Showing posts with label R.Baldwin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label R.Baldwin. Show all posts

Friday, January 2, 2009

"When it comes to macroeconomic stimulus measures, however, policy is in disarray. "

Richard Baldwin on Vox:

"
No one knows exactly how to stop the global economic crisis, but all agree that fiscal stimulus has a key role to play( NOT EVERYONE ). By reducing the length and depth of the recession, it should reduce bankruptcies, foreclosures, and further asset-price drops( THAT'S THE HOPE ). This column presents the main logic in a recent IMF paper authored by one of the world’s leading macroeconomists, Oliver Blanchard, and others.

There is near consensus among economists that fixing the world’s economy will involve at least these two steps:( 1 ) repairing the financial sector, and( 2 ) restarting economic growth. When in comes to financial sector policies, governments are already “on the case”. Much more surely needs to be done but governments are already deploying( PLEASE STOP ) all the policies( YEP. THAT'S HOW WE DO THINGS ON PLANET EARTH, AS OPPOSED TO PLANET THEORY. ) that eventually fixed every financial crisis since the dawn of the financial sector.

When it comes to macroeconomic stimulus measures, however, policy is in disarray( EXCEPT FOR THE MILDLY HELPFUL IDEA THAT KEYNES IS BACK IN VOGUE ). The US, UK and Japan have committed to fiscal stimulus, but other nations, such as Germany, don’t see the urgency of the situation – or, according to a more cynical interpretation – are hoping to free ride on the fiscal stimulus of others( THE SAVER COUNTRIES DO NOT WANT TO END THE CURRENT SAVER/SPENDER SYMBIOSIS. THE FREE RIDE IS TRYING TO GET OUT OF THIS CRISIS WITHOUT THE SYMBIOSIS COMING APART. ). Indeed, some economists question fiscal policy’s effectiveness.( TRUE )

The IMF’s paper on fiscal policy in the crisis

Given the lack of clarity on fiscal policy, the IMF paper released on 29 December 2008, “Fiscal Policy for the Crisis”, presents some very welcomed words of wisdom. Written by one of the world leading macroeconomists – Olivier Blanchard (who also happens to be the IMF’s chief economists) – with 3 coauthors, the report distils the lessons of five of the most relevant crises, namely the( 1 ) Great Depression,( 2 ) the Japanese 1990s banking crisis,( 3 ) the 1997 Asian crisis,( 4 ) the US 1980s S&L crisis, and the( 5 ) 1990s Nordic crisis.( DIDN'T ROGOFF AND REINHART SURVEY 800 YEARS? )

Why the drop in aggregate demand?

The paper starts by reminding us that there are indications that this recession could be deeper than any since the Great Depression. The sources of the decline in aggregate demand are:

· Drops in real and financial wealth( FROM THE FORECLOSURE AVALANCHE AND CALLING RUN );

· An increase in precautionary saving( FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK ) on the part of consumers,

· A wait and see attitude on the part of both consumers and firms( FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK ); and

· Increasing difficulties in obtaining credit( FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK ).

Things that won’t work

The specific features of this crisis mean that two of the standard anti-crisis macro tools are ineffective.

· The global synchronisation of recession means export-promotion policies – such as devaluations ( DON'T EXACTLY AGREE. PRINTING MONEY MIGHT HELP. )– cannot work for the major economies (and they risk making thing much worse if the ‘echo chamber’ of beggar-thy-neighbour policies starts resonating). ( GOOD LUCK. IT'S HAPPENING )

· The financial source of the crisis weakens the link between policy rates and banking lending – thus rending the traditional( YES. WE'VE TRIED THAT. ) monetary transmission mechanism much less effective.

In any case, key nations have very little room to lower policy rates, so fiscal policy is the best last policy option for avoiding a deepening of the recession which could well exacerbate the financial sector crisis.

Optimal fiscal policy in the crisis

Based on lessons extracted from past crises, the IMF argues that fiscal stimulus should be

· Timely (as there is an urgent need for action),( TRUE )

· Large (because the drop in demand is large),( TRUE )

· Lasting (as the recession will likely last for some time),( NOT SO SURE )

· Diversified (as there is uncertainty regarding which measures will be most effective),( OK )

· Contingent (to indicate that further action will be taken, if needed),( OK )

· Collective (all countries that have the fiscal space should use it given the severity and global nature of the downturn), and( HERE THERE'S A PROBLEM. )

· Sustainable (to avoid debt explosion in the long run and adverse effects in the short run).( TRUE )

The challenge facing each national government is to gauge the right balance between these features – particularly, large-and-lasting actions versus fiscal-sustainability.

Lessons from earlier crises

The IMF paper provides a survey of five well‑known crisis: Korea in 1997, Japan in the 1990s, the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, the Great Depression in the 1930s, and the US during the Savings and Loans crisis in the 1980s.

Countries have reacted to these downturns quite differently, thus providing us with some evidence on how best to manage fiscal policy in a crisis. The key lessons are:

· Successful resolution of the financial crisis is a precondition for achieving sustained growth.( MAKES SENSE )

The counter-example is Japan where fiscal policy failed because financial sector problems were allowed to fester. By contrast, prompt and sizeable support to the financial sector by the Korean authorities limited the duration of the macroeconomic consequences thus limiting the need for other fiscal action.

· The solution to the financial crisis always precedes the solution to the macroeconomic crisis.( OK )

· A fiscal stimulus is highly useful (almost necessary) when the financial crisis spills over to the corporate and household sectors with a resulting worsening of the balance sheets.( OK )

· The fiscal response can have a larger effect on aggregate demand if its composition takes into account the specific features of the crisis( THIS I AGREE WITH ).

In this regard, some of the tax and transfer policies implemented early in the Nordic crises did little to stimulate output.

Governments around the world are struggling with how to apply fiscal stimulus. The IMF’s analysis points out two features of the crisis that are important when thinking about the nature of the fiscal stimulus.

First, this crisis is here for while, so slow-acting fiscal spending can be part of the picture( INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING IS FINE. ). (In the usual recession, the simulative spending often( MIGHT HAPPEN HERE AS WELL ) kicks in after the recession is past and thus become part of the problem rather than part of the solution.) Moreover, expenditure measures have the advantage of directly stimulating demand rather than give money to consumers and companies who might not spend it( THAT'S THE REASON FOR GOVERNMENT SPENDING THE MONEY. ).

Second, the usual macroeconomic conditions mean existing estimates of fiscal multipliers are less reliable guides to the relatively effectiveness of various fiscal policies. This is why the IMF argues for fiscal policy diversification.( IT'S A GOOD IDEA )

Direct government spending

While each government will have to deal with national concerns, constraints and circumstances, the IMF offers some general words of wisdom.

· Governments should make sure that existing programs are not cut for lack of resources.( OK )

This bit of advice is aimed particularly at the US states, many of whom operate under constitutional balanced-budget rules that are forcing them to cut back spending on current programmes. (See Krugman’s column for examples.)

· Look for spending programs can be started or restarted quickly.

For example, the state could up its share in private-public partnerships for projects that would otherwise be suspended for lack of private capital. Public sector wage increases should be avoided as they are not well targeted, difficult to reverse, and similar to transfers in their effectiveness. Nevertheless, a temporary increase in public sector employment associated with some of new programs and policies may be needed( A JOBS BILL ).

· Public perceptions matter.( VERY IMPORTANT )

Much of this recession is coming from the sharp deterioration in expectations, and the sharp increased in perceived uncertainty about the economy’s prognosis( ABSOLUTELY. THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK.). A few high profile programs – especially those good long-run justification and strong externalities – could help restore consumers’ and firms’ belief that things will get better. Such confidence can itself improve aggregate demand by reducing wait-and-see behaviour.( I WOULD ARGUE THAT THIS IS IN FACT THE SOLUTION )

Stimulus aimed at consumers

Getting consumers to spend again faces three crisis-specific factors: 1) wealth reductions are a key cause of reduced consumption ( TRUE. BUT PERCEPTIONS OF IT VARY. ); 2) credit constraints( REALLY THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK. ) in some nations are forcing consumption reductions; and 3) uncertainty has spawned a wait-and-see attitude that results in the delay of planned purchases( THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON ).

These factors suggest two broad recommendations: Tax cuts should target consumers who are most likely to be credit constrained( I AGREE ), and should aim at restoring consumer confidence by committing to do ‘whatever it takes’( I AGREE. THAT'S WHY GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES ARE SO IMPORTANT, AS WELL AS INCENTIVES TO ALLEVIATE THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK. ). The goal is to overcome the waiting-and-see attitudes( EXACTLY ).

Fiscal stimulus aimed at firms

The high degree of uncertainty surrounding this crisis fosters a wait-and-see attitude when it comes to firms’ investments. Consequently, subsidies are unlikely to have much effect( I BELIEVE THAT TAX INCENTIVES MIGHT ). While acknowledging the political economic pitfalls, the IMF argues that there is also some scope for governments in supporting firms that are facing particularly difficult problems, could survive through restructuring, but find it difficult or impossible to receive the necessary financing from dysfunctional credit markets. Sector-wide policies like the US auto bailout are bad idea( THIS WAS DONE FOR SOCIAL REASONS, WHICH ARE IMPORTANT IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE. ).

Sustainability concerns

While the IMF’s call for deficit spending is unusual, the authors stay true to form in arguing that questions about debt sustainability would, especially in nations starting from weak fiscal postures, undercut the stimulus via adverse effects on financial markets, interest rates, and consumer spending( A GOOD WARNING ). A fiscally unsustainable path can eventually lead to sharp adjustments in real interest rates, and these in turn can destabilize financial markets and undercut recovery prospects.( A PROBLEM GOING FORWARD )

The IMF suggests a number of things that could help:

Measures should be reversible or have clear sunset clauses( WHICH IS WHY I FAVOR A SALES TAX DECREASE OR PAYROLL TAX REDUCTION ) contingent on the economic situation;

Measures that increasing the scope of automatic stabilizers are useful;

Pre-commitments to future policies that help shore up fiscal accounts are useful.( I AGREE )

Pre-commitment to unwinding stimulus measures either at a specific date (like lowering VAT for just two years as the U.K. recently did) or on a contingent basis (reversing the VAT cut once GDP growth has risen above a certain level) are a good idea;( I AGREE )

Strengthening fiscal governance by, for example, setting up an independent fiscal council( NOT SO MUCH );

Coordination: The G20’s role

Sizable fiscal stimulus is required at the global level since this crisis is global. However not all nations are in a position to widen government deficits. Many low income and emerging market countries are constrained volatile capital flows, high public and foreign indebtedness, and large risk premia – features that plague some advanced countries as well.

Given that some countries cannot pump up demand with fiscal policy, the IMF argues that it is imperative that the nations who can do. This includes some large emerging economies such as China. As fiscal stimulus is a policy that suffers from the classic free-rider externality, it is exactly one area where international coordination by the G20 nations would yield great benefits."( THE SAVER COUNTRIES AND STIMULUS PROBLEM )

Some good points.

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

"What matters is the explicit or implicit guarantee provided by the state to the banks to back up their assets and provide liquidity. "

Here's an interesting exchange involving a few of my favorite people, Felix Salmon, Willem Buiter, and John Hempton. Let's begin here:

"There is a wonderful (simply wonderful)
paper by Willem Buiter and Anne Siebert on the Icelandic banking crisis.

It’s the sort of paper that puts the lie to the line “nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition” because the core part of the paper was written – under contract – to the Icelandic Central Bank. All agreed that the contents were “too hot” and the academic authors agreed to secrecy.

Now that the worst has happened there is less need for secrecy so the paper has been published along with policy prescriptions for Iceland.

Ok – well and good.

Their explanation was that it doesn’t matter whether the Icelandic banks were solvent or insolvent – there was a simple problem that the banks were large compared to the Icelandic economy and the governments could not conceivably bail them out. As a result a run on one of them would collapse them all.

I will express an opinion on one – and one only. I think Kaupthing – which was by far the most aggressive purchaser of foreign assets – was probably insolvent.

Anyway the lesson was that a country could not afford to have banks whose liquidity they could not guarantee in a run. If the banks were so big you could not guarantee the liquidity then the banks were set up to fail."

Somehow, this seems obvious, but it's not.

"Of course there is one remaining country with banks that are large-relative-to-the-economy – and that is the UK. RBOS and Barclays are both enormous and - at best opaque.

Now do American taxpayers want to pick up UBS or Barclays? I don’t think in the end they will have any choice. The banks will fail or they won’t. And if they fail – well I hate to say it – but the new administration will be stuck with it. I guess UBS will lose its tax avoidance business in the process… and a few American rich folk can help pay for it all with their back taxes... unfortunately the risks to the system are bigger than that..."

Wait a minute. Are we implicitly agreeing to guarantee the whole world?

Now Felix Salmon:

"Richard Baldwin of VoxEU gives us a sneak preview of a new article by Jon Danielsson:

In this crisis, the strength of a bank's balance sheet is of little consequence. What matters is the explicit or implicit guarantee provided by the state to the banks to back up their assets and provide liquidity. Therefore, the size of the state relative to the size of the banks becomes the crucial factor. If the banks become too big to save, their failure becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This seems right to me. And also very scary, because of one country: Switzerland."

Here we go again with implicit and explicit guarantees.

"This could be the first make-or-break economic issue to face Barack Obama: if it came to it, would Treasury bail out UBS? I'm sure it would try to get European governments to pitch in too, and the Swiss, of course, to the extent that they can. But I'm sure I'm not the only person praying that UBS never comes close enough to the edge that we have to find out."

Here's my reply:

Posted: Nov 12 2008 10:03am ET
"What matters is the explicit or implicit guarantee provided by the state to the banks to back up their assets and provide liquidity."

Can we all agree,at least, that these guarantees become explicit and clearly defined? This is beginning to sound to me like Dr. Strangelove:

Strangelove explains the principles behind the Doomsday Device, which he says is "simple to understand... credible and convincing." He also points out that a Doomsday Device kept secret has no value as a deterrent; the Soviet Ambassador admits that his government had installed it a few days before they were going to announce it publicly to the world, because Kissoff "likes surprises".

"But I'm sure I'm not the only person praying that UBS never comes close enough to the edge that we have to find out."

Um, have we implicitly guaranteed the entire banking planet?