Showing posts with label Leverage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Leverage. Show all posts

Friday, May 29, 2009

up through the tranched leverage of a mortgage backed-security and again through the CDO tranches themselves

TO BE NOTED: From Alphaville:

"
Extreme leverage, broker fraud edition

Blithe investment in CDOs, it has come to be known, was generally a very bad idea.

Among their many failings, the instruments had huge built-in leverage: from the leverage inherent in the underlying mortgages themselves, up through the tranched leverage of a mortgage backed-security and again through the CDO tranches themselves.

Which is why the only thing that could be more completely disastrous than buying a CDO (apart, admittedly, from buying a CDO^2 or a LSS) would be buying a CDO on margin.

The people that facilitated such madness - ten of them at least - are crooks, says the SEC:

According to the SEC’s complaint, the defendants portrayed particularly risky types of CMOs as secure investments to defraud more than 750 customers, ultimately costing them more than $36 million in losses. Meanwhile, the 10 brokers received $18 million in commissions and salaries related to their customers’ investments in CMOs.

The complaint against the ten CDO brokers in full is available here, and is an interesting read. CDO brokers beware.

To be honest, we here at FT Alphaville were astounded that CDOs were being offered to retail punters at all, let alone CDOs on margin. The SEC is clearly astounded too:

Between 2004 and 2007, Defendants, formerly registered representatives at ‘Brookstreet Securities Corp. (”Brookstreet”), made false and misleading statements in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase ofcertain types of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (”CMOs'’). Defendants told their customers that the CMOs in which they would invest were safe, secure, liquid investments that were suitable for retirees, retirement accounts, and investors with conservative investment goals. Contrary to what they told customers, between 2004 and 2007 Defendants invested in risky types of CMOs that: (l) were not all, guaranteed by the United States government; (2) jeopardized customers’ yield and principal; (3) were largely illiquid; and (4) were only suitable for sophisticated investors with a high-risk investment profile.

In addition, Defendants heavily margined customers’ accounts (up to a ten to one margin to equity ratio), making the CMOs in which they invested even more sensitive to changes in interest rates and downturns in the CMO market.

Defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions attracted more than 750 investor accounts with CMO investments of more than $175 million.

Were it not for the particulars of this case (material misrepresentations) it might though, seem slightly invidious to single out individual brokers. The whole of Wall Street convinced itself CDOs were risk less miracle instruments. There was, in the words of Alan Greenspan a vast “intellectual edifice” that justified it all.

Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat May 29 17:02
"Were it not for the particulars of this case (material misrepresentations) it might though, seem slightly invidious to single out individual brokers. The whole of Wall Street convinced itself CDOs were risk less miracle instruments. There was, in the words of Alan Greenspan a vast “intellectual edifice” that justified it all."

Sorry Sam, that's wishful thinking. All financial crises begin with the Elmer Fudd Defense, Stupidity Defense, Following The Herd Defense, Ostrich Defense, The Devil Made Me Do It Defense, etc., stage. It takes litigation and good investigative reporting to suss out the Fraud, Collusion, Negligence, and Fiduciary Mismanagement, underlying a financial crisis, such as this one.

Mark my word. I'll still be reading in the future if you're still writing.

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Investors' bets that have fueled the recent rally in corporate bonds and other riskier markets have been made mostly without the excessive borrowing

TO BE NOTED: From Reuters:

"
U.S. corporate bond rally unfazed by lack of leverage
Wed May 13, 2009 6:48pm EDT

By Tom Ryan and John Parry - Analysis

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Investors' bets that have fueled the recent rally in corporate bonds and other riskier markets have been made mostly without the excessive borrowing of the boom years that preceded the Panic of 2008.

The huge amounts of leverage provided to "hot money" investors, or hedge funds, in the bull market heyday has been unwound and the recent rally in corporate bonds marks a return of more traditional investors, analysts say.

De-leveraging of trillions of dollars in borrowed money lies at the heart of the global credit crisis. But corporate bonds' recovery, courtesy of more traditional investors like pension funds and insurers, is an early sign that securities markets can function without hefty amounts of borrowed money.

Hedge funds "were primarily credit driven and the more you listen to the shrinkage of the hedge fund community, the more you realize there is less and less leverage being used," said Tom Sowanick, chief investment officer at Clearbrook Financial LLC in Princeton, New Jersey.

The decimation of hedge funds is one reflection of the heavy price that investors who borrowed excessive amounts had to pay when the global financial crisis cut a swathe through riskier asset markets.

Such speculative investors' exposure was magnified by hefty borrowing, or "leverage." For example, before the global credit crisis erupted in summer 2007, some speculative investors borrowed about $30 for every $1 bet.

When those bets went badly awry in everything from mortgage-backed securities to other complex financial structures, that "leverage" had to be quickly paid back.

During the third quarter of 2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed, the financial system went into cardiac arrest and leverage -- the lifeblood of hedge funds -- dried up.

As leverage was withdrawn, the hedge fund industry suffered over $100 billion in redemptions in the first quarter of 2009 alone, according to Hedge Fund Research, Inc, a Chicago-based research firm. That was on top of the quarterly record $152 billion in redemptions during the fourth quarter of 2008 and a huge acceleration from negligible redemptions in the previous three quarters.

Traditional buyers such as pension funds and insurers, who are restrained by regulators from borrowing large amounts to make market bets, have propelled corporate bonds to a stellar rally so far this year.

Since late March, U.S. investment-grade corporate bond yield spreads over comparable Treasuries have rallied 158 basis points tighter to 442 basis points, according to Merrill Lynch data as of Tuesday.

While hedge funds will always have a presence in the corporate bond market, they won't reach the same level they did before the financial meltdown, said Sabur Moini, high yield portfolio manager at asset management firm Payden & Rygel in Los Angeles.

"They were the marginal buyers that were being provided tremendous and cheap leverage by the Street" and "all that has been washed out of the system," he said.

"The world going forward is going to be different; we're just not going to have the sort of leverage and cheap financing" seen prior to the financial meltdown, Moini said.

With the once-championed Wall Street broker-dealer model extinct and stricter oversight on the remaining depository institutions, it is hard to see how the huge amounts of leverage once offered to hedge funds could ever return, analysts say.

"In the same vein, the prime brokers aren't extending the same amount of credit and there are fewer of them" than before the global financial crisis started, Clearbrook Financial's Sowanick said.

"Where the big change comes from is the brokers, who were (leveraged) between 30 and 40 times. But because brokers are now banks, their leverage has been cut significantly," to about 10 times, he said.

One example is Merrill Lynch, which had been leveraged at between 30 and 35 times. Its leverage is likely about 10 times since Bank of America bought it in late September, Sowanick said.

(Reporting by Tom Ryan and John Parry; Editing by Dan Grebler)"

Thursday, May 7, 2009

But what has made the current crisis so disastrous is the behaviour of large, regulated banks

TO BE NOTED: From the FT:

"
Insight: A harmful hedge-fund fixation

By Gillian Tett

Published: May 7 2009 20:00 | Last updated: May 7 2009 20:00

Almost exactly two years ago, at the craziest peak of the credit bubble, Western leaders gathered in a conference room at the World Bank in Washington to discuss what they should do about the financial world.

These days it is clear what those grandees ought to have discussed – notably the wild excesses afoot in subprime lending, structured credit, monoline insurance, credit ratings and bank leverage.

In practice, though, those issues were barely discussed. Instead, the hot topic for debate in that April 2007 meeting (as I describe in a book published this month) was how to clamp down on hedge funds – a topic dear to German leaders, who were chairing the G7 at that point.

“It was really hard to get anything apart from hedge funds on the agenda back then,” laments one international bank regulator, who tried – and failed – to divert the debate onto more pressing matters.

These days, there is an unnerving sense of déjà vu bubbling in some political quarters of Europe. Over in America the financial community is currently consumed with the matter of banking stress tests.

In London, however, there is another hot topic worrying financiers – what Brussels plans to do about hedge funds.

Last week the European Commission shocked the City of London by unveiling plans to impose potentially tough new controls on the hedge fund and private equity industry. The European parliament bayed for more.

Then, this week the French government warned that they might strengthen these measures, apparently because they, like many other Continental leaders, think that lax hedge fund controls have sparked the recent crisis.

In fairness, some of these calls for a clampdown are not ridiculous. Regulators need to get better information about what the hedge fund world is doing, and to prevent the abuse of off-balance sheet entities. There is also a strong case to reduce the scale of tax avoidance associated with the hedge fund sector.

But the real danger with the current debate – as two years ago – is that it risks missing the wider point. For sure, some unregulated hedge funds have taken crazy risks in recent years. And unregulated shadow banks have also messed up.

But what has made the current crisis so disastrous is the behaviour of large, regulated banks, which have spent the last decade operating with ridiculously high levels of leverage, and purchasing vast quantities of toxic assets.

And the only thing more remarkable than the scale of those bank follies is that they went unnoticed for so long, partly because many regulators spent the last decade so obsessed with hedge funds. Pace that Washington G7 meeting in the spring of 2007.

Given that, it seems self-evident that the real priority now in Europe is to ask hard questions about banks – and bank regulation. If I was a German voter, for example, I would want to know why nobody in Frankfurt tried to stop German banks from dashing into structured finance on such a spectacular scale – and why the only people who ever warned of those dangers before the summer of 2007 were investors who went short (ie, the hedge funds.)

I would also want to know why rumours remain widespread that German banks are still holding vast quantities of toxic assets which have been barely marked to market value. And why not ask what the German government will do if it turns out that the entire German system is insolvent (as the German press has recently suggested after leaked documents suggested German regulators privately fear that their banks hold over €800m of toxic and illiquid assets.)

Such questions, let me stress, do not entirely remove the need for some debate about hedge funds. But the issue is priority and scale. The global hedge funds sector is estimated to command about $1,500bn of assets on a global basis. The balance sheet of some individual European banks, by contrast, is not wildly different in scale – even today.

Of course, it is possible that European politicians have cannily spotted that logic and are simply focusing on hedge funds as a convenient, distracting scapegoat. It is also possible all the heat about hedge funds will disappear once the European parliamentary elections are over. That is what some senior UK government figures and bankers hope.

But even if that argument is right – and it remains a big “if” – the lesson from the spring of 2007 about the danger of policy distraction remains clear. If European politicians were squealing about the need to clean up big banks – say, by demanding that Europe hurry up and impose its own version of bank stress test – then they might have the right to worry about reforming hedge funds too.

Unfortunately, though, they are not. As a result, the likelihood is that Europe will remain plagued with doubts about the health of its financial system for the forseeable future. And that is a scenario which should worry everybody, hedge fund lovers and haters alike.

gillian.tett@ft.com"

Wednesday, May 6, 2009

a strategy that has become much more familiar after the Madoff revelations

TO BE NOTED: From RGE Monitor:

"Global Macro EconoMonitor
Ann Rutledge | Dec 29, 2008

In my first blog about the FER paper I asked the rhetorical question, How can we talk about elevating the standards of analysis and raising the accountability of SROs when we do not enable our MBAs to understand and follow the paradigm shifts etc. A guest commenter asked if I were implying that the FER were not qualified to comment (since the theory of securitization is not taught in any of the universities with which they are affiliated). Another guest commenter asked me to clarify whether I agreed or disagreed with the FER recommendations.

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

Substitute any number for the equity, and the structure still doesn't work, because the underlying collateral is crap.

TO BE NOTED: From Accrued Interest:

"Leverage doesn't kill investors. Bad investments do.

Every one wants to blame the financial crisis on leverage. There was a glib comment on the blog the other day which reflects a common view:

"Sad to see the "cure" for overleveraged, undercollateralized balance sheets to be... more leveraged finance."

No offense to Jonathan intended, as his view probably reflects the majority of opinions among those who follow finance. But I find blaming leverage per se to be a weak argument. Thus I don't see bringing some degree of leverage back into the market as a negative. Furthermore, I don't think that simply blaming leverage will be constructive as we try to construct a regulatory structure to prevent similar meltdowns in the future.

Let's consider the case of a CDO of ABS. To make life simple, we'll assume CDO was constructed from mezzanine bonds from HEL deals. This would be securities similar to the ABX 2007-1 A index, basically the segment of major home equity deals from early 2007 which were originally rated "A."

The HEL deals were structured something like the following (although I'm presenting a simplistic version, the point stands.) I'm assuming $100 million original face, with the underlying mortgages having a 6.75% rate.

  • Senior: 5.75% coupon, $80 million
  • Mezzanine: 6.50% coupon, $15 million
  • Subordinate: 8.00% coupon, $5 million


  • All principal cash flows to the Senior until it is entirely repaid, then to the Mezz, then to the Subs. Interest payments are only made to the mezz and subs if the senior interest obligations have been met. (Don't get hung up on the math right now, it won't be important to my point. If you have questions about ABS and/or CDOs, e-mail me. Accruedint AT gmail.com).

    In a CDO of ABS transaction, the CDO would buy a series of mezz bonds, then repackage them into a similar senior/sub structure. So now let's say we have a $100 million CDO which buys the mezz of 50 different HEL deals, all structured similarly to above.

    The CDO builds its own senior/sub structure as follows:

  • Senior: 5.45% coupon, $80 million
  • Mezz: 6.00% coupon, $12 million
  • Sub: 8.00% coupon, $4 million
  • Equity: $4 million


  • Same deal as above, where the senior gets all principal and interest due before the other pieces. Only once all other classes get their principal and interest does any cash flow accrue to the Equity. One might think of the sub/mezz/senior pieces of the CDO as providing leverage to the Equity. Since the total assets in this deal is $100 million, with equity of $4 million, we have 25x leverage.

    Its easy to see why the CDO of ABS world came crashing down. The ABX 2007-1 A is now trading at $2.5, or a 97.5% loss vs. the original face. So the CDO built on securities similar to ABX would have almost all principal in the deal wiped out entirely. Even the senior most piece of the CDO, which would have been rated AAA originally, would have suffered huge losses.

    But was it the 25x leverage that was the problem? Not at all. Substitute any number for the equity, and the structure still doesn't work, because the underlying collateral is crap. If you are going to try to tell me that leverage caused the meltdown, then you'd need to show me how a different leverage figure would have prevented the problem. Here is an example of a leveraged vehicle that fails at any haircut.

    Now one might say that if the ratings agencies would have required more overcollateralization, these CDOs never would have been created. Perhaps. But again, if leverage isn't the problem with the security, then allowing too much leverage wasn't the ratings agencies' primary mistake. The real problem is that the ratings agencies never considered the binary nature of these structures. If you build a CDO based on all mezz consumer loan ABS, and consumer loans perform poorly, then the whole deal is threatened. We didn't need catastrophic losses on consumer loans to impair the senior-most pieces of these CDOs. Had sub-prime consumer loans suffered a mere 10% loss rate, the CDO would have suffered a 50% loss rate! That would have resulted in the "AAA" rated Senior piece suffering a 30% loss. That isn't acceptable for a AAA-rated asset.

    It isn't like the ratings agencies should have rated these types of CDOs AAA at some lower leverage level. They shouldn't have rated these types of CDOs at all. We talk about toxic legacy assets. These CDOs were toxic from the word go.

    Now consider this. Why didn't the ratings agencies figure that consumer loans could go all go sour at once. Why did they assume that a 10% loss rate was nearly impossible? Or if you want to damn the ratings agencies as mere minions of the investment banks, why were people buying these CDOs? Those investors must also have assumed that the 10% loss rate was nearly impossible. Else they wouldn't have bought the bonds at all. So why was every one so confident?

    We all want to blame some nefarious party, because that would feel better. It is more satisfying to think we were all duped by the evil geniuses on Wall Street. But what if it was as simple as the Fed having succeeded in dampening the business cycle that people started to assume volatility would remain permanently low? What if the fact that previous disturbances that could have had greater contagion (1987 crash, Asian Currency crisis, Russian Debt crisis, LTCM, Y2K, Dot Com bubble, 9/11, etc), didn't. People began to assume the age of crashes was over.

    Now I'd be a fool to say that leverage played no part in the crisis. Clearly financials got over-leveraged. Part of the problem is that with so much leverage, some financials (AIG, Lehman, Bear) didn't have enough time to see if their asset bets would play out. But why they got over-levered was a response to contracting yield spreads. Or put another way, ROA was dropping so in order to get the same ROE you needed more leverage. Spreads were contracting (and thus ROA falling) because there was greater confidence in a more stable economic horizon. As ROA fell, too many fell into a trap of buying poorly constructed securities to get a relatively small amount of extra yield. And before you try to say that no one saw ABS CDOs as riskier, consider that the senior-most ABS deals always yielded 20-30bps more than the senior-most commercial loan-backed CDOs. Every one knew that consumer ABS-backed CDOs were more risky! ( NB DON )

    So ultimately, leveraged investing comes down to picking good assets first, then getting the leverage right. The crisis has been brought on by poor asset decisions more so than too much leverage."

    Friday, March 27, 2009

    The man behind the Oak demonstrates that even despite his sage investor advice, he is also mortal.

    From Zero Hedge:

    "Deep Thoughts From Howard Marks: March Edition

    The man behind the Oak demonstrates that even despite his sage investor advice, he is also mortal.



    Me:

    Don said...

    Another fascinating post. The point about leverage is key. The view of the Calling Run after Lehman from the inside is also interesting.

    Don the libertarian Democrat

    March 27, 2009 4:02 PM

    Wednesday, March 18, 2009

    banks load up on exposures when measured risks are low, only to shed them as fast as they can when risks materialise

    TO BE NOTED: From Vox:

    "
    Securitisation and financial stability

    Hyun Song Shin
    18 March 2009

    Did securitisation disperse risks? This column argues that it undermined financial stability by concentrating risk. Securitisation allowed banks to leverage up in tranquil times while concentrating risks in the banking system by inducing banks and other financial intermediaries to buy each other’s securities with borrowed money.


    Financial booms and busts are as old as finance itself, but the current global financial crisis has the distinction of being the first post-securitisation crisis. Securitisation refers to banks’ practice of parcelling and selling loans to other investors. Securitisation was meant to disperse risks associated with bank lending so that deep-pocketed investors who were better able to absorb losses would share the risks.

    But in reality, securitisation worked to concentrate risks in the banking sector. In a paper published this week (Shin 2009)), I argue that there was a simple reason for this. Banks wanted to increase their leverage ( NB DON ) – to become more indebted – so as to spice up their short-term profit. So, rather than dispersing risks evenly throughout the economy, banks bought each other’s securities with borrowed money. As a result, far from dispersing risks, securitisation had the perverse effect of concentrating all the risks in the banking system itself.

    Against received wisdom

    To understand the true role played by securitisation in the current financial crisis, we need to dispose of two pieces of received wisdom concerning securitisation - one old, one new. The old view, now discredited, emphasised the positive role played by securitisation in dispersing credit risk, thereby enhancing the resilience of the financial system to defaults by borrowers.

    But having disposed of this old conventional wisdom, the fashion now is to replace it with a new one that emphasises the chain of unscrupulous operators who passed on bad loans to the greater fool next in the chain. We could dub this new fashionable view the “hot potato” hypothesis. The idea is attractively simple and blames a convenient villain, so it has appeared in countless speeches given by central bankers and politicians on the causes of the subprime crisis.

    But the new conventional wisdom is just as flawed as the old one. Not only does it fall foul of the fact that securitisation worked well for thirty years before the subprime crisis( NB DON ), it fails to distinguish between selling a bad loan down the chain and issuing liabilities backed by bad loans. By selling a bad loan, you get rid of the bad loan from your balance sheet. In this sense, the hot potato is passed down the chain to the greater fool next in the chain. However, issuing liabilities against bad loans does not get rid of the bad loan. The hot potato is sitting on your balance sheet or on the books of the special purpose vehicles that you are sponsoring. Thus, far from passing the hot potato down the chain to the greater fool next in the chain, you end up keeping the hot potato. In effect, the large financial intermediaries are the last in the chain. They are the greatest fool. While the investors who buy your securities will end up losing money, the financial intermediaries that have issued the securities are in danger of larger losses. Since the intermediaries are leveraged, they are in danger of having their equity wiped out, as many have painfully learned.

    Figure 1. Total subprime mortgage exposure

    Source: Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008)

    Indeed, Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) report that, of the approximately $1.4 trillion total exposure to subprime mortgages, around half of the potential losses were borne by US leveraged( NB DON ) financial institutions, such as commercial banks, securities firms, and hedge funds (see Figure 1). When foreign leveraged institutions are included, the total exposure of leveraged financial institutions rises to two-thirds. So, far from passing on the bad loan to the greater fool next in the chain, the most sophisticated financial institutions amassed the largest holdings of the bad assets – they were the greatest fools.

    It’s all about leverage ( NB DON )

    Securitisation should be viewed in the larger context of balance sheet management by banks. Financial intermediaries manage their balance sheets actively in response to shifts in measured risks. In the name of modernity and price-sensitive risk management, banks load up on exposures when measured risks are low, only to shed them as fast as they can when risks materialise. The supply of credit is the outcome of such decisions and depends sensitively on key attributes of intermediaries' balance sheets. Three attributes merit special mention – equity, leverage, and funding source. The equity of a financial intermediary is its risk capital that can absorb potential losses. Leverage is the ratio of total assets to equity and reflects the constraints placed on the financial intermediary by its creditors on the level of exposure for each dollar of its equity. Finally, the funding source matters for the total credit supplied by the financial intermediary sector as a whole to the ultimate borrowers.

    At the aggregate sector level (i.e. once the claims and obligations between leveraged entities have been netted out), the lending to ultimate borrowers must be funded either from the equity of the intermediary sector or by borrowing from creditors outside the intermediary sector. Aggregate lending to end-user borrowers by the banking system must be financed either by the equity in the banking system or by borrowing from creditors outside the banking system. For any fixed profile of equity and leverage across individual banks, the total supply of credit to ultimate borrowers is larger when the banks borrow more from creditors outside the banking system.

    In a traditional banking system that intermediates between retail depositors and ultimate borrowers, the total quantity of deposits represents the obligation of the banking system to creditors outside the banking system. However, securitisation opens up potentially new sources of funding for the banking system by tapping new creditors. The new creditors who buy the securitised claims include pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies, as well as foreign investors such as foreign central banks. Foreign central banks have been a particularly important funding source for residential mortgage lending in the US.

    As balance sheets expand, new borrowers must be found. When all prime borrowers have a mortgage, but balance sheets still need to expand, banks have to lower their lending standards in order to lend to subprime borrowers. The seeds of the subsequent downturn in the credit cycle are thus sown.

    When the downturn arrives, the bad loans are either sitting on the balance sheets of the large financial intermediaries, or they are in special purpose vehicles that are sponsored by them. This is so since the bad loans were taken on precisely in order to utilise the slack on their balance sheets. Although final investors such as pension funds and insurance companies will suffer losses, too, the large financial intermediaries are more exposed in the sense that they face the danger of seeing their capital wiped out. The “hot potato” was sitting inside the financial system, carried by the largest and most sophisticated financial intermediaries. The severity of the current financial crisis attests to this feature.

    References

    Greenlaw, David, Jan Hatzius, Anil Kashyap and Hyun Song Shin (2008) “Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown” US Monetary Policy Forum Report No. 2.

    Shin, Hyun Song (2009) “Securitisation and Financial Stability” paper presented as the Economic Journal Lecture at the Royal Economic Society meeting, Warwick, March 2008."

    Sunday, January 4, 2009

    "The funny thing is, there’s nothing all that radical about most of these changes"

    From the NY Times:

    "
    The End of the Financial World as We Know It " By MICHAEL LEWIS and DAVID EINHORN

    "AMERICANS enter the New Year in a strange new role: financial lunatics. We’ve been viewed by the wider world with mistrust and suspicion on other matters, but on the subject of money even our harshest critics have been inclined to believe that we knew what we were doing. They watched our investment bankers and emulated them: for a long time now half the planet’s college graduates seemed to want nothing more out of life than a job on Wall Street.

    This is one reason the collapse of our financial system( IT'S TRUE. THE CRISIS STEMS FROM ITS BEGINNING HERE. ) has inspired not merely a national but a global crisis of confidence( THAT'S IT. THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK. )Good God, the world seems to be saying, if they don’t know what they are doing with money, who does?

    Incredibly, intelligent people the world over remain willing to lend us money( THEY ARE BUYING US TREASURIES IN A FLIGHT TO SAFETY ) and even listen to our advice; they appear not to have realized the full extent of our madness. We have at least a brief chance to cure ourselves. But first we need to ask: of what?

    To that end consider the strange story of Harry Markopolos. Mr. Markopolos is the former investment officer with Rampart Investment Management in Boston who, for nine years, tried to explain to the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bernard L. Madoff couldn’t be anything other than a fraud. Mr. Madoff’s investment performance, given his stated strategy, was not merely improbable but mathematically impossible( THAT'S NOT GOOD ). And so, Mr. Markopolos reasoned, Bernard Madoff must be doing something other than what he said he was doing.

    In his devastatingly persuasive 17-page letter to the S.E.C., Mr. Markopolos saw two possible scenarios. In the “Unlikely” scenario: Mr. Madoff, who acted as a broker as well as an investor, was “front-running” his brokerage customers. A customer might submit an order to Madoff Securities to buy shares in I.B.M. at a certain price, for example, and Madoff Securities instantly would buy I.B.M. shares for its own portfolio ahead of the customer order. If I.B.M.’s shares rose, Mr. Madoff kept them; if they fell he fobbed them off onto the poor customer( FRAUD ).

    In the “Highly Likely” scenario, wrote Mr. Markopolos, “Madoff Securities is the world’s largest Ponzi Scheme.” Which, as we now know, it was.

    Harry Markopolos sent his report to the S.E.C. on Nov. 7, 2005 — more than three years before Mr. Madoff was finally exposed — but he had been trying to explain the fraud to them since 1999. He had no direct financial interest in exposing Mr. Madoff — he wasn’t an unhappy investor or a disgruntled employee. There was no way to short shares in Madoff Securities, and so Mr. Markopolos could not have made money directly from Mr. Madoff’s failure. To judge from his letter, Harry Markopolos anticipated mainly downsides for himself: he declined to put his name on it for fear of what might happen to him and his family if anyone found out he had written it. And yet the S.E.C.’s cursory investigation of Mr. Madoff pronounced him free of fraud.

    What’s interesting( COLLUSION ) about the Madoff scandal, in retrospect, is how little interest anyone inside the financial system had in exposing it. It wasn’t just Harry Markopolos who smelled a rat. As Mr. Markopolos explained in his letter, Goldman Sachs was refusing to do business with Mr. Madoff; many others doubted Mr. Madoff’s profits or assumed he was front-running his customers and steered clear of him. Between the lines, Mr. Markopolos hinted that even some of Mr. Madoff’s investors may have suspected that they were the beneficiaries of a scam( YEP ). After all, it wasn’t all that hard to see that the profits were too good to be true. Some of Mr. Madoff’s investors may have reasoned that the worst that could happen to them, if the authorities put a stop to the front-running, was that a good thing would come to an end( I THINK THAT THIS IS LIKELY ).

    The Madoff scandal echoes a deeper absence inside our financial system, which has been undermined not merely by bad behavior( FRAUD, NEGLIGENCE, FIDUCIARY MISMANAGEMENT, AND COLLUSION ) but by the lack of checks and balances( INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ) to discourage it. “Greed” doesn’t cut it as a satisfying explanation for the current financial crisis. Greed was necessary but insufficient; in any case, we are as likely to eliminate greed from our national character as we are lust and envy( I AGREE. IT DOESN'T EXPLAIN IT. ). The fixable problem isn’t the greed of the few but the misaligned interests of the many.

    A lot has been said and written, for instance, about the corrupting effects on Wall Street of gigantic bonuses. What happened inside the major Wall Street firms, though, was more deeply unsettling than greedy people lusting for big checks( TRUE ): leaders of public corporations, especially financial corporations, are as good as required to lead for the short term.

    Richard Fuld, the former chief executive of Lehman Brothers, E. Stanley O’Neal, the former chief executive of Merrill Lynch, and Charles O. Prince III, Citigroup’s chief executive, may have paid themselves humongous sums of money at the end of each year, as a result of the bond market bonanza. But if any one of them had set himself up as a whistleblower — had stood up and said “this business is irresponsible and we are not going to participate in it” — he would probably have been fired. Not immediately, perhaps. But a few quarters of earnings that lagged behind those of every other Wall Street firm would invite outrage from subordinates, who would flee for other, less responsible firms, and from shareholders, who would call for his resignation. Eventually he’d be replaced by someone willing to make money from the credit bubble( I AGREE ).

    OUR financial catastrophe, like Bernard Madoff’s pyramid scheme, required all sorts of important, plugged-in people to sacrifice our collective long-term interests for short-term gain. The pressure to do this in today’s financial markets is immense. Obviously the greater the market pressure to excel in the short term, the greater the need for pressure from outside the market to consider the longer term( NO.THE GOVERNMENT IS IN CHARGE OF THE LONGER TERM. ). But that’s the problem: there is no longer any serious pressure from outside the market. The tyranny of the short term has extended itself with frightening ease into the entities that were meant to, one way or another, discipline Wall Street, and force it to consider its enlightened self-interest.

    The credit-rating agencies, for instance.

    Everyone now knows that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s botched( COLLUSION AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST ) their analyses of bonds backed by home mortgages. But their most costly mistake — one that deserves a lot more attention than it has received — lies in their area of putative expertise: measuring corporate risk.

    Over the last 20 years American financial institutions have taken on more and more risk, with the blessing of regulators, with hardly a word from the rating agencies, which, incidentally, are paid by the issuers of the bonds they rate( YEP ). Seldom if ever did Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s say, “If you put one more risky asset on your balance sheet, you will face a serious downgrade.”

    The American International Group, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, General Electric and the municipal bond guarantors Ambac Financial and MBIA all had triple-A ratings. (G.E. still does!) Large investment banks like Lehman and Merrill Lynch all had solid investment grade ratings. It’s almost as if the higher the rating of a financial institution, the more likely it was to contribute to financial catastrophe( THIS MAKES SENSE, BECAUSE THE POINT WAS TO INCREASE LEVERAGE, WHICH IS EASIER TO DO WITH A BETTER RATING. ). But of course all these big financial companies fueled the creation of the credit products that in turn fueled the revenues of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.

    These oligopolies( A CARTEL ), which are actually sanctioned by the S.E.C., didn’t merely do their jobs badly. They didn’t simply miss a few calls here and there. In pursuit of their own short-term earnings, they did exactly the opposite of what they were meant to do: rather than expose financial risk they systematically disguised it( FRAUD, ETC. ).

    This is a subject that might be profitably explored in Washington. There are many questions an enterprising United States senator might want to ask the credit-rating agencies. Here is one: Why did you allow MBIA to keep its triple-A rating for so long? In 1990 MBIA was in the relatively simple business of insuring municipal bonds. It had $931 million in equity and only $200 million of debt — and a plausible triple-A rating.

    By 2006 MBIA had plunged into the much riskier business of guaranteeing collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s. But by then it had $7.2 billion in equity against an astounding $26.2 billion in debt. That is, even as it insured ever-greater risks in its business, it also took greater risks on its balance sheet.( INCREASED LEVERAGE WAS THE OBJECT OF CDOs )

    Yet the rating agencies didn’t so much as blink. On Wall Street the problem was hardly a secret: many people understood that MBIA didn’t deserve to be rated triple-A. As far back as 2002, a hedge fund called Gotham Partners published a persuasive report, widely circulated, entitled: “Is MBIA Triple A?” (The answer was obviously no.)

    At the same time, almost everyone believed that the rating agencies would never downgrade MBIA, because doing so was not in their short-term financial interest. A downgrade of MBIA would force the rating agencies to go through the costly and cumbersome process of re-rating tens of thousands of credits that bore triple-A ratings simply by virtue of MBIA’s guarantee. It would stick a wrench in the machine that enriched them. (In June, finally, the rating agencies downgraded MBIA, after MBIA’s failure became such an open secret that nobody any longer cared about its formal credit rating.)

    The S.E.C. now promises modest new measures to contain the damage that the rating agencies can do — measures that fail to address the central problem: that the raters are paid by the issuers.( EXACTLY )

    But this should come as no surprise, for the S.E.C. itself is plagued by similarly wacky incentives. Indeed, one of the great social benefits of the Madoff scandal may be to finally reveal the S.E.C. for what it has become.( COLLUSION )

    Created to protect investors from financial predators, the commission has somehow evolved into a mechanism for protecting financial predators with political clout from investors( THAT'S IT. ). (The task it has performed most diligently during this crisis has been to question, intimidate and impose rules on short-sellers — the only market players who have a financial incentive to expose fraud and abuse.( I AGREE. ))

    The instinct to avoid short-term political heat is part of the problem; anything the S.E.C. does to roil the markets, or reduce the share price of any given company, also roils the careers of the people who run the S.E.C. Thus it seldom penalizes serious corporate and management malfeasance( THIS IS WHY THE SECOND MAJOR CAUSE OF THIS CRISIS, FRAUD, ETC., BECAME AN EPIDEMIC. ) — out of some misguided notion that to do so would cause stock prices to fall, shareholders to suffer and confidence to be undermined. Preserving confidence, even when that confidence is false, has been near the top of the S.E.C.’s agenda.

    IT’S not hard to see why the S.E.C. behaves as it does. If you work for the enforcement division of the S.E.C. you probably know in the back of your mind, and in the front too, that if you maintain good relations with Wall Street you might soon be paid huge sums of money to be employed by it.( TRUE )

    The commission’s most recent director of enforcement is the general counsel at JPMorgan Chase; the enforcement chief before him became general counsel at Deutsche Bank; and one of his predecessors became a managing director for Credit Suisse before moving on to Morgan Stanley. A casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that the whole point of landing the job as the S.E.C.’s director of enforcement is to position oneself for the better paying one on Wall Street.( IT IS. THAT'S OUR SYSTEM. CRONYISM AND COLLUSION. )

    At the back of the version of Harry Markopolos’s brave paper currently making the rounds is a copy of an e-mail message, dated April 2, 2008, from Mr. Markopolos to Jonathan S. Sokobin. Mr. Sokobin was then the new head of the commission’s office of risk assessment, a job that had been vacant for more than a year after its previous occupant had left to — you guessed it — take a higher-paying job on Wall Street.

    At any rate, Mr. Markopolos clearly hoped that a new face might mean a new ear — one that might be receptive to the truth. He phoned Mr. Sokobin and then sent him his paper. “Attached is a submission I’ve made to the S.E.C. three times in Boston,” he wrote. “Each time Boston sent this to New York. Meagan Cheung, branch chief, in New York actually investigated this but with no result that I am aware of. In my conversations with her, I did not believe that she had the derivatives or mathematical background to understand the violations( I'M TELLING YOU THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO BE GAUSS ).”

    How does this happen? How can the person in charge of assessing Wall Street firms not have the tools to understand them? Is the S.E.C. that inept? Perhaps, but the problem inside the commission is far worse — because inept people can be replaced. The problem is systemic. The new director of risk assessment was no more likely to grasp the risk of Bernard Madoff than the old director of risk assessment because the new guy’s thoughts and beliefs were guided by the same incentives( YES. PRESUPOSITIONS. ): the need to curry favor with the politically influential and the desire to keep sweet the Wall Street elite( THE INVESTOR CLASS. BUT, GUYS, THAT'S OUR SYSTEM. HELLO. ).

    And here’s the most incredible thing of all: 18 months into the most spectacular man-made financial calamity in modern experience, nothing has been done to change that, or any of the other bad incentives that led us here in the first place.( WE'D HAVE TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM. )

    SAY what you will about our government’s approach to the financial crisis, you cannot accuse it of wasting its energy being consistent or trying to win over the masses. In the past year there have been at least seven different bailouts, and six different strategies. And none of them seem to have pleased anyone except a handful of financiers.( TOTALLY TRUE )

    When Bear Stearns failed, the government induced JPMorgan Chase to buy it by offering a knockdown price and guaranteeing( ESSENTIAL ) Bear Stearns’s shakiest assets. Bear Stearns bondholders were made whole and its stockholders lost most of their money.

    Then came the collapse of the government-sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both promptly nationalized( ESSENTIAL ). Management was replaced, shareholders badly diluted, creditors left intact but with some uncertainty. Next came Lehman Brothers, which was, of course, allowed to go bankrupt. At first, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve claimed they had allowed Lehman to fail in order to signal that recklessly managed Wall Street firms did not all come with government guarantees( THEY DO. THEY WERE FOOLED BY THEIR OWN SELF-DELUSIONS. ); but then, when chaos ensued, and people started saying that letting Lehman fail was a dumb thing to have done, they changed their story and claimed they lacked the legal authority to rescue the firm.

    But then a few days later A.I.G. failed, or tried to, yet was given the gift of life with enormous government loans. Washington Mutual and Wachovia promptly followed: the first was unceremoniously seized by the Treasury, wiping out both its creditors and shareholders; the second was batted around for a bit. Initially, the Treasury tried to persuade Citigroup to buy it — again at a knockdown price and with a guarantee( ESSENTIAL ) of the bad assets. (The Bear Stearns model.) Eventually, Wachovia went to Wells Fargo, after the Internal Revenue Service jumped in and sweetened the pot with a tax subsidy.( FROM TARP )

    In the middle of all this, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. persuaded Congress that he needed $700 billion to buy distressed assets from banks — telling the senators and representatives that if they didn’t give him the money the stock market would collapse. Once handed the money, he abandoned his promised strategy, and instead of buying assets at market prices, began to overpay for preferred stocks in the banks themselves. Which is to say that he essentially began giving away( THAT'S IT ) billions of dollars to Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and a few others unnaturally selected for survival. The stock market fell anyway. ( NO ONE COULD FIGURE OUT EXACTLY WHAT THE HELL THEY WERE DOING )

    It’s hard to know what Mr. Paulson was thinking as he never really had to explain himself, at least not in public. But the general idea appears to be that if you give the banks capital they will in turn use it to make loans in order to stimulate the economy( HE KNEW BETTER ). Never mind that if you want banks to make smart, prudent loans, you probably shouldn’t give money to bankers who sunk themselves by making a lot of stupid, imprudent ones( THAT'S WHY THE SWEDISH PLAN WAS BETTER ). If you want banks to re-lend the money, you need to provide them not with preferred stock, which is essentially a loan, but with tangible common equity — so that they might write off their losses, resolve their troubled assets and then begin to make new loans, something they won’t be able to do until they’re confident in their own balance sheets. But as it happened, the banks took the taxpayer money and just sat on it( YES. A CREDIT STIMULUS WITHOUT THE STIMULUS. ).

    Continued at "How to Repair a Broken Financial World."

    Michael Lewis, a contributing editor at Vanity Fair and the author of “Liar’s Poker,” is writing a book about the collapse of Wall Street. David Einhorn is the president of Greenlight Capital, a hedge fund, and the author of “Fooling Some of the People All of the Time.” Investment accounts managed by Greenlight may have a position (long or short) in the securities discussed in this article."

    "Continued from "The End of the Financial World As We Know It"

    Mr. Paulson must have had some reason for doing what he did. No doubt he still believes that without all this frantic activity we’d be far worse off than we are now. All we know for sure, however, is that the Treasury’s heroic deal-making has had little effect on what it claims is the problem at hand: the collapse of confidence in the companies atop our financial system.( ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF TARP AND ALL THE OTHER GOVERNMENT ACTIONS IS THAT THEY ARE HARD TO ASSESS. )

    Weeks after receiving its first $25 billion taxpayer investment, Citigroup returned to the Treasury to confess that — lo! — the markets still didn’t trust Citigroup to survive. In response, on Nov. 24, the Treasury handed Citigroup another $20 billion from the Troubled Assets Relief Program, and then simply guaranteed( ESSENTIAL ) $306 billion of Citigroup’s assets. The Treasury didn’t ask for its fair share of the action, or management changes, or for that matter anything much at all beyond a teaspoon of warrants and a sliver of preferred stock. The $306 billion guarantee was an undisguised gift. The Treasury didn’t even bother to explain what the crisis was( IT'S A CALLING RUN ), just that the action was taken in response to Citigroup’s “declining stock price.”

    Three hundred billion dollars is still a lot of money. It’s almost 2 percent of gross domestic product, and about what we spend annually on the departments of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development and Transportation combined. Had Mr. Paulson executed his initial plan, and bought Citigroup’s pile of troubled assets at market prices, there would have been a limit to our exposure, as the money would have counted against the $700 billion Mr. Paulson had been given to dispense. Instead, he in effect granted himself the power to dispense unlimited sums of money without Congressional oversight. Now we don’t even know the nature of the assets that the Treasury is standing behind. Under TARP, these would have been disclosed.

    THERE are other things the Treasury might do when a major financial firm assumed to be “too big to fail” comes knocking, asking for free money. Here’s one: Let it fail.( NO )

    Not as chaotically as Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail. If a failing firm is deemed “too big” for that honor, then it should be explicitly nationalized( THAT'S THE ANSWER ), both to limit its effect on other firms and to protect the guts of the system. Its shareholders should be wiped out, and its management replaced. Its valuable parts should be sold off as functioning businesses to the highest bidders — perhaps to some bank that was not swept up in the credit bubble. The rest should be liquidated, in calm markets. Do this and, for everyone except the firms that invented the mess, the pain will likely subside.( THAT WAS AND IS MY SOLUTION. IT ALSO FULFILLS BAGEHOT'S PRINCIPLES )

    This is more plausible than it may sound. Sweden, of all places, did it successfully in 1992( AS I'VE SAID, IT WORKED ). And remember, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have already accepted, on behalf of the taxpayer, just about all of the downside risk of owning the bigger financial firms. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve would both no doubt argue that if you don’t prop up these banks you risk an enormous credit contraction — if they aren’t in business who will be left to lend money? But something like the reverse seems more true: propping up failed banks and extending them huge amounts of credit has made business more difficult for the people and companies that had nothing to do with creating the mess( TRUE ). Perfectly solvent companies are being squeezed out of business by their creditors( A CALLING RUN ) precisely because they are not in the Treasury’s fold( GUARANTEED ). With so much lending effectively federally guaranteed, lenders are fleeing anything that is not.( IN ALL HONESTY, THEY WANT THE GUARANTEES. )

    Rather than tackle the source of the problem, the people running the bailout desperately want to reinflate the credit bubble, prop up the stock market and head off a recession. Their efforts are clearly failing: 2008 was a historically bad year for the stock market, and we’ll be in recession for some time to come. Our leaders have framed the problem as a “crisis of confidence”( IT IS THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK ) but what they actually seem to mean is “please pay no attention to the problems we are failing to address.”

    In its latest push to compel confidence, for instance, the authorities are placing enormous pressure on the Financial Accounting Standards Board to suspend “mark-to-market” accounting( IN ODER TO END THE CALLING RUN BY, WEll, ENDING THE CALLING. OF COURSE, THIS MIGHT WELL NOT WORK ). Basically, this means that the banks will not have to account for the actual value of the assets on their books but can claim instead that they are worth whatever they paid for them.

    This will have the double effect of reducing transparency and increasing self-delusion (gorge yourself for months, but refuse to step on a scale, and maybe no one will realize you gained weight). And it will fool no one. When you shout at people “be confident,” you shouldn’t expect them to be anything but terrified.

    If we are going to spend trillions of dollars of taxpayer money, it makes more sense to focus less on the failed institutions at the top of the financial system and more on the individuals at the bottom. Instead of buying dodgy assets and guaranteeing deals that should never have been made in the first place, we should use our money to A) repair the social safety net, now badly rent in ways that cause perfectly rational people to be terrified( I AGREE ); and B) transform the bailout of the banks into a rescue of homeowners.( THIS IS TERRIBLY HARD )

    We should begin by breaking the cycle of deteriorating housing values and resulting foreclosures. Many homeowners realize that it doesn’t make sense to make payments on a mortgage that exceeds the value of their house. As many as 20 million families face the decision of whether to make the payments or turn in the keys. Congress seems to have understood this problem, which is why last year it created a program under the Federal Housing Authority to issue homeowners new government loans based on the current appraised value of their homes.

    And yet the program, called Hope Now, seems to have become one more excellent example of the unhappy political influence of Wall Street. As it now stands, banks must initiate any new loan; and they are loath to do so because it requires them to recognize an immediate loss. They prefer to “work with borrowers” through loan modifications and payment plans that present fewer accounting and earnings problems but fail to resolve and, thereby, prolong the underlying issues. It appears that the banking lobby( STILL VERY POWERFUL ) also somehow inserted into the law the dubious requirement that troubled homeowners repay all home equity loans before qualifying. The result: very few loans will be issued through this program.( TRUE )

    THIS could be fixed. Congress might grant qualifying homeowners the ability to get new government loans based on the current appraised values without requiring their bank’s consent. When a corporation gets into trouble, its lenders often accept a partial payment in return for some share in any future recovery. Similarly, homeowners should be permitted to satisfy current first mortgages with a combination of the proceeds of the new government loan and a share in any future recovery from the future sale or refinancing of their homes. Lenders who issued second mortgages should be forced to release their claims on property. The important point is that homeowners, not lenders, be granted the right to obtain new government loans. To work, the program needs to be universal and should not require homeowners to file for bankruptcy.( MAYER/HUBBARD. IT HAS PROBLEMS THOUGH. )

    There are also a handful of other perfectly obvious changes in the financial system to be made, to prevent some version of what has happened from happening all over again. A short list:

    Stop making big regulatory decisions with long-term consequences based on their short-term effect on stock prices. Stock prices go up and down: let them. An absurd number of the official crises have been negotiated and resolved over weekends so that they may be presented as a fait accompli “before the Asian markets open.” The hasty crisis-to-crisis policy decision-making lacks coherence for the obvious reason that it is more or less driven by a desire to please the stock market. The Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the S.E.C. all seem to view propping up stock prices as a critical part of their mission — indeed, the Federal Reserve sometimes seems more concerned than the average Wall Street trader with the market’s day-to-day movements. If the policies are sound, the stock market will eventually learn to take care of itself. ( YES AND NO. THE MARKETS TELL US WHAT THE PRESUPPOSITIONS THAT INVESTORS WORK UNDER ARE. SINCE THEY HAVE THE MONEY, THEIR VIEW IS IMPORTANT. )

    End the official status of the rating agencies. Given their performance it’s hard to believe credit rating agencies are still around. There’s no question that the world is worse off for the existence of companies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. There should be a rule against issuers paying for ratings. Either investors should pay for them privately or, if public ratings are deemed essential, they should be publicly provided. ( SOMETHING OF THIS SORT )

    Regulate credit-default swaps. There are now tens of trillions of dollars in these contracts between big financial firms. An awful lot of the bad stuff that has happened to our financial system has happened because it was never explained in plain, simple language( HERE I AGREE. BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN. THAT'S WHY I SAY THAT IT'S FRAUD, ETC. ). Financial innovators were able to create new products and markets without anyone thinking too much about their broader financial consequences — and without regulators knowing very much about them at all. It doesn’t matter how transparent financial markets are if no one can understand what’s inside them. Until very recently, companies haven’t had to provide even cursory disclosure of credit-default swaps in their financial statements.

    Credit-default swaps may not be Exhibit No. 1 in the case against financial complexity, but they are useful evidence. Whatever credit defaults are in theory, in practice they have become mainly side bets on whether some company, or some subprime mortgage-backed bond, some municipality, or even the United States government will go bust. In the extreme case, subprime mortgage bonds were created so that smart investors, using credit-default swaps, could bet against them. Call it insurance if you like, but it’s not the insurance most people know. It’s more like buying fire insurance on your neighbor’s house, possibly for many times the value of that house — from a company that probably doesn’t have any real ability to pay you if someone sets fire to the whole neighborhood( THAT WAS MY EXAMPLE. HOWEVER, I'VE POSTED ON CASES IN WHICH I BELIEVE CDSs MAKE SENSE. BUT LEWIS IS NOW MUCH BETTER ON THIS THAN IN HIS LAST ARTICLE. ) . The most critical role for regulation( OR SUPERVISION ) is to make sure that the sellers of risk have the capital to support their bets.

    Impose new capital requirements on banks. The new international standard now being adopted by American banks is known in the trade as Basel II. Basel II is premised on the belief that banks do a better job than regulators of measuring their own risks — because the banks have the greater interest in not failing. Back in 2004, the S.E.C. put in place its own version of this standard for investment banks. We know how that turned out. A better idea would be to require banks to hold less capital in bad times and more capital in good times( THIS IS A VERSION OF MY VALUE INVESTING SUPERVISION, SO I LIKE IT. ). Now that we have seen how too-big-to-fail financial institutions behave, it is clear that relieving them of stringent requirements is not the way to go.

    Another good solution to the too-big-to-fail problem is to break up any institution that becomes too big to fail.( GOOD LUCK )

    Close the revolving door between the S.E.C. and Wall Street( GOOD LUCK ). At every turn we keep coming back to an enormous barrier to reform: Wall Street’s political influence. Its influence over the S.E.C. is further compromised by its ability to enrich the people who work for it. Realistically, there is only so much that can be done to fix the problem, but one measure is obvious: forbid regulators, for some meaningful amount of time after they have left the S.E.C., from accepting high-paying jobs with Wall Street firms.

    But keep the door open the other way. If the S.E.C. is to restore its credibility as an investor protection agency, it should have some experienced, respected investors (which is not the same thing as investment bankers) as commissioners. President-elect Barack Obama should nominate at least one with a notable career investing capital, and another with experience uncovering corporate misconduct( A VERY GOOD IDEA ). As it happens, the most critical job, chief of enforcement, now has a perfect candidate, a civic-minded former investor with firsthand experience of the S.E.C.’s ineptitude: Harry Markopolos.

    The funny thing is, there’s nothing all that radical about most of these changes( COMMON SENSE OR BANKING AND INVESTOR 101. I AGREE. ). A disinterested person would probably wonder why many of them had not been made long ago. A committee of people whose financial interests are somehow bound up with Wall Street is a different matter."

    A much better article than the last one by Lewis. My disagreement is on the importance of the government guarantees, being, for me, paradoxically, the problem and the solution.

    Wednesday, December 10, 2008

    "For many, the New Capitalism may well seem fairer and less alienating than the model of the past 30 years"

    Robert Peston of BBC considers what changes in Capitalism will follow from the current crisis:

    "There's next year, and then there's the next decade.
    Economic conditions in 2009 will be treacherous. There'll be a formal recession in
    most developed economies, and the economic contraction is highly likely to be more
    severe in the UK than almost anywhere else.

    Companies and consumers will continue to tighten their belts. There'll be a sharp rise
    in unemployment. The extraordinary volatility we've experienced in the price of
    sterling, commodities, energy, shares and capital - which makes it so hard for
    businesses and investors to plan - is unlikely to dissipate.

    Many businesses, especially big ones, will become unviable - and will present the
    Government with an appalling dilemma of which ones to put on life support.
    So it’s understandable that most of us, including ministers, central bankers and
    regulators, are planning for the next few months. We're building the economic
    equivalent of bomb shelters and mobile hospitals.

    But this is no downturn like any we've seen since the Second World War, for two
    reasons: it's global; and its primary cause is the pricking of a massive debt bubble.
    We borrowed too much, especially in the US and the UK. And the process of paying
    the money back is not only leading to a fall in living standards but is also precipitating
    very significant changes in how the global financial economy operates."

    So, this financial crisis is different than others in the last 60 years because:
    1) It's global ( True )
    2) It involves huge debts ( True )

    The results will be:
    1) A lower standard of living ( Short term, but not necessarily long term )
    2) A change in the global economy ( True )

    "Capitalism is changing in fundamental ways. For many years to come, what's
    happening will affect the relationship between business and government, between
    taxpayers and the private sector, between employers and employees, between
    investors and companies.

    Arguably the global economic crisis will turn out to be more significant for us and
    other developed economies than the collapse of communism."

    I don't agree, unless he's just talking about very recent history.

    "A New Capitalism is likely to emerge from the rubble. And although it’s impossible
    to be precise about how the reconstructed economy will operate, parts of its outline
    are taking shape. What lies ahead can be determined from an understanding of what’s
    gone wrong with the existing model.

    This, in itself, is no reason for gloom or despair. For many, the New Capitalism may
    well seem fairer and less alienating than the model of the past 30 years, in that the
    system's salvation may require it to be kinder, gentler, less divisive, less of a casino in
    which the winner takes all."

    I agree that we could have a much better Capitalist system, and that includes one that has enough of a social safety net and wealthy enough lower and middle classes to be viable, i.e., accepted.

    "Here are some of the numbers that tell us what’s gone wrong. For the UK, if you
    aggregate together consumer, corporate and public-sector debt, the ratio of our
    borrowings to our annual economic output is a bit over 300%, or over £4000bn.
    That’s a similar ratio of debt to GDP as that of the US, and it’s a record. Over the past
    decade, we borrowed and we borrowed and we borrowed: we assumed that the day when we had to pay it back would never arrive, that there would always be an
    opportunity to roll over the debt."

    I think that's correct. There was a lot of wishful thinking involved. But I feel that it was more of a belief that government could easily bail us out if things went sideways. The other government actors around the world would also go along with bailing us out. However, I believe that the main assumptions about government coming to the rescue in the event of a financial crisis have proven to be correct.

    "Households borrowed too much, £1200bn on mortgages alone. Big companies
    borrowed too much, especially those taken off the stock market in private equity deals.
    Note however that for all the political fuss about the need for banks to maintain lines
    of credit to small companies, they're the unsung heroes of our tale of monumental
    financial folly: even today, the aggregated savings of small companies exceed their
    debt."

    It was the big boys that were paying the insurance premiums called lobbying.

    "One of the best ways of understanding how all our debts were accumulated is to look
    at the gross foreign current liabilities of our banks. These rose from £1,100bn in 1997
    to £4,400bn this year (again, about three times the size of our annual economic
    output).
    This trend tells two stories. It shows the massive and unsustainable growth in the City
    of London and our financial services industry - which is now shrinking with a
    vengeance, at the cost of massive job losses and evaporating tax revenues (perhaps
    £30bn to £40bn of income for the Exchequer gone forever)."

    Our financial services sector is shrinking as well.

    "But it also shows that our debts are, to a large extent, the recycled savings of other
    countries, notably the massive savings and surpluses of China, other Asian economies
    and the Middle East (one note of caution here: a sizeable proportion of these foreign
    currency liabilities, but by no means all, were used to buy foreign currency assets).
    To put it in crude terms, for much of the past decade, millions of Chinese slaved away
    on near subsistence wages and still managed to save, both as a nation (China swanks
    £1,400bn in foreign exchange reserves) and as individuals. And to a large extent they
    were working to improve our living standards, because they made more and more of
    the stuff we wanted at cheaper and cheaper prices - and clever bankers took their
    savings and lent the cash to us, so that we could buy the houses we cherished, the cars
    we desired, the flat-screen TVs.
    This imbalance - between the savings of China, India, Japan and Saudi and our
    indebtedness, between their massive trade surpluses and our deficits - was never
    sustainable. At some point, the Chinese were bound to say, “we’d like some of the
    cake now please, which means you’ll have to have a bit less”.
    Tragically, they toiled for our prosperity – or we lived high on the hog while they
    fattened the pigs for us – for too long. Which is partly why the return to equilibrium,
    to a more balanced global economy, is happening in a horribly painful way that's
    impoverishing millions of people."

    This was a two way street. It had benefits for both sides, but a restructuring of the situation might prove beneficial. It will certainly be painful unless governments help their citizens out with some of those savings.

    "For me, therefore, the most important event of the past week was the chastising of the
    US Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson, by Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the Chinese
    central bank. Zhou said that "over-consumption and a high reliance on credit is the
    cause of the US financial crisis" and "as the largest and most important economy in
    the world, the US should take the initiative to adjust its policies, raise its savings ratio
    appropriately and reduce its trade and fiscal deficits."

    This seemed a pretty unambiguous statement by the Chinese that they're no longer
    prepared to finance the spendthrift ways of the US and UK: they don't want to lend
    more and they want to be confident that what they have lent won't disappear in a puff
    of bad debts and inflation."

    Here I simply disagree. Zhou was putting on a show. He loves our relationship, but he has interests that we keep bothering him about, and he's using this opportunity to let us know that this lecturing and bothering is now a two way street.

    "So the big question is how much debt will we have to repay until our economy is
    returned to some kind of stability.
    This is tricky to calculate."

    Try impossible. We're going to use trial and error.

    "One important number, which gives us a clue, is the difference between what our
    banks have lent and what they've borrowed from British households, businesses and
    institutions that are too small to be players in global financial markets. It's what the
    Bank of England calls the customer funding gap. And it matters because it's a guide to
    the dependence of British banks on funds from overseas that are diminishing and
    could well, over time, drop to zero.
    This customer funding gap was nil in 2001. But by the end of June this year,
    according to the Bank of England, the gap had soared to £740bn. To be more specific,
    a typical British bank has been raising the funds for 40% of all the loans it makes to
    you and me from big financial institutions, money managers, giant companies and
    other so-called wholesale sources.

    The problem for British banks (and for those in many other countries) is that this
    source of funds dried up in August 2007 and it’s not at all clear that the tap will ever
    be turned on again in the way that it was. The trigger of the closing down of
    wholesale markets was the horrifying realisation by financial institutions in every
    country that hundreds of billions of dollars lent to US homeowners in the form of low
    quality subprime loans – and repackaged into putatively high quality investments as
    collateralised debt obligations – were going bad. This undermined trust within the
    financial system, in that none of the players could be confident which of them had
    been poisoned beyond rehabilitation by subprime. And this trust disappeared
    altogether in September of this year, when the US Treasury chose not to rescue one of
    the world’s biggest investment banks, Lehman Brothers."

    It was the trust in government intervention that got a jolt. There was no way for Lehman to unwind these deals without the money and time bought through government intervention. There was no Plan B.

    "This malfunctioning of money markets has also been the trigger for the end of the
    recycling of the surpluses from China, or others parts of Asia or the Middle East, into
    loans to us. Over the longer term, it would be a very good thing if these great
    exporting nations were to consume more of the wealth they generate. That would, for
    example, create great opportunities for our trading companies. But in the transitional
    period it’s something of disaster for our financial system, because there’s a
    progressive and painful withdrawal of funds from our banks (although this withdrawal
    of overseas funding from our banks happens in an indirect way, via assorted financial
    institutions, since China – for example – rarely lends directly to them).

    Our banks have been forced to reduce their dependence on these diminishing sources
    of wholesale funds, which is why they’ve been lending less to us. And it’s also why
    they’ve had to turn to taxpayers for financial succour on an unprecedented scale.
    Since the summer, as an ever increasing number of money managers, huge companies
    and financial institutions demanded their money back from our banks, the entire banking system came perilously close to collapse. Our banks didn't and don't have the
    readies, for the obvious reason that the cash had all been lent out in the form of
    mortgages and loans to companies and consumers.

    So you and I, as taxpayers, came to the rescue and filled the gap. Over just the past
    few months, British taxpayers have provided loans, commitments, guarantees and
    capital to our banks in excess of £600bn (in the US, the equivalent figure for taxpayer
    support is around £5,500bn). Which is probably just the beginning."

    That's the system.

    "In the UK, taxpayer funding for our banks is very likely to rise, probably to more than
    £1000bn, perhaps more still. And the reason is that many of our banks are still some
    way from equilibrium between the borrowing needs of British companies and
    households and the deposits and loans they receive from British companies and
    households."

    There's more to it than that, but that is a serious problem. The banks won't lend.

    "Here it’s necessary to take a detour into the way that credit was created in the boom
    years and is in the process of being destroyed.

    The recycling of Asian and Middle Eastern surpluses to the UK, Europe and the US in
    the form of loans wasn't a simple conversion of a pot of savings into an identical pot
    of debt. When loans were used to buy houses, or to support property developments, or
    to finance hedge funds that trade in every imaginable security and commodity, or to
    fund the buyouts of companies by private equity firms, these loans pushed up the
    value of assets. This rise in the value of assets sparked yet more lending, often at
    higher ratios of the loan to the value of the asset, to do more deals – which in turn
    pushed up asset prices further.

    As we entered 2007, whether you were borrowing several billion pounds to buy a
    company or £250,000 to buy a house, lenders were prepared to lend you almost 100%
    of the purchase price with few strings attached.

    There's a subtle but important point here. There were twin connected bubbles in assets
    and credit. Both of those bubbles have burst. Falling asset prices are leading to losses
    for those who borrowed to buy those assets (hedge funds, private equity firms,
    billionaire corporate raiders, banks, homeowners). And as they struggle to pay their
    debts, they sell other assets, driving down the price of those assets and causing losses
    for other borrowers. And when they can’t repay banks, the resources of banks are
    depleted, which means there's less credit available – and no 100% mortgages or other
    loans – which drives down asset prices further, which leads to a further contraction of
    lending, and so on in vicious cycle of decline."

    True, but it also involves the fear and aversion to risk and flight to safety. In other words, part of the problem is what the assumptions being acted upon are that are causing this "vicious cycle of decline". One big problem is the fact that government intervention doesn't seem to be well thought out or effective.

    "So it is unrealistic to expect our banks to cease the insidious process of contracting the
    volume of credit they'll provide - whatever the coaxing and bullying of politicians -
    unless and until the price of property, shares, commodities and other assets stops
    falling. Or to put it another way, asset prices have to find a floor – and they haven’t
    found the floor yet – before the financial economy can rebuild itself and the real
    economy can receive the necessary finance that will allow the recovery to begin."

    Then Keynes is correct and the government needs to step in. Otherwise, the floor will turn into quicksand. I'm sorry to have to tell the Cato people this, but businessmen don't buy and won't act on a totally free market plan. They don't believe in it, and wouldn't know how to act in it even if they did. It's a bit like Wittgenstein said: "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. "

    "As for alleviating the burden of all that debt, history would suggest that’ll necessitate
    the printing of money on a colossal scale, a revival of inflation, to reduce the real value of the debt. But as a deliberate strategy, that would be fraught with risks for the
    Government, since the influential babyboomer generation is now old enough to
    consist mainly of savers rather than borrowers – who would be the victims of
    spiralling prices rather than the beneficiaries."

    It's our best shot. Sorry.

    "A couple of questions follow. Who's to blame? And where will all this taxpayer
    support for banks - and probably, before long, for real companies and the real
    economy too - lead us?
    It takes a whole book to assign culpability. But the short answer is that we’re all at
    fault to varying degrees."

    To what degree are you assigning me?

    "The authorities in the US and the UK were aware of the dangers of allowing the
    financial and trade deficits with China and other exporting nations to persist. They
    could have corrected these deficits by using tax and interest rate policies to reduce our
    rampant consumption. But they chose not to do so, because it all looked too difficult.
    Our own Government turned a blind eye to all the evidence that a rampant lending
    binge was taking place, because the Exchequer was receiving all those lovely tax
    revenues from the housing and City bubbles – and because there was kudos to be had
    from the world renown of our financial services industry.

    In 2006 and 2007, I had long conversations with ministers, officials and regulators
    about how the hedge-fund and private-equity booms – the mind-bogglingly huge
    rewards available to the stars of these industries - were symptomatic of a
    malfunctioning in markets. I saw the frenetic activity of these young financial firms as
    a manifestation that too much debt was available on ludicrously cheap terms that
    didn’t remotely reflect the risks – and this seemed to me to be worrying. The standard
    response from those who now know better was that it would all come out in the wash
    in a painless way, that these new firms were a great asset to the UK, and I was fussing
    about nothing."

    They were right about it all coming out in the wash, but had apparently never been in a washer and dryer. It's hard to see how it could be painless. I agree in theory with what he's saying, but the politics of slowing down a booming economy need to be dealt with as you go along. Not at the very end, or all at one time. You need the correct procedures in place, and the ability to expect danger when times are good. Then people will accept a slowdown in the economy. It's all in the preparation and execution.

    "A corollary of precisely this complacency was that central banks, such as the Bank of
    England, were hopelessly wrong in believing that the explosive growth of credit and
    the surge in the price of assets such as houses was somehow hermetically sealed from
    the rest of the economy, such that it wouldn’t damage everything when the bubble
    was finally popped. That said, most would say that Alan Greenspan, the former
    chairman of the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, was the most benighted of all
    about how the global economy had become safer and sounder."

    He didn't get it. No.

    "Also regulators were negligent in allowing the creation of what’s become known as a
    shadow banking system, in which trillions of pounds of long term loans in the western
    economies were financed with credit that could be withdrawn far too quickly.

    As for the media, we certainly could have shouted louder about the risks of all that
    debt being accumulated – but perhaps the volume control was set a little too low
    because of all the splendid advertising revenue that was generated by the property
    boom.

    And, to repeat, most of us were prone to forget that if you borrow £100, or indeed
    £4000bn, you have to pay it back one day."

    I'm sorry, but leave me out of this. Also, I don't like this blaming everyone if it means that criminals will go free because we all made mistakes.

    "But it’s quite hard to hard to mount a convincing argument against the notion that
    most at fault were the banks and bankers – because they systematically failed to do
    what they were handsomely remunerated to do, which was to properly assess the risks
    of all that lending."

    They're my bottom line as well.

    "Their survival as institutions now wholly depends on the goodwill of governments
    and taxpayers around the world. From Australia, to South Korea, to Germany, France,
    the UK and the US – inter alia – taxpayers financial support for the banking system is
    now equivalent to more than one quarter of global GDP, or more than £9,000bn.

    There are reasons to believe that credit from taxpayers can’t and won’t be repaid for
    many years, in that this credit is financing the correction of huge financial and trading
    imbalances between the western and eastern economies. So if we’ve witnessed a
    semi-permanent nationalisation of the banking system and will soon see significant
    taxpayer support for real companies in the real economy, then our banks and privatesector
    companies will have to work much harder to sustain the goodwill of those who
    are keeping them alive: millions and millions of taxpayers."

    That's the Reich problem, only framed differently, and I concur.

    "That means, I think, that those running our biggest commercial businesses will have
    to be more visible. They’ll have to manifest a genuine understanding not only of the
    anxieties of their employees but of all taxpayers. Those chief executives who succeed
    will be those who imbue in their businesses very simple, commonsense standards of
    decency. And they’ll almost certainly be paid less for doing more, because the
    pricking of the debt bubble has undermined the institutions – the private-equity firms,
    hedge funds and investment banks – that were ratcheting up the pay of all business
    leaders."

    It will all have to be completely and clearly explained. Period. How to pay these people won't be a problem if we chuck them.

    "But the biggest lesson of all is that we are a million miles from having created the
    political and regulatory institutions to help us contain the risks of globalisation. We
    and most of the world may well have been beneficiaries of the open global economy.
    But as millions lose their jobs in Europe and the US in the coming year, the benefits
    will be forgotten.

    If the unfettered movement of capital, goods and services is going to survive, if
    there’s not going to be a retreat into national fortresses that could impoverish all of us
    over the longer term, we’ll have to find a far better way of monitoring global risks and
    of bringing governments together to deal with these risks.

    Some may see this as a threat to national sovereignty, as the thin end of an antidemocratic
    wedge that’ll see the world ruled by unaccountable bureaucrats.
    Reconciling our political traditions with the imperative of making safe the globalised
    world will be a challenge, to put it mildly. But it’s not a challenge we can shirk."

    I agree with this as well. We're not talking world government, or, at least, I'm not, but cooperative agreements that are negotiated and willingly entered into. We need to keep on the path of globalization and free trade.

    Tuesday, December 9, 2008

    "Big bets on the “great moderation” throughout the economy helped to create the financial basis for a potentially big slump."

    Brad Setser talks about the Great Moderation:

    "The great moderation – a theory that become quite popular once the big financial party of this decade really got going after 2004 (see the New York Times graphic on LBOs) – had two components.

    One: Macroeconomic volatility was a historical relic. Downturns were not going to be as severe as in the past – in part because of the success of counter-cyclical monetary policy.

    Two: Financial volatility also was a thing of the past. The combination of reduced macroeconomic policy and the credibility of monetary policy meant that financial markets weren’t as subject to wild gyrations.

    The implication of course was that leverage was safe. Financial firms could enhance their returns by borrowing more and taking bigger bets. And everyone else could increase take on more debt too – whether firms or households.

    I guess it is now time to go back to the drawing boards."

    It might be time to read some philosophy and history. Exactly how long was this "Great Moderation"? Was it even 20 years? Did it include the S & L Crisis, the Tech Bubble, the Inflation of the 70s?

    From Bernanke:

    "One of the most striking features of the economic landscape over the past twenty years or so has been a substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility. In a recent article, Olivier Blanchard and John Simon (2001) documented that the variability of quarterly growth in real output (as measured by its standard deviation) has declined by half since the mid-1980s, while the variability of quarterly inflation has declined by about two thirds.1 Several writers on the topic have dubbed this remarkable decline in the variability of both output and inflation "the Great Moderation."

    I lived through it and I didn't even know it. 20 years. Great. What are we going to call what we're going through now? Tiny.

    "Financial volatility has come back, with vengeance. And not just in the equity markets. After a period of (relative) stability, there have been a series of sharp moves in the foreign exchange market. The yield on the thirty year bond has swung wildly. The pros are amazed at some of the strange permutations that derivatives markets have churned up under stress.

    And Friday’s employment data leaves little doubt that macroeconomic volatility is back with a vengeance. The pace of contraction in economic activity in the US – and probably globally – this quarter is likely to be brutal. Wall Street economists are increasingly starting to sound like Dr. Doom.

    Alas, adjusted to a more volatile world won’t be easy. Belief in the great moderation meant that the US economy was operating with a smaller buffer of capital and liquidity than it had in the past. And here at least much of the world seems to have emulated the US. The easy way to increase equity returns over the last few years was to take on more debt. That in turn is likely to augment the amount of volatility in the economy.

    The risk, obviously, is that firms that borrowed to buy back their stock – or hadn’t run down their cash reserves – won’t be able to avoid Chapter 11. Or Chapter 7. And financial firms won’t be able to support their existing balance sheets with their now-depleted capital and will have to scale back (even after government capital injections), adding to the downturn.

    Ideas have consequences. Big bets on the “great moderation” throughout the economy helped to create the financial basis for a potentially big slump."

    Ideas have consequences. Yes, I suppose they do. So do foolish and shallow views of Human Agency and of Reason and of Mathematics and of what we can actually know. Why do people have to make every hypothesis and theory grand? Isn't it enough to accumulate some general wisdom that actually proves useful in helping us meaningfully and successfully lead our lives? In reality, that's all we do.

    Instead of a drawing board, how about something less grand? Like a notebook?