodes suggest these concerns should be taken seriously. In the three years following the arrival of Franklin Roosevelt in Washington, US banks acquired large amounts of government bonds. Wary of lending to the private sector, banks accumulated vast excess reserves. By July 1936, these reserves had climbed to 18 per cent of deposits, nearly double the legal minimum.

By that date, deflation had abated and the US economy had recovered from the ravages of depression. Unemployment had halved from its peak and stocks were up more than threefold from their June 1932 low. However, wage rates were climbing rapidly. In the summer of 1936, the Fed decided to head off inflation. Over the following year, the banks’ minimum reserve ratio was doubled. It was believed that raising reserves would have little impact on the economy since banks would not have to sell their bond holdings and the provision of credit to the private sector would be unimpaired.

The outcome was rather different than expected. Banks responded to higher reserve requirements by reducing their lending and holding fewer bonds. Spreads on riskier corporate bonds doubled. In the 12 months after December 1936, the money supply contracted by 6 per cent.

During this “depression within a depression,” unemployment climbed back to 20 per cent, manufacturing collapsed, deflation reappeared and the stock market halved in value.

The Bank of Japan introduced quantitative easing in March 2001 and continued the policy for five years. During this period, excess reserves in the Japanese banking system climbed to Y25,000bn (£174bn, €194bn, $258bn). When the time came to remove this liquidity, the authorities feared a dramatic sell-off of government bonds, according to economist Andrew Hunt. A sudden rise in long-term rates threatened to derail the government’s finances. To reduce this risk, the fiscal deficit, equivalent to 6 per cent of GDP at the time, was forced back to surplus. Domestic demand softened markedly, while the removal of liquidity in Japan coincided with turmoil in the global financial markets in the early summer of 2006.

Most investors would consider Japan’s discomfort a small price to pay for the quantitative easing experiment. However, the US depression of 1937 suggests central banks will be wary when it comes reversing this policy.


Edward Chancellor is a member of GMO’s asset allocation team"

Friday, May 1, 2009

we are heading into unknown territory. If prices fall at a rate of 1 percent, could they fall at a rate of 10 percent?

TO BE NOTED: Via the Economist's View:


Published on Taipei Times
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/04/29/2003442273

Deflation raises questions about global recovery

By Martin Feldstein

Wednesday, Apr 29, 2009, Page 9

The rate of inflation is now close to zero in the US and several other major countries. The Economist recently reported that economists it had surveyed predict that consumer prices in the US and Japan will actually fall this year as a whole, while inflation in the euro zone will be only 0.6 percent. South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand will also see declines in consumer price levels.

The prospect of falling prices reflects the collapse of industrial production, the resulting high level of unemployment, and the dramatic decline in commodity prices. Industrial production is falling at double-digit rates in the negative-inflation countries, and the price index for all commodities is down more than 30 percent over the past year.

Deflation is potentially a very serious problem, because falling prices — and the expectation that prices will continue to fall — would make the current economic downturn worse in three distinct ways.

The most direct adverse impact of deflation is to increase the real value of debt. Just as inflation helps debtors by eroding the real value of their debts, deflation hurts them by increasing the real value of what they owe. While the very modest extent of current deflation does not create a significant problem, if it continues, the price level could conceivably fall by a cumulative 10 percent over the next few years.

If that happens, a homeowner with a mortgage would see the real value of his debt rise by 10 percent. Since price declines would bring with them wage declines, the ratio of monthly mortgage payments to wage income would rise.

In addition to this increase in the real cost of debt service, deflation would mean higher loan-to-value ratios for homeowners, leading to increased mortgage defaults, especially in the US. A lower price level would also increase the real value of business debt, weakening balance sheets and thus making it harder for companies to get additional credit.

The second adverse effect of deflation is to raise the real interest rate, that is, the difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate of “inflation.” When prices are rising, the real interest rate is less than the nominal rate since the borrower repays with dollars that are worth less. But when prices are falling, the real interest rate exceeds the nominal rate. This is exacerbated by the fact that borrowers can deduct only nominal interest payments when calculating their taxable income.

Because the US Federal Reserve and other central banks have driven their short-term interest rates close to zero, they cannot lower rates further in order to prevent deflation from raising the real rate of interest. Higher real interest rates discourage credit-financed purchases by households and businesses. This weakens overall demand, leading to steeper declines in prices.

The resulting unusual economic environment of falling prices and wages can also have a damaging psychological impact on households and businesses. With deflation, we are heading into unknown territory. If prices fall at a rate of 1 percent, could they fall at a rate of 10 percent? If the central bank cannot lower interest rates further to stimulate the economy, what will stop a potential downward spiral of prices? Such worries undermine confidence and make it harder to boost economic activity.

Some economists have said that the best way to deal with deflation is for the central bank to flood the economy with money in order to persuade the public that inflation will rise in the future, thereby reducing expected real long-term interest rates. That advice would lead central banks to keep expanding the money supply and bank reserves even after doing so no longer lowers interest rates. In fact, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan are doing just that under the name of “quantitative easing.”

Not surprisingly, central bankers who are committed to a formal or informal inflation target of about 2 percent per year are unwilling to abandon their mandates openly and to assert that they are pursuing a high rate of inflation. Nevertheless, their expansionary actions have helped to raise long-term inflation expectations toward the target levels.

In the US, the interest rate on government bonds now rises from 1.80 percent at five years to 2.86 percent for 10-year bonds and 3.70 percent for 30-year bonds. Comparing these interest rates with the yields on government inflation-protected bonds shows that the corresponding implied inflation rates are 0.9 percent for five years, 1.3 percent for 10 years and 1.7 percent for 30 years.

Ironically, although central banks are now focused on the problem of deflation, the more serious risk for the longer term is that inflation will rise rapidly as their economies recover and banks use the large volumes of recently accumulated reserves to create loans that expand spending and demand.



Martin Feldstein, a professor of economics at Harvard, was formerly chairman of US president Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisors and president of the National Bureau for Economic Research.Copyright: Project Syndicate "