Showing posts with label Derivative Trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Derivative Trade. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

a few explanations as to why credit default swaps, Satan’s financial tool of choice, exist.

The great Derivative Dribble:

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Why Credit Default Swaps? In Politicized Economy, Systemic Counterparty Confusion on January 14, 2009 at 6:57 am

Imps and Impetus

In this article, I will give a few explanations as to why credit default swaps, Satan’s financial tool of choice, exist.

That Which I Do Not Understand Must Be Evil

There are formal rules of logic which distinguish between sound arguments and fallacies. Although most of us are not conscious of these rules, I would like to think that somewhere in the recesses of all human minds there is at least an abstract appreciation for these rules, despite the fact that we often argue and act with complete disregard for their existence. That said, we should expect more from those who claim to know things. Those who claim to know things should be able to explain exactly how it is that they know these things( TRUE ). Yet, for some reason, it has become acceptable for pundits discussing credit default swaps to claim to know that credit default swaps have no bona fide economic purpose simply because they cannot come up with one. So, rather than outlining the path to their knowledge, such pundits concede failure in their search for knowledge, and then infer that because of this failure, the knowledge sought after does not exist. I’m no logician, but I’m fairly certain that argument rests upon the assumption that these pundits know everything.

The Advantage Of Unfunded Instruments

As a general matter, credit default swaps are unfunded( AS IN A BOND, WHERE YOU LOAN THE PRINCIPAL OUT. INSURANCE, I BELIEVE, HAS CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE HIGHER THAN FOR BANKS, SAY. ). That is, the protection seller does not post the notional amount of the contract into an account for the benefit of the protection buyer. This allows the protection seller to invest that amount elsewhere( THAT'S THE WHOLE POINT, WHERE IT ISN'T INSURANCE. ), earning a return. If the notional amount is posted or held in Treasuries, then the cash flows received by the protection seller will be roughly equivalent to the cash flows of the reference obligation on which he has sold protection. This is because the protection seller will earn the risk free rate on the Treasuries and will receive the swap fee from the protection buyer, which should be approximately the spread over the risk free rate that the underlying reference obligation pays. So in a fully funded CDS, the protection seller earns the risk free rate plus a spread. This is explained in greater detail here. But if the protection seller invests an amount of cash equal to the notional amount in non-risk free instruments, he will be able to earn a return above the risk free rate, in addition to earning the swap fee, which implies that the total return will be higher than that of the underlying reference obligation. So in the case of an unfunded CDS, the protection seller earns a return above the risk free rate plus a spread. Thus, credit default swaps allow for unfunded exposure to credit risk, which facilitates a return that is higher than the underlying bond.( TRUE )

The Advantage Of Simplified Documentation

Credit default swaps also offer the advantage of simplified and standardized documentation, which allows market participants to precisely tailor the credit risks to which they are exposed. The document templates are prepared and published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, and then modified by market participants to define the terms of particular transactions. So ISDA publishes standardized forms, and then market participants customize the forms to reflect their individualized needs. Because almost all credit default swaps are based on the same form, it makes review and comprehension easier and faster, which reduces transaction costs.

The Advantage Of Contract

Credit default swaps are contracts, and so the rights and obligations of each party can be whatever the parties agree to. This allows for the creation of essentially infinite variations on the basic credit default swap theme. For example, rather than name a single reference obligation, a CDS could name a group of different bonds, known as a basket, on which protection is to be sold. This allows the protection seller to gain exposure to a basket of credit risks and the protection buyer to receive protection on that same basket. And this is done without either party purchasing a single bond.

Another common variation is the n-th to default CDS. In an n-th to default CDS, protection is bought on a basket of reference obligations, but the protection buyer only receives payment from the protection seller upon the occurrence of n defaults. So if n = 3, the protection buyer will only receive payment upon the 3rd default of the reference obligations in the basket. In an ordinary CDS, n = 1, since payment is made upon the 1st default. There are variations on this theme as well. For example, the CDS could be structured so that payment occurs only upon the n-th default, terminating the agreement. Alternatively, payment could be made for the n-th default and all defaults after that. It is up to the parties to decide how the deal is structured.

The point in both of these examples is that because swaps are rooted in contract, they offer a level of customization that would be prohibitively expensive and in some cases impossible using traditional financial instruments. If you can come up with a method of simulating an n-th to default CDS using only traditional instruments, please impress us all in the comment section."

These are valid points. In truth, this was why CDSs and CDOs were chosen by investors. They both allow investing with lower capital requirements. That was their value, and it is a real value. The mistakes made were not in the investments, but in the decisions made by people. For example, even if a CDO is very risky, as a tiny part of your portfolio, it might well be a good risk. Where I disagree here is that I believe that, had CDSs and CDOs not proven useful, other investment vehicles would have been found for fulfiiling these investment purposes. In truth, they might have turned out to be even more illiquid. We will never know.

Again, CDSs are good for:
1) Mirroring Bonds
2) Insurance On Defaults
3) Hedging Your Bets

All three of these are valid uses. I would not buy them because they are too risky for me, even in small doses, were that possible. But it is not obvious that a knowledgable investor couldn't make use of a CDS for one of these reasons and make money. It is all about measuring risk, which also means figuring out how much you can afford to lose.

Saturday, December 20, 2008

"it had postponed a planned launch of a new index tracking against prime RMBS."

From Paul Jackson on Housingwire:

"It was such a small press statement, but one imbued with indelible meaning — Markit, the financial technology firm that manages indices for the subprime and commercial mortgage securities markets, said earlier this week that it had postponed a planned launch of a new index tracking against prime RMBS.

“Following extensive discussions with major market participants, plans to launch a synthetic U.S. prime mortgage-backed securities index have been put on hold,” [1] the statement read. “The potential benefits of the proposed index will be re-assessed in 2009.”

That’s it. But there is much more behind the words, when you consider that synthetic credit indices have been assailed this year by critics who say the derivatives trading powered by them helped push the financial markets to the brink of outright disaster in this past year( DON'T AGREE ). In the case of the subprime market, Markit’s ABX index was launched in 2006 to track the private-party subprime RMBS market — and it allowed some hedge funds an easy mechanism to short the market for subprime mortgages( SOMEBODY HAD TO TAKE THE OTHER PART OF THE TRADE, DIDN'T THEY? ).

We’ve covered the ABX here extensively at HousingWire in the past 12 months. [2] See earlier coverage.

Critics say that enabled a crash, while fund managers say they were simply using the industry’s first transparent tool to make bets on mortgages they knew were bad. “The derivatives trade here worked in both directions, it goes both ways,” said one trader that spoke with HW, but asked not to be identified. “Those saying we’re being too pessimistic can always trade with their optimism, if they felt inclined to do so.” ( THAT'S TRUE )

[3] TheStreet.com’s Dan Freed has much more on the delay at Markit, suggesting that the delay came as regulators expressed concerns about putting a “weapon of mass destruction” into play in the prime mortgage market. ( BY SHOWING REALITY? )

“Financial companies around the world … collectively hold trillions of dollars worth of prime mortgage securities on their books, but they have a great deal of latitude( FUDGING ) in how they price them,” Freed writes in the story. “A prime mortgage index would take away a lot of this latitude, as banks carrying mortgages on their books at a significantly higher price than the index would have a lot of explaining to do to their auditors. That could lead to new writedowns on a massive scale.” ( WOW )

Market critics have suggested recently that the ABX has become a victim of a classic “macroeconomic short,” meaning that the value of the securities has been pushed well below their actual value( THAT'S THE OPPOSITE OF THE SCENARIO ABOVE, ISN'T IT ? SO SUBPRIME ARE BELOW AND PRIME ARE HIGHER THAN THEIR ACTUAL VAKUE? ) based on default rates and expected cash-flows. At least one hedge fund, T2 Partners LLC, has come out publicly and said it is [4] snapping up subprime RMBS wherever it can( WHERE IS IT DOING THIS AND HOW? IT'S ACTUALLY A GOOD SIGN ), based on this premise. Of course, only time will tell if the bet is well-timed or not — but the point here is that primary dealers are clearly worried about messing with the mechanics of a prime mortgage market that is already facing challenges of its own in recent weeks.

And, compared to subprime, the prime securitized mortgage market is BIG one, too. The securitization rate for loans originated in the first three quarters of 2008 rose to 78 percent, up from 74 percent in the year-ago period and 61 percent in 2001, according to a Bloomberg report Friday morning that cited data from industry newsletter Inside MBS & ABS (no link available, yet). In other words: the originate-and-sell model is alive and well in prime markets( SOME PEOPLE ARE PREDICTING ITS DEMISE. NOT ME ), and establishing a synthetic index could provide leverage for exposure that no primary dealer is likely to be comfortable with( THAT'S NOT A GOOD SIGN, IS IT? ).

TheStreet.com’s Freed notes that there is no confirmation as of yet as to whether regulators are involved in the index or not. But here’s guessing that the rollout of this particular Markit index will meet much more scrutiny than its subprime cousin( SCRUTINY, WHICH I CALL OBSERVATION, IS WHAT THEY SHOULD BE DOING )."

This is a very interesting post.