Showing posts with label Geither. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Geither. Show all posts

Sunday, May 3, 2009

You can’t make a borderline-solvent bank healthy by increasing its liabilities, only by decreasing them

From Reuters:

"Felix Salmon

a good kind of contagious

Posted by: Felix Salmon
Tags: blogonomics, journalism

In traditional journalism, you publish what you know for sure as quickly as you can while being assiduous about maintaining accuracy at all times. In financial markets, traders run with rumors and gut feelings and outright guesses on a regular basis, on the basis that they’ll change their mind (or, more to the point, their position) if they turn out to be wrong. And one of the reasons why traders like blogs — and why many journalists don’t like blogs — is that blogs tend to me more traderish than traditional journalism: they’ll run with stuff before it’s nailed down, without checking it, in the full knowledge that it might be wrong. How far they go in that direction depends entirely on the blog, which is one reason why blog readers need to be critical readers: you can’t read a blog and simply know, based on the reputation of the parent institution, that you can trust it implicitly.

For instance: this afternoon, a meme took hold in the blogosphere, started by Zero Hedge, and picked up by the likes of Clusterstock, that there had been some kind of unconscionable bullying of Chrysler holdouts by the White House. Wonderfully, the blog entries caused some real reporting from Dealbook, which got on-the-record denials of any such bullying from both sides. The denials don’t mean that negotiations never got heated at any point of course, but they do mean, I think, that the charges of fascism are maybe a bit overblown.

Blogs can also be sloppy: Clusterstock’s Henry Blodget, for instance, in asking for banks’ senior creditors to be part of any recapitalization by converting their debt to equity, says this:

The best way would have been to seize the banks and restructure them. Since Geithner has opted against the route, however, the next best way would be to convert unsecured bank debt to equity, not just the taxpayers’ preferred stock (the taxpayers’ preferred stock should have been senior to all the bondholders, but that’s spilt milk at this point).

But this just makes no sense: if the taxpayers’ preferred stock had been senior to all the bondholders, it wouldn’t have been preferred stock at all: it would have been a liability of the banks, not equity, and would have done no good whatsoever. You can’t make a borderline-solvent bank healthy by increasing its liabilities, only by decreasing them.

While I’m at it, I should also explain why Blodget’s broader argument is also flawed. He writes, of the plan to convert preferred stock to equity:

The banks will still have the same amount of crap assets on their balance sheets, and they’ll have no more capital available to absorb these losses when they hit. The only thing that will change is that the taxpayer will now get hit first as these losses flow through, instead of getting hit second, as is the case now.

But that’s a huge change, because when common stock holders get hit first, the banks can continue to operate quite happily. If a bank ever reaches the point at which its preferred stock holders get hit, on the other hand, it will pretty much automatically get taken over by the FDIC or otherwise cease to exist in its former form. So converting preferred stock to common really does strengthen a bank and make it more likely to be able to survive future asset write-downs.

Still, I’d much rather read inflammatory or even just plain wrong stuff on blogs than have to wade through execrable nonsense like Vanessa O’Connell’s 2,700-word article on discount shopping in the WSJ magazine. She’s great at (under)stating the bleeding obvious:

According to America’s Research Group, shoppers now view 70 percent off as a great sale, versus the 40-to-50-percent discounts of the past. At the 70 percent level, it’s extremely hard for traditional retailers to make a profit.

But more seriously, she’s also great at blithely parroting numbers without any indication of what they mean:

With carefully managed flash sales of top designer names—from Marc Jacobs to Missoni—it has amassed one million members within 18 months of launching, and the company says it’s on track to multiply its annual revenue to about $80 million, up from less than $7 million.

“On track”, of course, can mean anything — or nothing. If the company wants to give the WSJ its sales numbers, it should give the WSJ its sales numbers. If it doesn’t want to give out those numbers, that’s also fine. But if it doesn’t give out its sales numbers, the WSJ shouldn’t treat it as though it has revealed something interesting or important all the same. Especially when the journalist goes on to contradict herself on much less important numbers pertaining to the company later on in the piece:

Once you are invited to join the online sample sales at Gilt Groupe, get ready. To work up excitement, Gilt blasts an 11:50 a.m. email to its massive member list, with images of some of the designer clothes, shoes and accessories that will be offered at the noon sale time. At 11:59 a.m., there are typically somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 people on the site, waiting for the clock to tick. Most of the merchandise sells out within the hour…

By 11 p.m., more than half of the women’s styles that went on sale at noon are generally sold out.

So, how long does it take for most of the inventory to be sold? One hour, or eleven? Did O’Connell, or her editors, bother to check? It seems not — despite the luxury of long lead times on the magazine.

The problem here, of course, is that because the piece is appearing in a fluffy lifestyle magazine, rather than in the newspaper proper, no one particularly cares about the content — it’s mainly just there to look glossy and help sell watches. Which is never going to be much of an issue on a blog. If you’re reading something on a blog, it’s not because it was commissioned as a high-concept way of filling the feature well, but rather because someone genuinely has something to say and wants to communicate it. You might need to approach with skepticism — but you should do that with all journalism, not just blogs. And if you’re reading critically, you can generally get much more insight from blogs than you can from carefully-circumscribed journalism. They might sometimes be wrong — but at least they’re provocative, interesting, and useful. Which is more than can be said for just about anything in the WSJ magazine.

Journalism can be fantastically good, of course — as can blogging. But when it’s bad, journalism, even in a well-respected publication, can be just painful — more so than just about anything you’re likely to find on a reasonably-respected blog."

Me:

I’m having a hard time figuring out what people are proposing. First of all, from The Economics Of Contempt:

“The whole point of Treasury’s proposed resolution authority is to extend the FDIC’s systemic risk exception to the insolvency regime that governs large bank holding companies (e.g., Citigroup, BofA, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo). If there’s no systemic risk finding, failed bank holding companies will still be handled by the bankruptcy courts. Treasury’s proposal gives the government the same kind of discretion in cases of systemic risk that the FDIC has under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.”

Here’s the plan:

“March 25, 2009
tg-70

Treasury Proposes Legislation for Resolution Authority

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Monday called for new legislation granting additional tools to address systemically significant financial institutions that fall outside of the existing resolution regime under the FDIC. A draft bill will be sent to Congress this week and several key features are highlighted below.

The legislative proposal would fill a significant void in the current financial services regulatory structure and is one piece of a comprehensive regulatory reform strategy that will mitigate systemic risk, enhance consumer and investor protection, while eliminating gaps in the regulatory structure. ”

So the govt is moving towards being able to seize the large banks, but they don’t have the power as of yet. That leaves you with various alternatives, one of which is owning more of the stock, and running the company. This would have a few problems, in that we could still lose a lot of money, and foreign investors and companies will consider us owning the bank to be guaranteeing it. As far as I know, there will still be other shareholders, and they will have certain rights. It could also involve us in foreign politics, as in Mexico with Banamex. Still, it might be better than the current plan.

Now, I thought that this is what Stiglitz and Krugman were proposing, as well as anyone who was complaining that we were investing money but not getting control. After reading Blodget and Krugman, it would be nice to have a clear explanation of exactly what they’re proposing. Are they saying that all creditors would becoming shareholders, but we’d control the bank, because we’ll have more shares? How is that done? What exactly is the alternative to what Geithner’s doing?

- Posted by Don the libertarian Democrat

Monday, March 30, 2009

"Leverage" -- borrowing -- helped create this mess. Now it's expected to get us out.

TO BE NOTED: From Real Clear Markets:

"
Uncle Sam's Massive Hedge Fund By Robert Samuelson

Call it Uncle Sam's hedge fund. The rescue of the American financial system proposed by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is, in all but name, a gigantic hedge fund. The government would lend vast sums to private investors to enable them to buy loss-ridden assets at discounts from banks with the prospect of making sizable profits. If that's not a hedge fund, what would be? The hope is that the $14 trillion U.S. banking system would expand lending if it could get rid of many of the lousy securities and loans already on its books.

Almost everyone thinks that a healthier banking system is necessary for a sustained economic recovery. Can the Geithner plan work? Maybe, though obstacles abound. One is political. Private investors may balk at participating because they fear populist wrath. If the plan succeeds, many wealthy people will become even wealthier. Congress could subject them (or their firms) to humiliating hearings or punitive taxes. Why bother? Another problem: Investors and banks may be unable to agree on prices at which assets would be bought.

But succeed or fail, Geithner's plan illuminates a fascinating irony. "Leverage" -- borrowing -- helped create this mess. Now it's expected to get us out. How can this be? It's not as crazy as it sounds. Start with the basics on how leverage affects investment returns.

Suppose you bought a stock or bond for $100 in cash. If the price rises to $110, you make 10 percent. Not bad. Now, assume that you borrowed $90 of the purchase price at a 5 percent interest rate. Over a year, the stock or bond still increases to $110, but now you've made more than 50 percent. You pay $4.50 in interest and pocket a $5.50 gain on your $10 investment. Note, however, that if the price fell to $95, you'd be virtually wiped out ($4.50 in interest paid plus $5 lost on the security).

Economist John Geanakoplos of Yale University argues that the economy regularly experiences "leverage cycles." When credit is easy, down payment terms are loose. Investors or homeowners can borrow much of the purchase price of houses and securities. Prices of assets (stocks, bonds, real estate) rise, often to artificial levels because investment returns are so attractive. But when credit tightens -- government policy shifts or lenders get nervous -- the process reverses. Prices crash. Leveraged investors sell to repay loans. New borrowers face stiff down payment terms.

To Geanakoplos, we're suffering the harshest leverage cycle since World War II. Three years ago, he says, homebuyers could put down 5 percent or less. Now they've got to advance 20 percent or more. Hedge funds, private equity funds and investment banks could often borrow 90 percent of security purchases; now borrowing can be 10 percent or less. "Deleveraging" has caused prices to plunge to lows that may be as unrealistic as previous highs.

Grasping this, you can understand the idea behind Geithner's hedge fund. It is to inject more leverage into the economy -- not to previous giddy levels but enough to reverse the panic-driven price collapse. Details remain unsettled, but the plan would allow 6-1 leverage ratios in some cases. Here's an example. Private investors put up $5; the Treasury matches that with another $5. This equity investment could then be expanded by $60 of government-guaranteed loans. The entire $70 could be used to buy assets from banks.

Sounds simple. In practice, it won't be. Given all the deleveraging -- a record 15 percent of hedge funds closed last year -- the market prices of many securities have been driven well below prices that seem justified by long-term cash flows. Geanakoplos mentions one mortgage bond whose market value has dropped by roughly 40 percent even though all promised payments have been made and, based on the performance of the underlying mortgage borrowers, seem likely to continue.

If banks sold this and similar credits at today's market prices, they would have to record huge losses. ("Banks Face Big Writedowns in Toxic Asset Plan," headlined the Financial Times.) Their capital would be depleted, and they'd have to raise more or request more from the government. Presumably, the government-supplied leverage would enable investors to pay higher prices. After all, that's the purpose. Still, whether sellers and buyers ultimately agree on prices is unclear.

If they can't, Geithner's hedge fund will remain puny. Cautious banks will continue to constrict credit. But success also poses problems. Money managers talk about making huge annual returns of 20 percent or more from a scheme in which government puts up most of the funds and takes most of the risk. A political backlash might squash the project before it starts. Geithner treads a narrow line between financial paralysis and populist resentment.

Page Printed from: http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2009/03/uncle_sams_massive_hedge_fund.html at March 30, 2009 - 08:34:31 AM CDT "

Sunday, March 29, 2009

Sheila Bair, the FDIC’s chairman, indicated this week that banks would be given a nudge.

TO BE NOTED: From The Economist:

"America's toxic-asset plan

Dr Geithner's bank rehab
Mar 26th 2009 | NEW YORK
From The Economist print edition


There should be no shortage of buyers for American banks’ rotten assets, thanks to generous subsidies. Sellers will be harder to entice

AP
AP


ONE way to treat a recovering drug addict is to force him to go through cold turkey. Another is to prescribe him a substitute for the original poison, such as methadone. America’s long-awaited effort to relieve banks of troubled assets leans towards the second approach, aiming to entice private buyers by offering the same supercharged leverage that coursed through the veins of the financial system during the credit boom. Paradoxically, at a time when the private sector is furiously cutting back on debt, the government sees the copious provision of cheap financing as the best way to loosen up the market for illiquid debt.

The public-private partnership announced on March 23rd marks a revival of sorts for the asset-buying component of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a $700 billion rescue fund created last October which was quickly refashioned into a bank-recapitalisation vehicle. This time, however, the buyers will be money managers and insurers, not the government, though they will have plenty of help, through co-investment by the Treasury, cheap loans from the Federal Reserve and guarantees from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). For every private dollar invested, the taxpayer will provide a matching dollar of equity and up to $12 of other financing. Investors can walk away from their debts if a deal loses money.

In theory, private buyers, bidding against each other, should be better than the government at determining the real value of assets. But some economists have denounced the plan as a disguised subsidy posing as a market solution. The taxpayer is on the hook for most of the losses but gets only half of the profits.

Mr Geithner sees this as a price worth paying to unclog banks’ balance-sheets. And this is a cost that America has swallowed before to get out of trouble. Like the new plan, the Resolution Trust Corporation, an entity set up to resolve the savings-and-loan crisis, used auctions and government co-investment to attract buyers. Some of them made fortunes, but the mechanism helped the market to clear and was deemed a success.

This time, too, the sweet terms have piqued the interest of big fund managers, such as BlackRock and PIMCO. The biggest obstacle to their participation is no longer financial risk but the political sort, thanks to the bonus frenzy over American International Group (AIG). The Obama administration may have toned down its Wall Street-bashing, and Congress is rethinking its plan to tax bonuses at up to 90%. But many still worry that they could become a target if they reap big windfalls. Some fear that low-cost leverage might tempt buyers to overpay. Barclays Capital thinks it could lift market prices by 10-20%. The Treasury argues that these prices are artificially depressed because of illiquidity, though more pessimistic types suspect that they merely reflect future losses. Such concerns explain why, although stockmarkets leapt when the plan was announced, credit markets—generally a more reliable barometer—reacted less enthusiastically. Indices linked to risky mortgages remained near record lows.

If the plan falls flat, however, it is more likely to be because of a lack of sellers. Many banks are still holding assets, particularly whole loans, at values far above their market price because, under accrual accounting, losses can be booked over several years (see article). Even with government help, bids may not be high enough to tempt banks to deal, since any price below the carrying value would force them to take a write-down and deplete precious capital.

An example of this problem is adjustable-rate mortgages. Wells Fargo has written its portfolio (largely inherited from the acquisition of Wachovia) down to around 70 cents on the dollar. But the market price is half that. With leverage, a buyer might be prepared to pay close to its estimated “economic value” if held to maturity. But this is only perhaps 60 cents. Why sell now, and take an immediate ten-cent hit, when you can spread out the pain by holding on to the loans?

This problem is less acute in mortgage-backed securities, which holders of all stripes have been more willing to write down. Indeed, those banks, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, that have been most assiduous in marking to market expect to be able to sell some of their holdings for a higher price, boosting their bottom line. They may use these gains to repay TARP investments: Goldman is reportedly keen to pay back its $10 billion as early as next month.

The key to encouraging selling could be the “stress tests” being conducted on the 19 largest banks, which are due to conclude in late April. Regulators might use these to force over-optimistic banks to write loans down to levels at which they would find takers in “shotgun sales”, in the process topping them up with fresh capital in return for a bigger government stake. Sheila Bair, the FDIC’s chairman, indicated this week that banks would be given a nudge.

Still, some fear that the plan may not be big enough. Firepower of up to $1 trillion may sound a lot, but much more than that amount is in danger of souring in America as consumer credit deteriorates and more companies default. With little chance of wringing more bail-out money from Congress, barring a stunning change of mood, the new plan could hit a funding wall.

To date, just under half of the TARP’s $700 billion has been disbursed. Add in the toxic-asset plan, and the total climbs to as much as $608 billion. With large dollops needed to plug banks’ capital holes once the stress tests are completed, and other industries clamouring for help, the remaining $92 billion may fall short of what is required. One hope of topping up the pot may lie in an expansion of the FDIC’s emergency credit line, from $30 billion to as much as $500 billion, though that would require congressional approval.

So Mr Geithner faces hard choices. He will desperately want the new plan to succeed, not least because its failure could unseat him. He is already reeling from criticism that he was slow to respond to the AIG handouts. Now, at least, he has provided a detailed scheme, even if there is still devil in the details. America can claim to be tackling its troubled assets.

Whether it has picked the right approach is another matter. The alternative chosen by Britain, to leave the assets in place and insure them for a fee, has many proponents—indeed, America did just that with the worst assets of Citigroup and Bank of America, but rejected it as a system-wide solution. Others continue to push the nationalise-and-recapitalise option, though this remains politically unpalatable in America. World leaders must hope that, in banking as in narcotics, there are numerous paths to rehabilitation."