“Give me yield, give me leverage, give me return” perfectly sums up how Wall Street bought itself close to financial ruin. JP Morgan’s William Winters didn’t just create help to create CDOs. He seems to have a way with words.
During the past few years, the Street bet – and bet big – on two theories in its quest for higher returns.
The first was that housing prices never fell. At least not on a nation-wide basis. That meant that lending against a diversified pool of housing collateral wasn’t that risky, no matter how risky the individual borrower might be.
The second was that macroeconomic – and financial – volatility had been vanquished. That, in effect, meant it was OK to try to improve returns through the use of borrowed money.
Neither assumption proved true."
Neither assumption was even reasonable for God's sake.
"It turns out that the rapid growth in CDOs stuffed with exposure to risky mortgages — including “synthetic” exposure from writing credit default swaps on bonds backed by subprime debt* — was facilitated by the broker-dealers willingness to hold more credit risk on their own balance sheets. If you have any doubts, read Gillian Tett’s reporting from over a year ago."
What isn't credible is that they didn't understand the risk. Why did they take it?
"Synthetic CDOs were composed out of CDS rather than actual bonds. Selling insurance against default on a bond has many of the same characteristics as actually owning the bond. Both are bets that pay off if nothing goes bad. If you own the bond, you get paid back in full with interest. If you sell insurance you collect the insurance premium and never have to pay out. Clever financial engineers substituted one for the other, as for a while, there was more demand for subprime exposure than actual subprime loans from investors eager for big returns (helped along by investment banks willing to take the parts of the structure that investors didn’t want on their own balance sheets) …"
If you're lending money out on risky terms, buying insurance makes sense.
Many investment banks favored CDOs that contained these credit-default swaps, because they didn’t require the purchase of securities, a process that typically took months. With credit-default swaps, a billion-dollar CDO could be assembled in weeks."
Still makes sense to me, absent overlooking the risk.
"But there was another, far more important, incentive: regulatory arbitrage.Most notably, because super-senior debt carried the triple-A tag, banks were only required to post a wafer-thin sliver of capital against these assets - even though this debt has typically offered a spread of about 10 basis points over risk-free funds. Thus, banks such as UBS and Merrill have been cramming their books with tens of billions of super-senior debt - and then booking the spread as a seemingly never-ending source of easy profit. It is not just the CDO desks that have been playing this game; treasury departments have been playing along. So have many hedge funds, including those financed by . . . er . . . the major investment banks"
Now this is just plain risky. I actually mentioned this point about trying to invest in products with less capital/collateralization as being the motive for the investment, so that blaming the investment created to fill the need is silly. If not this product, it would have been something else give:
1) A taste for risk ( It's there, we just need to explain it )
2) A taste for lower capital/collateralization requirements
"It turns out that the super-senior tranches carried a lot more risk than many thought – Combing a bunch of CDOs composed of subprime securities into a new security didn’t make the underlying risk go away. Plus these instruments were illiquid and thus hard to sell.
I never thought that (formerly) highly-rated US securities would trade at the same price as Argentine bonds just after Argentina’s default. The ultimate recovery on those bonds may end up being higher as well.
Moreover, as Gillian Tett reports, the banks themselves weren’t only holding these securities to make the securitization process work. They also liked the extra yield that they could get on something that was rated triple-A."
By many, how about the buyers.
"It took a huge amount of sophistication – or at least computing power – to produce a lot of the securities that have caused so much trouble. But sophistication doesn’t explain why so many banks were holding something with risks that they didn’t fully understand to pick up a few basis points.
And it wasn't just pure regulatory arbitrage either . Unregulated institutions seem to have been doing much the same thing -- UBS's in-house hedge fund for example."
We've also talked about the search for the Holy Grail before: namely, how to use regulations to increase risk. Let's call this The Holy Grail Principle.
"My guess is that a bunch of unsophisticated reserve managers ended up doing a lot better over the past few years than a lot of sophisticated bank treasurers. They didn’t take on as much credit risk, so they didn’t get as much yield during the good times. But they also didn’t take on the risk of large losses for a few extra basis points"Bingo!
"Of course, the bank treasurers who took on too much “holding complex securities that you cannot sell when you need to risk” generally avoided taking on much currency risk. Central banks generally avoided credit risk, but took on a ton of currency risk. The investment banks held the super-senior tranches no one else wanted; central banks have been holding the dollars no one else wants."
Banks: High credit risk, Low currency risk
Lenders of Last Resort: Low credit risk, High currency risk
Super-symmetry.
Here's my comment:
“So there you have it: in the last resort, a key reason for these record-beating losses is not a failure of ultra-complex financial strategies or esoteric models; instead it arose from a humongous, misplaced bet on a carry trade that was so simple that even a first-year economics student (or Financial Times journalist) could understand it. It is a shocking failure of common sense and risk management. So the moral, in a sense, is also a simple one: if someone offers you seemingly free money, in seemingly infinite quantities, with a soothing new name, you really ought to smell a rat. Even - or especially - if you are in the position of running a supposedly sophisticated investment bank.”
So, how come, when I keep saying this is on blogs, I keep getting the response that:
1) It’s the complexity of the investments
2) It’s too easy credit
3) It’s too much incentive
The answer is just as described. My only point is to try and understand how much implicit and explicit government guarantees went into these decisions, and to what extent the selling of these products was either fraud, negligence, or fiduciary incompetence.
But thank you for linking to that post. I’ve finally found someone I basically agree with.