Another View Of Why This Plan Will Pass

David Friedman gives an elegant analysis of why this plan will pass:

"Looking at these alternatives, it seems plausible that if the bailout has no effect either way on the condition of the economy, a politician is better off supporting it. Only if the bailout makes worse outcomes substantially more likely or if some bad outcome directly associated with the bailout occurs, such as spending 700 billion and then having lots of firms fail anyway six months later, does opposition look like an attractive long run gamble.

I have a feeling that this argument could be generalized. One ought to be able to predict at least some patterns of political outcomes by asking what policies are more likely to be followed by outcomes that look like clear evidence for or against them. The point is related to the familiar observation that one would expect politicians to design programs whose benefits are easy to see and whose costs are hard to see."

Doing nothing is not an attractive long run gamble, as I've said.