Friday, November 21, 2008

"The IMF said in October it expects banks around the world to need $675 billion in order to recapitalize."

What's the level of Counterparty Risk in the OTC. From Zubin Jelveh's Odd Numbers:

"In February, Barlcays estimated that if one major institution went down, there would most likely be between $36-$47 billion in losses due to counterparty risk in the credit default swap market as risk was repriced. A similar CDS study by BNP Paribas put the figure at $150 billion in potential losses.

But the repricing of risk extends just beyond the CDS market, IMF economists Miguel A. Segoviano and Manmohan Singh argue in a new working paper. Using data on banks' counterparty positions before the Bear Stearns collapse, the pair calculate the potential loss to the financial system from a repricing of risk across the entire OTC derivatives market:

in the case of a single institution failure, the total loss could be as high as $300-$400 billion depending on the [institution]; but when cascade effects are taken into account, the total loss could rise to over $1,500 billion.
And that's just the potential losses from the derivatives and not the underlying assets. The IMF said in October it expects banks around the world to need $675 billion in order to recapitalize."

Here's the paper:

"The financial market turmoil of recent months has highlighted the importance of counterparty
risk. Here, we discuss counterparty risk that may stem from the OTC derivatives markets and
attempt to assess the scope of potential cascade effects. This risk is measured by losses to the
financial system that may result via the OTC derivative contracts from the default of one or
more banks or primary broker-dealers. We then stress the importance of “netting” within the
OTC derivative contracts. Our methodology shows that, even using data from before the
worsening of the crisis in late Summer 2008, the potential cascade effects could be very
substantial. We summarize our results in the context of the stability of the banking system and
provide some policy measures that could be usefully considered by the regulators in their
discussions of current issues."

Okay. Let's go.

"In this paper we are interested in counterparty risk that may stem from the OTC derivatives
markets. The financial market turmoil of recent months has highlighted the importance of
such risk. The risk is measured by losses that may result via the OTC derivative contracts to
the financial system from the default (or fail) of one or more banks or broker dealers. Thus,
in order to quantify counterparty risk, we calculate (expected) losses absorbed by the system
under two different scenarios (described in Section II.D). For the estimation of (expected)
losses, we define (i) the exposure of the financial system to specific financial institutions
(FIs); and (ii) propose a novel methodology to estimate the probability that given that a
particular institution (counterparty) fails to deliver, other institutions in the system would
also fail to deliver."

The risk of :
1) A particular bank failing
2) If a particular banks fails, what would the fallout be

"Counterparty risk largely stems from the creditworthiness of an institution. In the context of
the financial system that includes banks, broker dealers, and other non-banking institutions
(e.g., insurers and pension funds), counterparty risk will be the cumulative loss to the
financial system from a counterparty that fails to deliver on its OTC derivative obligation.
Thus, in order to estimate the potential cumulative loss in the system, we need to quantify
two variables (i) the exposure of the financial system (EFS) to a particular institution or
institutions that would fail to deliver; and (ii) the probability that given that a particular
institution (counterparty) fails to deliver, other institutions in the system would also fail to
deliver."

I think they just said that.

"We define the exposure of the financial system to the failure of a particular counterparty as
the liabilities of a particular institution (counterparty) to others in the financial system
stemming from its OTC derivatives that have not been netted under a master netting
agreement (e.g., International Swaps and Derivatives Association) or cross margining
agreements where margin/cash is assigned and netted across product categories."

I wonder how they're going to do that.

"Notional amounts are defined as the gross nominal value of all OTC derivative deals
concluded and not yet settled on the reporting date. These amounts provide a measure of the
size of the market, but do not provide a measure of risk. Risk in derivatives stems from
various other variables including price changes, volatility, leverage and hedge ratios,
duration, liquidity, and counterparty risk."

See, I already don't like the number of variables.

'The OTC derivatives market is tailored to clients’ needs and thus goes beyond what is
available in the standardized contracts that exchanges offer. Assuming anywhere from 1-25
basis points bid/ask spread on the notional value traded (about $ 600 trillion), dealers derive a
significant income from OTC derivatives markets. Thus banks and prime brokers have a
vested interest in protecting their franchise, and therefore limit transparency and
standardization. However, if indeed the results of our scenarios are illustrative, counterparty
risk is large (and especially large where cascade effects result in more than one bank or prime
broker failing). In addition, the re-pricing risk following a counterparty failure cannot be
easily quantified. Pressure to re-hedge at such times will be enormous and perhaps
unaffordable, which could lead to unanticipated pressures on the financial system."

So, this could be really bad. I can't seem to be able to copy the graphs and such, so read it yourself.

Solutions:

1) Capital requirements across products and banks
2) A Clearing House
3) Easy to sell capital, that can be passed on
4) Standardize contracts

They all seem reasonable, but are they necessary. Maybe only 2 and 3, but 1 is advisable.

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