Showing posts with label PPIP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PPIP. Show all posts

Saturday, June 20, 2009

“If you thought Lehman Brothers was a mistake, just stand by and see what nationalizing Citi or B.of A. would do,”

TO BE NOTED: From the NY Times:

Stephanie Diani for The New York Times

Appearing on TV and bending the ear of the White House, Bill Gross of Pimco has emerged as one of the nation's most influential financiers.



"
Treasury’s Got Bill Gross on Speed Dial

Newport Beach, Calif.

Every day, Bill Gross, the world’s most successful bond fund manager, withdraws into a conference room at lunchtime with his lieutenants to discuss his firm’s investments. The blinds are drawn to keep out the sunshine, and he forbids any fiddling with BlackBerrys or cellphones. He wants everyone disconnected from the outside world and focused on what matters most to him: mining riches for his clients at Pimco, the swiftly growing money management firm.

Mr. Gross, 65, has long been celebrated for his eccentricities. He learned some of his lucrative investing strategies by gambling in Las Vegas. Many of his most inspired ideas arrived while he was standing on his head doing yoga. He knows he has to be well dressed for client meetings or television — but instead of keeping his Hermès ties neatly knotted, he drapes them around his neck like scarves so he can labor with his collar open.

And with the collapse of Wall Street, Mr. Gross has emerged as one of the nation’s most influential financiers. His frequent appearances on CNBC draw buzz, as do his wickedly humorous monthly investing columns on the Pimco Web site. Treasury secretaries call him for advice. Warren E. Buffett, the Berkshire Hathaway chairman, and Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, sing his praises.

“He’s a very individualistic person. He doesn’t come at analysis or investment judgment in the words, terminology or ambience that I have been used to over the decades,” Mr. Greenspan says. “That may be the secret of his success. There is no doubt there is an extraordinary intellect there.” Mr. Greenspan, it should be noted, now works for Pimco as a consultant.

Amid all of this, Mr. Gross and his firm are trying to shape the government’s response to the economic crisis. He is one of the most fervent supporters of the Obama administration’s plan to enlist private investors to help bail out the nation’s ailing banks and try to revive the economy.

That effort, known as the Public-Private Investment Program, or P.P.I.P., has gained little traction so far. But Mr. Gross has energetically defended its architect, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, against critics like the New York University economics professor Nouriel Roubini and the New York Times columnist Paul Krugman — both of whom argue that the strategy is flawed and that it would be best for the government to temporarily nationalize so-called zombie banks to prevent a repeat of the Great Depression.

Such nationalization, Mr. Gross insists, would be an unmitigated disaster. “There are two grand plans,” he said this spring at a meeting of his firm’s investment committee. “One is the Krugman-Roubini plan. They think the banks have so much garbage they are beyond hope. The other side is the administration’s side. That’s the one we’re on. If the other side should ever gain credence, then we’ll have something to worry about.”

Mr. Gross is hardly a disinterested observer. Pimco, owned by the German insurer Allianz, is jockeying to be picked by Mr. Geithner to relieve the likes of Bank of America, Citigroup and other banks of an estimated $1 trillion in soured mortgage debt so they can start lending freely again. Mr. Gross calls the plan a “win-win-win” for the banks, taxpayers and Pimco investors.

The government is planning to announce soon which money managers will participate. A spokesman for the Treasury Department would not say whether Pimco would be one of them.

IN many ways, it is perfectly logical for the White House to turn to someone like Mr. Gross at such a time. Few investors understand the mortgage market better. As co-chief investment officer, he personally manages Pimco’s flagship, the Total Return fund, which has $158 billion in assets. As of the end of May, he had invested 61 percent of the fund’s money in mortgage bonds.

Mr. Gross has always been partial to mortgage bonds. And why not? He has done fabulously well with them. In an October 2005 letter to investors, he made one of the most prescient calls of the last decade, warning of the looming subprime mortgage crisis. Almost everybody ignored him. Today, they wish they hadn’t.

When the housing bubble burst and the financial markets fell apart, investors lost billions of dollars. Not Mr. Gross’s clients. Class A shares of the Total Return fund, for individual investors, were up 4.3 percent in 2008, or nine percentage points ahead of comparable bond funds, according to Morningstar; this year through Thursday, the shares were up 5.4 percent.

In the midst of an economic crisis, those numbers are impressive. So is the longer-term record: In the 10 years through Thursday, the fund had an annualized return of 6.42 percent, beating its benchmark by 0.54 percentage points, according to Morningstar.

That’s one of the reasons the government has courted him closely. Last fall, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, run at the time by Mr. Geithner, hired Pimco — along with BlackRock, Goldman Sachs and Wellington Management — to buy up to $1.25 trillion in mortgage bonds in an effort to keep interest rates from skyrocketing.

Last December, when it was pressing Bank of America to complete its ill-fated acquisition of Merrill Lynch, the Federal Reserve also looked to Pimco for advice. According to recently released messages that Fed staff members sent one another that month, Pimco evaluated the two banks and concluded that Merrill wouldn’t survive without a capital infusion or additional government aid.

Today, Mr. Gross is eager to buy the same subprime loans he once refused to touch, as part of the Treasury’s distressed-asset initiative. After all, the thinking goes, if anybody can figure out how much all this debt is worth, it’s Pimco. But Pimco’s involvement in so many aspects of the bailout has made many other financiers and analysts uncomfortable. They say its proximity to the Treasury Department and the Fed may allow it to reap billions of easy dollars through federal contracts and preferential investment opportunities.

A frequent complaint is this: Why is the Federal Reserve paying Pimco to buy mortgage securities on its behalf, when the firm is already a huge buyer and seller of the same bonds? “That’s the equivalent of a no-bid contract in Iraq,” fumes Barry Ritholtz, who runs an equity research firm in New York and writes The Big Picture, a popular and well-regarded economics blog. “It’s a license to steal.”

No one, of course, has actually accused Pimco of theft. But there is a larger question: Whose interests is the firm looking out for in the bailout? Money managers, after all, have a legal obligation — a fiduciary responsibility — to put the interest of their investors before anyone else. Even Mr. Gross acknowledges that Pimco’s interests won’t always be aligned with those of the government.

Mr. Gross points out that he has never even met Mr. Geithner. For its part, the Treasury Department plays down Pimco’s influence. “We speak with a number of market participants and believe seeking out a diversity of perspectives is critical to our efforts,” says Andrew Williams, a spokesman for the department. He says the Treasury takes conflicts of interests “very seriously in all cases.”

Mr. Gross is well aware of the criticism that has been directed at Pimco. During an interview at its headquarters in Newport Beach, Calif., sitting at his horseshoe-shaped desk on its 4,200-square-foot trading floor overlooking the Pacific Ocean, he brings up the topic of perceived conflicts of interest himself.

He almost never personally buys and sells bonds. Pimco has dozens of traders who do this for him here. “There’s the mortgage desk over there,” he says, pointing to a group of well-scrubbed young people hunched over computers. “We’ve been buying some mortgages this morning. That’s our baby, so to speak. That’s our bag.”

He immediately adds that this mortgage trading operation is completely separate from the one on the floor below, where traders are working on behalf of the Fed. He says he can’t even visit that floor himself anymore without a company lawyer at his side. The last time he did was in December, when he wished the traders happy holidays.

“I said, ‘Merry Christmas,’ ” Mr. Gross recalls. “The lawyer said, ‘Mr. Gross says Merry Christmas.’ Right then and there, I knew that communications were basically severed. That’s the way the Fed wants it.”

He says he assumes that Pimco traders working on behalf of the government don’t talk to their peers trading for Pimco’s own accounts. Then again, he said he doesn’t know for sure what happens after hours.

“I don’t drink beer with these guys; I have no idea what happens in the privacy of their own homes,” he says. He says that when he encounters traders working for the Fed outside the office, he doesn’t talk to them.

“I pass some of them on the way to the lunch shop,” he says. “I just sort of wave. I don’t know what to do.”

MR. GROSS is fond of saying he is the antithesis of a Wall Street “alpha male.” He is every bit the Southern Californian, with longish hair and a laid-back attitude. Most Wall Street executives won’t talk to a reporter without a public relations person hovering nearby. Even then, they can be disappointingly bland. No one would ever say such a thing about Mr. Gross. He approaches an interview is almost like a therapy session; it is a chance for him to make confessions.

“I’ll tell you an interesting story,” he says at one point. “I shouldn’t, but I will. It’s like I’m taking truth serum every time I do this.”

The tale is about “a very childish and immature” e-mail message that he sent Don Phillips, a managing director of Morningstar, the mutual fund research company, when Morningstar didn’t select him as its fixed-income fund manager of the year in 2008. It is an intriguing story. But it’s nowhere near as interesting as what he has to say about Pimco’s role in the bailout.

He sounds genuinely pained by the economic collapse. “There was always a big part of me that thought the Depression was just something from my old American Heritage history books,” he says. “I thought: ‘This stuff can’t happen really. I mean, this is just for the economic philosophers and the paranoid worriers.’ Then, in the last 6 to 12 months, you go, ‘God, this just might happen!’ ”

With the fate of the largest banks still uncertain, a heated debate continues about how to fix the problem. Mr. Geithner wants to enlist money managers like Pimco to buy distressed bank assets with financial backing from the government. That way, his supporters argue, they can offer such generous prices that banks can disgorge the assets without too painful a hit.

But proponents of bank nationalization say the Treasury’s plan won’t work because some banks can’t afford to take any losses on asset sales. This camp believes nationalization is the best path because it will let the government clean up banks’ balance sheets and restore their health.

Mr. Gross argues that this would completely destabilize the financial markets. “If you thought Lehman Brothers was a mistake, just stand by and see what nationalizing Citi or B.of A. would do,” he argued in one of his monthly letters to Pimco investors.

His mood brightens when he talks about how much money Pimco could reap by participating in the Geithner plan. No wonder: the terms are deliciously favorable for participants selected as fund managers. Money managers like Pimco would be expected to raise at least $500 million from their clients. The Treasury would match that with taxpayer dollars. Then Pimco and the Treasury would create a jointly owned fund of at least $1 billion that would buy distressed mortgage bonds.

Government largess doesn’t stop there. The fund will be eligible for low-interest financing from both the Treasury and the Fed that analysts at Credit Suisse First Boston estimate could be as high as four times the total equity in the fund. So if Pimco ponied up $500 million, the fund that it manages could borrow $4 billion.

Pimco would then negotiate with banks to buy their wobbly mortgage-backed securities. Mr. Gross says that some of these securities pay an interest rate as high as 14 percent and that even if default rates were 70 percent, Pimco and the government would still make a 5 percent return after covering their negligible borrowing costs. That means the government-Pimco partnership could make at least $250 million in a year on a $5 billion investment fund. Of that amount, Pimco would get $125 million — a 25 percent return on its original investment.

But here’s the part that makes Mr. Gross salivate. If things go badly, the government is responsible for repaying all that debt. “It’s just like in blackjack,” he says. “That puts the odds in your favor. If you don’t bet too much and if you stay at the table long enough, the odds are high that you are going to go home with some extra money in your pocket.”

Indeed, for all of Mr. Gross’s anguished talk about the crisis, there’s no escaping the fact that Pimco isn’t exactly suffering. In November, the Total Return fund became the world’s largest mutual fund with $128.4 billion in assets, according to Morningstar. Since then, its assets under management have climbed to $158 billion. The firm once had trouble luring prospective employees to Newport Beach. Now Pimco is being deluged with résumés.

Meanwhile, some of the most powerful people in the nation call Mr. Gross for advice. “Paulson will call, Geithner will call, and I’ll be like, ‘Yabba-dabba’ or ‘Blah-blah-blah,’ ” he says with a measure of self-deprecation — and an equal dose of pride. “I turn into a walking, talking idiot.”

Mr. Gross has been through crises before. He nearly died — and briefly lost part of his scalp — in 1966 when he crashed his car while making a doughnut run for his fraternity brothers at Duke University. He spent much of his senior year recovering in the hospital. He also became obsessed with blackjack after reading “Beat the Dealer: A Winning Strategy for the Game of Twenty-One,” by Edward O. Thorp, an M.I.T. mathematics professor (who is now a very successful hedge fund manager).

After he got his diploma, Mr. Gross hopped a freight train to Las Vegas with $200 sewed into his pant leg. He played blackjack for 16 hours a day. “After a while it gets pretty boring and pretty stinky,” he recalls. “People lose money. They don’t win it. You’re just watching the dealers.”

Even so, in four months, he turned $200 into $10,000 and used his winnings to pay for his studies toward an M.B.A. at the University of California, Los Angeles. He thought he could apply the lessons learned at the blackjack table to the stock market. After getting the degree, he called all the big Wall Street brokerage firms. Nobody called him back.

FINALLY, his mother showed him a classified ad for a junior credit analyst in the bond department at the Pacific Investment Management Company, a subsidiary of Pacific Mutual Life.

Although Mr. Gross had no interest in bonds, he took the job as a steppingstone to stock-picking. Back then, the bond market was a sleepy corner of the financial world. Mr. Gross’s job was to make sure that Pimco avoided buying bonds from companies that might go belly-up and burn their creditors.

By the mid-1970s, the market had become sexier as shrewd investors like Mr. Gross began trading bonds like stocks — and began earning outsize profits.

In short order, Mr. Gross also dived into the first mortgage-backed securities (which carried comfy government guarantees) and began studiously monitoring interest rates so he could place bets on his own macroeconomic predictions. This was highly unusual for a bond fund manager — and still is.

“There are a lot of big bond shops that frankly don’t feel confident doing this,” says Lawrence Jones, a Morningstar analyst. “It’s not part of their tool kit.”

Mr. Gross played well on television. In 1983, he became a regular on “Wall Street Week” on PBS; he loved the attention, and his ubiquity gave Pimco a big boost. Four years later, Pimco rolled out the Total Return fund. Over the next 10 years, its assets soared to $24 billion from $165 million. Much of this was because of shrewd investing. But TV did wonders, too. “It doesn’t do you any good to be good if nobody knows about you,” Mr. Gross says.

In 1999, he warned in his monthly investment column that the dot-com bubble would soon burst. The next year, it did. Despite the market downdraft, Mr. Gross’s fund ended 2000 up 12 percent, and that same year he and his partners sold Pimco to Allianz for $3.3 billion. Mr. Gross received $233 million for his stake, and Allianz also agreed to pay him $40 million in retention bonuses and seems to be giving him free rein.

Not that Mr. Gross was going anywhere.

FREE from distraction in a gym across the street from his offices, Mr. Gross happily rides a stationary bike, followed by a half-hour of yoga. Toward the end of his routine, he stands on his head for a few minutes in a position called the Feathered Peacock. He wobbles so much that you expect him to lose his balance and fall over, but he says some of his best ideas have come to him while he was upside down.

One of those insights came in 2005, when — while standing on his head — he began to worry about the real estate bubble.

He’d watched the prices of homes climb into the stratosphere in Southern California, and he says he felt as if he were witnessing something out of “Alice in Wonderland.” Was this happening all around the country?

Pimco dispatched 11 mortgage analysts to 20 cities to find out. They posed as prospective homebuyers and drove around with unsuspecting real estate agents and mortgage brokers who told them how easily they could get a home loan. “It was a little deceptive,” Mr. Gross says. “I didn’t feel good about that, but I didn’t know how else to get the real information.”

Mr. Gross says he thought it was obvious what was driving this madness: subprime mortgages. He was certain that the real estate market would collapse and take the economy down with it, and he made those thoughts known in letters to his investors. Pimco steered clear of risky housing debt, which meant that, for a time, some of his competitors who stockpiled the briefly lucrative products outperformed him.

For a fiercely competitive man, it was an awkward time. “Bill takes it hard when the numbers aren’t what he thinks they should be,” his wife, Sue, confided by e-mail. “In 2006, he recommended a Pimco bond fund to the owner of a local doughnut shop, and when it didn’t do well for a while, he could hardly go in the shop for his favorite coconut cake doughnut.”

Fortunately for Mr. Gross, but not for the economy, this couldn’t last forever. The housing bubble finally burst in 2007, and the crisis followed. He was vindicated. Yet this was only part of the reason for his success. He also predicted in one of his monthly columns that the government would have to pump billions of dollars into the economy to avert a total collapse. At the same time, he and his Pimco team came up with an audacious plan: invest in bond sectors that Washington would be forced to support — like government-backed mortgages guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Mr. Gross whimsically calls this strategy “shake hands with the government.” And he used his access to the news media to get the government’s attention. In a CNBC interview on Aug. 20, 2008, he argued that Americans were putting “their money in the mattress” because the government hadn’t rescued imperiled financial institutions like Fannie and Freddie.

On Sept. 7, Henry M. Paulson Jr., then the Treasury secretary, announced that the government was taking over Fannie and Freddie. The value of the Total Return fund rose by $1.7 billion in a single day.

Michele Davis, Mr. Paulson’s former spokeswoman, says Mr. Gross’s TV appearances had nothing to do with the decision: “There are $5.4 trillion of Fannie and Freddie securities around the world. Investors here and across the globe were worried and voicing the same concerns.”

But some of Pimco’s critics aren’t convinced. “The Treasury Department watches CNBC all day,” says Steven Eisman, a portfolio manager and banking expert at FrontPoint Partners, an investment firm. “I know that for a fact. He was putting pressure on them.”

Mr. Gross says nothing could have been further from his mind. He says he goes on TV with “a disbelief that people will believe or act on what I say,” adding that “people should think independently.”

At the same time, Pimco tried to influence the direction of the bailout itself. In the spring of 2008, Pimco’s chief executive, Mohamed A. el-Erian, a former policy expert at the International Monetary Fund, floated a plan in Washington for a public-private partnership similar to the P.P.I.P. plan that Mr. Geithner later unveiled. It didn’t get much traction.

But then Lehman Brothers collapsed on Sept. 15. Mr. Paulson asked Congress to pass the Troubled Asset Relief Plan, better known as TARP, which would enable the government to spend $700 billion to buy mortgage securities from teetering banks. The Treasury turned to Pimco and others for help.

“When we first asked for the TARP legislation in September, we were looking at purchasing assets,” says Ms. Davis, the former Treasury spokeswoman. “We definitely talked to Pimco and a lot of other asset managers. You had to find out how such a program might work and bounce ideas around to see how this thing would work.”

In the midst of the crisis, in October, Mr. Gross’s friend, Mr. Buffett, wrote to Mr. Paulson suggesting a plan similar to the one Mr. Erian had been pushing. However, Mr. Buffett says he came up with his idea independently.

“I called Bill Gross and Mohamed and said: ‘I’ve got this idea. If it goes forward, I hope you guys would manage it and would do it on a pro bono basis,’ ” Mr. Buffett recalled in an interview. “Within an hour, they said they were on board and they were willing to do whatever was called for.”

Mr. Gross publicly announced that his firm would do the job free. “I got call after call, e-mail after e-mail saying what Bill offered was right for the country and that he was a great American,” says a Pimco spokesman, Mark J. Porterfield. At first, it looked as if the Treasury might take Mr. Gross up on the offer. But his hopes were temporarily dashed when the Treasury simply gave TARP funds to the banks instead of purchasing bad assets.

And at the same time, people began to wonder about Mr. Gross’s motives. He made it clear that he was not afraid to put Pimco’s interests ahead of the government’s in the bailout. As part of its “shake hands with the government” strategy, Pimco had bet that the Bush administration would come to the rescue of the nation’s banks and other financial institutions. So it bought a variety of those bonds, including those of GMAC, the financial division of General Motors.

In November, as the economy continued to weaken, GMAC asked the Fed for permission to become a bank holding company so it could receive TARP financing. The central bank granted GMAC’s wish, with one caveat: GMAC had to swap 75 percent of its debt for equity, allowing GMAC to potentially buy back a big chunk of its bonds for just 60 cents on the dollar.

Mr. Gross balked at the arrangement because, as a GMAC bondholder, he would have been forced to take a big financial haircut. “We said: ‘It doesn’t look too good to us. We think we’ll just hold onto the existing bonds,’ ” he remembered. Much to the amazement of many people on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, which declined to comment, still allowed GMAC to become a bank holding company and the government later guaranteed all of its debt, meaning that Mr. Gross’s GMAC bonds would be worth 100 cents on the dollar when they mature.

Mr. Gross is unapologetic about the outcome. “The government has a vested interest, and it’s not necessarily aligned with Pimco’s interest,” he says.

SIMON JOHNSON, a former chief economist for the International Monetary Fund and now a professor at the Sloan School of Management at M.I.T., says he isn’t surprised that Mr. Gross is such a virulent foe of nationalization. As Professor Johnson points out, Pimco is a major bondholder in some of the biggest banks. Nationalization would hurt his portfolio.

“It would reduce the present value of his holding,” says Professor Johnson, himself a proponent of nationalization. “Therefore, he is not going to look good as an investment manager.”

What of Mr. Gross’s predictions that nationalization would deepen the recession? Professor Johnson acknowledges that there are risks either way, but says he thinks that people should be skeptical when powerful financiers make doomsday predictions.

“I think we pay undue deference to people who are very rich and have been successful in the financial sector in this country,” he says. “We think they are the gurus who think they have unique expertise, and if Bill Gross tells us there will be a panic, it must be true. Well, no, I don’t believe it. These guys all say this kind of thing.”

The twist, of course, is that the Obama administration has embraced the same public-private partnership proposal that Pimco has been pushing along and that Mr. Paulson briefly considered last fall. Mr. Gross says that the Geithner plan is better because the government provides such generous debt financing.

Pimco is proud of its partnership with the government. Mr. Erian points out that the firm’s executives have been members of the Treasury Department’s Borrowing Advisory Committee (along with many other Wall Street executives) for years. Its current representative, the Pimco managing director Paul McCulley, says part of his job is to ingratiate himself with officials at the Treasury and the Federal Reserve so Pimco can better understand impending policy decisions. He boasts that he is on a “first-name basis” with both Mr. Geithner and the Fed chairman, Ben S. Bernanke.

“We have a whole lot bigger profile now than we did years ago, but the fact of the matter is we’ve been doing the same thing in the last year that we’ve been doing for the last 10 years,” Mr. McCulley says. “I’d like to think we’re having some influence in the public policy arena. And I say that first and foremost as a citizen.”

Citizen — but also investor. And some critics of the financial benefits that Pimco might snare if the P.P.I.P. gets rolling are quick to point out what Pimco stands to gain.

“The critics would argue that all the benefits go to Pimco,” says Representative Scott Garrett, Republican of New Jersey, who is a member of the House Financial Services Committee and a skeptic of the Geithner plan. “Well, maybe not all the benefits. But they get the best ones right out the door. And the taxpayers are on the hook.”

The Obama administration says it will soon select lead fund managers for P.P.I.P. It’s almost certain that Pimco will be among them. “If you are trying to encourage investment from the private sector, isn’t it only logical to involve the most successful asset management organizations in the private sector?” says Thomas C. Priore, chief of ICP Capital, a boutique fixed-income investment bank.

And being selected by the government has other benefits, Mr. Priore adds. “If any endowment or public pension plan representative is looking for an asset management firm, he or she won’t get fired for hiring Pimco because, well, the government hired Pimco,” he says. “That certainly enhances your franchise value.”

P.P.I.P.’s fate remains uncertain. When the Treasury Department put 19 of the nation’s largest banks through a stress test, many passed the exam and their stocks prices rose. They have raised $50 billion in new capital. Now some of them are likely to hold on to their distressed mortgage securities in the hope that the housing market recovers — rather than face the pain of selling the assets at a loss now (a situation that may get dicey if housing doesn’t, in fact, recover).

The Treasury now says that Mr. Geithner expects P.P.I.P. to serve as “backstop” for banks that find themselves in a pinch.

There’s a darker scenario, possibly. If mortgage default rates do soar, some big banks may fail. Then the administration would have to seriously consider nationalization, which might devastate Mr. Gross’s holdings. He is, of course, well of aware of this possibility and says he’s watching Mr. Geithner as closely as he watched the blackjack dealers in Las Vegas.

“We just don’t want to flush it all down the drain,” he says. “You want to shake hands with the government. But maybe it shouldn’t be a super-firm handshake.”

AT a lunchtime meeting this past spring at Pimco, executives tell Mr. Gross that they’re worried about the fallout the firm will face if it receives a financial windfall as part of P.P.I.P.

“The risk is that you have a Congress with a populist bug,” Mr. McCulley says.

Dan Ivascyn, another of the firm’s managing directors, agrees. “I think there is a risk that we’re going to get criticized,” he says. “I think Pimco could get roughed up.”

“I think there is a much bigger chance of us getting roughed up personally,” says Scott Simon, head of Pimco’s mortgage-backed securities team.

Finally, Mr. Gross weighs in.

“So what are you saying?” he asks. “If we fail, we’ll get the shaft, and if we succeed, we’ll get the shaft?”

Monday, June 8, 2009

TARP funds shouldn’t be repaid with the hope that the banks don’t need them any more

From Reuters:

"
Felix Salmon

nonrival, nonexcludable

June 8th, 2009

Why the failed PPIP should prevent TARP repayments

Posted by: Felix Salmon
Tags: banking, regulation

When the PPIP was introduced, everybody was scared about the amount of toxic assets on banks’ balance sheets. Don’t worry, said Tim Geithner: between the stress tests and the PPIP, we’re going to be able to put a price on all those toxic assets, work out what the banks’ losses are, and ensure that the banks have enough capital to absorb those losses.

The market loved this idea, and started going up rather than down, to the point at which people weren’t scared any more about the amount of toxic assets on banks’ balance sheets. And so it didn’t matter that the adverse scenario in the stress tests is looking positively sunny these days. And it didn’t matter that PPIP disappeared with a whimper, the toxic assets no more priced now than they were six months ago. So long as the stock markets are happy, what’s to worry about?

Ezra Klein, for one, is still worried; so am I, not least because of all those leveraged loans maturing over the next few years. In other words, this is no time for banks — which, by their nature, are fragile leveraged institutions — to start repaying TARP funds. As my colleague Matt Goldstein notes:

The recent surge in the stock market and a slight slowdown in the pace of job losses should not lull anyone into believing that the economy is on the fast road to repair. If all the talk about economic green shoots is just some mirage, the banks could be in for a lot more trouble if there’s a new spike in mortgage defaults or corporate bankruptcies. And given the current public mood, it will be impossible to provide any struggling bank with a new round of financial aid.

Optimism is good, and we all hope that the stock market’s present upward trajectory proves justified and sustainable. But hope is not a regulatory strategy. And TARP funds shouldn’t be repaid with the hope that the banks don’t need them any more; they should be repaid only when the banks have demonstrated — with clear prices for their toxic assets — that they’re definitively in the clear."

Me:

I don’t see the point of your proposal. If the banks need the money going forward, we’ll give it to them. In the meantime, they should pay the money back if we have a better use for it. We should leave it with them only if it’s earning us a good bit of cash.

It’s got nothing to do with optimism. It’s more like realism that I’m suggesting.

- Posted by Don the libertarian Democrat

Thursday, May 28, 2009

Legacy Loans Program: Being Gamed Or Avoided?

From Marginal Revolution:

"
Is the Geithner plan dying a natural death?

Via Ezra Klein, we learn from the WSJ:

A government program designed to rid banks of bad loans, part of a broader effort once viewed as central to tackling the financial crisis, is stalling and may soon be put on hold, according to people familiar with the matter.

Ezra comments:

...the reasons appear to be twofold. First, few investors or banks want to work with the government. And second -- and maybe more importantly -- few investors and banks now think they'll have to. The banks, in particular, are apparently enthused by their ability to raise private capital, and now think they can wait out the market turmoil and sell their toxic assets in a few years, when they'll be worth more money.

And then:

Recently, I asked an administration official which government program we'd remember as making the most difference in averting catastrophe. Where will the history books place the credit?

"It'll be the Federal Reserve," he replied. "It'll be their decision to increase the size of their balance sheet from whatever it was before the crisis to whatever it is now."

Posted by Tyler Cowen"

Me:

So let's see:

"The WSJ reports:

Banking trade groups are lobbying the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. for permission to bid on the same assets that the banks would put up for sale as part of the government's Public Private Investment Program.

PPIP was hatched by the Obama administration as a way for banks to sell hard-to-value loans and securities to private investors, who would get financial aid as an enticement to help them unclog bank balance sheets. The program, expected to start this summer, will get as much as $100 billion in taxpayer-funded capital. That could increase to more than $500 billion in purchasing power with participation from private investors and FDIC financing.

The lobbying push is aimed at the Legacy Loans Program( NB DON ), which will use about half of the government's overall PPIP infusion to facilitate the sale of whole loans such as residential and commercial mortgages.

Federal officials haven't specified whether banks will be allowed to both buy and sell loans, but a list released by the FDIC and Treasury Department of the types of financial firms likely to be buyers made no mention of banks.

Allowing banks to have it both ways would give them added incentive to sell assets at low prices, even at a loss, the banks contend. They claim it also would free up capital by moving the assets off balance sheets, spurring more lending.

"Banks may be more willing to accept a lower initial price if they and their shareholders have a meaningful opportunity to share in the upside," Norman R. Nelson, general counsel of the Clearing House Association LLC, wrote in a letter to the FDIC last month."

And:

"U.S. plan to buy banks' bad loans stalls: report
Wed May 27, 2009 10:39pm EDT

NEW YORK (Reuters) - A U.S. government plan to rid banks of bad loans is stalling and may soon be put on hold, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday, citing people familiar with the matter.

The Legacy Loans Program ( NB DON ), which is being crafted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, is part of the $1 trillion Public Private Investment Program the government announced in March to encourage banks to sell securities and loans weighing on their balance sheets to willing investors.

Prospective buyers and sellers have expressed reluctance to the FDIC about participating for fear the program's rules will change in a political atmosphere hostile to Wall Street, the Journal reported. It also said that some banks that might have sold troubled loans into the program earlier in the year have become less eager as they regained a sense of stability.

FDIC spokesmen were not immediately available for comment."

So, the banks are lobbying for something that they have no intention of taking part in. Makes sense.

Posted by: Don the libertarian Democrat "

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

some banks that might have sold troubled loans into the program earlier in the year have become less eager as they regained a sense of stability

TO BE NOTED: From Reuters:

"
U.S. plan to buy banks' bad loans stalls: report
Wed May 27, 2009 10:39pm EDT

NEW YORK (Reuters) - A U.S. government plan to rid banks of bad loans is stalling and may soon be put on hold, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday, citing people familiar with the matter.

The Legacy Loans Program, which is being crafted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, is part of the $1 trillion Public Private Investment Program the government announced in March to encourage banks to sell securities and loans weighing on their balance sheets to willing investors.

Prospective buyers and sellers have expressed reluctance to the FDIC about participating for fear the program's rules will change in a political atmosphere hostile to Wall Street, the Journal reported. It also said that some banks that might have sold troubled loans into the program earlier in the year have become less eager as they regained a sense of stability.

FDIC spokesmen were not immediately available for comment.

(Reporting by Yinka Adegoke; Editing by Gary Hill)"

Allowing banks to have it both ways would give them added incentive to sell assets at low prices, even at a loss, the banks contend

From EconomPic Data:

"No EconomPic Needed to Explain this Greed

The WSJ reports:

Banking trade groups are lobbying the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. for permission to bid on the same assets that the banks would put up for sale as part of the government's Public Private Investment Program.

PPIP was hatched by the Obama administration as a way for banks to sell hard-to-value loans and securities to private investors, who would get financial aid as an enticement to help them unclog bank balance sheets. The program, expected to start this summer, will get as much as $100 billion in taxpayer-funded capital. That could increase to more than $500 billion in purchasing power with participation from private investors and FDIC financing.

The lobbying push is aimed at the Legacy Loans Program, which will use about half of the government's overall PPIP infusion to facilitate the sale of whole loans such as residential and commercial mortgages.

Federal officials haven't specified whether banks will be allowed to both buy and sell loans, but a list released by the FDIC and Treasury Department of the types of financial firms likely to be buyers made no mention of banks.

Allowing banks to have it both ways would give them added incentive to sell assets at low prices, even at a loss, the banks contend. They claim it also would free up capital by moving the assets off balance sheets, spurring more lending.

"Banks may be more willing to accept a lower initial price if they and their shareholders have a meaningful opportunity to share in the upside," Norman R. Nelson, general counsel of the Clearing House Association LLC, wrote in a letter to the FDIC last month.

Off balance sheet only frees up capital because it hides risks. This is absolutely mind boggling. Not the fact that they are asking, but how is this even a remote possibility?


Me:

Blogger Don said...

"Allowing banks to have it both ways would give them added incentive to sell assets at low prices, even at a loss, the banks contend."

This is, in fact, one positive note. It could mean that the banks feel that the loans will be a good value based on what they know. In other words, the banks are anxious to sell, even at a lower price.

Of course, they could be hoping to bid prices up or make it appear that they're ready to sell as well, I suppose.

However, if you believe that the government is already guaranteeing these assets, why not let them buy them at lower prices?

Don the libertarian Democrat

Monday, May 25, 2009

PPIP plan is designed to produce artificially high bid prices by leveraging private capital with government guarantees

TO BE NOTED: From Economic Principals:

Auctions and Politicians

Last September, when Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson first described to a startled world his $700 billion plan to deal with the emerging financial crisis, it was with these words: “And we’ll use – you know, we’re working through the processes, but there will be some form of auction process.”

Eight months later, the first auctions of those toxic assets are still a month away – assuming the Public Private Investment Plan, or PPIP, gets off the ground on schedule. Even now, its success is not assured.

Unmistakable, however, is the centrality of auction technology to the twenty-first century – indeed, of economic engineering in general. Newly-created markets resting on “some form of auction process” can be found for commodities of all sorts these days, from electricity and advertising to carbon emission and radio-spectrum rights.

That such new machinery might be equal to the task was anything but obvious fifteen years ago when Federal Communications Commission Chairman Reed Hundt boldly presided over the first successful modern high-tech auction, designed to carve up the emergent national market for broadband personal communication services. Congress had only required that he sell the relevant frequencies, rather than give them away.

Computer software replaced the sealed bids with which the government was accustomed to selling potentially valuable property, such as offshore oil and gas leases. Simultaneous ascending bids on multiple licenses replaced the much less complicated method of open-outcry auction of single properties. An activity rule prevented “sniping” – stealthy observation of others’ behavior, round by round, followed by a crashing big bid at the end.

The auction was a smashing success, and not just because it raised a lot of money for the government. Its bigger pay-off was the way it offered a complicated industry a way to begin working on the same page. Its design protocols quickly became the template for many other auctions in many other industries. And before long, it was clear that new tools were regularly being added, not just auction techniques, but clearinghouse techniques that addressed various market failures. Yet as recently as 2002, when Harvard University professor Alvin Roth wrote “The Economist As Engineer,” there was still something novel about the proposition that economic engineering was becoming close kin to chemical engineering or medicine.

Not any more! Auction technology has blossomed around the world, and called into existence a whole new industry, replete with firms, entrepreneurs, consultants, counter-consultants and even a few gunslingers. When the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Market Design Working Group held its first-ever meeting earlier this month, many of the stars were there, mostly economists, but a handful of computer scientists, as well.

That’s because auction technology has become a feature of life on the World Wide Web so familiar that it is scarcely noticed that competitive bidding determines what you see every single time you make a search, or call up a page that displays advertising. For a while, that was the province of the warriors who wrote the big engines’ code. Today, however, big-name economists advise all the top firms: Harvard’s Susan Athey is Microsoft’s chief economist, Berkeley’s Hal Varian is chief economist for Google, Caltech’s Preston McAfee leads a group at Yahoo. Lawrence Ausubel, of the University of Maryland, is helping ICANN, the Internet’s governing body, organize an auction of new top-level domain names. (Roth’s Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Market Design Page is a cornucopia of information on developments and emerging trends.)

For all their success organizing private markets, economists still often face an uphill struggle when it comes to winning government work. The reason is simple: auctions are all about, as the old saying goes, getting the most feathers out of the goose. The geese in the government flock are all owners or would-owners of something the government used to license at nominal rates or ignore altogether – the right to broadcast on a certain frequency, to harvest timber in a national forest, to send pollutants into the air. They would have paid for the privilege in the past – a relative or two on the payroll, good seats at the baseball game, a bundle of campaign contributions.

But whatever they paid for the privileges they received probably would have borne little relation to the worth of the franchise. That’s precisely the information an auction is designed to elicit, along with the cash. No wonder companies reflexively oppose auctions; auctions cost them cash. So spend freely to avoid them.

That’s why, for example, the US Department of Transportation earlier this month canceled plans to auction landing slots for New York’s three busiest airports. The Bush administration had sought the measure, hoping to cut delays at the chronically congested airports (and, of course, raise some much-needed cash). The airline industry lined up against the proposal, so did Democratic congressmen. Incumbent airlines will continue to profit; frequent travelers will continue to suffer delays.

Similarly, the banking lobby, among the nation’s strongest interest groups, has so far successfully opposed Treasury Department attempts to put up for bid banks’ questionable (now “legacy”) assets. The reason is simple: when the asking price is, say, 90 cents on the dollar and the bid is closer to 40 cents, no manager will willingly take part in an auction that seems certain to lower book values. The PPIP plan is designed to produce artificially high bid prices by leveraging private capital with government guarantees – a mechanism that seems unlikely to produce much of a gain for the taxpayer aside from jolting the system itself back into gear. The alternative would be for the government itself to temporarily take over threatened banks and hire the auctioneer – the dreaded “nationalization.” (For a look back at the design of an off-the-shelf auction that could have been conducted in a matter of days back in October 2008, see “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,” by Lawrnce Ausubel and Peter Cramton.)

Even when overwhelming pressures bring about some fundamental change in the regulatory apparatus, you can count on industry to oppose the auction mechanism. That’s the case with the landmark legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions through a cap-and-trade permit system expected to be taken up by the full Congress in July. President Obama campaigned on a promise to auction the permits. But a coalition of Midwestern and Southern Democrats teamed up to alter the bill, and when its language was released last week it turned out that fully 80 percent of the permits would be given away at first to electricity utilities and their big industrial customers, with the portion of permits to be sold at auction slowly rising to 100 percent by 2030. Consumers will experience higher prices only slightly less slowly, but owners of capital will have twenty years to adjust. The gradual transition is a price the president is said to be willing to pay in order to pass the bill into law. Equality of sacrifice will take a back seat to the goal of capping carbon emissions, a tradeoff noted with special force by journalist Matt Yglesias.

But the historical momentum in this case is clearly on the side of equality. Auctions, especially auctions of government property, are not a tool of the rich, especially when coupled with egalitarian principles of distribution (for instance, the proposition that every citizen should benefit equally when the radio spectrum is sold). As principles of market design become more thoroughly articulated and widely understood, the sphere of governmental discretion will shrink. More and more, politicians will be forced to play by the rules.

For example, serial entrepreneur Paul Milgrom, of Stanford University, who, along with Stanford’s Robert Wilson, played a key role in that first great auction in 1994, last week opened the Palo Alto office of a new firm, Auctionomics, with a proposal to avoid the kinds of manipulation that have sometimes plagued carbon markets in Europe. Allow firms to borrow against their future credits, when liquidity is short, he urged, in order to prevent market “corners.” Such “discounted time shifting” – emitting 95 tons of carbon this year in exchange for a promise to reduce emission by 100 tons next year – could end the manipulative practices that swept California electricity markets in 2000-01, causing blackouts and imposing huge financial tolls on ratepayers.

It’s the beginning of another episode in the eternal cat-and-mouse game between those who seek to exploit the political and market systems and those determined to prevent them, or at least diminish the opportunities for mischief – the latter, increasingly, are economic engineers. There will be many disappointments. But expertise in market design ordinarily will win out."

Thursday, May 21, 2009

the urgent pressure to sell assets is receding as banks raise capital

TO BE NOTED: From The FT:

"
Why public private plan has bankers squirming

By Gillian Tett

Published: May 21 2009 20:04 | Last updated: May 21 2009 20:04

Cometh the hour, cometh the acronym. Thus might run the unspoken motto of American financial policy these days.

As the banking saga has unfolded in the past two years, a string of US initiatives have tumbled out, with titles so lengthy I will not attempt to list them in full. Remember the M-LEC programme that was launched to reorganise the shadow banks (but quickly died)? Then came Talf, TSLF and Tarp, which aim to provide liquidity, restart the securitisation machine and recapitalise the banks.

Now a new focus is emerging. This week Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, said that a PPIP – or public-private investment plan – would start in early July to use $75bn-$100bn of state funds to encourage the sale of up to $1,000bn of toxic assets by banks. Part of the programme will cover loan sales and be run by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the other half, relating to securities, will be organised by the Treasury. In both schemes, asset managers will be given state finance to encourage bids. So will this latest acronym-filled endeavour work? (Or, at least, avoid the fate of the ill-starred M-LEC?) If you listen to some senior US bankers, it is easy to feel pretty doubtful that the PPIP can really fly. The key sticking point is price. The PPIP plan will work if banks take part to sell assets. But right now, no banker wants to participate in an auction that produces asset prices lower than those on bank books. After all, if that were to happen, banks would face pressure to make more writedowns – which they can ill afford.

The Treasury and FDIC hope to avoid this scenario by encouraging asset managers to place high bids for the bank assets, by offering non-recourse leverage of up to five times (or far higher than non-recourse leverage available in the market). Some politicians hate that, since the details of the deals mooted so far appear to leave taxpayers with little embedded upside.

That political scrutiny, in turn, makes asset managers nervous. As a result, it is still unclear whether enough asset managers will produce bids that are high enough to make the banks happy with an auction price.

So some large banks are – unsurprisingly – adopting a policy of quiet footdragging. A senior official at one large bank observed this week that his group would participate in a pilot scheme, as a gesture of goodwill. But after that token gesture, this bank will probably stop.

And while the government wants to set a minimum lot size of $1bn, this bank is lobbying for a figure nearer $250m to limit the auction to a few choice (token) assets. Unsurprisingly, this banker – like others – concludes that he is “not optimistic” about PPIP, not least because the urgent pressure to sell assets is receding as banks raise capital.

That view may not be entirely representative: another bank tells me it is preparing to get properly involved (not least because it has the financial strength to have written many assets down). Government officials running the PPIP scheme insist there is strong overall interest from potential buyers and sellers. They also point out that it need not matter if the scheme ends up being limited in size. After all, what PPIP is trying to do (like Talf and much else) is reignite market activity, not replace it. Think of it as a chunk of firelighter on a pile of wet wood. Thus, the sheer act of talking about PPIP – and then staging a few sales – may be enough to kickstart a private sector trading toxic assets again. Or so the hope in Washington goes. “Success is what happens to the market overall,” says one.

They have a point, given that there is some evidence that schemes such as Talf are contributing to a market thaw. But, almost irrespective of whether PPIP “succeeds” in delivering many deals (and personally I have doubts that it will), there may be another reason to welcome it.

Most notably, irrespective of the complexities of arranging deals, the PPIP has already served one extremely valuable function by highlighting the sheer insanity that has bedevilled the financial world in relation to asset prices.

Most notably, if large American banks had previously marked their assets at a realistic market-based price, they would not be so scared of engaging in auctions with PPIP now. Better still, they might have spotted earlier the degree to which their assets were deteriorating – and taken action to address it.

But precisely because the supposedly “free market” western financial system has become stuffed with complex assets that were rarely traded – even during the credit boom – banks have been able to use fantasy prices for their assets for years. Hence their continued horror at the idea of open trading.

That is the real scandal that bedevils the PPIP idea. That in turn points to a wider lesson for the future: namely that to avoid a similar credit disaster, it is crucial that financiers are forced to place as much financial activity as possible on transparent trading arenas. Better still, they need to do that well before a bubble bursts – or there is any need to start fighting over whether a PPIP can truly fly.

gillian.tett@ft.com"

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner outlined where TARP money has been allocated and how much is left

TO BE NOTED:

Need a Real Sponsor here

Where Is TARP Money Going? How Much Is Left?

In congressional testimony this morning, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner outlined where TARP money has been allocated and how much is left. Here is Treasury’s estimate:

Projected Use of TARP/Financial Stability Plan Funds by Administration as of May 18, 2009

Programs Announced Under Previous Administration

AIG

$40 billion

Citi/Bank of America (TIP and Guarantees)

$52.5 billion

Autos

$24.9 billion

Capital Purchase Program


$218 billion

TALF 1.0

$20 billion

Subtotal

$355.4 billion

Programs Announced Under Obama Administration

Housing

$50 billion

AIG (Second Investment)

$30 billion

Auto Suppliers

$5 billion

Additional Autos

$10.9 billion

Expansion of Consumer and Business Lending Initiative *

TALF Asset Expansion (New Issuance) **

$35 billion

Unlocking SBA Lending Markets

$15 billion

Public Private Investment Program ***

TALF for Legacy Securities

$25 billion

Other PPIP Programs for Legacy Assets

$75 billion

Subtotal

$245.9 billion

Total Committed (Without Potential Repayments)

$601.3 billion

Total Remaining (Without Potential Repayments)

$98.7 billion

Conservative Estimate of Potential Repayments

$25 billion

Total Committed (Including Potential Repayments)

$576.3 billion

Total Remaining (Including Potential Repayments)

$123.7 billion

Additional Funding

Additional Support for the Auto Industry

Capital Assistance Program

* The Consumer and Business Lending Initiative also includes the $20 billion committed to TALF under the previous administration and the $25 billion committed to TALF for legacy securities under the PPIP, amounting to an overall total of $80 billion under TALF and $95 billion under the CBLI.

** New assets made eligible under the expansion of TALF include commercial mortgage-backed securities, mortgage servicing advances, loans or leases relating to business equipment, leases of vehicle fleets, and floor plan loans.

*** The Public-Private Investment Program was announced at a level of $75 to $100 billion, which includes $75 billion in additional resources for the PPIP program on top of $25 billion devoted to TALF for Legacy Securities."

Saturday, May 9, 2009

value of a toxic asset largely hinges on the default rates of the underlying loans, a figure that can’t be precisely predicted

TO BE NOTED: From Bloomberg:

"BlackRock Is Go-To Firm to Divine Wall Street Assets (Update1)

By Kambiz Foroohar and Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam

May 8 (Bloomberg) -- Got assets you can’t value? Call Larry Fink.

That’s what Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have done, as have many heads of banks and insurance companies, including Robert Willumstad, former chief executive officer of American International Group Inc., and current AIG CEO Edward Liddy.

Fink, 56, is CEO of BlackRock Inc., the U.S.’s biggest publicly traded asset management firm, with $1.3 trillion under management for clients that include Ford Motor Co. and Microsoft Corp. BlackRock, like many other money managers, has taken some hits in the credit crisis. It also loaded up on Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. stock, for example, buying shares last June at $28 only three months before Lehman declared bankruptcy. One BlackRock fund that rushed in to buy distressed debt in September 2007 saw its value plunge 25 percent during the following 12 months.

More recently, mirroring results at rival firms, BlackRock’s first quarter profits fell 65 percent to $84 million after stock and bond market declines hurt its fees.

Dominant

Fink has a way of making good money in bad times. A decade ago, he created a subsidiary called BlackRock Solutions, looking to capitalize on ever-more-sophisticated risk-management analytics that the firm was running for clients, including mortgage giant Freddie Mac, that needed help in assessing stressed portfolios or in deciding whether an investment made sense.

In the unfolding credit crisis, BlackRock Solutions has become the dominant player in evaluating and pricing distressed assets such as mortgage-backed securities by winning more contracts from the government, investment banks and insurance companies than other firms.

“It’s our fastest-growing unit,” says Robert Kapito, BlackRock’s president, citing revenue that doubled to $400 million last year. In the latest quarter, the unit’s revenue more than doubled to $140 million from $60 million a year earlier.

“BlackRock has established itself as the go-to firm when you have problems,” says Terrence Keeley, a managing director at UBS AG, which sold a $22 billion portfolio of subprime mortgages to a fund managed by BlackRock.

Desperate Customers

The terms -- in which UBS offered a $7 billion discount and provided $11.25 billion in financing -- demonstrate how desperate banks are to get distressed assets off their books. “It’s hard to replicate the BlackRock approach because they built their systems, tools and analytics a long time ago,” Keeley says.

The Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department have awarded contracts to BlackRock Solutions to manage $130 billion in distressed debt formerly on the books of investment bank Bear Stearns Cos. and crippled financial giant AIG. The Fed called on the company in September to analyze the assets of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after the government took an 80 percent stake in the two mortgage giants. BlackRock is also one of four co-managers of a $500 billion Fed program, announced in November and expanded to $1.25 trillion in March, to buy residential mortgage-backed securities.

Fink began his career as a bond trader who three decades ago helped pioneer collateralized-mortgage obligations, the forerunners of the complicated derivatives at the heart of the present crisis.

Lucrative Work

Over time, Fink and BlackRock Solutions stand to earn tens of millions or even hundreds of millions of dollars in fees, primarily from lucrative private-sector toxic-asset work, according to Fink and people familiar with the contracts.

“We’re managing hundreds of billions for governments,” Fink says. Asked for details about whom else BlackRock is working for and how it actually goes about its tasks, he demurs. “I have to be opaque,” he says. “It’s hundreds of billions and not necessarily for the U.S. government.”

The Fed and Treasury, beyond confirming Fink’s contracts, also have little to say about the exact nature of the work -- a stance that worries some. Janet Tavakoli, president of Chicago- based Tavakoli Structured Finance Inc. and the author of three books on derivatives, says the government should be more forthcoming.

Need for Transparency

“The Federal Reserve and the Treasury would do the world a favor by giving us more transparency on AIG and Bear Stearns assets,” she says. “The regulators have just given up and are just throwing the assets with BlackRock and saying ‘Manage this.’” (Bloomberg News filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit in November asking a federal judge to require the government to disclose data about the Bear Stearns assets.)

Not content to be a manager of toxic assets with no transparent value, Fink is also planning to buy them. He says BlackRock Inc. wants to raise $5 billion to $7 billion from investors to participate in a government plan, announced March 23 by Geithner, to finance up to $1 trillion of such purchases. BlackRock intends to apply to become one of the five managers under the plan, known as the Treasury Department’s Public- Private Investment Program. Fink says he sees no conflict of interest in being one of the Treasury’s managers and participating in the plan.

“I don’t get any inside information, and it’s a competitive auction pool,” he says.

Rescue Plans

In theory, BlackRock Solutions has competition. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., for example, has its own risk management teams. Pacific Investment Management Co., the world’s largest bond manager, has a risk management component, as does Legg Mason Inc., a Baltimore-based asset management company.

As Bear Stearns collapsed during a frantic weekend in mid- March 2008, JPMorgan Chase & Co. called on a BlackRock team of 50 analysts and number crunchers who worked around the clock to assess Bear Stearns’s most illiquid assets.

At the end of the weekend, Geithner, then chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, called Fink personally to ask him to oversee $30 billion in soured mortgage debt that had been cleaved from Bear Stearns’s books before its viable assets were sold to JPMorgan.

Likewise, the Fed considered no other company for managing an additional $100 billion in AIG assets that the government steered Fink’s way last November, according to comments from an investigator for U.S. Senator Charles Grassley.

BlackRock had also undertaken a crash mission at the behest of AIG’s Willumstad during his four-month run as CEO, in a last- ditch effort in the summer of 2008 to avoid a government takeover of the firm.

Advanced Analytics

He had them run analytics on his company’s portfolio of collateralized-debt obligations and credit-default swaps. The government intervened before Willumstad could put together a rescue plan. That drama unfolded shortly before the government began injecting huge amounts of taxpayer capital --$182.5 billion as of April of this year -- to keep AIG afloat.

“We had the expertise; we had already evaluated the assets,” Fink says. “It’s not that we’re being opportunistic. We’ve been in this advisory business since 1994.”

During hearings in Congress in January, Grassley, an Iowa Republican and ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, questioned the no-bid government contracts awarded to BlackRock. “Why is it that BlackRock is the only firm qualified to manage the assets of special-purpose vehicles?” he asked.

Geithner supplied the answer. “They come with a world- class reputation,” he said. “We thought the interest of the American taxpayer would be best served by having them there on our side as we made those consequential judgments.”

Distressed Debt Losses

BlackRock’s asset management unit, which accounted for 87 percent of the company’s revenue last year, has stumbled by investing in assets similar to those the government is now calling on BlackRock Solutions to manage.

In April 2008, after the collapse of Bear Stearns, Fink said U.S. Treasuries had become too expensive and investors should put money into riskier debt such as MBSs. Merrill Lynch & Co.’s U.S. High Yield Master II index, which tracks corporate bonds, fell 30 percent between March 31 and year-end.

On June 13, 2008, as Lehman Brothers’ troubles began to unfold, Kapito, BlackRock’s president, said, “We have confidence in the firm, in the leadership.” On Sept. 15, Lehman filed for bankruptcy.

The $3 billion BlackRock Credit Investors LP fund, created in September 2007, sank hundreds of millions of dollars into distressed bank loans that continued to plummet as the credit crisis deepened. Investors, including pension funds, saw the value of their holdings shrink by 25 percent during the next 12 months, according to the New Jersey State Investment Council.

‘Good Money After Bad’

BlackRock remained bullish and urged investors to increase their holdings, and many did. In October 2008, the NJSIC added about $144 million to the $400 million it had originally put in. The Oregon Investment Council added $72 million to its $200 million investment in the same fund.

“We were throwing good money after bad,” says Jim Marketti, retired president of the Communications Workers of America Local 1032, who sits on the board of New Jersey’s Division of Investment. “They say these investments will perform well in the long run. Well, in the long run, we’re all dead.”

BlackRock was hardly alone in racking up losses. One fund set up by rival Pimco to buy troubled mortgages lost 38 percent last year, according to investors in the fund who declined to be named. (Pimco declined to comment.) “Even with the best and brightest, BlackRock missed what has been a glaring risk,” says Michael Herbst, an analyst at Chicago-based investment research firm Morningstar Inc.

Long-Term Optimism

Fink, while contrite, maintains his long-term optimism. “Clearly, I’ve been early in calling for clients to take more risks, as our balance sheet losses show,” Fink says. “In the long term, they’ll be good investments.”

For BlackRock’s fans, there’s no mystery as to why the government picked BlackRock Solutions to analyze -- without competitive bids -- distressed portfolios. The company’s more than a decade of experience coupled with its advanced analytics give it an edge over rivals, says Peter Federico, Freddie Mac’s treasurer.

You won’t get an argument from Morgan Stanley.

After Lehman’s bankruptcy, Morgan Stanley shares went into free fall, declining 74 percent in four weeks. The investment bank founded by Henry Morgan -- the grandson of J. Pierpont Morgan -- and Harold Stanley needed a lifeline. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. was chewing over a possible $9 billion investment.

‘Proctology Exam’

Lazard Ltd., Mitsubishi’s adviser, called BlackRock to analyze Morgan Stanley’s most illiquid commercial-backed securities, since Mitsubishi, Japan’s largest bank, wouldn’t act without reliable data on these assets’ values.

One Morgan Stanley executive described the experience as a “proctology exam,” yet after BlackRock delivered its results, Mitsubishi went ahead with the $9 billion investment.

Cleaning up a tainted balance sheet is complicated. Bad assets have to be identified and isolated from viable ones, removed from a financial institution’s books, somehow valued and eventually sold off into a secondary market. While that process unfolds, the assets also have to be managed. Some are securities that still throw off cash in the form of dividends. “The computations are complex and time-consuming,” Federico says. “BlackRock has the most sophisticated and widest range of expertise across all fixed income.”

Lack of Ostentation

In a photo gallery of archetypes, Laurence Douglas Fink would stand out as the middle-aged banker that he is: the tailored suits spiced up with the occasional flashy tie, the receding hairline and a demeanor rendered slightly professorial by his glasses. At a lectern, he tends to gesture a lot with his hands.

Save for the oblong A. Lange & Sohne watch he wears -- an artsy German brand whose intricate models can cost $40,000 --and a fondness for San Pietro, a pricey Manhattan power eatery, Fink shuns most of the trappings of Wall Street.

It’s not like he can’t afford them. He earned $21 million in 2008, down 26 percent from $26.4 million in 2007, according to company filings.

There have been no John Thain-style million-dollar office renovations for Fink. He holds forth in a modest, light-filled, fifth-floor office sporting a couch, a heavy rosewood-colored desk and a mundane view of 52nd Street in midtown Manhattan. A green china vase filled with striking purple orchids graces a filing cabinet.

Shoe-Store Experience

His prized adornment is a framed platinum CD by Maroon 5, a Grammy-winning Los Angeles band signed to the record company that Fink helped to fund. It leans against a wall. Acquaintances trace Fink’s lack of ostentation to his roots in Van Nuys, a working-class town in California’s San Fernando Valley, where he grew up counting laces and stacking polish in his father’s shoe store.

His brother Steven B. Fink, now a Los Angeles venture capitalist, helped out in the store, too. He recalls Larry as a trenchant observer of customers and what they wanted. “That’s a skill that Larry learned: being cognizant of other people’s needs and desires,” he says.

After attending public school in Van Nuys, Fink majored in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He stayed on at UCLA to earn a Master of Business Administration in 1976 from what’s now known as the Anderson School of Management.

‘Brilliant Mind’

Fred Weston, a professor who taught Fink at the management school, was so impressed with him that he put a note in his file predicting future business triumphs. “He had an unusually brilliant mind,” Weston says. “I predicted that he’d be a great success.”

After getting his MBA, Fink took a job selling bonds at New York-based investment bank First Boston Corp. (now a part of Zurich-based Credit Suisse Group AG), rising to managing director by the age of 28. Bond trading, say colleagues who knew him then, made Fink rich but didn’t affect his West Coast affability.

Fink’s diplomatic skills were on display in 2003, when as a director at the New York Stock Exchange, he worked out a deal to persuade then Chairman Richard Grasso to step down during a controversy over Grasso’s $140 million pay package.

“He’s very sensitive to the fairness of what he does,” says Kenneth Langone, a founder of Home Depot Inc. who served with Fink on the NYSE board and was a vocal supporter of Grasso. “Fink is a voice for reason.”

Scolding Congress

That doesn’t mean he can’t get riled up. On Sept. 29, 2008, as the Dow Jones Industrial Average was falling more than 700 points, Fink lashed out at the rhetoric coming out of Congress as it debated the need for the government to rescue the banks.

“It’s abhorrent that Congress is trying to say that this is a bailout of Wall Street,” Fink said during an interview on CNBC. “This package is a bailout of Main Street, and if we don’t solve this, Main Street is going to feel some very ill effects.” He went on to suggest that the Congressional naysayers -- almost all of them at that point Republicans -- ought to be fired in the next elections.

Fink has remained married for 34 years to his high-school sweetheart, Lori Weider. They have three grown children, including one who runs a hedge fund. Fink lives in a co-op on Manhattan’s Upper East Side in the same neighborhood as other Wall Street leaders such as private equity tycoon Henry Kravis.

Maroon 5 Gold

And while hedge fund managers and stock traders who play in garage bands are a dime a dozen, Fink in 2000 took his baby boomer affection for rock-and-roll and along with eight colleagues provided $5 million in startup capital for an independent record label called Octone Records. The company, now known as A&M/Octone, scored big when it signed a pop band known as Maroon 5.

The group has recorded four CDs and sold 15 million albums worldwide. Maroon 5 played at BlackRock’s 2006 holiday party for 4,000 people at the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center in Manhattan.

Fink’s rocketlike rise at First Boston was largely a result of his creative work with MBSs: the then novel idea of slicing and pooling mortgages and selling them as bonds. Fink took his concept to Freddie Mac, where he sold the mortgage company’s board on a $1 billion package of what became known as collateralized-mortgage obligations, or CMOs. The $1 billion was three times what he was expecting to sell, he says. “What Fink did was a tremendous success and created a huge market,” says Richard Roll, a professor of finance at the Anderson School.

Swings in Fortune

By 1986, a decade into his First Boston stint, Fink was among the firm’s rainmakers, along with mergers and acquisitions specialists Bruce Wasserstein and Joseph Perella. In the first quarter alone, Fink’s team made $130 million by amassing a huge position in securities known as Z-tranche CMOs: zero-coupon bonds whose value is driven down if interest rates fall and prepayments on the bonds climb.

Fink’s hero status was short-lived. The next quarter, interest rates fell, and he was hammered. His group posted a loss of $100 million.

“Fink vowed never to be in that situation again,” says Gregory Fleming, a former president of Merrill Lynch who first met Fink in the mid-1990s and who helped BlackRock go public in 1999. “Larry has an appropriate sense of paranoia. He thinks bad things can happen and often do.”

A Form of ‘Communism’

In 1988, Fink joined forces with Ralph Schlosstein, a friend and managing director at Lehman Brothers, to start the firm that would become BlackRock. It began life as Financial Management Group within private equity firm Blackstone Group LP. Blackstone provided an office, a telephone line and a $5 million line of credit in return for a 40 percent stake in the company. In its early days, the firm was an egalitarian place. For the first two years, the six original partners drew the same salary.

“We could focus on building the company without worrying about individual incentives,” says Susan Wagner, one of those partners and now BlackRock’s chief operating officer. “Larry and Ralph thought it was communism but agreed.”

In 1994, BlackRock parted company with Blackstone. Fink and Blackstone co-founder Stephen Schwarzman had a falling-out over how much equity should be awarded to new BlackRock hires. (Schwarzman didn’t return calls seeking comment.) PNC Bank Corp. of Pittsburgh bought Fink’s group for $240 million.

Turning Point

A turning point in BlackRock’s fortunes came the next year, when it helped General Electric Co. dispose of $10 billion in distressed MBSs left over after the Fairfield, Connecticut, company’s sale of its Kidder, Peabody & Co. brokerage unit to PaineWebber Group Inc. GE’s financial unit, GE Capital, had tried to sell the assets, only to get low-ball bids from investment banks.

BlackRock was convinced that it could run its sophisticated computer models to more accurately assess the value of GE’s distressed assets.

“We said, ‘We’ll analyze the risks and auction the assets,’” Fink recalls. “‘That way, you are not dependent on one price.’”

It was BlackRock’s analytics that allowed the company to accomplish this, says Charles Morris, a New York banker, lawyer and financial writer who wrote a book on the global credit crisis called The Trillion-Dollar Meltdown (Public Affairs, 2008). “They had every security on a real-time system so they could see what each portfolio was doing every minute,” Morris says.

Biggest Payday

Within six months, BlackRock had disposed of the portfolio for far more than GE expected -- saving GE $1 billion. Fink, says Dennis Dammerman, who was then CEO of GE Capital, had no idea how to price the service he had just rendered. “If you think we did a good job, pay us what you think,” Dammerman remembers Fink saying.

The result was a $7 million payday -- the biggest fee BlackRock had ever received, Fink recalls.

By 1998, as the use of derivatives and other arcane instruments spread throughout finance, Fink saw an opportunity to turn BlackRock’s risk management services into a separate business.

Today, BlackRock Solutions occupies three floors of its own Manhattan high-rise, directly across the street from the asset managers. There, amid arrays of open offices and banks of computers, Charles Hallac, head of BlackRock Solutions’ day-to- day operations, oversees an army of 950 analysts, programmers, economists and other number crunchers.

Parsing Complexity

The group includes 18 Ph.D.’s in such areas as mathematics, nuclear physics and aerospace and electrical engineering. BlackRock Solutions’ client list includes companies and pension funds, such as the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, that collectively control about $7 trillion of assets. The Solutions team is in the business of parsing complexity.

In 1983, when Fink sold the first CMO to Freddie Mac, it had only three tranches, or portions, that paid a different interest payment. It took a First Boston mainframe a whole weekend to model the payment scenario.

By the 1990s, some of the CMOs contained 125 tranches that were almost impossible to understand, Morris says. Those instruments seem simple compared with the collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, that are at the heart of the global meltdown. CDOs are pools that bundle high-yield subprime mortgages with high-yield loans. The hitch: higher-than- -anticipated default rates among the subprime mortgages in the CDOs prompted rating firms to downgrade CDOs to sub-investment- grade debt, causing their values to plunge.

Daunting Task

Analyzing pools of CDOs to determine which are toxic and which aren’t is a daunting task requiring computing power that simply wasn’t available 10 years ago. Each CDO may consist of 1,000 loans. BlackRock technicians say they have to run 500,000 computer models, in many cases tracing a mortgage or a loan back to the homeowner or to the property’s zip code.

“We can model every single item on a balance sheet and project cash flows,” says Mark Wiedman, managing director of BlackRock Solutions’ advisory group. After running the numbers, BlackRock assigns a “fair value” to each CDO, a value that’s supposed to represent the up-to-date value of the loans.

That doesn’t mean people will be willing to buy the assets at that price. “There is a big difference between the fair value of toxic assets and their market value,” says Gregg Berman, co-head of New York-based RiskMetrics Group Inc.’s Risk Management unit.

Hard to Value

To determine a fair-value price, analysts look at the underlying collateral and the various tranches and their interest rates. They prepare mathematical models to determine default rates, percentages of prepayments and interest-rate changes. Different models produce different valuations, Berman says.

The value of a toxic asset largely hinges on the default rates of the underlying loans, a figure that can’t be precisely predicted, even with the most sophisticated of models, he says.

“It’s almost impossible to figure out the prices of these things,” says Marshall Blume, a professor of finance at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.

Investors who bought into Fink’s vision for BlackRock early have been rewarded. Fink took the firm public on Oct. 1, 1999, at $14 a share. BlackRock’s shares climbed an average of 38 percent a year to a high of $230.75 on Aug. 11, 2008, before tumbling to $90.57 on March 3, hit by the drubbing financial stocks have received in the credit crisis. The stock has since staged a rally of 60 percent, closing at $144.48 on May 7.

Fink now finds himself with a new major shareholder: Bank of America Corp. It wasn’t an alliance he’d planned.

Looking to Expand

Fink, seeking to expand his firm, began hunting for a partner in 2005. In January 2006, after weeks of merger talks with Morgan Stanley deadlocked when the two firms couldn’t come to terms, Stanley O’Neal, then Merrill Lynch’s CEO, came calling on Fink to talk about a deal.

By February, Fink had snapped up Merrill Lynch Investment Managers, Merrill’s asset management business, for $9.5 billion -- the largest asset management deal ever. In return, Merrill ended up with 49.8 percent of BlackRock. (PNC reduced its stake to 34 percent.) The deal doubled BlackRock’s assets under management to $1 trillion, Fink says.

In October 2007, Merrill’s mounting subprime troubles forced it to take an unprecedented $8 billion write-off and prompted the board to push out O’Neal.

Merrill Contender

Fink emerged as one of a handful of front-runners for the job. Fink wanted a look at Merrill’s books before deciding but never got a chance; the board appointed John Thain. In September 2008, having reported a $19.2 billion loss, Merrill was sold for about $50 billion in stock to Bank of America. Thain, O’Neal’s replacement, would himself soon be fired by Bank of America CEO Kenneth Lewis. That leaves Bank of America holding Merrill’s 47 percent stake in BlackRock, a position the company says it plans to keep. BlackRock on May 6 emerged as one of the bidders to make a preliminary offer to buy Bank of America’s mutual-fund unit, according to people familiar with the situation.

Fink hasn’t been bashful about using his BlackRock platform to offer advice on fixing the financial crisis. Toward the end of U.S. President George W. Bush’s administration, Fink counseled then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson on the original rollout of the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, suggesting Paulson use TARP funds to buy banks’ toxic assets, Fink says.

Paulson opted instead to acquire equity stakes in banks, and Fink, on Dec. 11, publicly called the decision a “mistake,” a position he says is unchanged.

‘Major Mistake’

“The major mistake was not putting money in assets,” Fink says. “You can not stabilize equity until you stabilize balance sheets.”

Fink has since made the same appeal to the administration of Barack Obama, talking up the purchase option to both Geithner and Bernanke before Geithner made his March announcement. Fink says he’s known both men for several years, though only through the professional circles they all travel in. Politically, Fink is a registered Democrat and says he voted for Obama and raised $30,800 at a fundraiser for the Democratic Party.

BlackRock Solutions looks like a terrific investment for Fink. Besides its government contracts, the company says that in the last four months of 2008 it ran analytics on $1.5 trillion of new assets for its private clients. “The phone was kinda ringing off the hook,” Wiedman says. “Great for business. Not so good for weekends.”

Published in the June issue of Bloomberg Markets Magazine.

To contact the reporters on this story: Kambiz Foroohar in New York at k.foroohar@bloomberg.net; Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam in Boston at sbhaktavatsa@bloomberg.net.

Last Updated: May 8, 2009 13:14 EDT "