"The meaning of AAA changed after the introduction of CDOs and is different for corporate bonds and CDOs. Those are facts which an economic model should seek to explain. I have an explanation. What is your competing theory ?"
This means that implicit collusion can be maintained. That is, there is an equilibrium in which both agencies give generous ratings to new instruments and both damage their reputations when the crash comes. This is an unusual result. For a plain old cartel it is more difficult to maintain a collusive equilibrium -- a firm can profit in the short run by deviating. In this case, deviating to toughness is costly in the short run and well deviating is always costly in the long run because of the other agencies response.
So in this equilibrium, they rate sludge AAA. Then the crash comes and -- so what. They all have roughly equal amounts of egg on their faces. We can't do without credit rating agencies. They will still get as much business rating non-innovative assets as they would have if they were both tough. The new class of assets might vanish, but that was inevitable given the fact that the new assets are very risky and offer modest returns. The agencies profit from the period in which the toxic assets were issued and rated. So long as they gave similar ratings, the damage to both of their reputations won't hurt them at all.
Of course it will hurt investors who will have to do more research on their own, since they can't trust the credit ratings agencies as much as they would have been able to trust them in the world without financial innovation."
Okay. This is an answer to a question that I asked about Moody's: Namely, why should anyone trust them now?
The answer seems to be we have to, or at least trust someone who's as poor at this ratings business.
So, I asked this question:
"So in this equilibrium, they rate sludge AAA. Then the crash comes and -- so what. They all have roughly equal amounts of egg on their faces. We can't do without credit rating agencies. They will still get as much business rating non-innovative assets as they would have if they were both tough. The new class of assets might vanish, but that was inevitable given the fact that the new assets are very risky and offer modest returns. The agencies profit from the period in which the toxic assets were issued and rated. So long as they gave similar ratings, the damage to both of their reputations won't hurt them at all."
Why don't new ratings agencies, unsullied by this stupidity, start up and compete? What's the entry problem?
Here's the answer:
"Dear I forget who Why doesn't a new credit rating agency enter about now ? I sure wouldn't advise anyone to try. The reason is that a credit rating agency is only worth anything (to its shareholders) if it has a reputation better than "who is that ?". This means that there is a huge barrier to entry. I would think that a new credit rating agency would have to rate for free for years and years before anyone would pay them anything.
That is to say I think that, even now, Moody's S&P and Fitch have valuable reputations -- less valuable than they were last year but still much better than no reputation at all."
Well, if there's an impossibility of entry, then you don't need to worry.
Here's my next comment:
Here's another point from "I forget who". The only way that your explanation works, namely, as long as they're all equally awful, is if there is an impossibly high entry fee. Since that's the case, you're pretty much stuck with your list of choices, however poor. It's true that you can do your own research, but that has its problems as well. However, if they're all equally awful, at least you could try and get them to compete on fees, so that you would at least pay the least amount that you can for this product. That, I believe, is regulated.
"Wednesday, October 22, 2008
"products that later turned out to be extremely risky, and in some case, worthless. "
NY Times posted on the congressional hearings on the ratings agencies. How timely:"Members of Congress leveled sharp criticism at the major credit-rating agencies Wednesday morning, as the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing on these firms’ role in the current economic crisis.
Several lawmakers vented their frustration over what they considered to be egregious lapses at the agencies, Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.
Mark E. Souder, a Republican from Indiana, described their conduct as “gross incompetence.” Another lawmaker read from a series of instant messages, sent by employees of S&P, in which one analyst said they would rate a deal even if it were “structured by cows.”
In many cases, these ratings agencies assigned super-safe, triple-A ratings to structured products that later turned out to be extremely risky, and in some case, worthless.
These investment products, such as mortgage-backed securities, were created by financial institutions ostensibly to mitigate risk by pooling loans and selling parts of them off to investors. But many of the loans that were packaged in these securities were made to people with poor credit histories, little equity in their homes or overstated income."
Here's my comment:
“In the final few months of 2007, Moody’s downgraded more bonds than it had over the previous 19 years combined”
Interesting post on the FT by Sam Jones on Moody’s and the rating system:
“Then, on August 16 last year, after an internal revision of its ratings practices, Moody’s made an announcement that heralded the beginning of the credit crunch.”
And:
“The action was the first in a series of surprises for the credit markets. In each of the succeeding weeks, it seemed, Moody’s and the other rating agencies had more bonds to downgrade. And each set of downgrades was a convulsive shock. In the final few months of 2007, Moody’s downgraded more bonds than it had over the previous 19 years combined. Panic gripped trading floors. Titanic structured vehicles, created by banks to warehouse their “riskless” mortgage bonds, became untouchable for short-term investors. As a result, two big German banks revealed that they were within a whisker of collapse, and virtually overnight all the world’s banks stopped lending to one another.”
Please read it.
Let’s see, that was…about a year ago. Nice work
— Posted by Don the libertarian Democrat
"Friday, October 17, 2008
"In the final few months of 2007, Moody’s downgraded more bonds than it had over the previous 19 years combined"
Interesting post on the FT by Sam Jones on Moody's and the rating system:"Then, on August 16 last year, after an internal revision of its ratings practices, Moody’s made an announcement that heralded the beginning of the credit crunch."
And:
"The action was the first in a series of surprises for the credit markets. In each of the succeeding weeks, it seemed, Moody’s and the other rating agencies had more bonds to downgrade. And each set of downgrades was a convulsive shock. In the final few months of 2007, Moody’s downgraded more bonds than it had over the previous 19 years combined. Panic gripped trading floors. Titanic structured vehicles, created by banks to warehouse their “riskless” mortgage bonds, became untouchable for short-term investors. As a result, two big German banks revealed that they were within a whisker of collapse, and virtually overnight all the world’s banks stopped lending to one another."
Please read it.
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