Showing posts with label CDSs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CDSs. Show all posts

Thursday, May 7, 2009

In what way is this supposed to be even unethical, let alone criminal?

From Reuters:

"
Felix Salmon

preferred, not common

May 7th, 2009

CDS demonization watch, insurable-interest edition

Posted by: Felix Salmon
Tags: derivatives

A common meme among CDS pundits is that since credit default swaps behave in some ways like insurance policies, they should be regulated as insurance policies, and no one should be allowed to buy credit protection unless they have an insurable interest in the credit in question — that is, unless they loaned money to it.

Nemo, however, turns that meme on its head, and has decided that if you do have an insurable interest, and then act to collect on your insurance, then you’re “a criminal enterprise”:

Morgan Stanley bought insurance against BTA’s default and then caused that default. If you are wondering how this could possibly be legal, then good.

When he says that Morgan Stanley “caused” a default, he just means that the bank called in its loan, as is its right. But because Morgan Stanley was prudent and bought insurance against the default, its losses won’t be as big as they otherwise would have been. In what way is this supposed to be even unethical, let alone criminal?"

Me:

That’s the thing. If I buy a CDS, someone has to sell it to me. I can’t simply declare a CDS on X to be paid by ? That’s where price discovery comes in. There are two different assessments of the risk.

If I cause a default on X, I’ll be sued by X and the person who sold me the CDS, as well as probably be investigated by the govt.

- Posted by Don the libertarian Democrat

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

S&P, Moody’s and Fitch control 98 percent of the market for debt ratings in the U.S., according to the SEC

TO BE NOTED: From Bloomberg:

"Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail Investors

By David Evans and Caroline Salas

April 29 (Bloomberg) -- Ron Grassi says he thought he had retired five years ago after a 35-year career as a trial lawyer.

Now Grassi, 68, has set up a war room in his Tahoe City, California, home to single-handedly take on Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings. He’s sued the three credit rating firms for negligence, fraud and deceit.

Grassi says the companies’ faulty debt analyses have been at the core of the global financial meltdown and the firms should be held accountable. Exhibit One is his own investment. He and his wife, Sally, held $40,000 in Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bonds because all three credit raters gave them at least an A rating -- meaning they were a safe investment -- right until Sept. 15, the day Lehman filed for bankruptcy.

“They’re supposed to spot time bombs,” Grassi says. “The bombs exploded before the credit companies acted.”

As the U.S. and other economic powers devise ways to overhaul financial regulations, they have yet to come up with plans to address one issue at the heart of the crisis: the role of the rating firms.

That’s partly because the reach of the three big credit raters extends into virtually every corner of the financial system. Everyone from banks to the agencies that regulate them is hooked on ratings.

Debt grades are baked into hundreds of rules, laws and private contracts that affect banking, insurance, mutual funds and pension funds. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission guidelines, for example, require money market fund managers to rely on ratings in deciding what to buy with $3.9 trillion of investors’ money.

‘Stop Our Reliance’

State regulators depend on credit grades to monitor the safety of $450 billion of bonds held by U.S. insurance companies. Even the plans crafted by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to stimulate the economy count on rating firms to determine how the money will be spent.

“The key to policy going forward has to be to stop our reliance on these credit ratings,” says Frank Partnoy, a professor at the San Diego School of Law and a former derivatives trader who has written four books on modern finance, including Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Times Books, 2003).

“Even though few people respect the credit raters, most continue to rely on them,” Partnoy says. “We’ve become addicted to them like a drug, and we have to figure out a way to wean regulators and investors off of them.”

AIG Downgrade

Just how critical a role ratings firms play in the health and stability of the financial system became clear in the case of American International Group Inc., the New York-based insurer that’s now a ward of the U.S. government.

On Sept. 16, one day after the three credit rating firms downgraded AIG’s double-A score by two to three grades, private contract provisions that AIG had with banks around the world based on credit rating changes forced the insurer to hand over billions of dollars of collateral to its customers. The company didn’t have the cash.

Trying to avert a global financial cataclysm, the Federal Reserve rescued AIG with an $85 billion loan -- the first of four U.S. bailouts of the insurer.

Investors, traders and regulators have been questioning whether credit rating companies serve a good purpose ever since Enron Corp. imploded in 2001. Until four days before the Houston-based energy company filed for what was then the largest-ever U.S. bankruptcy, its debt had investment-grade stamps of approval from S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.

In the run-up to the current financial crisis, credit companies evolved from evaluators of debt into consultants.

‘Abjectly Failed’

They helped banks create $3.2 trillion of subprime mortgage securities. Typically, the firms awarded triple-A ratings to 75 percent of those debt packages.

“Ratings agencies just abjectly failed in serving the interests of investors,” SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey says.

S&P President Deven Sharma says he knows his firm is taking heat from all sides -- and he expects to turn that around.

“Our company has always operated by the principle that if you do the right thing by the customers and the market, ultimately you’ll succeed,” Sharma says.

Moody’s Chief Executive Officer Raymond McDaniel and Fitch CEO Stephen Joynt declined to comment for this story.

“We are firmly committed to meeting the highest standards of integrity in our ratings practice,” McDaniel said in an April 15 SEC hearing.

“We remain committed to the highest standards of integrity and objectivity in all aspects of our work,” Joynt told the SEC.

Ratings and Rescue

Notwithstanding the role the credit companies played in fomenting disaster, the U.S. government is relying on them to help fix the system they had a hand in breaking.

The Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF, will finance the purchase by taxpayers of as much as $1 trillion of new securities backed by consumer loans or other asset-backed debt -- on the condition they have triple-A ratings.

And the Fed has also been buying commercial paper directly from companies since October, only if the debt has at least the equivalent of an A-1 rating, the second highest for short-term credit. The three rating companies graded Lehman debt A-1 the day it filed for bankruptcy.

The Fed’s financial rescue is good for the bottom lines of the three rating firms, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal says. They could enjoy as much as $400 million in fees that come from taxpayer money, he says.

S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, all based in New York, got their official blessing from the SEC in 1975, when the regulator named them Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations.

Conflict of Interest

Seven companies, along with the big three, now have SEC licensing. The regulator created the NRSRO designation after deciding to set capital requirements for broker-dealers. The SEC relies on ratings from the NRSROs to evaluate the bond holdings of those firms.

At the core of the rating system is an inherent conflict of interest, says Lawrence White, the Arthur E. Imperatore Professor of Economics at New York University in Manhattan. Credit raters are paid by the companies whose debt they analyze, so the ratings might reflect a bias, he says.

“So long as you are delegating these decisions to for- profit companies, inevitably there are going to be conflicts,” he says.

In a March 25 report, policy makers from the Group of 20 nations recommended that credit rating companies be supervised to provide more transparency, improve rating quality and avoid conflicts of interest. The G-20 didn’t offer specifics.

52 Percent Profit Margin

As lawmakers scratch their heads over how to come up with an alternative approach, the rating firms continue to pull in rich profits.

Moody’s, the only one of the three that stands alone as a publicly traded company, has averaged pretax profit margins of 52 percent over the past five years. It reported revenue of $1.76 billion -- earning a pretax margin of 41 percent -- even during the economic collapse in 2008.

S&P, Moody’s and Fitch control 98 percent of the market for debt ratings in the U.S., according to the SEC. The noncompetitive market leads to high fees, says SEC Commissioner Casey, 43, appointed by President George W. Bush in July 2006 to a five-year term. S&P, a unit of McGraw-Hill Cos., has profit margins similar to those at Moody’s, she says.

“They’ve benefited from the monopoly status that they’ve achieved with a tremendous amount of assistance from regulators,” Casey says.

Sharma, 53, says S&P has justifiably earned its income.

‘People See Value’

“Why does anybody pay $200, or whatever, for Air Jordan shoes?” he asks, sitting in a company boardroom high over the southern tip of Manhattan. “It’s the same. People see value in that. And it all boils down to the value of what people see in it.”

Blumenthal says he sees little value in credit ratings. He says raters shouldn’t be getting money from federal financial rescue efforts.

“It rewards the very incompetence of Standard & Poors, Moody’s and Fitch that helped cause our current financial crisis,” he says. “It enables those specific credit rating agencies to profit from their own self-enriching malfeasance.”

Blumenthal has subpoenaed documents from the three companies to determine if they improperly influenced the TALF rules to snatch business from smaller rivals.

S&P and Fitch deny Blumenthal’s accusations.

‘Without Merit’

“The investigation by the Connecticut attorney general is without merit,” S&P Vice President Chris Atkins says. “The attorney general fails to recognize S&P’s strong track record rating consumer asset-backed securities, the assets that will be included in the TALF program. S&P’s fees for this work are subject to fee caps.”

Fitch Managing Director David Weinfurter says the government makes all the rules -- not the rating firms.

“Fitch Ratings views Blumenthal’s investigation into credit ratings eligibility requirements under TALF and other federal lending programs as an unfortunate development stemming from incomplete or inaccurate information,” he says.

Moody’s Senior Vice President Anthony Mirenda declined to comment.

Sharma says it’s clear that his firm’s housing market assumptions were incorrect. S&P is making its methodology clearer so investors can better decide whether they agree with the ratings, he says.

‘Talk to Us’

“The thing to do is make it transparent, ‘Here are our criteria. Here are our analytics. Here are our assumptions. Here are the stress-test scenarios. And now, if you have any questions, talk to us,’” Sharma says.

The rating companies reaped a bonanza in fees earlier this decade as they worked with financial firms to manufacture collateralized debt obligations. Those creations held a mix of questionable debt, including subprime mortgages, auto loans and junk-rated assets.

S&P, Moody’s and Fitch won as much as three times more in fees for grading structured securities than they charged for rating ordinary bonds. The CDO market started to crash in mid- 2007, as investors learned the securities were jammed with bad debt.

Financial firms around the world have reported about $1.3 trillion in writedowns and losses in the past two years.

Alex Pollock, now a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, says more competition among credit raters would reduce fees.

‘An SEC-Created Cartel’

“The rating agencies are an SEC-created cartel,” he says. “Usually, issuers need at least two ratings, so they don’t even have to compete.”

Pollock was president of the Federal Home Loan Bank in Chicago from 1991 to 2004. The bank was rated triple-A by both Moody’s and S&P. He says he recalls an annual ritual as he visited with representatives of each company.

“They’d say, ‘Here’s what it’s going to cost,’” he says. “I’d say, ‘That’s outrageous.’ They’d repeat, ‘This is what it’s going to cost.’ Finally, I’d say, ‘OK.’ With no ratings, you can’t sell your debt.”

Congress has held hearings on credit raters routinely this decade, first in 2002 after Enron and then again each year through 2008. In 2006, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which gave the SEC limited authority to regulate raters’ business practices.

The SEC adopted rules under the law in December 2008 banning rating firms from grading debt structures they designed themselves. The law forbids the SEC from ordering the firms to change their analytical methods.

Role of Congress

Only Congress has the power to overhaul the rating system. So far, nobody has introduced legislation that would do that. In a hearing on April 15, the SEC heard suggestions for legislation on credit raters. Some of the loudest proponents for change are in state government and on Wall Street. But no one’s agreed on how to do it.

“We should replace ratings agencies,” says Peter Fisher, managing director and co-head of fixed income at New York-based BlackRock Inc., the largest publicly traded U.S. asset management company.

‘Flash Forward’

“Our credit rating system is anachronistic,” he says. “Eighty years ago, equities were thought to be complicated and bonds were thought to be simple, so it appeared to make sense to have a few rating agencies set up to tell us all what bonds to buy. But flash forward to the slicing and dicing of credit today, and it’s really a pretty wacky concept.”

To create competition, the U.S. should license individuals, not companies, as credit rating professionals, Fisher says. They should be more like equity analysts and would be primarily paid by institutional investors, Fisher says. Neither equity analysts nor those who work at rating companies currently need to be licensed.

Such a system wouldn’t be fair, says Daniel Fuss, vice chairman of Boston-based Loomis Sayles & Co., which manages $106 billion. An investor-pay ratings model may give the biggest money managers a huge advantage over smaller firms and individuals because they can afford to pay for the analyses, he says.

“What about individuals?” he asks.

Eric Dinallo, New York’s top insurance regulator, proposes a government takeover of the rating business.

“There’s nothing wrong with saying Moody’s or someone is going to just become a government agency,” he says. “We’ve hung the entire global economy on ratings.”

‘Like Consumer Reports’

Insurance companies are among the world’s largest bond investors. Dinallo suggests that insurers could fund a credit rating collective run by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a group of state regulators.

“It would be like the Consumer Reports of credit ratings,” Dinallo says, referring to the not-for-profit magazine that provides unbiased reviews of consumer products.

Turning over the credit ratings to a consortium headed by state governments could lead to lower quality because there would be even less competition, Fuss says.

“I would be strongly opposed to the government taking over the function of credit ratings,” he says. “I just don’t think it would work at all. The business creativity, the drive, would go straight out of it.”

At the April 15 SEC hearing, Joseph Grundfest, a professor at Stanford Law School in Stanford, California, suggested a variation of Dinallo’s idea. He said the SEC could authorize a new kind of rating company, owned and run by the largest debt investors.

‘Greater Discipline’

All bond issuers that pay for a traditional rating would also have to buy a credit analysis from one of these firms.

SEC Commissioner Casey has another solution. She wants to remove rating requirements from federal guidelines. She also faults investors for shirking their responsibility to do independent research, rather than simply looking to the grades produced by credit raters.

“I’d like to promote greater competition in the market and greater discipline,” she says. “Eliminating the references to ratings will play a huge role in removing the undue reliance that we’ve seen.”

Sharma, who became president of S&P in August 2007, agrees with Casey that ratings are too enmeshed in SEC rules. He wants the SEC to either get rid of references to rating companies in regulations or add other benchmarks such as current market prices, volatility and liquidity.

“Just don’t leave us the way it is today,” Sharma says. “There’s too much risk of being overused and inappropriately used.”

‘Hurt Now’

Sharma says that even with widespread regulatory reliance on ratings, his firm will lose business if investors say it doesn’t produce accurate ones.

“Our reputation is hurt now,” he says. “Let’s say it continues to be hurt; it never comes back. Three other competitors come back who do much-better-quality work. Investors will finally say, ‘I don’t want S&P ratings.’”

S&P will prove to the public that it can help companies and bondholders by updating and clarifying its rating methodology, Sharma says. The company will also add commentary on the liquidity and volatility of securities.

S&P’s New Steps

S&P has incorporated so-called credit stability into its ratings to address the risk that ratings will fall several levels under stress conditions, which is what happened to CDO grades. The company has also created an ombudsman office in an effort to resolve potential conflicts of interest.

Jerome Fons, who worked at Moody’s for 17 years and was managing director for credit policy until August 2007, says investors don’t have to wait for a change in the rating system. They can learn more about the value of debt by tracking the prices of credit-default swaps, he says.

The swaps, which are derivatives, are an unregulated type of insurance in which one side bets that a company will default and the other side, or counterparty, gambles that the firm won’t fail. The higher the price of that protection, the greater the perceived risk of default.

‘More Accurate’

“We know the spreads are more accurate than ratings,” says Fons, now principal of Fons Risk Solutions, a credit risk consulting firm in New York. Moody’s sells a service called Moody’s Implied Ratings, which is based on prices of credit swaps, debt and stock.

In July 2007, credit-default-swap traders started pricing Bear Stearns Cos. and Lehman as if they were Ba1 rated, the highest junk level. They pegged Merrill Lynch & Co. as a Ba1 credit three months later, according to the Moody’s model.

Each of those investment banks was stamped at investment grade by the top three credit raters within weeks of when the banks either failed or were rescued in 2008.

Lynn Tilton, who manages $6 billion as CEO of private equity firm Patriarch Partners in New York, says she woke up one morning in August 2007 convinced the banking system would collapse and started buying gold coins.

“I predicted the banks would be insolvent,” Tilton says. “My biggest issue was credit-default swaps. When the size of that market started to dwarf gross domestic product by six or seven times, then my understanding of what defaults would be in a down market became clear: There’s no escaping.”

‘Collective Wisdom’

Investors like Tilton watched as the financial firms tumbled while credit raters held on to investment-grade marks.

“If the ratings mandate weren’t there, we wouldn’t care because the credit-default-swap markets can tell us basically what we want to know about default probabilities,” NYU’s White says. “I’m a market-oriented guy, so I’m more inclined to be relying on the collective wisdom of the market participants.”

While credit-default-swap traders lack inside information that companies give to credit raters, swap traders move faster because they’re reacting to market changes every day.

San Diego School of Law’s Partnoy, who’s written law review articles about credit rating firms for more than a decade and has been a paid consultant to plaintiffs suing rating companies, says raters hold back from downgrading because they know the consequences can be dire.

In September, Moody’s and S&P downgraded AIG to A2 and A-, the sixth- and seventh-highest investment-grade ratings. The downgrades triggered CDS payouts and led to the U.S. lending AIG $85 billion. The government has since more than doubled AIG’s rescue funds.

‘Basically Trapped’

“When you get into a situation like we’re in right now with AIG, the rating agencies are basically trapped into maintaining high ratings because they know if they downgrade, they don’t only have this regulatory effect but they have all these effects,” Partnoy says.

“It’s all this stuff that basically turns the rating downgrade into a bullet fired at the heart of a bunch of institutions,” he says.

Sharma says S&P has never delayed a ratings change because of potential downgrade results. He says his firm tells clients not to use ratings as triggers in private contracts.

“We take action based on what we feel is right,” Sharma says.

While swap prices may be better than bond ratings at predicting a disaster, swaps can also cause a disaster.

AIG, one of the world’s biggest sellers of CDS protection, nearly collapsed -- taking the global financial system with it -- when it didn’t have enough cash to honor its swaps contracts. Loomis’s Fuss says relying on swap prices is a bad idea.

‘Not Always Right’

“The market is not always right,” he says. “An unregulated market isn’t always a fair appraisal of value.”

Moody’s was the first credit rating firm in the U.S. It started grading railroad bonds in 1909. Standard Statistics, a precursor of S&P, began rating securities seven years later.

After the 1929 stock market crash, the government decided it wasn’t able to determine the quality of the assets held by banks on its own, Partnoy says. In 1931, the U.S. Treasury started using bond ratings to analyze banks’ holdings.

James O’Connor, then comptroller of the currency, issued a regulation in 1936 restricting banks to buying only securities that were deemed high quality by at least two credit raters.

“One of the major responses was to try to find a way -- just as we are now with the stress tests and the examination of the banks -- to figure out how to get the bad assets off the banks’ books,” Partnoy says.

Since then, regulators have increasingly leaned on ratings to police debt investing. In 1991, the SEC ruled that money market mutual fund managers must put 95 percent of their investments into highly rated commercial paper.

Avoiding Liability

Like auditors, lawyers and investment bankers, rating firms serve as gatekeepers to the financial markets. They provide assurances to bond investors. Unlike the others, ratings companies have generally avoided liability for errors.

Grassi, the retired California lawyer, wants to change that. He filed his lawsuit against the rating companies on Jan. 26 in state superior court in Placer County.

The white-haired lawyer discusses his case seated at a tiny wooden desk in his small guest bedroom, with files spread over both levels of a bunk bed. Grassi says in his complaint that the raters were negligent for failing to downgrade Lehman Brothers debt as the bank’s finances were deteriorating.

The day Lehman filed for bankruptcy, S&P rated the investment bank’s debt as A, which according to S&P’s definition means a “strong” capacity to meet financial commitments. Moody’s rated Lehman A2 that day, which Moody’s defines as a “low credit risk.” Fitch gave Lehman a grade of A+, which it describes as “high credit quality.”

‘Without Merit’

“We’d like to have a jury hear this,” Grassi says. “This wouldn’t be six economists, just six normal people. That would scare the rating agencies to death.”

The rating companies haven’t yet filed responses. They’ve asked the federal court in Sacramento to take jurisdiction from the state court.

S&P and Fitch say they dispute Grassi’s allegations. “We believe the complaint is without merit and intend to defend against it vigorously,” S&P’s Atkins says.

Fitch’s Weinfurter says, “The lawsuit is fully without merit and we will vigorously defend it.”

Mirenda at Moody’s declined to comment.

S&P included a standard disclaimer with Lehman’s ratings: “Any user of the information contained herein should not rely on any credit rating or other opinion contained herein in making any investment decision.”

‘On Your Own’

Grassi isn’t deterred.

“They’re saying we know you’re going to rely on us and if you get screwed, you’re on your own because our lawyers have told us to put this paragraph in here,” he says.

The companies have defended their ratings from lawsuits, arguing that they were just opinions, protected by the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

McGraw-Hill used the First Amendment defense in 1996 after its subsidiary S&P was sued for professional negligence by Orange County, California. S&P had given the county an AA- rating before the county filed for the largest-ever municipal bankruptcy.

Orange County alleged in its lawsuit that S&P had failed to warn the government that its treasurer, Robert Citron, had made risky investments with county cash.

Not Liable

The U.S. District Court in Santa Ana, California, ruled that the county would have needed to prove the rating company’s “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth” to win damages.

The court found that the credit rater couldn’t be held liable for mere negligence, agreeing with S&P that it was shielded by the First Amendment.

Sharma says rating companies shouldn’t be responsible when investors misuse ratings.

“Hold us accountable for what you can,” he says. He compares the rating companies to carmakers. “Look, if you drove the car wrong, the manufacturer can’t be held negligent. But if you designed the car wrong, then of course the manufacturer should be held negligent.”

The bigger issue is whether the credit rating system should be changed or even abolished. From California to New York to Washington, investors and regulators are saying it doesn’t work. No one has been able to fix it.

‘Like a Cancer’

The federal government created the rating cartel, and the U.S. is as dependent on it as everyone else. So far, the legislative branch hasn’t cleaned up the ratings mess.

“This problem really is like a cancer that has spread throughout the entire investment system,” Partnoy says. “You’ve got a body filled with little tumors, and you’ve got to go through and find them and cut them out.”

As the U.S. has spent, lent or pledged about $12.8 trillion in efforts to revive the slumping economy, and as President Barack Obama and Congress have worked overtime to find a way out of the deepest recession in 70 years, no one has taken steps that would substantially fix a broken ratings system.

If the government doesn’t head in that direction, all of its efforts at financial reform may be put in jeopardy by the one piece of this puzzle that nobody has yet figured out how to solve.

To contact the reporters on this story: David Evans in Los Angeles at davidevans@bloomberg.net Caroline Salas in New York at csalas1@bloomberg.net."

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Debt revamps hindered by credit default swaps: The Deal weighs in.

From Reuters:

"
Felix Salmon

Regaining productivity

April 28th, 2009

Monday links get laid off

Posted by: Felix Salmon
Tags: remainders

Debt revamps hindered by credit default swaps: The Deal weighs in.

Nostalgia, Entitlement and Murdoch’s ‘Journal’: Keeping the decline of the leder in perspective.

The Big Takeover: Now that Taibbi’s piece has been truncated on Rolling Stone, you can read it in full on Alternet."

Me:

From the NY Times DealBook:

“9:55 a.m. | Last Questions: Mr. Henderson is asked by Sharon Silke Carty of USA Today how many bondholders might have credit default swaps that would protect them if G.M. files for Chapter 11. He won’t give a number. That’s an important question, given the suspicion by analysts that many bondholders are balking because they have an ace in the hole.”

Gee. Let me see. Before you deal the cards, would you mind making sure to deal me a crappy hand. That way, you are more likely to win.

I’m really working hard on this one: really I am: I pay some extra money for insurance on my bond, decreasing my risk and lowering my profit. That’s bad. You see, if I had more risk, it would be easier for you to force me to take your terms. How dare I be prudent and protect myself!

I’ve loaned money to a company. G-d forbid I try and get more of my money back rather than less. You’ve no sympathy for me. After all, I’m the idiot that funded this company that, oh yes, you want to save. I took a risk in lending them money. Yes, that’s right. And that’s why I bought insurance!

You tell me my loss is good for the country. I tell you what: If it’s so good for the country, how about everyone pitching in by raising their taxes. On themselves. Better yet: Get off your ass and buy a GM car!

I’ve never heard anything so silly as that investors protecting their interests are at fault here. How about the investors who didn’t?

If it’s good for the country, take my taxes and pay these people off. And, in future, maybe more investors could follow their lead.

- Posted by Don the libertarian Democrat

Sunday, April 26, 2009

very little evidence to suggest that these contributed in any significant way to the crisis

TO BE NOTED: From the FT:

Warning over UK derivatives backlash

By Jeremy Grant in London

Published: April 26 2009 22:45 | Last updated: April 26 2009 22:45

London’s status as a leading financial centre risks being damaged if policymakers regulate over-the-counter derivatives without distinguishing between products that contributed to the financial crisis and those that did not, a report commissioned by the City of London Corporation says Monday.

The report, prepared by consultancy Bourse Consult, will urge regulators not to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” amid recent calls for OTC – or privately negotiated – derivatives markets to be subjected to greater clearing and regulatory scrutiny.

The warning is evidence of a nascent lobbying campaign by market participants against what they fear could be a regulatory backlash that inflicts collateral damage on London, which Bourse Consult says accounts for 43 per cent of the value of OTC derivatives traded.

This month’s Group of 20 nations summit pledged to “promote the standardisation and resilience of credit derivatives markets, in particular through the establishment of central clearing counterparties subject to effective regulation and supervision”.

The report rejects the assumption that derivatives in general are to blame for the current financial crisis, arguing that critics fail to distinguish between derivatives that functioned normally – such as foreign exchange and interest rate swaps – and collateralised debt obligations and other structured products.

“The credit derivatives, which were traded most heavily on the OTC derivatives markets, were CDS [credit default swaps]. There is very little evidence to suggest that these contributed in any significant way to the crisis,” the report said.

The push by regulators for such instruments to become more transparent had become “a highly politicised issue”.

Saturday, April 18, 2009

And so I have an incentive to opt for the more economically-destructive option.

From Reuters:

"How the CDS market makes restructurings more difficult
Posted by: Felix Salmon
Tags: bankruptcy, bonds and loans, derivatives

Commenter VM asks whether reduced incentives for bondholders to keep a company out of bankruptcy aren’t “a fairly horrible side effect” of the credit default swap market. Megan McArdle is thinking along similar lines, and her blog entry elicited a rather unconvincing response from Charles Davi.

To Charles’s point, no one is accusing cunning bondholders of finding “a serious loophole”, or “a nice way to make some fast cash”, or perpetrating a “restructuring-sabotage-strategy”. The problem is a bit more subtle than that, and is simply that bondholders who have bought CDS protection have much less incentive to participate in restructuring negotiations.

Let’s say that I buy $1 million of bonds. In order to protect my downside, I buy $600,000 of credit protection: if the issuer goes bust, I get $600,000, and a healthy 60% recovery value. I don’t want the issuer to go bust — I’d much rather the bonds continued to perform, and to be worth $1 million. But at least I can’t lose more than $400,000 in the event of default.

The issuer then gets into serious difficulties, and the bonds start trading at 25 cents on the dollar: my $1 million of bonds are now worth just $250,000 on the open market. The distressed issuer then seeks to avoid bankruptcy by entering into negotiations with its bondholders. “If we default and are forced into bankruptcy,” they say, “then bondholders will end up collecting no more than 20 cents on the dollar in a liquidation. But if you agree to a restructuring which keeps us out of the bankrupcy court, we can get you a good 45 cents on the dollar in value.”

Normally, bondholders would be well disposed to such an offer. But in this case, I might think twice. If the restructuring doesn’t count as an event of default for the purposes of the CDS contract, then I might end up with just 45 cents on the dollar — $450,000 — if I agree to the company’s plan. If I just let it go bust, on the other hand, I get $600,000. And so I have an incentive to opt for the more economically-destructive option.

Now there’s one big problem with this story: any restructuring as drastic as the one I described would count as an event of default — so owners of credit protection would get paid out either way.

But the fact is that whenever bondholders have bought credit protection, someone else — the protection seller — is in the position of caring deeply whether or not a restructuring goes through. But at the same time, that person can only cheer from the sidelines, and has no actual role in the bondholder negotiations, since they’re not a bondholder. Meanwhile, the bondholder doesn’t care nearly as much about the outcome of the negotiations as the issuer would like, since a lot of his exposure is hedged either way.

All of which leads Megan to propose that “swap contracts should allow the issuers to get involved in these negotiations, the way insurance companies sit at the table during lawsuits”. This is a bad idea, since there’s no limit to the amount of credit protection which can be written on any given issuer. A company thinks its dealing with a known quantity of bondholders, and then suddenly sits down at the restructuring-negotiation table to find ten times as many protection sellers? No one wants that.

And Charles Davi’s idea that companies could somehow constrain their creditors from buying credit protection is even sillier — and probably illegal. The whole point of issuing bonds is that they’re tradable, fungible, and anonymously held. You can’t covenant up bondholders in the same way you can with bank lenders.

The real solution here is to minimize the economic costs of bankruptcy. If the outcome of bankruptcy proceedings is that creditors end up with just as much value as they would have gotten from a restructuring, then there’s really no problem either way. When it’s done well, bankruptcy is little more than a change of ownership: shareholders get wiped out or diluted, and the old creditors become the new owners. The company itself doesn’t need to change much at all.

But there are certainly times when a constructive bond restructuring is going to create much more value than a drawn-out bankruptcy proceeding. And the existence of the CDS market does make such restructurings more difficult — just as the fact that mortgages have been sliced and securitized makes mortgage modifications more difficult.

Restructuring bonds outside bankruptcy is never easy — and that in fact is one reason why the bond market is normally so healthy: both issuers and investors know that companies can’t easily go back on their promise to pay what they owe. That helps to bring down the cost of funding for all companies in the bond market. But in times like these, when restructurings sadly become necessary on a large scale, having a lot of bonded debt is a problem. And when that bonded debt has been hedged in the CDS market, the problem becomes bigger still."

Me:

Let me try and understand this: I own a bond of a particular company that I bought expecting to be paid a certain amount. To protect my investment, I accept the extra investment of insurance on that bond. I thereby lessen my risk, and increase my expenses. Another bond buyer doesn’t buy insurance and has more risk. What on earth is wrong with that? It makes perfect sense to me.

So, the company is trying to restructure outside of bankruptcy. Let’s leave the type and point of bankruptcy out of it in this case. I can either accept a deal from the company or hold out for bankruptcy, depending upon what is better for me. Isn’t that our system?

The company can induce me to accept their restructuring plan by convincing me that they have a plan that will pay off for me in the long run, etc. If they don’t have one, I shouldn’t have to accept their plan.

As near as I can tell, we’re trying to create a system where my taking less risk is to be penalized because it might not fit some other person’s view of whether or not a particular company is worth trying to save. Weird. Another day, another weird and paradoxical proposal. I surely must be misunderstanding this argument. I must be very tired. I apologize.

- Posted by Don the libertarian Democrat

Friday, April 17, 2009

Many of the poor underwriting practices in the subprime market were also potentially unfair and deceptive to consumers.

TO BE NOTED: From the Fed:

"
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke

At the Federal Reserve System's Sixth Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C.

April 17, 2009

Financial Innovation and Consumer Protection

The concept of financial innovation, it seems, has fallen on hard times. Subprime mortgage loans, credit default swaps, structured investment vehicles, and other more-recently developed financial products have become emblematic of our present financial crisis. Indeed, innovation, once held up as the solution, is now more often than not perceived as the problem. I think that perception goes too far, and innovation, at its best, has been and will continue to be a tool for making our financial system more efficient and more inclusive. But, as we have seen only too clearly during the past two years, innovation that is inappropriately implemented can be positively harmful. In short, it would be unwise to try to stop financial innovation, but we must be more alert to its risks and the need to manage those risks properly.

My remarks today will focus on the consumer protection issues raised by financial innovation. First, though, I want to say how pleased I am to join you for the sixth biennial Federal Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference. We all want to see our communities grow and thrive, especially those that have been traditionally underserved. But the people in this room know as well as anyone that, when it comes to consumer protection and community development, good intentions are not enough. Hard-won knowledge, as exemplified by the empirical work presented here during the past two days, is required. I applaud your diligent and tough-minded research in analyzing what works and what doesn't. Only with such knowledge can efforts to spread prosperity more widely become increasingly effective.

Sources of Financial Innovation
Where does financial innovation come from? In the United States in recent decades, three particularly important sources of innovation have been financial deregulation, public policies toward credit markets, and broader technological change. I'll talk briefly about each of these sources.

The process of financial deregulation began in earnest in the 1970s, a period when stringent regulations limited competition and the range of product offerings in the markets for consumer credit. For example, Regulation Q, which capped interest rates on deposits, hampered the ability of depository institutions to attract funding and thus to extend credit. Restrictions on branching were a particularly significant constraint, as they limited the size of the market that individual depository institutions could service and thus their scope to reduce costs through economies of scale.1 The lifting of these regulations, especially branching restrictions, allowed the development of national banking networks. With national networks, the fixed costs of product innovation could be spread over larger markets, making the development and marketing of new products more profitable.

Many public policy decisions have affected the evolution of financial products and lending practices. One particularly important example was the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), which induced lenders to find ways to extend credit and provide services in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Another important set of policies was the government's support for the development of secondary mortgage markets, particularly through the government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Secondary mortgage markets were rudimentary and thin in the 1970s; indeed, the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts do not even record private securitization activity until the early 1980s. As secondary mortgage markets--an important innovation in themselves--grew, they gave lenders both greater access to funding and better ability to diversify, providing further impetus to expansion into new markets and new products.

On the technological front, advances in information technology made possible the low-cost collection, processing, and dissemination of household and business financial data, functions that were once highly localized and, by today's standards, inefficiently managed.2 As credit reporting advanced, models for credit scoring gradually emerged, allowing for ever-faster evaluation of creditworthiness, identification of prospective borrowers, and management of existing accounts.

All these developments had their positive aspects, including for people in low- and moderate-income communities. Prior to the introduction of the CRA, as you know, many of these communities had limited access to mortgages and other forms of consumer credit. Subsequent innovations in financial products and services, processes, and technology helped at least some underserved consumers more fully enter the financial mainstream, save money, invest, and build wealth, and homeownership rates rose significantly.

Yet with hindsight, we can see that something went wrong in recent years, as evidenced by the currently high rates of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure, especially in minority and lower-income neighborhoods. Indeed, we have come almost full circle, with credit availability increasingly restricted for low- and moderate-income borrowers. And the damage from this turn in the credit cycle--in terms of lost wealth, lost homes, and blemished credit histories--is likely to be long-lasting. One would be forgiven for concluding that the assumed benefits of financial innovation are not all they were cracked up to be.

A number of factors explain the recent credit boom and bust, including problems stemming from financial innovation. From a consumer protection point of view, a particular concern has been the sharp increase in the complexity of the financial products offered to consumers, complexity which has been a side effect of innovation but which also has in many cases been associated with reduced transparency and clarity in the products being offered. I will illustrate the issue in the context of some familiar forms of consumer credit: credit cards, mortgages, and overdraft protection.

Credit Cards, Mortgages, and Overdrafts: Some Instructive Examples
The credit card is an example of financial innovation driven by technological advance, including improvements in communications, data management, and credit scoring. When the first general-purpose credit card was issued in 1952, it represented a way to make small loans more quickly and at a lower cost than the closed-end installment loans offered by retailers and finance companies at the time. Moreover, this form of credit doubled as a means of payment. Card issuers benefited by spreading fixed costs over multiple advances of credit, over larger customer bases, across geographic areas, and among many merchants.3 From the consumer's perspective, credit cards provided convenience, facilitated recordkeeping, and offered security from loss (by theft, for example).4 Their use gradually expanded among American families, rising to 43 percent in 1983 and to 70 percent by 2007. Among lower-income families, usage increased from 11 percent in 1983 to 37 percent in 2007.5

Mortgage markets saw similar product innovations. For example, in the early 1990s, automated underwriting systems helped open new opportunities for underserved consumers to obtain traditional forms of mortgage credit. This innovation was followed by an expansion of lending to borrowers perceived to have high credit risk, which became known as the subprime market. Lenders developed new techniques for using credit information to determine underwriting standards, set interest rates, and manage their risks. As I have already mentioned, the ongoing growth and development of the secondary mortgage market reinforced the effect of these innovations, giving mortgage lenders greater access to the capital markets, lowering transaction costs, and spreading risk more broadly. Subprime lending rose dramatically from 5 percent of total mortgage originations in 1994 to about 20 percent in 2005 and 2006.6

Innovation thus laid the groundwork for the expansion of credit card and mortgage lending that has taken place over the past 15 years or so, as well as some other forms of credit like auto loans. However, while innovation often brought consumers improved access to credit, it also brought increased complexity and an array of choices that consumers have often found difficult to evaluate properly.

Take the case of credit cards. In the early days, a card may have allowed the user to make purchases or obtain cash advances, with a single, unchanging annual percentage rate, or APR, applied to each feature. Card fees were typically limited to an annual fee, a charge for cash advances, and perhaps fees for making a late payment or exceeding the credit limit. In contrast, today's more-complex products offer balance transfers and treat different classes of purchases and cash advances as different features, each with its own APR. In addition, interest rates adjust much more frequently than they once did, and the array of fees charged for various features, requirements, or services has grown.

More-complex plans may benefit some consumers; for example, pricing that varies according to consumers' credit risk and preferences for certain services may improve access to credit and allow for more-customized products. Growing complexity, however, has increased the probability that even the most diligent consumers will not understand or notice key terms that affect a plan's cost in important ways. When complexity reaches the point of reducing transparency, it impedes competition and leads consumers to make poor choices. And, in some cases, complexity simply serves to disguise practices that are unfair and deceptive.

Mortgage products have likewise become much more complex. Moreover, in recent years, the increased complexity has sometimes interacted with weakened incentives for good underwriting, to the detriment of the borrower. The practice of securitization, notwithstanding its benefits, appears to have been one source of the decline in underwriting standards during the recent episode. Depending on the terms of the sale, originators who sold mortgage loans passed much of the risk--including the risks of poor underwriting--on to investors. Compensation structures for originators also caused problems in some cases. For example, some incentive schemes linked originator revenue to particular loan features and to volume rather than to the quality of the loan. Complexity made the problem worse, as the wide array of specialized products made consumer choices more difficult. For example, some originators offered what were once niche products--such as interest-only mortgages or no-documentation loans--to a wider group of consumers. And, we have learned, loan features matter. Some studies of mortgage lending outcomes, after controlling for borrower characteristics, have found elevated levels of default associated with certain loan features, including adjustable rates and prepayment penalties, as well as with certain origination channels, including broker originations.7 Although these results are not conclusive, they suggest that complexity may diminish consumers' ability to identify products appropriate to their circumstances.

The vulnerabilities created by misaligned incentives and product complexity in the mortgage market were largely disguised so long as home prices continued to appreciate, allowing troubled borrowers to refinance or sell their properties. Once housing prices began to flatten and then decline, however, the problems became apparent. Mortgage delinquencies and foreclosure starts for subprime mortgages increased dramatically beginning in 2006 and spread to near-prime (alt-A) loans soon thereafter. By the fourth quarter of 2008, the percentages of loans 60 days past due, 90 days or more past due, and in foreclosure were at record highs.8

Credit cards and mortgages are not the only product classes for which innovation has been associated with increased complexity and reduced transparency. I will cite one more example: overdraft protection.

Historically, financial institutions used their discretion to determine whether to pay checks that would overdraw a consumer's account. In recent years, institutions automated that process with predetermined thresholds.

Although institutions usually charged the same amount when they paid an overdraft as when they returned the check unpaid, many consumers appreciated this service because it saved them from additional merchant fees and the embarrassment of a bounced check. However, technological innovations allowed institutions to extend the service, often without consumers' understanding or approval, to non-check transactions such as ATM withdrawals and debit card transactions. As a result, consumers who used their debit cards at point-of-sale terminals to make retail purchases, for instance, could inadvertently incur hundreds of dollars in overdraft fees for small purchases. In response to this problem, the Board last December proposed regulatory changes that would give consumers a meaningful choice regarding the payment of these kinds of overdraft fees, and we expect to issue a final rule later this year.

Protecting Consumers in an Era of Innovation and Complexity
In light of this experience, how should policymakers ensure that consumers are protected without stifling innovation that improves product choice and expands access to sustainable credit? The first line of defense undoubtedly is a well-informed consumer. The Federal Reserve System has a long-standing commitment to promoting financial literacy, and we devote considerable resources to helping consumers educate themselves about their financial options.9 Consumers who know what questions to ask are considerably better able to find the financial products and services that are right for them.

The capacity of any consumer, including the best informed, to make good choices among financial products is enhanced by clear and well-organized disclosures. The Board has a number of responsibilities and authorities with respect to consumer disclosures, responsibilities we take very seriously. In the past year or so, the Board has developed extensive new disclosures for a variety of financial products, most notably credit cards, and we are currently in the midst of a major overhaul of mortgage disclosures.

In designing new disclosures, we have increased our use of consumer testing. The process of exploring how consumers process information and come to understand--or sometimes misunderstand--important features of financial products has proven eye-opening. We have used what we learned from consumer testing to make our required disclosures better. For example, our recently released rules on credit card disclosures require certain key terms to be included in a conspicuous table provided at account opening; we took this route because our field testing indicated that consumers were often already familiar with and able to interpret such tables on applications and solicitations, but that they were unlikely to read densely written account agreements.

We have also learned from consumer testing, however, that not even the best disclosures are always adequate. According to our testing, some aspects of increasingly complex products simply cannot be adequately understood or evaluated by most consumers, no matter how clear the disclosure. In those cases, direct regulation, including the prohibition of certain practices, may be the only way to provide appropriate protections. An example that came up in our recent rulemaking was the allocation of payments by credit card issuers. As creditors began offering different interest rates for purchases, cash advances, and balance transfers, they were also able to increase their revenues through their policies for allocating consumer payments. For example, a consumer might be charged 12 percent on purchases but 20 percent for cash advances. Under the old rules, if the consumer made a payment greater than the minimum required payment, most creditors would apply the payment to the purchase balance, the portion with the lower rate, thus extending the period that the consumer would be paying the higher rate. Under these circumstances, the consumer is effectively prevented from paying off the cash advance balance unless the purchase balance is first paid in full.

In an attempt to help consumers understand this practice and its implications, the Federal Reserve Board twice designed model disclosures that were intended to inform consumers about payment allocation. But extensive testing indicated that, when asked to review and interpret our best attempts at clear disclosures, many consumers did not demonstrate an understanding of payment allocation practices sufficient to make informed decisions. In light of the apparent inadequacy of disclosures alone in this case, and because the methods of payment allocation used by creditors were clearly structured to produce the maximum cost to the consumer, last year we put rules in place that will limit the discretion of creditors to allocate consumers' payments made above the minimum amount required. We banned so-called double-cycle billing--in which a bank calculates interest based not only on the current balance, but also on the prior month's balance--on similar grounds; we found from testing that the complexity of this billing method served only to reduce transparency to the consumer without producing any reasonable benefit. These actions were part of the most comprehensive change to credit card regulations ever adopted by the Board.

Similar issues have arisen in the mortgage arena. Many of the poor underwriting practices in the subprime market were also potentially unfair and deceptive to consumers. For example, the failure to include an escrow account for homeowners' insurance and property taxes in many cases led borrowers to underestimate the costs of homeownership. In this case, allowing greater optionality--which we usually think of as a benefit--had the adverse effects of increasing complexity and reducing transparency. Restricting this practice was one of the new protections in the residential mortgage market that the Board established in a comprehensive set of rules released in July. Banning or limiting certain underwriting practices, which the new rules do for the entire mortgage market, also helps to address the incentive problems I discussed earlier. For institutions that we supervise, these incentive issues can also be addressed by requiring that lenders set up compensation plans for originators that induce behavior consistent with safety and soundness.

Where does all this leave us? It seems clear that the difficulty of managing financial innovation in the period leading up to the crisis was underestimated, and not just in the case of consumer lending. For example, complexity and lack of transparency have been a problem for certain innovative products aimed at investors, such as some structured credit products.

Conclusion
I don't think anyone wants to go back to the 1970s. Financial innovation has improved access to credit, reduced costs, and increased choice. We should not attempt to impose restrictions on credit providers so onerous that they prevent the development of new products and services in the future.

That said, the recent experience has shown some ways in which financial innovation can misfire. Regulation should not prevent innovation, rather it should ensure that innovations are sufficiently transparent and understandable to allow consumer choice to drive good market outcomes. We should be wary of complexity whose principal effect is to make the product or service more difficult to understand by its intended audience. Other questions about proposed innovations should be raised: For instance, how will the innovative product or practice perform under stressed financial conditions? What effects will the innovation have on the ability and willingness of the lender to make loans that are well underwritten and serve the needs of the borrower? These questions about innovation are relevant for safety-and-soundness supervision as well as for consumer protection.

In sum, the challenge faced by regulators is to strike the right balance: to strive for the highest standards of consumer protection without eliminating the beneficial effects of responsible innovation on consumer choice and access to credit. Our goal should be a financial system in which innovation leads to higher levels of economic welfare for people and communities at all income levels.


Footnotes

1. For a listing of these rules, see Dean F. Amel and Daniel G. Keane (1986), "State Laws Affecting Commercial Bank Branching, Multibank Holding Company Expansion and Interstate Banking," Issues in Bank Regulation, vol. 10, no. 2 (Autumn), pp.30-40. Research indicates that non-interest expenses, wages, and loan losses all declined following the lifting of branching restrictions leading to lower loan prices. Also, the lifting of geographic restrictions lead to larger and more diversified banking institutions. See Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan (forthcoming), "Regulation and Deregulation of the U.S. Banking Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future," in Nancy Rose, ed., Economics of Regulation, NBER Conference Volume. Return to text

2. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007), Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit, (Washington: Board of Governors, August). Return to text

3. Dagobert L. Brito and Peter R. Hartley (1995), "Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards," Leaving the Board Journal of Political Economy, vol. 103 (April), pp. 400-33. Return to text

4. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2006), Report to the Congress on Practices of the Consumer Credit Industry in Soliciting and Extending Credit and their Effects on Consumer Debt and Insolvency (Washington: Board of Governors, June). Return to text

5. See note 4, Report to the Congress on Practices of the Consumer Credit Industry, table 6; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007), 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, Board of Governors. Return to text

6. See Chris Mayer and Karen Pence (2008), "Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to Whom?" Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-29 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June); and Inside Mortgage Finance (2007), The 2007 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual vol. 1; The Primary Market (Bethesda, Md.: Inside Mortgage Finance Publications). Return to text

7. Lei Ding, Roberto Quercia, Wei Li, and Janneke Ratcliffe (2008), "Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects Using Propensity Score Models," Leaving the Board Working Paper (Chapel Hill, N.C.: UNC Center for Community Capital). See also Elizabeth Laderman and Carolina Reid (2009), "CRA Lending During the Subprime Meltdown (470 KB PDF)," in Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, pp. 115-33 (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, February). Other studies do not find evidence of consistent harm from stemming from certain practices or products. See, for example, Morgan J. Rose (2008), "Predatory Lending Practices and Subprime Foreclosures: Distinguishing Impacts by Loan Category," Leaving the Board Journal of Economics and Business, vol. 60 (January-February), pp. 13-32; and Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette, and Paul S. Willen (2008), "Just the Facts: An Initial Analysis of Subprime's Role in the Housing Crisis," Leaving the Board Journal of Housing Economics, vol. 17 (December), pp. 291-305. Return to text

8. Mortgage Bankers Association (2009), National Delinquency Survey, MBA, March. Return to text

9. See, for instance, materials on the Consumer Information portion of the Federal Reserve's website. Return to text"

bondholders who have purchased CDS on this debt have little incentive to negotiate or play ball

From Clusterstock:

"
The AIG Bailout Is Pushing Other Companies Into Bankruptcy

blackhole-tbi.jpgThis week, mall operator General Growth Partners (GGP) and newsprint maker AbitibiBowater both filed for bankruptcy, after failing to persuade bondholders to restructure voluntarily.

Now lawyers involved in these bankruptcy proceedings tell the Financial Times that the credit default swaps are the problem -- mainly, bondholders who have purchased CDS on this debt have little incentive to negotiate or play ball, since the CDS, if the counterparty honors the agreement, makes them whole.

FT: Some creditors, including Citigroup, which held a small exposure to AbitibiBowater, hedged themselves in the CDS market, meaning their economic interest in the deal was different to lenders who had not bought credit insurance, according to people familiar with the matter. Citigroup declined to comment.

Lawyers say CDS holdings were also a factor in the default and filing for Chapter 11 protection of General Growth Properties this week. Restructuring advisers expect many more such cases involving so-called fallen angels, or firms originally investment grade, since CDS was widely sold on such names.

Now just take a wild guess. What firm is most likely to be on the other end of Citi's CDS purchase? AIG maybe?

If it is AIG, it means our bailout is pushing companies into bankruptcy that might otherwise be able to restructure.

Note that this has been alleged before, though previously with GM's ongoing failure to get its bondholders to exchange debt for equity. Now those involved in actual bankruptcies are citing it as a problem."

Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat (URL) said:
"hedged themselves in the CDS market"

This makes sense. They insured themselves against a loss in their bonds. Consequently, they will be paid something either way, and are simply trying to figure out the best deal. What's the problem? Wouldn't you do that? The other creditors took a risk by not buying CDS insurance. What am I missing?

Sunday, April 12, 2009

It does not create value but redistributes it in a way that consumes real resources and exposes the real economy to unnecessary risk

From Buiter:

"Useless finance, harmful finance and useful finance

April 12, 2009 6:31pm

Useless finance

A derivative is a contingent claim whose payoff depends on the performance of some other financial instrument or security. For instance, an American equity call option gives the purchaser of the call the right (but not the obligation) to buy a share of equity from the issuer or writer of the call option at or before some future date at a price determined today. A credit default swap (CDS) is a credit derivative contract between two (counter)parties in which the holder makes periodic payments to the issuer in return for a payoff if the underlying financial instrument specified in the contract defaults.

A derivative contract is formally identical to a lottery, a (simple or compound) bet or gamble. Like any financial claim, any derivative is an ‘inside asset’ - it is in zero net supply. Because pay-offs associated with a derivative contract are functions of observable properties of other financial claims (prices, interest rates, default states), the derivative contract either re-packages existing underlying uncertainty or creates additional ‘artificial’ uncertainty. It would create additional extraneous uncertainty if it added some noise of its own to the fundamental, exogenous uncertainty that is presumably reflected in the features of the underlying security that determine the pay-offs of the derivative contract.

If the creation and trading of derivatives were costless, derivatives result in zero-sum redistributions of wealth between the issuers and the owners of the derivative contracts. Costless derivatives would be redundant if markets were complete. When markets are incomplete, as they are in our unfortunate universe, introducing derivatives can either lead to an increase or to a reduction in efficiency and social welfare. Lower efficiency and social welfare are possible even if creating and trading derivatives were costless. Derivatives may improve the allocation of risk, but there is no guarantee that they will. It is my contention that the unbridled explosion of certain categories of derivatives has done considerable harm, and that it is necessary to regulate all derivatives trading.

How can creating lotteries, even if they only mirror fundamental underlying uncertainty, be welfare increasing? The usual argument involves examples where there is a given quantum of ‘objective’ or ‘exogenous’ uncertainty in the world, e.g. uncertainty about endowments, technology and tastes (all assumed exogenous - only economists would treat technology and taste as exogenous, of course!). Markets for risk trading are incomplete and creating derivatives markets does not alter the objective/exogenous uncertainty in the world. Creating and trading derivatives is costless.

In such a world one can imagine a pension fund that wishes to hold default risk-free 10 year government securities, but unable to find them in the market, instead holding 10 year AAA corporate bonds and CDS to cover the default risk of these corporate securities. Provided the writer of the CDS is creditworthy, the pension fund could achieve its preferred portfolio mix. If the writer of the CDS has the appropriate capital structure and balance sheet, it could be both willing and able to bear the default risk on the corporate bonds than the pension fund. For the lottery created by a derivative contract to be welfare-increasing, it will have to produce a positive monetary pay-off for the purchaser of the derivative in exactly those ‘states of nature’ where the purchaser will be worst off, while at the same time ensuring that the corresponding negative monetary pay-off for the writer of the derivative does not hurt the writer of the derivative too badly.

It would of course be more direct to draw up contracts contingent on the exogenous uncertainty directly. If the pension fund’s ‘endowment’ were to be negatively correlated with that of some other legal entity, and if the two endowments could be observed and verified, an endowment-sharing rule could be specified that would make both parties better off. You would not start looking for contracts specifying payments that are contingent on endogenous risk, such as default risk or the behaviour of some price or interest rate.

Derivatives, insurance and gambling

Consider the CDS. The purchaser pays a premium to the writer of a CDS. That is the price of the lottery ticket, or the price of the betting slip. If the underlying security specified in the contract defaults, the writer of the CDS pays the owner of the CDS a specified amount of money. That’s the lottery prize, or the winnings of the bet. In the UK where there are more legal forms of gambling than in most other countries, many conventional financial instruments or securities have been ‘re-engineered’ as formal bets. Spread betting on exchange rates, interest rates, stock prices and now also house price indices is a popular form of investment. The reason is that earnings from gambling are not taxed. The government presumably does not tax the gains and losses from gambling because (ignoring the value added of the gambling industry) gambling winnings equal gambling losses, so if the tax code allows loss offsets, there is not much point (ignoring progressivity of taxation & other complications) in taxing the gains and losses from gambling.

Derivatives can be used to provide insurance (paying a premium to buy protection against a possible loss) or to gamble (paying a premium to acquire the opportunity to benefit from a possible gain). CDS can provide either insurance against loss or an opportunity to gamble. This is because the buyer of a CDS does not need to own the underlying security or other form of credit exposure. The buyer does not have to suffer any loss from the default event and may in fact benefit from it.

When purchasing an insurance contract, the insured party is generally expected to have an insurable interest in the event against which he takes out insurance. This simply means that he cannot be better off if the insured against event occurs than if it does not occur. Determining what constitutes an insurable interest is often complicated in practice, but simple in principle: you have an insurable interest if, when (a) the future contingency you insure against occurs and (b) the insurance contract performs (something you cannot necessarily count on, without assistance from the tax payer, if you buy your CDS from AIG), you are not better off than you would be if the insured-against future contingency did not occur.

Clearly, CDS contracts don’t require an insurable interest to be present. Many other derivatives likewise don’t require an insurable interest to be present. Short selling a share of common stock in the hope/expectation of a fall in the price of the equity without either owning or borrowing the stock (naked short selling) is an example of a derivative contract without an insurable interest.

Why should the state care about gambling through derivative contracts?

Harmful finance

(1) Gambling is addictive

Like all forms of gambling (deliberate risk-seeking), gambling in the derivatives markets can be addictive. This may create a paternalism-based argument for regulating, restricting or even banning the activity. Having observed derivatives writers, purchasers and traders in action, it is clear that the thrill of the gamble is part of the motivation behind this activity. The monetary gains and losses figure prominently, of course, but the bungee-jumping, sky-diving, tight-rope-walking-without-a-net dimensions of derivatives trading definitely play a role. It cannot be a coincidence that there are so many more male than female traders and other operators in the financial markets. Testosterone is not underrepresented in the trading room. And the thrill of taking a wide-open position can be addictive. I wouldn’t be surprised if Gamblers Anonymous had a special chapter for derivatives gambling.

I am generically underwhelmed by arguments for protecting compos mentis adults against themselves based on paternalism, but the list of arguments would not be complete without it.

(2) Moral hazard or micro-level endogenous risk.

This is the familiar argument already mentioned before, that if the insured party (the purchaser of a CDS, for instance) can influence the likelihood of the insured-against contingency (the default of the underlying security) occurring without the writer of the insurance contract (the issuer of the CDS) being aware of this, there is an obvious case of market failure and potential source of inefficiency. It’s also likely to be an illegal form of market manipulation.

(3) Derivative contracts as “bearer lottery tickets”

Unlike most conventional lotteries, the lottery tickets created as part of many derivatives contracts are traded in secondary markets, sometimes over the counter (OTC markets), sometimes on organised exchanges. These lottery tickets or betting slips are not just traded after they are issued (sold by the writer in the ‘primary issue market’), most of these derivative contracts are bearer securities: their ownership is not registered. The owner is anonymous. Listed common stock, by contrast, is an example of what I have called a ‘registered security’. There is an ownership register, which is, at least in principle, in the public domain. Clearly, establishing the beneficial ownership of an equity share may not be a simple matter of looking in the shareowners register in the jurisdiction where stock is listed, but with bearer securities the task is hopeless.

The writer of the derivative contract does not in general know the identity of the current owner of the contract. If the writer does not know this, the supervisor and regulator, or the state agency in charge of macro-prudential supervision (typically the central bank) does not know it either. There is therefore absolutely no way to determine whether the current distribution of the ownership of derivative contracts is systemically stabilising or destabilising, whether it is too concentrated or too dispersed. When a notional gross $60 trillion worth of CDS outstanding at the peak (yes, I know it’s ‘only’ $30 trillion now and much of it is ‘offsetting’ in some ill-defined way) and possibly around $400 trillion gross outstanding of total derivatives, we are talking ignorance on a cosmic scale.

(4) Risk-seeking by the over-confident

Even if the secondary markets for derivatives functioned properly (no bubbles, no liquidity seizures, no wide-spread defaults), these secondary markets can, like the primary issue market, redistribute the additional risk represented by any derivative either in a way that improves the ultimate allocation and sharing of risk or worsens it. Once a new derivative market is created, this market can either be used to hedge existing risk or to take on additional risk. I have seen no reliable statistics on the identities of the counterparties in the leading derivatives markets. My best guess is that most of the activity is not between households and financial intermediaries or between non-financial enterprises and financial intermediaries, but among financial intermediaries, mainly among different banking or shadow-banking player. Much of this trading appears to be driven by overconfidence and hubris. I have yet to meet a trader who did not believe that he or she could not beat the market. Because collectively these traders effectively are the market, they are collectively irrational, as they cannot beat themselves. So the risk ends up being concentrated not among those most capable of bearing it, but among those most willing to bear it - those most confident of being able to bear it and profit from it.

(5) Churning

The collective hubris of the banking sector (broadly defined to include all the shadow-banking sector institutions like hedge funds, private equity funds, SIVs, conduits, other investment funds, AIG-style insurance companies etc.) means that enormous volumes of bets are placed on the behaviour of endogenous variables. The first consequence of this is that, since derivatives trading is not costless, scarce skilled resources are diverted to what are not even games of pure redistribution. Instead these resources are diverted towards games involving the redistribution of a social pie that shrinks as more players enter the game.

The inefficient redistribution of risk that can be the by-product of the creation of new derivatives markets and their inadequate regulation can also affect the real economy through an increase in the scope and severity of defaults. Defaults, insolvency and bankruptcy are key components of a market economy based on property rights. There involve more than a redistribution of property rights (both income and control rights). They also destroy real resources. The zero-sum redistribution characteristic of derivatives contracts in a frictionless world becomes a negative-sum redistribution when default and insolvency is involved. There is a fundamental asymmetry in the market game between winners and losers: there is no such thing as super-solvency for winners. But there is such a thing as insolvency for losers, if the losses are large enough.

The easiest solution to this churning problem would be to restrict derivatives trading to insurance, pure and simple. The party purchasing the insurance should be able to demonstrate an insurable interest. CDS could only be bought and sold in combination with a matching amount of the underlying security. Ideally, it ought to be possible to for me to buy a CDS by demonstrating an insurable interest in terms of my “utility”, i.e. by demonstrating that, should the underlying security default, I would be worse off in one way or other, not necessarily because I own the underlying security. In practice, this would be wide open to abuse and manipulation.

(6) Macro-endogenous risk

Financial markets are inefficient in any of the ways specified by James Tobin in a great 1984 paper - information arbitrage efficiency, fundamental valuation efficiency, functional efficiency or Arrow-Debreu full insurance efficiency.[1] Financial markets even often are technically inefficient. A market is technically or trading efficient if it is liquid and competitive, that is, it is possible to buy or sell large quantities with very low transaction costs, at little or no notice and without a significant impact on the market price. We have seen many examples, from the ABS markets and the commercial paper markets to the interbank markets of massive and persistent failures of technical or trading efficiency.

Even in those financial markets that are reasonably technically efficient, like the US stock market, the foreign exchange markets and the government debt markets, Tobin saw frequent departures from efficiency in the less restricted senses of the word. He accepted that financial markets possessed what he called ‘information arbitrage efficiency’ that is, that they were informationally efficient in the weak and semi-strong sense. You cannot systematically make money trading on the basis of generally available public information. Clearly, however, trading profitably on the basis of insider information is possible.

He did not believe that financial markets consistently possessed ‘fundamental valuation efficiency’: financial asset prices do not necessarily reflect the rational expectations of the future payments to which the asset gives title. Key financial markets, including the stock market, the long-term debt market and the foreign exchange market are characterised both by excess volatility and persistent misalignments, that is, prices deviating persistently from fundamental valuations.

Tobin also contested the notion that the financial markets delivered ‘value for money’ in the social sense. “the services of the system do not come cheap. An immense amount of activity takes place, and considerable resources are devoted to it.” (Tobin [1984, p. 284]). Tobin referred to this aspect of efficiency as ‘functional efficiency’. Finally, the system of financial markets can be efficient in the technical, information arbitrage, fundamental valuation and functional senses without possessing what Tobin called Arrow-Debreu full insurance efficiency, that is, without supporting Pareto-efficient economy-wide outcomes. The reason is that real world financial markets interact with labour and goods markets that are inefficient in every sense of the word.

When financial markets are inefficient, the distinction between fundamental, exogenous variables and endogenous variables disappears. CDS prices can become quasi-autonomous drivers of the bond prices. The tail can wag the dog. The redistributions of wealth associated with the execution of derivatives contracts can trigger margin calls, mark-to-market revaluations of assets and liabilities, forced liquidations of illiquid asset holdings through fire-sales in dysfunctional markets, defaults and bankruptcies. Activities in derivatives markets, including futures markets, can feed back on sport markets and real production, consumption and storage decisions.

Unbridled derivatives markets may be liquid, but the question is, to what purpose? If, as I believe, there is no economic rationale for ‘naked’ CDS positions (that is, CDS that do not insure an open default position in the underlying security), then liquidity of the CDS market only serves those who want to trade naked CDS. This, in my view, only wastes real resources through (a) churning and (b) unnecessary bankruptcies.

Useful finance

I want to end on an upbeat note. I believe that effective and efficient financial intermediation is a necessary condition for prosperity. To those who doubt this, I recommend a reading of two books about the true microfoundations of financial intermediation, Hernando de Soto’s, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, New York: Basic Books (2000) Prosperity Unbound: Building Property Markets with Trust, by Elena Panaritis (Palgrave MacMillan 2007). If you have only time for one, read the shorter work by Elena Panaritis. It describes the fascinating story of how personal possessions (characterised through informal, insecure property rights) were turned into secure property rights and thence into productive capital through a World Bank project in Peru. The book shows the importance of local knowledge and of a deep understanding of the institutional prerequisites for a successful market economy based on collateralisable wealth (especially real estate). To raise the quality of the rule of law in the property sector to the point small businesses can credibly offer land and other real estate as collateral for formal sector finance requires a formal titling authority, a state capable of reliably maintaining property records, a functional judicial system, corruption levels bounded from above etc.

The world described in these books, where the foundations of a productive market economy are being put in place, appears light years removed from the world of Wall Street and the City of London. In Peru, access to formal sector finance on reasonable terms thanks to the newly created ability to offer collateral and perfect security interest, has lifted many out of grinding poverty. In Wall Street and the City of London, massive resources and lobbying power were devoted to turning complex, long-term relationships into tradable securities - preferably into tradable bearer securities, even when the informational preconditions for this transformation to be effective were not satisfied. Increasingly, as in the case of bearer instruments like mortgage-backed securities for instance, the ultimate issuer and the current owner of the instrument knew nothing about each other. And even with simpler bearer securities, most of the time no-one knows who the current owner is, not even the supervisor and regulator.

The endless churning of contingent claims, including derivatives, when the purchaser has no identifiable insurable interest, turns financial intermediation into a market-mediated betting shop. Then the betting slips become bearer securities and are themselves traded, either OTC or on organised exchanges, and the derivative transactions volumes expand to dwarf the transactions in the markets for the underlying financial claims (let alone the markets for the underlying real resources). At that point, the betting tip of the financial tail of the real economy dog does all the wagging. It does not create value but redistributes it in a way that consumes real resources and exposes the real economy to unnecessary risk. It’s time to tame the tiger.


[1] Tobin, James [1984], “On the Efficiency of the Financial System”, Fred Hirsch Memorial Lecture, New York, Lloyds Bank Review, No. 153, July, pp. 1-15, reprinted in Tobin [1987], Policies for Prosperity; Essays in a Keynesian Mode, Edited by Peter M. Jackson, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, Sussex. pp. 282-296. "

Me:

Now look at them yo-yo's that's the way you do it
You play the guitar on the MTV
That ain't workin' that's the way you do it
Money for nothin' and your chicks for free
Now that ain't workin' that's the way you do it
Lemme tell ya them guys ain't dumb
Maybe get a blister on your little finger
Maybe get a blister on your thumb

We gotta install microwave ovens
Custom kitchen deliveries
We gotta move these refrigerators
We gotta move these colour TV's