Showing posts with label stress tests. Show all posts
Showing posts with label stress tests. Show all posts

Saturday, May 16, 2009

Some bankers dismiss it as a half-hearted approach

TO BE NOTED:

Update | 11:13 a.m.

SunTrust, one of the 10 large banks found wanting in the government’s recent stress tests, said Friday that it would take a number of actions to raise and conserve capital, including issuing new stock and slashing its dividend.

Regulators said last week that SunTrust, an Atlanta-based regional bank, needed more capital to absorb future losses in case the economic downturn is worse than expected.

SunTrust said it “plans to adjust the composition of its overall Tier 1 capital resources to increase the common equity portion by $2.2 billion,” which is equal to the amount the government said the bank will need to raise by fall to be in compliance with the capital levels under the federal stress tests’ “more adverse” economic scenario.

Under Suntrust’s plan, which it said was not final or formally approved, more than half of the capital would be raised through the sale of $1.25 billion in new stock, diluting current shareholders. The company said it would sell the stock from time to time through an at-the-market, or A.T.M., offering, in which a company sells stock periodically at various prices instead of all at once. Morgan Stanley would be the sales agent for the offering.

To conserve capital, the company will also cut its quarterly dividend from its current payout of 10 cents per share to 1 cent per share.

SunTrust is the latest bank to announce an A.T.M. stock offering, which allows it to dribble out shares to investors over time. Bank of America began a similar effort last week, following on the heels of smaller lenders like Zions Bancorp and Wilmington Trust.

A.T.M. stock deals are frowned upon on Wall Street for many reasons. For one, bankers collect fewer fees for underwriting the offering. Investors may see it as a sign of weakness, since the banks forgo the opportunity to pitch their business strategy, and a signal they are worried that an ordinary offering could fall short. Some bankers dismiss it as a half-hearted approach.

For Bank of America, some longtime advisers suggested that the deal was a way for the bank to placate regulators that it was trying to raise equity, even if it was unable to raise the full amount. The hope is that the economy will improve enough that it can avoid selling new shares. That would minimize any dilution to existing investors.

SunTrust may be in an even weaker position, and it will be interesting to see how its offering fares. The bank has been hit hard by the housing crisis, and many analysts expect it to suffer even bigger losses on commercial real estate loans.

As part of its capital plan, SunTrust also said Friday it would sell some securities and other assets that are expected to generate about $300 million in common equity. The company also said it had $3.3 billion of preferred stock and other securities on hand for which it could exchange for common stock, a move that would further dilute existing shareholders.

“We are fortunate to have many ways to address the common buffer required under the government’s More Adverse scenario,” James M. Wells III, SunTrust’s chairman and chief executive officer, said in a statement announcing the plan. “We will be prudent and proactive in evaluating and executing aspects of the plan prior to the November 9th deadline.”

The government found that SunTrust needed the additional capital after the stress test showed it could face losses for 2009 and 2010 of $11.8 billion, or 8.3 percent of its total loans. The company received $4.9 billion under the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program.

Cyrus Sanati and Eric Dash"

Tuesday, May 12, 2009

just days after a U.S. government "stress test" found the struggling U.S. bank needed to find $34 billion worth of capital

TO BE NOTED: From Reuters:

"
Bank of America sells $7.3 billion CCB stake: source
Tue May 12, 2009 7:49am EDT

By Michael Flaherty

HONG KONG (Reuters) - Bank of America (BAC.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) sold $7.3 billion worth of shares in China Construction Bank (601939.SS: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) on Tuesday, according to a source, just days after a U.S. government "stress test" found the struggling U.S. bank needed to find $34 billion worth of capital.

BofA unloaded the entire lot of 13.5 billion CCB shares it was allowed to sell, the source said, at HK$4.20 each, or a 14.3 percent discount to their Monday close.

The group of buyers included a unit of China Life Insurance Co Ltd (2628.HK: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) (601628.SS: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz), Singapore state investment group Temasek Holdings TEM.UL and China's Hopu Investment Management Co, the source said. The source was directly involved in the deal but was not authorized to speak about it on the record.

The sale cut BofA's stake in the world's second-largest bank by market value to around 10.6 percent.

A lock-up period on the block of shares sold expired last Thursday, since when equity capital markets bankers had hit the phones to line up investors, hoping to get a mandate and a fee from finding buyers.

But the sale did not involve any of the major investment banks that worked on similar stock sales, with the source saying the block of shares was a "principle to principle" negotiated deal.

A $1.2 billion block of shares briefly placed in the market by an unnamed CCB shareholder early on Tuesday was part of BofA's share sale, said the source. The bookrunner of that placement was brokerage BOCI, according to a term sheet obtained by Reuters.

CCB's Hong Kong-listed shares (0939.HK: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) closed up 1.6 percent at HK$4.96 after falling sharply on Monday.

"Since the placement has been expected, I would see a slightly positive impact from the share sale as the overhang was removed," said Michael Tam, an analyst at South China Research.

"Buyers like China Life and Temasek are likely to hold the shares as longer term investments, especially as they bought the shares at a very attractive price below the stock's fair value."

A Bank of America spokesman declined to comment and an official with Beijing-controlled China Construction Bank could not be immediately reached for comment.

Bank of America had been expected to sell shares in CCB since the U.S. government ordered it to find new capital following its "stress test" of 19 large U.S. banks.

The discount is wider than when Bank of America offloaded $2.8 billion worth of CCB shares in January at 12 percent below the Chinese bank's last traded price.

That same month, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS.L: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) sold a $2.4 billion stake in Bank of China (3988.HK: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz)(601988.SS: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) at a 7.6 percent discount.

BofA agreed in June 2005 to pay $3 billion for a 9 percent stake in CCB -- a shareholding that later grew to 16.7 percent. The deal, like other Western banks buying into Chinese lenders, was meant to be a long-term, cross-border partnership, but was sideswiped by the financial crisis that has prompted several Western banks to sell Chinese banks stakes to raise cash.

THE BUYERS

Two members of the consortium that bought the shares have strong, historic ties.

Hopu Investment Management is a Chinese private equity fund founded by Fang Fenglei, chairman of Goldman Sachs' (GS.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) China joint venture. Hopu CEO Richard Ong, former co-head of Asia investment banking at Goldman, advised Temasek when the fund originally bought into CCB, said the source.

Temasek, one of the largest investment funds in the world, and Hopu teamed up last year to invest in iron ore company Hong Kong Lung Ming Investment Holdings.

Temasek owns stakes in several major financial institutions in Asia and across the globe. China Life is the world's largest life insurer by market value.

The consortium also included other Chinese investors, whom the source did not identify.

(Additional reporting by Tony Munroe, Clare Jim, Donny Kwok, Alison Leung and Victoria Bi in HONG KONG and Saeed Azhar in SINGAPORE; Editing by Jonathan Hopfner and Ian Geoghegan)"

Sunday, May 10, 2009

there are concerns that such an approach will be a “race to the bottom

TO BE NOTED: From Shadow Bankers:

"
Mitigating Counterparty Risk in the Credit Default Swap Markets with Central Counterparties: The Whys and Wherefores Jump to Comments

Guest post by Jodi Scarlata*

This post discusses key features of a well-designed central counterparty (CCP), aspects particular to a credit default swap (CDS) CCP, and the factors for choosing between multiple CCPs versus a single CCP. For broader discussions of CCP issues, see the 2004 and 2007 reports published by the Bank for International Settlements Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems.

A CCP facilitates standardization and multilateral netting, increases liquidity, and can improve the availability of price information, increasing the ability to value CDS products, and ultimately serves to mitigate risk. A CCP for standardized CDS contracts can reduce operational risks, especially those inherent in over-the-counter trades, such as backlogs of outstanding confirmations and unwinding positions in case of default that can spread across multiple counterparties. In addition, the mutualization of risk among clearing members provided by a CCP reduces hedging costs by eliminating the need for hedging bilateral exposure.

The lack of transparency about the net counterparty exposure in the CDS market can inflate the public perception of counterparty risk. For example, if the market had known in advance that the settlement of Lehman swaps would amount to only $5.2 billion of net funding obligations in the CDS market, according to the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, instead of the hundreds of billions in notional that were speculated, the financial markets might not have seen the same degree of turmoil in the fall of 2008. Thus, greater insight into CDS trading activity could reduce the uncertainties characteristic of the recent crisis.

Risk Management: Margining, Collateral, and Membership Requirements

While a CCP mitigates counterparty risk, it also concentrates risk and requires extensive risk management systems. Consequently, a CCP’s risk management processes, internal controls and operational risk procedures, and the adequacy of its back-up financial resources are key to ensuring that risks are contained. In addition, a CCP that clears CDS contracts should conduct stress tests with relevant shocks to its members.

A CCP typically uses margining as an instrument to reduce counterparty credit risk. Initial margin, the amount required to initiate a position, and variation margin, payments for the daily losses and payoffs for daily gains, are required to keep a position open. This allows payment flows to account for intra-day price movements and variation margin changes to account for end-of-day settling up, since variation margin is based on daily mark-to-market pricing; positions are liquidated if variation margin cannot be met. Riskier instruments should incorporate larger margins to account for the greater risk to which the CCP is exposed.

Margin requirements for less liquid instruments should incorporate the potential losses that might occur over a longer liquidation period following a default. Margining requirements should therefore account for risks of a particular product and elements such as sector risk and liquidity risk. The accurate calculation of margin requirements, or even an appropriate range of margin requirements, will be a key challenge to the new CDS CCPs due to the complexities in the pricing of these particular products.

Cash Settlement versus Physical Settlement in a CDS CCP

A CCP can facilitate settlement of contracts after an event of default. For credit derivatives contracts, there has been a decline of physical settlement in favor of cash settlement, and the use of ISDA auction protocols have become standard practice in credit events for the reasons cited below.

A feature of the CDS market is the settlement method in case of default, or credit event. With the occurrence of a credit event, there are two options for the settlement of CDS contracts— physical settlement or cash settlement. A CDS credit event is a default event that results in payments by the protection seller to the protection buyer, concurrent with delivery requirements by the protection buyer. Typical credit events include bankruptcy of the reference entity or its failure to pay with respect to its bond or debt and, for some reference entities, restructuring.

In the case of physical settlement, the protection buyer delivers the debt obligation (the cash instrument) of the reference entity and in return is paid the par value by the protection seller. In cash settlement, the protection seller pays the protection buyer the difference between par value and the market value of the debt obligation of the reference entity. However, the growth of the CDS market has resulted in a much larger notional value of CDS contracts than the outstanding value of the debt obligations. Cash settlement avoids possible failure in physical delivery due to a shortage in deliverable cash instruments.

Keep in mind that the notional amount of single-name CDS far exceeds notional of physical cash bonds and can be potentially distorting. Bank for International Settlements data show CDS notional outstanding of around $57 trillion at end-June 2008 versus a gross market value of underlying securities of only $3.2 trillion for the same period. Further, a physical settlement could result in a short squeeze, as protection buyers purchase bonds to deliver for settlement, bidding up the bond price and thereby offsetting the gains on the CDS protection.

In any case, in light of the concentration of risk in a CCP, a smoothly operating settlement system is crucial for reducing any potential systemic consequences. Central counterparties’ use of cash settlement for CDS contracts would deter market manipulation and help avoid disruption in the settlement process. In March 2009, ISDA initiated its Auction Settlement Supplement and Protocol incorporating cash auctions into standard documentation for settling CDS contracts, i.e., “hardwiring” the ISDA settlement protocol into the contracts. While the ISDA defined protocol provides for both auction and physical settlement, cash settlement can benefit by minimizing price distortions. However, maximizing participation in the industry standard settlement mechanism for all CDS contracts is crucial.

Multiple CCPs versus a Single Central Counterparty

The CDS CCP ventures based in the United States and Europe have engendered some debate as to the optimal number of central counterparties. These currently include CME Clearing, Eurex Clearing, ICE Trust/ICE Clear Europe, and NYSE Liffe/LCH.Clearnet. A single CCP would accomplish the largest reduction in systemic counterparty risk, benefit from economies of scale and a larger pool of counterparties and resource base, and limit opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and competitive distortions. See the recent paper by Duffie and Zhu (“Does a Central Clearing Party Reduce Counterparty Risk?”) for discussion of these points.

The resulting concentration of operational risk would necessitate strong risk management processes and oversight. The U.S. approach is to allow for multiple CCPs, allowing market forces to determine the optimal number of CCPs in order to assure clearing services are provided efficiently. However, there are concerns that such an approach will be a “race to the bottom,” as each CCP fights for market share by economizing on risk management procedures, and lowering margining requirements and contributions to a guarantee fund. (A guarantee fund compensates nondefaulting participants from losses suffered in the event of another participant’s failure to meet its obligations to the CCP.)

From a cross-border perspective, the systemic importance of a single CDS central counterparty for a domestic economy might lead authorities toward retaining the CCP under national regulatory and supervisory oversight for the ability to control or mitigate the impact on domestic financial stability. National authorities might be reluctant to oversee a global entity where jurisdictional disputes may arise. Nevertheless, a global CDS CCP would mitigate the most overall counterparty risk. Thus, if a global CDS CCP is not established, then the development of separate CCPs should provide for the crossborder coordination of regulatory and supervisory frameworks to avoid regulatory arbitrage. These frameworks should ensure that linkages and clearing mechanisms are established across CCPs, without constraining the use of multiple-currency transactions. At present, there are various legislative, regulatory, and market proposals outstanding to deal with counterparty clearing organizations, which may affect issues such as the standardization and documentation of credit default swaps, and the responsibilities of counterparties and clearinghouse members, amongst others.

————————————————

* Jodi Scarlata is a Senior Economist at the IMF. These are her personal views, and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management."

Thursday, May 7, 2009

an accounting trick that boosts tangible common equity without providing the banks any new cash

From The Baseline Scenario:

"Stress Tests and The Nationalization We Got

with 32 comments

The post was co-authored by Simon Johnson and James Kwak.

When the stress tests were first announced on February 10, bank stocks went into a slide (the S&P 500 Financial Sector Index fell from 133.13 on February 9 to 96.18 two weeks later), in part on fears that the stress tests would be a prelude to “nationalization” of the banks. This week, it has emerged that several large banks will require tens of billions of dollars of new capital, most notably Bank of America. They could obtain that capital by exchanging common shares for the preferred shares that Treasury now holds, an accounting trick that boosts tangible common equity without providing the banks any new cash. Such a conversion would greatly increase the government’s stake in certain banks, perhaps even above the 50% level, yet the markets seem relatively unconcerned this week, with the S&P 500 Financial Sector Index at 168.14 and rising.

What happened?

Back in February, America was mired in a public debate over the word “nationalization” and what it meant for our banking system, with contributions by Nobel Laureates Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, former and current Fed officials Alan Greenspan, Alan Blinder, and Thomas Hoenig, and administration figures Timothy Geithner, Larry Summers, and even Barack (”Sweden had like five banks“) Obama, among others. On a substantive level, the debate was over whether large and arguably insolvent banks should be allowed to fail and go into government conservatorship, as happens routinely with small insolvent banks. Opponents of this view who wanted to keep the banks afloat in their current form, including the current administration, beat off this challenge by calling it nationalization (more precisely, by demonizing government control of banks). Perversely, however, what we got instead was increasing co-dependency between the government and the large banks, as well as increasing influence of the government over the banks, and vice-versa. And according to the market, the banks should be quite happy with this outcome.

As a starting point for thinking about this issue, there are good reasons to be skeptical about nationalization, meaning indefinite state ownership of the banking system.

Government ownership of banks or any other company can go badly wrong. Anyone growing up in the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s experienced first-hand the problems that occur when the government runs major industrial and infrastructure companies – particularly when they have powerful unions. Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979 in part because the state-run parts of the U.K. economy were not doing well, and the wave of deregulation that she started (and the financial boom it triggered) was a reaction to that context.

Similarly, people working in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s got a close-up view of wasteful and unproductive state ownership at work. Privatization was not handled well in some situations, particularly when it led to the emergence of powerful oligarchs. But the state had been a dreadful owner in almost every respect – quality of service in stores, productivity in manufacturing companies, resource management in oil and gas companies, and massive pollution by energy and transportation systems.

All of these nationalized industries had something in common. When companies did badly, the losses were borne by the state. As a result, there was little incentive for company managers to improve their performance. Some years they would get lucky and even make a profit – but at those moments, most of the benefits would go to the insiders, in higher wages, bigger perks and the like.

Direct state ownership of industry has proved disappointing almost everywhere. It turns out to be an arrangement in which a small group of people – whoever has power at or around the state enterprise – get the upside, while society as a whole gets all the downside. There is a prominent role for government in the modern economy: setting rules, enforcing contracts, supporting longer-term research and development, and trying hard to continually upgrade education. But managing banks is not part of that package, primarily because politicians should be kept away from credit. Once the allocation of loans becomes politicized, you get all kinds of pathologies and, most likely, more inflation as the central bank loses the ability to cut back on credit.

However, this does not mean that the state has no role to play in the banking system.

In every developed country, the financial industry is closely monitored and regulated - on paper at least - because of its crucial role in the economy. That regulation has two major objectives that almost no one disagrees with. The first is protecting depositors. There is no simpler scam than accepting deposits, paying them out to bank insiders (or “investing” them in insiders’ money-losing projects), and then going bankrupt. Even in the absence of fraud, mismanagement can lead to the same result. If people do not trust banks to hold their money, they will hold onto cash instead - increasing the cost of everyday life, and starving the economy of credit.

The second, related objective is preventing bank failures, when they do occur, from causing major damage to other institutions. At any moment, a reasonably complex bank will own a diverse portfolio of assets, owe money in different forms to many different investors, and have open trading positions with many counterparties. Unwinding these relationships through a traditional bankruptcy process could cut off liquidity to other financial institutions and cause a ripple effect of successive failures.

In the U.S., the solution to this problem was defined in the Great Depression and has never been seriously questioned. Deposits are guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which receives insurance premiums from banks. In return, federal and state regulators have the right to monitor banks in order to minimize the losses that the FDIC could suffer. This is analogous to a workers’ compensation insurer auditing its customers’ workplaces to make sure they meet prescribed safety guidelines.

Under this system, if a bank is at risk of failure, the regulator can demand that it increase its capital. If it cannot find additional capital, or if it is insolvent, the FDIC will take over the bank. Most often the bank’s assets (loans, securities, buildings, customer base, deposit accounts, etc.) are transferred to another bank, insured deposits are protected, losses to uninsured deposits are minimized, and operations continue nearly seamlessly. By most accounts, this process runs very smoothly. And it happens regularly - 25 times in 2008, and 29 times through April this year.

Even when the FDIC has to operate a bank for some time before it can find an acquirer or wind it down, we never talk about the FDIC “nationalizing” a bank. An FDIC intervention is typically called a conservatorship or a receivership, depending on whether the bank will be liquidated or not. Although insured depositors are protected, uninsured creditors such as bondholders are not; how much they get depends on what the FDIC can sell the assets for. And shareholders are almost entirely wiped out.

Although this process includes a period of government control, there’s a good reason why no one calls it nationalization: the process preserves the incentives of free market capitalism. Shareholders, who took the most risk for the highest expected returns, lose their money. Bondholders, who took some risk for modest expected returns, lose some of their money. Managers lose their jobs. Healthier, better-run banks claim the assets, grow, and make more money.

The recent nationalization debate has this precisely backwards.

The problems of the banking sector are clear, although reasonable people may disagree about their magnitude. America’s biggest banks suffered massive financial losses due to bad loans and worse risk management, while reducing their capital to the legal minimum and then lobbying Washington to reduce that minimum. The crisis began with unexpected losses on complex securities, but has since spread to every type of financial asset, as the deepening recession undermines the ability of all types of borrowers to repay their loans. The IMF has boosted its estimate of aggregate losses by financial institutions to $4.1 trillion, only a fraction of which has been written down on balance sheets.

As a result, some of our largest banks are either insolvent - their assets are worth less than their liabilities - or are short on capital, and confidence in them has been preserved solely by the government’s willingness to provide capital injections, loans, and debt guarantees as necessary to keep them in operation.

In most countries, the course of action would be clear. The government would take over banks, remove “bad assets” from their balance sheets, inject fresh capital, and put them bank into the private sector. This is essentially what the FDIC does when it takes over a bank. There is some debate about whether the government currently has the power to do this for bank holding companies - Tim Geithner says no, Thomas Hoenig says yes - but if not, this is certainly something the Obama administration could press for.

In fact, this is usually the approach suggested by the U.S., both directly and through its influence at the IMF. For example, the U.S. repeatedly and publicly pressed Japan to do exactly this during the 1990s.

If the government were to implement this type of policy, the recent stress tests would be a reasonable first step. The stress tests would determine which banks were failing, and then they would be put into conservatorship. This is what investors were afraid of in February, because when a bank goes into conservatorship, its common shareholders are effectively wiped out - which, again, is what is supposed to happen in a free market system when companies mismanage themselves into the ground.

Since February, however, the government has clearly communicated that it has no such intentions, for example in Geithner’s insistence that “the vast majority of banks have more capital than they need to be considered well capitalized by their regulators.” Even as the capital shortfall numbers have leaked out over the past few days, the government has emphasized that no banks will actually be allowed to fail, or even be allowed to be put into a conservatorship; instead, they will first attempt to raise capital from the private sector, and failing that they can convert their TARP preferred stock into common stock. Even if this results in significant government ownership, there is no evidence that shareholders or creditors will be forced to take losses. As rfreud said in a comment here, “The stress tests results are confidence-building in that they signal the low likelihood of nationalization or seizure. Reform at the moment seems a distant prospect.”

The strategy, in short, is to continue to prop up our existing large banks in place (no such consideration has been granted to small banks) through a lengthening list of bailout measures. Why?

One reason is that taking over banks has somehow been redefined as “nationalization,” with the images it conjures up of forced confiscation of property. Yet there are no guns involved here. Ordinarily, when an investor puts a large amount of new capital into a bank, it gets some measure of control in return. Yet Treasury has bent over backward to minimize its voting shares, beginning with the initial round of recapitalizations and continuing through the latest Citigroup bailout in February.

Perhaps after fighting off charges of “socialism” from the McCain campaign, the Obama administration is wary of any steps that could be described as nationalization. And so instead of insisting on its well-understood duty to shut down failing banks for the public good, it has tied its hands by taking this option off the table.

But what are we getting instead? Increasing government support for the financial system, and increasing government influence over the flow of credit - or nationalization by another name.

Instead of the government taking over and sorting out banks transparently, the big banks are receiving massive government support:

  • $700 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) money is flowing to no fewer than eleven separate programs, as documented by the TARP Special Inspector General, including preferred share purchases, asset guarantees, purchases of asset-backed securities, and subsidized purchases of toxic assets.
  • The Federal Reserve has committed trillions of dollars to lend against and purchase securities of all kinds from the banking sector.
  • The FDIC is guaranteeing hundreds of billions of dollars of newly issued bank debt, and is set to guarantee loans to private investors to buy loans from banks under the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP).

In exchange, the government is deciding how credit is allocated in the economy, albeit on the wholesale rather than the retail level. In addition to direct loans to automakers, programs such as the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility are effectively distributing money to support specific types of lending (credit cards, auto loans, etc.), and the Fed is purchasing over $1 trillion of mortgage-backed securities in order to push mortgage rates down to historically low levels.

In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that the government, while renouncing official control of any banks, has intervened in management decisions for some of the weaker players. According to Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis, he was threatened with removal if he failed to complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch. And unnamed sources recently reported that federal regulators are considering removing Vikram Pandit from Citigroup.

In short, relationships between the government and the large banks have never been closer, with large amounts of money flowing in one direction, and complete co-dependency going in both directions. Those relationships are not entirely friendly, which is not surprising. In any crisis when public resources are called on to bail out the private sector, not all of the oligarchs will survive; Bear Stearns and Lehman have already vanished. But the winners - which should include Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman - will emerge even more powerful and influential than before.

In rejecting “nationalization” (regulatory takeover and conservatorship), the government has not ensured a private, properly functioning banking system. Instead, it has muddled into a broken-down, undercapitalized system that is nominally in private hands, but is able to tap the state for apparently limitless support. And to date, that support has flowed on one-sided terms, with the taxpayer accepting downside risk but limited upside potential. No wonder bank shareholders are comfortable with this outcome.

As a result, the banks have largely preserved their existing management teams and bonus plans: on Wall Street, first-quarter accruals for bonuses returned to the levels of the glory years of 2006 and 2007. Creditors and counterparties have been kept whole, most notably through the AIG bailout. And shareholders have seen their share prices supported by the promise of sustained government support. The incentives we have ended up with are more similar to those of a nationalized system than those of a free market. Instead of state-owned coal mines run for the benefit of miners (the U.K. in the 1970s) or state-owned oil and gas companies run for the benefit of bureaucrats (the Soviet Union in the 1980s), we have state-backed banks in the U.S. run for the benefit of bankers and their creditors.

The smart economists in the Obama administration must know what is going on. But having insisted that large bank takeovers are tantamount to nationalization and therefore off the table, the administration is betting that the financial system will repair itself - or “earn their way out,” as StatsGuy put it.

This is possible. With the competition in both investment banking (Bear Stearns, Lehman) and mortgage lending (most of the specialist mortgage lenders) gone, the survivors all enjoy larger market shares and higher prices, contributing to their somewhat healthy profits in the first quarter. Even the large banks that receive the lowest grades in the stress tests will be given relatively cheap capital by the government; Treasury will use its resulting stakes to apply behind-the-scenes pressure to the banks (more government influence), but without taking decisive steps to clean up bank balance sheets. Instead, it will hope that the PPIP will do the trick, using cheap government financing.

But success is by no means certain. And we cannot know for how long the government will have to continue propping up weaker banks, at growing taxpayer cost, while they absorb funds that could otherwise help the economic recovery.

In the end, when a financial system is dominated by banks that are too big to fail - and they do fail - the only options are an FDIC-style takeover or the kind of public-private co-dependency that we see today. As far as the current crisis is concerned, the die is cast and the big banks won.

For the future, however, the question is how to avoid a situation where banks cannot be made to fail gracefully without creating systemic risk. As a starting point, we believe that banks that are too big to fail are too big to exist. Only then will we be able to maintain the incentives necessary to manage risk, punish failure, and reward success.

Written by James Kwak

May 7, 2009 at 6:00 am"

Me:

Sheila Bair gave a speech yesterday in which she made some excellent points because, well, quite frankly, I agree with them. Here’s one:

“In the case of a bank holding company, whether systemically significant or not, the FDIC has the authority to take control of only the failing bank subsidiary, thereby protecting the insured depositors. However, in some cases, many of the essential services for the bank’s operations lie in other portions of the holding company and are left outside of the FDIC’s control, making it difficult to operate and resolve the bank. When the bank fails, the holding company and its subsidiaries typically find themselves too operationally and financially unbalanced to continue to fund ongoing commitments. In such a situation, where the holding company structure includes many bank and non-bank subsidiaries, taking control of just the bank is not a practical solution.”

This turned out to be true. I credit it because, for one thing, they’re admitting a huge gap in seizing banks: Namely, they had no means of seizing large banks. Since that’s the FDIC’s job, they’re essentially admitting incompetence. As well, there are many good arguments as to how complicated and messy this would be.

However, the Govt has in fact submitted a plan to do this:

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/032509%20legislation.pdf

I’m not sure what more you’re asking for. As for the current mess:

“Perversely, however, what we got instead was increasing co-dependency between the government and the large banks, as well as increasing influence of the government over the banks, and vice-versa. And according to the market, the banks should be quite happy with this outcome.”

We’ve been left with Hybrid Plans, all of which lead to what you have described. We began discussing this outcome in September, which is why a Swedish Plan made sense.

The real question seems to be about what kind of reform of the banking sector that we want. I want Narrow/Limited Banks, which is going nowhere.

Here:

“In short, relationships between the government and the large banks have never been closer, with large amounts of money flowing in one direction, and complete co-dependency going in both directions. Those relationships are not entirely friendly, which is not surprising. In any crisis when public resources are called on to bail out the private sector, not all of the oligarchs will survive; Bear Stearns and Lehman have already vanished. But the winners - which should include Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman - will emerge even more powerful and influential than before.”

I don’t agree. The fear of nationalization and the terms of TARP have caused banks to try and avoid govt largess now. That’s what I wanted. Didn’t you?

Here:

“The stress tests results are confidence-building in that they signal the low likelihood of nationalization or seizure. Reform at the moment seems a distant prospect.”

It’s the opposite. CAP, read it, was intended to guarantee the solvency of the banks by the govt. That’s what I’ve wanted since Sept. That’s the Swedish Plan. As well, that’s how you stop debt-deflation.

“But having insisted that large bank takeovers are tantamount to nationalization and therefore off the table, the administration is betting that the financial system will repair itself - or “earn their way out,” as StatsGuy put it.”

It’s not off the table, read the legislation, and it wouldn’t be better if they earned their way out. wouldn’t it? It doesn’t mean we can’t push for reform.

“Such a conversion would greatly increase the government’s stake in certain banks, perhaps even above the 50% level, yet the markets seem relatively unconcerned this week, with the S&P 500 Financial Sector Index at 168.14 and rising.”

Last disagreement. Stocks are up for many reasons, but one important one is QE, and the diverging tracks of shorter term and longer term bonds. There’s a good post this morning about this on Alphaville. I admit my view is a minority view explanation of this rise in stock prices.

We can still change the banking system. Sadly, few are willing to change it as much as I’d like.

Monday, April 27, 2009

The program effectively rolls the dice more than 100,000 times by running the information randomly

TO BE NOTED: From Alphaville:

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Gambling on Monte Carlo simulations

A mathematical model developed by physicists working on the atomic bomb in the 1940s and named after a gambling hub, is probably a fitting one for the US government to adopt in its banking stress tests.

While Friday’s release of the methodology for the tests contained little new on the loan loss assumptions of the exercise (the assumptions about GDP, unemployment and house prices had already been published) there was this bit from the paper:

Analysis of [commercial and industrial] loan loss projections was based on the distribution of exposures by industry and by internal rating provided by the firms. In many cases, these ratings were mapped to default probabilities by the firm; in other cases, this association was established by supervisory analysts. This information was confirmed and supplemented by external measures of risk, such as expected default frequencies from third party vendors. Supervisors evaluated firm loss estimates using a Monte Carlo simulation that projected a distribution of losses by examining otential dispersion around central probabilities of default. The approach produced a consistently‐prepared set of loss estimations across all the BHCs by combining firm‐specific exposure and rating information with standardized assumptions of the performance of similar exposures. The results of this analysis were compared to the firms’ submissions and adjustments made to ensure consistency across BHCs.

Monte Carlo simulations are pretty standard things in finance. They’re used to value not just potential loan losses but also portfolio risk and derivatives.

While there’s no single Monte Carlo method they tend to work like this: Define a domain of possible inputs, generate inputs randomly from the domain, apply some algorithms, then aggregate the results. In playground terms, you can imagine it as a game of battleship. First a player makes some random shots on their opponent’s board. Then they apply the maths (in this case, a battleship is a vertical or horizontal line of four or five dots) and then determine the likely locations of their opponent’s ships.

The good thing about Monte Carlo simulations is that they do well modelling things with lots of uncertainty and complexity in inputs. However, as the above should have suggested, they’re very much limited by their range of actual inputs. This snippet, from a May 2007 Bloomberg article on CDOs and subprime is a perfect illustration.

Because there are so many moving parts to a CDO, rating companies have to assess not only the chance that something may go wrong with one piece but also the possibility that multiple combinations of things could falter. To do that, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch use a mathematical technique called Monte Carlo simulation, named after the Mediterranean gambling city.

The rating companies take all the data they have on a CDO, such as information about specific bonds and securitizations and the remaining types of loans to be purchased for the package.

The firm enters data into a software program, which calculates the probability that a CDO’s assets will default in hypothetical situations of financial and commercial stress. The program effectively rolls the dice more than 100,000 times by running the information randomly.

If the inputs and assumptions are wrong then the Monte Carlo simulations will be of very little use. In that sense they’re very similar to the magic worked by David Li’s Gaussian Copula. They give a false sense of security.

And that’s precisely, some might argue, what the US government is going for with its bank stress tests anyway.

Related links:
Of couples and copulas - Sam Jones, FT
Dual stance on valuing bank securities - FT