Showing posts with label Agency Bonds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Agency Bonds. Show all posts

Friday, April 17, 2009

At some point, though, central bank and flight-to-safety demand for Treasuries will fade

TO BE NOTED: From Follow The Money:

"Reserve managers keep buying Treasuries …

Chinese reserve growth has slowed. Russia’s reserves are down in the first quarter (though most of the fall was in January). Saudi foreign assets fell in January and February.

Most emerging economies — including some that thought they had ample reserves a year ago — want more foreign currency liquidity. They are looking to borrow foreign exchange pretty much any place they can. Russia, Korea and Abu Dhabi are all poised to issue international sovereign bonds. Other cash-constrained countries (and companies) are turning to China for help, especially if they have a bit of oil or iron ore to offer in exchange. Still others are turning to the IMF.

The amazing thing is that central banks are buying more Treasuries now, when their reserves are shrinking, than they ever did when their reserves were growing.

After several years when plain vanilla Treasuries were out of favor as a reserve asset, demand for Treasuries surged late last year. It fell off a bit in January, but picked up again in February. Moreover, we know that little has changed since then. The Fed’s custodial of Treasuries are up by a stunning $76 billion since the end of February. Central banks were particularly active in the past week. Custodial holdings of Agencies are down by a little more than $8 billion since February.

Foreign demand for Agencies has truly disappeared. Look at the following chart, which shows rolling 12m purchases of all Treasuries and Agencies, includes short-term T-bills and short-term Agencies:

Indeed, the fall off in demand for long-term Agencies has been sharper than the fall off in demand for long-term US corporate bonds or equities.

Chalk that sudden stop to the reserve managers at a few large central banks. For a while, Agencies backed by prime mortgages and an implicit government guarantee were almost as toxic to central banks as subprime debt was to commercial banks. The Fed is buying Agencies, but almost no other central bank is.

Treasuries are the only US asset foreign investors still want, despite their low yields. Over the past 12 months, the US — rather amazingly — could have financed its trade deficit by just selling Treasuries. And nothing else. At least so long as Americans didn’t move large sums out of the US.

It still could for that matter. The $85.1 billion in Treasuries foreign investors bought in the first two months of 09 (mostly in February) easily exceeds the $62.2 billion January-February trade deficit.*

At some point, though, central bank and flight-to-safety demand for Treasuries will fade. That won’t necessarily signal a loss of confidence in US government bonds. It could equally signal renewed confidence in the Agencies — or at least an and to the reallocation of existing reserves toward Treasuries.

The fact that the US is financing its external deficit entirely by selling Treasuries understandably makes people a bit nervous. After so much has gone wrong over the past year it is natural to focus on the remaining risks. The sudden loss of foreign confidence in the Agencies is a cautionary tale.

But there are also three sources of comfort:

One, it is far easier for central banks to shift out of Agencies (and large uninsured deposits) and into Treasuries than it is for central banks to shift out of Treasuries. Especially when most countries are looking to increase their holdings of truly liquid assets. China now seems worried about the safety of its reserves, but far more countries worry that they don’t have enough reserves to be safe.

Two, American demand for foreign assets has fallen alongside foreign demand for US assets. That reduces the total amount the US need to borrow from the world.

Three, the big fall in the US trade deficit means that the US has to sell far fewer foreign assets of all kinds. A $30 billion monthly trade deficit doesn’t worry me quite as much as a $60 billion monthly trade deficit.

Ongoing demand for Treasuries and faster US sales of foreign “risk” assets than foreign sales of US “risk” assets have provided sufficient financing to cover the United States’ much reduced trade deficit. But I wouldn’t want to count on the current mix of financing to cover a growing deficit. That, in view, is still where the real risks lie.

*We don’t have data on the March trade deficit, and April isn’t over. But the $135.5 billion rise in the Fed’s custodial holdings of Treasuries so far this year seems to be roughly in line with the likely deficit. On the other hand, some of the inflow must be coming out of dollar assets, though less seems to be coming out of the Agency market than in the last half of 2008."

Monday, April 13, 2009

the bond market will figure out that a U.S. government guarantee works equally well on agency bonds as it would on Treasuries.

TO BE NOTED: From Fundmastery Blog:

"Pimco Adds to Government Bond Position

Kurt Brouwer April 13th, 2009

Bill Gross and his Pimco Total Return Bond Fund as loading up on government agency bonds such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds. These agency securities carry an explicit guarantee from the U.S. Treasury. This Bloomberg piece gives a bit more detail:

Gross Raises U.S. Debt Holdings to Highest Level Since 2007 (Bloomberg, April 13, 2009, Dakin Campbell)

Bill Gross, manager of Pacific Investment Management Co.’s $144 billion Total Return Fund, increased his holdings of U.S. government debt to 28 percent in March, the highest percentage in almost two years.

Pimco’s founder and co-chief investment officer boosted government debt holdings from 15 percent in February to the most since April 2007, according to the Newport Beach, California- based company’s Web site. The world’s biggest bond fund’s holdings of mortgage-backed securities dropped to 66 percent of total assets from 86 percent in February.

…While the government debt category includes Treasuries, Gross has said that Pimco is not interested in buying the securities. In February, Gross said that while the Fed should buy Treasuries he would not follow its lead.

…The Total Return Fund rose 4.8 percent in 2008, beating 93 percent of its peers, data compiled by Bloomberg show. The fund has returned 1.5 percent this year through March, according to Pimco data.

In January, Gross held a negative position in government debt securities such as Treasuries, debt issued by government-backed agencies such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Bank system or interest-rate derivatives.

The argument for agency (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac etc.) mortgage-backed securities is that they have far higher yields than Treasury bonds with comparable maturities, yet both are backed by the U.S. government. Presumably, the Pimco brain trust believes the bond market will figure out that a U.S. government guarantee works equally well on agency bonds as it would on Treasuries.

See also Pimco Predicts Inflation Ahead and

as investors demanded higher yields to lend to the government for longer periods

TO BE NOTED: From Bloomberg:

"Treasuries Little Changed as Fed Readies Purchases of Debt

By Dakin Campbell and Wes Goodman

April 13 (Bloomberg) -- Treasuries were little changed as the Federal Reserve prepared to buy U.S. government securities today and tomorrow in an effort to cut borrowing costs.

Investors seeking safety during the first global recession since World War II increased holdings of Treasury and agency debt to record levels, a survey of fund managers by Ried, Thunberg & Co. shows. Government and central bank reports this week will show U.S. retail sales rose in March, while a drop in factory production and slower inflation indicate the recession isn’t over, according to surveys of economists by Bloomberg.

“We traded off under the weight of supply last week,” said Martin Mitchell, head of government bond trading at the Baltimore unit of Stifel Nicolaus & Co. “Absent supply, the market will tend to drift lower in yield.”

The yield on the 10-year note rose one basis point to 2.93 percent as of 8:15 a.m. in New York, according to BGCantor Market Data. The price of the 2.75 percent security due February 2019 fell 1/32, or $0.31 per $1,000 face amount, to 98 14/32. U.K. trading of Treasuries was closed today for the Easter holiday, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association said.

Fed Buying

Ten-year yields will be in a range of 2.5 percent to 3 percent through the middle of the year, according to Kei Katayama, who oversees $1.6 billion of non-yen debt in Tokyo as leader of the foreign fixed-income group at Daiwa SB Investments Ltd., part of Japan’s second-biggest investment bank. The figure will fall to 2.75 percent by June 30, according to a Bloomberg survey of banks and securities companies with the most recent forecasts given the heaviest weightings. The yield has averaged 4.24 percent for the past five years.

The central bank plans to buy Treasuries due from March 2011 to April 2012 today and from September 2013 to February 2016 tomorrow, according to its Web site. The Fed has more than doubled the size of its balance sheet to $2.09 trillion in the past year by purchasing financial assets including Treasuries in an effort to spur growth.

Investors increased Treasury and agency holdings to 45 percent of their portfolios, matching the all-time high set in October 2002, according to Ried Thunberg, a research company in Jersey City, New Jersey. Agency debt is comprised mostly of securities sold by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two largest providers of funds for mortgages.

Decline Predicted

U.S. bonds may still fall, the survey showed. An index measuring investors’ outlook for Treasuries through the end of June declined to 43 for the seven days ended April 9 from 44 in the previous week. A reading below 50 means investors expect prices to drop. Ried Thunberg surveyed 25 fund managers controlling $1.35 trillion.

China, the largest holder of U.S. debt outside the nation, should buy more short-maturity U.S. Treasuries than long-term notes, the Oriental Morning Post reported today, citing a former adviser to the People’s Bank of China.

The government should “adjust the maturity structure, and keep asset and currency structures basically unchanged,” Li Yang said in Beijing, the Chinese-language newspaper reported.

Foreign holdings of Treasury bills surged to a record $486.9 billion in January from $207.1 billion a year earlier, according to the Treasury Department. Shorter-maturity bills tend to follow central bank interest rates while bonds are influenced more by inflation.

Yield Curve

The difference between two- and 10-year yields widened to 1.96 percentage points from 1.25 percentage points in December as investors demanded higher yields to lend to the government for longer periods.

Fed purchases have created a Treasury market “bubble” that may keep growing, said Jim Rogers, an investor and author of the book “Hot Commodities.” The Fed, like the Bank of Japan before it, is supporting government debt, he said.

“In Japan, long-term bonds were yielding one half of one percent at one time,” Rogers said on Bloomberg Television in an interview from Singapore, where he lives. “This can go to absurd levels, and bubbles usually do.”

Japan’s 10-year yields, little changed today at 1.46 percent, fell to 0.43 percent in June 2003, the lowest since Bloomberg data tracking the figure began in 1985.

Thirty-year mortgage rates rose to 4.87 percent in the seven days ended April 9 from 4.78 percent the week before, which was the lowest since Freddie Mac, the McLean, Virginia- based mortgage-finance company, began tracking the figure 37 years ago. Rates are 1.97 percentage points more than U.S. 10- year yields, widening from 1.46 percentage points two years ago.

TED Spread

Yields suggest U.S. credit markets haven’t fully recovered after last year’s decline.

The difference between what banks and the Treasury pay to borrow money for three months, the so-called TED spread, narrowed to 95 basis points from 96 basis points on April 10. The spread, which reached 4.64 percentage points in October, was about 36 basis points 24 months ago.

U.S. retail sales rose 0.3 percent in March, according to the median estimate in a Bloomberg News survey before the Commerce Department’s report tomorrow. Industrial production dropped 0.9 percent, the 14th decline in the last 15 months, figures from the Fed on April 15 may show, according to a separate Bloomberg survey.

The Treasury Department has ordered General Motors Corp. to prepare for a bankruptcy filing by June 1, the New York Times reported, raising speculation it will default on its bonds. The report cited people with knowledge of the plans.

Cost of Living

Treasuries fell last week as the government sold $59 billion of notes to help fund President Barack Obama’s spending plans. Government securities dropped 1.2 percent in April, extending a 1.4 percent loss in the first quarter that marked the worst start to a year since 1999, according to Merrill Lynch & Co.’s U.S. Treasury Master Index.

Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s efforts to spur growth may result in a higher cost of living, said Allan Meltzer, the central bank historian and professor of political economy at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh.

Inflation “will get higher than it was in the 1970s,” Meltzer said. At the end of that decade, consumer prices rose at a year-over-year rate of 13.3 percent. Rising costs erode the value of the fixed payments from bonds.

The difference between rates on 10-year notes and Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, which reflects the outlook among traders for consumer prices, was little changed at 1.35 percentage points from near zero at the end of 2008. The average for the past five years is 2.25 percentage points.

The U.S. consumer price index probably fell 0.1 percent in March from a year earlier, according to economists surveyed by Bloomberg before the Labor Department report on April 15. In February, the index rose at a year-over-year rate of 0.2 percent."

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

I was surprised by how conservative China was in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.

TO BE NOTED: From Follow The Money:

"Creditors generally do like to lend in their own currency …

China may not be an exception after all.

A creditor than lends in its own currency doesn’t have to worry all that much about the risk that it its lending is denominated in a currency that will depreciate. The borrower assumes the risk its currency will depreciate against the currency of its creditor as a condition for getting financing.

That is good for the creditor, and not so good for the borrower.

Back its days as a large creditor, the US (both the US government and private US creditors) generally lent in dollars. That meant that if a Latin currency depreciated against the dollar, the borrower had to find the dollars it needed to repay the US – or default and accept the consequences. Latin countries couldn’t allow their currencies to fall against the dollar and, in the process, reduce the real value of their foreign debts.

China is now a major creditor. But its foreign assets though are denominated in dollars, euros and yen – not RMB. That means that if the dollar depreciates against the RMB, it is China’s problem, not the United States’ problem. The amount of dollars the US has to pay China doesn’t change. But the amount of RMB that China gets for each dollar will fall

China’s willingness to take on this risk in some sense part was a core part of the Bretton Woods 2 system where reserve growth in emerging countries like China financed the United States external deficit. Had the United States external debt not been denominated in dollars, Dr. Roubini and I would have been even more worried by the size of the United States external debt than we were back in 2004. If United States debt structure hadn’t been as favorable, the dollar’s slide from 2002 on would have generated much, much larger problems.

China seems to have woken up, belatedly, to the fact that lending to the United States – or any other country – in its borrowers currency is risky. It probably should have started to worry some time ago, before it had $1.6 trillion or so of dollar-denominated claims. As the FT noted in a recent leader, “The People’s Republic has, however, over-exposed itself to the US, piling up dollar-denominated securities.” China is currently struggling with a problem that is very much of its own making.

China could, in theory, address this problem by ending its accumulation of dollar and euro and yen denominated reserves and instead making RMB denominated loans to the rest of the world.

Internationalizing the RMB poses two problems though.

First, most debtors, including the US, currently do not issue any RMB denominated debt – and I would strongly argue that they shouldn’t start. The countries able to borrow in their own currency at low rates should do so. And countries that have to pay more to borrow to borrow in their own currency also should generally do so, to avoid dangerous currency mismatches. Brazil has benefited immensely in the recent crisis from the fact that most of its debt is now denominated in real.

Second, expanding the “international use” of the RMB is rather hard when China doesn’t want foreign investors to hold RMB denominated assets. If say Argentina had RMB denominated debts, it also might want to hold some RMB denominated reserves as well.

And that would mean allowing foreigners to buy some of the RMB debt that China’s government issues and to hold it as part of there reserves.

That is the rub. Remember, buying RMB debt is also a way of speculating on the RMB.

If China made the RMB fully convertible, anyone could buy long-term RMB denominated debt and benefit if the RMB rose over time. That isn’t something China that has wanted. Remember all the complaints about speculative capital inflows a year ago?

Still, China’s willingness to provide RMB credit to Argentina suggests that China is beginning to recalibrate its definition of its interests.

It is further evidence that China is defining its interest as a creditor – not just as an exporter willing to accept losses on the “vendor financing” it supplies on subsidized terms to those it hopes to encourage to buy its goods.

I was surprised by how conservative China was in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.

It seemed to be concerned almost exclusively with the need to minimize the credit risk in its reserve portfolio. That meant turning down requests from countries like Pakistan for bilateral financing – as well as selling Agencies and buying Treasuries. Now it seems that China has concluded that it has reduced the credit risk in its reserve portfolio to an acceptable level and is turning its eye toward reducing its currency risk.

That though may be a tougher nut to crack.

Perhaps the state council was spooked by a memo the PBoC sent up the food chain laying out all of the risks that remained in China’s portfolio. If the rumors that China’s leaders were surprised to discover the extent of their exposure to Fanny and Freddie are true, the PBoC has every incentive now to make sure that China’s top leaders aren’t surprised by any future currency losses on China’s reserves.

But the state council has also historically been response to the concerns of China’s exporters – and the core tension between China’s interest as an exporter and its interest as a creditor remains.

Moreover, I am not exactly sure it would be a good thing for China to replace a lot of dollar lending to the world with a lot of RMB lending to the world. China would take on less currency risk to be sure, but all the problems created by China’s large surplus would remain. Actually, they would get worse — as more risk would be in the hands of the world’s big borrowers.

The FT leader again: “[China] must not just replace its mountain of dollar assets with heaps of other currencies.” Exactly right."

Friday, March 20, 2009

It is simply because China seems to have lost confidence in the implicit guarantee that backs the Agency market.

From Follow The Money:

"Did the Fed bail out China by buying Treasuries?

No. Not really. At least not in the sense that is usually argued. China has no need to sell foreign assets like Treasuries to finance its domestic fiscal stimulus so long as it is running a large external surplus.

But China could use a large buyer for some of its Agencies. Now it was one. Though here the Fed isn’t so much bailing China out as substituting fro the falloff in Chinese and other central band demand.

And I would be curious to know if China is worried by the latest bout of dollar weakness or relieved that a weaker dollar is pulling the RMB back down. China’s biggest financial exposure isn’t to the equity market, it is to the dollar. It thus benefits financially from dollar strength. But a strong dollar also doesn’t exactly help China’s exporters. And exporters have long driven China’s policy choices.

Let’s start with the first point. Does China — as Felix’s correspondent implies — need to sell Treasuries to finance its fiscal stimulus?

The simple answer is no, it doesn’t.

Foreign exchange reserves can finance a current account deficit or a capital outflow. Foreign assets aren’t needed to finance a fiscal stimulus. The US is a case in point; it has financed a large current account deficit by selling dollar-denominated bonds — not by selling off its reserves. China would only need to draw on its foreign exchange reserves to cover its fiscal deficit if its fiscal deficit led to a trade and current account deficit.

And China no need to worry there. It isn’t Russia — a country that looks set to run both a fiscal and a current account deficit this year, and thus will need to draw on its reserves to meet the balance of payments needs associated with its fiscal deficit.*

Don’t take my word. Read the World Bank’s latest China Quarterly. Thanks to David Dollar, Louis Kuijs and the rest of the staff of the Beijing office, it remains the best single source for analysis of macroeconomic trends in China.

The World Bank forecasts that China’s fiscal deficit will expand by about 2.8 percentage points in 2009, with the fiscal deficit rising from 0.4% of China’s GDP to 3.2% of GDP (table 4)

The World Bank also forecasts that China will run a $425 billion current account surplus in 2008. That means Chinese investors — whether private investors or the central bank — will be net buyers of the world’s financial assets, not net sellers. China, like the Fed, will be buying Treasuries.

How can the fiscal balance deteriorate by 2.8% of GDP while the current account deficit deteriorates by only — according to the World Bank’s forecasts — 0.8% of GDP? Shouldn’t the fiscal deficit suck up some of the funds that China would otherwise lend to the world?

There is an easy answer here too: the rise in the fiscal deficit will offset a sharp fall in private investment, a fall that otherwise would have pushed the current account surplus up.

But aren’t China’s reserves falling because of China’s new spending plans? It is certainly rumored that China’s reserves fell by $30 billion in January. But the euro fell sharply against the dollar in January (after rising in December). Currency moves alone likely subtracted $40-50 billion from China’s reserves. If China’s reserves only fell by $30 billion, China was still buying foreign exchange in the market to keep its currency from rising.

Consequently, it is more accurate to say that China’s reserves are still growing, just at a much slower pace than before. More importantly, the currency slowdown in reserve growth isn’t due to a spending spree that brought China’s current account surplus down. Not at all.

Real imports — according to the World Bank (see Table 1) — fell by more than real exports in November, December and January. February will prove to be a bit different, but it is a month that is heavily shaped by seasonal factors. Nonetheless, China’s q1 current account surplus is on track to exceed its current account surplus in q1 2009, even with China’s fiscal stimulus.

On a rolling 12m basis, China’s trade surplus is at or near a record high, even including the February data. That may change if the global slump — now a quite severe global slump — continues to cut into China’s export and the stimulus reverses the slide in China’s (real) imports. But for now, China’s surplus is getting bigger not smaller.

So why has reserve growth slowed? Simple: private capital is leaving China. And that has nothing to do with the fiscal stimulus. It is tied to the dollar’s rise — and expectations that China might allow its currency to slide against the dollar to help its export sector.

For the year, the World Bank forecasts that China’s $425 billion current account surplus will lead to $425 billion in reserve growth, as “hot” outflows subside. That means that China will still be buying foreign assets, and unless something changes, it will still be buying Treasuries. Perhaps not quite at the same rate as before. But there is a difference between not buying as much and selling.

So what has China been selling? Simple: Agencies. That isn’t because China needs the money to finance its fiscal deficit, or (more realistically) to finance large capital outflows. It is simply because China seems to have lost confidence in the implicit guarantee that backs the Agency market.

What is the Fed buying: Agencies.

That helps China. If SAFE wants to lighten up its Agency portfolio — and it has a lot of Agency MBS — it can now sell to the Fed. That facilitates its exit from its large position in the Agency market. I suspect that China alone accounts for about half of all central bank Agency holdings — it is a huge player. The Fed, in effect, is making it easier for China to sell long-term Agency bonds and shift into short-term Treasury bills — or whatever other asset China wants to buy.

That help though isn’t free.

The Fed’s move has pushed the dollar down v the euro. And helped push oil up. Neither helps China financially. If China wants to shift from say Agencies to bunds, it is now easier for it to trade its Agencies for dollars, but each dollar buys fewer euros.

The dollar’s share of China’s reserve portfolio exceeds the United States’ share of China’s imports. The more the dollar falls over time, the fewer of the world’s goods China can buy with all the dollars it has salted away. And the more the dollar falls, the more likely that the RMB will eventually resume its rise against the dollar.

That also doesn’t help China financially. China’s government has borrowed in RMB to buy dollars and to a lesser degree euros, effectively opting to hold more reserves than it needs to support its export sector. The ultimate cost of that policy hinges on the dollar’s ultimate fall v the RMB.

SAFE thus should want a strong dollar, as it is fundamentally long dollars. Relative to other reserve currencies. And relative to China’s own currency.

Then again China’s policy of building up far more reserves than it needs never made much financial sense. China wasn’t all that happy with a strong dollar, even if that was in its financial interest.

The RMB has appreciated far more in real terms over the last nine months — when it has been tightly pegged to the dollar — than it ever did back when the RMB was appreciating against a depreciating dollar. My guess is that Europe is far more worried by the dollar’s recent slide than China. China — or least its exporters — weren’t happy with the RMB’s recent strength.

The Fed thus, in some sense, bailed out China’s exporters far more than it bailed out China’s reserve managers.

Actually, it makes more sense to think of the Fed as substituting for China in the market for Agencies — and other central banks — than to think of the Fed as bailing out China and other central banks. The end of the foreign central bank bid, as global reserve growth slowed and central banks shifte dto Treasuries — has had a big impact on the Agency market. That wasn’t helping the US housing market.

Nor is the Fed just stepping in to buy the Agency bonds central banks now want to sell. It is also trying to substitute for the collapse in private financial intermediation here in the US. Private banks have gone from lending huge sums for almost nothing to not lending even when spreads are much higher for the same risk.

Put it this way: foreign central banks never bought anything close to a trillion dollars of Treasuries and Agencies in a single year. A half trillion or so of annual purchases was more than enough to have an impact ..

* Russia is effectively using its reserves to make up for the fall in the government’s export revenues. Absent a buffer of reserves, that short-fall would have required that Russia reduce both government spending and its import bill."

Me:

    March 20th, 2009 at 3:14 pm

  1. “It is simply because China seems to have lost confidence in the implicit guarantee that backs the Agency market.”

    I’ve been fascinated by this, because the implicit guarantee is not thought to be explicit by China, and yet I keep thinking that we’re signaling that the guarantee is explicit without saying so. Since this has been going on for so long, didn’t that move signal something negative about their trust in our guarantees.

    Also, if they can earn more interest and the Fed is buying them, why wouldn’t they leave them in agencies now? It would seem a better move to diversify a bit and buy some of these agencies, especially, again, since they’re being essentially guaranteed.

    I thought that China was mainly worried about possible defaults or haircuts on corporate bonds, since they seem to believe that these are implicitly guaranteed by us, or were when they bought them.

    Finally, I thought that China already knew this:

    http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ba857be6-f88f-11dd-aae8-000077b07658.html

    “China to stick with US bonds

    By Henny Sender in New York

    Published: February 11 2009 23:33 | Last updated: February 11 2009 23:33

    China will continue to buy US Treasury bonds even though it knows the dollar will depreciate because such investments remain its “only option” in a perilous world, a senior Chinese banking regulator said on Wednesday.

    China has used the dollars it accumulates selling manufactured goods to US consumers to accumulate the world’s largest holding of Treasuries.”

    And:

    “Mr Luo, whose English tends toward the colloquial, added: “We hate you guys. Once you start issuing $1 trillion-$2 trillion [$1,000bn-$2,000bn] . . .we know the dollar is going to depreciate, so we hate you guys but there is nothing much we can do.”

    This doesn’t sound like Luo would be happy with what we’re doing. What am I missing?

Saturday, January 17, 2009

"Central banks that needed cash to cover large capital outflows from their own economies"

Brad Setser:

"A few quick words on the November TIC data

China sold $9.2 billion of long-term Treasuries. But it also bought $38.2b of short-term Treasuries.( THE FLIGHT TO SAFETY CONTINUED ) China’s total Treasury holdings are up by $29.1b. By contrast it sold $3.1b of long-term Agencies( IMPLICITLY GUARANTEED ) and also reduced its short-term holdings by about $5 billion. China reallocated( TO EXPLICIT GUARANTEES ) its US portfolio, but it hasn’t cut back on its dollar purchases.( IT WANTS TO PRESERVE ITS CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US AT ALL COSTS. )

The following graph, prepared with help from Arpana Pandey, plots the average increase in China’s reserves (defined broadly, to include hidden reserves) over the last 3 months v my best estimate (taking flows through London into account*) of China’s Treasury and Agency purchases. It speaks for itself.( THE FLIGHT TO SAFETY. PERIOD. FROM IMPLICIT TO EXPLICIT GUARANTEES. IN A CALLING RUN, THIS IS WHERE YOU WANT TO BE. )

The same story applies to the official sector as a whole. Central banks sold $26.2b of long-term Treasuries, but added $66.6b to their short-term Treasury holdings. Net central bank holdings of Treasuries — judging from the TIC data — rose by $40.4b. That is consistent with the $49.1b rise in the Fed’s custodial holdings of Treasuries. Central banks by contrast are reducing their holdings of short-term and long-term Agencies. They sold $14.3b of long-term Agencies, and their short-term holdings likely fell by a comparable amount.**

The countries that are really running down their Treasury portfolio — Korea and Brazil — are countries whose reserves are falling and need the cash( A CALLING RUN ). Russia is running down its Agency portfolio for a similar reason. It really needs the cash( A CALLING ). Its short-term Agency holdings are down to $13.7b. They were close to $100b — 496.8b — in December of 2007.

The big stories in the TIC data, it seems to me, are:

– The ongoing reallocation of central bank portfolios toward short-term Treasuries. That reallocation has been huge( THE FLIGHT TO SAFETY ). Central banks held $$276.8b of t-bills at the end of September. They hold $427.2b at the end of December. And judging from the Fed’s custodial data there is every reason to think that total rose in December. Foreign central bank demand for safe and liquid assets rose at the same time as private demand rose.( FOR THE SAME REASON. THE FLIGHT TO SAFETY. )

– The ongoing retreat of private capital from global markets, or what I previously called the reversal of financial globalization( SIMPLY A CALLING RUN OR DEBT-DEFLATIONARY SPIRAL. ). Foreign investors sold $56b of US long-term securities in November, and another $36.6b in October. Central banks that needed cash to cover large capital outflows from their own economies( A CALLING RUN ) or that simply wanted to shift to short-term t-bills accounted for the majority of those sales, but private investors were selling too. Americans have sold about $35 billion of foreign securities in each of the last three months as well.( A CALLING RUN )

As a result, the US trade deficit is now effectively financed by short-term inflows — including short-term inflows from central banks*** - and the fact that American investors are currently selling their foreign portfolio faster than (private) foreign investors are selling their existing US portfolio.( FOR THE SAME REASONS. A CALLING RUN. IN NOVEMBER, A PROACTIVITY RUN BEGAN. )

* London flows had no real impact on the recent data.
** The US reports data on short-term negotiable securities held by central banks and short-term Agencies held by all foreigners, but not short-term Agencies held by central banks. i have to extrapolate a bit.
*** Some of these short-term inflows may be a reallocation away from private custodians, and thus may not represent a true increase in demand for US assets.

This is not hard to understand. In the comments, all sorts of technical reasons are put forth, but they are only symptoms, and of little or no explanatory power. Please read I. Fisher. What I call a Calling Run is a version of his Debt-Deflationary Spiral.

Sunday, January 11, 2009

"Longer Treasury bonds are the better bubble candidates. "

From Accrued Interest:

"2009 Forecast Episode II: Deflation Strikes Back

This is Part II of a indeterminate series on the Accrued Interest 2009 Forecast. Here I'll focus on general interest rates and Treasury Bonds.


The question on many lips is are Treasury bonds a bubble? I've already said that fighting deflation will be the major theme of 2009. Deflation will remain the primary concern of the Fed until housing prices start to recover. I don't see that happening until 2010( I DISAGREE ). Until housing prices start to rise, we'll see persistently poor final consumer demand( I DISAGREE ). This in turn keeps the velocity of money low and thus the money supply contracting.


I have a very simplistic mental model for Treasury rates. Real interest rates should reflect the opportunity cost of money. Thus a short-term Treasury rate should be the opportunity cost plus an inflation premium. Longer-term rates should reflect both opportunity cost, inflation, and a term premium. When economic growth is weak, opportunities are less, and thus interest rates should fall.


If we have negative inflation, then short-term Treasury rates should be extremely low. Near zero makes sense for T-Bills (although negative yields is questionable at best). Less than 1% makes sense for the 2-year. So I see no bubble on the front end of the Treasury curve. Not that there is a ton of upside on the 2-year at 0.75%, but could it go to 0.50%? Sure.


Longer Treasury bonds are the better bubble candidates. One might be able to argue that in the short term, both growth and inflation will be negative, thus the equilibrium nominal short-term rate should probably be negative. But longer term, we'll eventually have both growth and inflation, and thus long-term Treasuries should not be approaching Japanese-like levels( I AGREE ).

So when the 10-year was pushing 2%, it felt bubbly. But still I resist the bubble label. To me, Treasury rates are clearly below "fair value" but given the extreme liquidity and economic circumstances, I doubt the 10-year can move above 3% until at least 4Q 2009. I think long-term Treasuries remain over-valued until its obvious that inflation is going to eventually become a problem.( A FAIR POINT. I BELIEVE PEOPLE WILL PULL OUT BEFORE THAT. )

What about Treasury supply you ask? Won't the massive debt load eventually push rates much higher? While acknowledging that supply is an obvious negative for prices always and everywhere, as it is, Treasury supply is clearly not overwhelming demand. The 3-year and 10-year auctions from last week went quite well.

Besides the theory that government debt crowds out private investment doesn't hold water right now. Private lending ain't happening in areas where the government isn't subsidizing. In essence, the Treasury is leveraging because the private sector can't.( TRUE. MULLIGAN DOESN'T SEE IT. )

Eventually, the Fed's programs will result in much higher inflation, and thus Treasury rates will rise substantially( I AGREE ). But I think this is a year or more away, too far away to recommend a short.

The problem for real money investors is that Treasury yields are so low, that you pretty much have to own something else. The yield advantage on short-term Agencies versus short-term Treasuries is so large that there isn't any logical scenario where the Treasury outperforms. Therefore I'm playing this by remaining underweight Treasury bonds, but owning stuff that can appreciate if Treasury rates fall. This includes bullet agencies, and some very high quality corporates( THESE MAKE SENSE. )."

He could well be right. I don't want to see another bubble burst, even in my bathtub.

Thursday, January 8, 2009

"Hot money has to go somewhere and hot money outflows from China could go into the dollar"

Brad Setser:

"China hasn’t (yet) lost its appetite for US Treasuries …

Agencies, yes. But not Treasuries.

Keith Bradsher of the New York Times, citing Ben Simpfendorfer of RBS, argues that China’s government is likely to reduce its purchases of US debt.

“All the key drivers of China’s Treasury purchases are disappearing — there’s a waning appetite for dollars and a waning appetite for Treasuries, and that complicates the outlook for interest rates,” said Ben Simpfendorfer, an economist in the Hong Kong office of the Royal Bank of Scotland.

In some sense China’s purchases of US debt has to fall from its current level, as the current level of purchases is unsustainable in a context where China’s reserve growth seems to have slowed. The TIC data show a $44.4b increase in China’s US holdings in September and a $67.5b increase in October, with nearly all the increase coming from the rise in China’s short-term Treasury holdings.

That said, the available data from US suggests that China has yet to lose its appetite for either dollars or Treasuries, despite all the talk coming out of China.( THEY ARE NOT EAGER TO CHANGE ANYTHING. )

We don’t have data for November or December, so the US data are by now a bit stale. But China’s $67.9b of purchases of Treasuries in October were exceptionally high ($43.5b in September isn’t shabby either). That level of Treasury purchases suggests, if anything, that China was shifting funds into dollars, as China’s recorded US purchases almost certainly exceeded China’s October reserve growth. I suspect that China wasn’t shifting into the dollar so much as holding more dollars in ways that register in the US data, so I would discount this data point a bit. Still, the raw October data doesn’t indicate a shift away from either the dollar or Treasuries. Rather the opposite.( THIS MAKES SENSE )

Over the last 12 months, China’s recorded US Treasury purchases have topped $190 billion — a record. Most of the rise has come in the past few months of data. The US survey of foreign portfolio investment has tended to revise China’s purchases of Treasuries up, so $190 billion should be considered a minimum.

The TIC data for November and December isn’t available. But I suspect that the $136b increase in Fed’s custodial holdings of Treasuries over the last two months provides some clues about the evolution of China’s portfolio. Central bank holdings of Treasuries at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York continue to rise rapidly. As of now, I would argue the available evidence suggests that China’s appetite for Treasuries has increased in q4 — largely because of a fall in its appetite for Agencies( FROM IMPLICIT TO EXPLICIT GUARANTEES ). Let’s see what the November and December TIC data show.

Looking ahead, China’s official purchases of Treasuries will be function of three things:

1) The pace of China’s reserve growth. That will be determined by the evolution of China’s trade surplus, FDI flows and hot money flows. The World Bank expects China’s current account surplus to rise in dollar terms in 2009( THAT'S WHAT CHINA WANTS ); I tend to agree. Oil will not average close to $100 a barrel in 09. The fall in commodity import prices will help to offset a (probably large) fall in exports. The fall in exports implies fewer imported components, and China’s domestic slowdown implies fewer imports too. But FDI inflows will slow and hot money flows clearly have reversed, so overall reserve growth (counting the increase in China’s hidden reserves) should slow.

2) The share of China’s reserves that are held in dollars. That is currently close to 70% best I can tell. I have no idea if China will want to continue to maintain that dollar share even as the US runs huge fiscal deficits. But now that China is pegging tightly to the dollar, I would guess that Europe would put a lot of pressure on China not to sell dollars for euros in a way that drives up the euro. That would be tantamount to driving the RMB down v the euro to support China’s exports to Europe. I consequently don’t expect a big change in the dollar share, but that is a huge assumption. ( CHINA DOESN'T WANT TO SELL DOLLARS )

3) The share of China’s dollar reserves that are invested in Treasuries. That share is currently rising, big time. At some point though China will have brought its Agency portfolio down to an acceptable level and start to worry about the size of its Treasury holdings. So I wouldn’t expect it to rise forever.( THIS MAKES SENSE )

Sum it all up and the pace of China’s Treasury purchases should fall from their recent monthly highs in 2009. But that is only because they currently are at such a high level. Even SAFE cannot sustain a close to $70b a month pace of Treasury purchases for all that long. Not unless it really plans to run its Agency portfolio down to zero. ( WE'LL SEE )

One last point: Hot money has to go somewhere and hot money outflows from China could go into the dollar( THAT'S WHERE THEY WANT IT TO GO ). If Chinese reserve growth is below China’s 2009 current account surplus, private Chinese investors will be building up their foreign assets. China’s government won’t necessarily be the only Chinese buyer of dollars. Or, for that matter, euros.

Data on China’s recorded long-term purchases are here, data on China’s short-term holdings are here)."

China, being a Saver/Export Country, will do everything to keep the Saver Country/Spender Country Symbiosis alive.

Monday, January 5, 2009

It turns out our entire financial sector was operating under that same premise—and to a far greater degree than Fannie and Freddie.

So, let's look at Fannie/Freddie in Vanity Fair in an excellent post:

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The Economy

Fannie Mae’s headquarters, in Washington, D.C. From left: former Fannie C.E.O. Jim Johnson, Congressman Barney Frank, former OFHEO director Armando Falcon, former Fannie C.E.O. Daniel Mudd, President Bush, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, former Fannie C.E.O. Franklin Raines, and Alan Greenspan. Photograph by Cameron Davidson.

Fannie Mae’s Last Stand

Many believe the government-backed mortgage giants known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were major culprits in the economic meltdown. But, for decades, Fannie Mae had been under siege from powerful enemies, who resented its privileged status, its hard-driving C.E.O.’s, and its huge profits. Surveying Fannie’s deeply dysfunctional relationships with Congress, the White House, and Wall Street, the author tells of the long, vicious war—involving most of Washington’s top players—that helped propel one of the world’s most successful companies off a cliff.

by Bethany McLean February 2009

The chairman of the universe.”

“Washington, D.C.’s Medici.”

“The face of the Washington national establishment.”

“One of the most powerful men in the United States.”

All those phrases were used to describe a man you may never have heard of: Jim Johnson, the C.E.O. of mortgage giant Fannie Mae in the 1990s. Fannie was then one of the largest, most profitable companies in the world, with a stock-market value of more than $70 billion and more earnings per employee than any other company in America. (By comparison, G.M. at its peak, in 2000, was worth only $56 billion.) On one level, Johnson, now 65 years old, was just another businessman with a lot of money and multi-million-dollar houses in desirable locations from D.C. to Sun Valley, Idaho, to Palm Desert, California. Chairman of D.C.’s premier arts venue, the Kennedy Center, and one of its top think tanks, the Brookings Institution, Johnson was out “wearing white-tie and black-tie every night,” says Bill Maloni, Fannie’s former chief lobbyist. “Everyone wanted a little bit of Jim.”

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz explains the financial mess.

Capitalist Fools, January 2009

Reversal of Fortune, November 2008

The $3 Trillion War, April 2008 (with Linda J. Bilmes)

The Economic Consequences of Mr. Bush, December 2007

But Johnson was also a political force, because the company he ran had a public mission—literally. It had been chartered by Congress to help homeownership( A GOOD IDEA ). Johnson liked to paraphrase the old motto about General Motors: “What’s good for American housing is good for Fannie Mae,” he’d say. Accordingly, he built Fannie into what former congressman Jim Leach, a Republican from Iowa and longtime Fannie gadfly, calls “the greatest, most sophisticated lobbying operation ( COLLUSION ) in the modern history of finance.”

He may be right. John McCain was embarrassed last summer by revelations that his campaign manager, Rick Davis, had served as the president of the Homeownership Alliance, an advocacy group for Fannie and Freddie Mac, Fannie’s smaller brother. The “revolving door,” as people call it, between the Hill and Fannie and Freddie spun so quickly that it’s actually more surprising when someone isn’t on the list than when they are. Rahm Emanuel served on Freddie’s board! Right-wing godfather Grover Norquist lobbied for Fannie! Newt Gingrich was a consultant for Freddie, and Ralph Reed was a consultant for Fannie!

The Princeton-educated son of a Minnesota state legislator, Johnson has silver hair and round tortoiseshell glasses, which give him a warm appearance that is belied by the hard planes of his face. Indeed, he was “very warm, very nice,” in the words of one former Fannie executive, but also “very hard-ass.” In 1996, Richard Baker, a Republican representative from Louisiana, complained that the preface to a Treasury Department report on Fannie had been watered down to make it friendlier to the company( COLLUSION ). Rumors flew that this had been accomplished after Johnson, or someone else high up in the company, had simply made a call to Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin or President Bill Clinton, both of whom were Johnson’s personal friends. (Johnson and Clinton had met at a 1969 gathering on Martha’s Vineyard.) Johnson has denied calling either man, and has said that he and Rubin had a policy while Rubin was Treasury secretary that they would not discuss business. But, under Johnson, Fannie Mae had a reputation for never losing a fight. “The old political reality was that we always won, we took no prisoners, and we faced little organized political opposition” is how Daniel Mudd, son of journalist Roger Mudd and Fannie’s last real C.E.O., later described Fannie’s golden years.

On December 15, 1998, Jim Johnson’s retirement dinner was held at the National Museum for Women in the Arts. That seems to have been the second choice—according to The Washington Post, the gala was supposed to have been in the U.S. State Department’s Benjamin Franklin Room, which could be used by outsiders only if a government official requested it. The Post began making calls after it got hold of an invitation, at which point State Department lawyers pulled the plug. But the dinner was grand in any event. Rubin spoke, as did comedian Bill Cosby and Fannie board member Bill Daley, the brother of Chicago’s current mayor.

The press reported Johnson’s compensation in his final year as around $7 million, but an internal Fannie Mae analysis (which assumed a high stock price) said that the real number was closer to $21 million. Plus, he got perks that could add up to half a million a year: a consulting agreement, two support-staff employees paid for by Fannie Mae, a car, and partial payment for a driver.

There were rumors that Johnson was angling to become Treasury secretary. Instead, in 1999, he became one of the first outside directors of the investment bank Goldman Sachs, where Rubin had been C.E.O., and where current Treasury secretary Henry Paulson presided at the time. Johnson became the head of the compensation committee, making him the closest thing Hank Paulson had to a boss.

Flash forward to just 10 years later. On Friday, September 5, 2008, Treasury Secretary Paulson sat in a conference room at an obscure government agency known as the Federal Housing Finance Agency (F.H.F.A.), which had been charged with regulating Fannie and Freddie. Next to Paulson sat Jim Lockhart, the director of F.H.F.A. On Lockhart’s other side was Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve. Across the table sat Dan Mudd, who had become Fannie’s C.E.O. in late 2004. By the summer of 2008, Fannie and Freddie owned or guaranteed $5.2 trillion of American mortgages, roughly half the $12 trillion total. Just six weeks before the September 5 meeting, Lockhart had said publicly that Fannie Mae’s capital was “well in excess” of what it needed to survive the mortgage storm that was engulfing the nation. But at the meeting he announced that the company’s capital was, in fact, insufficient( THIS LYING HAS TO STOP ). The government officials told Mudd that his company had to give its consent to something called conservatorship, which meant that the government would take it over, pretty much wiping out shareholders—not because Fannie needed capital at that moment, but because they believed Fannie would need it in the future( BECAUSE OF FORECLOSURES ). Mudd was out. The message to Fannie executives, says one person who was in the room, was crystal clear: “If you oppose us, we will fight publicly and fight hard, and do not think that your share price will do well with all of the forces of the government arrayed against you.”

There was also a threat that F.H.F.A. would make life very unpleasant for both the board and management if they didn’t agree to the government’s terms, says another Fannie executive. “That’s really not true—there were no threats,” claims Lockhart, although he adds, “We were very firm.” Steve Ashley, former chairman of Fannie’s board, asked what the government wanted Fannie to do that it wasn’t already doing. The Fannie team didn’t feel that any good answers were given.

A lot of people assume they already know the story of Fannie’s fall from grace. In a narrative that has been repeated incessantly in op-eds and on cable TV, there were good guys and bad guys. The good guys were the Republicans, who had tried to rein in Fannie and Freddie (which was also put into conservatorship that same day), and the bad guys were the Democrats, who wanted to put people into houses they couldn’t afford with subprime mortgages, and Fannie itself, which took advantage of its supposed mission to enrich its executives at the expense of taxpayers. Some even argue that Fannie and Freddie—“the toxic twins,” former Connecticut Republican representative Chris Shays called them—are to blame for the entire economic meltdown( NO ). They were “the match that started this forest fire( TRUE, BUT THAT'S BECAUSE OF HOW THE GOVERNMENT HANDLED THIS. ),” according to John McCain. On October 21, a group of House Republicans wrote to Attorney General Michael Mukasey, requesting that the Justice Department appoint a special counsel to investigate Fannie and Freddie executives. (The F.B.I. is investigating both Fannie and Freddie( FRAUD, NEGLIGENCE, FIDUCIARY MISMANAGEMENT, AND OBVIOUS COLLUSION. ).) Jim Johnson, by last June the vetter of vice-presidential candidates for Barack Obama, had to resign the post due to allegations that he had gotten more than $7 million of loans—some at favorable rates—from scandal-ridden Countrywide Financial, a major Fannie Mae customer whose former C.E.O., Angelo Mozilo, was a friend of Johnson’s. (Johnson said at the time that he received no special favors.)

But there’s a very different—albeit equally radical—version of reality. In this version, which is told by former Fannie executives and shareholders, Fannie was shot, not because it had to be, but because it could be( A VERY GOOD POINT ). “The weekend massacre”( WHICH BEGAN THE FLIGHT TO SAFETY ) is how one former Freddie lobbyist describes the events of the September 5 weekend. “My view is [the Bush] administration said we’ve got four months to remove this thorn in our side,” says Tim Howard, who was Fannie’s chief financial officer from 1990 to 2004. “There will never be another time. We’ve got to do it now( A TERRIBLE MISTAKE ).”

It is worth noting that thus far the government has put not a dime into Fannie and only $13.8 billion into Freddie—which is a drop in the bucket compared to the taxpayer dollars that have gone to some other firms, such as the $45 billion Hank Paulson has handed Citigroup. In this alternative narrative, it was Paulson’s rash action of taking over Fannie and Freddie that helped cause the financial meltdown( TRUE ). As famous money manager Bill Miller, the chief investment officer of Legg Mason Capital Management, wrote in a recent letter to his investors: “When the government pre-emptively seized [Fannie and Freddie] not because they needed capital and could not get it, but because the government believed they would run out in the future, then shareholders of every other institution that needed or was perceived to need capital did the only rational thing they could do—sell, in case the government decided to pre-emptively wipe them out as well( TRUE ).”

In truth, Fannie was a company with extraordinarily powerful enemies. They spanned the decades, the two parties, and the ideological spectrum, from Reagan budget director David Stockman to Clinton Treasury secretary Larry Summers to President George W. Bush, and from Ralph Nader to former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan. These enemies, who detested the privileges Fannie got from its congressional charter, had long wanted to drastically curtail the company—or kill it outright. Johnson called the battle a “philosophical dispute with deep roots and many, many branches,” and it was, but it was also a personal dispute based on rivalries and jealousies. “The War of the Roses” is how a former Fannie executive describes it.

As in most wars, there is fault on both sides. Although in 2000 the Department of Housing and Urban Development (hud), under Andrew Cuomo, increased the requirements that Fannie and Freddie buy loans made to lower-income people, a dramatic increase came in 2004—under the Bush administration. Some people believe it did so merely in order to pressure the companies into agreeing to new regulation. But Fannie itself isn’t a hapless victim, either. In the end, it was Fannie executives( TRUE. NO INCENTIVES EXCUSE THIS NEGLIGENCE. ) who made a business decision to stake their future on risky mortgages that had nothing to do with helping people own homes. The company used its political power to stymie effective regulation, and its extreme aggressiveness and arrogance gave its enemies license to do things they never would have done to a normal company. And, oh, did they ever.

The Vampire Issue

Gary Gensler, the Treasury undersecretary for domestic finance in the final years of the Clinton administration, likes to tell a story about the deal Alexander Hamilton cut with Thomas Jefferson and James Madison back in 1790. Jefferson and Madison agreed that the nation would assume the debt of the states; Hamilton agreed that the capital of the country would not be in New York, but rather on the Potomac. “This was a very wise move,” says Gensler, “because for about two centuries it separated the nation’s financial capital from its political capital.” Then he chuckles a little. “It worked until Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac came along.”

The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was founded in 1938, a creature of F.D.R.’s New Deal. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (Freddie Mac) came along in 1970, when the thrift industry decided that Fannie needed a competitor. Referred to as Government Sponsored Enterprises, or G.S.E.’s, they were created to help homeownership, but that has never been because they lend money directly to homeowners. Instead, Fannie and Freddie bought mortgages from the local institutions—banks, thrifts, and mortgage originators—that had made them, which relieved those mortgage-makers of both the credit risk (the risk that the homeowner wouldn’t pay) and the interest-rate risk (the risk that the bank would earn less on the mortgage than it paid on its debt)( IN OTHER WORDS, AS GUARANTORS. ). This enabled the mortgage-makers to go out and make more loans.

In addition to having a congressional mandate to aid homeownership, Fannie and Freddie also had shareholders who wanted to see profits, just like Citigroup or General Electric or any publicly traded company. That’s because in 1968 President Lyndon Johnson, who needed money to pay for the Vietnam War, decided to remove Fannie from the government’s balance sheet by having it sell shares to the public( A HYBRID. A BAD IDEA. ). Freddie followed suit in 1989.

And yet, Fannie and Freddie weren’t just like Citigroup or General Electric, or any normal company, because they kept an array of special perks that came with their congressional charters. Among those perks: an exemption from state and local income taxes, presidential appointees on their boards of directors, and a line of credit( IMPLICIT GUARANTEE ) with the U.S. Treasury. This last was by far the most important, because the line of credit—eventually $2.25 billion for each company—implied to many investors that the full faith and credit of the U.S. government stood behind Fannie and Freddie. Officially, everyone denied that that was the case, but this “double game”( THE HYBRID GAME )—as Rick Carnell, the Treasury undersecretary for domestic finance in the 1990s, called it—enabled the companies to raise money at a cost that was just a smidgen higher than that of the government itself, thereby providing them with an enormous competitive advantage over ordinary financial institutions.

As the mortgage market evolved, and finance grew more sophisticated, Fannie and Freddie came to make their money in two ways. One was supposedly conservative: they were paid a small fee by the mortgage-makers to guarantee that the homeowner wouldn’t default. And for most of their history, they wouldn’t buy just any loans, but rather loans that conformed to certain size limits (thereby excluding so-called jumbo loans, more than $417,000) and fairly strict credit standards. Then they repackaged these loans into what are known as mortgage-backed securities, and sold them to other investors. The new investors were willing to take the interest-rate risk, but didn’t have to worry about evaluating each and every homeowner’s ability to pay—a task of enormous proportions—because Fannie and Freddie guaranteed( THE GOVERNMENT GUARANTEED ) that. Today, this is the $3.7 trillion in mortgages Fannie and Freddie guarantee.

The other way Fannie and Freddie made money was when they began to repurchase their own mortgage-backed securities, and to buy similar securities that were created by Wall Street without the G.S.E. guarantee, and hold them in a portfolio. Then Fannie and Freddie pocketed the difference—what Greenspan called “the big fat gap”—between what the mortgages yielded and the companies’ own cost of borrowing funds. This was an immensely profitable business: Wall Street analysts estimated that it provided up to three-fourths of Fannie’s and Freddie’s earnings, and today the portfolio business comprises most of the $1.5 trillion in mortgages that Fannie and Freddie own.

This second way of making money became the source of great controversy. Critics, most notably Alan Greenspan, argued that the portfolio wasn’t worth any risk at all because it did nothing to put people in homes and existed only to make money for the companies’ executives and shareholders. He and other critics didn’t want just to modify Fannie’s and Freddie’s business. They wanted to drastically curtail it—or, better yet, wipe out the two G.S.E.’s altogether. And so it was only human nature that Fannie and Freddie fought back—hard. Or, as former Fannie chief lobbyist Bill Maloni, whose Friday-night poker games for Washington power players were the stuff of legend, wrote on a blog, “One fact of the GSE world is that you will be slaughtered either for being a sheep or a wolf, and I’d much rather meet my fate as a predator than as a lamb chop provider.”

Maloni and his bosses felt that they couldn’t lose any battle, no matter how small. “You punch my brother in the face, I’ll burn down your house” was one Fannie Mae saying. Another was “It’s better to throw one brick too many than one brick too few.”

But Fannie, no matter how aggressive it was, could never stop the criticism. Within Fannie, people called the desire to shrink them or kill them the “vampire issue”—because Fannie could never make it go away.

Jim Johnson had come to Fannie in 1990. His predecessor, David Maxwell, had been on the tennis team at Yale and was “the kind of man who sends only handwritten notes,” recalls Maloni. But Maxwell was also a tough cookie who knew how to get what he wanted. When he left, in 1991—with a $19.5 million retirement package—a humorous going-away video showed corporate cars leaving Fannie’s offices with body bags in the trunks.

Maxwell had met Johnson at a small Washington dinner party in 1985. Johnson was a partner at Shearson Lehman, where he’d landed after he and Richard Holbrooke (who would go on to become ambassador to the U.N. under President Clinton) sold a consulting firm they’d founded to the investment bank. Johnson’s world encompassed both business and politics. He had worked on the campaigns of Eugene McCarthy and George McGovern, and then served in the Carter administration as Walter Mondale’s executive assistant (and later the chair of his presidential campaign), during which time he married Mondale’s press secretary, Maxine Isaacs, now a lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy School. When Maxwell retired, he chose Johnson as his successor over protests from President George H. W. Bush’s people, who claimed Johnson was a partisan Democrat.

It was Johnson who “took the seeds that David Maxwell sowed and [grew] them far beyond what David Maxwell dreamed,” as Countrywide chief Angelo Mozilo later told a reporter. Like Maxwell, Johnson cut a charming, suave figure in society, but under his Minnesota-nice exterior was the heart of a born fighter. “In daily life, he’d say things like ‘We’re going to cut them off at the knees,’ ” says a former Fannie executive.

A key test for Johnson came early in his tenure, when Congress began work on how best to regulate Fannie and Freddie. The resulting legislation, which allowed the G.S.E.’s to hold lower amounts of capital than other financial institutions, was what one analyst later called Johnson’s “finest moment.” Fannie lobbied relentlessly, using a letter from former Fed chairman Paul Volcker, who said that if Fannie reached its proposed capital standards it would be able to maintain its solvency.

Fannie’s allies in Congress also made sure that the new regulator—which was known as the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (ofheo) until its name was changed to the F.H.F.A. in the summer of 2008—was placed inside hud, which had no experience regulating a financial-services company, and that ofheo, unlike any other regulator, would be subject to the appropriations process, meaning its funding was at the mercy of politicians—politicians who often took their cues from Fannie.( COLLUSION )

Not surprisingly, ofheo was a notoriously weak regulator( PR ). For almost three years, from February 1997 to September 1999, the agency didn’t even have a director. “The goal of [Fannie’s] senior management was straightforward: to force ofheo to rely on [Fannie itself] for information and expertise to such a degree that Fannie Mae would essentially be regulated only by itself,” wrote ofheo in a report years later.

Johnson also addressed Fannie’s other big problem, which was that homeowners and politicians never really understood what it did. “There’s nothing in the homeowner’s life called Fannie Mae,” he’d say. So he had to show homeowners that the company was indispensable. The cornerstones of his strategy were the Fannie Mae Foundation and the Partnership Offices. In 1994, Fannie began opening offices in congressional districts around the country. They issued thousands of press releases, which usually featured a local politician prominently assisting Fannie in some good housing-related deed.

In 1995, Johnson seeded the Fannie Mae Foundation with $350 million in Fannie stock. In the ensuing years, the foundation gave away millions of dollars to organizations ranging from the Cold Climate Housing Research Center, in Fairbanks, Alaska, to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute. All of this, along with the alliances Johnson built with others in housing, including homebuilders and real-estate agents, helps explain all the outcry today about Fannie’s and Freddie’s lobbying dollars—$170 million over the past decade, or just a little less than what the American Medical Association spent, according to the Associated Press. But that misses the point. It’s like counting only one arm on a giant octopus. “They ran a battle plan that would make Patton proud. It was 24-7 and never anything left to chance,” says former congressman and Fannie antagonist Richard Baker today.

Despite what right-wing critics now charge, however, Fannie and Freddie weren’t big risktakers, even after the 1992 legislation in which Congress also mandated that they had to buy a certain number of mortgages made to people with lower incomes. Critics now charge that this was when Fannie began to engage in risky lending practices. But, in reality, Fannie was extremely careful about the credit risks it took. Johnson was a master at announcing plans that sounded very grand—such as the trillion-dollar initiative, in which Fannie would buy a trillion dollars’ worth of mortgages to help housing—but didn’t really cost much. “About 98 percent were done at market rates [i.e., mortgages they would have bought anyway],” says a former employee. “We were giving away a little at the edge of the big machine.” Or, as Maloni puts it, Johnson could say to a member of Congress, “ ‘Have you seen our initiative for the handicapped?’ It might have only been for a few dozen loans, but our intent mattered.” Johnson would tell people that “the [congressional] housing goals had no teeth.” Indeed, during those years, Fannie and Freddie faced harsh criticism that they did less—not more—to support affordable housing than private lenders did.

This wasn’t because Fannie people were cynical about affordable housing. Quite the contrary: many referred to themselves as “housers,” which is slang for those who believe that better housing is the cure to all of society’s ills. But the company’s leaders knew that they couldn’t afford to make many unsafe loans, because any sign of financial weakness would be grist for their critics.

If the 1990s were a golden time for Fannie’s political power, they were for its financial power as well. Fannie’s market valuation grew from $10.5 billion at the beginning of the decade to more than $70 billion by the end. On Wall Street, Fannie and Freddie were big business—all those mortgage-backed securities and all that debt to fund their growth were sold through Wall Street firms—and “people dealt with them as if they were sovereign credits( IMPLICIT GUARANTEE ),” says one former banker. There was even talk, in those days of no federal deficit, that Fannie and Freddie debt would become the substitute for U.S. Treasuries.

The G.S.E.’s also became the place for ex-politicians to work. The Washington Monthly once declared that after he left the White House, Bill Clinton should go to Fannie because “scoring an executive post at Fannie Mae is recognized around establishment Washington as the equivalent of winning the lottery.” After all, where else could you make Wall Street–type money with no financial skills? And where else could you make so much money as a lobbyist?

In retrospect, this was a balancing act that was almost destined to fail. As Fannie and Freddie got bigger and more powerful, they struck even more fear into the hearts of those who resented their size and power. “We became dominant so quickly that we scared people,” says former Fannie chief financial officer Tim Howard today. And as a former top lobbyist for Fannie says, “A company like Fannie Mae, which has defined itself in Washington through its public mission, but which also has very well-paid executives, will have a hard time staying in the sweet spot.”

Profits of Doom

Every winter, Fannie Mae held a conference for Wall Street analysts and major investors. One year, right before Johnson retired, the theme song was a customized version of the song “The Best Is Yet to Come( A JINX ),” popularized by Frank Sinatra. Fannie Mae executives dressed up in top hats and tails to perform it. Frank Raines, who took over from Johnson as C.E.O., told investors that “the future’s so bright that I’m willing to set as a goal that our earnings per share will double over the next five years.” A report by the research firm Sanford Bernstein noted that the combined assets of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exceeded, in dollar terms, the G.D.P. of any nation except the U.S., Japan, and Germany.

When Franklin Delano Raines was named Johnson’s successor, he became the first African-American C.E.O. of a Fortune 500 company. Born in 1949 in Seattle to blue-collar parents—his mother cleaned offices at Boeing and his father was a custodian at the Seattle Parks Department—Raines went to Harvard, where he joined both the Young Democrats and the Young Republicans, and was named a Rhodes scholar. He interned in the Nixon White House and then served in the Carter administration, before leaving government to become a partner at the investment bank Lazard Frères. After 11 years at Lazard, Raines was spending four days a week on the road. He left, without his next move planned, in order to spend more time with his three young children. In 1991, when Johnson offered him the vice-chairmanship of Fannie Mae, Raines said yes—Fannie’s offices were just a mile and a half from Raines’s seven-bedroom Colonial home in Virginia.

In 1996, President Clinton lured Raines away from Fannie by appointing him the director of the Office of Management and Budget. Raines asked Clinton how long the job would last, and Clinton replied, “Until you balance the budget.” Within two years Raines produced the first balanced budget the U.S. had seen in 30 years. Later, he would be amazed to find himself painted as a partisan Democrat, because, during his time at O.M.B., Democrats had been angered by what they saw as his support for Republican fiscal policies. In 1995, Raines was appointed to the board of Boeing, where his mother had scrubbed floors. In 1998 he returned to Fannie Mae. At the time, there was talk that one day he would become the first black president of the United States.

There is no one who says that Franklin Raines isn’t incredibly smart. But praise for Raines’s intelligence is often accompanied by criticism of his interpersonal skills. “He’s very introverted,” says one former executive. “He cannot lower himself to make nice to people he considers intellectually inferior.” “Frank hurt himself,” says another. “He lacks a certain understanding of how to best position the other person so that you get what you want.”

Inside Fannie, there was also skepticism about the promise Raines made to Wall Street to double Fannie’s earnings from $3.23 per share in 1998 to $6.46 per share in 2003. “All the V.P.’s in the company looked at each other and said, ‘How is that going to happen?”’ says a former executive. The promise, combined with the lure of financial rewards, created an unhealthy pressure throughout the company. In 2000 the head of Fannie’s office of auditing gave a speech to the company’s internal auditors. “By now, every one of you must have 6.46 branded in your brains,” he said. “You must be able to say it in your sleep, you must be able to recite it forwards and backwards, you must have a raging fire in your belly that burns away all doubts, you must live, breathe, and dream 6.46 After all, thanks to Frank, we all have a lot of money riding on it.”

Almost immediately in Raines’s tenure, the criticism of the G.S.E.’s took on a new ferocity. One of the first salvos was fired by the Clinton Treasury Department under Larry Summers, who had replaced Rubin in the summer of 1999. Treasury workers knew that taking on Fannie was akin to political suicide, but “everyone jumped off together,” in the words of one former appointee, because they were all so convinced that Fannie and Freddie would eventually fall on top of taxpayers with a crushing thud. One of Summers’s goals was to weaken the perceived ties between the G.S.E.’s and the U.S. government, which was enabling the G.S.E.’s to take on too much risk( THIS IS MY MAIN CAUSE OF THE CRISIS ). Most notably, on March 22, 2000, in congressional testimony, Gary Gensler said that the U.S. Treasury should consider cutting the lines of credit that Fannie and Freddie had with the government.

The response from Fannie Mae was immediate and furious. Tim Howard called Gensler’s comments “inept” and “irresponsible.” Fannie even tried to get the White House to distance itself from the Treasury, according to one person.

What has never been disclosed before is that, even before Gensler’s comments, and through the summer of 2000, Treasury held a series of meetings—some in a room just down the hall from Summers’s office—with Fannie’s top executives, in which Fannie tried to get Treasury to sign off publicly on a set of initiatives Fannie had devised in the hopes of appeasing its critics. Both sides describe Fannie’s strategy in the same way: keep your friends close and your enemies closer. But the negotiations came to nothing. One explanation is that the chemistry between Summers and Raines was “horrible,” in the words of one former executive. “The two of them were so alike,” says this person. “They were both arrogant, stubborn sons of bitches, and they both viewed themselves as the smartest guy in the room.”

Another explanation is that Summers realized that if Treasury supported Fannie in any public way it would only strengthen its apparent ties to the U.S. government, so he backed off. “Treasury was too smart,” Howard says now. “Larry wouldn’t bite.”

But perhaps the best explanation is that there just wasn’t a deal to be cut. Treasury officials simply didn’t believe Fannie’s arguments. As for Fannie, “you have to have some level of trust that they’re not trying to do you in, and there wasn’t that level of trust,” says another former Fannie executive.

As the critics became more vehement, Fannie’s responses became ever tougher. Its customers, including major banks, who were terrified of its rapid growth and Raines’s grand plans, set up a group called FM Watch, which began its own anti-G.S.E. lobbying effort. Fannie responded by comparing FM Watch to Slobodan Milošević, the Serb dictator who was charged with crimes against humanity for his role in the Balkan wars. “I think Frank was scared that he couldn’t be as tough as Jim, and so he overcompensated,” says a former executive.

Operation “Noriega”

When George W. Bush ran for president, part of the Republican Party platform was that “homeownership is central to the American Dream.” Those words were manna for Fannie and Freddie. And Bush appointed people to their boards, including Yale classmate Victor Ashe and campaign donor Manuel Justiz. (“It is a great honor to be appointed by the President to serve on the board of a company with such an important housing mission,” wrote the Bush appointees in a letter to ofheo in late 2001.) In 2002, Karl Rove invited Raines to Bush’s economic summit in Waco. Raines still keeps a “Doonesbury” cartoon on his wall that features an admiring Bush saying, “Franklin can tell you … ”

Perhaps most notably, after a 2002 event in Atlanta in which Bush announced his efforts to help 5.5 million black and Hispanic families buy homes before the end of the decade, both Raines and Freddie C.E.O. Leland Brendsel flew back with him on Air Force One.

Then the Bush administration’s attitude changed dramatically. Both sides point to the same catalyst: Enron. “It was as if someone flipped a switch,” Raines says today. A former Bush-administration official says that the last thing the president wanted was to be at the center of another corporate scandal, and if you were looking for likely candidates, how could you miss Fannie and Freddie, with their longtime critics and thin capitalization? Raines, for his part, thought that the administration wanted to deflect the criticism it got for its ties to Enron by pointing at what it could claim was a Democratic scandal in the making. In 2003, Bush’s chief of staff Andrew Card was put in charge of a policy-review group. Soon thereafter, Bush pulled his presidential appointees from the G.S.E.’s boards.

And then there was Fed chairman Alan Greenspan. He was friendly with Raines, had regular lunches with him, and came to the grand Christmas parties at Raines’s home—but he never got past his deep suspicion of the G.S.E.’s. To wit: the portfolio business was a ticking time bomb, and who needed Fannie and Freddie anyway? Big banks, which were supposedly subject to the discipline of the market, were better holders of mortgage risks than the G.S.E.’s.

Although it didn’t happen immediately, Greenspan’s thinking on the G.S.E.’s soon came to dominate the Bush administration’s thinking on them. “[Greenspan and the Bush administration] weren’t interested in having a strong regulator,” says Howard today. “They were interested in constraining Fannie and Freddie. Obviously, Fannie and Freddie weren’t going to agree to that.” So someone had to win, and someone had to lose.

The fight became both nasty and personal in early 2004, when Raines sent what one person calls a “fuck you” letter to Andrew Card. This came about after the homebuilders complained to Raines that Card had told them Raines had agreed to regulatory compromises the homebuilders didn’t want. After that the White House took on Fannie and Freddie in an organized, orchestrated way that was akin to how Fannie itself had long operated. Some of those on the inside jokingly referred to their assault as “Noriega”—as in Manuel Noriega, the former Panamanian dictator and drug kingpin whom the U.S. military blasted with loud, incessant rock music during its attempt to get him to leave a Vatican compound and surrender.

Congressman Barney Frank, a Massachusetts Democrat and longtime supporter of the G.S.E.’s, told a Wall Street analyst that “the [Bush] administration is engaged in a strategy of political attacks on the G.S.E.’s, designed to pressure them into accepting the administration’s regulatory-reform bill by depressing their stock prices.”

But the best weapon the G.S.E.’s opponents could have had was handed to them by Freddie Mac itself. On June 9, 2003, Freddie’s entire top management team was ousted after the company confessed to needing to re-state its earnings for the past three years. They had understated—not overstated, but understated—earnings in order to produce the smoothly growing earnings that investors most valued.

Just days before Freddie announced its accounting error, ofheo had signed off on Freddie’s management and internal controls. This very public mistake was a huge black eye—a “humiliating experience,” in the words of Steve Blumenthal, then ofheo’s deputy director—for an agency that was already smarting from years of perceived and real condescension.

Not that anyone would have guessed that ofheo’s director at the time, Armando Falcon, was a guy to take on the G.S.E. machine. A Texas Democrat who was appointed by Clinton to head ofheo in 1999, Falcon had been raised near San Antonio by a father who was an aircraft mechanic. On the surface, he seemed like a shy, gentle soul—but he was far more politically savvy and ambitious than anyone would have expected. And he had Steve Blumenthal, a longtime Republican Hill staffer who viewed himself as a warrior, by his side. Even ofheo’s supporters say that Falcon and Blumenthal were emotionally invested in getting Fannie. And even though Falcon is a Democrat, he and the White House both wanted the same thing. In early 2004, over Fannie’s protests that “there should be no question about our accounting” in the wake of Freddie’s problems, ofheo launched a review of Fannie’s finances.

Fannie fought back in classic Fannie fashion. They tried to get Falcon and Blumenthal fired. Via a staffer who was a longtime friend and poker buddy of Maloni’s, Fannie got Republican senator Kit Bond of Missouri to launch a counter-investigation into ofheo. The resulting 2004 report from the hud inspector general (I.G.) came to some startling conclusions that couldn’t be dismissed as politics as usual, however. It claimed that Falcon and Blumenthal’s campaign against the G.S.E.’s was both ugly and relentless. It accused ofheo of taking what one source within ofheo called a “publicity-driven approach to oversight” with a “very strong intent to embarrass Fannie Mae.” A witness recalled that Blumenthal was “almost gleeful” when Fannie’s stock went down. (Blumenthal denied being gleeful, but did say, “You can’t hurt them enough to matter.”) Even more troubling was that both ofheo’s chief accountant, Wanda DeLeo, and its chief examiner, Scott Calhoun, complained that Falcon and Blumenthal were overstating Fannie’s problems or prematurely reporting some of ofheo’s findings, partly for political purposes. Another witness, who wanted to remain anonymous, had this way of explaining ofheo’s strategy: “Everybody runs for cover if somebody’s accusing a company of some impropriety in terms of their accounting. All of a sudden, they don’t have any friends anymore.”

An online exchange that took place in December 2007 shows how bitter emotions were, and still are, between Fannie publicist Bill Maloni and Blumenthal.

Maloni: “A HUD IG in a GOP Administration—with no Dems involved in the process—revealed the game you and your friends were playing.… Why would a regulator turn to guerilla tactics and try and financially injure one of its regulated institutions?”

Blumenthal, who didn’t directly answer the question, responded: “It has been my privelege [sic] to fight people like you all my life. Corrupt, fundamentally dishonest, cowards The HUD IG didn’t intimidate me, and a Chevy Chase wanna-be thug doesn’t either.” (Maloni now lives in Chevy Chase.)

Falcon and Blumenthal accused Fannie’s management of seeking to “misapply and ignore accounting principles” in order to meet Wall Street’s earning expectations. Although much of this was due to the implementation of a complicated new accounting rule for derivatives—one that caused hundreds of other companies to re-state their results as well—Falcon also accused Fannie of improperly deferring $200 million of expenses in 1998 to the following year in order to meet earnings targets and pay management’s bonuses. Both the Department of Justice and the S.E.C. opened investigations into possible accounting fraud at Fannie Mae.

At a congressional hearing on October 6, 2004, Raines and Falcon faced off. Falcon defended his work; Raines defended himself and his company. At the end of the hearing, longtime G.S.E. antagonist Richard Baker, the Republican from Louisiana, threw a curveball. More than a year earlier, he had requested information from ofheo on the compensation of Fannie’s top executives. He hadn’t released it, because Fannie had hired Ken Starr—the former special prosecutor who investigated Bill Clinton—to represent it, and had gone so far as to threaten “criminal proceedings” against anyone who supposedly violated privacy laws to disclose the information. Now Baker had found his moment. He put up a chart showing that 20 of Fannie’s top executives—including three lobbyists—had earned more than $1 million in 2002, and 9 had made more than $3 million. Today, Baker says that when he brought the chart out “the whole room blew up. It was the most animated room I’d ever seen in a hearing.”

If Fannie had any hope of prevailing, that was demolished on December 15, 2004, when the S.E.C. sided with ofheo and said that Fannie would have to re-state years of earnings, wiping out as much as $9 billion in profits. Under pressure from the board, which was itself under pressure from ofheo, Raines retired and Howard resigned.

One and a half years later, on May 23, 2006, ofheo issued its final report on Fannie Mae. The agency claimed that Fannie’s executives “deliberately and systematically” created earnings “illusions” to hit Fannie’s earnings-per-share targets from 1998 through 2004. Fannie agreed to pay the government $400 million. Christopher Cox, chairman of the S.E.C., promised to “vigorously pursue” the people responsible for this “extensive financial fraud.”( DID HE ? )

At the end of that year, ofheo sued Frank Raines, along with Tim Howard and controller Leanne Spencer, demanding the payment of $100 million in civil fines and returned bonuses that could exceed $115 million. ofheo said that Raines, in particular, had gotten $90 million in total compensation from 1998 to 2003, of which more than $52 million was directly tied to achieving earnings-per-share targets.

But astonishingly, given the extreme rhetoric from ofheo—Falcon even called Fannie a “government-sponsored Enron”—no criminal charges were filed against Fannie Mae or any of its executives. And despite Cox’s promises, the S.E.C. never filed civil charges against any Fannie Mae executive, either( THIS IS PART OF THE PATTERN THAT LED TO OUR CURRENT EPIDEMIC OF FRAUD. ). This past spring, ofheo trumpeted the news that the former Fannie executives had paid $31.4 million to settle the charges against them, with Raines agreeing to forgo cash, stock, and other benefits of $24.7 million. But the headline number was an illusion( PR ). In Raines’s case, the bulk of his settlement consisted of stock options that were so out of the money they would never be worth anything, along with $5.3 million that ofheo called “other benefits,” but which Raines says was a “totally made up number.” Nor did Raines agree to keep his mouth shut. In fact, he wanted to respond to the settlement by saying that “the process against me began with lies and ended with lies,” but was persuaded by his lawyers to say instead that “the process invoked against me by ofheo was fundamentally unfair.”

Raines “had to settle because something was wrong,” says current F.H.F.A. director Jim Lockhart. He adds, “It was not one of my happier days. Over 20 percent of the agency’s budget was legal expenses. We were just being eaten up, and [Raines] knew it.”

To this day, Raines insists that he was sabotaged by his enemies. He tells friends that he told Clinton, “They spent more time and money investigating me than you!” In 2007, in a civil suit that is still proceeding against Fannie and its former executives, Raines subpoenaed the White House for what his lawyers called “evidence that officials in the most powerful office in the country were part of a plan to influence the political debate about Fannie Mae.” (Of course, Raines can afford to be aggressive, because as part of his “retirement,” Fannie Mae is paying his legal bills.)( YIKES )

“Frank Raines continues to try to re-write history to protect his reputation, but the history is clear,” counters White House deputy press secretary Tony Fratto.

But, in fact, the history isn’t perfectly clear( OF COURSE NOT ). There is no question that Fannie Mae’s accounting problems were real, and that under Raines the company had an unhealthy focus on earnings growth, but, still, one has to wonder about the solidity of the charge that Raines led an Enron-like enterprise. While some believe the lack of prosecution merely reflects the Justice Department’s unwillingness to take on a deeply complicated accounting case, others argue that it didn’t have a case, because there is a line between aggressive accounting and intentional fraud( THIS IS ALWAYS THE EXCUSE ). And, in fact, an internal Fannie Mae investigation led by former senator Warren Rudman found no evidence that Raines knew the company’s accounting policies departed significantly from generally accepted principles. For Fannie Mae, the distinction didn’t much matter, because its reputation was tarnished beyond repair.

Despite that, no new legislation for regulation of the G.S.E.’s made it through Congress. While it is true that votes often broke along partisan lines, with the Democrats siding with Fannie and Freddie, it’s also true that Republicans often broke ranks. In one instance, Senator Bob Bennett, a Republican from Utah, sabotaged a bill by adding an amendment that favored the G.S.E.’s. (Bennett’s son worked for Fannie’s partnership office in Utah.) Congressman Mike Oxley, an Ohio Republican and a recipient of much campaign cash from the G.S.E.’s, also introduced bills that the administration thought were too weak. “I think the administration, for whatever reason, wants to do a lot more than is possible,” said Oxley. Says former congressman Richard Baker today, “There were Democrats and Republicans who had reservations.… It was not a partisan thing.”

Maybe the truth is that, as one person puts it, “everyone was still scared of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” Or maybe the truth is that everyone—not just Democrats, and not just Republicans—was terrified that hurting Fannie and Freddie would, as the G.S.E.’s always said, hurt the housing market. “Everybody had a fear of the unknown,” says consultant Bert Ely, another longtime G.S.E. critic.

The End of the Holy War

When Raines was dethroned, the board called Dan Mudd, then the company’s chief operating officer, at seven a.m., just as Mudd was getting dressed for work, and asked him to step in. Mudd couldn’t be more different from Raines and Johnson. He’s “not a rock star,” as one former Fannie employee puts it, he’s not a Democrat, and he’s all businessman. (He ran G.E. Capital Japan before joining Fannie, in 2000.) A self-deprecating ex-Marine, he was not close to Raines, and he had thought about leaving the company because he didn’t like what he called the “arrogant, defiant, my-way Fannie Mae.” But he stayed because, as he later said, “I’m not a quitter.”

Mudd immediately embarked on a strategy of conciliation with ofheo. He visited members of its staff and Congressman Baker, and he even gave ofheo examiners their own badges so they didn’t need a Fannie Mae escort when they were at the company’s offices. “I thought for a very long time that it was our fault, because we were heavy-handed, because we had a propaganda machine,” he says now. “I thought the only way to solve it was to make it Fannie’s problem. It’s like having an argument with your spouse. There’s no use in being right. You have to find the way forward.”

There are some who think Mudd had no choice, and some who are far more critical. Says Maloni, “Dan’s attitude is great if you don’t live in a jungle where all the other animals are trying to eat you.” Even Mudd himself says today, “I thought there were things we could do to be a normal company. I did some, and it turned out they didn’t make a difference.” It was perhaps telling that during his years as C.E.O., he says, no one in the White House would ever take his calls.

By mid-2006 there was a new actor in this long-running drama: Hank Paulson, the former Goldman Sachs C.E.O. who had just become Treasury secretary. Unlike the advisers who surrounded Bush, Paulson did not believe that the G.S.E.’s were the bogeymen of the financial system. After all, they had been major clients of his for years, and the ties between Goldman and Fannie ran deep. Nor did Paulson want any part of what he called “the closest thing I’ve witnessed to a Holy War.”

Paulson quickly began to move away from what one observer calls the “extreme rigidity” of the administration’s position. Then, on the Tuesday night before the 2006 Thanksgiving weekend, he “threw down the gauntlet to change course on where the administration was going,” says someone familiar with the events. He “aggressively argued that the White House should soften its position” and cut a deal for new regulation—which Paulson strongly believed was necessary—with Barney Frank, who had just been named the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. Bush, who had granted Paulson an unprecedented degree of independence in exchange for his taking the job, soon gave him the authority to change existing policy, according to one inside source.

“I was aghast,” says a longtime G.S.E. foe, expressing a common attitude. “Here we were fighting trench warfare with Fannie and Freddie, and Paulson says, ‘Let’s cut a deal and say we won.’ Some of us really did believe they were a house of cards.”

That fall, Barney Frank told The Washington Post that Paulson had told him he wasn’t going to use the Treasury’s authority to limit Fannie’s and Freddie’s ability to raise money by issuing new bonds. The Bush administration had won that right in 2004, and other Treasury officials had been saying the government would use it. With Paulson’s backing down from Treasury’s position, the White House had lost one of its major clubs against the G.S.E.’s.

At the same time, a critical change was occurring in Fannie’s and Freddie’s businesses. By the mid-2000s, the mortgage market was radically different than it had been in Fannie’s and Freddie’s golden years. What we now all know as the subprime business had taken off, and a whole new breed of opportunistic lenders, such as IndyMac and Washington Mutual, were selling their mortgages to Wall Street, which churned out its own mortgage-backed securities. These were often referred to as private-label securities, or P.L.S.’s, because they bypassed Fannie and Freddie and didn’t have the G.S.E. imprimatur. As a result, Fannie and Freddie, which had always been selective as to which mortgages met their criteria for purchase, saw their market share plunge. Shareholders and customers were begging them to dive into this new, highly profitable world.

Although both companies resisted due to their worries about the riskiness of the new products, eventually senior executives disregarded internal warnings( NEGLIGENCE ), because the lure of big profits was too great. “We’re rushing to get back into the game,” Mudd told analysts in the fall of 2006. “We will be there.” Both companies did two major things. For their portfolios, they bought Wall Street’s P.L.S.’s. They also began to guarantee so-called Alt-A mortgages—loans made to people who had better credit scores than a subprime customer’s, but who might lack a standard job and pay stub. (These mortgages came to be known as “liar loans( FRAUD ),” because either the customers or the brokers, or both, were often just making up the information on the applications.) By the spring of 2008, the companies owned a combined $780 billion of the riskiest mortgages, according to the Congressional Budget Office, even though they had bought P.L.S.’s that were rated Triple A by the rating agencies and they thought their Alt-A product was conservative. But they bought in bulk.

The Green Team

For a brief time, in the summer and fall of 2007, it did look as if the G.S.E.’s would be the saviors of the mortgage market. That is, if you didn’t look too closely and instead just listened to what congressional Democrats were pushing hard, and what the powers that were, including Paulson, Bernanke, Lockhart, and, yes, even President Bush, started saying. As the banks that everyone had said could handle mortgage risk better than the G.S.E.’s deserted the market, stumbling under the weight of billions of dollars in losses on subprime mortgages, there wasn’t anyone else to turn to. Even so, “is there anything dumber than the suggestion that the institutions to rescue the U.S. mortgage market are institutions that are leveraged 60 to 1 and only own U.S. mortgages?” asks one G.S.E. opponent.

Not surprisingly, Fannie and Freddie—egged on by Democrats—seized the opportunity to prove how critical they were to the market. By the first quarter of 2008, they were buying 80 percent of all U.S. mortgages, roughly double their market share from two years earlier.

To some observers, the most remarkable moment came on March 19, 2008, when ofheo held a press conference to announce a deal that Bob Steel—a former Goldman Sachs partner who had joined the Treasury Department shortly after Paulson—had brokered with Fannie and Freddie. The deal was that the G.S.E.’s, which had already sold a combined $14 billion in preferred stock in late 2007, would raise as much as another $10 billion in capital. In return, new ofheo director Jim Lockhart agreed to lower the amount of capital( THIS HAS BEEN THE GOAL OF ALL THIS MESS ) the G.S.E.’s were required to hold, enabling them to acquire another $200 billion in mortgages. Several people who were involved with the discussions say that the theme was that they were all in this together. They say Steel would use the line “We want to come out of this with everyone on the green team.” (Possibly Mudd used the phrase first.) Says Lockhart today, “We could not afford them not being able to provide funding to the housing market.”

ofheo (with Treasury’s support) cut this deal despite the fact that the G.S.E.’s losses from mortgages’ going bad were already escalating. By the spring of 2008, the two had reported combined losses of $9.5 billion over the previous year. And they had just $81 billion in capital, which was 1.5 percent of the $5.2 trillion in mortgages they owned or guaranteed. In other words, if they had to make good on their promises, they had very little money with which to do so. (Skeptics on the Street believed that ofheo’s calculation of Fannie’s and Freddie’s capital was deeply flawed and made the G.S.E.’s look healthier than they were.)

Fannie’s $300 billion Alt-A portfolio accounted for roughly 50 percent of its credit losses. At Freddie, the numbers were similar. Although both companies justified their purchases of risky loans based on their need to meet hud’s affordable-housing goals, former Fannie employees say that, while the P.L.S. purchases did aid in meeting the goals (which, given the abusiveness of these loans, is an abomination), the Alt-A loans did not. In other words, Fannie dove into Alt-A not because of its mission but because of its bottom line( NEITHER IS AN EXCUSE. PERIOD. )—and because its executives feared that Fannie would become irrelevant if it continued to say no to this brave new world.( THIS IS ALWAYS GOING TO BE THE CASE. )

By the summer of 2008, the market was going from bad to worse, and Fannie’s and Freddie’s stocks were plunging. International banks, which held big chunks of both companies’ debt, were panicking, and asking if the U.S. government stood behind the debt( THIS IS THE BIG ISSUE ). On July 13, Paulson announced a plan under which Treasury would backstop all of the G.S.E.’s debt and buy equity if needed. “If you’ve got a bazooka, and people know you’ve got it, you may not have to take it out,” Paulson told lawmakers.

Said President Bush about Fannie and Freddie, “We must ensure that they can continue providing access to mortgage credit during this time of financial stress.”

Said Lockhart, “At a very difficult time in the market, the enterprises have the flexibility and sound operations needed to support their mission.” That was when he also said that their capital levels were “well in excess” of federal requirements.

How did we land in a recession? Visit our archive, “Charting the Road to Ruin.” Illustration by Edward Sorel.

Paulson’s plan was signed into law as part of legislation that—finally!—created a new G.S.E. regulator: the F.H.F.A. This legislation was based on a deal Paulson had cut with Barney Frank. (Despite the criticism of Paulson and Steel, they did succeed where their predecessors had failed, and helped create a far tougher regulator—although by then it was too late.) Slipped in was a provision that exempted Fannie’s and Freddie’s boards from shareholder lawsuits—which was an enormous threat—if they agreed to conservatorship in time of crisis. Fannie didn’t fight this provision, because Mudd thought that conservatorship would require a negotiation. “It’s like the president has the right to fire a nuclear weapon, but it’s unlikely he’ll do so,” as Mudd put it. And maybe there was also a little hubris at work. “I used to say that if two accounting scandals [and] a Republican Congress and White House couldn’t kill us, how could you kill us ever?” says a former executive.

Others knew better. “Fannie Mae figured they could give the government an enormous loaded gun and they’d never fire it,” says Tim Howard.

Paulson’s bazooka to help Fannie and Freddie failed. It failed for a mixture of reasons. Investors were unsure what their eventual losses would be. Both companies announced terrible 2008 second-quarter results, with Fannie losing $2.3 billion and Freddie losing $821 million. But investors were also unsure what the new legislation meant. No one wanted to risk putting money into the G.S.E.’s, only to have the government radically raise capital requirements( NOT MAKE ENOUGH MONEY )—or step in and wipe the shareholders out( YES ). And so, as if the second-quarter results hadn’t caused enough alarm on their own, the legislation had the perverse effect of ensuring the companies would be unable to raise new capital, even as everyone began to say that they had to do so.

Maybe Fannie’s executives should have anticipated what happened next, but they didn’t. After taking the red-eye back from a short family trip over Labor Day weekend—a trip he’d had to reschedule four times—Mudd got a letter from Lockhart that abruptly changed the tone. It “condemned everything we’d ever done,” says one person familiar with the letter’s contents. (Lockhart agrees it was a “severe letter” but says he had given “verbal warnings” about what his agency saw as a “significant deterioration” in their financial position.) On Friday morning, Mudd was summoned to the meeting at F.H.F.A. at three p.m. that day. When the Fannie contingent arrived, there had been no preparation for the meeting, so they were wandering around the lobby when Bernanke came in the front door. The Fannie people also spotted a Wall Street Journal reporter, who had been given advance notice of the meeting, lurking outside the door. It was “almost comical if it weren’t tragic,” Mudd has since joked.

In a conference room off his office, Lockhart told Fannie, he says today, that “pending losses … were going to make it such that [Fannie and Freddie] could not function and fulfill their mission” of supporting the housing market. Then government officials told Fannie that the company had to give its consent to conservatorship.

As for the terms, they were fairly straightforward, with one exception. The government would acquire $1 billion of preferred shares, giving it 80 percent of the company and pretty much wiping out the existing shareholders( NECESSARY IF GOVERNMENT INTERVENES ). Although the government would provide no upfront cash, it would put in money up( NOT A COMPLETE GUARANTEE ) to a combined $200 billion for Fannie and Freddie if needed. Both Mudd and Syron were out, and in short order they were told to forfeit their “golden parachutes.” The exception was an odd detail: Fannie and Freddie would be allowed to grow their portfolios through 2009 in order to help the mortgage market, but then would have to shrink them to $250 billion each. To Fannie people, that provision seemed like a clear indication that their adversaries had had a hand in the battle that ended the war.

Although Freddie agreed to conservatorship at a separate meeting that same day, the Fannie contingent headed to Sullivan & Cromwell’s law offices and called all of their board members to fly to Washington on Saturday for a deliberation. The board came to the conclusion that they had no choice. They could not “single-handedly declare war on the federal government!” Mudd said. Added board chairman Steve Ashley, according to people who were present: “We’ve closed the book on 70 years of housing policy in this country.”

There are a lot of conflicting views on why Paulson abruptly stopped supporting the G.S.E.’s. The best explanation is probably that he was convinced they needed large amounts of capital, and there was no way, given what a Treasury official calls the polarizing quality of the G.S.E.’s in Washington, that he could simply cut them a check without punishing their shareholders and executives( THIS IS TRUE ).

When a CNBC host asked Paulson what he thought the losses would be, he said, “We didn’t sit there and figure this out with a calculator.” In truth, there’s no way to know, because the ultimate number will depend on what happens with the housing market( TRUE ), and on what activities Fannie and Freddie undertake at the direction of their new owner: you! Estimates, which depend on whether you talk to a G.S.E. friend or foe, range from as low as $30 billion for Fannie to well over the $100 billion the government has allocated to each G.S.E.( TRUE )

But a few things are clear. One is that the argument that Fannie and Freddie caused our entire economic calamity is absurd( I AGREE ). Yes, the volume of bad mortgages that Fannie and Freddie bought may have blown the bubble bigger than it otherwise would have been. But to put the blame entirely on Fannie and Freddie is to exempt all the other players, including the mortgage originators who sold subprime mortgages( THE REAL PROBLEM ) and Wall Street, which packaged up the bad mortgages and sold them to investors around the globe.

Another thing that’s clear is that the critics were both right and very wrong about Fannie and Freddie. Yes, their executives and shareholders made fortunes in the glory years, and, yes, taxpayers are now bearing the brunt of whatever losses there are. Just as critics always warned, it’s “the privatization of profits and the socialization of risks.” But what the critics missed is that that wasn’t unique to Fannie and Freddie. It turns out our entire financial sector was operating under that same premise( AMEN. MY EXACT POINT. )—and to a far greater degree than Fannie and Freddie.( THIS IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE CRISIS )

The last thing is that what happened on September 7 didn’t solve anything. In fact, quite the opposite. “It is a hodgepodge of nothing( THE PROBLEM ),” says one Wall Streeter. One key idea was, as the Treasury put it, that Fannie and Freddie would “work to increase the availability of mortgage finance.” In other words, the government takeover would reduce the cost of Fannie’s and Freddie’s funds, thereby enabling them to raise money at cheap rates and pump that money into the mortgage market. In a great irony, almost everyone, even some longtime critics, now agree that’s necessary. As Larry Summers recently said, “They have to be used to keep the flow of capital going to the housing market.”( TRUE )

But the terms of the conservatorship are confusing, because the government backing lasts only through 2009, and government officials refuse to confirm( THIS BEGAN THE FLIGHT TO SAFETY. LOOK AT THE CHART OF THE FLIGHT FROM AGENCIES INTO TREASURIES. ) that the U.S. actually guarantees Fannie’s and Freddie’s debt. Instead, they say there is an “effective guarantee”—which means nothing( EXACTLY. THIS WAS THE BIGGEST MISTAKE EXCEPT FOR LEHMAN ) in a market as untrusting as this one. And so, Fannie’s and Freddie’s cost of funds has shot higher, making it economically unfeasible for them to buy up a slew of mortgages. (Lockhart continues to defend the conservatorship. “If we hadn’t done it, there would probably have been a run on the bank( NOT IF IT HAD BEEN GUARANTEED ),” he says, adding, “My view is that conservatorship is working at this point. We prevented a downward spiral( IT CAUSED ONE, BY NOT GUARANTEEING THEM EXPLICICTLY ).”)

In other words, in the greatest irony of all, the G.S.E.’s critics have finally gotten what they wanted—Fannie’s and Freddie’s perceived ties to the government have been weakened—just when no one wants that anymore. “There is culpability somewhere,” says a former Fannie executive. “Whether it is a conspiracy or incompetence, I don’t know.” And in some ways, that sums up the entire story—on both sides.

Bethany McLean is a Vanity Fair contributing editor."

The decision to seize Fannie/Freddie without explicit guarantees and which wiped out shareholders as well began the Flight To Safety. Check the VIX and chart of the switch from Agencies to Treasuries. By letting Lehman fall, they assured a Calling Run, which, as I've argued, can only be stopped by government guarantees in this age. Lockhart doesn't seem to understand what a Calling Run is, or why it occurs. The only way to stop a Calling Run once foreclosures began mounting was for government to explicitly back Agencies and make it clear that the Treasury and Fed would both be a LOLR. That's the Presupposition and Context that investors were working under. There was no plan B.

The evidence for this position are the real world actions of investors and markets, not theories.

Also, and this might not be fair, but this cast of characters is looking like an oligarchy.