"to control its price by buying and selling blocks of shares on the open market."

An alternative to Bagehot's Principles from the FT:

"By Roger E.A Farmer

The US recession that began in December 2007 resulted in 403,000 lost jobs in September, 320,000 in October and 533,000 jobs in November. Projections for 2009 are ominous( BUT THEY ARE PROJECTIONS ).

The global financial system is undergoing a meltdown that has not been seen since the 1930s and nobody seems to know what to do about it. How did we get to this point and how can we move forward?

Since world war two, economic policy in most western democracies has been based on Keynesian economics.( I WOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE WELFARE STATES, WHICH ARE GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE SECTOR HYBRIDS. )

But although policy makers still rely on Keynes’ ideas, academics gave up on his theories 40 years ago and went back to classical economics( THEY ARE BOTH RELEVANT AND USEFUL. THERE'S NO NEED FOR A CHOICE BETWEEN THE TWO. ): Keynesian theory( THAT WHAT IT IS: A THEORY ) could not explain how unemployment and inflation can coincide. The result has been 40 years of disconnect in which policy makers are tinkering with the engine without a manual( SILLY ANALOGY ).

The US stock market has lost 40 per cent in the past three months and this is a good performance by the standards of many global markets.

In classical economics, the prices of stocks are determined by fundamentals and the fundamentals of the economy are sound. The US had the same stock of factories and machines in August that it had in July and the US workforce has not been afflicted by a sudden attack of contagious laziness. Although Keynes didn’t manage to work out all of the details of his theory he was right on one point: In the real world; psychology matters for the behaviour of markets!( WHICH IS WHAT I CALL A HUMAN AGENCY EXPLANATION )

When households believe that assets are not worth much, they spend less; unemployment increases and the belief becomes self-fulfilling( THIS IS TRUE. BELIEFS INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR. ). This is why households and firms are not spending today; they are forecasting further falls in asset prices and there is a real danger that these gloomy forecasts may turn out to be correct( SEE THE RECENT NEWS N ECONOMICS POST ).

We have seen economies stagnate for a decade or more in the past – the UK in the 1920s, the US in the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s – and it would be presumptuous to think that this cannot happen again when the existing dominant paradigm says that it could not happen in the first place( CHEAP SHOT ).

Classical economists argue that falling wages will restore equilibrium; but this is based on the belief that the labour market works like an auction in which employment is determined by demand and supply.( THE MODEL IS OF SOME USE. HERE, IT SHOWS THAT EMPLOYER'S HAVE BEEN PROACTIVELY LAYING OFF WORKERS WHILE DEMAND REMAINS HIGHER THAN THEY ARE ASSUMING. )

It ignores the very real frictions( TRUE. IT'S SIMPLY A MORE OR LESS USEFUL MODEL. NOT REALITY. ) involved in searching for a job by both households and firms that can lead to many possible equilibrium employment levels just as Keynes argued in the General Theory.

For much of the post-war period, the US Federal Reserve has been relatively successful at combating recessions by lowering the interest rate to stimulate aggregate demand. The policy was unavailable in the 1930s because the interest rate on treasury securities was already near zero, just as it is today( ZIRP ). It is this fact( ONE OF THE ONLY ONES, AND EVEN IT IS AN ABSTRACTION FROM THE REALITY AND CONTEXT OF THE TIME. ) that makes the current crisis more like the Great Depression than any other of the post-war recessions.

So where do we go from here? The only actor large enough to restore confidence in the US market is the US government( UNFORTUNATELY, I AGREE. AND THAT IS ITS JOB. ). The current policy of quantitative easing by the Fed is a move in the right direction but it does not, as yet( OK ), go nearly far enough.

It is time for a greatly increased role for monetary policy through direct intervention of central banks in world stock markets to prevent bubbles and crashes( IMPLEMENT BAGEHOT'S PRINCIPLES ). Central banks control interest rates by buying and selling securities on the open market( NO ).

A logical extension of this idea is to pick an indexed basket of securities: one candidate in the US might be the S&P 500, and to control its price by buying and selling blocks of shares on the open market.( A VERY BAD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT )

Even the credible announcement that a policy of this kind was being considered should be enough to boost( SCARE ) the markets and restore consumer and investor confidence in the real economy( I DON'T AGREE ).

Critics will argue that this policy is dangerous socialist meddling( NO. IT'S BAD POLICY. ). But I am not arguing that the government should pick winners and losers( ACTUALLY, IT WILL HAVE A SLIGHT EFFECT ON THAT I'M AFRAID. ): only that it should stabilise( FIX THE PRICE ) a broad basket of stocks.

This policy would still allow poorly run firms to fail but it would not allow all firms to fail at the same time( BUT WE MIGHT HAVE LESS FIRMS. ). Although the free market is very good at deciding how many left and right shoes to produce( TRUE ), it cannot prevent systemic risk( BANK OR CALLING RUNS ) that arises from the psychology of herd behaviour( I AGREE THAT THE FEAR AND AVERSION TO RISK AND ACCOMPANYING FLIGHT TO SAFETY ARE SUCH BEHAVIOR. ). This is a job for Uncle Sam.( BY IMPLEMENTING BAGEHOT'S PRINCIPLES. ACTUALLY, FDIC INSURANCE HAS HELPED STOP BANK RUNS. BAGEHOT'S PRINCIPLES OFFER SIMILAR AID IN PREVENTING CALLING RUNS. THIS IDEA IS SIMPLY TOO BLUNT AN INSTRUMENT. )

Prof Roger E. A. Farmer is vice chair for graduate studies in the department of economics at the University of California Los Angeles and the author of two forthcoming books on economics: Expectations, Employment and Prices and How the Economy Works and How to Fix it When it Doesn’t"

"But desperate times lead to desperate actions by desperate policy makers."

Roubini on ZIRP:

"The Fed decision to cut the Fed Funds range to 0%-0.25% has formalized the fact that, over the last month, the Fed had already moved to a zero-interest-rate policy, or ZIRP, and started a policy of quantitative easing (QE) as its balance sheet has surged over the last few months from $800 billion to over $2 trillion.

The Fed is now undertaking even more unorthodox policy actions. These actions are occurring while the U.S. and the global economy are at risk of a protracted bout of "stag-deflation" (stagnation and deflation).

While it is now fashionable to talk about such deflationary risks (and the latest U.S. Consumer Price Index figures confirm that we are entering into deflation ) some of us were worrying about the coming deflation well before the mainstream--concerned with short-run and unsustainable increases in commodity prices--discovered the deflationary risks in the global economy.

It was clear to those who saw, early on, the risks of a severe U.S. and global recession, that deflationary rather than inflationary pressures would emerge alongside a slack in goods, labor and commodity markets. Welcome to the world of stag-deflation or, as Paul Krugman would put it, the world of "depression economics."

So what is the outlook for 2009? And what is the likely policy response to the risks of a global stag-deflation?

The outlook for the U.S. and the global economy is now very bleak and getting worse as the global economy experiences its worst recession in decades. In the U.S., recession started last December and will last at least 24 months until next December--the longest and deepest U.S. recession since World War II, with the cumulative fall in gross domestic product possibly exceeding 5%.

In comparison, the last two recessions in 1990-91 and 2001 lasted only eight months each and the cumulative fall in GDP was only 1.3% and 0.4%, respectively. There is also a risk that this deep and protracted U-shaped recession (the mainstream consensus view of a V-shaped short and shallow recession is now out the window) may morph into a more severe Japanese style L-shaped recession unless aggressive fiscal policy and recapitalization of the financial system is enacted.

The recession in other advanced economies (the euro zone, the U.K., other European economies, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) started in the second quarter of this year, before the financial turmoil in September and October further aggravated the global credit crunch. This contraction has become even more severe since then. I don’t expect growth in the advanced economies to recover before the end of 2009.

There is now also the beginning of a hard landing (growth well below potential) in emerging markets as the recession in advanced economies, falling commodity prices and capital flight all take their toll on growth.

Indeed, the world should expect a recession (growth in the -1 to -2% range) in Russia and a near recession (growth close to zero) in Brazil next year, owing to low commodity prices. There will also be a very sharp slowdown in China and India that will be the equivalent of a hard landing for these countries. In China the latest figures for electricity use, exports and imports suggest that the economy is already close to the hard landing scenario of a growth rate of 5%. The deceleration of growth in China is much more rapid than expected.

Other emerging markets in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe will not fare better and some may experience full-fledged financial crises. More than a dozen emerging-market economies now face severe financial pressures: Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine in Europe; Indonesia, South Korea and Pakistan in Asia; and Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador (a country that has just defaulted on its sovereign debt) in Latin America.

What is the policy response in the U.S. and other countries to this risk of a global stag-deflation?

The Fed decision to cut the target for the Fed Funds rate to the 0% to 0.25% range is just underwriting what was already obvious and happening in reality: While the target Fed Funds was until Tuesday still 1%, in the last few weeks--following the massive increase in liquidity by the Fed--the actual Fed Funds was already trading at a level literally close to 0%.

So the Fed just formalized what had already been happening for weeks now, i.e., that the Fed Funds rate was already zero and that the Fed had already moved to quantitative and qualitative easing (QE) in the form of a massive increase in the monetary base and aggressive use of monetary policy to reduce short-term and long-term market rates that are stubbornly high in a sign that the credit crunch is severe and worsening.

I predicted early in 2008 that the Fed Funds rate "would be closer to 0% than to 1%" in the midst of a severe recession. Now, 12 months into this severe recession--a recession that will last at least another 12 months (if not, as is possible, much longer)--the Fed Funds rate is already down to 0% (the beginning of the zero-interest-rate-policy, or ZIRP, for the U.S.) and the Fed has moved into uncharted unorthodox monetary policy as a severe stag-deflation is taking place.

And, as predicted by me over a month ago, the Fed is now committed to keep the Fed Funds rate close to zero for a long time (as a way to push lower long term Treasury yields); purchasing agency debt and agency MBS in massive amounts; and even considering purchasing long-term Treasuries as a way to push lower long-term government bond yields that are already falling sharply.

More aggressive policy actions may be undertaken by the Fed as a severe credit crunch shows no signs of relenting. In a 2002 speech on deflation, Ben Bernanke spoke even of helicopter drops of money, monetizing fiscal deficits and even buying equities.

The latter actions have already been partially undertaken: The Fed is effectively already monetizing U.S. fiscal deficits as the purchase of markets assets is financed with the Fed printing presses rather than the TARP program. And now, with the Fed considering the purchase of long-term Treasuries, such monetization of deficits will be made more formal.

Also, since the TARP has been turned into a program to recapitalize financial institutions (and thus boost their capital and market value), the U.S. has already effectively intervened indirectly in the equity market (by partially nationalizing a good part of the financial system). Once the Fed starts to buy the long-term Treasuries financing the TARP program, this indirect Fed purchase of U.S. equities will be even clearer.

While Fed actions to reduce mortgage rates--via purchases of agency debt and agency MBS--are partially successful as long-term mortgage rates are falling, most of the Fed purchases of private assets have been so far limited to very high-grade securities.

Thus, the gap between the yield on high-grade commercial paper purchased by the Fed and the one that the Fed is not purchasing is sharply rising; ditto for the gap between agency MBS and private label MBS. Also, while long-term Treasury yields are sharply falling, the spread of corporate bonds--both high-yield and high-grade--relative to Treasuries remains huge as a sign of a severe credit crunch.

Thus, as a next step, the Fed may be soon forced to walk down the credit curve and start buying private short-term and long-term securities with lower credit ratings. That would mean the Fed will take on even more credit risk than it is already taking on today while purchasing illiquid private assets. But desperate times lead to desperate actions by desperate policy makers."

This post seemed to be simply a list of what's happening. Not much to disagree with. As for the predictions, I've no idea.

"But if I’m right (or London Banker, or Tim Duy, or Stephanie Pomboy) things could be considerably ugly as the situation proves too big for the Fed"

David Merkel on The Aleph Blog with a list:

"1) There are firsts for everything. Americans paid down debt for the first time, according to a Federal Reserve Study that started in 1952. America has always been a pro-debt and pro-debtor nation( SPENDER NATION ). It goes all the way back to the Pilgrims, who paid back the merchant adventurers who funded them at a rate of nearly 40%/yr over a 15-20 year period. But, the Pilgrims did extinguish the debt. Us, well, I’m amazed at the decrease, but we need more of that to restore normalcy to financial institutions.

2) Dropping to 45%, though, is the amount of aggregate home value funded by equity. With the decline in housing values, the fall in the ratio was inevitable. The low ratio puts downward pressure on home prices, because it means that more homes are underwater ( IT STILL HAS A GOOD SIDE ). Perverse, huh?

3) It’s a long interview, but Eric Hovde (my former boss) has a lot of important things to say regarding the financial sector. Few hedge funds focused on financials remained bearish on the sector, but Hovde’s funds survived to 2007-2008 where his bets paid off.

4) Is there a Treasury bubble? Yes, but it may persist for a while because of panic, central bank buying, buying from pension funds and endowments, mortgage hedging, and more( TRUE ).

5) Now these same low yields whack Treasury money funds. How many will close? How many will cut fees? How many will break the buck, and credit negative interest? An unintended consequence of monetary policy. Another unintended consequence reduces liquidity in the repo markets. Yet another unintended consequence is the reduction in investment from Japan and other nations that don’t want to hold dollars at low rates( WHO KNOWS? ).

6) Brave Ben Bernanke is fighting the Depression. If his theories are right( I AGREE WITH BERNANKE ) (and mine wrong), if he succeeds, he will face a difficult challenge in collapsing the Fed’s balance sheet as inflation re-emerges, without taking the wind out of the economy ( TRUE ). But if I’m right (or London Banker, or Tim Duy, or Stephanie Pomboy) things could be considerably ugly as the situation proves too big for the Fed and the US Government to handle( TRUE ).

7) Inflation is the lesser evil at this point.( I AGREE ) It would raise the value of collateral over the value of the loans, dealing purchasing power losses to those that made the bad loans, but not nominal losses.

8 ) I have said before that the Fed and Treasury are making it up as they go( TOO MUCH ), and Elizabeth Warren now confirms it for the Treasury. My Dad (turned 79 yesterday) used to say, “The hurrier I go, the behinder I get.” So it is for the TARP bailout( A HYBRID ). Policy made hastily rarely works. Spend more time, get it right. The market won’t die as you work it out.

9) But will AIG die, or the automakers?

• Sales are slow for assets at AIG. ( THEY WILL BE. BUYERS CAN TAKE THEIR TIME ) (no surprise valuations are crushed, and all likely buyers face lower P/Es and higher debt costs.)
• And who knows where the writeoffs end? As I said long before the failure of AIG, don’t trust the financial statements ( TRUE ). The palce was too complex, and the culture of fear inhibited objective financial reporting.
• GM’s suppliers are seeking cash. Just one of the costs of financial stress.( WOULDN'T YOU )
  
• Suppliers worry over a lack of demand if the automakers fail. They should retool for Japanese and European automakers. ( MAYBE )
  
• From Credit Slips, the important idea is that without a good business plan the automakers are toast anyway. I predict they will be back hat in hand in half a year even with a bailout( THEN WE CAN LET THEM FAIL ).
• A GM bankruptcy would take a long time, and a prepack would not get done before the cash runs out. Maybe, but I would still take it through bankruptcy, with the US Government as the DIP lender. ( THE BAILOUT NEEDS TO BE SEEN AS JUST THAT, BOTH FOR SOCIAL REASONS DEALING WITH PERCEPTIONS OF FINANCIAL TYPES BEING THE ONLY ONES SAVED, AND THE GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES ARE ESSENTIAL TO GETTING OUT OF THIS . THAT'S WHY INVESTORS ARE FLEEING AGENCIES FOR TRASURIES )
  

10) Even VCs are looking at the survivability of their portfolio holdings. Who can survive and become cash-flow positive in a tough environment. Who needs little additional funds?

11) Leveraged loans are attractive, but it is a situation of too many loans with too few native buyers. Watch the loan covenants, so that you can get good recoveries in a default. If you are an institutional investor, this is a place to play now that will deliver reliable returns net of defaults. For retail investors, the closed end funds typically employ too much leverage — it is possible that one could collapse before this crisis is over.

12) Residential mortgages continue to weaken along with property prices. Two examples: Alt-A loans and second mortgages.

13) I have a lot of respect for Dan Fuss. This is a tough time for anyone taking credit risk. That said, it could be a good time to take on credit risk now, if you have fresh money to deploy.

14) Two views of the crisis: one that focuses on structured finance, particularly CDOs, and one that focuses on macroeconomics. I favor the latter, but both have good things to say.

15) Michael Pettis is one of my favorite bloggers. He notes the weakness in China, and notes that the current economic situation is ripe for trade disputes. ( I'VE BLOGGED ABOUT THIS POST )

16) You can give the banks funds, but you can’t make them lend. Would you lend if you didn’t have a lot of creditworthy borrowers? ( YOU CAN MAKE THEM LEND )

17) The export boom is dead, for now. Fortunately, imports are falling faster, so the current account deficit is falling.

18) I blinked when I saw this Wall Street Journal Op-Ed. Sorry, but the secret to changing the residential real estate market is not lowering interest rates( IT'S A WAY THAT THEY CAN BE SEEN AS HELPING HOME OWNERS ), but writing-off portions of loan balances. Most delinquents can’t make even reduced payments, half re-default, and can’t refinance because the property is underwater. Yes, I know that the government is pressing to have Fannie and Freddie suck down more losses by letting underwater loans refinance, but if you’re going to do that, why not be more explicit and let the losses be realized today by resetting the loan’s principal balance to 80% of the property value, and giving the GSE a property appreciation right on any growth in the home value on sale, of say 150% of the amount written down?( THAT'S A POSSIBLE SOLUTION )

19) On commercial property, when do you extend on a loan vs foreclosing? In CMBS, if the special servicer has no bias, or if a healthy insurer/bank holds the loan on balance sheet, you extend when you are optimistic that this is just a short-term difficulty with the property, and you think that the property owner just needs a little more time in order to refinance the loan. More cynically, extensions can occur in CMBS because the juniormost surviving class directs the special servicer to extend because it maximizes the value that they will get out of their investment, because a foreclosure will wipe out a portion of their interests, since they are in the first loss position. With a less than healthy bank or insurer, the same procedure can happen if they feel they can’t take the loss now. (I know that in a extension/modification there should be some sort of writedown, but some financial entities find ways to avoid that.)

20) Time to go bungee jumping with the US Dollar? As Bespoke pointed out, the Dollar Index has just come off its biggest 6-day loss ever. Should we expect more as the US heads into a ZIRP [zero interest rate policy], with aggressive expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet, much of which might be eventually monetized? The best thing that can be said for the US Dollar is that it is already in ZIRP-land, and much of the rest of the rest of the world is being dragged there kicking and screaming ( TRUE ). As the interest rate differentials narrow in real terms, the US Dollar should improve.( TRUE )

But, there are complicating factors. Future growth or shrinkage of the demand for capital will have an impact, as will future inflation rates. Even if the whole world is in a global ZIRP, there will still be differences in the degree of easing, and how much easing the central bank allows to leak into the money supply ( TRUE ).

This is a mess, and over the next few years, expect to see a whole new set of metrics develop in order to evaluate monetary policies and currencies ( TRUE ). For now, put your macroeconomics books on the shelf, because they won’t be useful for some time ( TRUE ).

A good post.