Monday, February 2, 2009

We can’t afford to squander money giving huge windfalls to banks and their executives, merely to preserve the illusion of private ownership.

From Paul Krugman:

"
Bailouts for Bunglers

Question: what happens if you lose vast amounts of other people’s money? Answer: you get a big gift from the federal government — but the president says some very harsh things about you before forking over the cash.

Am I being unfair? I hope so. But right now that’s what seems to be happening.

Just to be clear, I’m not talking about the Obama administration’s plan to support jobs and output with a large, temporary rise in federal spending, which is very much the right thing to do. I’m talking, instead, about the administration’s plans for a banking system rescue — plans that are shaping up as a classic exercise in “lemon socialism”: taxpayers bear the cost if things go wrong, but stockholders and executives get the benefits if things go right.

When I read recent remarks on financial policy by top Obama administration officials, I feel as if I’ve entered a time warp — as if it’s still 2005, Alan Greenspan is still the Maestro, and bankers are still heroes of capitalism.

“We have a financial system that is run by private shareholders, managed by private institutions, and we’d like to do our best to preserve that system,” says Timothy Geithner, the Treasury secretary — as he prepares to put taxpayers on the hook for that system’s immense losses.

Meanwhile, a Washington Post report based on administration sources says that Mr. Geithner and Lawrence Summers, President Obama’s top economic adviser, “think governments make poor bank managers” — as opposed, presumably, to the private-sector geniuses who managed to lose more than a trillion dollars in the space of a few years.

And this prejudice in favor of private control, even when the government is putting up all the money, seems to be warping the administration’s response to the financial crisis.

Now, something must be done to shore up the financial system. The chaos after Lehman Brothers failed showed that letting major financial institutions collapse can be very bad for the economy’s health. And a number of major institutions are dangerously close to the edge.

So banks need more capital. In normal times, banks raise capital by selling stock to private investors, who receive a share in the bank’s ownership in return. You might think, then, that if banks currently can’t or won’t raise enough capital from private investors, the government should do what a private investor would: provide capital in return for partial ownership.

But bank stocks are worth so little these days — Citigroup and Bank of America have a combined market value of only $52 billion — that the ownership wouldn’t be partial: pumping in enough taxpayer money to make the banks sound would, in effect, turn them into publicly owned enterprises.

My response to this prospect is: so? If taxpayers are footing the bill for rescuing the banks, why shouldn’t they get ownership, at least until private buyers can be found? But the Obama administration appears to be tying itself in knots to avoid this outcome.

If news reports are right, the bank rescue plan will contain two main elements: government purchases of some troubled bank assets and guarantees against losses on other assets. The guarantees would represent a big gift to bank stockholders; the purchases might not, if the price was fair — but prices would, The Financial Times reports, probably be based on “valuation models” rather than market prices, suggesting that the government would be making a big gift here, too.

And in return for what is likely to be a huge subsidy to stockholders, taxpayers will get, well, nothing.

Will there at least be limits on executive compensation, to prevent more of the rip-offs that have enraged the public? President Obama denounced Wall Street bonuses in his latest weekly address — but according to The Washington Post, “the administration is likely to refrain from imposing tougher restrictions on executive compensation at most firms receiving government aid” because “harsh limits could discourage some firms from asking for aid.” This suggests that Mr. Obama’s tough talk is just for show.

Meanwhile, Wall Street’s culture of excess seems to have been barely dented by the crisis. “Say I’m a banker and I created $30 million. I should get a part of that,” one banker told The New York Times. And if you’re a banker and you destroyed $30 billion? Uncle Sam to the rescue!

There’s more at stake here than fairness, although that matters too. Saving the economy is going to be very expensive: that $800 billion stimulus plan is probably just a down payment, and rescuing the financial system, even if it’s done right, is going to cost hundreds of billions more. We can’t afford to squander money giving huge windfalls to banks and their executives, merely to preserve the illusion of private ownership."




Me:

“We have a financial system that is run by private shareholders, managed by private institutions, and we’d like to do our best to preserve that system,” says Timothy Geithner, the Treasury secretary"

Sorry Tim, but that's not our system. We have a hybrid economy. Our version of the welfare state. In our system, bankers and investors count on government support in a crisis. With their lobbying, the buy insurance from the government. They've been calling it in.

TARP failed because it was a hybrid. The government and banks did not and do not have the same aims. Hence, a costly mess.

We must nationalize for moral hazard. Banks fear, loathe, despise, and hoard cash, that's right, actually hoard cash to avoid nationalization. Case closed on moral hazard.

Then we can throw the banks back into the private realm ASAP. Along with a healthy dose of moral hazard.

Don the libertarian Democrat

— Don, Tacoma, WA

Sunday, February 1, 2009

Progress on banking can be swift and the relevant metrics are straightforward - are the big banks broken up and placed under new, more effective own

From Simon Johnson:

"Rahm’s Doctrine And Breaking Up The Banks

with one comment

According to David Leonhardt, writing in today’s New York Times magazine,

TWO WEEKS AFTER THE ELECTION, Rahm Emanuel, Obama’s chief of staff, appeared before an audience of business executives and laid out an idea that Lawrence H. Summers, Obama’s top economic adviser, later described to me as Rahm’s Doctrine. “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste,” Emanuel said. “What I mean by that is that it’s an opportunity to do things you could not do before.” (Links in the quote are from the on-line original.)

Leonhardt explains how this Doctrine can be applied to issues ranging from health care costs to education, and some of this is already apparent in the fiscal stimulus details currently before Congress.

Can the same approach also guide actions regarding our deeply broken and broke financial system? There are three possible answers.

1. No. If you support this view, you presumably think (a) there are no powerful vested interests on Wall Street, (b) these vested interests are not a first order reason why we are in so much trouble, (c) these same interests are doing a good job leading us towards economic recovery. My guess is that this is currently the view of only a small minority; perhaps it is limited just to people who received large TARP-funded bonuses.

2. Yes in principle, but the situation is now so dire that we really don’t have the opportunity. In this view, the Wall Street interests are a problem, but we need to get credit flowing again as fast as possible, and this requires being nice to banks and bankers. If you think that maintaining or increasing the amount of nominal credit in the economy is the number one issue (e.g., for February), then this view may have some validity. But if credit is falling in part because creditworthy people don’t want to borrow as much as before and because desired savings are increasing almost everywhere in the world, then the case is weaker. Most likely, we have some time to sort out the banking system properly.

3. Yes, but how? Members of the incoming Administration have spent years thinking ahead about controlling health care costs and reforming education; no one really anticipated there would be an opportunity - let alone a potential need - to restructure the financial industry. Perhaps we should leave this to G20 reregulation, meshing with the Dodd-Frank legislative agenda at the national level? This might be part of the answer, but it doesn’t seem to match other proactive uses of Rahm’s Doctrine or the scale of the financial catastrophe.

Recent prominent actions on Wall Street - excessive risk taking, pervasive mismanagement, failure to take responsibility, mind-boggling bonus behavior - all point to a deeper underlying problem: no real owners. Large banks operate on the fundamental principle that it is all, “other people’s money.”

So it has been and so it is - except now it is very much taxpayer money, from the Treasury and from the Fed, that keeps large banks alive. In essence, the government is already the primary provider of capital to this part of the banking industry, i.e., we are in some fundamental sense already the owners, and if we provide more capital or insure/purchase more bad assets then we really own the store. (If anyone from a large bank would like to do without taxpayer support at this stage, please step forward.)

What should we do with our ownership rights? We will, no doubt, attempt to exercise greater control over executive compensation and bonuses - and the industry, no doubt, will evade the spirit of these controls quite effectively. We might impose some other symbolic restraints over corporate jets and the like, but none of this will be meaningful.

The only real way to apply Rahm’s Doctrine is to break the overly powerful vested interests in this part of the economy, and that means to break up the banks. The government needs to sell its effective control rights over large banks to private investors - providing them with at least temporary permission to become concentrated owners. Antitrust provisions must ensure that the large banks are dismantled in this process. Whether the executives stay or go is a matter for the new owners to decide. (For an example of how to organize the technical details of acquiring and disposing of government ownership, see our previous suggestions; there are other ways to do this that would also be quite straightforward.)

One pushback response to this proposal is: it’s too different, too risky, and there’s a good reason we’ve never been able to do this before. Fortunately, we have a serious crisis and Rahm’s Doctrine is in effect. And, really, it’s just an application to the US context of what other well-run countries have done when faced by a collective breakdown of bank executive competence.

Progress on the healthcare and education fronts will take many years, and the right way to measure success may well prove controversial. Progress on banking can be swift and the relevant metrics are straightforward - are the big banks broken up and placed under new, more effective ownership? And does the taxpayer finally get some upside?

Written by Simon Johnson

February 1, 2009 at 9:21 pm

Posted in Commentary

Tagged with "

Moi:

I agree with your point, but not your solution. We need to nationalize some of these banks. Why? For moral hazard. The thing that bankers fear most, that gets them steamed, and causes them to hoard money, is fear of nationalization. Anything less than that they accept as the price of salvation. In fact, the banking lobby believes they have bought and paid for this salvation through lobbying. I believe, contrary to you, that they believe that, so far, they are winning, given how atrociously, corruptly, and incompetently, that they have behaved. They must believe they have divine help.

Witness the various forms of corruption underlying the current global financial crisis that started in the U.S.

From Forbes, via Jesse:

"Corruption
Corruption And The Global Financial Crisis
Daniel Kaufmann 01.27.09, 2:58 PM ET

It would be very convenient to start this article by stating that corruption is a challenge mainly for public officials in developing countries and that it is unrelated to the current global crisis.

I also wish I could claim that corruption has declined worldwide as a result of the global anti-corruption and awareness-raising campaign, the many effective anti-corruption commissions, and the recognition that poverty and culture are the reasons why corruption prevails.

But none of it is true. For starters, corruption is not unique to developing countries, nor has it declined on average. Some developing countries, such as Chile and Botswana, exhibit lower levels of corruption than some fully industrialized nations. And countries like Colombia and Liberia have made gains in recent years, while others, such as Zimbabwe, have deteriorated. Bribery remains rife in many countries, totaling about $1 trillion globally every year.

In truth, anti corruption commissions, revised laws and awareness-raising campaigns have had limited success. Focus on petty or administrative bribery has been misplaced at the expense of high-level political corruption.

One neglected dimension of political corruption is "state capture," or just "capture." In this scenario, powerful companies (or individuals) bend the regulatory, policy and legal institutions of the nation for their private benefit. This is typically done through high-level bribery, lobbying or influence peddling.

The cost to society of bribing a bureaucrat to obtain a permit to operate a small firm pales in comparison with, say, a telecommunications conglomerate that corrupts a politician to shape the rules of the game granting it monopolistic rights, or an investment bank influencing the regulatory and oversight regime governing them.

As a country becomes industrialized, its governance and corruption challenges do not disappear. They simply morph and become more sophisticated: Transfer of a briefcase stashed with cash is less frequent.

Instead, subtler forms of capture and "legal corruption" exist: an expectation of a future job for a regulator in a lobbying firm, or a campaign contribution with strings attached. In many countries this may be legal, even if unethical. In industrialized nations undue influence is often legally exercised by powerful private interests, which in turn influence the nation's regulations, policies and laws.

This has dire consequences: Witness the various forms of corruption underlying the current global financial crisis that started in the U.S.

There are multiple causes of the financial crisis. But we can not ignore the element of "capture" in the systemic failures of oversight, regulation and disclosure in the financial sector. Concrete examples abound.

First, the way Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae spent millions of dollars lobbying some influential members of Congress in exchange for, among other things, lax capital reserve requirements for these mortgage giants.

Second, how AIG's "small" derivatives unit located in London managed to obscure its accounts, be governed by lax regulatory oversight, and take inordinate risks that effectively brought down AIG's empire of 100,000 employees in 130 countries, accelerating the global financial crisis.

Third, how giant mortgage lenders such as Countrywide Financial switched regulators so to fall under the lax oversight of the Office of Thrift Supervision, which was funded by fees paid by the regulated banks (and which also supervised AIG's derivative unit).

Fourth, how in April 2004, during a 55-minute-long meeting at the Securities and Exchange Commission, the largest investment banks persuaded the SEC to relax its regulatory stance and allow them to take on much larger amounts of debt.

Finally, Madoff's giant Ponzi scheme, some of which appears to be plain fraud, though system-wide irregularities also point to subtler forms of corruption and capture. Years ago the SEC knew that Madoff, who had served on the commission's own advisory committee, had multiple violations and was misleading it in how he managed the funds of his customers. Yet the SEC failed in unmasking the Ponzi scheme.

Consequently, the study of corruption ought to include acts that may be legal in a strict narrow sense but where the rules of the game have been bent. Would this broader view of corruption result in different corruption ratings? Absolutely.

Let's look at the U.S. Over the past few years, traditional measures of corruption, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, have placed the U.S. among the least corrupt nations in the world, currently ranking No. 18 among 180 rated countries.

In stark contrast, when in 2004 I calculated an index of "legally corrupt" manifestations (measured through the extent of undue influence through political finance and powerful firms influencing politicians and policy making), the U.S. rated in the bottom half among the 104 countries surveyed. Countries like the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Finland exhibited low levels of "legal corruption" (ranking Nos. 1 through 4, respectively). Yet the U.S. was rated 53rd, a few ranks below Italy. Chile rated 18th. Also rating better than the U.S. were countries like Botswana, Colombia and South Africa.

Corruption and capture are important causes of the crisis. But it is also urgent to face up to the consequences of "new world order." There is a rapid--unprecedented in peacetime--expansion in the role and scope of government in "market economies." This new overarching role of government, taking place in the U.S. and other large economies, is occurring at five levels.

First, the public sector is reshaping regulation; second, the government is becoming an owner of financial institutions; third, it is bailing out selected private concerns through a quick and massive infusion of funds; fourth, it is to provide almost a huge fiscal stimulus into infrastructure; and fifth, it intends to extend the social (and housing) safety net for millions of vulnerable citizens.

There are governance and corruption risks in each of these areas. Lobbyists are already at the door. These new risks are not exclusive to the U.S., but apply to other G-7 countries: Russia and China, among others. With the U.S. leading, current global estimates of disbursed and planned bailout funds approach $3 trillion, while cumulative global plans for fiscal stimulus near $2 trillion.

The new U.S. administration has stated its intention to address the challenges of transparency and accountability in its stimulus plan. The devil will be in the details. Merely creating an oversight institution will not do; system-wide reforms in incentives are required. Deep-seated transparency reforms need to be a cornerstone in the government's plan, and should apply to U.S. public agencies as well as domestic and international financial institutions. Regulations supporting effective disclosure, as well as improved audit, accounting and risk-rating standards, should be preferred to restrictive regulatory controls that block innovation and growth.

Humbly learning from other nations will also go a long way. The situation in the U.S. warrants studying other countries--for instance, Sweden and Chile, which successfully addressed their financial crises long ago. Chile also offers guidance on how to structure less corrupt and effective concessions in infrastructure, where the U.S. is a novice.

In order to restore confidence, citizens, entrepreneurs and bankers need to have renewed trust in the financial system. That way they can be persuaded that it is no longer a giant Ponzi scheme. Transparency is the key.

Daniel Kaufmann, a Chilean citizen, is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, formerly director of governance at the World Bank. Read his blog at www.thekaufmannpost.net."

Me:

Posted by Donthelibertariandemocrat | 02/02/09 12:34 AM EST
I believe that Fraud, Negligence, Fiduciary Mismanagement, and Collusion are the second most important cause of this crisis.

Sadly, people are focusing on low interest rates, too much money out there, complex investments, etc. In other words, everything but people actually committing crimes and misleading clients. This also happened in the S & L Crisis.

If we focused on human agency explanations, rather than mechanistic explanations, it would be obvious that actual individual human beings are responsible for the severity of this crisis. It is most obvious in the selling of sub-prime and clearly fraudulent mortgages.

Thank you for joining those of us who the problem. Of course, this aspect of the crisis will be ignored, leading to another outbreak fairly soon. Keep your column handy for the next time.

Don the libertarian Democrat

Joseph Arthur

Tonight's music:

Back in 2001, our proposals must have been as welcome as Banquo’s ghost at Macbeth's banquet.

From Vox:

Hyun Song Shin
31 January 2009

Today’s financial regulation is founded on the assumption that making each bank safe makes the system safe. This fallacy of composition goes a long way towards explaining how global finance became so fragile without sounding regulatory alarm bells. This column argues that mitigating the costs of financial crises necessitates taking a macroprudential perspective to complement the existing microprudential rules.

The regulatory system stands accused of having failed to provide any check or barrier against the boom-and-bust cycle in the financial system. It was largely a bystander during the build-up of leverage and the erosion of credit standards in the credit boom and has been largely powerless as the boom has turned to bust with a devastating impact on the real economy.

How did we reach this state of affairs?

It was not for want of the quantity of financial regulation, if quantity be measured in terms of thickness of the rule books. The Basel II rules for banking regulation famously generated reams of paper, all the while sapping the energy and patience of the hapless cadre of dedicated officials locked in detailed discussions on the latest bell or whistle to be attached to the rules.

Microprudential versus macroprudential perspectives

Basel II rests on the principle that the purpose of regulation is to ensure the soundness of individual institutions against the risk of loss on their assets. Of course, it is a truism that ensuring the soundness of each individual institution ensures the soundness of the system as a whole. But for this proposition to be a good prescription for policy, actions that enhance the soundness of a particular institution should promote overall stability. However, the proposition is vulnerable to the fallacy of composition. It is possible, indeed often likely, that attempts by individual institutions to remain solvent can push the system to collapse.

Fallacy of composition

Consider Figure 1 below. Bank 1 has borrowed from Bank 2. Bank 2 has other assets, as well as its loans to Bank 1. One day, Bank 2 suffers credit losses on these other loans, depleting its equity capital. The prudent course of action for Bank 2 is to reduce its overall lending, including its lending to Bank 1.

Figure 1. Prudent shedding vs a run

Figure 1

But a prudent shedding of lending by Bank 2 is a run when seen by Bank 1. Arguably, this type of run is what happened to the UK bank Northern Rock, which failed in 2007, as well as to the US securities houses Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, both of which suffered crippling runs in 2008.

In this simple setting, it is clear how misguided it would be to induce even greater recoiling from risk on the part of Bank 2 when faced with shocks. But a greater recoiling from risk is exactly what the Basel II rules have managed to hard-wire into the financial system.

Systemic implications of recoiling from risk

In the name of modernity and price-sensitive risk management, Bank 2 is encouraged to load up on exposures when measured risks are low, only to shed them as fast as it can when risks materialise, irrespective of the consequences of the rest of the system. Unfortunately, the recoiling from risk by one institution generates greater materialised risk for others. Put differently, there are pervasive externalities in the financial system. What we are witnessing now in the global financial crisis is that these externalities also extend to the real economy. The loading up and subsequent shedding of risks show up in the leverage cycle of banks, as shown by Figure 2 which shows how each major crisis in recent years has been preceded by a rapid increase in leverage of banks (Adrian and Shin, 2009).

Figure 2. US Primary Dealer Mean Leverage (June 1986 – Sept 2008)

Figure 2

Is there a better way? Pigou to the rescue

One textbook prescription to deal with externalities is to impose Pigovian taxes to internalise those externalities. For the smoky factory located next to the laundry, the externality is the pollution emitted by the factory that soils the washing laid out to dry by the laundry. In this case, calculation of marginal costs will enter into the appropriate Pigovian tax on the factory.

How far can we take the exercise of imposing Pigovian taxes to the financial context? In the abstract, we could assign a “systemic impact factor” to each entity in the financial system that attempts to gauge the extent of the spillover effects. For instance, the systemic impact factor could be calculated through the type of fixed point calculation that is used in journal citations ratings or for calculating impact weights that Google uses for ranking websites. The impact weights for journals are such that a high-impact journal receives many citations from other high-impact journals. Similarly, the rankings of websites have the feature that a high-ranking website has links that point to it from other high-ranking websites.

In the financial context, a high-impact bank is one that imposes costs on other high-impact banks (Morris and Shin, 2008).

Proposals in the Geneva Report

In practice, however, the rules governing financial regulation will need to be based on indicators that are more directly measured. The task is to find proxies for the underlying externalities that can reliably serve as the informational basis for regulation.

This year’s Geneva Report on the World Economy (Brunnermeier et al., 2009) argues for a fundamental reappraisal of the basis for financial regulation and sets out a proposal on how the existing Basel II regulations should be modified to incorporate macroprudential goals – in particular, how the existing Basel II capital requirements ought to be modified by the multiplication by a systemic impact coefficient that depends on indicators of potential spillovers.

Macroprudential indicators

Our list of indicators includes recent trends in leverage, asset growth, and the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. Each of these elements capture (albeit imperfectly) aspects of the externalities that one institution imposes on the system. At the same time, our goal is to preserve as much as possible that is good about the microprudential rationale for financial regulation. Our hope is that familiarity of the starting point (the existing Basel II framework) will make the task of re-orienting the regulatory framework appear less daunting and less wrenching in terms of implementation. But the underlying rationale for our proposals could not be more different from the Basel II rules themselves.

The Basel II process illustrates how changes in regulation are typically achieved incrementally. Even such measures as may have seemed to involve a discrete jump in the regulatory process, such as the passage of the original 1988 Basel I Accord turn out, on closer inspection, to have been largely an attempt to agree on, and to harmonise, pre-existing ‘best practices’ in the key nation states, without much overt attempt to rationalise them against fundamental principles, or underlying theory. Incremental change has the strength that it builds on accumulated wisdom. But it is possible for such an incremental, and generally reactive, process to migrate over time in wrong, or just inferior, directions. It is only with wrenching economic crises, such as the Great Depression, that there is a general willingness to review the fundamental tenets of the regulatory framework. With the global financial crisis that began in 2007, we may be experiencing another comparable shift in the collective willingness to review the foundations of regulation.

All this was known but ignored

In 2001, Jon Danielsson, Charles Goodhart, and I, together with other colleagues at the Financial Markets Group of the LSE, submitted a paper to the Basel Committee in response to a call for comments on the initial Basel II proposals. The three key planks in our argument were summarised in the executive summary in the following terms.

“The proposed regulations fail to consider the fact that risk is endogenous. Value-at-Risk can destabilise and induce crashes when they would not otherwise occur.

Heavy reliance on credit rating agencies for the standard approach to credit risk is misguided as they have been shown to provide conflicting and inconsistent forecasts of individual clients’ creditworthiness. They are unregulated and the quality of their risk estimates is largely unobservable.

Financial regulation is inherent procyclical. Our view is that this set of proposals will, overall, exacerbate this tendency significantly. In so far as the purpose of financial regulation is to reduce the likelihood of systemic crisis, these proposals will actually tend to negate, not promote this useful purpose.” (Danielsson et al. 2001)

Eight years later, these conclusions still have resonance.

Banquo’s ghost at the banquet

Back in 2001, our proposals must have been as welcome as Banquo’s ghost at Macbeth's banquet. No one likes to be told that their carefully crafted work is flawed.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 has changed everything. The proposals of the Geneva Report are aimed at achieving a more stable financial system that works more effectively in serving the workings of the real economy to promote economic prosperity. We should seize this opportunity to put financial regulation on more secure conceptual foundations.

References

Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin (2009) “Money, Liquidity and Monetary Policy” forthcoming in American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings.

Brunnermeier, Markus, Andrew Crockett, Charles Goodhart, Avinash Persaud and Hyun Song Shin (2009) “The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation” 11th Geneva Papers on the World Economy

Danielsson, Jon, Paul Embrechts, Charles Goodhart, Con Keating, Felix Muennich, Olivier Renault and Hyun Song Shin (2001) “An Academic Response to Basel II’’ Financial Market Group special paper 130, London School of Economics.

Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (2008) “Financial Regulation in a System Context” forthcoming in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity."

ME:

"Calling Runs ( Debt-Deflation )

Our current crisis started with a tsunami of foreclosures on bad loans. The effect of this tsunami was a huge loss of money that was loaned out and falling home prices. The problem was that no one knew what the extent of the foreclosures or drop in home prices would end up being. Truthfully, even as the crisis began, many people realized that the losses could be enormous. At that point, anyone who had a cash claim on the people who had loaned this money or were connected with the people who loaned this money began calling in those claims. At that point, it was simply a matter of whether there would be a Calling Run and Debt-Deflation or not. The key was to stop the run.
The problem with capital requirements or insurance as a solution to this problem is that, given how banks use money, it is conceivable that huge losses could lead to these reserves being used up. It is not clear that the uncertainty could be contained by these methods. Only a total government guarantee is able to stop a Calling Run. It must be explicit and expected. That would allow the necessary backing for a more orderly unwinding and exchanging of assets. However, this necessitates a serious and believable threat of moral hazard. For example, the seizure of the assets if the government does have to intervene in a particular case. Although it looks like a bank run, it isn't. Bank runs are insured at the level of individual investors, and, in their case, the possible losses are known. In a Calling run, although there is a lot of talk about CDS exchanges and such, it is simply not going to be possible to estimate the losses clearly, because no one can tell when or where the run ends.
All of this is in Bagehot, and I've yet to see any evidence of anyone improving on his advice.

This proposal ensures that US taxpayers, in aggregate, get what they pay for when they rescue a bank.

From Interfluidity:

So, your banking sector is basically insolvent, and your economy is teetering on the brink. No question, that's a rough situation. Never fear, Interfluidity is here. With the help of this uncredentialed blogger, you can turn your banking system around, save civilization as we know it, and still have time to do the laundry.

  1. Never, ever feed the zombies!

    Zombie banks beg for money. They are very clever. They come up with ways you can give them money while pretending not to give them money, such as guaranteeing their assets, guaranteeing new debt issues, or buying up assets at "hold to maturity" values. Just say no! A healthy financial system cannot be run by zombies. "Rescuing" insolvent banks makes about as much sense as tying string to the arms of a loved one's corpse so it can come to the dinner table as a marionette. For a while that may be comforting (or not), but pretty soon it's sure to smell really bad, and it's gonna ooze. If you think you have engineered a miraculous turnaround, you have only made matters worse. An undead bank is an abomination. It will pretend good health but hide a rot. It will afflict you, over and over and over again, with harrowing near insolvencies (cf Citibank). Dead banks must be allowed to die.

  2. Help private individuals save good banks.

    A bank is insolvent if no one will save it. Do what John Hempton recommends for a hypothetical, troubled GothamBank:

    The government could inject some capital into the bank as a temporary subordinated loan. A third party could then be appointed... to produce fair accounts for Gotham. Ten weeks should do it... The management of Gotham can go to the markets. If the management can raise [sufficient private capital to ensure the bank's viability] then the shareholders keep Gotham. Sure existing shareholders might get diluted — but at least they get to have a decent go at keeping their capital stake. If they can't or won't fund the bank in full knowledge of its position then it is nationalised.

    The government might go a step farther: It could provide loans at near-Treasury interest rates to creditworthy individuals willing to commit capital to ailing banks. Individuals who take the loans would agree to hold the bank's shares until the loan was fully paid.

    In effect, the government would help bail out tenuous banks. But it would require private citizens to certify banks' viability by putting their wealth on the line first. Investors would have to accept personal bankruptcy before taxpayers take a loss. (Of course, investors could skip the loan and put up cash if they prefer.) If investors fail to provide capital on these terms, then a bank is clearly not worth keeping alive. There can be no question that the bank is "illiquid but not insolvent", since the government has offered liquidity on generous terms to help get the deal done.

    (For the record, I view this procedure as too generous. As far as I'm concerned, banks that have extracted asset guarantees from taxpayers — yes, that means Citibank and Bank of America — have conceded their insolvency and been purchased by the state. If private capital swoops to the rescue now, the new owners will benefit from a substantial public transfer. Nevertheless, in deference to people's heebeegeebies about the government owning what it pays for, I'd put up with that if we had a fair procedure for evaluating and enforcing bank solvency going forward.)

  3. Nationalize, reorganize, privatize spin-off to taxpayers.

    Insolvent banks become wards of the state. They are nationalized. The "N-word", as Paul Krugman put it may seem un-American, but any time a US bank fails, it is taken into some form of receivership by the FDIC. Often the operations of the dead bank are quickly merged with a healthy bank so we can pretend we live in a capitalist utopia. But that doesn't change the story. The old bank is nationalized, its good assets are sold to another bank (which pays by assuming dead-bank liabilities), and the FDIC takes control of what remains. When we talk about "nationalizing", say, Citibank, we are asking nothing more than that it should be treated like Suburban Federal Savings Bank, CenterState Bank, and MagnetBank were this very weekend. There is not actually any controversy over nationalizing banks. There is controversy over nationalizing large and politically influential banks, and there is controversy over having banks operate for more than a brief period under direct control of the state.

    Obviously, banks that had Robert Rubin on their boards are entitled to no gentler treatment than Suburban Federal enjoyed this weekend. The trouble with big banks is that they are too big to be merged into someone else, but are deemed too "systemically important" to be liquidated. That means if the FDIC takes such a bank into receivership, it would have to operate under state control. Americans are legitimately nervous about this. What we need is some means by which the government could commit to restoring banks to private ownership after they are reorganized and recapitalized.

    Henry Blodget suggests we

    refloat the banks immediately, so the government is not in the business of forcing banks to make stupid loans or determining what is and isn't appropriate for people to get paid.

    But refloating is hard. If the government were to rush-sell a generously capitalized bank with a one-shot whole-company IPO, taxpayers would end up with a raw deal. No private owner would sell a large firm this way, because it would be a very dumb thing to do. (IPOs typically only offer a fraction of a firms shares, and are known to fetch poor prices. The famous IPO "pop" goes to flippers, not to the firm or its original shareholders. There's a deep literature on the phenomenon of "IPO underpricing".)

    Here's an idea. The government should commit to fully reprivatizing nationalized banks (really their sliced-up and reorganized successors) within a year of taking a bank into receivership. But rather than selling the reorganized banks, the government should structure the divestitures as spin-offs. The government should distribute equal numbers of shares to every adult US citizen. Individuals could decide whether to hold the shares or sell them. The new banks would be publicly listed, so they'd quickly have frenetic market prices like every other firm. The government would spread the transfers out over several months. (People who need immediate cash will sell their shares as soon as they get them. If everyone gets shares at the same time, motivated sellers might flood the market and end up selling at a crappy price.) To promote efficient pricing of the new banks, prior to the spin-off the government would remove hard-to-value "toxic" assets into asset management companies, which would not be privatized, but managed conventionally to maximize taxpayer value.

    This proposal ensures that US taxpayers, in aggregate, get what they pay for when they rescue a bank. It puts banks into private hands while avoiding the corruption and theft of public wealth that invariably attends privatization. It would function as a mild "stimulus" — even though no public cash would be disbursed, the distributed shares would increase consumption. (Liquidity constrained individuals would sell their shares to savers, whose cash is then mobilized to buy stuff.) Having the government recapitalize banks and then give them away might seem rough on the budget, but it's far less costly to taxpayers broadly than offering windfalls to zombie bank shareholders and management by subterfuge, which is our current practice. If the exercise were made revenue neutral by raising taxes to recoup the recapitalization cost, the whole thing would amount to a flat transfer, which is good policy anyway.


Incidentally, the Winterbug post inspired an intense comment thread. The extraordinary JKH offered a view of public finance that has tax payments as purchases of government equity, and state benefits as equity buybacks. The analogy is interesting, quite because it is imperfect. "Compare and contrast" is a fruitful exercise. The spin-off idea owes something to this perspective.

Steve Randy Waldman — Sunday February 1, 2009 at 5:27am "

Me:

Don the libertarian Democrat (mail) (www):
"The government should distribute equal numbers of shares to every adult US citizen. Individuals could decide whether to hold the shares or sell them."

I know I shouldn't be such a pessimist, but I see rampant fraud come calling. There will be funny ads saying that the shares can only be sold to X, redeemed by Y. Also, you won't be happy with who ends up owning these shares. Do they then control the banks again?

I know that it shouldn't, but it also reminds me of schemes whereby reservations were split up into parcels or shares, only to end up leaving the tribe homeless.

You'd need a massive education campaign and lots of advisers to make sure that people weren't shafted. Hell, we can't even stop mortgage renegotiation fraud going on right now!

there are funds which have easy enough to mark to market assets and where the assets are sufficiently liquid are refusing to give money back.

From John Hempton:

Blogger"John Paulson accuses his competitors of theft or fraud


I was reading Paulson Funds latest client letter (hat-tip Kedrosky). It is an enviable list of the things he got right this year. However one section jumped out at me – a hand grenade thrown at about 100 hedge funds:

Redemption policy

As a firm, we have not imposed any gates or other restrictions on clients withdrawing their assets. While we recognize the difficulties of the current environment, we think it’s a manager responsibility to raise liquidity to meet the needs of their investors. There is plenty of liquidity in the markets. Even in opaque areas of the markets such as in bank debt, mortgage backed securities and other distressed securities, we see hundreds of millions of dollars trading every day. We are especially surprised that many managers have restricted client withdrawas when: 1) the total redemptions are manageable (15-25% of AUM); 2) the managers have the cash; and 3) one of the stated reasons for restricting withdrawals is so the manager can continue to invest in new opportunities. Emphasis added.

I read this as John Paulson saying that there are funds which have easy enough to mark to market assets and where the assets are sufficiently liquid are refusing to give money back. Theft or fraud. Or maybe both. Moreover the liquidity according to Paulson is sufficient that funds almost never should have stop withdrawals – even in opaque areas of the market.

Now I guess it is up to John Paulson to name names – or perhaps some enterprising WSJ reporter can do it for us. Whatever – this is a big story.



John Hempton


Me:

Don said...

I agree with you about pricing and buying. Paulson and other investors have been buying since November when TARP looked to be out of the Toxic Asset business and the price fell. My theory was that the holders of these assets want and are waiting for government intervention of some kind. In fact, Liddy said just that. He considers AIG's money to be a bridge loan in order to avoid selling assets at a fire sale price.

I understand you to be saying that one way to avoid being caught up in a Calling Run is to say that you can't fulfill the calls. This would be fraud, and would also go some way to explain the supposed lack of liquidity in this market. If this is true, you have certainly seen a very important point.

Don the libertarian Democrat

February 2, 2009 9:49 AM

Philip Gourevitch on Reporting Genocide

True West - Pt 1

Play of the day:

Annie Lennox- Why

Afternoon tune:

have utterly underestimated the sober, changing attitude toward Israel since the Gaza attack

From Bernard Avishai:

Obama's Mission In Short

The (appropriately) laconic George Mitchell has come and gone, and the Israeli press, particularly radio, is full of knowing talk about an impending clash between Bibi Netanyahu, almost certain to be the next prime minister, and the Obama administration, mainly over settlements. There is something surreal about this: Netanyahu's lead in the polls has not really eroded, and the rightist, pro-settler coalition he will rely on to anchor his personal power in any unity government is gaining. The government is going ahead with plans to join Maale Adumim to Mount Scopus. It is as if the commentators were talking about a clash between Israel the American Reform movement over conversion.

Israelis have lived so long under American protection they have confused America's power for their own, and have utterly underestimated the sober, changing attitude toward Israel since the Gaza attack--around the world, but also in America. More about this presently. For now, a shorter, more succinct and shareble version of my double post on what Obama should be doing has been published by London's Prospect magazine. It can be read here.

1 comments:

Don said...

You have rightly seen that a major aspect of this conflict is the tension in both societies, that many fear could lead to a kind of civil war, causing the side in such a civil war to collapse, and leaving the other side standing and victorious. The outside world, on both sides, through funding, has abetted this problem.

The only solution that I can see is for the US and other meddlers or helpers, on each side, to agree on a plan and tell both sides take it or leave it. Maybe that would wake everybody up. Otherwise, at some point, people are going to simply disengage out of frustration, including the US.

Don the libertarian Democrat

By the way, I assume Israel's right to exist, as I do every other country on earth. I find debates on that topic ludicrous.

One other point: Can we solve this crisis so that people can notice that 5 million people have recently died in the Congo, 10,000 in Nigeria, 2 million in Sudan,etc.?

Whatever you call it, trickle down economics is one of the casualties of the financial crisis.

John Quiggan:

"Refuted economic doctrines #5: Trickle down

By jquiggin | February 1, 2009

The idea that policies favorable to the wealthy, such as financial deregulation and favorable tax treatment of capital income, will ultimately benefit everybody has been described, pejoratively, as ‘trickle down’ economics.

The same idea been summed up, more positively, in the aphorism ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’ attributed to John F Kennedy, and a favorite of Clinton advisers such as Gene Sperling and Robert Rubin. (It should be noted that this phrase is also used in the context of debates over free trade and over the effects of macroeconomic expansion. While it generally implies that we should focus on expanding aggregate income without too much concern over distribution, it is less sharply focused than the ‘trickle down’ pejorative.

Whatever you call it, trickle down economics is one of the casualties of the financial crisis. I’m not the first to point this out, and I’m sure I won’t be the last, but here’s a piece summing up my thoughts.

US experience during the decades of neoliberalism gives little support for this view. In the period since the economic crisis of the early 1970s, US GDP has grown strongly, and the incomes and wealth of the richest Americans has grown spectacularly.

By contrast, the gains to households in the middle of the income distribution have been much more modest. Between 1973 (the last year of the long postwar expansion) and 2007, median household income rose from $44 000 to just over $50 000, an annual rate of increase of 0.4 per cent. (More on this here and here)

Household size has decreased, mainly due to declining birth rates. The most appropriate measure of household size for the purpose of assessing living standards is the number of “equivalent adults” derived from a formula that takes account of the fact that children cost less to feed and clothe than adults and that two or more adults living together can do so more cheaply than adults in separate households. The average household contained 1.86 equivalent adults in 1974 and 1.68 equivalent adults in 2007 (my calculations on US census data). Income per equivalent adult rose at an annual rate of 0.7 per cent over this period.

For those at the bottom of the income distribution, there have been no gains at all. Unlike the situation in Australia and other countries where a poverty line is defined in relative terms, as a proportion of average income, the US has a poverty line fixed in real terms, and based on an assessment of a poverty-line standard of living undertaken in 1963.

The proportion of Americans below this fixed poverty line fell from 25 per cent in the late 1950s to 11 per cent in 1974. Since then it has fluctuated, reaching 12.5 per cent in 2007, a level that is certain to rise as a result of the financial crisis and recession now taking place. Since the poverty line has remained unchanged, this means that the incomes accruing to the poorest 10 per cent of Americans have actually fallen over the last 30 years.

Other measures yield similar conclusions. Median earnings for full-time year-round male workers have not grown since 1974. Women have done a little better, with median earnings for full-time year-round workers rising by about 0.9 per year over this period.

Overall, the main factors sustaining growth in living standards for American households outside the top 20 per cent have been an increase in the labour force participation of women and a decline in household savings. Over the period since 1999, consumption financed by borrowing against home equity has been the main factor offsetting stagnant or declining median household incomes.

Thus, in statistical terms the US offers little support to the trickle down theory. It is equally important, however, to look at how the theory is supposed to work. The general idea is that, the more highly owners of capital and highly-skilled managers are rewarded, the more productive they will be. This will lead both to the provision of goods and services at lower cost and to higher demand for the services of less-skilled workers who will therefore earn higher wages.

The financial sector is the obvious test case for this theory. Incomes in the financial sector have risen more rapidly than in any other part of the economy, and have played a major role in bidding up the incomes of senior managers and professionals in related fields such as law and accounting. According to the trickle-down theory, the growth in income accruing to the financial sector benefitted the US population as a whole in three main ways.

First, the facilitation of takeovers, mergers and buyouts by private equity firms offered the opportunity to increase the efficiency with which capital was used, and the productivity of the economy as a whole.

Second, expanded provision of credit to households allowed higher standards of living to be enjoyed, as households could ride out fluctuations in income, bring forward the benefits of future income growth, and draw on the capital gains associated with rising prices for stocks, real estate and other assets.

Finally, there is the classic ‘trickle-down’ effect in which the wealth of the financial sector generates demands for luxury goods and services of all kinds, thereby benefitting workers in general, or at least those in cities with high concentrations of financial centre activity such as London and New York.

The bubble years from the early 1990s to 2007 gave some support to all of these claims. Measured US productivity grew strongly in the 1990s, and moderately in the years after 2000. Household consumption also grew strongly, and inequality in consumption was much less than inequality in income or wealth. And, although income growth was weak for most households, rates of unemployment were low, at least by post-1970 standards for most of this period.

Very little of this is likely to survive the financial crisis. At its peak, the financial sector (finance, insurance and real estate) accounted for around 18 per cent of GDP and a much larger share of GDP growth. With professional and business services included, the total share was over 30 per cent.[1] The finance and business services sector is now contracting, and it is clear that a significant part of the output measured in the bubble years was illusory. Many investments and financial transactions made during this period have already proved disastrous, and many more seem likely to do so in coming years. In the process, the apparent productivity gains generated through the expansion of the financial sector will be lost.

The failure of the trickle-down approach has been even more severe in relation to consumer finance. The idea that increasing income inequality was unimportant when households could borrow to finance growing consumption was never defensible. The gap between income and consumption had to be filled by a massive increase in debt. With sufficiently optimistic assumptions about social mobility (that low-income households were in that state only temporarily) and asset appreciation (that the stagnation of median incomes would be offset by capital gains on houses and other investments) these increases in debt could be made to appear manageable, but once asset prices stopped rising they were shown to be unsustainable.

In the US context, these contradictions have been resolved for individual households by a massive increase in financial breakdowns. Until 2005, this mainly took the form of a steady increase in bankruptcy, to the point where Americans were more likely to go bankrupt than to get divorced. Restrictive reforms introduced at the behest of the credit card industry produced a dramatic drop in bankruptcy (in part, the lagged counterpart a massive upsurge in 2003 and 2004 as people rushed to get in under the old rules). From 2006, onwards, bankruptcy rates resumed their upward trend, reaching 1.1 million per year in 2008

This trend attracted little attention as bankruptcies were rapidly overshadowed by foreclosures on home mortgages. During the boom, when overstretched householders could normally sell at a profit and repay their debts, foreclosures were rare. From 2007 onwards, however, they increased dramatically, initially among low-income ‘subprime’ borrowers but spreading ever more broadly. 2.3 million houses were affected by foreclosure action in 2008. In hard-hit areas of California, more than 5 per cent of houses went into foreclosure in a single year

As in other respects, the longer-run implications of the crisis have yet to be fully comprehended. Even when economic activity recovers, consumer credit will be far more restricted than in past decades. As a result, there will be no escape from the implications of decades of stagnant wages for workers at the median and below.

Politically, the failure of the trickle-down theory seems likely to produce a resurgence of the class-based politics pronounced dead in the era of economic liberalism. The contrast between the enforced austerity of any recovery period, and the massive, and massively unjustified, excesses of the financial elite during the boom period, will produce a political environment where phrases like “malefactors of great wealth” no longer seem quaint and old fashioned. (Just after writing this, I Googled it, and found it as the title of a piece in Time Magazine’s Swampland by Joe Klein, among the most reliable indicators of the political zeitgeist_

fn1. Here I’m measuring the ratio of gross FBS output to gross domestic product, which is the figure most relevant to the argument. The value-added in FRB (which nets out inputs purchased by the FRB sector) is smaller, around 20 per cent, but still indicates a highly financialised economy."

And me:

  1. Don the libertarian Democrat Says:
    February 2nd, 2009 at 7:19 am

    “The general idea is that, the more highly owners of capital and highly-skilled managers are rewarded, the more productive they will be. This will lead both to the provision of goods and services at lower cost and to higher demand for the services of less-skilled workers who will therefore earn higher wages.”

    Like a lot of theories, this one has taken on a much wider meaning. In some sense, it is true that more investment leads to more jobs. Hence, if you encourage investment with tax breaks, that should lead to more jobs. It seems to me that the real question you’re asking, which is a very good one, is why the middle and lower income earners seem stagnant? Shouldn’t the standard of living be going up? As I understand most free market theories, it should.

    Of course, unlike you, I believe that we have a welfare state. Here’s a paper similar to my view:

    http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=1096

    Most likely, lobbying accounts for much of the problem. In other words, contrary to what people believe in theory, the Investor Class, say, is simply far more effective at getting policies in their favor adopted. They are not all free market, as tariffs and professional standards will often attest.

    My solution is simple: we need to focus on the problem and try whatever we can to alleviate this problem. Sometimes, lowering government requirements, based on large industries, for example, will encourage competition from smaller businesses. Michael Pollan and Barbara Kingsolver’s recent books both mention this problem, for example.

    In other words, I see the problem as political. You can call my approach class based if you’d like. I prefer to call it an approach that leads to a wealthier and more stable society. When people are wealthy enough, including the middle class and lower class, government will have far less to do. For me, there is no diminution of government power and interference that doesn’t involve the rising economic tide of the middle and lower classes. At some point along this path, we will, as Thoreau said, have the kind of government we deserve. Namely, confined to helping the truly needy, which will hopefully keep getting smaller and smaller.

Maria Callas, O Mio Babbino Caro

Morning music:

Granted the death of CDS is an exaggeration,

From Zero Hedge:

"Some More Facts About How The CDS Market Will Be Misconceived To Death

When you have the House Agriculture Committee getting involved in the regulation of the CDS market, it is only a matter of time before it is game over. When both conventional wisdom, and economists-turned-philosophers like Soros claim that credit default swaps are responsible for the downfall of western civilization, presenting any type of factual information is pretty much useless. Nonetheless, Zero Hedge will fight until the Soros-spearheaded bitter end of "efficient" markets, to prevent what is basically the scapegoating of a risk-mitigating mechanism in order to deflect the public attention from what has been a phenomenal failure in risk-management by a handful of greedy Wall Street fatcats... It is not the market that is as fault - it is the people who abused it (here's looking at you AIG).

As we have noted, the DTCC finally started releasing somewhat detailed data in November about the CDS market. Unfortunately it was too late, and it seems only 3 people in the entire world follow what is says. So let us summarize it simply: 1) the market is already on a death spiral in terms of gross notional, and 2) the net notional of outstanding CDS is woefully inadequate to protect from the upcoming default onslaught in cash bonds.

What is the difference between gross and net notional? The gross number indicates the total notional of CDS contracts without taking into consideration offsetting trades. As the bulk of CDS notional holdings are at broker dealers who (aside from now defunct prop desks) take little principal risk, most of the CDS contracts they hold are offset. This means that for any $10 million CDS in a single name or index a B/D sells to counterparty X, the B/D has to purchase an offsetting $10 million from a different counterparty Y in order to be risk neutral. And so while the two transactions result in gross notional of $20 million outstanding, the net impact is 0. As the CDS data that had been previously available (which was never that much to begin with), was all on a gross basis, it tended to substantially exaggerate the total risk exposure in the market, and might have misled financial titans such as Mr. Soros himself. And as the charts below will show, the size of the net notional CDS market is troubling - in that it may in fact be too little.

While the gross notional size of the CDS market did grow significantly in recent years, there has been a very troubling decline recently in gross amounts. From a peak size of $62 trillion in 2007, gross notional CDS size has dropped to $28 trillion, with a run-rate weekly decline of almost $1 trillion, if DTCC is to be trusted. Interestingly, the gross notional on single names is for the first time on par with the size of the comparable cash bond market, both at about $14 trillion. If one actually were to delta hedge all bonds per the agriculture department's proposal, the argument would go that the market now is in equilibrium... at least based on a gross exposure.



The decline in the gross size is troubling: the overshoot to the downside over the past 6 months is almost as large as the ramp up during the peaking of the credit bubble. Data indicates the bulk of the change is in the index and tranche components of total gross, with single name gross size declining less acutely.


Which leads to the net CDS market exposure. Another way to think of net is how the general public thinks of gross: it is the total amount of cash that would change hands if every single reference entity were to suffer an event of default with a 0% recovery. And the total amount is a paltry $2.6 trillion, at least when juxtaposed to such previously hyperbole as $50 + trillion. Additionally, as the total cash bond market is $14 trillion, one could argue that the net notional does not nearly hedge enough of the cash market in the case of spreading defaults. ZH has shown before how market values of Investment Grade and High Yield indices imply there is a blended cumulative default risk of up to 40% over the next 5 years (assuming a high 40% recovery rate), the (simplified) argument would go that of the $14 trillion in cash bonds, up to $5-6 trillion could default. This number is therefore underhedged by up to 75%: there is a total of $2.6 trillion in total net, but only $1.4 trillion net in singe name CDS (excluding indices and index tranches which are used by index correlation trading desks as trading vehicles, not hedging instruments, and would promptly collapse when defaults start to really pick up).


Zero Hedge argues that CDS has been probably the most efficient way to hedge credit risks in the past 3 years. The fact the insurance companies took Buffett's example 10 steps too far, and just kept on selling and selling protection (kinda analogous to how the U.S. is printing and printing $$$ now) assuming six sigma events would never occur, thereby exposing the entire financial system to systemic risk, is solely their mistake and the appropriate punishment should have been default. An efficient market would have eventually picked up the pieces from AIG's failure, so the course that Paulson departed on when he bailed AIG out just takes that mistake even further as it merely leverages the faulty disbelief in fat tail events. The argument goes that CDS and equity markets are self referential when gossip picks up and companies like Bear and Lehman get shorted to death as fear is rampant. There are many more pieces to this argument, but we think it is totally meritless (in Lehman's case CDS traders would not purchase protection blindly as they were worried a Bear Stearns bail-out type event would reoccur making all CDS contracts virtually worthless; the government is as much to blame for being unable to hold a consistent policy course w/r/t how to deal with bank failures). The flipside is that CDS provide the only mechanism to hedge credit risk, which at implied 40% default probabilities, will need to be hedged even more so in the future.

So what is in store? Granted the death of CDS is an exaggeration, CDS will soon move from trading Over The Counter to a centralized Clearinghouse exchange, maybe in as little as 3 months. Initially this market will support indices (HY and IG) and subsequently move to index tranches and single name CDS. The clearinghouse will eliminate counterparty risk as contracts will be netted multilaterally, not just between two entities. Dealers would face a centralized cash-rich entity: The Clearing Corp (TCC), which would be funded through initial and daily collateral postings and cash flow sweeps on mark-to-market CDS margins. The biggest benefit from this would be the sharing of losses by all counterparties in case of a systemic failure.

Once counterparty risk is removed two things will happen: basis trades will collapse and the overall CDS levels will likely spike dramatically (wider). Due to aforementioned liquidity constraints (here and here), true risk levels are captured by spreads on cash bonds, not CDS. The counterparty premium is manifested by an artificial tightening in single-name CDS vis-a-vis matched maturity bonds (the negative basis trade phenomenon), and represents anywhere between 200 and 500 bps in any reference entity. Thus once a clearinghouse is established, as long as economic fundamentals maintain their scary downward trajectory and defaults are expected to keep rising, CDS will move steadily wider until they catch up with the true risk levels as currently expressed by Z Spreads (or interpolated recovery levels on highly convex names). Bottom line: we recommend purchasing CDS outright in any name that has a marked negative basis as counterparty risk become an negligible issue."

From me:

Blogger Don said...

"Another way to think of net is how the general public thinks of gross: it is the total amount of cash that would change hands if every single reference entity were to suffer an event of default with a 0% recovery. And the total amount is a paltry $2.6 trillion, at least when juxtaposed to such previously hyperbole as $50 + trillion."

In the case of AIG, I view the chain of events as follows:
1) Tsunami of foreclosures begins, leading to gross uncertainty as to how many foreclosures there would be and how much housing prices would fall. If I'm correct, that meant that there was uncertainty in both:
A: The number of defaults
B: The amount which would be paid in the event of a default. The lower housing prices go, the more insurance there is to be paid on a foreclosure.
2) AIG was downgraded because of the uncertainty of A and B.
3) AIG had a capital call, and needed to raise money.
4) They went to the government for a bridge loan, to avoid selling assets at fire sale prices. This is what Liddy actually said in November. He did not say that he couldn't sell the assets.
The CDS and CDO problems are part of a larger Calling Run. That is, anyone who had investments with the lenders on these poor mortgages started demanding cash if they could, worrying that at some point the money might run out. The TARP plan actually hindered everything by raising the price of Toxic Assets and giving the owners of these investments the hope that the government might, somehow, provide a better deal than John Paulson. This is somewhat like the difference between the terms Buffet got and the government got on similar investments. Underneath everything, is the foreclosure tsunami, which is a Calling Run ( Debt-Deflation ). This problem will lead to some real and very large losses, no matter what insurance there is on these foreclosures. Since the foreclosures must, to some degree, offset the losses on the mortgages, it's hard for me to see them, qua insurance, as the problem. Where third parties are concerned, my understanding is that those have been working since they were marked-to-market. In that case, I'm still wondering how CDSs are causing the problem. To the extent that CDOs are, that seems a problem of liquidity, which I believe is largely induced by the holders unwillingness to absorb huge losses. My view, but I'm not an expert.

Don the libertarian Democrat

February 1, 2009 3:07 PM



Again, I don't have faith in these models and I believe agnosticism is the correct stance.

From Tyler Cowen:

"
Permanent vs. temporary increases in government consumption

Paul Krugman writes:

...he [Brad DeLong] fails to note that it’s not just wrong, it’s 180 degrees wrong: a temporary increase in government spending should have a larger impact on demand than a permanent increase, not a smaller impact.

I intend my comments as the most boring blog post I have written, so it goes beneath the fold...

Perhaps Krugman is drawing from Barro's 1981 JPE paper on government purchases, which does indeed derive the stated result, but that is no longer the dominant approach. Circa 1990, Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum note:

First, we demonstrate analytically that -- under standard assumptions spelled out in section 2 below -- the employment and output effects of permanent increases in government consumption always exceed those of temporary increases.

On pp.4-5 they explain why Barro is incomplete.

Overall I find these debates confusing. I wonder for instance if Krugman's blog example is actually comparing tax finance to debt finance, rather than temporary vs. permanent spending shocks. (Note also that Krugman is making a claim about demand or effective "stimulus" rather than output and employment, although I am taking the latter as what matter.)

Those of you with lots of time on your hands can ponder whether the "permanent vs. temporary" debates compare "$100 billion this year vs. $100 billion for each year to come" and/or "$100 billion this year vs. the present value of $100 billion spread out over time, in perpetuity," and whether all cited articles and blog posts are making exactly the same comparisons.

Results in this area usually can be modified by further assumptions. I think of this as the central paper, published in the JME 1999. Admittedly it is for a small open economy but the key result is:

Moreover, permanent increases in government expenditures have larger positive labor supply and output effects than temporary fiscal policies.

Again, I don't have faith in these models and I believe agnosticism is the correct stance. The point is not about who is wrong and who is right but rather how treacherous these analytical waters can be. Beware!

In any case there is hardly an overwhelming brief in favor of the stimulative powers of the temporary spending increase. The best case for the temporary boost is I think the public choice argument that it is better to get it over with more quickly, so as to limit corruption of the government.

Addendum: Megan McArdle adds comments on her contribution to the debate."

And I argue:

Previewing your Comment

"On pp.4-5 they explain why Barro is incomplete."

I would say less useful. The very fact that the model is being improved leads one to believe that the model is useful, but not a complete description, or even causal, of the real world. In our circumstances, it might turn out to be of limited use.

But the same can be said of the multiplier. It seems unreasonable to put so much faith in the precision of any multiplier in this situation, or to simply plug in a consumption figure which needs to be filled.

To me, both approaches seem useful, but not persuasive. The one person I agree with, Shiller, wants us to spend a massive amount of money. I agree that would work, but it could also cause serious inflation, causing us to induce another shock. As well, spending massive amounts of money can influence behavior, but that influence might not all be benign.

And that's my problem with your NY Times post: In order for behavior to be changed in a meaningful way, the influence upon it must be large and long lasting. I think that you underplay the possible social changes that could go with such a shift. They worry me more than this downturn.

Finally, the actual bill. Here was my plan:
1) $100 Billion Infrastructure Investment
2) $200 Billion Sales Tax Cut or Payroll Tax Cut
3) $100 Billion Tax Cut for Investment
4) Social Safety Net and State Aid ( $ ? )

This is different than the bill, but, if I were the Republicans, I would have asked for something similar to my plan and split the difference, for reasons of Political Economy. It would be better that we have an agreed upon plan, precisely because the social changes going forward could be so unpleasant.

Here, I echo Burke:

"All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. "

I think that Burke is someone we should keep in mind during a crisis.

if you can’t explain the propensity to hoard, then you can’t explain our current predicament.

From Free Exchange:

"Blanchard roundtable: Where economists fear to tread
Posted by:
The Economist | DELHI
Categories:
Blanchard roundtable

OLIVIER BLANCHARD provides a disturbing account of what Knightian uncertainty means for the economy; let me offer a few untutored thoughts about what it means for economics.

Economists do not, in fact, follow Knight’s work very much. The discipline shys away from his concept of uncertainty (as distinct from risk), because it is, by definition, so hard to model. If economists could model it, then so could firms and investors. The future would be calculable, if not knowable, and there would be less excuse for bewildered inaction.

Paul Samuelson once went so far as to argue that economics must surrender its pretensions to science if it cannot assume the economy is “ergodic”, which is a fancy way of saying that Fortune’s wheel will spin tomorrow much as it did today (and that tomorrow's turn of the wheel is independent of today's). To relax that assumption, Mr Samuelson has argued, is to take the subject “out of the realm of science into the realm of genuine history”.

The scientific pose has great appeal. But this crisis is reminding us again of its intellectual costs. Knightian uncertainty may be fiendishly hard to fathom, but ignoring it, as economists tend to do, makes other phenomena devilishly hard to explain. The thirst for liquidity—the sudden surge in the propensity to hoard—is one example. If risks are calculable, then investors will place their bets and roll the dice. Only if they are incalculable will they try to take their chips off the table altogether, in a desperate scramble for cash (or near-cash). As Keynes put it, “our desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the future.”

We journalists make great sport poking fun at the techniques on which financial markets have relied—the value-at-risk models with their normal distributions—much as Keynes scorned all those “pretty polite techniques, made for a well-panelled board room and a nicely regulated market”. But as economists (or as friends of economics) we have to fess up that the models that led banks astray are, fundamentally, ours—they spring from the same intellectual tradition. My suspicion, perhaps unfair, is that in recent years too much macroeconomic theory itself became “one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future.”

As Mr Blanchard’s article makes clear, if you can’t explain the propensity to hoard, then you can’t explain our current predicament. And a macroeconomics that cannot explain this crisis is hardly worthy of the name."

Me:
Paul Samuelson once went so far as to argue that economics must surrender its pretensions to science if it cannot assume the economy is “ergodic”, which is a fancy way of saying that Fortune’s wheel will spin tomorrow much as it did today (and that tomorrow's turn of the wheel is independent of today's). To relax that assumption, Mr Samuelson has argued, is to take the subject “out of the realm of science into the realm of genuine history”.

Much of economics is Correlative Explanation and Reasoning. It is not cause and effect. Math can be useful in describing relations, as long as those relations continue to hold. Where behavior is concerned, or any teleological action, you will have correlative reasoning and explanation.

The math models used are simply useful in simple ways. What is shocking is that, compared to the old practitioners of political economy, which will always be the really important realm of understanding these issues, current economists don't seem to have a philosophy of action or math that can explain their assumptions. Consequently, many spit out mechanistic explanations, or versions of dubious psychological theories like behaviorism.

The only way to explain Political Economy is through a Human Agency approach or explanation. The only way to explain hoarding is such an approach. I have found Fisher's Debt-Deflation model to be of great help, but that model also needs a more robust human agency explanation to fill it out.

One famous economist recently mocked Shiller's 'trust' as hard to measure. In saying this, he showed that he had no clear idea of what is involved in a human agency explanation, nor a clear idea of what the limitations of measurement are. It is would interesting to hear the assumptions and presuppositions underlying his basic view of human behavior, if he has one.

Incidentally, I find Bagehot to be still valuable for understanding our current crisis.
2/1/2009 4:25 PM GST